Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148

Section 148 does not treat compensatory time created by converting unused vacation time as earned wages.

Fontana v. City of Boston · filed 2026-06-02

Beyond the absence of any express language in the statute, the formula used here to conjure both cash and compensatory time out of unused vacation time did not create "wages earned."

Section 148 protects commissions as wages only after valid conditions in a commission plan have been met and the commissions are due and payable.

Klauber v. VMware, Inc. · filed 2023-08-21

It is clear that the terms and conditions agreed to by the parties set valid contingencies that had to be met before a commission could be earned. Until those contingencies were satisfied, any potential commissions did not become due and payable and, thus, did not qualify as "wages" within the purview of the Wage Act.

Section 148 is not violated by a deduction when employees still receive more than the wages their collective bargaining agreement requires.

Owens v. City of Malden · filed 2023-10-30

As such, there is no Wage Act violation for an improper reduction of wages.

Section 148 does not treat unaccrued sick pay as wages, so an employer may deduct the value of sick days used before they accrued when calculating earned wages.

Rossman v. Nashoba Regional School District · filed 2024-08-28

However, given the SJC’s unequivocal holding that unused accrued sick pay is not “wages,” it follows that unaccrued sick pay cannot be wages. The fact that Nashoba allowed Plaintiff to use portions of her sick day allowance before she had accrued the equivalent value in sick pay, as the statute allows, does not transform the unaccrued sick pay into wages. Thus, Nashoba did not deduct, or withhold payment of any earned wages when it deducted the value of 4.5 unaccrued sick days in the calculation of Plaintiff’s wages.

Section 148 can cover commissions earned while employed even if the customer pays after employment ends.

Warren v. Zapata Computing, Inc. · filed 2025-06-02

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, a factfinder could conclude that, pursuant to the terms of the March 2022 Plan, the commissions may have been earned, and could have been due and payable, at the time Plaintiff closed the deals, even if Zapata did not receive payment from the clients until after Plaintiff was no longer employed.

Section 148 may cover compensation paid through a worker’s corporation when the payment is for the worker’s services.

Canales · filed 2026-03-30

Here, as an initial matter, Defendants have not established that the payments that Plaintiffs received, through T&B, were not “wages” for purposes of the Wage Act. As discussed supra, a reasonable trier of fact could find that Plaintiffs performed services for Defendants. It follows that the payments that T&B received based on Plaintiffs’ deliveries to chain account customers can reasonably be characterized as compensation for those services.

Section 148 treats commissions that are definitely determined and due and payable as wages subject to § 150’s mandatory treble damages.

Weber v. Coast to Coast Medical, Inc. · filed 2013-04-10fourth par.

... we continue to view the trebling provision of § 150 as intended to be applied to commissions “determined and due.” G. L. c. 149, § 148. Given the jury’s verdict, the judge was correct to treble the commissions.

Section 148 protects employees’ right to wages, and an agreement must expressly subject Wage Act claims to arbitration.

Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc. · filed 2013-12-05

This Court concludes that, under Massachusetts law, to subject a Wage Act claim to arbitration, an agreement must do so explicitly.

Section 148 claims seeking benefits under an ERISA plan are preempted when they function as an alternative means of enforcing the plan's terms.

Gordon v. AB · filed 2016-08-09

I find that Plaintiffs claims for breach of contract and violation of the Wage Act relate to the Plan and are thus preempted by ERISA. In his complaint, he asserts that he complied with the terms of the Plan but was denied benefits to which he was entitled pursuant to the Plan. As damages, he seeks to recover severance pay. In short, he attempts to enforce the terms of the Plan through state-law causes of action— precisely the type of alternative enforcement that ERISA prohibits. Accordingly, I find that Plaintiffs claims are preempted by ERISA.

Section 148 requires employers to pay employees their earned wages within specified time periods and supports a claim when wages are not paid timely.

Hamilton v. Partners Healthcare System, Inc. · filed 2016-07-21

Section 148 requires that “[e]very person having employees in his service shall pay ... each such employee the wages earned by him” within certain time periods. The purpose of this provision “is to prevent the ‘unreasonable detention of wages [by employers].’ ” ... To make out a claim under § 148, Plaintiffs must show that they were employees under the statute and that “defendants violated the Act by not paying ... wages in a timely manner.” ... For these reasons, the claim for unpaid wages in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws 149, § 148 is preempted by § 301 of LMRA.

Section 148 requires prompt and full payment of wages and prohibits improper wage deductions, even when the employee has assented.

DaSilva v. Border Transfer of MA, Inc. · filed 2017-01-05

The Massachusetts Wage Law requires prompt and full payment of wages due. It provides that “in no event shall wages remain unpaid by an employer for more than six days from the termination of the pay period in which such wages were earned by the employee.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has interpreted the statute as banning improper wage deductions,- even where the employee has given his or her assent.

An employee may seek a criminal complaint for a Section 148 violation involving unpaid, definitely determined commissions; the department is not the exclusive complainant.

Commonwealth v. Northern Telecom, Inc. · filed 1988-01-11

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, G. L. c. 149, § 148, with its reference to § 150, does not mean that only the department can bring a complaint when “definitely determined” commissions are due an employee.

A private claim for unpaid wages and vacation pay under § 148 is subject to § 150's Attorney General filing and waiting requirements.

Axton-Cross Co. v. Blanchette · filed 1994-10-17

Blanchette does not allege any facts which indicate that he has filed a complaint with the Attorney General or that he has received the Attorney General’s written approval to bring a private civil claim for violations of G.L.c. 149, §148. Thus, because Blanchette has failed to comply with the statutory prerequisites for bringing a private claim under G.L.c. 149, § 148, Count VI must be dismissed.

A finding of unpaid wages in violation of §148 requires an award of treble damages under §150.

