Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10

Section 10(b)’s discretionary function exception does not cover a probation officer’s duty to make reasonable efforts to check compliance with court-ordered probation conditions.

A.L. v. Commonwealth · filed 1988-04-21(b)

A probation officer’s duty to make reasonable efforts to ascertain whether a probationer has complied with the terms of his or her probation is not a discretionary function within the meaning of G. L. c. 258, § 10 (b).

Section 10(b) does not shield negligent execution of established policies or plans; its discretionary-function exception concerns public policy and planning choices.

Onofrio v. Department of Mental Health · filed 1990-11-19(b)

It is clear from the judge’s memorandum of findings and rulings that the conduct he found to have been negligent was not the exercise of choice regarding public policy and planning but, instead, was the negligent carrying out of previously established policies or plans.

Section 10(6)'s discretionary function exemption does not cover a municipality's failure to maintain a fence after erecting it.

Tryon v. City of Lowell · filed 1991-01-18(6)

However, whether or hot in a particular situation a decision to erect a fence is discretionary, the maintenance of or failure to maintain a fence after its erection does not entail a discretionary function.

Section 10(b)'s discretionary function exception does not shield a failure to warn without evidence that the omission was based on policy.

Alter v. City of Newton · filed 1993-08-16(b)

It is difficult to imagine the city justifying a decision not to place warning signs to high school students on economic or other policy grounds. In the absence of evidence that the city made such a decision based on policy, it may not here invoke the exception of § 10(6).

Section 10(b)’s discretionary function exception covers policy and planning judgments, but does not cover an officer’s decision to carry out an established traffic-control policy.

Golb v. Dembs · filed 1993-08-25(b)

Here, Officer Sullivan’s decision to direct traffic by bypassing a functioning traffic signal was merely a decision to carry out a well established policy that allows an officer to take control of traffic at a busy intersection. No reasonable basis exists for arguing that an officer is making “a policy or planning judgment” in assuming such a responsibility.

Section 10(b) protects policy creation but does not immunize the Commonwealth when employees negligently carry out that policy by making inappropriate referrals.

Fredette v. Respite House · filed 1995-05-30(b)

While the Commonwealth is immune from liability for creating the policy stated in the regulations, it is not immune from liability for employees who negligently carry out this policy by making inappropriate referrals. The reach of §10b is not as comprehensive as the Commonwealth suggests.

Section 10(b) does not immunize an adoption worker’s decision to withhold information when the worker follows an existing agency policy rather than making a policy or planning judgment.

Mohr v. Commonwealth · filed 1995-08-14(b)

In this case, Tompkins did not make a policy or planning judgment in deciding whether to withhold information from the plaintiffs about Elizabeth’s background. Rather, according to Tompkins, she acted in accordance with an agency policy not to disclose a biological parent’s mental illness to prospective adoptive parents. Thus, Tompkins’s actions did not constitute a discretionary function entitled to immunity pursuant to G. L. c. 258, § 10 (b).

Section 10(b)'s discretionary-function exclusion does not cover a claim that officials failed to obtain consent required by a zoning code.

Rezendes-Walsh v. City of Boston · filed 1996-11-06(b)

The City argues that a negligence claim by the plaintiff would be barred by the exclusion in the Tort Claims Act for “any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a public employer or public employee.” G.L.c. 258, §10(b). Plaintiff claims, however, that the Commission erroneously classified the district in which her property was located without obtaining her consent as required by Article 33 of the Boston Zoning Code. She, therefore, is not complaining about the exercise of any discretionary function.

Section 10(b) does not exempt ministerial acts merely because they involve choices; the discretion must involve policy or planning.

Niser ex rel. Niser v. Town of Clinton · filed 1997-02-24(b)

In short these decisions confirm the reality that many ministerial functions require the exercise of discretionaiy choices; but that those choices do not transform the function from ministerial to discretionary character under the exemption of the Tort Claims Act. Those choices do not involve the necessary quality and scale of policy and planning or policy-and-planning implementation, however important they may be in their immediate operation.

Section 10(b)'s discretionary function exception does not bar a claim at the pleading stage when the complaint alleges negligent implementation of established policies or plans.

