Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2959

Section 600.2959 permits a reduction for comparative fault only when the plaintiff’s fault contributed to the injury for which damages are sought.

Taylor v. Kent Radiology, PC · filed 2009-12-22

However, because the statutes imposing comparative fault only require the allocation of liability in proportion to the fault for the injury for which the plaintiff is seeking damages, under the facts of this case, plaintiffs could only be allocated liability to the extent that they were at fault for the aggravation of the preexisting foot injury.

Section 600.2959 requires a plaintiff's damages to be reduced by the plaintiff's percentage of comparative fault when the plaintiff's conduct was a proximate cause of the damages, even when the defendant's conduct was wilful and wanton or intentional.

Lamp v. Reynolds · filed 2002-05-01

In summary, our comparative fault statutes, particularly MCL 600.6304, MCL 600.2957, and MCL 600.2959, mandate the allocation of liability among all persons who contributed to the accrual of a plaintiffs damages. These statutes do not distinguish between types of at-fault conduct that resulted in the plaintiffs sustaining damages. Consequently, the comparative fault statutes apply to all persons, including the plaintiff, who are found to be at fault, i.e., whose conduct is a proximate cause of the plaintiffs damages.

Section 600.2959 reduces damages by the injured person's percentage of comparative fault, bars noneconomic damages when that fault exceeds the aggregate fault of the other persons, and still permits reduced economic damages unless the injured person is entirely at fault.

Schaub v. Seyler · filed 2018-11-15

And MCL 600.2959 provides in full: In an action based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, the court shall reduce the damages by the percentage of comparative fault of the person upon whose injury or death the damages are based as provided in section 6306 or 6306a, as applicable. If that person's percentage of fault is greater than the aggregate fault of the other person or persons, whether or not parties to the action, the court shall reduce economic damages by the percentage of comparative fault of the person upon whose injury or death the damages are based as provided in section 6306 or 6306a, as applicable, and noneconomic damages shall not be awarded. [Emphasis added.] Accordingly, if, for example, a plaintiff seeking damages is 40% at fault, one defendant is 50% at fault, and a second defendant is 10% at fault, the plaintiff would still be entitled to recover his or her damages, minus 40% attributable to the plaintiff’s fault. And the second defendant must remain in the lawsuit, even though he or she was less at fault than the plaintiff, with the plaintiff being more than 50% at fault if considered solely in comparison to the second defendant. Therefore, on total damages amounting to $100,000, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover $60,000—$50,000 from the first defendant and $10,000 from the second defendant.

Section 600.2959 generally makes a plaintiff's comparative fault reduce recoverable damages by the plaintiff's percentage of fault rather than automatically barring recovery.

Kandil-Elsayed v. F & E Oil Inc · filed 2023-07-28

Michigan is a comparative-fault jurisdiction, meaning that it is the policy of our state that when a plaintiff is at fault, it does not bar recovery, but rather reduces the amount of damages they can recover by their percentage of fault. MCL 600.2959. It is of course true that technically, duty and comparative fault are two separate elements of a premises-liability claim. See Riddle, 440 Mich at 95-96. But functionally, by situating the open and obvious danger doctrine in duty, the plaintiff’s comparative fault has become an integral part of the duty analysis. Practically, what this means is that a plaintiff’s fault works to cut off liability in full, directly against the policy of this state.

The statute adopts comparative negligence, so a plaintiff's negligence reduces recoverable damages rather than automatically barring recovery.

Hill v. Hoig · filed 2003-11-26

Since the Supreme Court decided Grummel, however, Michigan has replaced the doctrine of contributory negligence with the doctrine of comparative negligence. M.C.L. § 600.2959; see also Placek v. Sterling Hts., 405 Mich. 638, 650, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979). Comparative negligence only serves to reduce the amount of damages a plaintiff may recover to the extent that the plaintiff was negligent, whereas any negligence on the part of the plaintiff would bar recovery under the doctrine of contributory negligence.

Section 600.2959 requires a plaintiff's damages to be reduced in proportion to the plaintiff's own comparative fault under Michigan's pure comparative-negligence rule.

Laier v. Kitchen · filed 2005-08-03

Thus, the doctrine of pure comparative negligence distributes responsibility according to the proportionate fault of the parties. It requires that a plaintiff's damages be reduced in the same proportion by which the plaintiff's own conduct contributed to his or her injuries. MCL 600.2959; Placek v. Sterling Hts., 405 Mich. 638, 660-661, 681, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979).

Section 600.2959 is part of Michigan’s comparative-fault scheme, under which a plaintiff’s fault may bar noneconomic damages when the statutory conditions are met, but that scheme does not abrogate the common-law wrongful-conduct rule.

