Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10

Section 10(c) does not bar a negligence claim against public employees merely because an intentional assault underlies the injury, when the employees’ own alleged negligence is the focus of the claim.

Doe v. Town of Blandford · filed 1988-07-13(c)

We also are persuaded that the narrow construction of the exclusion is the appropriate one. The Legislature, by excluding intentional torts from the waiver of governmental immunity, sought to insulate the government from liability for intentional conduct which it had not authorized. In this case, where the defendants allegedly had, or should have had, knowledge of Shaughnessy’s assaultive behavior, the negligence of the defendants is the true focus of the case. The claim is not barred by G. L. c. 258, § 10 (c).

Section 10(c)’s intentional tort exception does not bar a claim against a municipality based on reckless conduct under the recreational use statute.

Forbush v. City of Lynn · filed 1994-01-04(c)

For these several reasons, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ claims against the city falling within the recreational use statute, G. L. c. 21, § 17C, are not barred by the intentional tort exception contained in G. L. c. 258, § 10(c).

Section 10(c)’s intentional tort exception requires more than proof of the prima facie elements of battery.

Foster v. McGrail · filed 1994-01-25(c)

Based on Massachusetts precedent, I conclude that more than the prima facie elements of a battery must be shown in order to invoke the intentional tort exception of § 10(c) of the Act.

Section 10(c) excludes intentional torts such as false imprisonment from the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, but does not apply to conduct that sounds in negligence.

Camoscio v. Hanley · filed 1996-04-03(c)

G.L.c. 258, §10(c) excludes intentional torts, such as false imprisonment, from the scope of the MTCA. ... As discussed earlier, however, the plaintiff has stated a claim in negligence and has failed to state a claim for false imprisonment against the defendants individually.

Section 10’s intentional tort exclusion does not apply to claims alleging only negligence.

Lovejoy v. Greenwood · filed 1996-04-10

Concededly, the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act does not provide an exemption from liability for intentional torts by public employees, id. at 46; G.L.c. 258, §10; but Lovejoy has made no claims against the Trustees for intentional torts. Thus, Lovejoy can find no support in §10’s exclusion of intentional torts from the statutory exemption.

Section 10(c) does not immunize a municipality from claims based on wanton or reckless conduct.

Molinaro v. Town of Northbridge · filed 1995-01-06(c)

Section 10 (c) does not immunize a municipality from claims based on wanton or reckless conduct.

Section 10(c) bars intentional tort claims against a municipality, while § 10(b) does not immunize a failure to intervene in an assault that does not involve governmental policy or planning.

Figueroa ex rel. Figueroa v. Town of Southbridge · filed 2010-03-22(b), (c)

MTCA allows suits against a municipality or city for negligent or wrongful conduct, G.L.c. 258, §2, but not for claims arising from intentional torts. G.L.c. 258, § 10(c). This court agrees with Southbridge that all these counts allege intentional torts barred by MTCA. ... Here, the discretionary function immunity does not apply. First, it is not entirely clear that school officials did not have a duly to protect its students from assault. Moreover, there is no indication that the failing to intervene while Officer Iwanski assaulted Kimberly furthered any governmental policymaking or planning issues. Accordingly, this count is not dismissed.

Section 10(c) preserves public employers’ immunity from claims arising out of intentional torts, including intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Wilmot v. Tracey · filed 2013-03-28(c)

However, under Section 10(c) of the MTCA, public employers remain immune from “any claim arising out of an intentional tort[.]” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c). Accordingly, Wilmot cannot maintain a claim against the DCF for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Section 10(c) shields public employers from claims arising out of intentional torts, including intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Savage v. City of Springfield · filed 2020-06-10(c)

A claim against Sarno under Count VI, which alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress, is barred because “’public employers remain immune from ‘any claim arising out of an intentional tort[.]’” Id. at 143 (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c)); see also Saltzman v. Town of Hanson, 935 F. Supp. 2d 328, 350 (D. Mass. 2013).

Section 10(c) preserves public employers’ immunity from claims arising out of intentional torts, including intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Savage v. City of Springfield · filed 2021-03-08(c)

Defendants are correct. “[U]nder Section 10(c) of the MTCA, public employers remain immune from ‘any claim arising out of an intentional tort[.]’” Wilmot, 938 F. Supp. 2d at 143 (alteration in original) (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c)). “Accordingly, [Plaintiffs] cannot maintain a claim against the [City] for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”

Section 10(c) immunizes municipal entities from intentional tort claims, including intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Sullivan v. Town of Walpole · filed 2021-06-21(c)

Finally, the motion is granted with respect to the remaining claims against the municipal entities. Municipal entities are immune from all intentional torts including intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count IV), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c), and plaintiffs have failed to allege that the City engaged in some policy or practice that contributed to the alleged constitutional violation necessary to sustain a municipal § 1983 claim (Count I).1 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).

Section 10(c) bars claims against public employers arising from intentional torts, including intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Gable v. Borges Constraction, Inc. · filed 2011-06-17(c)

The same is not true with respect to Count VII, which is expressly barred by the MTCA. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c) (expressly exempting public employers for liability for “any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including ... intentional mental distress.... ”). Count VII will thus be dismissed with prejudice as to Defendant Town.

Section 10(c) bars intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against municipalities, including claims against municipal police officers in their official capacities.

Stuart v. City of Gloucester · filed 2019-07-15(c)

Regardless, the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c), precludes tort suits against municipalities of the Commonwealth, which encompasses tort suits brought against police officers in their official capacities.

Section 10(c) excludes claims arising from intentional torts, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, from the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity.

Daly v. Mason · filed 2024-09-30(c)

Moreover, the MTCA provides that the limited waiver provided under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 2 does not apply to “any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including … intentional mental distress,” among others.

Section 10(c) immunizes a public employer from a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from its employee’s intentional conduct.

Gifford v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts · filed 2025-05-07(c)

Thus, under § 10(c) of the MTCA, the City of Taunton is immune from suit for the alleged intentional emotional harm caused by its public employee.

Section 10(c) bars municipal liability for claims arising out of intentional torts, including intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Hootstein · filed 2025-12-08(c)

Plaintiff’s claim against the Town is barred by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c), which precludes the imposition of municipal liability for “any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, [and] intentional emotional distress ….”

Section 10(c) bars claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against municipalities and public employees acting in their official capacities.

Souza · filed 2026-03-30(c)

Section 10(c) explicitly provides immunity to municipalities and their employees acting in their official capacity for claims of “intentional mental distress.”

Section 10(c) preserves sovereign immunity for claims of reckless infliction of emotional distress because the statutory exception for intentional mental distress includes reckless conduct.

Tilton v. Town of Franklin · filed 1987-04-29(c)

The reference in G. L. c. 258, § 10(c), to the tort of “intentional mental distress” refers to the tort first recognized in George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244 (1971), and later applied in Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 *113Mass. 140 (1976) (where it is referred to, at 143, as “the cause of action for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress”), and Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91 (1982) (where it is referred to, at 95 and 97, as the tort of “reckless infliction of emotional distress”).

Section 10 bars intentional tort claims against a town, including claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Mellinger v. Town of West Springfield · filed 1987-11-23

Therefore, we vacate the Superior Court judgment, except in so far as it dismisses the intentional tort claim against the town, which is barred by c. 258, § 10, and remand for a trial on the merits.

Section 10(c) excludes intentional torts, including assault and battery, from the MTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity.

Fernandes v. Bouley · filed 2021-09-29(c)

Even if it did waive sovereign immunity in federal court, the MTCA exempts from waiver intentional torts, “including assault, battery….” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c).

