Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3

Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(I) permits venue in specified defendant-residence/business or substantial-act/injury-event counties, while subsection (1)(b) permits suit in the plaintiff’s county of residence or domicile against a nonresident only when subsection (1)(a) cannot establish venue.

Ramsey v. Auburn University · filed 2016-02-25(1)(a)(I), (1)(b)

Mississippi’s venue statute provides four permissible venue options for “[c]ivil actions of which the circuit court has original jurisdiction”: (1) “the county where the defendant resides,” or (2) “if a corporation, . . . the county of its principal place of business,” or (3) “the county where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred,” or (4) the county “where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(1)(a)(I) (Rev. 2004). If a plaintiff cannot establish venue under one of these four criteria against a nonresident defendant, “a civil action against a nonresident may be commenced in the county where the plaintiff resides or is domiciled.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(1)(b) (Rev. 2004). ... In light of this Court’s holdings in Myers and Wood, Ramsey’s receipt of mail at his residence and his signing of his National Letter of Intent in Madison County, standing alone, are insufficient to create venue in Madison County. ... But the county of the plaintiff’s residence or domicile is relevant for the purpose of determining venue under present Mississippi law, specifically, Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3(1)(b). Section 11-11-3(1)(b) is relevant only when venue cannot be established in Mississippi under Section 11-11-3(1)(a). ... If true, this would create venue in Madison County because Madison County then would be a place “where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred.” ... Because Defendant Kevin Yoxall does not reside in Madison County, Mississippi, because Defendant Auburn University is not incorporated or situated in Madison County, Mississippi, and because Ramsey has not articulated that the defendants either committed a “substantial alleged act or omission” or that “a substantial event that caused the injury occurred” in Madison County, Mississippi, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Madison County, Mississippi, was not the proper venue for Ramsey’s suit under Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(I). ... Because no credible evidence exists, either alleged in the complaint or in supporting affidavits, to suggest that Ramsey was a resident or domiciliary of Mississippi at the time the complaint was filed, venue was improper in Madison County, Mississippi.

Section 11-11-3 requires an action involving a physical invasion of land, even when labeled nuisance, to be treated as local in nature and venued in the county where the land is located.

Donald v. Amoco Production Company · filed 1997-09-09

Here, Donald alleges an actual physical invasion of the subject property, although he labels it a "nuisance" cause of action. Therefore, this action is "in the nature of one for trespass to realty" and is thus subject to the local action doctrine of Section 11-11-3. Hence, the Hinds County Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in transferring the venue of this case to Wayne County where the property is located.

Section 11-11-3 requires an action based on a physical invasion of real property, even when labeled nuisance, to be brought in the county where the property is located.

Donald v. Amoco Production Co. · filed 1999-03-25

Here, Donald alleges an actual physical invasion of the subject property, although he labels it a "nuisance" cause of action. Therefore, this action is "in the nature of one for trespass to realty" and is thus subject to the local action doctrine of Section 11-11-3. Hence, the Hinds County Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in transferring the venue of this case to Wayne County where the property is located. Likewise, the Wayne County Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration of the venue transfer issue.

The version of section 11-11-3 discussed by the court confined the local action jurisdiction rule to listed circuit court land claims, leaving venue waivable in this chancery title dispute.

Hodnett v. Hodnett · filed 2018-04-17

But Donald was founded on section 11-11-3 of the Mississippi Code, which at that time expressly limited circuit courts’ jurisdiction over “actions of trespass on land, ejectment and actions for the statutory penalty for cutting and boxing trees” to the county in which the affected land was situated. ... We conclude that venue was not jurisdictional in this case, and Sarah waived any objection to the suit being heard in Sharkey County.

Section 11-11-3 permits venue where a legitimate defendant resides or where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred; venue is improper when the resident defendant lacks a reasonable claim of liability.

Austin v. Wells · filed 2004-06-07

Accordingly, we turn to Miss. Code Ann. Section 11-11-3, which provides that venue will lie in a county where a legitimate defendant resides or where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred. ... Because the Wellses failed to establish a proper factual basis to support a reasonable claim of liability against JCH, we find that venue in Jefferson County is improper.

Section 11-11-3 gives a defendant the right to be sued in a county of proper venue where a legitimate defendant resides.

Jewel Christian v. McDonald · filed 2003-08-18

Christian and Magee have asserted their right under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3 (2001) to be sued in a county of proper venue; in this case, a county where a legitimate defendant may be found. The only counties in Mississippi which qualify under § 11-11-3, are Walthall County, which is Magee’s county of residence, and Pike County, which is Christian’s county of residence.