Coughlin v. Department of Correction · filed 1997-11-14(b)

Reading the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it can fairly be said that it alleges the “negligent carrying out of previously established policies or plans,” Onofrio v. Department of Mental Health, 408 Mass. 605, 611 (1990), thus precluding finding the discretionary function exception as matter of law.

Section 10(b)'s discretionary function exception does not bar a negligence claim based on failure to perform duties prescribed by law.

McLaughlin v. City of Lowell · filed 1998-04-03(b)

To the extent that the negligence count is limited to the negligent violation of specific legal obligations set forth in the IDEA and its implementing regulations, it survives summary judgment.

Section 10(b) does not require dismissal of a parole negligence claim when the alleged conduct could fall outside discretionary function immunity.

Kent v. Commonwealth · filed 1999-04-08(b)

In view of the plaintiffs’ allegations and the absence of any record, this Court cannot conclude beyond a doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts that would place the Parole Board’s conduct outside the discretionary function immunity of §10(b).

Section 10(b) shields a city's policy choice about sewer monitoring from negligence liability, but does not shield routine maintenance or the execution of existing policies.

Caveney v. City of Fitchburg · filed 2000-01-15(b)

Such a decision is plainly one that G.L.c. 258, § 10(b) protects, as a “discretionary function,” from negligence claims. ... The discretionary function exemption set forth in G.L.c. 258, § 10(b), does not apply to day-to-day care and maintenance or to the execution of previously established policies or plans.

Section 10(b)’s discretionary function exception does not apply to a city’s statutory duty to give a property owner notice.

Morais v. City of Lowell · filed 2000-12-01(b)

In any event, the city’s duty to give notice was prescribed by statute, and does not implicate the discretionary function exception described in § 10(b).

The discretionary function exception does not immunize a public property owner for failing to comply with applicable State Building Code requirements.

Ford v. Boston Housing Authority · filed 2002-08-20(6)

The failure to comply with the State Building Code in this case may be seen as analogous to those cases where a public employer under G. L. c. 258, § 1, as a property owner, “has not been afforded immunity under the discretionary function exception.” Wheeler v. Boston Hous. Authy., supra at 41, and cases cited.

Section 10(b)'s discretionary function exception does not cover negligent failure to follow an established classroom supervision policy.

Fitzpatrick ex rel. Moberg v. Mendon Upton Regional High School District · filed 2002-11-20(b)

Therefore, as a matter of law, under and limited to the particular circumstances of this case, the discretionary function exception does not include the allegations of the plaintiff based upon a negligent failure to comply with a policy requiring classroom doors to remain open during periods of indoor recess in the absence of an adult monitor in the classroom.

Section 10(b)'s discretionary function exception does not bar a claim based on inadequate supervision of a funeral escort when the alleged negligence does not involve planning or policy considerations.

Manganaro v. Hudson · filed 2005-03-08(b)

Here, the alleged negligent conduct that caused the plaintiff to be struck by a police motorcycle was not founded on planning or policy considerations. The claimed negligence is the failure to provide proper training and supervision to police officers engaged in funeral procession escorts, and particularly the leapfrog procedure. Planning and policy considerations are not involved when the City, through the officer in charge of the police escort, permitted Officer Hudson to participate in a leapfog escort without proper training or supervision.

Section 10(b) protects discretionary policy making and planning, but does not immunize the negligent execution of an established policy.

Greenwood v. Town of Easton · filed 2005-06-10(b)

The distinction between policy making or planning, on the one hand, and the carrying out of established policies or plans, on the other hand, is dispositive. Accordingly, we conclude that the town was not entitled to immunity under § 10 (b).

Section 10(b) bars negligence claims based on decisions to adopt policies, but does not bar claims about how a policy is carried out, such as negligent supervision.

Lockhart-Bembery v. Town of Wayland Police Department · filed 2005-12-07(b)

To the extent Ms. Lockhart-Bembery alleges that the municipal defendants were negligent in their failure to adopt and implement procedures 1) to prevent abuse of police authority and 2) to discipline its officers, those claims are barred by the discretionary function exception to the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, M.G.L. c. 258, § 10(b). ... Nevertheless, claims with respect to the manner in which a policy is carried out, such as negligent supervision, are not barred by the discretionary function.

Section 10(b) does not shield a town’s failure to warn of a dangerous walkway or restrict access to it when that failure is not a policy or planning decision.

