Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148

Section 148 does not protect additional incentive-plan commissions that are contingent on exceeding sales quotas and therefore fall outside the Wage Act’s scope.

Cumpata v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc. · filed 2000-09-13

Involvement in the Plan was voluntary and additional compensation was contingent on exceeding sales quotas. ... The commissions in question appear to be “compensation ‘triggered by contingencies’ and thus outside the scope of the Wage Act.” ... Thus, the compensation in question falls outside the protection of the Wage Act.

Section 148 does not let an employer deny a worker overtime pay offered to other employees by misclassifying that worker as an independent contractor.

Amero v. Townsend Oil Co. · filed 2008-12-03

Rather, he is arguing, correctly, that under the Massachusetts Wage Law an employer that offers overtime pay to some of its employees may not avoid paying overtime to others simply by reclassifying them as independent contractors.

Section 148’s wage protections do not apply to employee stock purchase plans covered by G. L. c. 154, § 8.

Weems v. Citigroup Inc. · filed 2009-01-30

We conclude that the payroll program of CAP is not governed by the act, because it is, in its essence, an employee stock purchase program. Rather, by operation of G. L. c. 154, § 8, the act is inapplicable here.

Section 148 treats a misclassified employee’s contract rate as the wage rate and requires payment of wages and benefits owed to that employee.

Somers v. Converged Access, Inc. · filed 2009-08-21

An employee misclassified as an independent contractor, as a matter of law, is an employee; his contract rate is his wage rate; and his “damages incurred” equal the value of wages and benefits he should have received as an employee, but did not.

Section 148 does not apply to work performed predominantly outside Massachusetts merely because the decision to withhold payment was made in Massachusetts.

Hadfield v. A.W. Chesterton Co. · filed 2009-09-15

In the absence of any guidance from Massachusetts courts on this subject, the decisions cited above, which are directly on point, persuade the Court to conclude that the relevant conduct to which the Wage Act applies is Hadfield’s work in sub-Saharan Africa, not the Massachusetts-based decision not to pay Had-field his accrued vacation time.

Section 148 requires full, timely payment to employees, and its coverage depends on whether the worker is an employee.

Oliveira v. Advanced Delivery Systems, Inc. · filed 2010-07-16

General Laws c. 149, §148 (“§148”), requires an employer to pay an employee in full, within a week of the weekly or biweekly pay period in which the employee performed the work. Whether an employer is bound by this law depends on whether the worker is an independent contractor or an employee. ... The court, therefore, concludes that Oliveira is ADS’ employee for purposes of G.L.c. 149, §148.

Section 148 protects an employee who works outside Massachusetts when the employee has sufficient contacts with the Commonwealth.

Dow v. Casale · filed 2011-07-19

The court concludes, therefore, that Dow had more than sufficient contacts with Massachusetts to afford him the protection of the Wage Act.

Section 148 does not cover employees who work outside Massachusetts merely because their employer is headquartered there and they occasionally visit its Massachusetts office.

Nekoroski v. Mathai · filed 2012-09-28

Neither the language of the Wage Act, nor any case decided under it, suggests that the Act should apply to a person employed outside Massachusetts, simply because the employer is headquartered here and the employee occasionally visits the home office on company business.

A Section 148 wage claim cannot be dismissed for lack of employee status while the workers’ classification remains unresolved.

Taylor v. Eastern Connection Operating, Inc. · filed 2013-05-17

Additionally, because the plaintiffs may yet be deemed employees under the Massachusetts independent contractor statute, it was error as well to dismiss their wage and overtime claims on the ground that, as independent contractors, they failed to state claims under the Massachusetts wage statutes. See G. L. c. 149, § 148; G. L. c. 151, § 1A.

Section 148 protects housing authority employees, who may bring unpaid wage claims in court without first proceeding before the Civil Service Commission.

Fernandes v. Attleboro Housing Authority · filed 2014-11-19

Similarly, nothing in the Wage Act excludes a housing authority employee from its protections or requires that such employee pursue relief from alleged wrongful conduct under the civil service system.

Section 148 permits a private wage claim against the Commonwealth only for the limited categories of state employees it covers.

Jergensen v. Massachusetts Historical Commission · filed 2015-05-14

On the other hand, because Section 148 applies only to certain limited categories of state employees, the existence of a private cause of action and waiver of sovereign immunity to allow claims under Section 148 is similarly limited only to those employees.

Section 148 does not cover employees of the Massachusetts Historical Commission under its provision for people employed in charitable institutions because the Commission is not a charitable institution.

Jergensen v. Massachusetts Historical Commission · filed 2016-11-21

Although Plaintiff argues otherwise, the Court is persuaded that the better reasoned conclusion is that the Commission does not constitute a “charitable institution” for purposes of G.L.c. 149, §148.

Section 148 does not allow employees to recover prevailing wage rates when their only claim is that their employer failed to pay the rates required by the Prevailing Wage Act.

Donis v. American Waste Services, LLC · filed 2020-07-21

Following Crocker, we hold that the plaintiffs may not recover under the Wage Act, where their only contention is that the defendants failed to pay the wage rates mandated by the Prevailing Wage Act.

Section 148 requires timely wages for specified Commonwealth workers and all municipal employees; together with § 150, it waives sovereign immunity for their unpaid wage claims by necessary implication.

Craig Harrison and Barbara Ruchie, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated v. Massachusetts Bay Transp · filed 2020-07-22

Similarly, the Wage Act provides that the Commonwealth must pay timely wages to every "mechanic, workman, and laborer" and to employees of a "penal or charitable institution," that every city and town must pay timely wages to all employees, and that any employee aggrieved by a violation of that statute may bring a civil action to recover their unpaid wages. See G.L. c. 149, §§ 148 and 150. These statutes waive sovereign immunity as to such claims by necessary implication.

Section 148 makes identified public officers individually liable for failures to pay wages, but that provision does not broadly waive the Commonwealth's sovereign immunity.

Bucca v. Commonwealth. · filed 2024-02-08

We do not agree with Bucca's reading of the emphasized language as establishing a blanket waiver of sovereign immunity. Rather, as explained in Cook v. Patient Edu, LLC, 465 Mass. 548, 553 (2013), that language "imposes individual liability" on the identified public officers if they fail to make payment of wages in accordance with the statute.

Section 148's limited waiver of sovereign immunity does not cover a court officer's Wage Act claim for unpaid assault pay.

Howard v. Massachusetts Trial Court. · filed 2024-03-14

The judge dismissed Howard's Wage Act claim based on sovereign immunity. ... See Donahue at 185-186 (court officer "is not a mechanic, workman, or laborer," and "court houses are not penal institutions"). The same reasoning applies to the case before us. The dismissal of count two therefore was correct.

Section 148’s public officer liability provision does not waive the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity for employees outside the categories specified in its first paragraph.

NATALIE B. SAWYER v. COMMISSIONER OF DIVISION OF CAPITAL ASSET MANAGEMENT AND MAINTENANCE & Another. · filed 2024-07-29

We do not view the emphasized language as establishing a blanket waiver of sovereign immunity. Rather, as explained in Cook v. Patient Edu, LLC, 465 Mass. 548, 553 (2013), that language "imposes individual liability" on the identified public officers if they fail to make payment of wages in accordance with the statute. To construe it instead as a blanket waiver of immunity would render superfluous the provision in the first paragraph limiting the Commonwealth's waiver to suits brought by certain subsets of employees.

Section 148 requires employers to pay a terminated employee all amounts due, including owed overtime, on the termination date.

Lopera v. Compass Group USA, Inc. · filed 2021-12-28

The Wage Act requires an employer to pay all amounts due to a terminated employee on the date of termination, including overtime pay. ... Because she is qualified as an executive under the statute, she is not entitled to overtime pay and her Wage Act claim is unavailing.

Section 148 requires payment for all hours worked. An automatic meal deduction is not unlawful on its face; an unpaid meal break claim requires showing that the employer knew or should have known the employee worked during the break.

Walker v. Osterman Propane LLC · filed 2019-10-21

Under Massachusetts law, employees are entitled to wages for all hours worked. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149 § 148. ... An automatic meal deduction policy is not illegal on its face. ... “To prove . . . a claim [of unlawful meal break deductions] plaintiffs must demonstrate that [the employer] knew or should have known that drivers were working during those meal breaks.”