Section 11-11-3 places venue in the county where a defendant resides.

Guy v. State · filed 2005-11-22

Venue is appropriate in the county in which a defendant resides. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-3 (Rev.2004). Therefore, the Circuit Court of Greene County was the appropriate venue for Guy's petition.

Section 11-11-3 permits a separate action to renew a judgment to be brought where the defendant resides.

Lloyd v. Bank of the South · filed 1999-11-23

If however, a separate action is brought, it may be brought wherever venue is proper, including, where the defendant resides.

Section 11-11-3 makes the general venue locations mandatory, so when a resident defendant is joined with a nonresident defendant, the plaintiff cannot keep the action in the plaintiff’s home county merely because of the nonresident defendant.

Baptist Memorial Hospital-Desoto, Inc. v. Bailey · filed 2004-02-27

As in Capital City Ins. Co., the issue here centers on the mandatory “shall” language in Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3.3 The venue statutes which control this case were never designed to remove a resident defendant’s right to be sued in his or her own county of residence. Moreover, the Legislature never intended an interpretation of the venue statutes that would allow a resident defendant to be sued in the plaintiff’s county of residence simply because a non-resident defendant, be it an individual or a corporation is joined in the same suit. The reasoning and logic in Capital City Ins. Co. control the case sub judice.

Section 11-11-3 is mandatory and applies when there is a resident defendant, governing the available venue for the action.

Snyder v. Logan · filed 2003-06-09

Because there is a resident defendant (Logan Insurance Agency) in the case sub judice, the general venue statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3, shall apply.

Section 11-11-3 requires a civil action to be filed where a resident defendant resides or where the alleged act, omission, or injurious event occurred, and does not permit filing in the plaintiff's home county when a resident defendant is joined with a nonresident defendant.

Baptist Memorial Hospital-DeSoto, Inc. v. Bailey · filed 2005-06-02

The venue statutes which control this case were never designed to remove a resident defendant's right to be sued in his or her own county of residence. Moreover, the Legislature never intended an interpretation of the venue statutes that would allow a resident defendant to be sued in the plaintiff's county of residence simply because a non-resident defendant, be it an individual or a corporation is joined in the same suit.

Section 11-11-3 permits venue against a corporate defendant in its principal-place-of-business county or where a substantial alleged act, omission, or injury-causing event occurred, and permits venue in the plaintiff's county of residence or domicile when paragraph (a) does not apply.

Canadian National/Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Smith · filed 2005-07-18(1)(a)(I), (1)(b)

Our current statute, which was in effect when the complaint was filed, provides that venue for a suit against a corporate defendant would be proper “in the county of its principal place of business, or in the county where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred or where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3 (1)(a)(I) (Supp. 2004). The statute further provides that “[i]f venue in a civil action against a nonresident defendant cannot be asserted under paragraph (a) . . . [it] may be commenced in the county where the plaintiff resides or is domiciled.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3 (1)(b). ... We find the amended complaint woefully inadequate in alleging sufficient information to establish venue.

Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(I) permits a suit against a corporation in its principal-place-of-business county or where a substantial act, omission, or injury-causing event occurred, while subsection (1)(b) permits suit in the plaintiff's county of residence or domicile when subsection (a) cannot establish venue.

CANADIAN NAT./ILL. CENT. R. CO. v. Smith · filed 2006-02-23(1)(a)(I), (1)(b)

Plaintiffs also assert that venue is proper in the First Judicial District of Hinds County pursuant to Section 11-11-3. Our current statute, which was in effect when the complaint was filed, provides that venue for a suit against a corporate defendant would be proper "in the county of its principal place of business, or in the county where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred or where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred." Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-3(1)(a)(I) (Supp. 2004). The statute further provides that "[i]f venue in a civil action against a nonresident defendant cannot be asserted under paragraph (a) . . . [it] may be commenced in the county where the plaintiff resides or is domiciled." Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-3(1)(b). ... We find the amended complaint woefully inadequate in alleging sufficient information to establish venue. We further find it fails to comply with the requirements announced in Mangialardi. Therefore, we are unable to say at this point whether any of the five plaintiffs are properly before the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County.

Section 11-11-3 permits venue in a county where a legitimate defendant resides or where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred, and allows transfer when the action is filed in an improper county.

Austin v. Wells · filed 2006-01-19

The procedure for determining venue in Mississippi is well-defined. Moreover, Miss. R. Civ. P. 82(b) provides that "[e]xcept as provided by this rule, venue of all actions shall be as provided by statute." Stated differently, the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure generally defer to legislative instruction for the purposes of determining venue. Accordingly, we turn to Miss.Code Ann. Section 11-11-3, which provides that venue will lie in a county where a legitimate defendant resides or where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred.

Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i) permits venue where a defendant resides, where a corporation has its principal place of business, or where a substantial alleged act or omission or injury-causing event occurred; merely experiencing the effects of an act or omission in a county is insufficient.

American Family Life Assurance of Columbus v. Ellison · filed 2007-08-28(1)(a)(i)

Thus, according to the plain language of the statute, Ellison may set venue in either: (1) the county where the defendant resides; (2) the county of a corporation’s principal place of business; or (3) the county “where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred or where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred.” ... However, in searching the record for activity which occurred in Smith County, we find only that Ellison was in Smith County when he was informed of the denial of insurance benefits. We previously have held that simply experiencing the effects of an act or omission in a county is insufficient to establish venue. ... Therefore, according to the plain language of section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i), venue is proper only in Rankin County.

Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(I) places venue in the county of a resident defendant or where a substantial alleged act or omission or injury-causing event occurred; here, the accident made Rankin County proper and Hinds County improper.

Holmes v. McMillan · filed 2008-06-20(1)(a)(I)

That being said, pursuant to Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i), venue is proper in Rankin County. ... Pursuant to Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(I), this Court holds that the plaintiff cannot establish venue in Hinds County pursuant to any basis provided for in the statute for the following reasons: (1) Holmes, the resident defendant, resided in Rankin County at the time of the accident; (2) corporate defendant State Farm’s principal place of business is in Bloomington, Illinois, i.e., outside of Mississippi; (3) under the facts of this case, the communications received in Hinds County by McMillan between himself and State Farm are not sufficient to show that a “substantial alleged act or omission occurred” in Hinds County, pursuant to ... and (4) the accident -- which certainly occurred in Rankin County-- is “a substantial event that caused the injury.” ... The venue statute says nothing about who happens to own the property where an automobile accident occurs; nor does it concern itself with whose police officers respond to the accident scene. Therefore, venue for the action against Holmes is not proper in Hinds County, but rather in Rankin County.

Section 11-11-3 applies to administrative-review claims under Section 47-5-807, with venue proper where the defendant resides or where a substantial alleged act or omission or substantial injury-causing event occurred.

Putnam v. Epps · filed 2010-03-26(1)(a)(I)

This Court finds that Section 11-11-3 applies to claims brought pursuant to Section 47-5-807 of the administrative-review-procedure statutes. ... Therefore, venue is proper in the First Judicial District of Hinds County, not in Yazoo County.

Section 11-11-3 permits venue where the defendant resides or has its principal place of business, or where a substantial alleged act or omission or substantial injury-causing event occurred; a plaintiff’s mere receipt of documents is not such an event.

Wilkerson v. Goss · filed 2011-10-21(1)(a)(i)

Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3 is a plain and unambiguous statute that should be applied according to its plain meaning. ... Our venue statute “lays out four venue options from which plaintiffs can choose when filing a lawsuit.” ... Thus, in addition to where a defendant resides or has a principal place of business, the Gosses could have filed suit “where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred” or “where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred.” ... Furthermore, “even if an act or omission did not cause the injury, it can nevertheless establish venue if it is both substantial and alleged by the plaintiff.” ... We find that, just as in Myers, the Gosses’ mere receipt of the documents in Smith County was a “passive function” of their presence there and not a substantial event causing the damages they claim.

Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i) permits venue where a defendant resides, where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred, or where a substantial event causing the injury occurred; receipt or processing of communications in a county is not by itself a substantial act establishing venue.

Pam Wood v. Safeway Insurance Company · filed 2011-12-15(1)(a)(i)

Mississippi’s general venue statute, Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3, reads in pertinent part as follows: ... Civil actions of which the circuit court has original jurisdiction shall be commenced [1] in the county where the defendant resides, . . . or [2] in the county where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred or [3] where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred. ... All agree that the defendants reside in Smith County. Thus, under [1], Smith County is a permissible venue. The county where a substantial event (car accident) that caused injury occurred also is Smith. Thus, under [3], Smith County is a permissible venue. Since all defendants reside in Smith County, and the accident occurred in Smith County, venue would be proper in Rankin County only if that county is “where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred[,]” under [2].

Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i) permits a civil action in the county where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred; failure to make required payments at a designated address can constitute such an omission.