Estate of Michael Travis Errett v. a Forever Recovery Inc · filed 2017-05-30

In 1995, the Legislature codified a system of comparative negligence through the enactment of MCL 600.2957, MCL 600.2958, and MCL 600.2959, and the amendment of MCL 600.6304.8 1995 PA 161; 1995 PA 249. This statutory system of comparative negligence requires triers of fact in actions “seeking damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death” to allocate the liability of each person who contributed to the injury, including the plaintiff, “in direct proportion to the person’s percentage of fault.” MCL 600.2957(1). Accordingly, a plaintiff’s contributory fault does not bar his or her recovery; it only reduces his or her economic damages, MCL 600.2958, and, in some instances, bars the recovery of noneconomic damages, MCL 600.2959.9 MCL 600.6304(8) defined “fault” to include “an act, omission, conduct, including intentional conduct, a breach of warranty, or a breach of a legal duty, or any conduct that could give rise to the imposition of strict liability, that is a proximate cause of damage sustained by a party.” Except as expressly provided for in sections 2957, 2958, and 2959, enactment of these sections did not “eliminate or diminish a defense or immunity” that existed at the time of the enactment. MCL 600.2957(3). ... In light of the applicable law, we conclude that the Legislature’s passage of comparative negligence statutes in 1995 did not abrogate the wrongful-conduct rule.

Section 600.2959 permits the jury to consider a plaintiff’s comparative negligence in determining liability for tort damages.

Estate of David Niehaus v. Asia Nails LLC · filed 2017-07-25

If a jury finds defendant negligent, it can then consider whether Niehaus was comparatively negligent for allegedly failing to inform defendant of his diabetic neuropathy. MCL 600.2959.

Section 600.2959 makes comparative fault a rule for allocating damages, not a basis for defining the defendant’s legal duty or dismissing the action altogether.

Blackwell v. Franchi · filed 2018-07-25

It was codified in its present form in 1995 in MCL 600.2959. ... Comparative fault is a rule of decision for damages. It does not define the contours of the defendant’s legal duty.

Section 600.2959 requires damages to be reduced according to the injured person's comparative fault and bars noneconomic damages when that fault exceeds the aggregate fault of the other persons.

Holt v. Detroit Department of Transportation · filed 2022-08-18

In an action based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, the court shall reduce the damages by the percentage of comparative fault of the person upon whose injury or death the damages are based as provided in section 6306 or 6306a, as applicable. If that person’s percentage of fault is greater than the aggregate fault of the other person or persons, whether or not parties to the action, the court shall reduce economic damages by the percentage of comparative fault of the person upon whose injury or death the damages are based as provided in section 6306 or 6306a, as applicable, and noneconomic damages shall not be awarded. [Emphasis added.12] ... Contrary to DDOT’s argument, we conclude that reasonable minds could differ on whether Bechard was more than fifty percent at fault. ... Because there is evidence that both Bechard and Reed breached multiple duties that contributed to the crash, the issue of comparative negligence should be left to the jury.

Section 600.2959 permits apportionment of fault for liability arising from an inaccurate appraisal, but not for nonparty wrongdoing that merely contributed to a borrower’s obtaining or defaulting on a loan.

American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc. v. Appraisal Place, Inc. · filed 2006-10-06

As stated in footnote 5, “defendants are entitled under the statutory provisions for comparative fault, to seek an apportionment of fault for the alleged liability concerning the inaccurate appraisal of the Property, but not for any alleged non-party wrongdoing that contributed to Mr. Lewis obtaining the loan or that contributed to his default thereon.”

Section 600.2959 permits comparative negligence to apply to a common-law negligent-misrepresentation claim when the evidence supports fault by the plaintiff, allowing damages to be apportioned according to each party's fault.

Alfieri v. Bertorelli · filed 2012-01-10

Additionally, “comparative negligence should be applied in all common-law tort actions sounding in negligence where the defendant’s misconduct falls short of being intentional,” Vin*ing v Detroit,* 162 Mich App 720, 727; 413 NW2d 486 (1987), and “the question is whether, in viewing the evidence most favorably to the defendant, there is sufficient evidence for the jury to find negligence on the part of the injured plaintiff.” Duke v American Olean Tile Co, 155 Mich App 555, 566; 400 NW2d 677 (1986). Although both these cases predate the Legislature’s adoption of MCL 600.2959, we think both remain “good law” and comport with Michigan’s public policy of fairly apportioning damages according to each party’s fault.

Section 600.2959 reduces a plaintiff’s damages according to the plaintiff’s fault and bars noneconomic damages when the plaintiff’s fault exceeds the aggregate fault of the others.

Harper v. Reed · filed 2025-12-22

Generally, when applying the doctrine of comparative negligence, a plaintiff’s damages are reduced to the extent a plaintiff’s own conduct contributed to his or her injuries. See MCL 600.2959; Laier, 266 Mich App at 496. However, a plaintiff may not recover noneconomic damages when a plaintiff’s fault is greater than the aggregate fault of the others involved. MCL 600.2959; see also MCL 500.3135(2)(b) (“Damages must be assessed on the basis of comparative fault, except that damages must not be assessed in favor of a party who is more than 50% at fault.”).

Section 600.2959 requires economic damages to be reduced by the plaintiff's comparative-fault percentage and bars noneconomic damages when the plaintiff is more at fault than the defendant.