Chiappetta v. Lyons · filed 1999-11-29

Both the language of the statute and its underlying Legislative intent indicate that an award of treble damages is mandatory upon any finding of a failure to have paid wages in violation of §148.

An employee who prevails on an unpaid-wages claim under § 148 is entitled to treble damages under § 150.

Gibbs v. Archie · filed 2002-11-21

The sole issue in this case is whether the plaintiff/appellant is entitled to treble damages as a matter of law pursuant to M.G.L.C. 149, §§148-150, after having pre-valed on his claim for non-payment of wages. ... For the reasons stated above the Plaintiff/Appellant’s appeal is allowed, judgment is to be entered for plaintiff/appellant in the amount of $8,160.00 plus interest and costs and reasonable attorney fees.

Section 148 creates an independent right to timely payment of wages that employees may enforce in court even when their collective bargaining agreement addresses the compensation.

Newton v. Commissioner of the Department of Youth Services · filed 2004-10-27

In this case, we agree with the plaintiffs that the right to timely payment of wages is a distinct, independent statutory right that can be enforced judicially even though the subject matter of overtime, call-back, and stand-by pay is incorporated in the plaintiffs’ collective agreement.

A claim under § 148 may be subject to arbitration under an individually executed employment agreement that covers statutory claims.

Allied Home Mortgage Capital Corp. v. Grant · filed 2005-12-06

While certain personal, statutory rights, including rights under G.L.c. 149, §148, can be enforced judicially even though they are incorporated into a collective bargaining agreement, Newton v. Comm’r of Dept. of Youth Serv., 62 Mass.App.Ct. 343, 346 (2004), and cases cited, that rule is inapplicable to individually executed employment contracts containing arbitration agreements like the one at issue here.

Section 148 gives employees an independent right to payment of wages that they may enforce in court without first exhausting a collective bargaining agreement’s grievance process.

Beaupre v. Town of Douglas · filed 2006-04-04

Beaupre’s request for payment of wages is an independent statutory right and does not require that he exhaust administrative remedies contained in a collective bargaining agreement before seeking judicial remedy.

Section 148 does not categorically bar arbitration of Wage Act claims.

Dixon v. Perry & Slesnick, P.C. · filed 2009-09-28

As to Dixon’s first argument, we disagree and conclude that claims under the Wage Act are arbitrable. We discern nothing in the language of § 148 or § 150 that would lead us to conclude otherwise.

Section 148 prevents an employer from using a general termination release to defeat an unacknowledged wage claim by a worker allegedly misclassified as an independent contractor.

Crocker v. Townsend Oil Co. · filed 2010-08-05

The clear legislative purpose of G.L. c. 149, § 148 was to prevent employers from inducing their employees to surrender the protections they are provided under the Wage Act. To allow employers to induce employees to waive their Wage Act protections by possibly mis-classifying them as independent contractors is contrary to the purpose of the Wage Act.

Section 148 wage claims are not preempted by the FAAAA when the wage law has only a remote, tenuous, or peripheral effect on a carrier’s prices, routes, or services.

Derochers v. Staples, Inc. · filed 2010-06-08

Applying this analysis to the case at bar, it is clear that the effect of the law classifying independent contractors, G.L.c. 149, §148B, and the Massachusetts wage laws, G.L.c. 149, §148 and G.L.c. 151, §1A, do ... not significantly affect carrier prices, routes and services. ... The court finds no preemption by the FAAAA.

Section 148 does not make the Wage Act the exclusive remedy for unpaid wages or preempt existing contract and quasi-contract claims.

Lipsitt v. Plaud · filed 2013-08-12

In this case, we are asked to decide whether G. L. c. 149, §§ 148 and 150 (Wage Act), are intended to be the exclusive remedy for the recovery of unpaid wages under Massachusetts law, preempting common-law breach of contract and related quasi-contract claims. We conclude that they are not.

Section 148 bars contractual exemptions from Wage Act protections, but a wage claim may proceed in arbitration after a term waiving required damages is severed.

Paradise v. Eagle Creek Software Services, Inc. · filed 2013-09-06

It further provides that “[n]o person shall by a special contract with an employee or by any other means exempt himself from this section or from section one hundred and fifty.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149 § 148. ... An arbitration provision that circumvented the Wage Act would therefore be unenforceable. ... The Court will accordingly sever the term in the ENCCA that purports to waive multiple damages, which term the Court finds to be invalid. Absent that waiver, the arbitration provision will be enforceable with respect to plaintiffs Massachusetts Wage Act claim.

Section 148’s prohibition on contractual exemptions does not bar arbitration of wage claims because arbitration changes the forum without waiving the right to recovery.

Machado v. System4 LLC · filed 2015-04-13

An arbitration agreement, as opposed to a general release, does not permit an employer to thwart or exempt itself from Wage Act obligations, but solely dictates the forum in which the plaintiffs' right to recovery will be determined.

For wage claims under § 148, employees may recover earned wages their employers have withheld.

Wessell v. Mink Brook Associates, Inc. · filed 2015-08-05

In sum, read in totality, for wage claims under § 148, an employee may recover earned wages that an employer has withheld.

Section 148 wage claims are preempted by the Railway Labor Act when resolving them requires interpreting a collective bargaining agreement.

Brown v. Jetblue Airways Corporation · filed 2025-04-30

Both of Brown’s proposed Wage Act claims are entangled enough with CBA interpretation that they would stand preempted.

Section 148 treats unpaid base salary as lost wages subject to mandatory trebling.

Ferrara v. Voyport II, LLC · filed 2018-10-29

As to Voyport, the $27,500 in base salary for 5 months is awarded as “lost wages.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148. Under the Wage Act, this amount is subject to mandatory trebling.

A successful Section 148 wage claim can result in trebled damages and prejudgment interest.