Section 148 requires wages earned to be paid promptly after the pay period in which they were earned, rather than being deferred and later paid as compensatory time.

United States v. Dwyer · filed 2007-08-24

However, the very compensatory time policy which Dwyer argues entitled Illingsworth to be paid long after the fact would itself appear, if anything, to violate the plain language of the statute. According to the statute, Illingsworth was to be paid promptly after he performed the painting work in 1998; he was not so paid.

Section 148 requires employers to pay earned wages on time, and an employee may recover unpaid overtime wages when the employer knew or had reason to know the overtime was worked.

Napert v. Government Employees Insurance · filed 2014-07-22

To establish a claim for weekly wages under the statute, a plaintiff must show that (1) he was an employee under the statute, (2) his form of compensation constitutes a wage under the statute, and (3) the defendants violated the Act by not paying him his wages in a timely manner. Stanton v. Lighthouse Fin. Servs., Inc., 621 F.Supp.2d 5, 10 (D.Mass.2009) (citing Allen v. Intralearn Software Corp., 2006 Mass.App. Div. 71, 2006 WL 1277813 at *1 (2006)). It is undisputed that plaintiff qualified as an employee under the statute and that his compensation constituted a wage. Plaintiff contends that because defendant agreed to pay him a premium wage for any overtime hours he worked, he can recover those wages under the Wage Act. ... Although plaintiff did not report those hours in his time sheets, there is evidence that defendant had notice of them, and there is accordingly a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant failed to pay plaintiff for overtime hours he *243worked in violation of the Wage Act. See Souto v. Sovereign Realty Assocs., Ltd., 23 Mass. L. Rptr. 386, 2007 WL 4708921 at *3 (2007) (Wage Act claim for overtime wages survived summary judgment where plaintiff stated he worked an average of fifty-five to sixty hours per week in his deposition and a former supervisor’s affidavit supported that testimony).

Section 148 requires employers to pay employees their “wages earned” within the statutory time period, and a wage is earned once the employee completes the required labor, service, or performance.

Clee v. MVM, Inc. · filed 2015-03-10

The Wage Act provides the time period within which employers must pay the “wages earned” to their employees. Mass. Gen. Law ch. 149, § 148. No party may exempt himself from the law. Id. The Act does not comprehensively define “wages.” See Fraelick v. PerkettPR, Inc., 83 Mass.App.Ct. 698, 703, 989 N.E.2d 517 (2013). Nor does it define “earn.” However, the Supreme Judicial Court has defined “earn” to mean “ ‘to acquire by labor, service, or performance’ or ‘to do something that entitles one to a reward or result, whether it is received or not.’ ” Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc., 460 Mass. 484, 492, 952 N.E.2d 890 (2011) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 584 (9th ed.2009)). Therefore, once “an employee has completed the labor, service, or performance required of him, ... he has ‘earned’ his wage.” Id.

Section 148 requires a discharged employee to have control of the full wages on the day of discharge; an electronic transfer is timely only when the funds are received that day.

Clermont v. Monster Worldwide, Inc. · filed 2015-04-06

The plain meaning of the language “paid in full on the day of his discharge” requires the employer to transfer control over the funds to the employee on the day of discharge. ... Payment is, thus, incomplete until the recipient.of the funds has some control over the funds. ... The statute permits electronic transfer payments, provided, the discharged employee is paid in full on the day of discharge. However,- the payment method, as implemented in this case, does not comply with the statute, rather it is akin to placing cash in an overnight mail envelope knowing that delivery to the employee will not occur until the next day. This the statute, as written, does not permit.

Section 148 applies to the untimely payment of all wages to which an employee is entitled under state or federal law, including federally required overtime wages.

Lambirth v. Advanced Auto, Inc. · filed 2015-10-15

The above-cited decisions, and a close reading of the Wage Act, lead to the conclusion that the statute applies to the untimely payment of all wages to which an employee is entitled under either state or federal law.

Section 148 requires prompt and full payment of wages and generally bars an employer from deducting or withholding earned wages, even when the employee assents, subject to the statute’s exceptions.

Selfridge v. Jama · filed 2016-03-24

“Section 148 of the Wage Act requires prompt and full payment of wages’ due” and prohibits “special contracts” that aim to thwart the requirements of the Wage Act. ... Section 148 therefore “generally prohibits] aii employer from deducting, or withholding payment of, any earned wages,” even where the employee has assented to the deduction. ... Where there was not even an internal adjudication, much less a judicial one, of Selfridge’s liability to Boston Home Health, it is unlikely that the Wage Act permits the company simply to withhold what it believes is due to it from an employee’s wages.

Section 148 requires employers to pay earned wages weekly or biweekly, but it supplies no substantive standard for deciding what wages are owed.

Rueli v. Baystate Health, Inc. · filed 2016-08-23

The Act requires that "[e]very person having employees in his service shall pay weekly or bi-weekly each such employee the wages earned by him" within a fixed time period after the work is performed. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148. ... To prevail on a Weekly Wage Act claim, a plaintiff must "prove there are wages owed," though the Act itself provides no substantive standard for determining what wages are owed. ... Consistent with its name, the Weekly Wage Act was intended to ensure that employers pay wages weekly or bi-weekly, not to create substantive standards for employee pay.

Section 148 requires employers to pay employees all accrued wages in full on the day of discharge, making late payment a statutory violation even if the wages are paid the next day.

Lawless v. Steward Health Care Sys., LLC · filed 2018-06-25

Section 148 directs that an employee "shall be paid in full on the day of [her] discharge." We think that language says what it means and means what it says — and that conclusion is reinforced by the legislature's use of the word "shall." ... So viewed, the Wage Act establishes a mandatory obligation to pay an employee any accrued "wages" by the day of her discharge. An employee who does not receive her due wages by that date — even an employee who is paid in full a day later — suffers a cognizable injury within the purview of the statute.

Section 148 permits an individual employee to recover overtime wages owed under the FLSA, but a dependent Section 148 claim seeking those wages cannot proceed as a Rule 23 class action.

Chavira v. OS Restaurant Services, LLC · filed 2019-02-25

This Court finds the reasoning of both Lambirth and Carroca sound and agrees with the parties that the Wage Act may be used by individual plaintiffs to hold employers accountable for failure to pay overtime wages due only under the FLSA. ... A Rule 23 action for a claim seeking to recover wages due exclusively under the FLSA circumvents the FLSA’s opt-in requirements, even when it is not wholly duplicative of the FLSA claim, and may not be maintained.

Section 148 requires payment of definitely determined commissions when due and payable, less allowable or authorized deductions.

Singleton v. Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. · filed 2009-10-06

The Wage Act requires the “payment of commissions when the amount of such commissions, less allowable or authorized deductions, has been definitely determined and has become due and payable to such employee.” ... While Plaintiff claims that she has “definitely determined” the commissions that were due her upon her termination, as required by the statute, ... she neglects the plain language in the Wage Act stating that the commissions are paid “less allowable or authorized deductions” and only when “due.” ... Thus, the deduction of the short-term disability payments was an “allowable or authorized” deduction. Furthermore, as provided in the policy outlined in the Human Resources Manual, the commissions that Plaintiff “earned” while she was on her second leave were only payable after she returned to work for thirty days. Because she never returned from her second leave, those commissions were not “due” at the time she was terminated. Thus, Sinclair did not violate the Wage Act by deducting her short-term disability payments or by not paying commissions that accumulated while on her second leave. Finally, Plaintiff claims that she was owed commissions on accounts that were transferred to other AEs and that Sinclair’s failure to pay her for those accounts violated the Wage Act. However, as Plaintiff acknowledges, AEs were not entitled to commissions on ad sales at least until the ad aired. Because these accounts were transferred before the ads aired pursuant to a valid reassignment process motivated by legitimate business concerns, Plaintiff was never entitled to any of these commissions. Thus, Sinclair did not violate the Wage Act, and it is entitled to summary judgment on Count VII.

Section 148 requires employers to pay earned wages on time, including within six days after the earning period for employees working five or six days per calendar week.