Section 10(c) exempts a public employer from liability for its employees’ intentional torts and false arrests.

Melendez v. City of Worcester · filed 1994-12-14(c)

As the City suggests, it is not liable for the alleged intentional torts or false arrests committed by its employees. M.G.L. c. 258, § 10(c).

Section 10(c) bars a Tort Claims Act claim for battery because battery is an intentional tort.

Felix v. Commissioners of Middlesex County · filed 1994-12-29(c)

Construing the words of the letter according to common and approved use,5 Felix’s letter solely delineates a claim for battery, an intentional tort barred by G.L.c. 258, §10(c).

Section 10(c) excludes municipal liability for intentional tort claims, including interference with contractual or advantageous relations.

Swanset Development Corp. v. City of Taunton · filed 1996-08-01(c)

The plaintiffs’ tort claims against Taunton fail because under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G. L. c. 258, § 10 (c) (1994 ed.), municipalities are not liable for “any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including . . . interference with advantageous relations or interference with contractual relations.”

Section 10(c) bars claims against a town for intentional torts, including interference with advantageous relations.

Parks v. Duplease · filed 1997-05-29(c)

The defendants also correctly point out that under G.L.c. 258, §10(c), the Town of Winchendon cannot be held liable for intentional torts such as interference with advantageous relations.

Section 10(c) bars malicious prosecution claims against a city because they arise out of an intentional tort.

Segelman v. City of Springfield · filed 2008-06-11(c)

With regard to Count I, alleging malicious prosecution solely against the City of Springfield, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c) bars “any claim arising out of any intentional tort, including ... malicious prosecution.”

Section 10(c) bars a public employer from liability for assault and battery committed by its employees because assault and battery is an intentional tort.

Titus v. Town of Nantucket · filed 2011-11-10(c)

As ch. 258, § 10(c) recognizes, however, assault and battery is, by definition, an intentional tort for which the Town cannot be held liable.

Section 10(c) excludes claims arising from intentional torts, including assault, battery, and false imprisonment, from the waiver of public employer immunity.

Niles v. Town of Wakefield · filed 2016-03-24(c)

However, section 10(c)- of that statute specifically excludes from the waiver of public employer immunity in Massachusetts “any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including assault, battery, [and] false imprisonment[.]” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c). Given the clear language of the statute, and the fact that the tort claims that the plaintiff has brought are for assault and battery and false imprisonment, summary judgment will enter in favor of the Town on this Count.

Section 10(c) excludes claims arising from intentional torts, including interference with advantageous or contractual relations, from public-entity liability under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act.

Crenshaw v. Town of Southborough · filed 2018-03-29(c)

Under the Massachusetts Torts Claims Act, a public entity may be held liable for tortious actions of a public employee with the exception of “any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including assault, battery, false imprisonment,...misrepresentation, deceit,...interference with advantageous relations or interference with contractual relations.” Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 12–13 (1st Cir. 2002); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c)). Therefore, to the extent Crenshaw seeks relief from the Town for counts III, V, and VIII, summary judgment is granted.

Section 10 bars claims against a public employer for its employees’ intentional torts, including false arrest, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution.

Arias v. City of Everett · filed 2019-12-04(c)

With respect to the tort claims, the City is not liable for the intentional torts of its public employees, including false arrest, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10 (2018).

Section 10(c) preserves a municipality’s immunity from claims arising from intentional torts, including interference with advantageous business relations.

Summers v. City of Fitchburg · filed 2024-02-12(c)

In any event, even assuming Summers were the aggrieved party, the claims fail because Fitchburg, a municipality, cannot be liable for intentional torts.

Section 10(c) bars municipal liability for common-law malicious prosecution claims because they arise from an intentional tort.

Fruzzetti v. Easton Police Officers · filed 2024-02-28(c)

First, the Court agrees with the Plymouth and Easton Defendants, see [ECF No. 30 at 6–7; ECF No. 33 at 6], that both towns are immune from liability with respect to Fruzzetti’s common-law malicious prosecution claim.

Section 10 excludes claims arising out of intentional torts, including assault and false imprisonment, from the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act.

Grauds v. Fitzgerald · filed 1981-05-12

Section 10 provides that the provisiqns of the Act do not apply to “any claim arising out of an intentional tort including assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest...” In effect, the Legislature has retained, for state and municipal government, a limited immunity from certain types of claims. Since Counts IV and V of the plaintiff’s amended complaint allege intentional torts, the plaintiff is barred from bringing such actions against the government.

Section 10(c) excludes claims arising from intentional torts, including interference with advantageous or contractual relations, from the Commonwealth’s waiver of immunity.

Novak v. Department of Environmental Protection · filed 1994-11-03(c)

With the enactment of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G.L. c. 258, the Commonwealth waived its immunity from suit in certain types of actions. However, the statute specifically excluded from this waiver “any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including . . . interference with advantageous relations or interference with contractual relations.” G.L. c. 258, §10(c). Accordingly, this claim is dismissed as to DEP.

Section 10(c) excludes fraud claims from the Tort Claims Act’s waiver of governmental immunity because fraud is an intentional tort.

Govoni v. Town of Acushnet · filed 1995-11-17(c)

Although Govoni characterizes her cause of action as “fraud” rather than “misrepresentation” or “deceit,” the Supreme Judicial Court has interpreted the language of § 10(c) as excluding all intentional torts from the coverage of the Mass Tort Claims Act. ... The Town is immune from liability for any fraud allegedly committed with respect to Govoni’s signing of the 1990 Right of Entry, and accordingly, the Town is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Count IV of the complaint.

Section 10(c) excludes fraud claims from the Tort Claims Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity because fraud is an intentional tort.

Van Houtum v. Campos · filed 2000-05-05(c)

A fraud claim such as this brought by Van Houtum is an intentional tort squarely within the types of torts which are excluded by §10 from the waiver of immunity under the Tort Claims Act.

Section 10(c) bars municipal liability for claims arising from intentional torts, including interference with advantageous or contractual relations.

Howcroft v. City of Peabody · filed 2001-05-17(c)

Howcroft’s intentional tort claims against the city fail because under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G. L. c. 258, § 10(c), municipalities are not liable for “any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including . . . interference with advantageous relations or interference with contractual relations.” Swonset Dev. Corp. v. Taunton, 423 Mass. at 397. Accordingly, Howcroft’s like claims for damages against the other defendants in their official capacities were properly dismissed.

Section 10(c) preserves municipal immunity for intentional tort claims, including interference with business relations, malicious abuse of process, and malicious prosecution.

Petricca v. City of Gardner · filed 2002-03-21(c)

The MTCA does not waive municipal immunity with respect to: ... any claim arising out of any intentional tort, including assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, intentional mental distress, malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, invasion of privacy, interference with advantageous relations or interference with contractual relations. ... Accordingly, the Defendant City of Gardner is entitled to judgment on the pleadings on plaintiffs claims for interference with business relations, malicious abuse of process and malicious prosecution (Counts V, VI and VII respectively).

Section 10(c) places an intentional tort claim against a public official sued individually outside the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act.

South Boston Betterment Trust Corp. v. Boston Redevelopment Authority · filed 2002-10-31(c)

Because the mayor has been sued individually for an intentional tort, G. L. c. 258 does not apply. G. L. c. 258, § 10 (c).

Section 10(c) excludes intentional interference with contractual and advantageous relations from public employer liability under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act.

EIC Development, LLC v. Mystic Valley Development Commission · filed 2003-03-26(c)

Indeed, Section 10(c) specifically declares that this particular intentional tort claim is not among the claims for which public employers are liable under the Act.

Section 10(c) bars intentional tort claims against the Commonwealth, including fraud claims.