Owens v. City of Malden · filed 2022-07-28

Accordingly, judgment is entered in favor of the Plaintiffs on the Wage Act claim (count II), Mass Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148, in the amount of $7,538,815.28 in trebled damages and $812,555.82 in prejudgment interest, in the manner described above and as detailed in Appendix I.

Section 148 may entitle misclassified employees to benefits provided to other employees even without an agreement for those benefits.

Gonzalez v. RXO Last Mile, Inc. · filed 2022-01-10

XPO argues that Somers is distinguishable because Somers relies on a statutory provision that states that wages include benefits “due an employee under an oral or written agreement,” M. G. L. c. 149, § 148, and here, there was no agreement between the plaintiffs and XPO. But in Somers too, there was no agreement for benefits between the plaintiff putative employee and the defendant putative employer. Yet the SJC explained that if the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant employer under M. G. L. c. 149, § 148B, then the plaintiff “did not receive the vacation, holiday, or overtime pay to which [the plaintiff] was legally entitled, or any employment benefits that were extended to other [of the defendant’s] employees.” Somers, 911 N.E.2d at 748-49. Thus, Somers indicates that a company’s misclassified employees may be entitled, under the Massachusetts wage laws, to benefits extended to the company’s properly classified employees, regardless of the existence of an agreement between the plaintiff employee and defendant employer.

Section 148's Wage Act protections apply to individual workers even when the employer contracts through a corporation, and improper wage deductions remain actionable.

Dasilva v. Border Transfer of Ma, Inc. · filed 2017-11-09

However, incorporation cannot be a shield to prevent liability under the Wage Act. ... Thus, regardless of whether a full-time driver formed a corporation prior to his engagement with Border Transfer, the class only involves full-time drivers for Border Transfer. Thus, the analysis for Wage Act purposes is whether the individual driver was an employee with Border Transfer. ... Although the class definition avoids the individualized Chambers inquiry into applicability of the Wage Act, Plaintiffs still must show that Border Transfer took deductions that were improper under the Wage Act. ... The propriety of deductions under the Wage Act can be resolved on common evidence.

Section 148 bars an employer from deducting or withholding earned wages even with contractual authorization or employee consent, and deems corporate presidents, treasurers, and qualifying managing officers or agents to be employers under the Wage Act.

DaSilva v. Border Transfer of MA, Inc. · filed 2019-05-01

An employer may not, however, exempt itself from the Wage Act via “special contract with an employee or by any other means.” ... Accordingly, the Wage Act “prohibit[s] an employer from deducting, or withholding payment of, any earned wages,” even if the employee assents. ... “The president and treasurer of a corporation and any officers or agents having the management of such corporation shall be deemed to be the employers of the employees of the corporation . . . .”

Section 148 permits individual liability for wage violations only when an officer or agent has company-wide policy-making authority comparable to a corporate president or treasurer; control over compensation for a specific account is insufficient.

Edwards v. Granite Telecommunications, LLC · filed 2020-07-01

For Hoff to be held liable under the MWA, he must have had authority to oversee company policies. ... As Defendants note, Hoff was setting policies for “a specific account,” but not for the company as a whole. [ECF No. 12 at 2 n.2]. Like the human resources director in Drachman who determined employee salaries and bonuses, Hoff’s ability to control Plaintiff’s compensation with regard to a specific account does not evidence “the necessary involvement with and control of company policies” to be held individually liable under the MWA. See Drachman, 2016 LEXIS 186283, at *18. Because Hoff cannot be held liable under the MWA, the motion to dismiss the MWA claim, [ECF No. 5], is GRANTED.

Section 148 does not provide recovery for severance or separation payments.

Viscito v. National Planning Corporation · filed 2020-07-24

Because severance or separation payments are not recoverable in a Massachusetts Wage Act case, however, Plaintiff has not shown that he is, or ever would be, entitled to require Lambrechts to produce her confidential personal financial information, including income tax returns and documents showing severance or separation payments she has received from an NPC affiliated entity (or any entity).

Section 148 permits individual liability for a corporation’s president, treasurer, or agents who have substantial management responsibility over the corporation, especially control of finances or wage payments.

Pineda v. Skinner Services, Inc. · filed 2020-09-28

Under the Massachusetts Wage Act (“MWA”), the president, treasurer, and “any officers or agents having the management of such corporation” are considered to be employers who may be individually liable for violations of the Act. ... The MWA imposes personal liability on people who may not have the title of president or treasurer, but who have “assumed and accepted as individuals significant management responsibilities over the corporation similar to those performed by a corporate president or treasurer, particularly in regard to the control of finances or payment of wages.” ... The Supreme Judicial Court has cautioned that “merely holding a managerial position over some branch, division, or office of a corporation does not, by itself, mean that that manager has the ‘management’ of the ‘corporation’ as a whole.” ... Rather, a person who has management of the corporation necessary to impose individual liability “controls, directs, and participates to a substantial degree in formulating and determining policy of a corporation.”

Section 148 imposes personal liability on corporate officers or agents whose management responsibilities are comparable to those of a president or treasurer, particularly regarding corporate finances or wage payments.

Fall v. Battan · filed 2025-10-03

As relevant here, persons liable under the Massachusetts Wage Act include “[t]he president and treasurer of a corporation and any officers or agents having the management of such corporation.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has interpreted this language to impose per se personal liability on the president and treasurer of a corporation and de facto liability “on other officers or agents who may not hold these titles but whose significant management responsibilities over the corporation are similar to those performed by a corporate president or treasurer, particularly in regard to the control of finances or the payment of wages.” Segal, 478 Mass. at 570. “[N]either board members nor investors are officers or agents having the management of the company for Wage Act purposes unless they are so empowered by the corporation.” Id. at 568. Where an individual plays multiple roles in a corporation, Wage Act liability is established only according to the individual’s officer or agent powers, as “distinct” from their other powers, including those flowing from any board of directors position. Id. at 565 (“The other significant powers the defendants had as board members and investors were distinct from the agency powers provided in the agreement.”) ... Even so, Fall has not put forward sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Battan’s officer-agent powers gave him “over-all management of the financial and payroll function of the company.” See Segal, 478 Mass. at 565. This is dispositive because such a finding is required for personal liability to attach. Id.