Figueroa v. Cactus Mexican Grill, LLC · filed 2021-12-10

The Massachusetts Wage Act imposes liability on employers who fail to timely pay wages earned by their employees. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148. Among other things, the Act requires that an employer pay wages within six days of the period during which wages were earned if the employee is employed for five or six days in a calendar week.

Section 148 permits an employee to bring an unpaid-wage claim without pleading misclassification, and an alleged promised salary can support the claim at summary judgment.

Panagopoulos v. Genuine Food Lab, LLC · filed 2022-11-02

Defendants’ first argument, that Plaintiff should have filed a misclassification claim, fails at the threshold. Plaintiff is not alleging that he was misclassified as an independent contractor, and therefore had no obligation to assert a claim under the independent contractor statute. Plaintiff instead contends that as an employee, he is owed unpaid wages for services performed on behalf of Genuine Food and that claim is properly brought under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148. Defendants’ secondary argument, that Plaintiff’s claim fails because he did not plead a wage or salary, is contradicted by the record. Plaintiff has alleged that he was promised payment of at least $150,000 for the period of time he agreed to perform services for the Company. See, e.g., [ECF No. 25 ¶ 7]. Defendants contest this, but the Court notes that there is nothing in the record before it that definitively disproves Plaintiff’s assertion. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148 is DENIED.

Section 148 treats commissions as wages once the amount is definitely determined and due and payable, requiring timely payment.

Trindade v. Grove Services, Inc. · filed 2024-01-22

Commissions are wages within the meaning of the statute when the amount has been "definitely determined" and has become "due and payable" to the employee.

Section 148 requires employers to pay employees weekly or biweekly, within six days after the end of the pay period, for wages earned.

Ruiz v. NEI General Contracting, Inc. · filed 2024-02-29

The Unpaid Wages Class is brought under the Massachusetts Wage Act, which states that Contractors “shall pay weekly or bi-weekly each such employee the wages earned by him to within six days of the termination of the pay period during which the wages were earned. . . . ” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148.

Section 148 requires timely payment of wages earned through completed labor and bars employers from contracting around its protections.

Austin v. Ken's Foods, Inc. · filed 2025-03-21

Section 148 of the Massachusetts Wage Act, which also mirrors the FLSA,7 mandates that every employer shall pay each employee their “wages earned” within a fixed period of days after the end of a pay period. ... While the statute does not itself define “earn,” the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (“SJC”) has adopted the “plain and ordinary meaning” of the term. ... Accordingly, “[w]here an employee has completed the labor, service, or performance required of him, therefore, according to common parlance and understanding he has ‘earned’ his wage.”

Section 148 requires employers to pay earned wages within six days after the end of the pay period in which they were earned.

Douglas Goncalves Santos and Jaderson Goncalves Da Silva v. Capital Power and Lighting, LLC, and Kevin Isabelle · filed 2026-01-16

Under the Wage Act, Defendants were required to pay Plaintiffs “within six days of the termination of the pay period during which the wages were earned,” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148, but they did not do so, [Compl. ¶¶ 20–23].

Section 148 requires employees to be paid weekly or biweekly and discharged employees to be paid in full on the day of discharge.

Despins · filed 2026-03-12

Section 148 provides that employees must be paid “weekly or bi-weekly” and that “any employee discharged from . . . employment shall be paid in full on the day of his discharge.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148.

Section 148 does not require payment of salary an employee would have earned after discharge, and commissions are covered only when definitely determined and due.

Doherty v. American Medical Response of Massachusetts, Inc. · filed 1997-11-12

Although Doherty alleges that he signed a two-year employment contract, §148 does not mandate that employers must pay to employees discharged before the end of a contract term the amount in salary which the employees could have earned in the future, but for the discharge. ... The commissions Doherty may have earned were neither “definitely determined” nor “due” on the date he was terminated from his position at AMRM, or on any other specific date.

Section 148 protects wages earned through work performed, but does not cover salary owed under an employment agreement for a period after termination when no work was performed.

Kittredge v. McNerney · filed 2004-05-11

This Court does not believe that the Legislature intended to include within the rubric of wages or salary “earned” those monies that are due to the employee because of contractual obligations entered into by the employer, regardless of whether the work was performed.

Section 148 requires payment of earned wages and due vacation pay on the day of discharge; a claim fails without evidence of underpayment or late payment.

Goodrich v. CML Firberoptics, Inc. · filed 2000-05-25

Here, there is no dispute that when he was discharged, Goodrich was entitled to be paid for two days’ work and sixteen days unused vacation time. After he was terminated, however, Goodrich admits that CML paid him $9,450 as severance pay, representing fifteen days of unused vacation time plus one month of additional pay, although not obligated to do so. There being no evidence that Goodrich was not paid “on the day of discharge,” this court finds that he has utterly failed to demonstrate, with either countervailing materials or relevant and supporting legal jurisprudence, that he is entitled to anything more than he received upon termination of his at-will-employment.

Section 148 prohibits an employer and employee from agreeing to defer payment of earned wages beyond the statutory deadline.

Dobin v. CIOview Corp. · filed 2003-10-29

Viewing the words used in this provision in light of the statute’s legislative purpose, it is plain that the Legislature intended to bar any contract between an employer and employee that denied the employee the prompt payment of wages guaranteed by the Wage Act.

Section 148 requires employers to pay earned overtime wages within seven days after the pay period ends.

Parow v. Howard · filed 2003-11-12

In the case at bar, Defendants have consistently violated G.L.c. 149, §148, by failing to pay Plaintiffs their earned overtime wages within seven days of the termination of the pay period in which they worked the overtime.

Section 148 does not cover severance pay or compensation due under a termination notice period when the employee did not perform the work and the payment was contingent on termination.

Fitzgerald v. ChipWrights Design, Inc. · filed 2005-07-01

Thus, even assuming the employment agreement is an operative contract without having been executed by ChipWrights, the compensation due to Ms. Fitzgerald under the agreement is not governed by G.L.c. 149, §148 because such compensation does not constitute “earned” wages under the statute. As a matter of statutory interpretation, neither the compensation due under the notice period nor the severance pay constitutes earned wages within the meaning of the Wage Act.

Section 148 requires weekly or biweekly wage payments and payment of earned wages within seven days after the pay period ends.

Munson v. Valente · filed 2005-08-04

G.L.c. 149, §148 requires the weekly or bi-weekly payment of wages, and mandates that an employee who has earned wages must be paid such wages within seven (7) days of the termination of the pay period during which such wages were earned.

Section 148 requires payment of earned wages and commissions without conditioning payment on a release of claims.

Wilkie v. NETS, Inc. · filed 2005-09-16

The Act provides that wages “shall” be paid, a mandatory direction with no qualifications. G.L.c. 149, § 148. Apromise ofpayment of what the employer acknowledges is owed, conditioned on execution of a release or on other consideration beyond the services by which the compensation was earned, is not a tender complying with the Act.

Section 148 requires an employer to pay commissions when their amount is definitely determined and they have become due and payable to the employee.

DeSantis v. Commonwealth Energy System · filed 2007-04-26third par.

General Laws c. 149, § 148, third par., as appearing in St. 1956, c. 259, is violated where an employer fails to pay commissions “when the amount of such commissions . . . has been definitely determined and has become due and payable to [an] employee.”

Section 148 covers employee commissions once they are definitely determined and due and payable, without additional restrictions on how they are earned.

Okerman v. VA Software Corp. · filed 2007-08-20

By its terms, the language of the wage act regarding commissions applies broadly, and is restricted in its application only by the requirements that the commissions be “definitely determined” and “due and payable.”

Section 148 may prohibit redress charges that deprive employees of wages they have rightfully earned.

Driscoll v. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. · filed 2009-09-28

While the use of “redress charges” is not necessarily violative of the Wage Act, improper use of such charges so as to deprive carriers of otherwise rightfully earned wages, could violate the Wage Act.

Section 148 is sufficiently pleaded when a discharged employee alleges that amounts owed were not paid on the date of termination.

