Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.330

Section 452.330 allows a just division of marital property that is unequal, particularly when one spouse has engaged in misconduct.

In Re the Marriage of Lindenfelser · filed 1980-03-04

The trial court has discretion in the division of marital property. A just division does not have to be equal. This is particularly true where one party has engaged in misconduct. ... Under §§ 452.330, RSMo 1978, and the evidence, the division was within the court’s discretion.

Section 452.330 requires a just, though not necessarily equal, division of marital property and makes the parties’ conduct during marriage a factor in that division.

Marriage of Royal v. Royal · filed 1981-05-26(1)(4)

In the performance of its statutory duties, the trial court is required to make a “just” and not necessarily equal division of the marital property, and the conduct of the parties during marriage is one of the factors to be assessed, see Pederson v. Pederson, 599 S.W.2d 51 (Mo.App.1980); Beckman v. Beckman, supra, and § 452.330.1(4), RSMo 1978.

Section 452.330 calls for a just division of marital property, which need not be equal, particularly when one spouse has engaged in misconduct.

Rasmussen v. Rasmussen · filed 1982-01-05

The guiding rule under § 452.330 is that a just division takes precedence over an equal division, particularly where one party has engaged in misconduct.

Section 452.330 calls for consideration of relevant factors in dividing marital property; a just division need not be equal, particularly when one spouse engaged in misconduct.

In Re the Marriage of Arnold · filed 1982-03-16

The findings of fact and conclusions of law show that in the disposition of property the trial court considered the factors relevant to that disposition, including the matters specifically set forth in § 452.330, RSMo 1978. ... A just division of marital property does not have to be equal and this is particularly true when one party has engaged in misconduct.

Section 452.330 requires the court to divide marital property in proportions it deems just, even when a spouse refuses to answer questions about marital misconduct.

Satterfield v. Satterfield · filed 1982-06-01

Here, however, the court was proceeding on wife’s petition. The court was required by § 452.330 RSMo. 1978 to divide the marital property. “The court ... shall divide the marital property in such proportions as the court deems just.” ... The fact that the court adopted some of husband’s suggested procedures for disposition of the marital property and denied wife maintenance does not constitute affirmative relief to him.

Section 452.330 permits a court dividing marital property to consider a spouse’s misconduct in diverting marital funds.

Dreyer v. Dreyer · filed 1983-08-23

Such misconduct may be taken into account by the trial court in awarding the marital property. Sec. 452.330 RSMo 1978.

Section 452.330 permits courts dividing marital property to consider the parties’ general conduct during the marriage, including conduct unrelated to marital property.

Butcher v. Butcher · filed 1976-10-12(1)

As to Section 452.330, the “conduct” of the parties is legislatively declared to be a “relevant” factor, and the intent could have only been to refer to general conduct of the parties during the marriage.

Section 452.330.1(4) requires courts dividing marital property to consider the parties’ conduct during the marriage among all relevant factors.

Vadnais v. Vadnais · filed 1977-08-29(1)(4)

Section 452.330.1(4) requires that in making division of marital property, the court shall consider “all relevant factors including: * * * The conduct of the parties during the marriage.” The decree demonstrates adherence to this requirement in that it recites that the division of marital property was made “after considering all relevant factors”; and upon this review the conduct of the wife does not appear any less worthy than that of the husband so as to be an element of weight in division of marital property according to the statute. The division made by the court accorded with provisions of the statute, including consideration of the conduct of the parties during the marriage, and will not be disturbed.

Section 452.330(4) makes marital misconduct a relevant factor in dividing marital property.

Smith v. Smith · filed 1977-05-31(4)

As to the consideration of marital misconduct [it is not necessary to set forth that misconduct], § 452.330(4) provides that it be considered as a relevant factor.

Section 452.330 allows a court to consider the parties’ conduct when dividing marital property, including when making an unequal division.

Marriage of Childers v. Childers · filed 1983-05-17(1)(4)

As to division of marital property by granting the wife $8,500, Section 452.330 RSMo. Supp. 1982, declares marital property shall be divided “in such proportions as the court deems just after considering all relevant factors including ... the conduct of the parties during the marriage.” ... As noted, the quoted statute allows the court in dividing marital property to consider the parties’ conduct. ... We deny husband’s contention of error in allowing wife the $8,500 lump sum award.

Section 452.330 permits marital misconduct to be considered as one factor in dividing marital property.

Dempsey v. Dempsey · filed 1980-07-15

We find that the trial court pursuant to § 452.330, RSMo 1978, considered appellant’s marital misconduct as only one factor and properly distributed the marital property.

Section 452.330.1(4) makes marital misconduct a consideration in dividing property, but misconduct does not necessarily forfeit a spouse’s equitable share.

Marriage of Marks v. Marks · filed 1981-12-03(1)(4)

Defendant was guilty of misconduct, but it was not such as to forfeit his right to an equitable share of the marital property.

Section 452.330 permits a court to consider marital misconduct when making a just, unequal division of marital property.

Gray v. Gray · filed 1983-06-21(1)(4)

While the case awards a greater distribution of marital property to wife, under the circumstances of this case, we find no abuse of discretion in the disposition of such property.

Marital misconduct is a factor in dividing marital property only when it places extra burdens on the other spouse in the marital partnership.

Fausett v. Fausett · filed 1983-10-18(1)(4)

Admittedly, the “conduct” of the parties during the marriage is one of several relevant factors to be considered in apportioning marital property. Section 452.330.1(4), supra. Marital misconduct, however, is a viable factor only when an “errant spouse’s misconduct places extra burdens on the non-errant spouse in the partnership endeavor.”

Section 452.330.1(4) permits consideration of marital conduct throughout the marriage, including conduct before the Dissolution of Marriage Act took effect.

McMillin v. McMillin · filed 1982-04-13(1)(4)

One of the factors to be considered in distributing marital property is the conduct of the parties during the marriage. § 452.330.1(4), RSMo. 1978. ... The effective date of the Dissolution of Marriage Act is not a cut-off date for evidence of marital conduct.

Section 452.330 requires courts dividing marital property to consider the parties’ conduct during the marriage; a spouse’s abuse can support a greater award to the other spouse.

Parks v. Parks · filed 1983-08-30

Under Section 452.330 RSMo. titled “Disposition of property, factors to be considered”, in dividing marital property the trial court shall consider: Each spouse’s contribution to the marital property including contribution as a homemaker, the economic circumstances of each spouse including the desirability of awarding the family home to the parent having child custody, and critically pertinent here, “[t]he conduct of the parties during the marriage”. ... Considering the husband’s conduct related above we find no abuse of discretion here.

Section 452.330 allows a court to consider a spouse’s conduct as one factor in making a just division of marital property.

Oldfield v. Oldfield · filed 1984-02-07

Although there was evidence that wife, without authority, signed husband’s name as an endorsement on some checks, there is no evidence that the court failed to consider this in its final distribution of property. In fact, this is only one of the many factors considered by the court in making a just division. § 452.330, RSMo.Supp.1982; McMillin v. McMillin, 633 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Mo.App.1982). Therefore, we rule this point against husband.

Section 452.330.1(4) makes the parties’ conduct during marriage a relevant factor in dividing marital property.

Abell v. Abell · filed 1984-11-201(4)

Section 452.330.1(4), RSMo. Supp.1983 directs that the conduct of the parties during the marriage is a relevant consideration on the issue of division of marital property.