Buchanan v. Hope Federal Credit Union · filed 2023-02-21(1)(a)(i)

Under Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-11-3 (Rev. 2019), our general venue statute, venue is held to be proper as follows: ... By failing to make payments to HFCU at the specified address, which was the place where the loan went into default, Buchanan made a substantial omission, breaching his obligations under the Guaranty. The address designated in the loan documents was located within Rankin County. Thus, the record indicates that Buchanan’s substantial omission was in Rankin County. We find that the record contains “some credible evidence” to support HFCU’s choice of Rankin County Circuit Court as the venue for its action to confirm the arbitration award against Buchanan and find no abuse of discretion.

For a prisoner’s complaint under Section 47-5-807, venue is proper in the county where a defendant resides or where a substantial act or event causing the injury occurred, rather than automatically where the prisoner is housed.

Jessie D. Boyett, Jr. v. Burl Cain, MDOC Commissioner, MDOC Director of Offender Services, MDOC Classification Director, · filed 2024-12-05(1)(a)(i)

We take this opportunity to clarify that when a prisoner brings a complaint pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 47-5-807 (Rev. 2023), venue is proper (1) in the county where a defendant resides, not the prisoner, and (2) in the county where a substantial act or event that caused the injury occurred. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(1)(a)(i) (Rev. 2019).

Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i) permits venue where a defendant resides, a corporation has its principal place of business, or a substantial alleged act, omission, or injury-causing event occurred; merely receiving notice of an insurance-benefit denial in the plaintiff’s county is not enough.

American Family Life Assurance of Columbus v. Ellison · filed 2009-02-19(1)(a)(i)

Thus, according to the plain language of the statute, Ellison may set venue in either: (1) the county where the defendant resides; (2) the county of a corporation’s principal place of business; or (3) the county “where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred or where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred.” ... We previously have held that simply experiencing the effects of an act or omission in a county is insufficient to establish venue. ... Therefore, according to the plain language of section 11 — 11—3(l)(a)(i), venue is proper only in Rankin County.

Subsection (3) overrides subsection (1) and requires suits against medical providers for malpractice or negligence to be brought only in the county where the alleged act or omission occurred.

O. Tuck Adams v. Baptist Memorial Hospital-Desoto, Inc. · filed 2006-02-22(3)

“The “notwithstanding” language is clear. Regardless of Goldstrike’s joinder as a defendant, the only proper venue for a suit against medical providers is the county in which the alleged act or omission occurred.”

For malpractice and similar claims against the listed medical providers and liable entities, venue lies only in the county where the alleged act or omission occurred.

Forrest Gen. Hosp., J. Keith Thompson, Hattiesburg Clinic, Grif A. Leek & S. Miss. Emergency Physicians, P.A. v. Steven · filed 2018-04-19(3)

Suits against HC, SMEP, Thompson and Leek all are governed by Section 11-11-3(3), which requires that they be sued "only in the county in which the alleged act or omission occurred."

Subsection (3) makes the medical-provider venue rule control over subsection (1), requiring suits against medical providers to be brought in the county where the alleged act or omission occurred, even when other defendants are joined.

Adams v. BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL-DESOTO · filed 2007-08-16(3)

The "notwithstanding" language is clear. Regardless of Goldstrike's joinder as a defendant, the only proper venue for a suit against medical providers is the county in which the alleged act or omission occurred.

Section 11-11-3(3) requires a medical-malpractice action to be filed in the county where the alleged negligence occurred.

Pringle v. Kramer · filed 2008-12-29(3)

Madison County was an appropriate venue on August 30, 2004, but on and after September 1, 2004, medical malpractice actions were required by the legislature to be filed in the county where the alleged negligence occurred. Miss. Code Ann. §11-11-3(3) (Rev. 2004). Because the original suit has been dismissed, and because this action was filed on February 7, 2008, after the venue statute was amended, Rankin County is the appropriate venue.

Section 11-11-3(3) requires a medical-malpractice action against a licensed physician to be brought only in the county where the alleged act or omission occurred, but its mandatory wording does not make venue immune from waiver.

Fredericks v. Malouf · filed 2009-07-16(3)

When the Maloufs filed their amended complaint, Section 11-11-3 had been amended specifically to address actions filed against physicians: “[A]ny action against a licensed physician . . . for malpractice, negligence, error, omission, mistake, breach of standard of care or the unauthorized rendering of professional services shall be brought only in the county in which the alleged act or omission occurred.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(3) (Rev. 2004) (emphasis added). ... The language in effect at the time the Maloufs filed their amended complaint does not support the Defendants’ position that venue cannot be waived. Many of our statutes, including those governing the statute of limitations, contain similar, mandatory language. We have never held that such language prevents a litigant from waiving a right.

For malpractice claims against private medical defendants, the statute permits venue in each county where an alleged act or omission contributing to an indivisible injury occurred and does not bar permissive joinder or application of Rule 82(c).