Byrnes v. Lukes · filed 2009-11-03

Because the court finds Byrnes has sufficiently alleged the defendants violated G.L.c. 149, §148, by failing to pay her amounts owed to her on the date of her termination, it will give Byrnes leave to amend her complaint to allege under Count V that she followed the requirements of G.L.c. 149, §150 (see the court’s Order).

Section 148 prohibits agreements to deduct earned wages for employee-caused damage unless the deductions are valid setoffs for clear and established debts.

Camara v. Attorney General · filed 2011-01-25

The statutory language and the interplay of §§ 148 and 150 of the Wage Act reflect that employee deduction agreements of the type at issue in this case constitute special contracts that § 148 prohibits unless the deductions are valid setoffs for clear and established debts within the meaning of § 150.

Section 148 requires employers to pay earned wages on time regardless of whether a customer has paid, and bars contracts that treat those wages as recoupable advances.

Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc. · filed 2011-08-31

That a Coverall customer may not have yet paid its bill within a week after the pay period does not affect Graffeo’s right to wages he has earned. Graffeo is an employee, and, therefore, the obligation to pay him earned wages rests with Coverall, not third parties. The accounts-receivable financing system incorporated into Graffeo’s contract, which classifies what are in reality wages for work performed as compensation “advances” that may be recouped, violates the “special contracts” provision of the Wage Act.

Section 148 does not treat wages for workdays prospectively eliminated by a furlough as earned wages.

Massachusetts State Police Commissioned Officers Ass'n v. Commonwealth · filed 2012-05-11

Accordingly, we conclude that a prospective reduction in the number of days to be worked does not deprive the plaintiffs of any wages “earned.”

Section 148 does not treat a payment negotiated to settle a disputed grievance and contingent on the employee dismissing it as earned wages.

Jason v. City of Lowell · filed 2012-10-15

The payment was an amount that was negotiated in order to settle a disputed claim. Thus, the City’s payment to Jason was not based on anything Jason had earned according to the terms of his employment. Rather, the payment was contingent upon Jason’s performance of his obligations under the settlement agreement that consisted, essentially, of the dismissal of his grievance. Payments based on such contingencies are not “earned wages” under the Wage Act.

Section 148 requires an employer to pay a discharged employee’s wages on the day of discharge; an unresolved damages amount does not prevent a finding of liability.

Byrnes v. Lukes · filed 2012-08-21

However, under the Wage Act, Byrnes was entitled to her wages on the day of her termination. The defendants admit that Byrnes was not paid on that day. Even if a specific amount of damages remains subject to further evidence, the plaintiff has established a violation of the Wage Act.

Section 148 requires payment of earned, unused vacation time on discharge; later gratuitous salary payments cannot be treated after the fact as vacation pay.

Dixon v. City of Malden · filed 2013-03-04

We conclude that the failure to pay unpaid wages, as defined by G. L. c. 149, § 148, cannot be mitigated by gratuitous, after-the-fact payments, and that employees who have not received payment for unused vacation time to which they are entitled may seek relief pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 150.

Section 148 bars an employer from reducing wages or conditioning their full and timely payment on an employee paying expenses for the employer.

Fraelick v. PerkettPR, Inc. · filed 2013-06-06

However, as noted above, § 148 prohibits not just “special contracts],” but also wage reductions achieved by “any other means,” and all but “valid set-off[s].” The relevant precedent makes it clear that an employer may not reduce wages by, or condition the full and timely payment of wages on, payments by an employee to or on behalf of the employer. Wages must be paid both in a timely manner and in full. The arrangement alleged here falls short on both fronts.

Section 148 does not allow an employee to recover salary for a period after termination in which the employee performed no work.

Salter v. Lopez · filed 2013-10-28

Here, it is undisputed that Salter did not perform any work for Lopez during the two weeks following her termination on November 14, 2011. Accordingly, the salary for those weeks does not constitute earned wages recoverable under the Act.

Section 148 governs the timing of wage payments and exemptions; §150 provides damages for violations of §148.

Blake v. CRNC Operating, LLC · filed 2015-09-24

General Laws c. 149, §148 addresses the timing of the payment of wages and exemptions. It is G.L.c. 149, §150 that actually provides punitive damage for a violation of §148.

Section 148 permits an employee entitled to overtime wages to seek relief when those wages are not paid on time.

O'Brien v. Lifestyle Transportation, Inc. · filed 2013-07-23

Thus, if O’Brien is found to be entitled to overtime under Mass. Gen. L. c. 151 § 1A, he can also proceed under Mass. Gen. L. c. 149 § 148 and hold the defendants accountable for not paying that overtime in a timely manner.

Section 148 requires a terminated employee to be paid in full on the day of termination.

Littlefield v. Adcole Corp. · filed 2015-06-18

General Laws c. 149, §148, provides that a terminated employee must be paid in full on the day of his or her termination.

Section 148 prohibits employers from effectively reducing wages by shifting ordinary business costs, including work-related travel expenses, to employees.

Garcia v. Right at Home, Inc. · filed 2016-01-21

The Appeals Court has noted, however, that Section 148 of the Wage Act prohibits wage reductions achieved by “any other means,” thus preventing an employer from effectively reducing wages by shifting ordinary business costs to the employee. ... Section 27.04(4)(d) prevents a wage reduction achieved by “any other means” in that it prohibits employers from shifting the costs of travel related business expenses to employees. The regulation is thus consistent with the Wage Act.

Section 148 can be violated by failing to pay wages earned by misclassified employees or by making them bear business costs through special contracts.

Hogan v. SPAR Group, Inc. · filed 2018-03-12

Either of these theories, if proven, would establish a violation of M.G.L. c. 149 § 148, which could serve as a predicate for Hogan’s claim under § 150.

Section 148 does not treat WARN Act damages for inadequate closure notice as earned wages recoverable from corporate officers.

Calixto v. Coughlin · filed 2018-12-28

We thus hold that WARN Act damages are not wrongfully withheld wages for which the officers can be held liable under the Wage Act.

Section 148 permits a public employee’s union to request a different overtime payment schedule on employees’ behalf through collective bargaining.

Parris v. Sheriff of Suffolk County · filed 2018-09-05

To harmonize the Wage Act with c. 150E, we hold that the unions may act on behalf of their members to exercise the employees' election under the Wage Act to alter the timing of the overtime payments.

Section 148 requires timely payment of prevailing wages owed under § 27F and supports a separate Wage Act claim when those wages are unpaid.

Donis v. American Waste Services, LLC · filed 2019-05-22

Thus, the plaintiffs have two distinct claims: they were not paid prevailing wages under § 27F, and they were not timely paid under the Wage Act at the rates required by § 27F.

Section 148 requires payment on the day the employment relationship ends; an employee may remain employed during paid notice even after being relieved of work duties.

Knous v. Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. · filed 2020-05-27

The Court rejects that overbroad and unsupported reading of the statute. First, the word “employment” encompasses the entire employment relationship including all of its attributes, not merely the performance of “work” for the employer.

Section 148 prohibits an employer from using an employment contract to authorize deductions for damage caused by employees.

Muniz v. RXO Last Mile, Inc. · filed 2023-12-21

When a contract authorizes deductions from wages “only to certain employees and only in certain circumstances,” it is a “special contract” and violates the wage laws.

Section 148 requires payment of wages earned for work performed; promised pay for time not worked and severance pay are not earned wages under the Act.

Hakuzimana v. Ivory Systems, Inc. and Bristol Myers Squibb · filed 2026-03-31

The defendants have the better argument: Hakuzimana does not allege that he performed work for Ivory or BMS after September 27, 2023, and he therefore “earned” no wages beyond that date. Hakuzimana’s effort to characterize Ivory’s promise to pay him during that period as a form of “severance” does not aid him, because severance pay is not an “earned wage” under the Act.

Section 148 requires employers to pay discharged employees in full on the day of discharge and imposes strict liability for failing to do so.

Gendron v. Kinjawi · filed 2025-02-25

Because the defendants do not dispute that they failed to pay Gendron in full on the day of her discharge, and because the Wage Act creates strict liability, any reasonable jury would find that the defendants violated the Wage Act in failing to pay Gendron in full on her final day of work.

Section 148 requires an employer to pay the employee, but does not make the employer responsible for what the employee does with a delivered wage check.

