Miss. Code Ann. § 85-5-7

Section 85-5-7(8) preserves existing tort immunity, including an employer’s immunity under workers’ compensation law.

Stringfellow v. Reed · filed 1990-06-29(8)

Mississippi Code Annotated § 85-5-7(8), provides: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to create a cause of action. Nothing in this section shall be construed, in any way, to alter the immunity of any person.” Accordingly, the new statute does not affect the tort immunity of Sea Land or its general contractor Deviney (or D & C), nor does it overrule McClellan.

Section 85-5-7(5) preserves sovereign immunity when the state is alleged to be a joint tortfeasor, barring a contribution claim against an immune state agency.

Transportation Comm, MS v. Jenkins · filed 1994-09-01(5)

However, Mobile Medic overlooks the specific provision of paragraph (5) of that very section which provides that "Nothing in this section shall eliminate or diminish any defenses or immunities which currently exist, except as expressly noted herein." Clearly, that paragraph encompasses sovereign immunity in that sovereign immunity is not expressly mentioned in the section. Therefore, we find that the legislature intended that sovereign immunity apply to actions where the state is a possible joint tortfeasor, as is the case here.

Section 85-5-7 allows fault to be allocated to an immune employer without making the employer liable for damages.

Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tackett · filed 2003-03-27(7)

As to allocation of fault, we conclude that allocation of fault to immune employers is consistent with § 85-5-7 and required under Estate of Hunter v. General Motors Corp., 729 So. 2d 1264 (Miss. 1999), provided that they are not held liable for damages.

Section 85-5-7 permits fault to be allocated to an immune employer even though the employer cannot be held liable.

Entergy Mississippi, Inc. v. Hayes · filed 2004-04-22

In Mack Trucks II, we stated, ““[t]o the extent that Accu-Fab may be construed as stating that immune parties may not be assessed fault (as opposed to liability) under [Miss. Code Ann. § 85-5-7], therefore, that opinion is overruled.” ... Accordingly, it was proper to allow allocation of fault to Jim Avis and Associates as an absent tortfeasor.

Section 85-5-7 permits a jury to allocate fault to an immune employer even after the employer has been dismissed from the lawsuit.

Ware v. Entergy Mississippi, Inc. · filed 2003-12-31

In Mack Trucks II, we held: “[t]o the extent that Accu-Fab1 may be construed as stating that immune parties may not be assessed fault (as opposed to liability) under § 85-5-7, therefore, that opinion is overruled.” 841 So.2d at 1115 (¶ 28). ... Inasmuch as this issue has already been decided in Mack Trucks (II), the trial court was correct in granting Entergy's motion in limine relative to the allocation of fault to the immune employer.

Section 85-5-7(7) requires the jury to determine the percentage of fault of a tortfeasor who contributed to the injury, even if that tortfeasor settled and is no longer a party.

Smith v. Payne · filed 2002-01-10(7)

This Court has interpreted this section to mean that any tortfeasor, even absent ones, that contributed to the injury must be considered by the jury when apportioning fault. ... The jury in the case sub judice was obligated to determine Long's percentage of fault irrespective of his status as a party at the time of trial.

Section 85-5-7(7) requires the trier of fact to determine each alleged joint tortfeasor’s percentage of fault.

City of Ellisville v. Richardson · filed 2003-10-31(7)

Miss. Code Ann. § 85-5-7 requires the trier of fact to apportion fault.

Section 85-5-7(7) allows the jury to allocate fault to any participant in the occurrence, including a settling tortfeasor who is absent from trial.

Hunter v. General Motors Corporation · filed 1996-08-30(7)

This Court holds that the term "party," as used in § 85-5-7(7), refers to any participant to an occurrence which gives rise to a lawsuit, and not merely the parties to a particular lawsuit or trial.

Section 85-5-7 does not mandate joining alleged joint tortfeasors, even as phantom parties, to allocate fault.