Mississippi Baptist Medical Center v. Harkins · filed 2018-02-15(3)

Therefore, where two medical defendants fall within the same category, the Court holds that Section 11-11-3(3) does not contain any language preventing permissive joinder under Rule 20. Further, the plain language does not prevent the application of Rule 82(c).

Section 11-11-3(3) requires malpractice and similar actions against covered medical providers to be brought only in the county where the alleged act or omission occurred.

Forrest General Hospital v. Upton · filed 2018-04-19(3)

Suits against HC, SMEP, Thompson and Leek all are governed by Section 11-11-3(3), which requires that they be sued “only in the county in which the alleged act or omission occurred.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(3); see Adams v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp.-DeSoto, Inc., 965 So. 2d 652, 656 (Miss. 2007) (“[T]he only proper venue for a suit against medical providers is the county in which the alleged act or omission occurred.”)

Subsection (3), as amended effective September 1, 2004, requires a medical-malpractice action to be filed in the county where the alleged negligence occurred.

Pringle v. Kramer · filed 2010-07-29(3)

Madison County was an appropriate venue on August 30, 2004, but on and after September 1, 2004, medical malpractice actions were required by the legislature to be filed in the county where the alleged negligence occurred. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-3(3) (Rev.2004).

Section 11-11-3(3) requires an action alleging medical malpractice or negligence against a listed health-care provider to be brought in the county where the alleged act or omission occurred.

MISSISSIPPI CRIME LABORATORY v. Douglas · filed 2011-09-22(3)

Mississippi Code Section 11-11-8(3) states: Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, any action against a licensed physician, osteopath, dentist, nurse, nurse-practitioner, physician assistant, psychologist, pharmacist, podiatrist, optometrist, chiropractor, institution for the aged or infirm, hospital or licensed pharmacy, including any legal entity which may be liable for their acts or omissions, for malpractice, negligence, error, omission, mistake, breach of standard of care or the unauthorized rendering of professional services shall be brought only in the county in which the alleged act or omission occurred. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-3 (Rev.2004) (emphasis added). Kaddarius received his medical care from Dr. Vig and Hoehn at the Sunshine Medical Clinic located in Canton, Mississippi. The alleged negligence happened at that clinic. Therefore, under Section 11-11-3(3), venue for the claims against the medical-negligence defendants is proper in Madison County, Mississippi.

Subsection (3) requires an action against a licensed physician for malpractice or related professional-liability claims to be brought only in the county where the alleged act or omission occurred, but its mandatory language does not make venue nonwaivable.

Fredericks v. Malouf · filed 2012-01-19(3)

The language in effect at the time the Maloufs filed their amended complaint does not support the Defendants’ position that venue cannot be waived. Many of our statutes, including those governing the statute of limitations, contain similar, mandatory language. We have never held that such language prevents a litigant from waiving a right.

Section 11-11-3(3) requires a medical malpractice action against a licensed physician or an entity liable for the physician’s acts to be brought in the county where the alleged act or omission occurred.

Dot Merchant v. Forest Family Practice Clinic, P.A. · filed 2009-06-11(3)

Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3(3) provides, in pertinent part, that: any action against a licensed physician . . . including any legal entity which may be liable for their acts or omissions, for malpractice, negligence, error, omission, mistake, breach of standard of care or the unauthorized rendering of professional services shall be brought only in the county in which the alleged act or omission occurred. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(3) (Rev. 2004). In this case, the circuit court denied the Estate’s “Motion to Transfer Venue” from that statutorily required forum, but also summoned additional jurors to expand the venire and granted six additional peremptory challenges to each side. Under these circumstances, this Court cannot conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the Estate’s “Motion to Transfer Venue.”

Section 11-11-3(1)(a) provides four mandatory venue options, and subsection (1)(b) applies only when no proper venue is available under subsection (1)(a).

Herman Grant Co., Inc. v. Washington · filed 2017-03-30(1)(a)(i), (1)(b)

Therefore, this Court applies the clear meaning of the statute, laying out the four mandatory venue options for a plaintiff filing a lawsuit. If no proper venue is available under Section 11-11-3(1)(a), only then does Section 11-11-3(1)(b) apply.

Section 11-11-3 allows a corporation only one principal place of business for venue purposes; when venue against a nonresident defendant cannot be established under subsection (1)(a), the plaintiff may sue in the county where the plaintiff resides or is domiciled.