Section 148 applies to commissions once their amount, after allowable or authorized deductions, has been definitely determined and the commissions have become due and payable.

Trindade v. Grove Services, Inc. · filed 2020-11-09

The Wage Act applies “to the payment of commissions when the amount of such commissions, less allowable or authorized deductions, has been definitely determined and has become due and payable to such employee . . . .” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148.

Section 148 treats commissions as wages once their amount is definitely determined and they are due and payable, including when the commission is arithmetically determinable.

KNIGHTLY v. CENTIMARK CORPORATION · filed 2022-01-10

Under the Wage Act, ... Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148 (2009). Compensation based on commissions has been “definitely determined” when it is “arithmetically determinable.” ... As such, the evidence of record establishes that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Knightly was paid the correct commission for the Operation Safe Quarters project under the Dual Rate Commission Plan, and the Court will deny CentiMark’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to that project.

Section 148 requires commissions to be paid only when their amount is definitely determined and they have become due and payable; future renewal commissions dependent on post-termination events and variable renewal rates do not meet those conditions.

Fine v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America · filed 2022-03-07

That is, the act requires that commissions are to be paid when two conditions are met: (1) the amount of the commission “has been definitely determined”; and (2) the commission “has become due and payable.” G.L. c. 149, § 148, fourth par. ... The future renewal commissions, however, are not “arithmetically determinable,” see id., because the commission amount would vary depending on the number of policies that were renewed, on Fine’s annual persistency factor, which depended on the rate of renewals in his book of business, which presumably would not be static over time, and on changes to policies that could impact commission amounts.

Section 148 applies to commissions once their amount, less allowable or authorized deductions, is definitely determined and the commissions have become due and payable.

Edwards v. Granite Telecommunications, LLC · filed 2022-03-31

The terms of the MWA are applicable to commissions “when the amount of such commissions, less allowable or authorized deductions, has been definitely determined and has become due and payable to such employee.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148 (emphasis added).

Section 148 treats commissions as wages only after their amount is definitely determined and they are due and payable; contractual contingencies may determine when that occurs.

Klauber v. VMware, Inc. · filed 2022-04-20

Commissions qualify as wages under the statute “when the amount of such commissions, less allowable or authorized deductions, has been definitely determined and has become due and payable to such employee . . . .” ... Commissions are “due and payable” only if any contingencies relating to their entitlement have occurred. ... “When a compensation plan specifically sets out the contingencies an employee must meet to earn a commission, courts apply the terms of the plan . . . .” ... The terms and conditions at issue here regarding commission compensation are, therefore, not unenforceable under the Wage Act. ... Here, the plan is clear—an employee has not “earned” commission compensation until a plan reconciliation for Exceptional Transactions and/or Large Deals has been completed by VMware. ... Therefore, plaintiff’s commission compensation for those deals did not become “due and payable” until after a plan reconciliation had occurred—until after all contingencies were met. Any potential commissions on those deals, prior to the occurrence of a plan reconciliation, would thus not qualify as wages under the statute. ... Because (1) the commission payments plaintiff contends he is owed are not “wages” within the meaning of the Wage Act and (2) VMware’s terms and conditions are enforceable under Massachusetts law, the claim under the Wage Act cannot survive. For that reason, defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s Wage Act claim will be granted.

Section 148 prevents a person from waiving or exempting himself from Section 150 by a special contract or other means.

Hogan v. The InStore Group, LLC · filed 2021-01-11

And this right to pursue class-wide relief for violations of the Massachusetts Wage Act Law and Independent Contractor Law is further protected by the statutory preclusion of waiver of these rights: “No person shall by a special contract with an employee or by any other means exempt himself from” Section 150. Id. ch. 149 § 148.

Section 148 requires final payment on the day the employment relationship is severed; an employee is not necessarily discharged merely because the employer tells the employee to stop working before that date.

Knous v. Broadridge Fin Solutions, Inc. · filed 2021-03-25

We agree with the district court. In both its broad scope and in its detail, the Act evidences a concern that employees be paid all wages and benefits on time, see Elec. Data Sys. Corp. v. Att'y Gen., 907 N.E.2d 635, 640–41 (Mass. 2009), and that the day of discharge is the time for a final accounting and payment. Nothing in the Act suggests that the legislature also wanted to require employers to have employees do work until the day of their official discharge. Simply put, we cannot imagine that the legislature sought to punish Broadridge because it gave Knous prior notice of the day on which his pay and benefits would cease, plus full paid time off through that day.

Section 148 waives the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity under the Wage Act only for mechanics, workmen, laborers, or employees of a penal institution, not for MBTA law enforcement officers.

Rae v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts MBTA · filed 2021-04-22

By its express terms, the Wage Act applies to the Commonwealth only with respect to “mechanic[s], workm[e]n and laborer[s]” or employees of a “penal” institution. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148. ... The Court holds that the Wage Act does not waive the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity with respect to claims brought by MBTA law enforcement officers.

Section 148 requires timely payment of wages earned by an employee, but an equity grant whose material terms were not negotiated until the end of employment is not a wage under the Wage Act.

Hoffman v. Thras.io Inc. · filed 2021-05-10

Here, the material terms of the alleged grant of equity were not negotiated until the end of the alleged employment. Based on these allegations, this Court holds that Hoffman has not made a plausible claim that the equity grant was a “wage” under the Wage Act.

Section 148 does not require a particular method of paying wages, but requires employers to timely pay all wages earned and does not permit a special contract to evade its requirements.