White v. Esmark Apparel, Inc. · filed 1992-04-20

Without any clear guidance from the Mississippi Supreme Court or the Mississippi state legislature, this court will not presume that § 85-5-7 mandates the joinder of alleged joint tortfeasors, even as phantom parties, so that fault can be apportioned among potentially negligent entities.

Section 85-5-7(7) requires a jury to consider the fault of a tortfeasor who contributed to an injury, even if that tortfeasor settled before trial.

Smith v. Payne · filed 1999-10-05(7)

The jury in the case sub judice was obligated to determine Long's percentage of fault irrespective of his status as a party at the time of trial.

Section 85-5-7 requires fault to be allocated to a settling, nonexempt contributor to an injury when a party requests it.

Peterson v. Ladner · filed 2000-11-07

Regardless of the uncertainty surrounding whether someone exempt from tort liability can nonetheless have fault allocated to him, it is clear that a nonexempt contributor to an injury must have fault allocated if that is requested by a party to litigation.

Section 85-5-7(7) does not allow fault to be allocated at trial to a party dismissed on summary judgment when no evidence supports that party’s fault.

Kerr-McGee Corporation v. Maranatha Faith Center, Inc. · filed 2002-12-06(7)

This ruling will prevent an allocation of fault to Sanderson at trial. Kerr-McGee’s argument on this issue is without merit.

A defendant seeking to apportion fault to a third party under § 85-5-7(7) must provide enough evidence of that party’s fault to create a genuine issue of material fact.

Eckman v. Moore · filed 2004-03-25(7)

This Court finds that the trial court did not err by granting partial summary judgment in Michelle's favor. Dr. Eckman did not provide sufficient proof that created a genuine issue of material fact. Dr. Eckman's Answer to Plaintiff's first set of Interrogatories, supplemental answers to plaintiff's interrogatories, and the deposition of Dr. Killeffer, filed as part of a supplemental exhibit, did not indicate any fault attributable to a third party.

Section 85-5-7(7) requires the trier of fact to apportion fault among joint tortfeasors.

City of Ellisville v. Richardson · filed 2005-04-28(7)

Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7 requires the trier of fact to apportion fault.

Section 85-5-7 allows a jury to apportion fault to an immune nonparty.

Ghane v. Mid-South Institute of Self Defense Shooting, Inc. · filed 2014-01-16

See Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7 (Rev.2011); Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-15 (Rev.2004); Fielder v. Magnolia Beverage Co., 757 So.2d 925, 933 (Miss.1999). A jury can apportion a percentage of fault even to an immune nonparty.

Section 85-5-7(5) does not require fault to be apportioned to a defendant whose conduct was not a proximate cause of the injury.

Lawanda Hall, Individually and on Behalf of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Donald Hall, Jr., Deceased v. Mitche · filed 2025-09-16(5)

Here the trial court made a finding of fact that the County truck was not a proximate cause. Therefore, there was no need to apportion fault to the County.

Section 85-5-7(7) does not entitle a party to allocate fault to a dismissed codefendant when it offers no evidence supporting that codefendant’s fault at summary judgment.

Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Maranatha Faith Center, Inc. · filed 2004-05-13(7)

Kerr-McGee refers to Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7(7), which states: “In actions involving joint tort-feasors, the trier of fact shall determine the percentage of fault of each party alleged to be at fault.” ... This ruling will prevent an allocation of fault to Sand-erson at trial. Kerr-McGee’s argument on this issue is without merit. ¶ 15. Kerr-McGee failed to “go forward” in the face of an affidavit proving that Sanderson was not responsible for the contamination found on Maranatha’s property.

Section 85-5-7 permits a defendant to present evidence of a third party’s negligence for the jury to consider when apportioning fault.

Jackson v. Parker-Hannifin Corporation · filed 2023-01-11(2)

However, the Court agrees that such evidence of the torch manufacturer’s negligence would certainly be relevant to the ultimate issues of this case and that Defendant is entitled to present its version of the facts. Issues related to apportionment of third-party fault, if any, will be determined by a properly instructed jury. Therefore, Defendant should be permitted to offer evidence of the torch manufacturers’ negligence.