Cleveland Smith v. Kansas City Southern Railway Company · filed 2017-03-30(1)(a)(i), (b)

The statute refers to a corporation’s principal place of business and not to its principal places of business. The term “place” is singular, which indicates that there can be only one. The plain language of the statute reads “if venue in a civil action against a nonresident defendant cannot be asserted . . . a civil action against a nonresident may be commenced in the county where the plaintiff resides or is domiciled.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(1)(b) (emphasis added). Therefore, because KCS is a nonresident defendant with its principal place of business in Kansas City, Missouri, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the case to the Lowndes County Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i) permits venue in any of several qualifying counties, including where a substantial event causing the injury occurred, and more than one county may qualify.

Short v. Versiga · filed 2019-10-03(1)(a)(i)

Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i) (Rev. 2016) provides four permissible venue options for civil actions of which the circuit court has original jurisdiction: “[(1)] in the county where the defendant resides, or, [(2)] if a corporation, in the county of its principal place of business, or [(3)] in the county where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred[,] or [(4)] where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred.” ... While Jackson County is a permissible venue, “the language of [Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i)] acknowledges that venue may be proper in more than one county.”

Section 11-11-3 permits a separate action to renew a judgment wherever venue is proper, including the county where the defendant resides.

Lloyd v. Bank of the South · filed 2001-07-26

If however, a separate action is brought, it may be brought wherever venue is proper, including, where the defendant resides.

Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i) permits venue in the county where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred, including service of garnishment writs in furtherance of an alleged conspiracy.

Carson v. Kimberly (Carson) Linley and Jay Howard Hurdle · filed 2020-03-12(1)(a)(i)

The service of the writs of garnishment in Scott County, Mississippi, is a substantial alleged overt act or omission in furtherance of the alleged unlawful conspiracy to seize Carson’s funds. Moreover, the overt act of serving the writs in Scott County effectuated the alleged unlawful purpose of seizing Carson’s funds. ... Therefore, the Court finds that Linley and Hurdle’s service of the writs in Scott County was a substantial and alleged act done in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to wrongfully seize Carson’s funds.

Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i) permits venue in the county where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred or where a substantial event causing the injury occurred, so a substantial part of a tort occurring in a county can support trying the entire tort there.

Allstate Insurance Company v. Gloria Millsaps, Individually and in her Capacity as the Administrator of the Estate of Wi · filed 2020-05-12(1)(a)(i)

The Mississippi Legislature made the venue statute simple: ... Civil actions of which the circuit court has original jurisdiction shall be commenced in the county where the defendant resides, or, if a corporation, in the county of its principal place of business, or in the county where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred or where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred. ... In essence, the Legislature said that if a “substantial” part of a tort occurred in a county, then all of the tort could be tried in that county.

Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i) permits venue where a defendant resides, where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred, or where a substantial event causing the injury occurred; an accident in Rankin County made Rankin County proper venue, while communications received by the plaintiff in Hinds County were insufficient.

Holmes v. McMillan · filed 2009-11-19(1)(a)(i)

Pursuant to Section 11 — 11— 3(l)(a)(I), this Court holds that the plaintiff cannot establish venue in Hinds County pursuant to any basis provided for in the statute for the following reasons: (1) Holmes, the resident defendant, resided in Rankin County at the time of the accident; (2) corporate defendant State Farm’s principal place of business is in Bloomington, Illinois, i.e., outside of Mississippi; (3) under the facts of this case, the communications received in Hinds County by McMillan between himself and State Farm are not sufficient to show that a “substantial alleged act or omission occurred” in Hinds County, pursuant to this Court’s precedents in Myers3 and Hedgepeth, and (4) the accident — which certainly occurred in Rankin County — is “a substantial event that caused the injury.”

Section 11-11-3 does not establish venue where plaintiffs merely receive allegedly fraudulent documents, because that passive receipt is not a substantial event causing their injury.

Wilkerson v. Goss · filed 2013-05-16(1)(a)(i)

We find that, just as in Myers, the Gosses’ mere receipt of the documents in Smith County was a “passive function” of their presence there and not a substantial event causing the damages they claim.

Section 11-11-3(4)(b) bars dismissal until the defendant files a written stipulation waiving applicable statute-of-limitations defenses as necessary to toll limitations in other states from filing until dismissal.

Oak Creek Investments, LLC v. Atlas FRM LLC d/b/a Atlas Holdings, LLC, New Wood Resources, LLC, Winston Plywood and Vene · filed 2020-11-17(4)(b)

However, subsection (4)(b) provides that ... [a] court may not dismiss a claim under this subsection until the defendant files with the court or with the clerk of the court a written stipulation that, with respect to a new action on the claim commenced by the plaintiff, all the defendants waive the right to assert a statute of limitations defense in all other states of the United States in which the claim was not barred by limitations at the time the claim was filed in this state as necessary to effect a tolling of the limitations periods in those states beginning on the date the claim was filed in this state and ending on the date the claim is dismissed. ... Therefore, we also agree with OCI that the circuit court erred by dismissing the case without first requiring the Winston parties to file a written stipulation regarding tolling pursuant to section 11-11-3(4)(b).