JUSINO v. MASSACHUSETTS CHIROPRACTIC CENTER, LLC, & Another. · filed 2026-01-14

The Wage Act requires the employer only to pay the employee; it does not impose any responsibility on the employer for what the employee does with the check.

Section 148 requires prompt payment of wages and does not allow an employee to agree to defer them.

Guevara-Salgado v. Hayes-Meninno, LLC · filed 2015-08-31

Consequently, even deferred' compensation arrangements to which ah employee agreed violate the Wage Act.

Section 148 permits recovery at the standard rate for wholly unpaid hours, but does not permit recovery of an overtime premium for hours already paid at the standard rate.

Mogilevsky v. Bally Total Fitness Corp. · filed 2003-05-13

The Court now moves back to the period for which Mogilevsky is entitled to back pay under Mass. Gen. Laws c. 149, § 148: namely, the period from May 18, 1998 to May 17, 1999. Here, the Court rules that Mogilevsky is entitled to recover only at the standard rate — not the overtime rate — for any hours for which he received no compensation whatsoever. For those hours in which he was compensated at the standard rate rather than the overtime rate, he is not entitled to’ the difference.

Section 148 permits an unpaid-wages claim to proceed when evidence could support a finding that the claimant was an employee owed earned wages.

Allen v. Fuller · filed 2025-08-20

Construing the record in Allen’s favor, there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Fuller violated the Wage Act and the Minimum Fair Wage Law.

Section 148 treats an employee’s base salary as wages and prohibits an agreement to defer its payment.

Stanton v. Lighthouse Financial Services, Inc. · filed 2009-03-25

Following Dobin, I find that the deferral agreement in Stanton’s employment contract is void as a matter of law. Stanton is an employee and his salary amounts to wages under the Act. Notwithstanding any future startup-protecting revisions by the legislature, the plain text of the statute prohibits attempts to avoid the payment obligation.

Section 148 applies to commissions when they are definitely determined and due; commissions based on quarterly SIM activations cannot be determined until the activation total is known.

Daly v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. · filed 2018-08-22

Here, it is undisputed that Daly's commissions are based on the number of SIM cards activated in a particular quarter. Until that number is known, Daly's commissions are not "arithmetically determinable." Accordingly, Daly's Wage Act claim is not barred by the statute of limitations in so far as it concerns disputed commissions from July 23, 2012 (three years before he filed the present action) through the end of his employment at T-Mobile.

Section 148 includes vacation payments due under an oral or written agreement in the definition of wages.

U.S. Trust v. American Travel, Inc. · filed 1995-09-14

“Wages” include “any holiday or vacation payments due under an oral or written agreement.” G.L.c.149, §148; Commonwealth v. Morash, 402 Mass. 287, 288 (1988).

Section 148 includes holiday and vacation payments due an employee in wages.

Daly v. Norton Co. · filed 1999-11-15

For the purposes of G.L.c. 149, the word “wage” includes any holiday or vacation payments due an employee. G.L.c. 149, §148. Daly, therefore, must either file a complaint with the attorney general or seek the attorney general’s written permission before filing a claim for unpaid vacation pay in this Court.

Earned, unused vacation time owed under an employment agreement is wages payable under Section 148.

Morris v. J J. Best & Co. · filed 2008-10-06

“Where [she] was owed vacation time under the employment agreement, payment for that unused vacation time is a form of ‘wages’ that must be paid pursuant to [G.L.c. 149,] §148.”

Section 148 treats extra vacation time granted to employees as wages.

Interstate Gourmet Coffee Roasters, Inc. v. The Travelers Indemnity Company · filed 2018-08-06

Extra vacation time is considered part of an employee’s “wages” under Massachusetts law, and is treated similarly to overtime pay for hourly employees as an additional payroll expense falling outside employees’ regular wages or salaries.

Section 148 protects earned wages and assured compensation such as vacation pay, but does not cover contingent bonuses.

Doucot v. IDS Scheer, Inc. · filed 2010-08-10

In dispute is whether the Bonus Plan and Retention Plan 2010 bonuses constitute “wages” under the MA Wage Act. The term “bonus” does not appear in the plain language of the act. ... “Generally, bonuses are not ‘wages earned’ within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148.” ... Additionally, “[c]ourts have distinguished wages, which include assured compensation and compensation equivalents such as accrued vacation pay and sick leave, from compensation ‘triggered by contingencies’ [that are] thus outside the scope of the [MA] Wage Act.” ... Given the foregoing Massachusetts case law the Plan Bonus and the Retention Plan 2010 bonus are not “wages” protected by the MA Wage Act. Therefore, insofar as the Count V concerns these bonuses, it is subject to dismissal.

Section 148 does not protect a bonus as wages when the employer retains discretion over whether to award it.

Comley v. Media Planning Group · filed 2015-06-12

While the result may seem harsh, discretion is what it is, and if retained by the employer over the award of a bonus, the employee, under Weems, has no resort to the Wage Act.

Section 148 requires an employer to pay wages owed to an employee within a fixed period, and an employee must prove that wages are owed.

Cavallaro v. UMASS MEMORIAL HEALTHCARE, INC. · filed 2012-04-18

The Massachusetts Weekly Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148, requires an employer to pay wages owed to an employee within a fixed period; to succeed, an employee must, among other things, prove there are wages owed. Stanton v. Lighthouse Fin. Servs., Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 5, 10 (D. Mass. 2009).

Section 148 requires prompt payment of wages earned, but a bonus that remains contingent and is never earned is not protected as wages under the Wage Act.

Weiss v. DHL Express, Inc. · filed 2013-06-03

The Wage Act requires prompt payment of "wages earned" on pain of civil and criminal penalties, treble damages, and attorney's fees. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, §§ 148, 150. While the Act makes clear on its face that holiday pay, vacation pay, and definitely determined commissions fall within its protections, the term "wages" is not otherwise defined. Id. § 148. ... Like the unvested shares of stock in Weems, the bonus in Weiss's case was contingent on either continued employment, with his performance remaining in good standing, or the Committee's determination that his termination was without good cause. The Committee determined, in its sole discretion, that Weiss was terminated for good cause prior to the payment date. The bonus was therefore never "earned" because neither contingency occurred. Because DHL was under no obligation to pay the bonus, Weiss was not deprived of wages that he earned. We affirm the grant of summary judgment in DHL's favor.

Section 148 exempts an employee of an incorporated hospital conducted as a public charity from the Massachusetts statutory wage-and-hour claims at issue, but that exemption does not bar distinct common-law remedies.

Manning v. Boston Medical Center Corp. · filed 2013-08-01

Defendants note that the district court dismissed the original Manning II complaint’s statutory Massachusetts wage-and-hour claims because those statutes exempt “an employee of an incorporated hospital ... which is conducted as a public charity,” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148, and “any employee who is employed ... in a hospital,” id. ch. 151, § 1A(16). ... Although McCarthy cannot bring statutory wage-and-hour claims against defendants directly due to BMC’s exempt status, that prohibition does not compel the erasure of her remedies at common law. ... We therefore conclude that these laws do not preclude McCarthy from asserting the common law claims pled in this case.

Section 148 generally excludes discretionary bonuses but protects commissions that are due and payable and arithmetically determinable; commissions become due and payable when the contingencies to entitlement have occurred.

Trindade v. Grove Services, Inc. · filed 2023-02-22

The Wage Act generally does not apply to discretionary bonuses, but does protect commission payments that are “due and payable” and “arithmetically determinable.” ... Commissions are due and payable when “any contingencies relating to their entitlement have occurred.”

Section 148 treats commissions as wages when they are definitely determined and due and payable, and imposes individual liability on corporate presidents, treasurers, and officers or agents who manage the corporation; ordinary management participation alone is insufficient.

Norton v. Archetype Consulting, Inc. · filed 2023-06-08

“Wages” include commissions that “ha[ve] been definitely determined and ha[ve] become due and payable.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148; accord Parker v. EnerNOC, Inc., 139 N.E.3d 328, 334 n.11 (Mass. 2020). ... Individual liability under the Wage Act attaches to “[t]he president and treasurer of a corporation and any officers or agents having the management of such corporation.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148. Courts have defined a person “having the management of such corporation” as one who “controls, directs, and participates to a substantial degree in formulating and determining policy of a corporation.”