Section 85-5-7 excludes conduct committed with specific wrongful intent from the percentages of fault allocated among joint tortfeasors.

First Investors Corporation v. Rayner · filed 1995-05-04(1)

This is especially evident in light of the fact that the allocation statute, § 85-5-7, would not include Smith's "specific wrongful intent" as a percentage of fault among joint tort-feasors.

Section 85-5-7 excludes conduct committed with specific wrongful intent from the percentages of fault allocated among joint tortfeasors.

First Investors Corp. v. Rayner · filed 1999-05-06(1)

This is especially evident in light of the fact that the allocation statute, § 85-5-7, would not include Smith's "specific wrongful intent" as a percentage of fault among joint tort-feasors.

Section 85-5-7(7) allocates fault only among at-fault parties, excluding intentional tortfeasors even when they helped cause the injury.

Dawson v. Townsend & Sons, Inc. · filed 1999-06-08(7)

Yet whether an intentional tortfeasor is joined or not, those parties to an event who are at "fault," including potentially a plaintiff, are responsible for one hundred percent of the damages. The allocation under section 85-5-7(7) should be solely to the at-fault parties.

Section 85-5-7 does not apply to causes of action arising before its July 1, 1989 effective date.

Pickering v. Industria Masina I Traktora (Imt) · filed 1996-12-06

The cause of action in the present case arose prior to the July 1, 1989 effective date of § 85-5-7, and the holding in Wood is, accordingly, clearly applicable to the case at bar.

Section 85-5-7 permits a jury instruction on whether a defendant caused an injury to be given separately from an instruction apportioning fault between joint tortfeasors.

Lanice Fielder v. Magnolia Beverage Company · filed 1996-12-19

The instruction offered by the plaintiffs for determining whether MBC's negligence in any way caused Bobbie's injuries satisfied § 85-5-7. The instruction merely stated that the jury should find that Bobbie was entitled to recover from MBC if it found that MBC's negligence in any way caused her injuries. The instruction did not provide that MBC was responsible for all of Bobbie's recoverable damages. And any apportionment of fault between MBC and Lanice, as joint tortfeasors towards Bobbie, could have been handled in a separate jury instruction.

Section 85-5-7 requires the jury to allocate fault to each party alleged to be at fault, using instructions that allow it to assess each defendant separately.

Beverly Enterprises, Inc. v. Reed · filed 2007-07-26

The evidence established that BEM and BEI were separate entities, therefore, each corporation should have been judged by the jury according to the evidence and law specifically applicable to each as a putative joint tortfeasor. See Fielder v. Magnolia Bev. Co., 757 So.2d 925, 932-934 (Miss.1999) (jury instruction should allow for apportionment of fault between joint tortfeasors); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tackett, 841 So.2d 1107, 1116-17 (Miss.2003) (stating that under Mississippi Code Section 85-5-7, trier of fact should allocate fault to each party alleged to be at fault). Instructions segregating the claims of duty, breach, causation, and damages against each Defendant were required but were not given.

A party who denies in discovery that another person contributed to the injury may waive the right to an apportionment instruction under Section 85-5-7.

Candice Young v. Guild · filed 2004-08-24

Young stated in a discovery response that no heir had exacerbated Hancock’s mental illness. Young provides no other theory as to how an heir could be held partially responsible for the suicide. Thus, Young’s denial is binding on her, and waives her right to an apportionment instruction.

A party can waive the right to an apportionment instruction by denying in discovery that another person contributed to the injury.

Young v. Guild · filed 2009-04-23

Young’s denial in her discovery response was binding on her; she waived her right to an apportionment instruction.

Section 85-5-7 requires the trier of fact to allocate fault to each party alleged to be at fault, so jury instructions must permit separate findings for each defendant.