Daniel v. Massachusetts State Lottery Commission · filed 2003-07-15(c)

The fraud claims are barred by § 10(c) of the MTCA, G.L.c. 258, §10(c), which bars intentional tort claims against the Commonwealth including fraud claims.

Section 10(c) excludes all intentional tort claims against municipalities, including trespass.

Tsivitsi v. City of Worcester · filed 2010-03-12(c)

The statute specifies a list of intentional torts, but is properly read to exclude all intentional torts, including trespass.

Section 10(c) bars conversion claims as intentional tort claims even though it does not expressly list conversion.

Mason v. Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection · filed 2011-03-29(c)

Although conversion is not enumerated in Section 10(c), it constitutes an intentional tort and is barred under the MTCA.

Section 10(c) excludes intentional tort claims, including interference with contractual relations and civil conspiracy, from § 2 public employee immunity.

Dobelle v. Flynn · filed 2014-04-09(c)

As Plaintiff points out, both the state law claim of tortious interference with a contract and the state law conspiracy claim are intentional torts for which M.G.L. c. 258, § 2 provides no immunity. This is made clear both by the statute itself, see M.G.L. c. 258, § 10(c) (section 2 does not apply to “any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, intentional mental distress, malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, invasion of privacy, interference with advantageous relations or interference with contractual relations ” (emphasis added)), and applicable case law, .see Wentworth Precious Metals, LLC v. City of Everett, 2013 WL 441094, at *14 (D.Mass. Feb. 4, 2013) (although M.G.L. c. 258, § 10(c) “does not specifically enumerate conspiracy, [it] still contemplates such claims ‘by the language of § 10(c) in that the essence of civil conspiracy is the intent to act in concert with another to the detriment of a third party’ ”) (quoting Leatham v. Donell, 1996 WL 1251390, at *2 (Mass.Super. Aug. 9, 1996)).

Section 10(c) preserves the Commonwealth’s immunity from claims for interference with advantageous or contractual relations.

Anzalone v. Administrative Office of the Trial Court · filed 2010-08-30(c)

The Commonwealth has expressly retained its immunity from being sued in its own courts for “interference with advantageous relations or interference with contractual relations.”

Section 10(c) bars municipal liability for claims arising from intentional torts, including malicious prosecution.

Calixte v. David · filed 2018-08-01(c)

Similarly, the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act prohibits municipal liability from attaching in "any claim arising out an intentional tort, including ... malicious prosecution[.]" M.G.L. c. 258 § 10(c) ; Barrows v. Wareham Fire Dist., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 623, 626, 976 N.E.2d 830 (2012) ("The Act expressly exempts intentional torts from its provisions, and therefore a public employer cannot be sued for the intentionally tortious conduct of its employee."). Thus, Calixte fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution upon which relief can be granted.

Section 10(c) bars municipal liability for claims arising from intentional torts, including malicious prosecution.

Lucien-Calixte v. David · filed 2018-08-01(c)

Similarly, the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act prohibits municipal liability from attaching in “any claim arising out an intentional tort, including . . . malicious prosecution[.]” M.G.L. c. 258 § 10(c); Barrows v. Wareham Fire Dist., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 623, 626 (2012) (“The Act expressly exempts intentional torts from its provisions, and therefore a public employer cannot be sued for the intentionally tortious conduct of its employee.”).

Section 10(c) bars claims against public employers and employees for intentional torts.

Felix v. Town of Kingston · filed 2019-07-08(c)

The plaintiff’s intentional interference claim is also barred because the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA) bars claims against public employers and employees for intentional torts.

Section 10(c) bars claims against a municipality for intentional interference with contractual relations.

Bourne v. Gardner · filed 2017-09-07(c)

With respect to plaintiffs claim against the Town, the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, M.G.L. c. 258, § 10(c), expressly bars such claims.

Section 10(c) bars claims against the Commonwealth, its agencies, and municipalities for intentional torts.

Conley v. Bardon · filed 2021-08-11(c)

The MTCA bars claims against the Commonwealth, its agencies, and municipalities for intentional torts. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258 § 10(c). Conley’s claim against the Sheriff’s Department therefore fails as a matter of law.

Section 10(c) preserves a public employer’s immunity from defamation claims because libel and slander are intentional torts.

Baer v. Montachusett Reg'l Technical Sch. Dist. · filed 2019-05-17(c)

Accordingly, Plaintiffs' defamation claims are barred by the MTCA.

Section 10(c) preserves municipal immunity for intentional tort claims, including defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, even when the tort is not expressly listed.

Radfar v. Covino · filed 2021-09-09(c)

As intentional torts, the claims are barred against the City of Revere even if they are not specifically mentioned in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, §10(c).

Section 10(c) preserves municipal immunity from claims arising out of intentional torts, including invasion of privacy.

MacFarlane v. Town of East Bridgewater · filed 2015-06-23(c)

Even if the MacFarlanes had complied with the presentment requirement, their privacy claims against the Town and its employees acting in their official capacities would still not withstand scrutiny. “The MTCA does not waive municipal immunity with respect to: ‘any claim arising out of any intentional tort, including ... invasion of privacy....’” Petricca v. City of Gardner, 194 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 (D.Mass.2002) (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c) (1978)). For this reason as well, the challenged claims must be dismissed.

Section 10(c) preserves a public employer’s immunity from defamation claims because libel and slander are intentional torts.

Baer v. Montachusett Regional Technical School District · filed 2019-05-17(c)

Pursuant to the MTCA, a public employer retains immunity for “any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including . . . libel, slander.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ defamation claims are barred by the MTCA.

Section 10(c) exempts intentional tort claims, including defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, from the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act’s presentment requirement.

Burns v. City of Worcester · filed 2025-03-20(c)

Because defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are intentional torts, they are not subject to the MTCA’s presentment requirement set forth under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 4.

Section 10(c) exempts the Commonwealth from liability for defamation and intentional interference claims arising from its conduct.

Johnson v. Board of Bar Overseers · filed 2006-08-04(c)

Both of these actions, and the defamation and intentional interference claims that flow from them, fall squarely within the section 10(c) exemption for intentional torts.

Section 10(c) bars invasion of privacy claims against a public employer when the alleged tort was committed by employees acting within the scope of their employment.

Spartaro v. Commonwealth · filed 2007-01-04(c)

The Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G.L.c. 258, establishes immunity for public employers from “any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including . . . invasion of privacy ...” committed by a public employee acting within the scope of his employment. G.L.c. 258, §2; §10(c). ... Because the plaintiff asserts that DSS employees acting within the scope of their employment engaged in the alleged tortious conduct that forms the basis of her complaint, her claim against DSS for invasion of privacy must fail as a matter of law.

Section 10(c) preserves sovereign immunity from damages claims arising out of intentional torts, including invasion of privacy.

Doe, SORB No. 137631 v. Holmes · filed 2012-06-04(c)

The Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G.L.c. 258, does provide such a waiver as to certain types of claims, but expressly preserves sovereign immunity as to others. Among the claims for which the act preserves sovereign immunity are “any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including ... invasion of privacy.” G.L.c. 258, § 10(c). SORB is thus immune from liability for damages under c. 214, §1B.

Section 10(c) bars damages for Fair Information Practices Act and invasion of privacy claims.

Amato v. District Attorney for Cape & Islands District · filed 2011-08-25(c)

Although Amato’s complaint also seeks damages, he now concedes, as he must, that the judge properly determined that G. L. c. 258, § 10(c), prevents him from seeking damages for his FIPA and invasion of privacy claims.