Under § 148, a commission must be paid when the employee completed the work to earn it before resignation, even if calculating the exact amount takes additional time.

Rivard v. NICE Systems, Inc. · filed 2023-09-13

Where an employee has already done the work to earn a commission prior to their resignation, as Rivard alleges she has here, the Wage Act requires the payment of that commission, even if calculating the exact amount would take some time.

Section 148 requires employers to pay earned wages within a specified time and applies to commissions when the amount is definitely determined and has become due and payable.

Bean v. NICE Systems, Inc. · filed 2025-04-30

In general, the Wage Act requires employers to pay employees earned wages within a specified amount of time. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148. ... The terms of the Wage Act apply to commissions when the amount of the commission “has been definitely determined” and it “has become due and payable.” Parker v. EnerNOC, Inc., 484 Mass. 128, 133 (2020) (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148); Klauber v. Vmware, Inc., 80 F.4th 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2023).

Section 148 wage claims can survive dismissal when alleged unpaid bonus compensation and vacation pay may qualify as wages.

Scott v. Granada Computer Services, Inc. · filed 1996-05-02

In particular, Scott alleges in various parts of the Complaint that Granada has failed to pay him “bonus compensation” and “vacation pay,” without specifying further the nature of these promised payments. In the absence of further information, this Court cannot conclude beyond a doubt that there is no set of facts which would entitle Scott to relief under G.L.c. 149, §§148, 150.

Section 148 does not treat amounts withheld under the employees’ deferred compensation plan as wages subject to its weekly payment requirement.

Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n v. City of Boston · filed 1999-11-16

In sum, taking into account the ordinary usage of the term “wages” and the evil sought to be remedied by the passage of c. 149, §148, and reading that statute together with c. 29, §64B, the court concludes that the amounts at issue are not “wages” within the meaning of section 148.

Section 148 does not require payment of estimated commission advances before the commission amount is definitely determined.

Klint v. J&J Associates, Inc. · filed 1998-09-03

Estimated advances towards that amount were not themselves “definitely determined” such that failure to pay them would violate §148.

A claim for unpaid accrued vacation time under § 148 can proceed when material facts about the vacation time owed are disputed.

Marchant v. Burlington Municipal Employees' Federal Credit Union · filed 1998-09-03

In Count III, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant Credit Union failed to pay her for accrued but unused vacation time in violation of G.L.c. 149, §148. ... There are genuine issues of fact which preclude summary judgment on Count III.

Section 148 does not cover a lawyer’s substantial, irregular, contingent compensation as wages or commissions.

Dennis v. Jager, Smith & Stetier, P.C. · filed 2000-04-10

Moreover, the annual compensation at issue here is not a “wage” under the Wage Act. ... Neither is Dennis’ annual compensation a “commission” covered by the act. ... Unlike such commissioned sales employees who aire paid weekly, lawyers such as Dennis receive substantial and irregular compensation, in the form of a draw, that is not afforded the protections of the Wage Act.

Section 148 does not cover quarterly commissions whose payment depends on production and placement contingencies.

Locke v. Sales Consultants of Boston, Inc. · filed 2001-04-13

Therefore, Locke’s claim fails because it is outside the intended scope of the Wage Act as it is for compensation paid quarterly rather than weekly and triggered by numerous contingencies.

Section 148 protects commissions when the triggering contingency has occurred and the amount due can be precisely determined.

Lohnes v. Darwin Partners, Inc. · filed 2002-07-22

The Legislature intended no sham; it required simply that the commissions be “definitely determined,” meaning that the contingency must already have occurred and the amount due be capable of being precisely ascertained.

Section 148 covers commissions that have become due and payable, and a complaint may proceed when its allegations could establish that condition.

Barthel v. One Community, Inc. · filed 2002-10-25

The language of the Act expressly includes commissions under some circumstances by providing that it covers “the payment of commissions when the amount of such commissions ... has become due and payable”. M.G.L. ch. 149 § 148. Barthel’s complaint pleads facts that if proven may show that his commissions for the Digex and Tectron accounts are indeed, “due and payable.” Read in the light most favorable to Barthel, the complaint is sufficient.

Section 148 does not cover commissions contingent on reaching sales goals when they have not been definitely determined.

Okerman v. VA Software Corp. · filed 2003-07-09

Further, his commissions were contingent on the attainment of certain sales goals being reached and therefore were not “definitely determined” under the Wage Act.

Section 148 covers wages earned by an employee, excluding unearned future salary and contract payments triggered by termination or death.

Huebsch v. Katahdin Industries, Inc. · filed 2001-04-24

Moreover, the Wage Act expressly states that it applies only to wages earned by the employee. Huebsch did not work during the second year and therefore did not earn any part of the second-year salary. Any right Huebsch had to the guaranteed second year salary is based on contract. Similarly, any right to payment that resulted from Hubesch’s termination without cause or death was created by the Agreement, not because Huebsch had earned this compensation before his employment was terminated. The payments which plaintiff seeks to recover in this action were not “wages” covered by G.L.c. 149, §148.

Section 148 does not treat contributions to a deferred compensation plan as wages.

Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n v. City of Boston · filed 2002-01-30

Because we agree with the Superior Court judge that contributions to a deferred compensation plan are not “wages” under this statute, we affirm the judgment.

Section 148 treats earned vacation as wages and requires vacation pay to be prorated according to time worked when the employer’s yearly vacation policy is ambiguous.

Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. Office of the Attorney General · filed 2002-02-25

This interpretation accords with the apparent intent of the statute and the holdings that view vacation as wages. As such, this court finds that the vacation payment due to Hutchins should have been pro-rated according to the period of time he actually worked.

Section 148 treats payment for unused vacation time owed under an employment agreement as wages that must be paid.

Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. Attorney General · filed 2003-11-05

Where he was owed vacation time under the employment agreement, payment for that unused vacation time is a form of “wages” that must be paid pursuant to § 148.

Section 148 treats earned vacation time as wages.

Gifford v. Soma Group, Inc. · filed 2004-11-03

For the reasons set forth in the plaintiffs Memorandum of Law at 2, earned vacation time is treated as wages under G.L.c. 149, §148.

A claim for unpaid stock options under § 148 may survive a motion to dismiss when it is premature to determine whether the options are wages.

Brown v. Nortel Networks, Inc. · filed 2002-04-26

The court believes it is premature at this procedural stage for a judicial determination on whether Brown’s stock options, whether vested or unvested, are wages for the purposes of Wage Act protection. ... In sum, the defendant has failed to show that Count IV of the plaintiffs complaint alleges no set of facts which would entitle the plaintiff to relief under G.L.c. 149, §§148 and 150.

Section 148 covers a highly paid executive’s earned base salary as wages even when the employer expects venture capital funding to pay it.

Sword v. Biofertec, Ltd. · filed 2002-12-02

A salary funded by venture capitalists does not alter the nature of Sword’s compensation as something other than a base salary. Thus, this Court finds that Sword’s salary falls within the Wage Protection Act because the Act applies to highly paid executives and the compensation he earned constitutes wages.

Section 148 does not cover severance pay that is contingent on termination.

Prozinski v. Northeast Real Estate Services, LLC · filed 2003-10-16

Although the statute expressly refers to holiday pay, vacation pay, and definitely determined commissions, it does not refer to “severance pay” or similar terms. ... Prozinski’s severance pay was not earned but contingent upon severance.

Section 148 covers commissions labeled as bonuses once they are definitely determined and due and payable; a monthly bonus dependent on full-month sales is not due when an employee resigns midmonth.

Beaule v. M.S. Inserts & Fasteners Corp. · filed 2004-02-24

The statute includes as wages holiday pay, vacation pay and “definitely determined” commissions which have “become due and payable.” ... At the end of January, as stated in the plan, Beaule’s bonus became due and payable. ... On the date of his resignation, Beaule’s February bonus could not be definitely determined and had not become due and payable. ... When Beaule resigned in the middle of the month, he forfeited his right to his bonus for that month.