Grogan v. All My Sons Business Development LLC · filed 2021-08-04

The Court agrees with All My Sons that the Payroll Policy does not facially violate the Wage Act simply because it fails to separately pay employees for each hour worked. ... And after reviewing the terms of the Payroll Policy itself, the Court believes it to establish a “compensation structure with the employee [that] pays him on an hourly basis for only certain tasks but no additional compensation for others,” Salerno, 2016 WL 513747, at *3, and not to constitute an attempt to evade the requirements of the Wage Act by “special contract,” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148.

Section 148 treats compensation received by police officers for private detail work as wages for purposes of a Wage Act claim.

Owens v. City of Malden · filed 2021-10-04

This Court therefore rules that compensation received by the Plaintiffs for private detail work constitutes “wages” for the purposes of the Plaintiffs’ Wage Act claim.

Section 148 requires employers to pay discharged employees in full by the discharge date and treats a corporation’s president, treasurer, or management agent as the employer for wage-liability purposes.

Glynn v. Martin Sports & Entertainment, LLC · filed 2023-03-22

The Wage Act “requires an employer to pay an employee ‘in full’ by the date of discharge.” Lawless v. Steward Health Care Sys., LLC, 894 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148). “This provision ‘impose[s] strict liability on employers,’ who must ‘suffer the consequences’ of non-compliance regardless of their intent.” Id. (quoting Dixon v. City of Malden, 464 Mass. 446, 984 N.E.2d 261 (2013)). ... The Wage Act applies to David Martin as a matter of law where he is the President and CEO of Martin Sports. ... Thus, a fact finder could determine that she is an “agent[] having the management of” Martin Sports for purposes of the statute. ... Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 54] as to the Wage Claim against Individual Defendants is DENIED where David Martin is an employer under the Wage Act as a matter of law and a fact finder could conclude that Theresa Martin was an employer under the Wage Act based on the summary judgment record.

Section 148 requires a plaintiff to show employee status, wages, and a violation based on untimely payment; employer status for a non-employing entity turns on economic reality rather than an integrated enterprise.

Jiang v. Kobe Japanese Steakhouse, Inc. · filed 2024-02-05

Similarly, to state a claim under the Massachusetts Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was an employee under the statute, (2) his form of compensation constitutes a wage under the statute, and (3) the defendants violated the Act by not paying his wages in a timely manner. ... As the Court explained in its memorandum and order on defendant’s motion for summary judgment in Jiang v. Shogun Japanese Steakhouse Inc., the relevant test for determining whether liability may be imposed on a non-employing entity is the “economic-reality” test, not the “integrated-enterprise” test. ... Because the complaint here does not plead that any of the Baystate factors are met, it fails to state a claim against Tokyo III. ... Accordingly, the complaint does not set forth sufficient facts to plausibly allege that defendant Tokyo III was his employer within the meaning of the FLSA or the Massachusetts Wage Act.

Section 148 requires a Wage Act plaintiff to show employee status, compensation qualifying as wages, and a violation through untimely payment, with non-employing entities assessed under the economic-reality totality-of-the-circumstances test.

Jiang v. Kobe Japanese Steakhouse, Inc. · filed 2024-11-22

Similarly, to state a claim under the Massachusetts Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was an employee under the statute, (2) his form of compensation constitutes a wage under the statute, and (3) the defendants violated the Act by not paying his wages in a timely manner. ... As the Court explained in its memorandum and order on defendant’s motion for summary judgment in Jiang v. Shogun Japanese Steakhouse Inc., the relevant test for determining whether liability may be imposed on a non-employing entity is the “economic-reality” test, not the “integrated-enterprise” test. ... It “is the totality of the circumstances, and not any one factor, [that] determines whether a worker is the employee of a particular alleged employer.”

Section 148 requires prompt payment of earned wages, but contingent severance benefits are not treated as wages covered by the Wage Act.

Sullivan v. etectRx, Inc. · filed 2023-05-11

Here, like the sick pay in Mui, the severance benefits are contingent on the departing employee meeting certain criteria, namely that the "Executive's employment is terminated by the Company for any reason other than [for cause, death, or disability] or by Executive for Good Reason." ... So we see no basis for holding that her severance benefits, if due, were the type of contingent compensation that Massachusetts classifies as a wage for purposes of the Wage Act. ... Thus, we affirm dismissal of Sullivan's Massachusetts Wage Act claim on the alternative grounds that her severance benefits are not covered by the Wage Act.

Section 148 permits a release of existing Wage Act claims when the release is stated in clear and unmistakable terms; an active dispute over those claims is not required for enforceability.

Lynch v. Enlighten Software Inc. · filed 2023-06-02

But the SJC did not require that a Wage Act claim be the subject of an active dispute between the parties in order for a release to be enforceable. To the contrary, it specifically held that “clear and unmistakable” releases were enforceable with respect to “all possible existing claims” and nowhere imposed a requirement that such claims actually be in dispute. See Crocker, 979 N.E.2d at 1087. Thus, although an active dispute as to purported Wage Act violations may be probative of the fact that a release is intended to settle those claims, such a dispute is not a prerequisite for enforceability.

Section 148 treats holiday or vacation payments due under an oral or written agreement as wages, but does not itself require an employer to provide paid time off.

Caswell v. Steward Good Samaritan Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2024-03-22

Massachusetts law, however, does not require an employer to provide PTO. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148 (“The word ‘wages’ shall include any holiday or vacation payments due an employee under an oral or written agreement.”).

Section 148 requires a plaintiff to show employee status, compensation qualifying as wages, and untimely payment; agreed unused vacation can qualify as wages, fronted employment expenses can constitute wage reductions, and an officer who controls or substantially participates in company finances or wage payments can be liable.