Section 452.330 makes a spouse’s conduct during the marriage relevant to the division of marital property.

Hagenbuch v. Hagenbuch · filed 1987-04-28

That conduct is relevant and material under Sec. 452.330 RSMo 1986, to the distribution of marital property.

Section 452.330.1(4) permits a court to consider marital misconduct when dividing marital property as it deems just.

Corey v. Corey · filed 1986-06-10(1)(4)

The decree does not indicate that husband was penalized for his affair, but, even if true, the trial court has discretion to divide the marital property as it deems just and marital misconduct is a specific factor which the court may consider under § 452.330.1(4) RSMo 1978. We find no abuse of discretion.

Section 452.330.1(4) makes the parties’ conduct during marriage a factor in dividing marital property; misconduct can support an unequal division.

Woods v. Woods · filed 1986-07-15(1)(4)

The trial court stated that it had considered all the factors set forth in § 452.330, including husband’s misconduct during the marriage. Our review of the record convinces us that the division of marital property was supported by substantial evidence.

Section 452.330.1(4) requires courts dividing marital property to consider the parties’ conduct during the marriage.

Usrey v. Usrey · filed 1989-12-14(1)(4)

Section 452.330.1(4), RSMo Supp. 1988, provides that in dividing marital property the court shall consider all relevant factors including the conduct of the parties during the marriage. ... Given the record before us and the findings we have gleaned from it by implication, we are persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Jimmy such a large percentage of the marital property.

Section 452.330.1(4) permits a court to consider the spouses’ conduct during marriage when dividing marital property, along with their contributions and economic circumstances.

Klenke v. Klenke · filed 1987-12-29(1)(4)

Husband claims that the court’s focus on Section 452.330.1(4) RSMo 1986—the conduct of the parties during the marriage— rises to the level of abuse of discretion. We disagree. There was ample evidence that the trial court considered (1) the fact that wife “contributed substantially to the acquisition of marital assets by her employment outside the home” and by her contribution as spouse and homemaker; (2) the economic circumstances of each spouse, particularly the fact that husband earned 72% of the spousal income to wife’s 28%, and the desirability of awarding the family home to the wife who will house the children; and, (3) the conduct of the parties during the marriage. Section 452.330.1(1)-(4) RSMo 1986. We find no abuse of discretion.

Section 452.330.1(4) permits consideration of the parties’ conduct during marriage but does not authorize a wholly disproportionate property division to punish either spouse.

In Re Marriage of Sumner · filed 1989-08-31(1)(4)

Nevertheless, § 452.330.1(4) was never intended to authorize judicial censure of either party by means of a wholly disproportionate distribution of marital property.

Section 452.330.1(4) permits a court to consider the parties’ conduct during marriage when dividing marital property.

Tully v. Tully · filed 1991-08-06(1)(4)

Also, the trial court may consider the conduct of the parties during the marriage. § 452.330.1(4), RSMo 1986. ... Here, the trial court properly considered the husband’s contribution to the marital residence, as well as, his misconduct.

Section 452.330 requires a just and equitable division of marital property; misconduct affects the division only when it places an extra burden on the marriage.

Marriage of Hogan v. Hogan · filed 1990-09-11

Section 452.330 RSMo Cum.Supp.1989 requires the trial court to make the property division just and equitable in light of the particular circumstances of the parties and the statutory factors to be taken in consideration. ... Misconduct is only a viable factor in dividing property when the misconduct places an extra burden on the partnership endeavor. ... We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to find husband’s conduct placed undue marital burdens on wife.

Section 452.330.1 permits a court to consider marital misconduct along with the other statutory factors when dividing marital property.

In Re Marriage of Clark · filed 1990-12-26(1)

Marital misconduct is a factor the court may consider in dividing marital property. § 452.330.1. ... The court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the marital property.

Section 452.330.1(4) allows a court to consider marital misconduct when dividing property, but misconduct that causes a marriage to end does not alone deprive a spouse of a share of marital assets.

Tucker v. Tucker · filed 1991-04-09(1)(4)

The misconduct was serious and presumably caused the breakup of the marriage but that alone does not destroy the right of the wife to share in the marital assets.

Section 452.330.1 permits a court to consider a spouse’s misconduct when dividing marital property, including spending marital funds to support a new partner.

Pratt v. Pratt · filed 1991-08-20(1)

Initially we note that § 452.330.1, RSMo 1986, requires the trial court to “divide the marital property in such proportions as the court deems just after considering the relevant factors....” ... Thus, were we to determine that the property division was unequal, this misallocation of marital funds would be a justification for the inequality. However, we see no inequities in either the division of marital property or in the award of maintenance.

Section 452.330.1 permits a court to consider marital misconduct when dividing marital property.

Harding v. Harding · filed 1992-03-17(1)

It is within the court’s discretion to divide the marital property on the basis of marital misconduct, ... § 452.330.1, RSMo 1986. ... The evidence of the concealment was before the trial court, the court awarded Jamie the cost of proving parentage, and there is no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s division of property.

Spousal misconduct is one factor in dividing marital property, and the trial court determines its weight.

Myers v. Myers · filed 1992-12-10(1)(4)

Section 452.330.1(4) RSMo Cum.Supp.1991 provides that spousal misconduct is a factor to be considered in distributing the marital property. But, it is only one factor, the weight of which is to be determined by the trial court.

Section 452.330.1 allows a court to give substantial weight to marital misconduct when dividing property after considering the relevant statutory factors.

Dodson v. Dodson · filed 1995-05-09(1)

Based upon this evidence and the relevant statutory factors, this Court determines that the trial court could in its discretion consider marital misconduct a very important factor in dividing the marital property.

Section 452.330(1) permits a court to consider a spouse’s conduct during marriage when dividing marital property.

Lawrence v. Lawrence · filed 1997-02-11(1)

Section 452.330(1), RSMo 1994, sets forth the factors which the trial court may take into consideration when distributing marital property, including the “conduct of the parties during marriage.” ... This evidence permits the trial court to take the misconduct into account when dividing the marital property.

Section 452.330.1 gives trial courts considerable discretion in dividing marital property; a spouse’s affair does not require a substantially unequal division.

Marriage of Stephens v. Stephens · filed 1997-10-31(1)

The decree demonstrates the trial court took the affair into account. ... A trial court is vested with considerable discretion in dividing marital property, and an appellate court will interfere only if the division is so heavily and unduly weighted in favor of one party as to amount to an abuse of discretion.

Section 452.330.1(4) requires courts to consider the parties’ conduct when dividing marital property, but misconduct does not necessarily require an unequal division.

In Re Marriage of Tullier · filed 1999-03-17(1)(4)

Inasmuch as the trial court divided the marital property equally, this court infers the trial court concluded both parties misbehaved and neither’s misdeeds, measured against the other’s, were excessive enough to warrant an unequal division of marital property.

Section 452.330.1 permits a court to consider the parties’ conduct during marriage when dividing marital property.

Schwartzkopf v. Schwartzkopf · filed 1999-11-23(1)

Section 452.330.1, RSMo (1994) sets forth the factors which the trial court may take into consideration when distributing marital property, including the “conduct of the parties during marriage.” ... Here, the trial court found that neither party engaged in marital misconduct. This finding was supported by the evidence.

Section 452.330.1(4) makes marital misconduct relevant to property division when it burdens the other spouse, even if the burden is not financial.