Estate of John Conforti v. Cornell · filed 2020-10-29

Furthermore, MCL 600.2959 provides that, in actions based on tort, if the plaintiff’s fault is greater than the defendant’s, “the court shall reduce economic damages by the percentage of comparative fault . . . and noneconomic damages shall not be awarded.”

Section 600.2959 requires reducing damages by the injured person's own comparative fault, but does not reduce an innocent plaintiff's damages based on a co-plaintiff's fault.

MCDOWELL v. LIVONIA HOTEL BUSINESS, INC · filed 2022-07-25

While Michigan’s comparative fault scheme abolished joint and several liability among defendants, it does not require reduction of an innocent plaintiff’s damages based on the comparative fault of a co-plaintiff. See MCL 600.2959 (“the court shall reduce the damages by the percentage of comparative fault of the person upon whose injury. . . the damages are based. . .” (Emphasis added)). This mandate to reduce a plaintiff’s damages by his own fault for his own injuries has nothing to do with either establishing liability in the first instance or allocation of fault between a plaintiff and a defendant who may share liability for another plaintiff’s injuries.

Section 600.2959 requires courts to allocate tort damages according to the injured person's comparative fault and bars noneconomic damages when that fault exceeds the aggregate fault of the other persons.

Parraghi v. Chodyniecki · filed 2022-11-03

MCL 600.2959, Michigan’s comparative fault statute, provides: In an action based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, the court shall reduce the damages by the percentage of comparative fault of the person upon whose injury or death the damages are based as provided in section 6306 or 6306a, as applicable. If that person’s percentage of fault is greater than the aggregate fault of the other person or persons, whether or not parties to the action, the court shall reduce economic damages by the percentage of comparative fault of the person upon whose injury or death the damages are based as provided in section 6306 or 6306a, as applicable and noneconomic damages shall not be awarded.

Section 600.2959 reduces a plaintiff's damages in proportion to the plaintiff's comparative fault, as determined by the jury.

St Clair v. Xpo Logistics Inc · filed 2022-12-01

Rather, any recovery of damages will be reduced by the plaintiff’s comparative fault, see MCL 600.2959, which will be determined by the jury, see Holton v A+ Ins Assoc, Inc, 255 Mich App 318, 323-324; 661 NW2d 248 (2003); MCL 600.2957(1).

Section 600.2959 embodies Michigan’s comparative-fault policy: a plaintiff’s fault reduces damages by the plaintiff’s percentage of fault rather than automatically barring recovery.

Pinsky v. Kroger Co of Michigan · filed 2023-07-28

Michigan is a comparative-fault jurisdiction, meaning that it is the policy of our state that when a plaintiff is at fault, it does not bar recovery, but rather reduces the amount of damages they can recover by their percentage of fault. MCL 600.2959. It is of course true that technically, duty and comparative fault are two separate elements of a premises-liability claim. See Riddle, 440 Mich at 95-96. But functionally, by situating the open and obvious danger doctrine in duty, the plaintiff’s comparative fault has become an integral part of the duty analysis. Practically, what this means is that a plaintiff’s fault works to cut off liability in full, directly against the policy of this state.

Section 600.2959 requires tort damages to be reduced by the injured person's percentage of comparative fault and bars noneconomic damages when that fault exceeds the aggregate fault of the other persons at fault.

Brock v. Clary · filed 2025-02-20

Michigan applies comparative fault in tort cases. Under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2959, In an action based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, the court shall reduce the damages by the percentage of comparative fault of the person upon whose injury or death the damages are based as provided in section 6306 or 6306a, as applicable. If that person’s percentage of fault is greater than the aggregate fault of the other person or persons, whether or not parties to the action, the court shall reduce economic damages by the percentage of comparative fault of the person upon whose injury or death the damages are based as provided in section 6306 or 6306a, as applicable, and noneconomic damages shall not be awarded. ... Here, the probative value of the ordinance is not outweighed by risk of undue prejudice to Brock as the ordinance is relevant to the question of whether Brock was comparatively negligent by having Moose off leash.

Section 600.2959 bars noneconomic damages when the plaintiff is more than 50% at fault; a genuine dispute over comparative fault can prevent summary judgment on liability.

Dean v. United States · filed 2020-06-22

Although “a plaintiff’s negligence [may] not be used as a basis to dismiss a suit altogether,” recovery of noneconomic damages — compensation for pain and suffering, emotional distress, or loss of enjoyment — “are barred whenever the plaintiff is more at fault than anyone else.” Id. at 918 n.2, 914 N.W.2d 903 n.2 (citing Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2959). If the factfinder finds credible Brewer’s portrayal of the accident circumstances, then it would have a valid evidentiary foundation for a finding that the plaintiff was comparatively negligent, and perhaps to conclude that she was at least 51% at fault in causing the collision. See, Howard v. Wistinghausen, No. 345788, 2020 WL 402056, at *8 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2020). Therefore, Dean is not entitled to a judgment in her favor on liability as a matter of law.