Serebrennikov v. Proxet Group LLC · filed 2024-03-29

To state an actionable claim under the Massachusetts Wage Act, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was an employee under the statute, (2) his form of compensation constitutes a wage under the statute, and (3) the defendants did not pay his wages in a timely manner. ... Payment for unused vacation days can be considered “wages” under the Act if provided for under the terms of “an oral or written agreement.” ... Requiring employees to front employee expenses, including travel expenses, can constitute wage reductions under the Wage Act. ... An officer of a company is liable for Wage Act violations if the officer “controlled, directed, or participated to a substantial degree in formulating and determining the financial policy of [the company], or . . . accepted significant management responsibilities similar to those performed by a president or treasurer, regarding the control of finances or payment of wages.”

Section 148 does not treat unused accrued sick time as wages, even when an employer's policy allows employees to collect it upon departure.

Fernandes v. Criterion Child Enrichment, Inc. · filed 2024-09-30

Regarding Fernandes’ original claim that Criterion did not pay out her accrued sick time at all, employers are not required to compensate employees for unused sick time. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148C(d)(7); Rossman v. Nashoba Reg’l Sch. Dist., No. 3:21-CV-40042-KAR, 2024 WL 3966619, at *7 (D. Mass. Aug. 28, 2024) (quoting Tze-Kit Mui v. Mass. Port Auth., 89 N.E.3d 460, 463 (Mass. 2018)) (“because an employee may use accrued sick time under appropriate conditions, i.e., illness, but may ‘lose’ it if not used, unused accrued sick time cannot be a wage [under the Massachusetts Wage Act], even where the employer had a policy allowing employees to collect unused sick time upon their departure.”). Therefore, even under the most-generous interpretation of Fernandes’ allegations, her claim fails as a matter of law.

Section 148 protects wages earned and does not make an employer’s refusal to pay generic business expenses a Wage Act violation.

Waithaka v. Amazon.com Inc · filed 2024-12-31

As a matter of statutory law, the text of the Wage Act defines some benefits as “wages,” but not expenses. ... Therefore, it is not a violation of the Wage Act for an employer to refuse compensation for generic business expenses like those alleged here.

Section 148 requires timely payment of earned wages and permits neutral timeclock rounding when the rounding complies with the applicable regulation.

Darden v. Colbea Enterprises, L.L.C. · filed 2025-03-26

The Regulation permits timeclock rounding to calculate earned wages. Read together, the Regulation sets parameters by which an employer may calculate earned wages, and the Wage Act requires timely payment of those earned wages. ... As such, timeclock rounding is permissible under the Wage Act, subject to the requirements under the Regulation.

Section 148's wage obligations do not reach a defendant who is merely the worker's lawyer and advisor, without sufficient control to qualify as the worker's employer.

Pereira v. The Estate of Maria Jose Oliveira · filed 2025-07-11

Drawing all reasonable inferences in Pereira’s favor, “the totality of the circumstances” suggests that Sousa was Oliveira’s advisor and counsellor, not Pereira’s employer for purposes of the FLSA, the Wage Act, the FMWL, or the DWBORA.

Section 148, together with § 150, permits an employee aggrieved by an employer’s violation of those provisions to bring a private action.

Fabio Aparecido De Sousa and Julio Miranda Caldeira v. Amazon Siding Application Inc. · filed 2026-05-22

Mass. Gen Laws ch. 149, §§ 148 and 150 and Mass. Gen Laws 151, §§ 1A and 1B, confer a private right of action for an employee “aggrieved” by an employer’s violations of these provisions.

Section 148 permits a wage claim against a corporation's president, treasurer, or an officer or agent who has management of the corporation, but individual liability requires sufficient control over the employer.

McFadden v. Davis Ulmer Sprinkler Company · filed 2025-07-10

The MWA “provides a cause of action for employees whose wages have been wrongfully withheld.” ... Under the MWA, a cause of action can be brought against a corporation, as well as “[t]he president and treasurer of a corporation and any officers or agents having the management of such corporation.” ... “This expansive view of potential liability is circumscribed,” however, by the requirement that the individual be able to exercise sufficient control over the employer.

Section 148’s weekly commission payment requirement does not cover a real estate broker who works as an independent contractor rather than an employee.

Commonwealth v. Savage · filed 1991-12-30

In the instant case, the factors to be considered line up persuasively for the conclusion that Winchester was an independent Contractor in relation to the Savage office.

A claimant under §148 bears the initial burden of proving that she is an employee covered by the section.

Molloy v. Massachusetts Mortgage Corp. · filed 1998-01-12

First, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff in the first instance to establish that she was an employee within the purview of G.L.c. 149, §148 for “a party making a claim under a statute usually bears the burden of proving that he comes within the terms of the statute.” Eliot Discount Corp. v. Dame, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 280, 285 (1985).

Section 148 protects executive and professional employees from the withholding of salary regardless of how highly they are paid.

Kohli v. RES Engineering, Inc. · filed 2000-12-19

The plain and unambiguous statutory language demonstrates that executive and professional employees, no matter how highly compensated they may be, are protected by the Wage Act from the unreasonable detention of their salary.

Section 148 makes a corporate treasurer involved in management personally responsible for payment of wages.

Dunfey v. Primetech Professional Services, Inc. · filed 2002-01-04

Pichette is, or was at all relevant times, allegedly involved in the management of both Primetech and PPS, and was the Treasurer of both companies. Because both Primetech and PPS are proper parties to the civil action, Pichette is an additional individual who is personally responsible for the payment of wages. See G.L.c. 149, §148.

Section 148 makes corporate presidents and treasurers personally liable for unpaid wages and extends that liability to agents whose duties are functionally equivalent to theirs.

Bisson v. Ptech, Inc. · filed 2004-10-19

Rather, when one looks at the phrase “agents having the management of such corporation” in the context of the language it follows — "the president and treasurer of a corporation" — it appears that the Legislature intended to impose personal liability on the president and treasurer of a corporation, and on other agents who may not hold these formal titles, but whose actual responsibilities are functionally equivalent to those performed by a corporate president or treasurer.