Griem v. Town of Walpole · filed 2006-08-16(b)

Walpole’s failure to warn of the dangers on the walkway under the bleachers and its failure to prevent access do not rise to the level of policy-making that § 10(b) protects from liability.

Section 10(b) discretionary immunity does not relieve a city of its duty to maintain and repair an existing sewer system merely because it had discretion to create an emergency response policy.

Sherman v. Sewer Division of the Public Works Department · filed 2006-11-02(b)

On the other hand, the City’s discretion in creating the policy is not a basis per se for asserting that immunity exists when applying the case law. Instead, the case law supports that the City had no discretion in whether it would react to the sewer damage or not; it was responsible for the maintenance, operation, and repair of the sewer main line without exception.

Section 10(j) does not bar a claim for injury allegedly caused by someone acting on a public employer’s behalf, and § 10(b) does not shield negligent execution of an established snow removal policy.

Ku v. Town of Framingham · filed 2004-10-18(j), (b)

Thus, in the circumstances presented, § 10(j) is not a bar because the plaintiffs’ injuries are alleged to have been “negligently caused” by a person acting on behalf of the public employer. ... Thus, the negligence asserted by the plaintiffs in this case appears to concern the carrying out of established policies rather than actual policymaking and planning. ... Therefore, section 10(b) is not a bar to this action.

Section 10’s discretionary function exception does not shield an automatic waiver process in which no discretion is exercised.

Nordberg v. Massachusetts Department of Education · filed 2010-01-29(b)

Discretion was neither exercised nor abused; it was extracted entirely from the process and set aside. In these circumstances, discretionary immunity does not apply because, at bottom, no discretion was involved.

Section 10(b) discretionary-function immunity cannot support dismissal at the pleading stage when a municipal policy or practice may have constrained the town’s discretion.

Plante v. Town of Blackstone · filed 2010-05-11(b)

While the town may have shown that no state statute or regulation governs the manner in which it *148clears snow from roadways, It has not shown that no municipal policy or practice forecloses its discretion. Indeed, resolving all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs and limiting review to the four corners of the Amended Complaint, the town cannot make such a showing at this point.

Section 10(b)’s discretionary function exemption does not shield a city from a claim based on its failure to implement sewer improvements before increasing flow through the system.

Robbins v. City of Worcester · filed 2010-10-22(b)

The record establishes that the Robbinses’ claim is based upon the City’s failure to implement the sewer system improvements prior to increasing the flow within the system. As such, it falls within “the implementation and execution of. . . governmental policy or planning.” Whitney, 373 Mass, at 217. Thus, governmental immunity does not extend to the City’s allegedly negligent conduct.

Section 10(b) does not bar a claim based on a city’s failure to implement an adopted sewer improvement plan.

Shapiro v. City of Worcester · filed 2011-02-10(b)

This failure in implementation is the purported cause of. the damage; therefore, this action is not barred by G.L.c. 258, § 10(b).

Section 10(b)’s discretionary function exception does not entitle a town to summary judgment when it made no discretionary decision about maintaining the pipe at issue.

Spencer Furniture, Inc. v. Town of Spencer · filed 2012-02-02(b)

Thus, the present case falls in line with the case of Greenwood v. Eastern, 444 Mass. 467 (2005), since the defendant in this case was not involved in any type of discretionary decision making, but instead did no maintenance on the subject corrugated steel pipe. ... However, based on the summary judgment record the defendant has not demonstrated that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law based on the discretionary function exemption as articulated in Mass. G.L.c. 258, § 10(b).

Section 10(e) bars a negligence claim against a municipality based on its issuance of a building permit, even if the permit was issued negligently.

Pinecrest Village, Inc. v. MacMillan · filed 1996-02-16(e)

Even if Bowker’s issuance of tire building permit without the sprinkler requirement constituted negligence, the Town can not be held liable for a negligence claim based upon the issuance of that permit.

Section 10(f) did not protect the Commonwealth from an inadequate-inspection claim arising from a 1993 incident because the provision was added in 1994.