Hatchette v. Hatchette · filed 2001-10-23(1)(4)

Our review is not limited by the trial court’s chosen terminology in evaluating the parties’ conduct; rather we must focus on whether the court considered the extent to which the misconduct burdened the marital relationship. Those burdens may or may not have been financial in nature, but they become significant when the “misconduct of one spouse changes the balance so that the other must assume a greater share of the partnership load.”

Section 452.330.1(4) makes a spouse’s misconduct a relevant factor in dividing marital property.

Adair v. Adair · filed 2004-01-20(1)(4)

Misconduct by a spouse prior to the dissolution is a relevant factor for the trial court to consider in dividing marital property. § 452.330.1(4), RSMo.

Section 452.330.1 permits a court to consider misconduct in dividing marital property when it places an additional and unreasonable burden on the marital relationship.

Ludwig v. Ludwig · filed 2004-02-17(1)

We disagree that this is the type of misconduct envisaged in Section 452.330. Although not appropriate, her actions were not shown to place any burden on the marital unit itself, whether economic or emotional. The trial court, therefore, erred to the extent it relied upon such misconduct to justify a highly disproportionate division of property.

Section 452.330.1 allows a court to consider marital misconduct when dividing property even if a spouse did not claim misconduct.

Finch v. Joann K. Finch · filed 2014-09-16(1)

This argument, however, disregards § 452.330.1 wherein it states that when dividing marital property a trial court should consider all relevant factors, including “[t]he conduct of the parties during the marriage.” Nowhere in the statute does it require a spouse to claim misconduct or such claim is waived.

Section 452.330.1(4) requires courts to consider the parties’ conduct during marriage when dividing marital property; misconduct may support an unequal division.

L.R.S. v. C.A.S. · filed 2017-08-15(1)(4)

Moreover, we find the trial court correctly considered the conduct of the parties during the marriage when dividing the marital property.

Section 452.330.1(4) permits a court to consider marital misconduct when dividing marital property, but misconduct does not make a spouse’s nonmarital property marital.

Schutter v. Seibold · filed 2018-02-271(4)

While Section 452.330.1(4), RSMo 2016, allows the court consider the parties' conduct during the marriage when dividing marital property, it does not allow the court to classify nonmarital property as marital based on the nonmarital property owner's misconduct. The court was free to award Wife a larger share of the marital estate in consideration of Husband's misconduct, but it had no authority to give Husband's nonmarital property to Wife.

Section 452.330 permits a court dividing marital property to require a spouse to account for an asset’s decline in value after the other spouse raises squandering and shows a decline not attributable to them.

GILBERT v. CHRISMER-STILL · filed 2024-07-17

Respondent raised the issue of squandering and showed a marital asset’s diminution in value, not attributable to him, which occurred during or after the marital breakdown. Appellant then had an obligation to account for the asset’s disposition.

Section 452.330 requires a just division of marital property after considering all relevant factors, but does not require equal shares.

In Re Marriage of Cox · filed 1987-01-16

Louis’ third allegation of error is that the trial court did not make a just division of marital property as required by § 452.330, RSMo 1978, as amended. Patsy received 57 percent of the marital property, and Louis received the remaining 43 percent. The above-mentioned statute does not require an equal division of marital property. The statute does require that the division of property be “just” after considering all relevant factors.

Section 452.330.1 lists nonexclusive factors for a just division of marital property and does not require equal shares.

Feinberg v. Feinberg · filed 1984-05-29(1)

Section 452.330.1 RSMo 1978, amended 1981, sets forth four non-exclusive factors to consider in the just distribution of marital assets; (1) the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker; (2) the value of the property set aside to each spouse; (3) the economic circumstances of each spouse; and (4) the conduct of the parties during the marriage. In addition in this case it is necessary to consider the instability of the business interests. Rarely, if ever, will these guidelines require exact equality.

Section 452.330 calls for consideration of each spouse’s contribution, the property’s value, each spouse’s economic circumstances, and the parties’ conduct during the marriage when assessing a property settlement.

Clapper v. Clapper · filed 1984-07-24

When determining the propriety of a property settlement, the court should consider the factors set forth in § 452.330 such as the contribution of each spouse, the value of the property, the economic circumstances of each spouse, and the parties’ conduct during the marriage.

Section 452.330 calls for courts to consider all relevant factors and divide the marital estate as a whole in a just manner.

Marriage of Goldberg v. Goldberg · filed 1985-03-29

The courts should look to the total amount of marital property as a unit rather than view the various assets as separate items and then consider “all relevant factors” and make a just division in cash and kind as is most convenient to the parties.

Section 452.330 requires a just division of marital property after considering all relevant factors; it does not require an equal division in every case.

In Re Marriage of Cornell · filed 1977-03-28(1)

§ 452.330 calls for a just division of the marital property after considering all relevant factors. In our opinion, and we so hold, the trial court’s decree failed to meet that standard in the division of marital property.

Section 452.330 requires courts to consider relevant factors when dividing marital property; the division is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Klinge v. Klinge · filed 1977-06-14

Giving effect, as we must, to the relevant factors, § 452.330 RSMo Supp.1975, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion as to the division of property awarded, except with respect to the $20,000 lump sum awarded to the husband to be a lien on the house.

Section 452.330 requires a just division of marital property after consideration of its statutory guidelines, but does not require an equal division.

Hilger v. Hilger · filed 1978-07-31

Section 452.330 RSMo Supp.1973 provides that the court “shall divide the marital property in such proportions as the court deems just” after considering the statutory guidelines as set out in that section. ... There is no requirement, statutory or otherwise, that the trial court divide the marital property equally.

Section 452.330 requires a just division of marital property based on relevant factors; it does not require an equal division.

Arp v. Arp · filed 1978-10-02

After reviewing the evidence in light of the relevant factors, including those enumerated in § 452.330, it does not appear that the trial court abused its discretion in making a just division of the marital property.

Section 452.330 requires a just division of marital property after consideration of relevant factors, but does not require an equal division.

In Re the Marriage of Morris · filed 1979-09-04(1)

Thus, Betty’s argument that the court was required to make an equal division unless a consideration of the factors mentioned dictated a contrary result is erroneous. The court was required to make a just division of the marital property.

Section 452.330 permits an unequal division of marital property when the statutory factors justify it.

In Re the Marriage of Reagan · filed 1979-10-17

The court would have been justified in such a division in applying the evidence to the factors to be considered under § 452.330, RSMo 1969.

Section 452.330 calls for a just division of marital property, which need not be equal, after considering the spouses’ contributions, circumstances, and conduct.

Daus v. Daus · filed 1979-12-26

The objective of the trial court is to make a just division. This does not mean that the division must be equal.

Section 452.330 requires courts to consider relevant factors when dividing marital property, and the division is overturned only for an abuse of discretion.

In re the Marriage of Smith · filed 1980-12-31

Section 452.330, RSMo 1978 sets forth various factors to be considered in making a division of marital property in a dissolution proceeding and the decision of the trial court will be overturned only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion.

Section 452.330 requires courts to consider four factors and divide marital property fairly and equitably, though not necessarily equally.

Metts v. Metts · filed 1981-11-17

Under the mandate of § 452.330 RSMo. 1978, the trial court is required to consider four factors in dividing the marital property. This does not mean the court is required to equally divide the marital property, but only to fairly and equitably distribute it.

Section 452.330 provides guidelines for dividing marital property in a dissolution.

Srba v. Srba · filed 1982-03-02

Our reading of the transcript convinces us that the trial court followed the guidelines of § 452.330, RSMo.1978.