Beverly Enterprises, Inc v. Reed · filed 2005-03-08

The evidence established that BEM and BEI were separate entities, therefore, each corporation should have been judged by the jury according to the evidence and law specifically applicable to each as a putative joint tortfeasor. See Fielder v. Magnolia Bev. Co., 757 So. 2d 925, 932-934 (Miss. 1999) (jury instruction should allow for apportionment of fault between joint tortfeasors); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tackett, 841 So. 2d 1107, 1116-17 (Miss. 2003) (stating that under Mississippi Code Section 85-5-7, trier of fact should allocate fault to each party alleged to be at fault). Instructions segregating the claims of duty, breach, causation, and damages against each Defendant were required but were not given.

Section 85-5-7(3) treats an employer and employee as one defendant when the employee caused the liability, so fault is not apportioned between them.

Coho Resources, Inc. v. McCarthy · filed 1997-10-14(3)

The Stroos correctly respond that the statute does not permit apportionment of liability between an employer and employee, because they "shall be considered one (1) defendant" when the liability has been caused by the employee.

Section 85-5-7(2) does not bar recovery from an employee for the employee’s own negligence when the employer and employee are considered one defendant for fault allocation.

Reed v. Walmart Inc. · filed 2025-02-18(2)

The Court therefore rejects Walmart’s argument that Miss. Code Ann. § 85-5-7(2) forecloses any possibility of recovery from Rodgers.

Section 85-5-7 permits apportionment of damages caused by negligence, but not damages arising from breach of contract.

Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Tarmac Roofing Systems, Inc. · filed 2002-01-07

Because IFIC was liable for breach of contract, and § 85-5-7’s apportionment provision only applies to damages incurred due to negligence, the district court’s decision not to apportion is correct.

Section 85-5-7(2) limits a defendant’s liability to its percentage of the total damages found by the jury, including noneconomic damages.

Mississippi Valley Silica Company, Inc. v. Barnett · filed 2016-08-23(2)

The trial court’s judgment also complies with section 85-5-7(2) because it holds Valley liable for precisely thirty-five percent of the total noneconomic damages found by the jury.

When a defendant’s fault exceeds 50%, Section 85-5-7(3) limits its liability to its proportionate share of total damages; subsection (2) cannot be added to expand joint and several liability.

Classic Coach, Inc. v. Johnson · filed 2002-08-01(2), (3)

The trial court erred when he applied Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7 (1999). Miss.Code Ann. §§ 85-5-7(2) and 85-5-7(3) were not meant to be used in conjunction to expand joint and several liability. Classic Coach was found 54% liable and is thus responsible under Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7(3) (1999) for 54% of the Johnsons' and McBrides' total damages.

Section 85-5-7(2) makes defendants collectively jointly and severally liable for up to 50% of a judgment, so one defendant’s payment reduces the amount the others owe toward that share.

Narkeeta Timber Company, Inc. v. Jenkins · filed 1999-05-21(2)

Implementing the statute here, these defendants are jointly and severally liable for up to 50% of the judgment. Therefore, Narkeeta and McCallum have satisfied the judgment against them because 50% of the total judgment has been paid to the plaintiffs.

Section 85-5-7(2) excludes the plaintiff’s share of fault when calculating recoverable damages and requires joint and several liability sufficient for the plaintiff to recover 50% of those damages.

DePriest v. Barber · filed 2000-02-10(2)

However, the plaintiff's share of fault should never be used to fulfill the requisite 50% of recoverable damages under Miss. Code Ann. § 85-5-7(2) (1999).

Section 85-5-7(6) preserves joint and several liability for defendants who deliberately act together, while allowing credit for a settlement payment toward the same injury.

Brown v. North Jackson Nissan, Inc. · filed 2003-09-30(6)

While there can be no doubt that North Jackson Nissan and Graham were jointly and severally liable for the entire verdict returned by the jury based on common law principles as preserved and carried forward in Section 85-5-7(6), there can also be no doubt that nothing in Section 85-5-7 has modified the common law principle that an injured party is entitled to but one recovery on his claim. Since this case was submitted to the jury on instructions to return a verdict reflecting the entirety of Brown's damages in conversion, the defendants suffering a judgment in that amount are entitled to credit for sums already received in partial satisfaction of that same claim by way of settlement with others alleged to have participated in causing the injury.