Section 148 does not make a person individually liable as an employer merely for managing a branch, division, or office of a corporation.

Wiedmann v. Bradford Group, Inc. · filed 2005-07-21

Merely holding a managerial position over some branch, division, or office of a corporation does not, by itself, mean that that manager has the “management” of the “corporation” as a whole.

Section 148 can impose individual liability on an LLC principal who has employees in his service.

Keefe v. Enterprise Associates, LLC · filed 2012-06-12

There is no statutory reason inherent in the LLC form or the Wage Act why the Wage Act cannot apply to Ramsdell and Martin, so long as either is a “person having employees in his service . . .” M.G.L.c. 149, §148.

Section 148 may impose individual liability on managers, officers, or agents of limited liability entities who substantially control the entity’s policies.

Cook v. Patient Edu, LLC · filed 2013-06-13

Because a manager or other officer or agent of an LLC, limited liability partnership, or other limited liability business entity may be a “person having employees in his service,” and thus may be civilly or criminally liable for violations of G. L. c. 149, § 148, if he “controls, directs, and participates to a substantial degree in formulating and determining policy” of the business entity, see Wiedmann v. The Bradford Group, Inc., 444 Mass. 698, 711 (2005), the claims against Graziano and Schulman should not have been dismissed.

Section 148 treats a corporation’s president as an employer subject to personal liability for unpaid wages.

George v. Synkinetics, Inc. · filed 2013-03-20

In any event, they would not change the court’s legal conclusion that the plain language of the Wage Act renders the President of the Company an “employer” for purposes of Wage Act liability.

Section 148 permits an unpaid-wage claim against LLC managers when the complaint sufficiently alleges their control over the company.

Donaldson v. Shapemix Music, LLC · filed 2013-12-11

Therefore, the plaintiffs have aptly pled that these defendants had sufficient “control” of Shapemix to potentially be liable for violations of G.L.c. 149, §148.

Section 148’s definition of an employer applies only to claims under section 148, not to claims under other Wage Act sections such as the Tips Law.

Yucesoy v. Uber Technologies, Inc. · filed 2015-06-12

Thus, section 148 does not apply to e.g. section 152A of the Wage Act.

Section 148 permits individual liability only for corporate officers or agents who manage the corporation; a market manager’s control over workers alone is insufficient.

Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc. · filed 2018-07-20

Only officers or agents "having the management of the corporation" may be held individually liable under the Massachusetts Independent Contractor Law or Wage Act.

Section 148 makes a corporation’s president who manages its business personally liable for employees’ unpaid wages.

Chen v. Wen Jing Huang · filed 2016-09-07

Defendant Wen Jing Huang is personally liable for these amounts because she was Millennium’s president and managed the corporation’s business. See G.L.c. 149, §148.

Section 148 does not make a MassHealth fiscal intermediary liable as a PCA’s employer when the PCA provides no services to the intermediary.

Gallagher v. Cerebral Palsy of Massachusetts, Inc. · filed 2017-09-13

We therefore conclude that, in the circumstances of this case involving a PCA and fiscal intermediary working wholly within the framework of the regulations, Gallagher did not provide services to CPM and cannot be deemed its employee for the purpose of the Wage Act or the overtime statute.

Section 148 imposes personal liability on board members or investors only if the corporation empowers them to act as officers or agents having management of the company.

Segal v. Genitrix, LLC · filed 2017-12-28

In sum, neither board members nor investors are officers or agents having the management of the company for Wage Act purposes unless they are so empowered by the corporation.

Section 148 makes employers and their presidents and treasurers liable for unpaid wages.

TESSA WOLFE & Another v. JOHN BUDZYNA & Another. · filed 2023-04-11

The Massachusetts Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 148, imposes liability for unpaid wages on an employer, as well as on the employer's president and treasurer.

Section 148 can impose individual liability on a manager who substantially controls, directs, and participates in determining a business’s financial policy.

Darden v. Colbea Enterprises, L.L.C. · filed 2024-05-07

To determine whether a manager is subject to individual liability under the Wage Act, courts consider the extent to which the manager “controls, directs, and participates to a substantial degree in formulating and determining the financial policy of [the] business entity.” Cook v. Patient Edu, LLC, 465 Mass. 548, 549 (2013) (quotation marks omitted).

Section 148 does not impose personal liability on a director who merely advises management and has not been empowered to act for the corporation.

Melendez v. Openrounds, Inc., Jonathan Wyeth and Joseph Reel · filed 2024-06-12

There is no evidence in the record that Reel was an agent of OpenRounds within the meaning of the Wage Act - namely, that Reel was ever subject to the control of OpenRounds, or that the Company ever expressly or impliedly empowered Reel to act on its behalf.

Section 148 permits employees to seek damages from corporate officers who control, direct, and substantially participate in company policy for alleged Wage Act violations.

Corbin v. Hilco Merchant Resources LLC · filed 2024-11-01

In Massachusetts, a plaintiff employee of a corporation has an independent right to seek damages from the corporation’s employees. ... Here, the Plaintiffs have a right to seek damages from the Salkovitzes for their alleged violations of the Massachusetts Wage Act.

Section 148 permits the commissioner to set reasonable check-cashing facilities through prospective rules or orders for particular employers.

Treasurer of Worcester v. Department of Labor & Industries · filed 1951-03-29

This section is rather to be given the more reasonable interpretation that the commissioner is to act prospectively to affect only future conduct, either by a general rule or regulation, or, as now before us, by an order applicable to a particular employer.

A claim for employment benefits sought under §148 is subject to a three-year limitations period.

Miller v. Trinity Oil Co. · filed 1999-04-05

Assuming that Trinity had a legal obligation to provide these benefits, any claim for such benefits is subject to a three-year statute of limitations set forth in the state wages and hours statute.