Dever v. Reid · filed 1996-06-26(f)

The Commonwealth also contends that it is immune from any part of the plaintiffs claim that is based on the Department’s inadequate inspection of the Reids’ home under G.L.c. 258 §10(f). Since this provision was part of the 1994 amendment of c. 258, however, I find and rule that the Commonwealth was not protected by this provision at the time of the incident in 1993.

Section 10(e) and (f) bar claims against a public employer based on negligent inspections and the issuance of a permit following those inspections.

Leatham v. Donell · filed 1996-08-09(e), (f)

Plaintiffs allege that the failure of Wilmington’s employees to properly conduct fire and safety inspections, and to issue an occupancy permit based on those flawed inspections, amounted to negligence and negligent misrepresentation. Such conduct falls squarely within the scope of §§ 10(e) and (f).

Section 10(j)(3)’s exception for negligent maintenance of public property does not make municipal private nuisance claims subject to the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act.

Murphy v. Town of Chatham · filed 1996-12-26(j)(3)

Since municipalities were not immune from liability for private nuisance and since private nuisance was not subject to the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act once enacted, a statute exempting certain actions but excluding others from that exemption does not make private nuisance subject to the statute.

Section 10(e) bars municipal liability for claims based on issuing a permit, including a failure to investigate before issuance.

Wasserman v. Town of Bellingham · filed 1997-05-27(e)

Here, the language of§10(e) is clear and unambiguous: the provisions of c. 258, §§1 through 8, which permit municipal liability in certain negligence actions, do not apply to any action based upon the issuance of a permit. Whether the negligence arises out of a failure to investigate the propriety of the permit’s issuance or out of negligence in the issuance itself, the language of the statute clearly proscribes municipal liability.

Section 10(f) bars claims based on a public employee’s failure to inspect property, or inadequate inspection, for compliance with laws and regulations.

Sadlowski v. Albertson · filed 1999-02-01(f)

In the instant case, where Sadlowski’s allegations focus upon the defendants’ alleged activities or omissions in failing adequately to inspect Rheault’s property and enforce land use regulations applicable to Rheault’s property, Sadlowski’s claim is barred by G.L.c. 258, §10(f).

Section 10(e) immunizes a public employer from a claim based on issuing a license when suit was filed after the licensing exception took effect, even if the license was issued earlier.

Tivnan v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles · filed 2000-09-19(e)

The Superior Court judge ruled that Tivnan’s claim was barred as grounded upon the issuance of a license, a transaction specifically immunized by operation of G. L. c. 258, § 10(c). This section of the statute was added by St. 1993, c. 495, § 57. The effective date of the section, January 14, 1994, was some two years after the issuance of the duplicate license. St. 1993, c. 495, § 145. Tivnan’s suit was brought about one month after § 10(c) became law. The Superior Court judge was correct, however, in determining that the registry was immunized by application of § 10(c), as the law was made applicable to “all claims upon which suit is filed after the effective date of this act.” St. 1993, c. 495, § 144.

Section 10(e) bars claims against a public employer based on license revocation, including a claim arising from erroneous information about a license’s status.

Melanson v. Commonwealth · filed 2002-10-23(e)

That claim falls within the ambit of G.L.c. 258, and is barred by § 10(e) of that Act which, where applicable, states clearly and unambiguously that “any claim based upon the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation or failure or refuse to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order or similar authorization” is exempt from suit under the Massachusetts Tort Claim Act.

Section 10(f) exempts a public employer from liability for negligent inspection when the duty to inspect is owed to the public generally and no special duty is owed, but it does not cover a property owner's duty to maintain safe premises for lawful visitors.

Irvin v. Roxbury Community College · filed 2003-01-08(f)

The exemption for negligent inspection in § 10(f) codifies the rule stated in Dinsky and exempts from liability a failure to inspect where the duty to inspect is owed to the public generally and no special duty is owed. ... It does not apply to the duty owed to lawful visitors to maintain property in a reasonably safe condition, a duty common to all persons in control of real properly, including RCC.

Section 10(f) covers inspections of third-party property but does not bar claims for negligent maintenance of the Commonwealth’s own property, even when maintenance includes inspections.

Twomey v. Commonwealth · filed 2005-04-20(f)

It does not preclude claims, as here, arising from the Commonwealth’s negligent maintenance of its own property, even though that maintenance may include inspections.

Section 10(f) does not immunize a municipality from claims concerning inspection or maintenance of its own property.