Section 452.330’s factors guide the division of marital property, and a just division need not be equal.

Palmquist v. Palmquist · filed 1982-04-13

Albeit, as indicated, the appeal should be dispatched because of rule violation, we make the following observations and rulings upon the merits, if any, of the cause. ... The findings of fact and conclusions of law show that in the disposition of property the trial court considered the factors relevant to that disposition, including the matters specifically set forth in § 452.330, RSMo 1978. ... A just division of marital property does not have to be equal and this is particularly true where one party has engaged in misconduct. ... We find no abuse of discretion in the division of property.”

Section 452.330 requires a just division of marital property based on all relevant factors, leaving the trial court discretion rather than requiring a mathematical formula.

Budzinski v. Budzinski · filed 1982-04-20(1)

By statutory command (Section 452.330, RSMo 1978), a trial court is required to make a “just” division of the marital property taking into consideration all “relevant factors” including those specifically delineated in said statute. The keystone is a “just” division which entails an exercise of discretion rather than blind resort to an abstract mathematical formula.

Section 452.330 requires a just division of marital property after considering all relevant factors, but does not require an equal division.

Ploch v. Ploch · filed 1982-05-11(1)

Section 452.330 does not require an equal division; it requires a just division “after considering all relevant factors.”

Section 452.330 requires a just division of marital property based on all relevant factors; it does not require equal shares.

Fields v. Fields · filed 1982-11-30(1)

No positive command of parity or mathematical precision regarding the division of marital property is to be found in Section 452.330, RSMo 1978. To the contrary, the legislature, at least in theory, obviously intended that a just division of marital property, arrived at by properly weighting and balancing the four statutorily enunciated factors and all other “relevant factors”, should take precedence over a division arrived at by a stylized formula.

Section 452.330.1 permits an unequal division of marital property when the trial court considers the statutory factors.

Schnitker v. Schnitker · filed 1983-01-18(1)

His assigned share was 60% of the total, hers 40%. Without a detailed comment on the evidence, however, we can confidently say that the trial court appears to have taken into consideration all the statutory factors bearing upon a proper division of marital property, § 452.330.1, RSMo (Supp. 1982). The division was well within the trial court’s discretion.

Section 452.330(1) requires the court to consider all relevant factors when making a just division of marital property.

Elliott v. Elliott · filed 1981-06-23(1)

The record convinces us that the trial judge made a reasonable division of the marital property and debts and properly considered all factors relating to such a division, including those factors enumerated in § 452.330-1.

Section 452.330(1) requires the court to consider its listed factors before dividing marital property.

Pruitt v. Pruitt · filed 1981-09-15(1)

Wife argues in her second point that the court failed to consider the factors enumerated in § 452.330(1), RSMo. 1978 which must be considered by the court prior to dividing the marital property. Wife fails to substantiate her bald assertion that these factors were not considered. Instead she argues, in effect, that the result of the division speaks for itself. We find no abuse of discretion in the division of marital property, nor any indication § 452.330(1) was not followed.

Section 452.330 requires courts dividing marital property to consider each spouse’s contribution to its acquisition, its value, the spouses’ conduct during marriage, and their economic circumstances at dissolution.

Marriage of Schreier v. Schreier · filed 1981-11-17

In making the division the trial court must consider the contribution of each spouse toward acquisition of the property, value of the property, conduct of the parties during marriage and the economic circumstances of the respective spouses upon dissolution of the marriage.

Section 452.330 gives trial courts discretion in dividing marital property.

Hartzell v. Hartzell · filed 1982-05-11

Further, wife claims she should have obtained a larger share of the allocation of marital assets, even though she received over one-half of the distribution. We discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in the division of marital property. Section 452.330, RSMo.1978.

Section 452.330.1 requires courts dividing marital property to consider each spouse’s contributions, property set apart, economic circumstances, and conduct during the marriage.

Turley v. Turley · filed 1982-06-22(1)

The trial court must consider four non-exclusive factors in dividing marital assets. They are: (1) the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker; (2) the value of the property set apart to each spouse; (3) the economic circumstances of each spouse; and (4) the conduct of the parties during the marriage. ... Having considered these factors, this court finds that the trial court’s award to the husband of assets having almost twice as much value as the assets awarded to the wife, to be against the weight of the evidence.

Section 452.330 directs courts to consider the spouses’ contributions, the property awarded to each, their economic circumstances, and their conduct when dividing marital property.

Wachter v. Wachter · filed 1982-11-23

There is no indication that, in dividing the marital property, the court here failed to consider the factors set out in § 452.330. Each party was awarded approximately one-half of the marital property, and husband was ordered to pay all remaining marital debts. In view of the $50,000.00 mortgage on the marital home and the size of the payments, approximately $610.00 per month, we cannot fault the court’s decision to order the home sold and the proceeds divided equally between the parties. We find the court did not abuse its discretion in its disposition of the marital property.

Section 452.330 requires the court to consider its enumerated factors when dividing marital property.

Mills v. Mills · filed 1983-12-20

We have reviewed the entire record and conclude that the court properly considered all of the factors enumerated in § 452.330 RSMo 1978.

Section 452.330 does not require the court to identify which listed factors led to its division of marital property when no specific findings were requested.

In re the Marriage of Hardy · filed 1983-08-30

The finding of the trial court that it had considered the factors set forth in § 452.330 in dividing the marital property was sufficient to show it had properly considered these factors without further specificity.

Section 452.330.1 requires a just division of marital property based on all relevant factors; the property's source is only one factor, and the custodial spouse's housing needs also matter.

In re the Marriage of Tune · filed 1986-09-22(1)

Of course, the source of the property is just one of the factors to be considered. Among the other factors for the trial court to consider in dividing marital property is the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for a reasonable period to the spouse having custody of any children. ... Acknowledging that we are not infallible, we nevertheless conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the marital property and determine that for there to be a “just” result, appellant should receive an additional $11,000 to offset in part the real estate given to respondent.

Section 452.330 requires courts dividing marital property to consider each spouse’s contributions, the property set apart to each spouse, their economic circumstances, and their conduct during the marriage.

Duebelbeis v. Duebelbeis · filed 1987-06-30

Section 452.330 RSMo (1986) sets forth the factors to be considered in the division of marital property: (1) the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of marital property; (2) the value of the property set apart to each spouse; (3) the economic circumstances of each spouse; and (4) the conduct of the parties during the marriage.

Section 452.330.1 requires courts dividing marital property to consider each spouse’s contributions, the property each receives, their economic circumstances, and their conduct during marriage.

Burbes v. Burbes · filed 1987-11-03(1)

The court must, however, consider the following four non-exclusive factors in making the division: (1) the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property, including the contribution of the spouse as homemaker; (2) the value of the property set aside to each spouse; (3) the economic circumstances of each spouse; and (4) the conduct of the parties during marriage.

Section 452.330.1 requires the court to consider all relevant factors when dividing marital property, including the four factors it lists.

Binkley v. Binkley · filed 1987-03-10(1)

Section 452.330.1 RSMo (1986) lists four non-exclusive factors to be considered in making a just division of marital property. The trial court announced, prior to submission of the case, that it would only consider one such factor. Such a statement ignores the statutory mandate of § 452.330.1 and constitutes an erroneous declaration of law.

Section 452.330 makes the desirability of awarding the family home to the spouse with custody of the children a factor in dividing marital property.