Section 10(c) exempts a public employer from liability for defamation of a private person regardless of whether the alleged misconduct was intentional, reckless, or negligent.

Barrows v. Wareham Fire District · filed 2012-10-12(c)

Since our case law has determined that any degree of misconduct — intentional, reckless, or simply negligent — is sufficient to prove a claim for defamation of a private party, it follows that it should make no difference which level of fault is pleaded for the purposes of a § 10(c) exemption.

Section 10(c) bars intentional tort claims against state employees sued in their official capacities.

Santiago v. Keyes · filed 2012-08-21(c)

Similarly, Keyes cannot be held liable for claims of intentional torts asserted against him in his official capacity. See Villanueva v. Franklin County Sheriff’s Office, 849 F.Supp.2d 186, 191 (D.Mass.2012) (concluding that defendants may “be held liable in their individual capacities, but not in their official capacities, for intentional torts.”) (citing MASS. G.L. c. 258, § 10(c)).

Section 10(c) shields public employees acting in their official capacity from intentional tort claims when the plaintiff alleges no facts showing conduct driven by purely personal motives or disconnected from the employer’s interests.

Comeau v. Town of Webster · filed 2012-07-24(c)

As a matter of law, Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to bring their claims outside the umbrella of immunity provided by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c) for employees acting in their official capacity.

Section 10(c) bars claims against a public employer for intentional torts committed by its employees, including claims against employees in their official capacities.

Harnois v. University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth · filed 2019-09-30(c)

Relatedly, the failure to make a presentment notwithstanding, because UMass Dartmouth may not be held liable for the intentional torts of its employees, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c), the court will dismiss claims against UMass Dartmouth and defendants acting in their official capacities as alleged in Count VI (defamation), Count VIII (intentional interference with third party advantageous relations), Count XI (invasion of privacy), Count XII (malicious prosecution and abuse of process), Count XVI (intentional infliction of emotional distress), Count XVIII (intentional interference with contractual relations), and Count XIX (alleged civil conspiracy).

Section 10(c) bars intentional tort claims against public employees sued in their official capacity.

Estock v. City of Westfield · filed 2011-07-26(c)

Pursuant to the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, public employees sued in their official capacity are not liable for intentional torts.

Section 10(c) permits individual-capacity liability for intentional torts but bars official-capacity liability for those torts.

Villanueva v. Franklin County Sheriff's Office · filed 2012-03-27(c)

Defendants may also be held liable in their individual capacities, but not in their official capacities, for intentional torts. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c); Nelson v. Salem State College, 446 Mass. 525, 537, 845 N.E.2d 338, 348 (2006). The court will allow Defendants’ motion as to all official capacity claims under Count IV, and deny the motion as to all individual capacity claims under Count IV.

Section 10(c) leaves public employees personally liable for intentional torts they commit.

Lachance v. Town of Charlton, Corp. · filed 2019-03-21(c)

Under the Massachusetts Torts Claims Act ("MTCA"), "[i]ndividuals ... are not shielded from liability in their personal capacities for intentional torts they commit." ... Therefore, because Defendants are not shielded from liability, I must assess whether Plaintiff has plausibly stated a claim.

Section 10(c) preserves public employers’ immunity from defamation claims based on libel or slander, including official-capacity claims against public officials.

Ayyadurai v. Walsh · filed 2021-08-03(c)

The MTCA retains immunity for public employers in “any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including . . . libel, [or] slander.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c). Thus, the MTCA bars Plaintiff’s defamation claim against Walsh in his official capacity.

Section 10(c) permits claims against public officials individually for intentional torts, including malicious abuse of process.

Lamoureux v. Haight · filed 1986-10-28(c)

To the contrary, Massachusetts law expressly authorizes claims against public officials individually for alleged intentional torts, including malicious abuse of process. Mass. Gen. Laws c. 258, § 10(c).

Section 10(b)'s discretionary function exemption applies to public employers, not public employees sued in their individual capacities.

Nelson v. Salem State College · filed 2006-04-13(b)

In this case, the individuals named in the G. L. c. 214, § IB, claim are being sued only in their individual capacities, and therefore, the Act, and its relevant discretionary function exemption as to public employers, does not apply.

Section 10(c) shields a public official acting in his official capacity from liability for tortious interference.

Saxonis v. City of Lynn · filed 2004-11-08(c)

In his official capacity, Malagrifa is immune from liability under G. L. c. 258, § 10(c).

Section 10(c) bars intentional tort claims against public employees sued in their official capacities.

Mirsky v. Barkas · filed 2011-01-31(c)

General Laws c. 258, §10 (c) bars intentional tort claims asserted against public employees acting in their official capacity.

Section 10(c) bars recovery against a municipality or municipal officials in their official capacity for claims arising out of an intentional tort.

Cummings v. City of Newton & Setti D. Warren in His Individual & Official Capacities · filed 2018-02-06(c)

The Massachusetts Tort Claims Act bars recovery against a municipality or municipal officials in their official capacity for "any claim arising out of an intentional tort." M.G.L. c. 258, § 10(c).

Section 10(b) does not provide a discretionary function exemption when public employees are sued only in their individual capacities, and section 10(c) does not bar intentional tort claims against them in that capacity.

Crabtree v. Castinetti · filed 2019-01-18(b), (c)

With regard to G. L. c. 258, § 10 (b ), where individuals "are being sued only in their individual capacities ... the [MTCA], and its relevant discretionary function exemption ..., does not apply." Nelson, 446 Mass. at 537. Similarly, G. L. c. 258, § 10 (c ), does not bar intentional tort claims against defendants being sued in their individual capacities.

Section 10(i) exempts claims for harm caused to a third party by a person released from state custody; it does not cover injury caused by the act of release itself.

Suboh v. City of Revere, Mass. · filed 2001-03-30(i)

Although Sofia’s release might literally fall under the terms of section 10(i), this section was intended to apply to a situation in which a person in state custody is released by a state actor and then causes harm to some third person, who brings an action alleging improper release.

Section 10(d) preserves the Commonwealth’s immunity for claims arising from law enforcement officers’ lawful detention of goods, but does not immunize the individual officers.

Powell v. Holmes · filed 2018-02-01(d)

In other words, Section 10(d) does not provide immunity to individual defendants—it only provides immunity to the Commonwealth.

Section 10(b) does not immunize a failure to follow established police procedures, and § 10(c) does not bar a negligence claim against supervisors who knew or should have known of an employee’s assaultive behavior.

Dobos v. Driscoll · filed 1989-04-19(b), (c)

Therefore, the Commonwealth does not have immunity under G. L. c. 258, § 10 (b), based on a claim of the exercise of discretionary functions by the supervisors. ... As we held in Blandford, where the supervisory officials allegedly had, or should have had, knowledge of a public employee’s assaultive behavior, it is the supervisors’ conduct, rather than the employee’s intentional conduct, that is the true focus of the case. The claims were not barred by G. L. c. 258, § 10 (c).

Section 10’s exceptions do not limit a public employer’s liability under G. L. c. 21E because the two statutes provide separate waivers of sovereign immunity.

Hill v. Metropolitan District Commission · filed 2003-04-29

Rather, G. L. c. 258, and G. L. c. 21E, were intended to be interpreted as separate waivers of sovereign immunity, concerning distinct categories of claims, with separate rights and procedures. The MDC’s motion to dismiss was properly denied.

Section 10(d) bars claims arising from the detention of property by any type of law enforcement officer, including court officers.

Vining v. Commonwealth · filed 2004-04-28(d)

The federal case law thus supports the interpretation of § 10(d) that emerges from its plain language; that is, that it bars all claims arising from detention of property by any type of law enforcement officer.