Section 11-11-3(4)(b) requires a defendant to file a written stipulation waiving applicable out-of-state statute-of-limitations defenses before a Mississippi court may dismiss a claim under the forum-non-conveniens provision.

Alston v. Pope · filed 2012-01-31(4)(b)

Section 11 — 11—3(4)(b) provides: A court may not dismiss a claim under this subsection until the defendant files with the court or with the clerk of the court a written stipulation that, with respect to a new action on the claim commenced by the plaintiff, all the defendants waive the right to assert a statute of limitations defense in all other states of the United States in which the claim was not barred by limitations at the time the claim was filed in this state as necessary to effect a tolling of the limitations periods in those states beginning on the date the claim was filed in this state and ending on the date the claim is dismissed. (Emphasis added). ... In the instant case, the Defendants were required to file a written stipulation waiving the statute of limitations defense before the circuit court could dismiss the case on the ground of forum non conveniens. Miss.Code Ann. § 11 — 11— 3(4)(b). The statute does not permit “oral” stipulations. ... The filing of the written stipulation is a condition precedent to dismissal. Therefore, we find that the circuit court’s order is void because the court was without authority to dismiss the case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens prior to the defendant filing the stipulation of waiver.

Section 11-11-3(4)(b) permits the required statute-of-limitations waiver to be established by stipulation language included in the court's filed written forum-non-conveniens dismissal order, rather than only by a separate pre-dismissal stipulation.

Alston v. Pope · filed 2013-03-28(4)(b)

On the question of Section 11 — 11—3(4)(b)’s waiver requirement, we agree with Judge Roberts’s dissent, in that we can see “no substantial distinction between a defendant filing a separate stipulation before a circuit court dismisses a claim based on the ground of forum non conveniens and a defense counsel’s inclusion of the stipulation language in the actual order dismissing a claim on the ground of forum non conveniens.” Alston, 112 So.3d 439 at 450 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Section ll-ll-3(4)(b) simply requires proof that the defendants have waived “any defense that the statute of limitations expired during the time that a claim was pending in the inconvenient forum or the period that remained on the statute of limitations after the tolling effect of the statute ends.” Alston, 112 So.3d 439 at 449 n. 6 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Such proof was established here with the circuit court’s filed written order, drafted by Defendants’ counsel and delivered to the Al-stons’ counsel via fax and mail for preview, with no response or objection interposed from the Alstons’ counsel.

For venue, Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i) places a civil action against a corporation in the county of its actual principal place of business, not merely the address listed in corporate filings.

Weeks, Inc. and D&W Tire and Muffler Company, Inc. v. Lewis · filed 2022-03-24(1)(a)(i)

Instead of venue being dictated by statements made by corporations, we find the proper course is to follow the plain language of the statute and base venue on the corporation’s “principal place of business.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(1)(a)(i) (emphasis added).

Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i) permits a civil action within circuit-court jurisdiction to be filed where the defendant resides or where a substantial alleged act, omission, or injury-causing event occurred.

Neal v. Burl Cain, MDOC Commissioner and Kevin Jackson, MDOC Records Director · filed 2024-06-25(1)(a)(i)

Therefore, courts look to Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-11-3 (Rev. 2019) to determine venue. ... The Putnam court held that this statute applies to section 47-5-807 (Rev. 2015), which addresses the administrative review procedure. ... Subsequent caselaw has clarified that appeals from MDOC’s decisions have proper venue in the county where the prisoner was incarcerated at the time he requested relief through the ARP. ... It is undisputed that Neal was incarcerated in Marshall County when he initiated his ARP request. Therefore, although Putnam indicates that venue was proper in Hinds County, venue was also proper in Marshall County.

Section 11-11-3(1) makes venue improper in Lafayette County for a defendant who is not a county resident and did not commit the alleged defamatory act there, when that defendant is sued alone.

Jones v. Rebel Rags, LLC · filed 2018-03-21(1)

Accordingly, venue would not be proper in Lafayette County if Jones were the only defendant named in the lawsuit.

Section 11-11-3 applies to civil actions in all courts, and subsection (1)(b) can provide venue in the plaintiff’s county when the other venue criteria are unavailable.