Gomez v. Paxton Municipal Light Department · filed 2006-01-30(f)

This section has no application to the facts in this case because it does not afford a municipality any immunity with respect to the inspection or maintenance of its own property.

Section 10(e) bars negligence claims arising from the entry and maintenance of motor vehicle registration data.

Smith v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles · filed 2006-04-06(e)

In this case, the entry and maintenance of registration data are central to the functions that are immunized from liability by § 10(e).

Section 10(e) preserves the Commonwealth’s immunity from common-law claims based on its decision to issue a permit for highway alteration work.

Morrissey v. New England Deaconess Ass'n-Abundant Life Communities, Inc. · filed 2009-10-08(e)

His remaining claims of interference with his rights to lateral support and trespass to land relate only to the Commonwealth on the basis of its decision to issue a permit allowing Deaconess to perform the alteration work. The Commonwealth has not waived immuniiy to claims based on a discretionary decision, an issuance of a permit, or an alleged failure to prevent or diminish harmful consequences that it did not originally cause. See G.L.c. 258, § 10(b), (e), (j). Consequently, the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over these common-law claims.

Section 10(e) preserves governmental immunity from a private nuisance claim based on the issuance of a work permit.

Morrissey v. New England Deaconess Ass'n - Abundant Life Communities, Inc. · filed 2010-12-22(e)

Here, because the actions that allegedly caused the private nuisance occurred as a result of the Commonwealth’s issuance of a work permit to Deaconess, Morrissey’s claim against the Commonwealth is barred by the express language of § 10 (e).

Section 10(e) bars a negligent-training claim rooted in the issuance of an arrest warrant because an arrest warrant is an order covered by the exemption.

Cohen v. Commonwealth · filed 2011-03-22(e)

An arrest warrant meets one definition of an “order” as “a written direction of a court or judge.” ... Count IV therefore must be dismissed under G.L.c. 258, § 10(e).

Section 10(e) preserves sovereign immunity for claims arising from the denial of, or refusal to issue, a license or certificate.

Mello Construction, Inc. v. Division of Capital Asset Management · filed 2013-12-18(e)

First, the Commonwealth has not waived sovereign immunity with respect to any claims arising from the denial of, or refusal to issue, a license or certificate. See G. L. c. 258, § 10(e); Tivnan v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 96, 102 (2000); Smith v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 31, 32 (2006).

Section 10(b) does not provide discretionary function immunity when a statute prescribes the public employer’s course of action; under § 10(j), an affirmative act that materially creates the harmful situation can defeat immunity even when a third party inflicts the injury.

NATASHA M. BAPTISTA, individually and as personal representative v. BRISTOL COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT (and a companion case ). · filed 2022-04-15(b), (j)

Because G. L. c. 111B, § 8, required that Batista be returned to his residence, taken to a facility, or detained at a police station, the department is not entitled to discretionary function immunity under G. L. c. 258, § 10 (b), for its actions in placing him in the holding cell at the jail. ... It was an affirmative act that materially contributed to creating the condition or situation that resulted in harmful consequences to Batista from the violent or tortious conduct of Mojica. Consequently, the department is not immune under G. L. c. 258, § 10 (j).

Section 10(b) provides immunity for discretionary functions based on public policy.

Penate v. Scampini · filed 2022-04-26(b)

These decisions necessarily implicate policy considerations, and thus, are discretionary within the meaning of M. G. L. c. 258, § 10(b).

The discretionary function exception shields municipalities from tort claims based on governmental planning and policymaking decisions, but not negligent implementation or execution of those policies.

Marino v. City of Newton. · filed 2024-06-28(b)

Helpfully, in rejecting Barnett's argument that for purposes of § 10 (b) the municipality's decisions in her case were analogous to those in Doherty, 396 Mass. at 276, the court said, "[t]he present case would be similar to the Doherty case had the city decided to erect a fence and then negligently maintained it, or decided to remove the snow but acted negligently in its shoveling, salting, or sanding." Barnett, supra at 666. This latter language describes precisely the allegations in this case. While the language in the Barnett decision is dictum, we think it accurately explains why, in this case, the city is not immune from suit under § 10 (b) for torts arising out of its challenged decisions.