Section 148 wage claims can turn on whether the parties agreed that salary depended on the employer obtaining funding; a factual dispute over that agreement precludes summary judgment.

Kalra v. Viking Networks, Inc. · filed 2005-01-21

However, even though Kalra qualifies as an employee and Viking as an employer, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the agreement between them allowed for a salary contingent on sufficient funding.

Section 148 covers commissions that are part of an employee’s regular compensation, rather than episodic payments from special events.

Richards v. Datatec Systems, Inc. · filed 2005-03-31

That is, the commissions must be part of an employee’s regular compensation, not episodic payments from special events.

Section 148 covers commissions that are definitely determined and due and payable when a customer’s contract is signed and booked.

DeSantis v. Commonwealth Energy System · filed 2005-12-30

Giving DeSantis the full benefit of all facts and inferences therefrom that might be found by the jury, this evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that DeSantis’ contract bookings were “definite” to “determine” his commissions within the meaning of the Wage Act and were therefore, “due and payable” at the time each contract “sale” was made and booked.

Section 148 does not cover compensation that is conditional and contingent under an entrepreneurial agreement.

Berenson v. Monadnock Associates, Inc. · filed 2006-04-10

By its very nature, the compensatory structure of the Term Sheet was conditional and contingent. As such, it was outside of the Wage Act. ... As such, the Term Sheet created no rights pursuant to G.L.c. 149, §§148 and 150.

Section 148 treats deferred compensation earned for an employee’s work as wages that must be paid by the next regular pay day after the employee leaves.

Allen v. Intralearn Software Corp. · filed 2006-04-24

Because we deem the deferred compensation owed to Allen to be wages, it is clear and there is no dispute that Intralearn did not pay Allen the wages that he earned in a timely fashion, as required by statute. Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 149, section 148 requires that “any employee leaving his employment shall be paid in full on the following regular pay day, and, in the absence of a regular pay day, on the following Saturday[.]”

Section 148 treats vacation pay as wages only when it is due under an oral or written employment agreement.

Local 589, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority · filed 2006-08-16

First, the plain meaning of §148 only gives the plaintiffs the right to collect the vacation pay as “wages” from the defendant pursuant to “an oral or written agreement.”

Section 148 covers wages at an employee’s regular rate for hours worked beyond normal hours.

Souto v. Sovereign Realty Associates, Ltd. · filed 2007-12-14

To the contrary, Massachusetts courts have recognized that wages at the employee’s regular rate for time worked in excess of his normal hours are “wages” nonetheless for purposes of G.L.c. 149, §148.

Section 148 requires an employer to pay an involuntarily discharged employee for earned, unused vacation time.

Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. Attorney General · filed 2009-06-11

Giving deference to the Attorney General’s reasonable interpretation of the Wage Act and in agreement with the Superior Court judge and the division of administrative law appeals (DALA), we conclude that the statute requires such an employee to be paid for unused vacation time remaining at the time of involuntary discharge; and that because the EDS policy does not provide for such payment, it contravenes the Wage Act.

Section 148 does not provide an unpaid wages claim for a hypothetical hourly wage and overtime differential when all commissions owed were paid.

Amero v. Townsend Oil Co. · filed 2009-04-15

They are not, however, a basis for asserting a claim under section 148, which is primarily concerned with the timely and regular payment of wages. Amero can seek these amounts as damages resulting directly from his misclassification, but since he has not alleged that Townsend failed to pay any commissions owed to him, he has no claim for unpaid “wages” under G.L.c. 149, §148.

Section 148 does not cover discretionary bonuses.

McQueen v. True Partners Consulting, LLC · filed 2011-01-07

Consistent with the narrow construction that has been afforded the Act and the foregoing discussion, this court declines to expand the scope of the Act to cover Plaintiffs’ bonuses and grants Defendants summary judgment as to counts I and IX.

Section 148’s definition of wages can include severance pay.

Juergens v. MicroGroup, Inc. · filed 2011-01-28

Following Wiedmann, a more expansive definition of “wages” is appropriate and it should not be limited to exclude severance pay.

Section 148 does not cover an employee’s share of development profits under a profit-sharing arrangement as a commission.

Suominen v. Goodman Industrial Equities Management Group, LLC · filed 2011-02-11

The compensation at issue here was of a different sort, a share of the overall profits generated by the development efforts. Whatever the precise boundary of the term “commission” as used in the Wage Act, we agree with the trial judge’s conclusion that any money owed Suominen under such a profit-sharing arrangement was not a “commission” covered by the statute.

Payroll deductions intended for a retirement account are wages under § 148 when the employer never creates the account and retains the money; they must be paid within six days after the pay period ends.

Pacheco v. H.N. Gorin, Inc. · filed 2011-05-10

Because this Court holds that the deductions from Pacheco’s pay constitute wages under the Wage Act, this Court finds that the defendants violated the Wage Act by failing to pay Pacheco his wages within six days of the termination of the pay period during which those wages were earned.

Section 148 does not cover incentive compensation tied to a discretionary distribution of profits to shareholders, even if the employee may be owed the payment under a contract.

Vinch v. Lown Cardiovascular Group, P.C. · filed 2011-12-21

Because the initial distribution to the Lown Group shareholders was discretionary, Vinch’s claim to a portion of that money falls outside of the Wage Act, ... Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on count I of Vinch’s amended complaint.

Section 148 does not cover severance pay promised upon termination without cause.

Farrell v. Farrell Sports Concepts, Inc. · filed 2012-04-06

The main issue before the court is whether severance pay is covered under the Massachusetts Wage Act, G.L.c. 149, §148. ... “Although the [Wage Act] statute expressly refers to holiday pay, vacation pay, and definitely determined commissions, it does not refer to ’’severance pay" or similar terms." ... Based on the foregoing, the defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss Count I of the plaintiffs Complaint is ALLOWED as to all defendants.

Section 148’s reference to holiday and vacation payments is illustrative rather than exclusive, and wages include payment for unused personal days.

Byrnes v. Lukes · filed 2012-09-27

I also find that Byrnes is entitled to be paid for $346.50 for 1.5 personal days. ... I determine the words “holiday or vacation payments” to be merely illustrative, and not exclusionary.

Section 148 does not require commissions to be earned or paid regularly or weekly.

Stamos v. Verdasys, Inc. · filed 2013-05-22

The Act’s plain language no more requires that commissions be “regular” than that all wages be paid weekly.

Section 148 treats incentive compensation based on revenue generated by an employee’s practice as wages when its amount can be definitely determined.

Feygina v. Hallmark Health System, Inc. · filed 2013-07-12

The incentive compensation promised to Dr. Feygina constitutes “wages” within the meaning of G.L.c. 149, §148. ... Furthermore, HHMA could and in fact did definitely determine the total amount of incentive compensation it owed Feygina as soon as HHMA finished collecting all of the revenue generated by Feygina’s practice.

Section 148 does not treat an annual bonus contingent on continued employment through the calendar year as a wage.

Boesel v. Swaptree, Inc. · filed 2013-12-23

Giving the words “Annual Bonus” their natural meaning, such a bonus is not a “wage” so long as there is some contingency attached to the company’s obligation to pay. Here, under the Agreement, the contingency is that Boesel remain employed by Swaptree throughout the calendar year. Thus, the Annual Bonus under the Agreement was not a “wage” under the Act.

Section 148 bars a municipality from using a local fiscal act to avoid paying earned, accrued compensatory time due at retirement.

Plourde v. Police Department · filed 2014-04-09

The defendant cannot arbitrarily invoke the Lawrence Act as a shield to avoid its statutory obligations to pay the plaintiff’s compensatory time.

Section 148 requires timely payment for accrued, unused vacation when an agreement makes that payment due.

EventMonitor, Inc. v. Leness · filed 2016-02-04

General Laws c. 149, § 148, requires timely payment of wages, including payments due under the terms of an agreement for accrued but unused vacation time.

Section 148 permits an agreement to pay an hourly rate for selected tasks without additional pay for other work, so long as the employer pays as agreed and complies with minimum wage and overtime laws.

