12 Mass. Gen. Laws § 111

Claims under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act fail when the corresponding § 1983 claims fail for the same substantive reasons.

Garcia v. City of Boston · filed 2000-09-15

Accordingly, Garcia’s claims under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act fail for the reasons specified above with regard to his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The NLRA preempts a Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claim based on an employee’s discharge for attempting to organize coworkers when the claim concerns the same conduct addressed by the NLRB.

Williams v. Commonwealth Limousine Service, Inc. · filed 1999-01-26

Plaintiff also argues that the NLRA does not preempt his civil rights’ claim because the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G.L.c. 12, §111 treats interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that they should remain within the state courts’ ambit. ... In the case at bar, however, Plaintiff seeks relief for the identical misconduct which underlies the NLRB proceedings: discharge for attempting to organize employees. The NLRB has already ruled (favorably to Plaintiff). A state court could (and should) add nothing to the controversy.

Section 111 requires plaintiffs to present their discrimination claims to the MCAD before filing suit.

Quarterman v. City of Springfield · filed 2009-09-28

The court concludes that (1) Plaintiff SSE, by failing to file a complaint with MCAD, failed to exhaust its remedies on all three state statutory counts, and (2) both Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies with respect to the claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 111.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act applies the same qualified-immunity standard to police officers as 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Robinson v. Cook · filed 2012-03-21

Thus, the qualified immunity analysis applies equally to the plaintiffs’ claims under Section 1983 and their claims under the MCRA.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act applies the same qualified-immunity standard as a § 1983 claim, and municipalities are not covered persons who can be sued under the Act.

Parker v. Town of Swansea · filed 2003-05-27

The "same qualified immunity standard that applies under § 1983 has also been held to apply to claims under the MCRA.” ... The disputed facts which preclude the entry of summary judgment on the § 1983 claim against the individual defendants similarly preclude the entry of summary judgment on the MCRA claim. Additionally, no MCRA claim can be asserted against the Towns for the simple reason that "a municipality is not a ‘person’ covered by the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA), G.L. c. 12, §§ 11H, 11I.”

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act applies qualified immunity to officials performing discretionary acts when the plaintiff does not allege a violation of a clearly established right.

T.T. the Bear's Place, Inc. v. Rodriguez · filed 1994-02-17

Massachusetts has adopted this federal standard of qualified immunity for actions brought pursuant to the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. ... Inasmuch as plaintiff has not alleged facts supporting its claim that the defendants violated a clearly established constitutional right, plaintiff has failed to state either a Civil Rights Act claim or a §1983 claim, and cannot claim against the individual defendants on the basis of their discretionary acts.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act when the plaintiff identifies no violation of a clearly established right.

Duca v. Martins · filed 1996-08-20

The foregoing qualified immunity analysis concerning the plaintiffs’ federal claims compels the conclusion that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Duca’s Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claim because he has not identified the violation of any right clearly established by state law.

Public officials have qualified immunity from Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claims for discretionary acts unless they violated a clearly established federal or state right.

LaRossa v. Dupont · filed 1997-05-13

Accordingly, “public officials are not liable under the Civil Rights Act for their discretionary acts, unless they have violated a right under Federal or State constitutional or statutory law that was ‘clearly established’ at the time.”

Section 11I applies the same qualified immunity standard to police officers as claims under § 1983.

Hunt v. Massi · filed 2014-03-25

Because the police officers are not protected by qualified immunity with respect to the section 1983 excessive force claim, this Court likewise conclude that they are not entitled to qualified immunity against the MCRA claim alleging excessive force.

Section 111 does not treat state employees sued in their official capacities as “persons” under the Massachusetts civil-rights statute.

Villanueva v. Franklin County Sheriff's Office · filed 2012-03-27

State employees sued in their official capacities are not “persons” within the meaning chapter 12.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act incorporates § 1983 qualified immunity, and municipalities are not “persons” subject to suit under the Act.

Wagner v. City of Holyoke · filed 2003-01-24

Qualified immunity under § 1983 applies with equal force to claims brought under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 111. ... The plaintiffs’ state civil rights claim against the defendant City of Holyoke also fails, because municipalities are not “persons” within the meaning of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act.

Section 11I preserves absolute immunity for prosecutors whose conduct is sufficiently related to the prosecutorial function, even though it does not expressly provide immunity.

Chicopee Lions Club v. DIST. ATTORNEY FOR HAMPDEN DIST · filed 1985-11-18

The district attorney is similarly immune from suit under G. L. c. 12, § 11I. The issue of prosecutorial immunity under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act is a question of first impression before this court. Like the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act by its terms admits of no immunities. We do not presume, however, that the Legislature in passing this statute intended to abrogate a tradition of judicial and prosecutorial immunity rooted in history and based upon sound considerations of public policy.

Section 11I does not immunize public officials from suit for intentional ministerial acts that interfere with civil rights.

Breault v. Chairman of the Board of Fire Commissioners · filed 1987-10-13

We conclude, therefore, that, where intentional ministerial acts of public officials are involved, there is no basis to conclude, under the relevant statutes and case law, that immunity from suit should be granted. Accordingly, the judge was correct in ruling that the defendant was not immune from the remedial ambit of the Act.

Section 111 does not treat the Commonwealth or its agents sued in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

Priestly v. Doucette · filed 1993-12-21

As a matter of law, the Commonwealth and its agents acting in their official capacity are not “persons” for purpose of G.L.c. 12, §§11H and 111.

Section 11I provides a remedy coextensive with §1983 except that it does not require state action; a claim against supervisors requires facts linking them to the alleged interference.

Priestly v. Doucette · filed 1994-05-31

The Supreme Judicial Court in Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 393 Mass. 819 (1985), stated that the remedy provided under G.L.c. 12, §111 was intended to be coextensive with 42 U.S.C. §1983 (except the state statute does not require state action). Batchelder, supra at 822-23. Due to the equivalent nature of these statutes the court concludes, for the reasons set forth in part A, supra, that Priestly has failed to allege specific facts which raise a genuine issue of material fact as to Baran and Henderson’s liability under G.L.c. 12, §§11H & I.

Section 111 requires a plaintiff to allege that an individual defendant personally engaged in threats, intimidation, or coercion to state a claim against that defendant in an individual capacity.

Martinez v. Wolferseder · filed 1998-03-17

The MCRA prohibits any person from interfering or attempting to interfere with the exercise of any rights secured by the constitution or laws of the United States or the Commonwealth by threats, intimidation, or coercion. M.G.L. c. 12, § 111; Willitts v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, 411 Mass. 202, 210, 581 N.E.2d 475 (1991). The plaintiffs have not alleged that defendant Roddy personally engaged in any acts that constituted threats, intimidation or coercion, and, therefore, they have not stated a MCRA claim against him in his individual capacity.

Municipalities are not persons who can be sued under Section 111 of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act.

Thyng v. City of Quincy · filed 2014-06-02

As a preliminary matter, municipalities are not “persons” under the MCRA and, therefore, cannot be sued under the statute.

A government official sued only in an official capacity is immune from damages under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act.

Stetson v. Town of Ashland · filed 2008-09-08

Because Stetson sued Melnick professionally, Melnick is entitled to governmental immunity. See O'Malley, 415 Mass. at 141 n.13. Therefore, Stetson is unable to recover for his MCRA claim.