Section 10(d) bars claims against the Commonwealth for property negligently lost by court officers during lawful detention.

Vining v. Commonwealth · filed 2005-06-08(d)

Where property is lost as a result of negligence of court officers, the Commonwealth is immune because any such loss arose in relation to or out of the lawful detention of property by law enforcement officers.

Section 10 preserves existing limits on public entity liability, so Chapter 84 remains the exclusive remedy for injuries caused by defects in municipal ways.

Loan v. Boston Water & Sewer Commission · filed 2005-11-25

The Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, enacted in 1978, expressly states that its provisions “shall not be construed to modify or repeal the applicability of any existing statutes that limits, controls or affects the liability of public employers or entities.” G.L.c. 258, §10. ... As Loan has similarly grounded her complaint upon a defect in a municipal way, her exclusive remedy is provided by G.L.c. 84, §15, and her claim under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (Count III) must be dismissed.

Section 10(d) preserves the Commonwealth’s immunity from claims arising from law enforcement officers’ detention of an inmate’s property.

LaPage v. Dennehy · filed 2010-09-09(d)

That is because the general waiver of sovereign immunily accomplished by the Tort Claims Act is subj ect to a carve-out of liability for claims arising from law enforcement officers’ actions with regard to the “detention of any goods or merchandise.” G.L.c. 258, § 10(d).

Section 10(b) immunizes discretionary policy making conduct, while § 10(j) does not immunize an actor who is an original cause of the harmful condition.

Dudley v. Massachusetts State Police · filed 2017-06-01(b), (j)

In our view, particularly at the summary judgment stage, we cannot say Trooper Blackwell's injury producing conduct of commanding and releasing Jager to apprehend a criminal suspect involved the use of planning or policy making discretion. Rather, it was conduct that carried out or implemented the State police's general policy for police canine use in the field. ... The State police is not assisted by the governmental immunity provision set forth in § 10(j) either, because § 10(j) does not preclude suit where the governmental actor is an "original cause" in creating the harmful condition that resulted in injury to the plaintiff.

Section 10(b) provides discretionary-function immunity, while § 10(j)(3) allows claims based on negligent maintenance of public property.

Graham v. City of Worcester · filed 2017-10-31(b), (j)(3)

Section 10(b ) immunizes the discretionary functions of government. ... We thus agree with the motion judge that the city at this time was not entitled to discretionary function immunity as a matter of law based on the allegations of the complaint. ... As such, it falls within the § 10(j )(3) exception for claims "based on negligent maintenance of public property." ... Because the city, as owner of the road, has a duty to maintain it and its contractor, acting under its supervision and pursuant to its contract, is alleged to have failed to do so, the complaint falls within the § 10(j )(3) exception.

Section 10(j) bars claims based on a failure to prevent or diminish harm from a third party unless the public employer originally caused the condition or situation.

Cormier v. City of Lynn · filed 2018-02-27(j)

Section 10 (j) bars "any claim based on an act or failure to act to prevent or diminish the harmful consequences of a condition or situation, including the violent or tortious conduct of a third person, which is not originally caused by the public employer or any other person acting on behalf of the public employer." G. L. c. 258, § 10 (j).

Section 10(c) bars claims arising from intentional torts, and section 10(d) bars claims arising from the lawful detention of goods by law enforcement officers.

Evans v. Mendosa · filed 2018-10-15(c)-(d)

Here, Evans first argues that "staffs [sic ] carelessness of leaving the safe open and unattended" caused the loss of his medallion. Given that the Commonwealth is immune from suits arising from the negligence of correction officers, which would include the staff at MCI-Norfolk, for claims arising out of the lawful detention of any goods, which would include the storage of Evans's medallion, § 10 of the Act would bar Evans's claim. See G. L. c. 258, § 10 (d ) ; Vining, 63 Mass. App. at 695. Additionally, Evans argues that another inmate "stole[ ]" his medallion from a safe in MCI-Norfolk. An intentional theft is an "intentional tort" under § 10 (c ) of the Act, therefore this section of the Act would also bar Evans's claim. See G. L. c. 258, § 10 (c ).

Section 10(h) excludes claims based on failures to provide adequate police protection, while section 10(j)(2) preserves claims arising from an intervention that causes injury or places the victim in a worse position.

Reid v. City of Boston · filed 2019-07-12(h), (j)(2)

The exclusion does not extend to every negligent act that a police officer commits in the course of providing police protection. ... But § 10 (j) does not provide immunity where a public employee's affirmative act "creates the 'condition or situation' that results in harm inflicted by a third party."

Section 10(e), (h), and (j) preserve governmental immunity for specified failures involving permits, police protection, and preventing third-party tortious conduct.

Back Beach Neighbors Committee v. Town of Rockport · filed 2021-04-21(e), (h), and (j)

Those purported failures are clearly subject to the exceptions listed in Chapter 258, § 10(e), (h) and (j) and thus the Town is immune to such private nuisance claims.

Section 10(c) bars claims against a public employer for employees’ intentional torts, and section 10(j) bars claims based on failure to prevent third party harm when the employer was not the original cause.

Doe ex rel. Doe v. Town of Hopkinton · filed 2017-03-07(c), (j)

However, Counts 7, 8 and 11 of the Verified Complaint speak of the negligence of the Town’s employees, not the intentional acts of Howard. Therefore, section 10(c) is inapplicable.

Section 10(b) immunizes a town from negligence claims challenging police officers’ planning of security for a public meeting.

Nolan v. Krajcik · filed 2005-07-12(b)

In the instant case, Nolan is challenging the decisions made in connection with preparing for security at the meeting. This is clearly a challenge to “planning and policy-making” for which there is immunity.

Section 10(b) immunizes a municipality from a negligent hiring claim based on its discretionary decision to hire a police officer through the civil service process despite his prior criminal conviction.

Crete v. City of Lowell · filed 2005-08-11(b)

We believe that the SJC, if faced with a similar set of facts such as the ones before us, would extend the rationale of Gaubert to the MTCA and would find that the discretion exercised by the City in hiring Ciavola -- discretion granted to it by the Massachusetts legislature -- was grounded in policy and was therefore immune from tort liability.

Section 10(b) bars a claim against a public employer based on officers’ discretionary response to an anonymous tip during an investigation.

Firman v. City of Boston · filed 2021-02-02(b)

Here, because Firmin is attempting to hold the City liable for how its police officers conducted their investigation (i.e., crediting the anonymous tip), his claim is barred by § 10(b).

Section 10 excludes claims arising from intentional infliction of emotional distress under subsection (c) and claims arising from discretionary police investigation decisions under subsection (b).

Evariste v. Boston Police Department · filed 2020-03-23(b), (c)

Second, the MTCA does not permit recovery for intentional torts, including intentional infliction of emotional distress. ... Third, the MTCA would not permit recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress in this case, because the alleged negligence arose from discretionary functions. ... The actions of Officers O’Brien and Dugal in searching, detaining, and arresting plaintiff are clearly “decisions of law enforcement officers regarding whether, when, how, and whom to investigate,” and therefore fall within the “discretionary function” exception to the MTCA.

Section 10(b) immunizes a municipality from claims based on discretionary police supervision and training decisions about enforcing court orders.

Bache v. Town of Boxborough · filed 2022-02-09(b)

Therefore, the Town is immune under § 10(b) from liability for any claim based on the supervision and training of its officers pursuant to the enforcement of court orders.

Section 10(b) bars damages against a town for selectmen’s improper conduct of a disciplinary hearing as a discretionary function.