Salerno v. Baystate Ford, Inc. · filed 2016-02-05

By contrast, an employer and employee who agree at the outset of their contract that the employee will be paid at an hourly rate for selected tasks, but not for all work, are plainly not violating the Wage Act when the employee is paid in accordance with this agreed understanding. To the contrary, an employer who pays an employee as he has agreed to be compensated-provided (as here) that it complies with all applicable minimum wage and overtime laws-has fulfilled the core aspiration of this statute.

Section 148 requires payment of all earned wages, including statutory premium pay for Sunday work.

Bassett v. Triton Technologies, Inc. · filed 2017-03-06

Section 148 applies to all wages earned, whether the obligation to pay the wage is solely a function of a private contractual arrangement or arises in whole or in part under a statute. A failure to pay one and one-half times an employee’s regular wage when such bonus pay is required by statute is therefore a violation of the Wage Act.

Section 148 does not treat accrued, unused sick pay as wages subject to its payment deadlines.

Mui v. Massachusetts Port Authority · filed 2018-01-29

Upon review, we discern no reason to conclude that the Legislature intended to include sick pay as "wages" under the Wage Act.

Section 148 does not treat contingent profit distributions paid to shareholders because of their ownership interests as wages.

O'Connor v. Kadrmas · filed 2019-10-18

With these principles in mind, it is clear that the distributions under paragraph V(a) of the stock agreement are not "wages" within the scope of the Wage Act. Most fundamentally, they are not compensation from an employer to an employee, but rather profit distributions to shareholders to which they are entitled because of their ownership interest in the corporation, not because of their employment.

Section 148 does not treat accrued, unused sick time as wages even when an employer's payout policy is unconditional.

Hahnfeldt v. Newman · filed 2019-02-01

However, the SJC did not hold in Mui that an employer's sick time policy has to be conditional in order to be excluded as a wage. Although the SJC addressed such conditions because they were relevant to the facts presented, we do not read the holding in Mui to turn on this factor.

Section 148 does not require payment of commissions before their amounts are arithmetically determinable.

Sullivan v. Dumont Aircraft Charter, LLC · filed 2019-03-07

Although the parties cannot, by law, contract around the requirements of the Wage Act, the Wage Act was inapplicable until such time as the commissions became arithmetically determinable, and Mr. Sullivan has failed to rebut the Defendants' evidence that the commissions on the Lyon Aircraft flights were not definitely determinable until, at the earliest, December 20, 2015.

Section 148 can protect incentive pay calculated as a percentage of an employee's sales as commissions.

Levesque v. Schroder Inv. Mgmt. N. Am., Inc. · filed 2019-03-27

Rather, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that, with respect to quantitative compensation, he was paid quarterly based on a percentage of his individual gross sales. Such payment is akin to that of commissions, not bonuses, and thus the Court will deny defendants' motion to dismiss.

Section 148 prohibits a contract term that withholds earned commissions when an employee is terminated.

Levesque v. Schroder Investment Management North America Inc. · filed 2019-03-27

Assuming that the award at issue is a protected “commission” under the Act (i.e., that the award was “earned”), the Court finds that the prescribed withholding of earned commissions constitutes a special contract in violation of the Act.

A claim for commissions under § 148 can survive dismissal when the facts needed to determine whether the commissions became due and payable remain unresolved.

Rist v. Reputation Institute, Inc. · filed 2020-01-17

This potentially thorny question of law, depending upon the facts, might not require resolution, and, in any event, is best resolved on the fuller factual record available at summary judgment or trial. ... Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss Count I of the Complaint is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Section 148 treats a draw against future commissions as a payment of wages.

Perras v. Trane U.S., Inc. · filed 2022-01-06

First, the accidental draw was a payment within the meaning of the Wage Act.

Section 148 treats a draw on commission as a payment under the Wage Act.

Post v. Mark Edward Partners LLC · filed 2022-10-03

Contrary to Defendants’ argument, a draw on commission is “a payment within the meaning of the Wage Act.”

Section 148 does not cover a bonus contingent on a business’s profits when the bonus is not a commission.

Barnia v. Kaur · filed 2022-12-05

Even though Dr. Barnia alleges that the management bonus was “non-discretionary,” its payment was still contingent on the dental practices’ profitability, a prospect that was uncertain to Dr. Barnia in its initial years. [See Am. Cmplt. at ¶ 23]. The profit-based bonus can therefore only be understood as contingent. [See id.]. The bonus also cannot be understood as a commission.

Section 148 prohibits withholding a commission that is owed; an employer that pays the commission due does not violate it.

Green v. D2L LTD · filed 2023-09-15

Under the Massachusetts Wage Act, an employer may not withhold duly owed compensation from an employee. ... Because the court finds that D2L has paid Green the commission owed her on the SNHU deal, see supra Section IV.A.1, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count I is GRANTED.

Section 148 treats compensation an employer contractually promises for labor or services as wages.

Adrienne E. Cohen, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Bret A. Cohen v. Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP · filed 2024-06-26

Count III of the complaint is a claim that Nelson Mullins also breached the Massachusetts Wage Act, G.L. c. 149, § 148, by failing to pay commissions that Cohen was contractually entitled to receive under the Partnership Agreement. Where an employer makes a contractually binding promise to pay someone compensation for their labor or services, the promised compensation constitutes a “wage” within the meaning of the Wage Act.

Section 148 treats Sunday pay earned under the Sunday pay statute as wages earned, so failure to pay it violates § 148.

Sutton v. Jordan's Furniture, Inc. · filed 2024-03-28

When an employee works on a Sunday, he or she earns Sunday pay pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 148; therefore, a Sunday pay violation is also a violation of § 148 of the Wage Act.

Section 148 includes holiday and vacation pay in the term "wages."

Kojuharova v. Petar Stefanov. · filed 2025-07-24

The Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 148, specifically provides that the term "wages" includes holiday and vacation pay.

Section 148 protects earned vacation pay as wages and bars later agreements from taking it away.

LORI CONVEY v. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS & Another. · filed 2024-05-14

We conclude, however, that, to the extent these agreements abrogated the plaintiffs' right to their earned wages in the form of the nine weeks of vacation in question, they are "special contracts" proscribed by the Wage Act and are therefore unenforceable.

Section 148 requires an employer to pay the agreed hourly wage for travel time between clients when that time is covered by the employment agreement.

Kim Luz, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Bayada Home Health Care, Inc.; David Baiada; And · filed 2024-06-26

Bayada’s failure to honor its agreement to pay the same hourly rate for travel time as for client care time violates the Wage Act. Where an employer makes a contractually binding promise to pay someone compensation for their labor or services, the promised compensation constitutes a “wage” within the meaning of the Wage Act.

Section 148 does not entitle a person to unpaid wages when the person was never permitted to perform work.

ABRAHAM KASPARIAN, JR. v. TRANSITIONS CENTERS, INC., & Others. · filed 2024-06-28

Compare G. L. c. 149, § 148 (requiring some employers to pay employees within a certain number of days of the date of discharge). Putting aside that the allegations are not precise enough to put the defendants on notice of the claims being lodged against them, see Mass. R. Civ. P. 8 (a), 365 Mass. 749 (1974), the plaintiff has not alleged that he was ever permitted to perform any work at the job, and therefore has not established that he is entitled to any earned but not disbursed wages.

Section 148 does not treat compensation contingent on other principals' pay and subject to future negotiation as wages.

CHANDRA v. PETER DECAPRIO & Others. · filed 2025-03-05

With these principles in mind, we conclude that the compensation under the July 2014 side letter are not "wages" within the scope of the Wage Act.

Section 148 does not treat a contingent variable compensation award that is not a commission as wages.

SULLIVAN v. PEOPLESBANK & Others. · filed 2025-12-04

Where the contingent, variable compensation award at issue is not a commission, it is not considered a wage.

Section 148 does not cover commissions that remain unearned at voluntary resignation under an enforceable continued-employment condition tied to ongoing sales duties.

Rivard v. NICE Systems, Inc. · filed 2025-08-20

Since Rivard’s voluntary resignation made it impossible for her to perform or be available to perform that work, the Plan’s condition of continued employment is enforceable. In accordance with that provision, the Unearned Incentive payments at issue had not become “due and payable” when Rivard resigned from NICE and are not, therefore, subject to the Wage Act.