Purdue Pharma L.P. v. State of Mississippi · filed 2018-10-18(1)(a)(i), (1)(b)

Section 11-11-3, therefore, is applicable to civil actions in “all courts.” ... Accordingly, because the State’s Medicaid agency is located in Hinds County along with most state agencies, venue in Hinds County was appropriate pursuant to Section 11-11-3(b).

Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i) governs venue for a corporate defendant’s breach-of-contract action, and venue was proper in the county of the Port Authority’s principal place of business.

Mississippi State Port Authority v. Southern Industrial Contractors, LLC · filed 2018-12-18(1)(a)(i)

We find that pursuant to Mississippi’s general venue statute, Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-11-3 (Rev. 2004), venue is proper in the First Judicial District of Harrison County.

For an appeal challenging an MDOC decision, § 11-11-3 places venue in the county where the prisoner resides.

Jessie D. Boyett, Jr. v. Burl Cain, MDOC Commissioner, MDOC Director of Offender Services, MDOC Classification Director, · filed 2023-12-05

venue is appropriate where the prisoner resides.

Section 11-11-3 limits Mississippi's "local" causes of action to trespass on land, ejectment, and actions seeking the statutory penalty for cutting and boxing trees or firing woods.

Trust Company Bank v. United States Gypsum Company · filed 1992-02-24

A Mississippi statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-3 (Supp.1990), alone determines whether a court can exercise jurisdiction over a “local” cause of action. ... This statute recognizes only three categories of “local” actions: (1) actions of trespass on land; (2) ejectment proceedings; and (3) actions for the statutory penalty for cutting and boxing trees and firing woods. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-3. The instant action does not fall within any of these three categories. It therefore is not a local action under Mississippi law, and the courts in Mississippi, including the federal district court in Biloxi, properly could exercise jurisdiction over it.

Section 11-11-3 is mandatory and applies when a resident defendant is present, allowing venue in each county where a substantial component of the claim occurs.

Snyder v. Logan · filed 2005-01-06

In Capital City Insurance Co. v. G.B. "Boots" Smith Corp., 889 So.2d 505 (Miss.2004), we recently examined both statutes and held the general venue statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-3, to be mandatory, while the insurance venue statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-7, is permissive. 889 So.2d at 516 (¶ 35). Capital City further held that, "[t]hus, where there is a resident defendant, the general venue statute `shall' apply; and where there is no resident defendant, the insurance company venue statute offers the plaintiff other options." Id. Because there is a resident defendant (Logan Insurance Agency) in the case sub judice, the general venue statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-3, shall apply.

Section 11-11-3 requires a civil action to be commenced in a county where a defendant resides or the cause occurred, and its forum-non-conveniens provision requires transfer to a county of proper venue while directing courts to consider specified convenience factors.

Namihira v. Bailey · filed 2005-01-20(1), (4)(a)

The statute provides that the suit "shall be commenced" in the county where the defendant resides or the alleged act or omission occurred. The permissive language, "may also be commenced in the county in which the plaintiff resides" applies only where there is no resident defendant. Since Dr. Namihira is a resident defendant, this suit should have been brought in his home county of Warren. ... We find these factors to be helpful, not only in the resolution of a motion for transfer of venue for forum non conveniens, but also where, as here, the action must be transferred due to the inability to seat a fair jury. However, in the case sub judice, the trial court would not even reach an evaluation of the factors, since both Rule 82(e) and Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-3(4)(a) require transfer to a county of proper venue which, here, would be Warren County.

Section 11-11-3(4)(a) requires a claim or action that would be more properly heard in another proper Mississippi county to be transferred to that county.

Stokes v. State · filed 2008-06-24(4)(a)

"As to a claim or action that would be more properly heard in a different county of proper venue within this state, the venue shall be transferred to the appropriate county." Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-3(4)(a) (Rev.2004).

Section 11-11-3 permits a circuit-court civil action against a corporation to be filed where its principal place of business is located or where a substantial alleged act or omission or injury-causing event occurred.

Autozone Mississippi, Inc. v. Craft · filed 2012-04-11(l)(a)(I)

Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-11 — 3(l)(a)(I) states: Civil actions of which the circuit court has original jurisdiction shall be commenced in the county where the defendant resides, or, if a corporation, in the county of its principal place of business, or in the county where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred or *22where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-3 (Rev.2004). Based on the claims alleged by Craft, the act or omission vesting in Craft a right to sue Autozone, ie., selling the wrong computer, occurred in Scott County. Further, Craft failed to allege in his Complaint that a substantial event that caused the injury occurred in Smith County. Craft has failed to establish Smith County as an appropriate venue.