Section 148’s requirement to pay a discharged employee in full does not restart the limitations period for wages and benefits that went unpaid earlier; each missed payment accrues separately.

Drexler v. Tel Nexx, Inc. · filed 2015-08-28

Instead, the Supreme' Judicial Court held that plaintiffs could recover only for those.damages which occurred in the last three years — implicitly holding that the statute of limitations begins to run at each failure to pay wages and benefits, and not at the time of the employee’s discharge.- ... Accordingly, Mr. Drexler’s Wagé Act claim in Count V relating to his miscl'assification as an independent contractor from 2003 until 2005 is time-barred.’

A claim for unpaid wages under § 148 accrues each time an employer fails to pay wages owed at the end of a pay period.

Wang v. Palmisano · filed 2016-01-26

Finally, for purposes of calculating the timeliness of Plaintiffs Complaint, the Court notes that Plaintiffs wage claims accrued each time Defendants allegedly failed to pay him at the end of’a pay period.

Section 148 prevents an employer from using a contractual choice of law provision to avoid its wage payment requirements.

Kirby v. Miami Systems Corp. · filed 1999-08-16

Further, §148 specifically states: “No person shall by a special contract with an employee or by any other means exempt himself from this section or from section one hundred and fifty.” It is thus clear that the employer in this case cannot escape the requirements of G.L.c. 149, §148 or the sanctions of §150 by the Ohio choice of law provision in its contract.

Section 148 treats a forum selection clause as a prohibited special contract only if the employee’s claim is covered by the Wage Act, the chosen forum would apply law other than Massachusetts law, and that law would deprive the employee of a substantive Wage Act right.

Melia v. Zenhire, Inc. · filed 2012-05-08

We conclude that a forum selection clause operates as a special contract only when three conditions are met: the employee’s claim is covered by the Wage Act; the court of the forum State, applying its choice-of-law principles, would choose a law other than that of Massachusetts to govern the dispute; and application of the foreign law will deprive the employee of a substantive right guaranteed by the Wage Act.

Section 148 permits an employee to release existing Wage Act claims only through clear, understandable language that specifically identifies the rights and claims being waived.

Crocker v. Townsend Oil Co. · filed 2012-12-17

We similarly conclude that a settlement or contract termination agreement by an employee that includes a general release, purporting to release all possible existing claims, will be enforceable as to the statutorily provided rights and remedies conferred by the Wage Act only if such an agreement is stated in clear and unmistakable terms. In other words, the release must be plainly worded and understandable to the average individual, and it must specifically refer to the rights and claims under the Wage Act that the employee is waiving.

Section 148 prohibits an employee agreement that waives the mandatory treble damages provided by § 150.

Machado v. System4 LLC · filed 2013-06-12

In turn, G. L. c. 149, § 148, provides that “[n]o person shall by a special contract with an employee or by any other means exempt himself from this section or from [§ 150].” ... Accordingly, because the award of treble damages is mandatory under G. L. c. 149, § 150, and cannot be waived, that waiver must be invalidated.

Section 148 bars an employer from using a contract or other arrangement to avoid its duty to pay lawful wages to employees.

Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising International, Inc. · filed 2013-06-17

To allow such an “end run” around G. L. c. 149, § 148, would contravene the express purpose of the statute and would nullify the provision therein that specifically forbids this type of arrangement “by a special contract with an employee or by any other means.”

Section 148’s anti-waiver rule does not invalidate a forum-selection clause when the employee fails to show that the selected forum would apply law depriving the employee of Wage Act rights.

Reynoso v. Lasership, Inc. · filed 2018-06-22

Reynoso has not met his burden of demonstrating that Virginia's choice-of-law rules would select a law other than Massachusetts. Accordingly, the forum-selection clause does not operate as a "special contract" that would impermissibly waive rights under the Wage Act and the motion to transfer will be allowed.

Section 148 prevents an employer from avoiding its wage payment obligations through an agreement with an employee, even if the employee agrees to it.

Sullivan v. Dumont Group, LLC · filed 2019-03-07

Consequently, Defendants argue, even if Mr. Sullivan is entitled to wage payments after January 1, 2016, they can no longer be held liable for those payments because of this discharge. This argument fails as a matter of law. The Wage Act makes clear that “[n]o person shall by a special contract with an employee or by any other means exempt himself from [the Wage Act].” M.G.L. c. 149 § 148.

Section 148 bars agreements that exempt an employer from Wage Act protections, including an employee’s ability to bring a misclassification claim.

GROUP MANAGEMENT 0002, LLC v. MARILYN YONG, Personal Representative. · filed 2025-08-19

By statute, "[n]o person shall by a special contract with an employee or by any other means exempt himself from" the provisions of the Wage Act, including the provisions allowing an individual to bring a misclassification claim. G. L. c. 149, § 148. See also G. L. c. 149, §§ 150, 148B. The operating agreement plainly violates § 148.

Section 148 gives employees a right to prompt wage payment that a forum selection clause limited to disputes under an employment agreement does not govern.

KIM v. SYK BIOSCIENCES LLC & Others. · filed 2026-04-15

The FSC governs claims to enforce the payment provision of the agreement, but it does not govern claims to enforce the prompt payment provision of the statute.

Section 148 does not allow an employer to avoid liability for deductions from earned wages merely because employees agreed to them.

DaSilva v. Border Transfer of MA, Inc. · filed 2019-05-01

Defendants cannot avoid liability simply because the CCAs authorize the deductions. Defendants contend that CCA provisions requiring its drivers to bear certain costs are not special contracts because they are common in the delivery industry. Even if so, the Wage Act also prohibits employers from exempting themselves via any other means. See Crocker, 979 N.E.2d at 1086 n.15. The class members' consent to these deductions is no defense to Defendants' Wage Act liability.