Kreitz v. Kreitz · filed 1988-05-10

The desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein to the spouse having custody of the children is a factor to be considered in dividing marital property. Section 452.330, RSMo 1986; Daniels v. Daniels, 675 S.W.2d 29, 34 (Mo.App.1984).

Section 452.330 requires a dissolution court to identify and equitably divide marital property, including resolving claims to property that may be marital.

Feinstein v. Feinstein · filed 1989-06-30

By statute, the court is now required to determine what property before it is marital and to distribute that property equitably. § 452.330 RSMo 1986. Thus, the statute contemplates the resolutions of claims to property which may be marital.

Section 452.330.1 requires courts dividing marital property to consider the spouses’ economic circumstances and the value of their nonmarital property.

Abrams v. Abrams · filed 1990-04-24(1)

In dividing marital property a court is to consider, among other relevant factors, the economic circumstances of the spouses at the time the division of the property becomes effective and the value of the nonmarital property set aside to each spouse. § 452.330.1, RSMo Supp. 1989. ... In any event, it appears the court considered all relevant factors in making its distribution.

Section 452.330 requires consideration of its property division factors, but the court need not expressly announce that it considered them.

Lehmann v. Lehmann · filed 1988-05-24(1)

Further, nothing in the record indicates that the trial court failed to take into consideration the factors enumerated in Section 452.330. Neither party requested findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 73.01. A division of marital property is not deficient for the trial court s failure to announce that it has arrived at the division in accordance with the requisite statutory factors.

Section 452.330.1 lists factors for dividing marital property, but those factors are not exclusive.

Wright v. Wright · filed 1990-04-26(1)

The plaintiff has argued the inequity of the trial court’s distribution of marital property in terms of the factors set forth in § 452.330.1, RSMo Supp.1989; however, it has never been supposed that the factors or considerations enumerated in § 452.330.1 are exclusive.

Section 452.330.1 requires the court to consider the spouses’ economic circumstances, custody of a minor child, marital conduct, nonmarital property, and contributions when dividing marital property.

Hendrix v. Hendrix · filed 1990-12-31(1)

Section 452.330.1 RSMo Cum.Supp.1989 lists several factors to be considered by the court when dividing marital property. ... Given the facts and the factors set forth in the governing statute the division of marital property, which awards the equity in marital home to wife, is neither inequitable nor disparate.

Section 452.330.1 requires courts to consider statutory factors when dividing marital property; the division need not give each spouse an equal share.

Blundon v. Blundon · filed 1991-01-16(1)

Considering the other factors required by § 452.330.1 we cannot convict the trial court of error. Although the portion of the civil service retirement constituting marital property was divided 51.8 percent to Merle and 48.2 percent to John, it is obvious that in the overall division of marital property John received a much greater share than Merle.

Section 452.330.1 directs courts dividing marital property to consider relevant factors, including the spouses’ economic circumstances, contributions, and conduct.

York v. York · filed 1991-10-29(1)

In his first point, husband alleges the award of 68% of the marital property was against the weight of the evidence because it “focused inordinately on one of the statutorily relevant factors, conduct” and ignored other factors set forth in § 452.330.1 RSMo Cum.Supp.1990. The court made findings regarding the economic circumstances of the parties, the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of marital property, as well as the conduct of both parties. Furthermore, the court carefully and fully valued the non-marital property set apart to each spouse. The statutory provision for custodial arrangements of children is not relevant here. Thus, the court considered all relevant statutory provisions in making its determination. The limited claim of error is denied.

Section 452.330.1 requires courts to consider the spouses’ economic circumstances and contributions when dividing marital property.

Moritz v. Moritz · filed 1992-12-22(1)

Applying the applicable factors to be considered when dividing marital property as mandated by section 452.330.1, the trial court’s award of the entire pension to Mr. Moritz is not supported by the evidence.

Section 452.330.1 permits a court to consider the spouses’ economic circumstances and marital conduct when making an equitable division of marital property.

Boettcher v. Boettcher · filed 1993-12-071

Nonetheless, lump sum payments are permissible in property division to make an equitable division. Margie Boettcher faced depressed economic circumstances. The trial court found James Boettcher guilty of extreme marital misconduct. Trial courts are permitted to take such factors into account when dividing property. Section 452.330.1, RSMo Supp.1991.

Section 452.330.1 allows a court to consider marital misconduct when dividing property, but misconduct is not the sole factor.

Sinopole v. Sinopole · filed 1993-12-28(1)

In addition, while § 452.330.1, RSMo Supp.1992, does provide the court may consider the conduct of the parties during marriage, such misconduct is not the sole factor to be considered.

Section 452.330 requires courts dividing marital property to consider the family home, each spouse's contributions to acquiring property, and the spouses' conduct during marriage.

In Re Marriage of V----A----E · filed 1994-03-02

The factors to be considered by a trial court in dividing marital property appear in § 452.330, RSMo Cum.Supp.1988. They include the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live in it for reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of any children, the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property (including the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker), and the conduct of the parties during the marriage. ... However, on the evidence here, we hold it was an abuse of discretion to award Husband anything less than one-third of the marital property.

Section 452.330 requires a court dividing marital property to consider all relevant factors, but it need not make a finding on each factor unless specifically requested under Rule 73.01(a)(2).

In Re Marriage of Kovach · filed 1993-12-07

Section 452.330 requires the court to consider all relevant factors when dividing marital property. This requires the court to consider all factors. However, in the absence of a specific request pursuant to Rule 73.01(a)(2), this statute does not require the trial court to make a finding with respect to each factor.

Section 452.330 requires the court to consider the statutory factors when dividing marital property, but the court need not announce that it considered them.

Schroeder v. Schroeder · filed 1996-06-04

Nothing in the record indicates that the trial court failed to take into consideration the factors enumerated in § 452.330. Neither party requested the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in conformity with Rule 73.01. A division of marital property is not deficient for the trial court’s failure to announce that it has arrived at the division in accordance with the requisite statutory factors.

Section 452.330.1 requires courts dividing marital property to consider each spouse’s economic circumstances, contributions including homemaking, nonmarital property, and conduct during the marriage.

Beckham v. Beckham · filed 2001-04-031

Section 452.330 contains several factors, relevant here, that courts must consider in disposing of property: the economic circumstances of each spouse, the contribution of each spouse, including the contribution of a homemaker, the value of non-marital property set aside to each spouse, and the conduct of the parties during the marriage. ... The trial court’s decision was neither against the weight of the evidence nor a misapplication of the law.

Section 452.330.1 directs courts to divide marital property in just proportions after considering relevant factors, including each spouse’s contributions and conduct.

Booth v. Greene · filed 2002-05-28(1)

The trial court is to divide the property “in such proportions as the court deems just.” Section 452.330.1, RSMo 2000. ... Under the facts of this case, an equal division of the marital residence is not clearly against the logic of the circumstances and it is not “so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration.”

Section 452.330.1 allows a disproportionate division of marital property when the spouses’ economic circumstances and non-marital property support it.

Woodard v. Woodard · filed 2006-09-19(1)

Husband argues that the property division “stands or falls” on whether the trial court properly applied two of the five statutory factors: (1) economic circumstances of each party and (2) the value of the non-marital property. Contrary to Husband’s assertions, we conclude that the trial court properly applied both factors in arriving at the property division.

When neither party requests findings, the trial court is presumed to have considered the relevant factors under Section 452.330 in dividing marital property.