Section 85-5-7(3) limits a joint tortfeasor’s liability to its percentage of fault applied to the total damages awarded.

Callahan v. Ledbetter · filed 2008-09-09(3)

Therefore, Lee County was only liable for the portion of fault assigned to it applied to the total amount of damages awarded to Holst. In the instant case, this amounted to 65% of $40,000, or $26,000.

Section 85-5-7 requires proximate cause before fault may be allocated and a consciously pursued common plan or design to commit a tortious act before joint and several liability may be imposed.

Causey v. Sanders · filed 2008-10-23(1), (4)

Assuming arguendo that UMC was negligent, proximate cause must be satisfied for fault to be allocated pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated 85-5-7(1)[5] and it must be proved that UMC and Dr. Causey consciously and deliberately pursued a common plan or design to commit a tortious act before joint and several liability may be imposed. See Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7(4) (Supp.2008).[6] There is no evidence that UMC actually took part in Dr. Causey's decision to switch the medication to Dilaudid, or to establish the dosage. ¶ 42. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not err in not issuing an allocation of fault instruction.

Subsection (2) requires joint and several liability when two or more persons cause damages, but limits it to fifty percent of recoverable damages.

Robinson Property Group, Limited Partnership v. McCalman · filed 2009-03-19(2)

Subsection 2 not only allowed, but actually required – as indicated by the word “shall” – joint and several liability where, as in this case, “damages [are] caused ... by two (2) or more persons.” But subsection 2’s joint and several liability was limited to fifty percent of “recoverable damages.”

Under the version of Section 85-5-7 in effect when the claim accrued, subsection (2) required joint and several liability for damages caused by two or more persons, limited to fifty percent of recoverable damages.

Robinson Property Group, Ltd. Partnership v. McCalman · filed 2011-01-13(2)

Subsection 2 not only allowed, but actually required — as indicated by the word “shall” — joint and several liability where, as in this case, “damages [are] caused by two (2) or more persons.” But subsection 2’s joint and several liability was limited to fifty percent of “recoverable damages.”

Section 85-5-7(2) requires liability to be allocated among tortfeasors in proportion to their fault when they did not collude to commit a tortious act.

Borne v. Estate of Carraway · filed 2013-07-18(2)

The chancellor did not find that the City, the Lake Owner Defendants, and ELA had colluded to commit a tortious act. Therefore, the imposition of joint and several liability was not permitted under Section 85-5-7(2).

Section 85-5-7(2) limits a joint tortfeasor’s liability to its percentage of fault; when crediting a settlement, the court subtracts the settlement from total damages before applying that percentage.

Pettway v. Circle S. Irrigation, Inc. · filed 2021-12-02(2)

Mississippi law provides that “a joint tortfeasor shall be liable only for the amount of damages allocated to him in direct proportion to his percentage of fault.” Miss. Code Ann. § 85-5-7(2). ... The Court, therefore, defaults to the oft-endorsed settlement-first approach.

Section 85-5-7(2) makes each defendant liable for damages in proportion to that defendant’s share of fault; a settlement with another defendant gives no credit when the jury assigns that defendant no fault.

Robb v. McLaughlin · filed 2023-09-26(2)

He was liable for the amount of damages allocated by the jury. ... The jury was properly instructed under Mississippi law and found MSRB at no fault and allocated no damages to MSRB. ... Robb is not entitled to any credit from the settlement between McLaughlin and MSRB.

Section 85-5-7 imposes joint and several liability to the extent of a proven civil conspiracy.

Mills · filed 2026-03-03

Should the Receiver prevail on her civil conspiracy claim, for example, joint and several liability would attach to the extent of the conspiracy she proves.

Section 85-5-7(4) gives a jointly liable defendant a right of contribution only when there is a joint judgment against the defendants.

Coleman Powermate, Inc. v. Rheem Manufacturing Company · filed 2002-11-06(4)

Mississippi law now explicitly confers a right of contribution in tort to a defendant that is jointly liable with another party. Miss. Code Ann. § 85-5-7(4). This is contingent on there being a joint judgment against the defendants.