Fratus v. Board of Selectmen · filed 1984-03-29(b)

The directed verdict on count four was also proper because, under G. L. c. 258, § 10(b), relating to discretionary functions, the town could not be made answerable in damages for the selectmen’s improper conduct of a disciplinary hearing.

Section 10(b) bars a claim based on a public employer’s policy choice even if that choice was imprudent or unreasonable.

Patrazza v. Commonwealth · filed 1986-09-12(b)

Thus, even if the adoption of the policy was not prudent or reasonable, G. L. c. 258, § 10 (b), would bar this action.

Section 10(b)'s discretionary function exception bars tort claims over state employees' Social Security disability determinations made under federal standards and procedures.

Pina v. Commonwealth · filed 1987-07-09(b)

We believe it unreasonable to conclude that the Legislature intended to include within the scope of the Act decisions of State employees acting for the Federal Secretary of Health and Human Services, pursuant to standards and procedures prescribed by that Federal agency.

Section 10(b) protects a town from liability for an intersection design that is a discretionary function.

Drivas v. Barnett · filed 1987-09-30(b)

On this record, we hold that the design of the intersection by Hanover is the type of discretionary function which G. L. c. 258, § 10(6), was designed to protect.

Section 10(b) exempts a municipality from liability for policy judgments about which safety measures to take, even if it has a duty to take some measures.

Gage v. City of Westfield · filed 1988-12-23(b)

Given the judgment involved in weighing alternatives and making policy choices as to what safety measures to take, even if there was a duty on the part of the city to take some safety measures, we think the discretionary function exception was applicable.

Section 10(b)’s discretionary function exception covers a decision to relocate witnesses without alerting local authorities to the reasons for the move or requesting their supervision.

J. K. v. Commonwealth · filed 1990-07-02(b)

We think that the defendant’s decision to relocate Dutra and Shagoury to Provincetown without alerting local authorities to the details of the reasons for the move or requesting that they be supervised was a discretionary decision.

Section 10(b) exempts the adoption of an individualized education plan and a child’s placement under that plan from tort liability as discretionary acts.

Bencic v. City of Malden · filed 1992-03-02(b)

We conclude that the adoption of an IEP and the placement of a child pursuant to that plan are therefore acts exempt from tort liability under G. L. c. 258, § 10(b)..

Section 10(b) protects a public housing authority’s decisions about patrols and door security under the discretionary function exception.

Wheeler v. Boston Housing Authority · filed 1993-01-25(b)

We believe that the decision to provide more police patrols to the premises or how and when doors to housing projects should be secured falls within the second category of cases which are protected by the discretionary function exception.

Section 10(b) shields a public employer’s discretionary decisions about playground design and safety features from negligence liability.

Sico v. City of Cambridge · filed 1993-07-13(b)

There is no allegation in this case of a negligent failure to maintain an existing safety feature. The allegedly negligent conduct involves decisions by the City of Cambridge in designing its playground and the safety features thereof, and is therefore protected under the discretionary function exception of G.L.c. 258, § 10(b).

Section 10(b)'s discretionary function exception covers the Boston Housing Authority's security decisions regardless of whether the injured person is a tenant, visitor, or employee.

Grankewicz v. Boston Housing Authority · filed 1993-08-26(b)

This Court holds that the duty of the defendant is the same for all persons whether tenant, visitor, or employee. The relationship between parties does not matter here. The discretionary function exception applies.

Section 10(6) shields a town from negligence claims arising from policy and planning decisions about whether and how to remove accumulated silt and vegetation from waterways.

Tarzia v. Town of Hingham · filed 1993-11-22(6)

Accordingly, the judge was correct in holding that the town is shielded by G. L. c. 258, § 10(6), from the plaintiffs’ claims of negligence.

Section 10(b)’s discretionary function protection does not bar design evidence offered to prove recklessness when liability is not based on defective or negligent design.

Sandler v. Commonwealth · filed 1995-01-19(b)

Moreover, the plaintiff’s case was not based on liability for defective or negligent design, and, therefore, discretionary function considerations had no bearing on the admissibility of the evidence.

Section 10(b) immunizes a town from a negligence claim based on discretionary decisions about meeting security.

Shank v. Town of Townsend · filed 2000-04-26(b)

These decisions, right or wrong, were within the discretion of her office and not prescribed by statute, regulation or agency practice.

Section 10(b) immunizes discretionary decisions involving policymaking or planning, including decisions to exceed state requirements for detention facilities and police training.

Rochleau v. Town of Millbury · filed 2000-09-29(b)

The Act provides immunity only for discretionary conduct that involves policymaking or planning, as opposed to conduct which involves the implementation and execution of such governmental policy or planning. ... Because the Town had already met the state requirements concerning cell conditions and the first aid training of its police personnel, any decision to require more would involve discretionary policy making and planning.

Section 10(b) shields board members from individual liability for discretionary variance denials made within the scope of their duties.

Kuhn v. Kaufman · filed 2001-01-12(b)

Under G.L.c. 258, §§10 and 10(b), the actions of the Board members in exercising their discretion to deny the plaintiffs’ requests for variances fall within the scope of their employment duties. Accordingly, the defendants are immune from liability and the plaintiffs’ claim for damages directed at the Planning Board members in their individual capacities must be dismissed.

Section 10(b) exempts public employers from liability for discretionary decisions about whether to erect safety barriers or remove snow from public property.

Barnett v. City of Lynn · filed 2001-04-09(b)

The relevant issue here is the decision not to erect a fence or to remove snow, a decision protected under the discretionary function exception.

Section 10(b) immunizes a municipality’s decisions about allocating emergency services when those decisions are based on public policy considerations.

DiLoreto v. Town of Winchester · filed 2001-10-22(b)

The court concludes that Winchester’s decision regarding when to provide service to DiLoreto on June 11, 1998 fulfills the purposes of the discretionary functions exception of G.L.c. 258, § 10(b) because it was made on the basis of public policy considerations.

Section 10(b) shields public policy decisions about foster care placement from negligence liability as discretionary functions.

Archer ex rel. Maureen G. v. Dare Family Services, Inc. · filed 2002-02-11(b)

With respect to the plaintiffs separate allegation of negligence by the Commonwealth in selecting the appropriate foster care placement for the child, the Commonwealth is entitled to discretionary function immunity under G.L.c. 258, § 10(b).

Section 10(b) shields a town from claims based on a discretionary decision about streetlighting; carrying out an established lighting policy would not be discretionary.

Walenty v. Town of Mendon · filed 2002-08-30(b)

The location of utility poles is a discretionary function, see Sanker v. Orleans, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 410, 412 (1989), and the town is immune from any claim based upon the exercise or failure to exercise such a function. G. L. c. 258, § 10(b).

Section 10(b) and (j) immunity defenses require factual support sufficient to establish the claimed exception on summary judgment.

Allen v. City of Boston · filed 1998-05-01(b), (j)

However, on both “placement” and “security” all the defendant offered of record was reference to court decisions indicating that a public employer might in given situations properly approach such questions on a policy basis and thus sustain a § 10(6) defense of immunity. On the present record the defense is insufficiently supported. The same lack of factual support impairs the defendant’s treatment of the claimed § 10(/) immunity.

Section 10(b) shields discretionary decisions about where to install state highway lights, and § 10(j) shields a failure to prevent a dangerous condition that leads to injury caused by a third party.

Estate of Walenty v. Commonwealth · filed 2000-10-04(b), (j)

Although the Defendants do have the authority to install streetlights on state roads, they have discretion as to where those lights should be installed and, therefore, are immune from liability on this claim under the discretionary function exception. G.L.c. 258, § 10(b) (1999). Additionally, the Defendants are exempt from liability because they failed to prevent a dangerous condition that lead to an injury caused by a third party — a claim which is barred under the third party rule. G.L.c. 258, §10(j) (2000).