Kamler v. Kamler · filed 2007-01-30

Neither party here requested findings of fact and conclusions of law. Therefore, all fact issues upon which no specific findings were made must be considered as having been found in accordance with the trial court’s result. The court is presumed to have considered the relevant factors in Section 452.330 RSMo. 2000.

Section 452.330.1’s five factors must be reconsidered when property awarded as non-marital is reclassified as marital property on remand.

Schild v. Schild · filed 2008-10-21(1)

Given the change in character of these properties, the trial court is further directed on remand to reconsider the five statutory factors listed in Section 452.330.1 and to reevaluate the award of these four properties in light of the relevant statutory factors.

Section 452.330.1 requires the court to consider each spouse’s economic circumstances, contributions, nonmarital property, and conduct when dividing marital property.

Fisher v. Fisher · filed 2009-03-10(1)

On remand, the trial court must consider a number of factors when dividing marital property pursuant to Section 452.330.1. Pertinent to this case, the relevant factors include: the economic situation of each spouse when the property is divided; how each spouse contributed to the acquisition of marital property including Wife’s contribution as a homemaker; the value of non-marital property awarded to each spouse; and the conduct of the parties during the marriage.

Section 452.330 does not require a court dividing marital property to assign it a dollar value unless a party requests specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Cavallaro v. Cavallaro · filed 1981-08-04

Concomitantly, a line of cases exists holding that absent a request for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, a trial court is not required to fix a dollar value to marital property when decreeing its division.

Section 452.330.1 requires a dissolution decree to dispose of all marital property before the judgment is final and appealable.

Adamson v. Adamson · filed 1984-10-31(1)

Section 452.330.1, RSMo 1978, as amended by Laws 1981, p. 615, provides that in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court “shall divide the marital property in such proportions as the court deems just” after considering all relevant factors. Where full disposition of marital property is not accomplished, the trial court has not exhausted its jurisdiction, and no final appealable judgment results.

Section 452.330.1 does not require a trial court to assign a value to each marital asset when no specific findings were requested and sufficient evidence supports a just division.

McClement v. McClement · filed 1984-11-20(1)

Here, Husband did not request specific findings of fact or conclusions of law. Thus, the failure of the trial court to assign values to each item, does not require reversal, unless there was insufficient evidence before the court for it to make a just division.

Section 452.330 requires a dissolution decree to divide marital property; failure to do so leaves the judgment nonfinal and unappealable.

In re Marriage of Allen · filed 1978-08-23

Because the decree did not vest custody of the child in either party [Cradic v. Cradic, 544 S.W.2d 605 (Mo.App.1976)] and did not divide the marital property as required by Section 452.330, it is not a final judgment and not appealable.

Section 452.330’s requirement to divide all marital property is satisfied when a decree awards a spouse the assets she used to buy a house titled in her name; the house need not be divided separately.

McCall v. McCall · filed 1978-11-27

There was no need to divide the real estate in the decree under these circumstances. The division of the marital property was complete and total.

Section 452.330.4 makes a final order distributing marital property nonmodifiable.

Terrell v. Terrell · filed 1979-05-15(4)

A modification of the decree would be an erroneous application of the law. Murphy, supra; § 452.330.-4, RSMo Cum.Supp.1975; Laney, supra.

Section 452.330 requires the trial court to divide all marital property before the judgment is final and appealable.

In Re Marriage of Wineland · filed 1980-12-02

Despite all of the procedural maze outlined above, the judgment is not final, the jurisdiction is not exhausted, and the appeal must be dismissed because the trial court has failed to divide the marital property.

Section 452.330 does not require a property division decree to list dollar values when asset values are undisputed and no party requested findings.

Fastnacht v. Fastnacht · filed 1981-05-04

Deficiencies in property description and omissions of valuations in dissolution decrees are of consequence in the cited cases, not merely for want of adherence to a requirement for formal de-cretal recitals, but because the incomplete decree in each case precluded appellate review of substantive issues raised concerning the trial court’s orders dividing property under § 452.330, RSMo 1978. ... In the limited situation where assets values are undisputed as shown by the evidence and there is no express request by the parties for findings, it is assumed that the valuation which the evidence disclosed was taken into account by the trial court in its award. The husband is not now in a position to complain solely because the decree does not assign dollar values to the distributed marital property.

Section 452.330.1 requires the court to value and divide all marital property in a single proceeding.

Marriage of Marks v. Marks · filed 1981-06-04(1)

The intent of the statute is that all the marital property be valued and divided in a single proceeding; otherwise one of the parties may go without day.

Section 452.330 requires the trial court to resolve disputed property values when dividing marital property so the division can be reviewed under the statutory factors.

Glascock v. Glascock · filed 1981-08-04

The inescapable result of a resolution of this point is for this court, upon the basis of a cold record, to arbitrarily value the assets of the parties and then reapply the statutory factors to determine the justness of the distribution of the trial court’s decree. ... The case is reversed and remanded with directions to the trial court to resolve the disputes in connection with the value of the various properties and enter a new decree reflecting the trial court’s determination of the value of the property set off to each spouse.

Section 452.330 requires the trial court to value and allocate marital assets so the fairness of the division can be reviewed.

In Re Marriage of Mihalovich · filed 1983-10-18

The wife’s assertion on this appeal that the division of property was not fair and equitable cannot be adequately considered until the trial court has established values for the dwelling lease and the option and has set apart these assets in such manner as the trial court deems to be just under the factors stated in § 452.330, RSMo Supp. 1982.

Section 452.330 requires the dissolution court to divide all marital property; a decree that leaves marital property undistributed is not a final appealable judgment.

Hutchins v. Hutchins · filed 1983-10-18

Section 452.330 RSMo. 1978 provides that in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, “the court shall set apart to each spouse his property and shall divide the marital property.... ” Where full disposition of marital property is not accomplished, the trial court has not exhausted its jurisdiction, and no final appealable judgment results.

Section 452.330 requires division of marital property, and both parties generally bear responsibility for presenting evidence of its value.

Marriage of Smith v. Smith · filed 1984-10-09

Aside from default cases, the parties have at least an equal burden to carry on the matter of evidence of value in a dissolution. A complainant should not be rewarded for presenting insufficient evidence of property values.

Marital property is valued as of the trial date, including property acquired after the dissolution action is filed but before the decree.

Marriage of Taylor v. Taylor · filed 1987-09-15(3)

Such a conclusion is consistent with the notion that property acquired during the marriage, including that acquired after the filing of a dissolution action but before the entry of a dissolution decree, is marital property. We hold that the proper date for valuing marital property in a dissolution proceeding is the date of trial.

A petitioner seeking division of marital property after a sister state dissolves the marriage must prove the property's existence and value.

Misdary v. Misdary · filed 1987-09-15(1)

In a proceeding asking a Missouri court to distribute marital property owned at the time of a dissolution granted by a sister state, the burden is on the petitioner to prove the existence and value of the marital property. It appears to us that it would have been impossible for the trial court to have made a fair distribution when it was not presented with evidence about all the alleged marital property. Under these circumstances, mother failed in her burden of proof and we cannot say the trial court erred.

Section 452.330 permits commercial business goodwill to be valued as marital property using a capitalization method when the evidence supports that valuation.

In Re Marriage of Brooks · filed 1987-12-09

Nevertheless, we do not read Hanson, Graham and Taylor as rejecting all capitalization formulae as methods of valuing goodwill as an intangible asset of a commercial corporation or other business organization, no matter the nature of the business involved.