Section 85-5-7(4) permits contribution only against tortfeasors made parties to the action, with each defendant responsible only for its assessed percentage of fault.

In Re North American Refractories Co. · filed 2002-06-28(4)

As noted earlier, Mississippi law provides for a right of contribution only as to defendants who are made party to the suit. Movants argue that notwithstanding Debtors’ absence from the state court suit Debtors’ liability will be determined against them anyway under Mississippi law. Mississippi law provides to the contrary. Mississippi Code Ann. § 85-5-7(4) provides that a “defendant shall be held responsible for contribution to other joint tortfeasors only for the percentage of fault assessed to such defendant.”

Section 85-5-7(4) gives a jointly liable defendant a right of contribution only when there is a joint judgment against the defendants.

Coleman Powermate, Inc. v. Rheem Mfg. Co. · filed 2004-08-19(4)

Mississippi law now explicitly confers a right of contribution in tort to a defendant that is jointly liable with another party. Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7(4). This is contingent on there being a joint judgment against the defendants. Estate of Hunter v. General Motors Corp., 729 So.2d 1264, 1275-76 (Miss.1999). However, Rheem has conceded that, based on this statute, it is not eligible for contribution because there has been no judgment entered against it.

Section 85-5-7 permits contribution among joint tortfeasors only when a joint judgment has been entered against them.

Travelers Property & Casualty Co. of America v. City of Greenwood Fire Department · filed 2006-08-01

... the Supreme Court has interpreted the subsequently enacted § 85-5-7 as providing for contribution only in cases where a joint judgment is obtained among the parties. ... The court therefore concludes that plaintiffs have no right to seek contribution from the Greenwood Fire Department in this case.

Section 85-5-7 did not eliminate Mississippi’s rule barring contribution absent a joint judgment among the parties.

Hill v. General Insurance Co. of America · filed 2006-08-21

Farm Bureau’s failure to explicitly mention contribution in its complaint is understandable, given that it is well established that such a cause of action simply does not exist under Mississippi law absent a joint judgment among the parties which is clearly not present here. In Estate of Hunter v. GM, 729 So.2d 1264, 1276 (Miss.1999), the Mississippi Supreme Court made it clear that while this traditional Mississippi rule barring contribution is arguably unfair, it nevertheless remains the law in this state following the enactment of Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7.

Section 85-5-7 requires fault to be allocated to a plaintiff whose negligence proximately contributed to an injury.

Mississippi Dept. of Transp. v. Trosclair · filed 2003-07-29

Those who are negligent and proximately contribute to an injury should be allocated a percentage of fault. Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7 (Rev.1999). The comparative negligence principle includes allocation of fault to a plaintiff. Based on the evidence before us, the failure to allocate at least some of the fault to Bridget rises to the level of manifest error.

Fault may be allocated under § 85-5-7(1) only when the person's act or omission proximately caused the injury.

William A. Causey, M.D. v. Reitha Sanders · filed 2006-08-15(1)

Assuming arguendo that UMC was negligent, proximate cause must be satisfied for fault to be allocated pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated 85-5-7(1) 5 and it must be proved that UMC and Dr. Causey consciously and deliberately pursued a common plan or design to commit a tortious act before joint and several liability may be imposed.

Fault is allocated only to parties whose conduct proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury; a finding of only one proximate cause assigns no fault to another party.

City of Jackson, Mississippi v. Spann · filed 2007-06-11(1), (5)

To recover damages in a negligence suit, a plaintiff must establish that the damage was proximately caused by the negligent act of the defendant(s). Glover v. Jackson State Univ., 968 So. 2d 1267, 1277 (Miss. 2007); Miss. Code Ann. § 85-5-7 (1), (5) (Rev. 1999) (fault is allocated only to the party(s) which proximately caused the injury to the plaintiff). ... We further find that the circuit court did not fail to address the comparative fault of Jenkins, but simply assigned one hundred percent fault to the City. The circuit court did not set forth specific percentages of fault either to the City or to Jenkins, but clearly held that the Officers were “the proximate cause[]” of the accident. By finding only one proximate cause, the circuit court implicitly assigned no fault to Jenkins.