Section 10(b) immunizes public employers from claims based on discretionary functions or duties, including policy making or planning decisions rather than actions that merely implement established policy.

Doe v. Massachusetts Trial Court · filed 2024-07-29(b)

Among those exceptions is the MTCA's discretionary function exception, which exempts public employers from liability for "any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a public employer . . . acting within the scope of his office or employment, whether or not the discretion involved is abused." G. L. c. 258, § 10 (b). Section 10 (b) "distinguishes between 'discretionary' acts, defined as 'conduct that involves policy making or planning,' and 'functionary' acts, that is, those actions that simply implement established policy."

Section 10(b) exempts public employers and employees from liability for claims based on discretionary functions or duties performed within the scope of employment, even when the discretion is abused.

ABLORH v. TOWN OF STONEHAM, DAVID STEFANELLI, SHERYL ROTONDI, & BRIAN RAFFAELO · filed 2025-11-20(b)

Plaintiff’s claim is barred because it falls within the discretionary acts exemption to the Massachusetts Tort Claims provided in M.G.L. ch. 258, § 10(b).

Subsections 10(c) and 10(d) preserve sovereign immunity for specified intentional torts and lawful detention of goods, barring suits against state employers while allowing suits against state employees.

Toney v. Guerriero · filed 2022-09-28(c) and (d)

As is made clear in plaintiff’s amended complaint and implicit in his avowal that a Rule 61 petition was the single post-deprivation remedy available to him, plaintiff asserts that he could not bring a state tort action against Trooper Guerriero for intentional deprivation of his property because any such suit is barred by M.G.L. c. 258, §§ 10(c) and (d). Subsections 10(c) and 10(d) relate, respectively, to intentional torts and the lawful detention of any goods or merchandise by law enforcement officers. They, like the other subsections contained within M.G.L. c. 258, § 10, negate the Commonwealth’s waiver of sovereign immunity for the specified conduct, thereby barring suits against state employers.

Section 10 preserves immunity for tax claims, acts by public employees exercising due care, and intentional torts by public employees.

EDUCATIONAL DIVIDE REFORM, INC. v. CITY OF CAMBRIDGE & Another. · filed 2023-02-23(a), (c), and (d)

Under the MTCA, the Commonwealth and its municipalities are immune from liability for "any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax." G. L. c. 258, § 10 (d). They are also immune from "any claim based upon an act or omission of a public employee when such employee is exercising due care in the execution of any statute or any regulation of a public employer." G. L. c. 258, § 10 (a). Moreover, the MTCA does not waive immunity for intentional torts of public employees, and government entities retain their immunity from liability for such conduct. See G. L. c. 258, § 10 (c). Accordingly, EDR's claims against the city are barred by the MTCA.

Section 10 creates exceptions to Massachusetts Tort Claims Act liability, including discretionary-function and failure-to-prevent-harm exceptions.

Doe v. City of Northampton · filed 2023-03-06(b), (j)

The first of these, the discretionary function exception, provides that “public employers are not liable for ‘any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a public employer or public employee, acting within the scope of his office or employment, whether or not the discretion involved is abused.’” ... As a result, the discretionary function exception is not applicable the disciplinary actions taken by SVHS employees with respect to Doe I. ... The court agrees that the § 10(j) exception applies to the portions of Plaintiffs’ negligence claim based on allegations that Defendants failed to prevent Hanlon’s actions.

Section 10(j)(1), (2), and (4) remove Massachusetts Tort Claims Act immunity in specified circumstances involving assurances, intervention, and negligent treatment.

Paradis v. Frost · filed 2023-09-22(j)(1), (j)(2), and (j)(4)

Accordingly, § 10 (j) (1) does not apply. ... Because § 10 (j) (2) eliminates immunity for affirmative acts of intervention, it does not apply here. ... We cannot stretch the plain language of the operative phrase of § 10 (j) (4) -- negligent medical treatment -- to encompass nonmedical acts or omissions by public employees.

Section 10(b) preserves immunity for discretionary policy or planning decisions, § 10(c) excludes intentional torts, and § 10(e) excludes claims based on the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of a permit or similar authorization.