Section 452.330 requires a dissolution court to divide the property before its decree is final.

Crangle v. Crangle · filed 1991-05-28

More specifically relevant here, in a dissolution action, a trial court must, among its other actions, divide the property before it can be said the court has exhausted its jurisdiction.

Section 452.330.1 requires the court to set apart each spouse’s nonmarital property and divide marital property; significant omissions leave the dissolution judgment nonfinal.

Wagner v. Wagner · filed 1992-01-28(1)

Because the trial court did not divide the property as mandated by § 452.330.1, RSMo Supp.1988, its judgment is not final and this court is left without jurisdiction to decide the appeal and has no other option than to dismiss the appeal.

Section 452.330.1 does not require the decree to state specific values for each item of marital property awarded.

Holland v. Holland · filed 1993-11-24(1)

Section 452.330.1, RSMo Supp.1991, the statute imposing the duty on the trial court to divide marital property in dissolution actions, “does not require specific findings of fact as to the value of the items of marital property awarded in the decree.” Dardick v. Dardick, 670 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Mo. banc 1984). The trial court had sufficient evidence from which it could determine the value of the property disposed in the decree.

Section 452.330.1(1) requires the court to consider each spouse’s economic circumstances when the property division takes effect; a new valuation hearing may be needed when that date is not reasonably close to trial.

Marriage of Price v. Price · filed 1996-05-14(1)(1)

In Gustin, this court harmonized the holding of Taylor v. Taylor, 736 S.W.2d 388, 391 (Mo. banc 1987), in which the Supreme Court determined that the date of valuation of marital property is the date of trial, with § 452.330.1(1), RSMo 1994, which mandates that the trial court must consider the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective.

Section 452.330.1(1) requires the court to consider each spouse’s economic circumstances when the property division takes effect; valuations too remote from that date require a new hearing.

Morgan v. Ackerman · filed 1998-03-17(1)(1)

The date of valuation herein is not reasonably proximate to the effective date of distribution. We reverse all judgments regarding the distribution of property and remand for the trial court to receive evidence of the value of the property and to consider the current economic circumstances of each spouse.

Section 452.330 permits a just division of marital property without assigning an exact value to every item when no party requests those findings and the record supports the division.

Bullard v. Bullard · filed 1998-06-16

A trial court is not required to specifically determine the value of particular items of marital property unless a party requests such findings, or unless the record contains insufficient evidence to enable the court to make a just division. ... We fail to see how Wife was prejudiced by the division of the stocks, even though they were not assigned an exact dollar value.

Section 452.330 requires marital property to be valued as of the time of trial when the court divides it.

Lewis v. Lewis · filed 1998-10-27

Thus, under either of our two scenarios, we are required to reverse and remand for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to determine the values of the bank accounts as of the time of trial, including receiving additional evidence, if necessary, and render a just division of the parties’ marital property accordingly.

Section 452.330.1 does not require a court to assign a value to uncertain personal injury claims when dividing marital property.

Laffey v. Laffey · filed 1999-11-09(1)

In view of the fact that the evidence of values of the claims was very uncertain, and in view of the fact that the trial court provided for the maintenance to be modifiable in the event of a significant change in Wife’s financial circumstances, we hold that the trial court did not err in failing to place a value on Wife’s personal injury claims.

Section 452.330 requires the trial court to distribute all marital property; a decree that omits property identified before the time for appeal has run is not final.

McCord v. McCord · filed 2002-05-28

Here, the omission of the Sprint retirement plan from the decree was discovered before the time for appeal had run, and the issue was presented with the appeal. This court must dismiss the appeal.

Section 452.330 requires the trial court to distribute all property identified as marital property; leaving such property undistributed makes the decree nonfinal.

In Re Marriage of Bell · filed 2002-06-18

The trial court’s decree is not final if it fails to distribute all of the property identified as marital property or fails to make a determination that the property is nonmarital or nonexistent.

Section 452.330 requires a dissolution court to classify and divide all marital property; a judgment that leaves a potential marital asset unresolved is not final.

Nguyen v. Ha Van Le · filed 2007-08-21

Pursuant to section 452.330 RSMo (2000), the trial court must set apart nonmarital property and divide marital property in a manner it deems just after consideration of the relevant factors enumerated in section 452.330. A judgment of dissolution will not be considered final if it does not distribute all of the marital property of the parties, or if it does not determine that certain property is non-marital or nonexistent.

Section 452.330.1(1) requires courts to value marital property reasonably close to the effective date of division so they can consider each spouse’s economic circumstances at that time.

Morse v. Morse · filed 2002-07-30(1)(1)

Section 452.330.1(1), RSMo 2000, however, mandates that the trial court consider the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective. Thus, valuation of property should be reasonably proximate to the date the division is to be effective.

Section 452.330.1 requires the court to consider the spouses’ economic circumstances using property valuations reasonably proximate to the date of distribution.

Perryman v. Perryman · filed 2003-09-23(1)

We find that it was error for the trial court to enter its final judgment distributing the parties’ property based on Judge Jamison’s prior findings because these findings were not reasonably proximate to the date of the court’s distribution. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s judgment distributing the parties’ property and remand for the trial court to hold a hearing regarding the parties’ economic circumstances such that the valuation of their property is reasonably proximate in time to the court’s distribution.

Section 452.330.1(1) requires the court to consider each spouse’s economic circumstances when the property division becomes effective, using valuations reasonably close to that date.

McCallum v. McCallum · filed 2003-11-251(1)

Because neither the date of valuation in July 2002 nor the date of distribution in November 2002 was reasonably proximate to the date of trial in October 2001, the court failed to consider the economic circumstances of the parties at the time the property division became effective in accordance with section 452.330.1.

Section 452.330.1(1) requires courts to consider the parties’ economic circumstances when the division of marital property takes effect.

Galloway v. Galloway · filed 2003-12-091(1)

Section 452.330.1(1) RSMo 2000, however, requires a trial court to consider the economic circumstances of the parties at the time the division of property is to become effective.

Section 452.330.1 requires the court to classify and divide all property before it; a dissolution judgment that leaves property undistributed is not final.

Gillette v. Gillette · filed 2013-12-201

Thus, if a trial court fails to distribute all the property’ before the court, the judgment in a dissolution case is not final, and this Court lacks the statutory authority to consider the appeal.

Section 452.330 requires courts to consider all relevant factors when dividing marital property fairly, including responsibility for debts incurred during the marriage.

Levis v. Levis · filed 1986-06-30

The court must consider all relevant factors, including those listed in § 452.330 RSMo Cum.Supp.1982, so as to distribute the marital property in a fair and equitable fashion. ... The determination of who will be responsible for debts incurred during the marriage is a factor the trial court is to consider in seeking a fair division of marital property.

Section 452.330 permits a just division of marital property that need not give each spouse a positive balance after debts are counted.

Geldmeier v. Geldmeier · filed 1984-02-28

However, a balance sheet approach is not necessarily the just approach to distribute marital assets. ... The court’s order that husband assume responsibility for the lion’s share of outstanding marital debts is supported by the evidence, since only husband at that time possessed the ability to assume those obligations. Moreover, its order concerning the debts does not alter the fact that, consistent with § 452.330, RSMo.Supp.1982, the court set aside to husband portions of the marital property. Therefore, we can find no abuse of discretion in the court’s property division.