Section 10(b) provides immunity for claims based on a municipality’s discretionary sewer design decisions.

Spignola v. City of Leominster · filed 2005-06-16(b)

The Act, however, does not apply to claims based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function. G.L.c. 258, §10(b). ... The plaintiff cannot prevail under a theory of negligent design by the defendant because the Act provides a valid immunity defense if the defendant’s design caused the plaintiffs damage.

Section 10(b) does not warrant dismissal when the record leaves unclear whether the challenged conduct involved governmental policymaking or planning.

Doe ex rel. Doe v. Nashoba Regional School District · filed 2005-10-12(b)

In a case such as this in which the basis for the conduct of municipal employees or officials which is alleged to have harmed the plaintiff is unclear, it is not appropriate to dismiss the complaint on the basis of G.L.c. 258, Sec. 10(b).

Section 10(b) protects DCR’s discretionary allocation of resources for bike path snow removal from negligence claims.

Roy v. Massachusetts Department of Conservation & Recreation · filed 2005-12-12(b)

Instead, DCR argues that discretionary immunity under G.L.c. 258, §10(b) absolves it of any liability related to plaintiffs injuries. The court agrees. ... Moreover, the court finds that DCR has unfettered discretion in the allocation of its resources.

Section 10(b) immunizes DSS from liability for negligent child placement decisions that involve discretionary judgments about public policy.

Serrano v. Massachusetts Department of Social Services · filed 2007-05-08(b)

The SJC has held that section 10(b) provides immunity for discretionary actions based on considerations of, and that necessarily affect, public policy. This court finds Judge Hely’s reasoning persuasive. DSS must be able to freely exercise its discretion when making often difficult and complex decisions about child placement without fear of liability. ... Therefore, DSS is immune from liability on the plaintiffs’ negligent placement claim.

Section 10(b) immunizes discretionary government decisions involving policy and planning, including choices about bridge railings.

Fortenbacher v. Commonwealth · filed 2008-06-16(b)

As described by these expert witnesses, what we are left with is the quintessential type of discretion for which § 10(6) of the Act provides immunity.

Section 10(6) exempts claims based on medical examiners’ discretionary handling of an autopsy report from Tort Claims Act liability.

LeBlanc v. Commonwealth · filed 2009-10-15(6)

We also think that the specific duties of the medical examiners with respect to the handling of the autopsy report fell within the “exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a public employer or public employee, acting within the scope of his office or employment, whether or not the discretion involved [was] abused.” G. L. c. 258, § 10(6), inserted by St. 1978, c. 512, § 15. Claims based on such functions or duties are exempted from liability.

Section 10(b) excludes claims based on a public employer’s discretionary acts from the waiver of governmental immunity, even when that discretion is abused.

Ciccone v. City of Newton Police Department · filed 2009-11-05(b)

Furthermore, any abuse of discretion on the part of the defendants in imposing various medical examinations and other preconditions to the plaintiffs reinstatement falls outside of the waiver of governmental immunity afforded by the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. SeeG.L.c. 258, §10(b) (excluding “any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a public employer . . . whether or not the discretion involved is abused”).

Section 10(b) immunizes a city’s discretionary decisions about improvements to its sewer and drainage systems.

Canterbury Automotive, Inc. v. City of Worcester · filed 2014-01-15(b)

As to the City’s decisions not to make certain improvements to its sewer and drainage systems, these are clearly the type of core discretionary functions that are immunized from liability under G.L.c. 258, § 10(b).

Section 10(b)'s discretionary function exception requires a fact-specific determination whether the challenged government decision involved policy-making and planning.

Murray v. Town of Hudson · filed 2015-08-03(b)

The issue whether some or all of the plaintiff's claims come within the discretionary function exception cannot be resolved until the judge can determine whether the plaintiff rests liability on a negligent design theory and, if so, whether the decisions concerning the design of the bullpen constitute the type of discretionary policy-making and planning by government officials that is protected by sovereign immunity.

Section 10(b) grants municipalities immunity for claims based on a public employer's or employee's discretionary functions performed within the scope of employment.

Atkinson v. Town of Ashburnham · filed 2018-08-10(b)

According to M.G.L.c. 258 § 10(b), municipalities are immune from liability for a claim based on the performance, or nonperformance, of “a discretionary function or duty on the part of a public employer or public employee, acting within the scope of his office or employment.” ... I find that the Town is immune from liability for Officer Kaddy’s conduct in investigating Ms. Syvari’s claims and decision to arrest Mr. Atkinson under the discretionary function exemption. See M.G.L.c. 258 § 10(b).

Section 10 bars negligence claims based on a public employee’s due-care enforcement of a law even if its application is invalid, and treats code-enforcement decisions as discretionary functions.

Donohue v. City of Methuen, Massachusetts · filed 2019-05-17

The complaint does not allege that Gibney failed to exercise due care in his enforcement of the various laws he intended to enforce, and the statute specifies that liability for the execution of any law is precluded regardless of the ultimate validity of the law being executed. In other words, Gibney and the City cannot be held liable for negligence simply because their position on the application of the Building Code and other laws was eventually held invalid. Further, given that Gibney’s enforcement decisions are essentially an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, his decisions in code enforcement also fall within the discretionary function exception.

Section 10(a) requires a claimant challenging the execution of a statutory duty to plead or show facts indicating a failure to exercise due care.

Commonwealth v. Elm Medical Laboratory, Inc. · filed 1981-01-29(a)

In order to present an actionable claim under section 10(a) of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, Elm must plead or show ... by way of affidavit that the Department failed to exercise due cafe in the preparation and issuance of the “Health Alert.”

Section 10(a) bars claims against the Commonwealth based on a public official’s act or omission when the official acted with due care.

Dineen v. Department of Social Services · filed 2000-01-31(a)

Any claim based upon a public official’s act or omission, provided they acted with due care, cannot subject the Commonwealth to liability. G.L.c. 258, § 10(a).

Section 10(b)’s discretionary function exception covers school authorities’ decisions about student disputes, discipline, and school decorum.

Cady v. Plymouth-Carver Regional School District · filed 1983-12-09(b)

Management of student imbroglios, student discipline, and school decorum fall readily within the discretionary function exception to the Tort Claims Act.

Section 10(b)’s discretionary function exception applies to school staff decisions about supervising students even when discretion is abused.

Wightman v. Town of Methuen · filed 1988-08-09(b)

Under the Act, the exception applies even where there has been abuse of discretion.

Section 10(b)’s discretionary function exception covers school officials’ decisions about supervising students when there is no proof they ignored a student’s dangerous proclivities.

Roman v. City of Boston · filed 1994-01-12(b)

Absent proof that defendant ”ignor[ed] dangerous proclivities of the student,” this Court holds that this matter readily falls into the discretionsry function exception of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act as enumerated in Cady. Moreover, this Court is guided by Judge Botsford’s decision in Alake v. City of Boston, supra, and further holds that it is improper for the Court to second-guess school officials’ decisions on how to effectively supervise students.

Section 10(b) shields a city's decisions about how to supervise high school students when those decisions involve planning and policy choices about allocating school personnel.

Alake v. City of Boston · filed 1993-11-10(b)

Rather, by its nature the decision of how effectively to supervise high school students is largely one of judgment which involves both planning and policy choices with respect to the most appropriate allocation of school personnel resources.

Section 10(b) provides immunity from liability for negligent supervision of students because that supervision is a discretionary function.

Stagl v. City of Cambridge · filed 1994-06-21(b)

This court is unwilling to depart from the clear line of Massachusetts cases which hold that the supervision of students is a discretionary function for which G.L.c. 258, §10(b) provides immunity from liability.