Section 85-5-7 requires a verdict form permitting allocation of fault to each party whose fault is supported by the evidence.

Baker & McKenzie LLP v. Evans · filed 2013-10-17

Thus, we find that the evidence at trial supported an allocation of fault to either Plaintiffs, Cross-Plaintiffs, the Baker Defendants, or Cagle. And this triggered Mississippi’s comparative fault law and required a verdict form permitting an allocation of fault to each. Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7 (Rev. 2011).

Section 85-5-7(5) permits a jury to assign fault to a participant in an occurrence even if that person is not a party to the lawsuit.

Brewer v. Kemp Bush · filed 2022-05-24(5)

Here, because the evidence at trial would have permitted the jury to assign fault to Busby, the trial judge did not err by including Busby on one of the verdict forms.

Section 85-5-7 defines comparative fault as an act or omission that proximately causes injury, and its list of forms of fault is nonexclusive.

FAMILY DOLLAR STORES OF MS. v. Montgomery · filed 2006-12-12

A statute defines comparative fault as "an act or omission of a person which is a proximate cause of injury" to another, "including, but not limited to, negligence, malpractice, strict liability, absolute liability or failure to warn." Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7 (Supp.2006). This statutory list indicates by the word "including" that it is non-exclusive.

Section 85-5-7 allocates fault only to parties whose conduct proximately caused the injury; a finding of one proximate cause implicitly assigns no fault to other parties.

City of Jackson v. Spann · filed 2009-01-22(1), (5)

To recover damages in a negligence suit, a plaintiff must establish that the damage was proximately caused by the negligent act of the defendant(s). Glover v. Jackson State Univ., 968 So.2d 1267, 1277 (Miss.2007); Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7(1), (5) (Rev.1999) (fault is allocated only to the party(s) which proximately caused the injury to the plaintiff). ... We further find that the circuit court did not fail to address the compara*1034tive fault of Jenkins, but simply assigned one hundred percent fault to the City.

Section 85-5-7(2) places the burden of proving comparative negligence on the defendant.

Wiggins v. P & S Transportation LLC · filed 2021-06-10(2)

The burden of proving the affirmative defense of comparative negligence lies squarely upon the Defendant. See Miss. Code Ann. § 85-5-7(2)4; see also Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Ernst & Young LLP, 542 F.3d 475, 490 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that Section 85–5–7 is an affirmative defense; the defendant bears the burden of providing proof sufficient to establish fault attributable to a third party).

Allocation of fault under § 85-5-7 is an affirmative defense that the defendant must plead and prove.

Whittington · filed 2025-12-05

Although the Mississippi Supreme Court applied Mississippi’s rules regarding summary judgment, the same principles—namely that apportionment under Miss. Code Ann. § 85-5-7 is an affirmative defense that must be pled and proven—counsel in favor of granting summary judgment under the federal rule here.

Section 85-5-7 permits fault to be apportioned to a fleeing driver whose conduct proximately caused an injury, even if the driver did not collide with the injured person.

Mary Luckett and Gary Luckett v. Leake County, Mississippi and Chiquitta M. Cooks (Fortune) · filed 2026-02-03(1), (5)

Although we acknowledge that in this case and the other cases cited by the circuit court, the fleeing suspect—not the pursuing officer—collided with the plaintiff(s), the cases nevertheless demonstrate that fault may be apportioned between the suspect and the municipality/officer, regardless of which party came in actual contact with the plaintiff(s).

Section 85-5-7 creates a substantive right to allocation of fault, but it does not require Mississippi courts to apply that rule when another state’s law governs.

Dale v. Ala Acquisitions I, Inc. · filed 2006-05-26

Moreover, the court is not persuaded that § 85-5-7 represents a “fundamental” or “deeply ingrained” public policy of this state.