Section 452.330 permits a division of marital property when the record supports that the trial court considered a spouse's debt, even if the court did not expressly mention it.

Waitsman v. Waitsman · filed 1980-04-15

We cannot say the trial court failed to consider this debt in dividing the marital property. Our reading of the transcript convinces us that the trial court followed the guidelines of § 452.330, RSMo.1978.

Section 452.330 requires division of marital property but does not require a dissolution decree to assign responsibility for spouses’ debts.

Njw v. Wew · filed 1979-06-29

Section 452.330 requires only that the court "divide the marital property." A debt owed by the spouses does not constitute "property" owned by them. The failure of the decree to provide as to payment of debts is therefore not a fatal defect, although the better practice would be to do so and thereby reduce subsequent dispute and contention.

Section 452.330 does not treat the parties’ debts as marital property, so a trial court’s failure to distribute them does not prevent a final judgment.

Flach v. Flach · filed 1982-11-02

Pursuant to § 452.330 RSMo (1978), the debts of the parties do not constitute marital property, and the trial court’s failure to distribute them does not prevent the finality of the judgment.

An unequal allocation of marital debts does not by itself make a property division erroneous under § 452.330.

Berry v. Berry · filed 1983-05-10

We do not find that this disparity in the amount of debts assigned to the respective parties for payment makes the decree erroneous, § 452.330, RSMo (Supp.1981).

Section 452.330 permits a court dividing marital property to allocate a debt assumed in contemplation of marriage, even when the debt arose before marriage.

In Re Marriage of Welch · filed 1990-09-18

However, if “marital property” can include real estate purchased before marriage (but in contemplation of marriage) with the intent that it be the marital home, then “marital debt” may include a debt assumed when real estate is conveyed to a party before marriage (but in contemplation of marriage).

Section 452.330 permits a just division of marital property that assigns pre-separation debts to one spouse when the evidence supports that allocation.

Woolsey v. Woolsey · filed 1995-08-22

Finally, given the nature of the family debts, the trial court did not err in its division of marital property by ordering husband to pay a $25,000 debt to his father and a $70,000 debt to the IRS.

Section 452.330.1(1) allows a court to consider a spouse’s separate debts as part of that spouse’s economic circumstances when dividing marital property.

Stratman v. Stratman · filed 1997-06-30(1)(1)

The term “economic circumstances,” when given its plain and ordinary meaning, does not limit the court’s consideration to marital debts and exclude consideration of a spouse’s individual debts.

Section 452.330.2 defines marital property as property acquired after marriage, and debt incurred after marriage is ordinarily marital debt.

Hicks v. Hicks · filed 1998-06-02(2)

Because “marital property” is defined by § 452.330.2, RSMo Cum.Supp.1997, as “all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage,” it follows that “marital debt” is “ ‘ordinarily debt incurred subsequent to the marriage.’ ”

Section 452.330(1), as amended in 1998, requires trial courts to allocate marital debts.

Nichols v. Nichols · filed 2000-03-14(1)

That has now changed with the legislature's 1998 amendment to § 452.330, which inserted the words “and marital debts” in the introductory paragraph of subsection 1.

Section 452.330.1 requires a dissolution court to determine whether an outstanding 401(k) loan is a marital debt to be divided.

Rivers v. Rivers · filed 2000-06-27(1)

If the trial court finds that a 401(k) loan existed at that time, the trial court must determine whether the loan was a marital debt to be divided according to section 452.330.1.

Debt payments allocated in a marital property division cannot also be classified as maintenance.

Evans v. Evans · filed 2001-05-01

Here, the trial court has awarded to Wife, as a component of maintenance, the debt payments described above, yet the trial court also allocated those debts to Husband in the division of marital property and debts. In our view, those debts cannot be classified as both maintenance and property division.

Section 452.330.1 requires courts to divide marital debts under the same principles used to divide marital property.

Petties v. Petties · filed 2004-03-301

Section 452.330.1, was amended in 1998 to expressly require the division of marital debts, in addition to marital property.

Section 452.330 requires a just division of marital property and marital debt but does not require division of nonmarital debt.

Binder v. Thorne-Binder · filed 2006-03-28

Perhaps more importantly, the trial court is only required by section 452.330 to divide the marital property and marital debt justly between the spouses; nothing in the statute requires that the nonmarital debt be divided.

Section 452.330.1 requires the court to divide all marital property and debts; leaving a marital debt unallocated prevents a final, appealable judgment.

Hetherington v. Hetherington · filed 2007-07-24(1)

Section 452.330.1 RSMo. (2000)... requires the court in a dissolution action to divide the parties’ marital property and marital debts. Where a trial court has not divided all of the marital assets and debts, it has not exhausted its jurisdiction, it has not disposed of all issues, and its judgment is not a final, appealable judgment.

A possible future mortgage default does not by itself make a division of marital property and debt inequitable under § 452.330.

Parciak v. Parciak · filed 2018-08-07(1)

Whereas Wife's default and Husband's liability to the bank are mere hypotheticals, Husband's cross-appeal is denied.

Section 452.330.1 permits a court to assign all marital debt to one spouse when that allocation is just under the circumstances.

Sabatino v. Sabatino · filed 2010-07-13(1)

Section 452.330.1 provides that the court “shall divide the marital property and marital debts in such proportions as the court deems just after considering all relevant factors[.]” ... Under the circumstances of this case, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s allocation of the marital debts.

Section 452.330 permits a court to allocate marital debt based on the relevant circumstances, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

In Re the Marriage of: DANA LEA WASSON and JEREMY SHANE WASSON. DANA LEA WASSON v. JEREMY SHANE WASSON, Respondent/Respo · filed 2022-05-04

Moreover, the trial court made a significant number of specific findings (supported by the record) which demonstrate that its allocation of debt from the deficiency judgment on the marital home was not an abuse of discretion: ... Mother fails to demonstrate that this ruling “is clearly against the logic of the circumstances before the court at the time and is so unreasonable that it shocks one’s sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful consideration.” Baker Team, 611 S.W.3d at 354 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

Section 452.330 requires courts dividing marital property to consider each spouse’s contribution to its acquisition, including homemaking.

In Re the Marriage of Simpelo · filed 1976-10-12(1)(1)

So construed, it was obviously predicated upon subparagraph (1) of paragraph 1 of Section 452.330, supra, “[t]he contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as homemaker”, a statutorily prescribed “relevant factor” for consideration in arriving at a “just” division of marital property.

Section 452.330 makes contributions toward acquiring marital property a relevant factor when dividing that property.

McLaughlin v. McLaughlin · filed 1979-08-07

The trial court’s finding that the wife and her family made the major contribution toward purchase of the home is supported and not contradicted by the record. Such factor is relevant to the division of property. Section 452.330, RSMo. Supp.1973. Upon a consideration of all the relevant factors, including contributions by both spouses toward the acquisition of property, the economic circumstances of the parties, and the marital conduct of the parties, we cannot say the trial court erred in awarding the home to the wife.

Section 452.330.1 permits a court to consider the source of marital property, including gifts and aid from one spouse’s parents, when making a just division.

In re the Marriage of Hedrick · filed 1983-10-12(1)

The distribution of marital property under § 452.330.1 is to be “just”. It need not be equal. ... Within its statutory discretion, the trial court can consider the source of marital property. ... He did not err in considering the gifts and aid given by respondent’s parents to the parties in making the distribution of marital property. A “just” division of marital property was made here.