Donovan v. Pangallo · filed 2023-10-20(b), (c), and (e)

The MTCA excludes intentional torts from its waiver of sovereign immunity. M.G.L. c. 258, § 10(c). ... To the extent that the Donovans’ claim is based on a decision by the city to revoke the variance, Defendant is correct. The MTCA does not waive sovereign immunity for the Donovans’ tort claims for any such claim. ... Consequently, the Donovans have plausibly alleged that the town’s conduct with respect to parking meter installation was outside the scope of the discretionary function exception.

Section 10(c) preserves immunity for intentional torts such as battery.

Mukulukusso v. Doogan · filed 2023-11-16(c)

The general waiver for tort claims against state agencies and officers, the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (“MCTA”), does not waive immunity for intentional torts such as battery. M.G.L. c. 258, § 10(c).

Section 10(b) immunizes public employers for discretionary policy making or planning, while § 10(j) bars claims to prevent harm originally caused by another person, subject to the negligent maintenance exception in § 10(j)(3).

EDGARDO STERNBERG & Another v. CITY OF NEWTON. · filed 2024-08-01(b), (j), (j)(3)

The second step is to determine whether the discretion that the city had is the type of discretion for which § 10 (b) provides immunity from suit. ... That is, § 10 (b) provides "immunity only for discretionary conduct that involves policy making or planning." ... The Sternbergs' claims are foreclosed by G. L. c. 258, § 10 (b). ... In these circumstances, the city is immune from suit pursuant to G. L. c. 258, § 10 (j). ... The Sternbergs' claims do not fall within the § 10 (j) (3) exception.

Section 10(c) preserves sovereign immunity for claims arising from intentional torts, including intentional mental distress and malicious prosecution.

Caldwell v. Cambra · filed 2025-09-10(c)

This waiver of immunity does not apply, however, to “any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including . . . intentional mental distress [and] malicious prosecution.” M.G.L. c. 258 § 10(c).

Section 10(e) preserves immunity for claims rooted in the issuance, denial, suspension, revocation, or failure to issue a license.

SACHCHIDANAND JHA & Another v. DEPARTMENT OF EARLY EDUCATION AND CARE. · filed 2023-02-08(e)

In this case, the gravamen of the Jhas' complaint is that the department, in carrying out its statutory oversight and licensing duties, improperly found regulatory and other violations; issued sanctions and other orders; suspended and then declined to renew the Jhas' licenses; and defended its findings and decisions before administrative and judicial tribunals, all to the Jhas' and their business's injury. As such, the Jhas' claims are rooted in the "issuance, denial, suspension or revocation [of] or failure . . . to issue" any license or similar authorization.

Section 10(b) provides immunity for discretionary policymaking and planning, while section 10(j) immunizes claims based on failures to prevent or diminish harm caused by a third person when the public employer did not originally cause the condition.

DOE v. TOWN OF NORTH ANDOVER · filed 2023-05-16(b), (j)

Accordingly, the court cannot find that the narrowly-applied discretionary function bars Plaintiffs’ claims in this case. ... Thus, the alleged failure to implement better policies or investigate sooner falls under the immunity for failure to act exception to the MTCA.

Section 10(c) exempts municipalities from liability for intentional torts.

GOODALE v. TOWN OF UPTON & Others. · filed 2023-08-08(c)

The town is immune from suit for intentional torts. G. L. c. 258, § 10 (c); Barrows v. Wareham Fire Dist., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 623, 626 (2012).

Section 10(c) immunizes public employers from liability for intentional torts committed by their employees.

Carr v. Town of Bourne By Its Board of Selectmen · filed 2024-01-11(c)

Independently, Count Two would fail against the Town because the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act immunizes public employers from the intentional tortious acts of their employees. M.G.L. c. 258, § 10(c); FBT Everett Realty, LLC v. Mass. Gaming Comm’n, 187 N.E.3d 373, 389 (Mass. 2022).

Section 10(c) preserves municipal immunity for claims arising out of intentional torts, including defamation and invasion of privacy.

Wood v. Haverhill Police Department · filed 2024-09-13(c)

The Town of Wenham contends, correctly, that Wood’s invasion of privacy claim against the town, like his defamation claim, is barred by the MTCA, which preserves municipal immunity for “any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including . . . invasion of privacy.” M.G.L c. 258, § 10(c).