Section 10(b)’s discretionary function exception shields a town from a negligent-supervision claim arising from an off-site physical education class when no established supervision standards or policies are alleged to have removed its discretion.

Lombardo v. Town of Billerica · filed 1994-12-05(b)

In the circumstances alleged here, the Town’s alleged misconduct falls squarely within the discretionary function exemption of c. 258.

Section 10(b)’s discretionary function exception does not protect conduct that puts an already injured student at risk of further injury.

Bastien v. Town of Southbridge · filed 1995-10-03(b)

It follows that the exception could not be invoked to protect conduct that placed an already injured student at risk of further injury.

Section 10(b) shields a school district from negligence claims based on discretionary decisions about student parking lot supervision and security.

Stubbs v. Greater Fall River Regional Vocational School District · filed 1996-06-21(b)

The “determination of what security measures to take to protect” students in the parking lot from the consequences of reckless driving by other students is an integral part of the School District’s policy making or planning process. ... In sum, the injury-producing behavior alleged by Stubbs falls squarely within § 10(b).

Section 10(6) immunizes a school’s policy decision about how many field-trip chaperons to provide, but does not immunize negligent supervision by the chaperons present.

Alake v. City of Boston · filed 1996-06-27(6)

We conclude that the discretionary function exception to the act immunizes the city from suit under the plaintiff’s first theory, but that immunity does not extend to the plaintiff’s second theory.

Section 10(b) immunizes a public employer from claims based on school officials’ discretionary decisions about recess supervision, staffing, and activities.

Rayberg v. City of Waltham · filed 1996-04-03(b)

The decisions school officials and teachers make surrounding recess and recess activities for minors are the types of discretionary decisions encompassed within Section 10(b).

Section 10(b)’s discretionary function immunity does not cover a school’s supervision of its weight room, warnings about weightlifting, or placement of floor mats when those decisions do not involve policy or planning.

Turk v. Town of Westborough · filed 2011-02-22(b)

Although a school’s administrative decisions regarding the allocation of limited resources, including the decision to maintain a weight room, are considered policymaking decisions, the court concludes the School’s failure to supervise the students adequately while in the weight room, the failure to post warnings about the dangers associated with weightlifting, and the purchase and improper placement of station mats do not implicate the type of policymaking and/or planning decisions protected by Section 10(b).

Section 10(b) exempts lawful discretionary decisions about criminal investigations and seeking arrest warrants from tort liability.

Sena v. Commonwealth · filed 1994-03-10(b)

The decisions of law enforcement officers regarding whether, when, how, and whom to investigate, and whether and when to seek warrants for arrest are based on considerations of, and necessarily affect, public policy. So long as they are within the bounds of the law, and therefore within the officers’ discretion, they are public policy decisions.

Section 10(b) protects policy decisions about training police dogs and officers, but does not protect negligent control of a dog while carrying out established policies.

Kyle v. Commonwealth · filed 1994-06-10(b)

Since the training of police dogs and police dog officers involves discretionary functions and represents a policy decision, the Commonwealth is entitled to summary judgment under G.L.c. 258, §10(b). Trooper Lannon’s alleged negligence in controlling Fritz, however, is not protected under G.L.c. 258, § 10(b). While the use of police dogs represents a policy decision, Trooper Lannon’s actions in the case at bar do not. Rather, Trooper Lannon’s conduct involved following “previously established policies,” and as such are not protected under the discretionary functions exception.

Section 10(b)’s discretionary function exception does not immunize an officer’s decisions to begin and continue a high-speed pursuit when those decisions do not involve governmental policy making or planning.

Horta v. Sullivan · filed 1994-08-18(b)

Because Meninno’s discretion in commencing and continuing the high-speed pursuit of the motorcycle did not involve policy making or planning, we answer the certified question, “No.”

Section 10(a) excludes claims based on officers’ exercise of due care in executing a search warrant, and § 10(b) excludes claims based on discretionary police investigation and decisions to seek a warrant.

Donahue v. Commonwealth · filed 1994-04-26(a), (b)

Accordingly, I conclude that there is no material factual issue concerning the officers’ exercise of due care in executing the warrant, and that G.L.c. 258, §10(a) applies. ... Thus, the Commonwealth is entitled to prevail on its argument that G.L.c. 258, § 10(b) precludes Donahue’s claim of negligence relating to the state police investigation.

Section 10(b) exempts the Department from negligence claims based on employees’ discretionary decisions about investigating suspected child abuse and initiating court proceedings.

Suarez v. Belli · filed 1997-01-13(b)

The discretionary function immunity applies as a matter of law to the allegations of negligence by Department employees in this complaint.

Section 10(h) does not bar a negligent investigation claim when police investigative techniques cause wrongful detention rather than harm by a third party.

Sterling v. Commonwealth · filed 2000-08-15(h)

The plaintiffs are contesting the internal investigative techniques of the Commonwealth, which resulted in them being wrongfully imprisoned, rather than alleging the negligent investigation on the part of the police led to the plaintiffs being harmed by some third party. Section 10(h) does not address situations such as this, and it is inappropriate to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim for this reason.

Section 10(b) shields a town from negligence claims based on a discretionary police investigation, including claims framed as negligent supervision or training of investigation participants.

Triplett v. Town of Oxford · filed 1999-07-06(b)

The Town is immune from Counts One, Two, and Four through Ten under the discretionary function immunity as that immunity has been interpreted and applied in Sena v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 250, 254-59 (1994). These counts amount to claims of a negligently conducted investigation, regardless of whether plaintiffs counsel also characterizes them as a negligent failure to supervise or train the investigation participants.

Section 10(b) bars claims against public employers for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from pursuing and executing search warrants because those acts are discretionary functions.

Opalenik v. LaBrie · filed 2013-03-22(b)

Under section 10(b) of the MTCA, however, public employers are immune from liability for claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress where the alleged negligent acts arise from discretionary functions. ... Similarly, this court concludes, pursuing and executing search warrants are discretionary functions. Therefore, discretionary function immunity applies to the official capacity NIED claims and Plaintiffs cannot prevail.

Section 10’s discretionary-function exception does not cover a doctor’s treatment of a patient when accepted medical practice supplies an ascertainable standard of conduct.

Kelley v. Rossi · filed 1985-08-15(b)

We reject any suggestion that the doctor was engaged in a discretionary function in treating the patient so as to make G. L. c. 258, §§ 1-8, inapplicable to this claim. See G. L. c. 258, § 10. The doctor was governed by the standard of accepted medical practice, an ascertainable guide to proper conduct.

Section 10(b)’s discretionary function exception does not protect negligent performance of ministerial maintenance tasks that do not involve public policy or planning decisions.

Doherty v. Town of Belmont · filed 1985-11-25(b)

Any negligence in performing, or failing to perform, the ministerial task of maintenance does not rise to the level of “public policy or planning” decisions warranting protection under G. L. c. 258, § 10 (b).

Section 10(b)'s discretionary function exception does not apply to a municipal private nuisance claim outside the Tort Claims Act.

Asiala v. City of Fitchburg · filed 1987-04-03(b)

As the Act is not applicable, the judge did not have to instruct the jury on the discretionary function exception found in G. L. c. 258, § 10(b).

Section 10(b)'s exception for discretionary acts does not apply to ministerial acts.

Breault v. CHAIRMAN OF BD, FIRE COMMR. OF SPRINGFIELD · filed 1987-10-13(b)

None of these cases, or § 10 (b), has application to acts, such as those in the case at bar, which are ministerial in nature.