Section 10 bars municipal liability for intentional torts under subsection (c) and for claims arising from the issuance or denial of a permit under subsection (e).

Zarba v. The Town of Oak Bluffs · filed 2020-08-11(c), (e)

Additionally, it is well-settled that municipalities may not be held liable for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 absent allegations of an unconstitutional municipal policy, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978), nor may they be held liable for violations of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 11 n.9 (1st Cir. 2002), for intentional torts, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c), or for claims arising out of the issuance or denial of a permit, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, §10(e).

Section 10 affords a city immunity from tort claims arising from a police arrest supported by probable cause.

Richardson v. City of Boston · filed 2001-11-08

Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment properly was allowed, given the existence of probable cause to arrest under G. L. c. 209A, § 6(7), and the immunities afforded by that section and by G. L. c. 258, § 10, in the case of the city of Boston.

Section 10(j) immunizes public employers from claims based on failures to prevent harm from third-party conduct when the employer did not originally cause the condition or situation.

Zereski v. Town of Uxbridge. · filed 2023-08-09(j)

Were we to accept that the supervisors' neglect of a duty or a failure to act "materially contributed" to the daughter's injuries, "then the opening words of § 10 (j), immunizing 'act[s] or failure[s] to act to prevent,' . . . would be virtually read out of the provision."

Section 10(j) shields a public employer from liability for failing to detect a third party’s gun when that failure did not originally cause the resulting injuries.

MARQUE'E DORSEY & Others v. CITY OF BOSTON & Others. · filed 2025-05-23(j)

Just as the Brum defendants' failure to keep the assailant who stabbed the student out of the school and the Cormier defendants' failure to protect Mumbauer from the assailant who pushed him down the stairs did not amount to the original causes of those harms, here the defendants' failure to detect the gun possessed by the shooter was not the original cause of the plaintiffs' injuries.

Section 10(j) does not bar negligent hiring, supervision, or retention claims based on a public employer's conduct.

Theisz v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority · filed 2024-03-15(j)

The MBTA argues that it is immune from liability for the plaintiff's negligence claim based on G. L. c. 258, § 10 (j). Section 10 (j) exempts public employers from liability for "any claim based on an act or failure to act to prevent or diminish the harmful consequences of a condition or situation, including the violent or tortious conduct of a third person, which is not originally caused by the public employer or any other person acting on behalf of the public employer." G. L. c. 258, § 10 (j). The MBTA argues that § 10 (j) applies because the plaintiff's claim is based on the MBTA's failure to prevent Smith's violent conduct. Keeping in mind that the plaintiff's claim of negligent hiring, supervision, and retention is based on the conduct of the MBTA and not on Smith's conduct, it is evident that § 10 (j) is inapplicable.

Section 10(j) immunizes a public employer from claims based on failures to prevent or diminish harm from a condition the employer did not originally cause.

The Norfolk & Dedham Group v. Town of Falmouth. · filed 2024-10-04(j)

The exception at issue here is set forth in § 10 (j), which provides that a public employer is not liable for "any claim based on an act or failure to act to prevent or diminish the harmful consequences of a condition or situation . . . which is not originally caused by the public employer or any other person acting on behalf of the public employer." On this record, the application of § 10 (j) is a question of law. ... And in any event, even assuming that the ordinance applied in these circumstances, the town is immune under § 10 (j) for failure to inspect the water meter where the plaintiff has no reasonable expectation of proving that the town was the original cause of any improper installation, as discussed above.

Section 10(j) immunizes public employers from liability for harm they did not originally cause when their conduct merely fails to prevent it.

WILLIAM G. LUFKIN, JR., & Another v. COMMONWEALTH & Another. · filed 2025-12-08(j)

Rather, where the decedent showed no signs of any intention to harm himself, the facility's failure to deviate from normal practices was merely a "failure to prevent" the death, and § 10 (j) thus immunizes the Commonwealth from liability.

Section 10 (j) generally immunizes public employers from claims based on failing to prevent harm, but does not immunize their own misfeasance in placing a known violent employee in a public-facing position.

Theisz v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority · filed 2025-03-14(j)

In sum, § 10 (j) does not provide immunity to a public employer for its misfeasance in placing an employee with known but untreated anger management issues that manifest in violent and hostile behaviors in a public-facing position.