12 Mass. Gen. Laws § 111

Section 111 gives a private plaintiff a right of action.

Doyle v. Dukakis · filed 1986-05-16

Section 111 is a different matter, for it provides Doyle with a private right of action.

Section 111 authorizes a private civil action by anyone whose constitutional or statutory rights have been interfered with, or whose interference has been attempted, as described in § 11H.

Nolan v. Krajcik · filed 2005-07-12

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 111 authorizes civil actions by any person who has suffered the interference or attempted interference of the rights described in § 11H.

Section 111 authorizes a private civil action by a person whose rights were interfered with or threatened through threats, intimidation, or coercion, as described in § 11H.

Sheppard v. Aloisi · filed 2005-08-11

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 111 authorizes civil actions by any person who has suffered the interference or attempted interference of the rights described in § 11H.

Section 111 provides a private civil rights action for equitable, injunctive, and compensatory relief when threats, intimidation, or coercion interfere with rights secured by Massachusetts law.

Grubba v. Bay State Abrasives, Division of Dresser Industries, Inc. · filed 1986-10-20

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 12 § 111 (Supp. 1986), effective since 1979, provides a private cause of action for equitable, injunctive, and compensatory relief to “[a]ny person whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by ... the constitution or laws of the commonwealth, has been interfered with [by threats, intimidation, or coercion].”

Section 111 permits compensatory damages but does not authorize punitive damages.

Gardner v. Governor Apartments Associates · filed 1986-02-03

Because the statute does not authorize an award of punitive damages, only compensatory damages may be recovered under G. L. c. 12, § 111.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act does not support a spouse’s derivative claim for loss of consortium.

Tauriac v. Polaroid Corporation · filed 1989-01-03

Rather, this court anticipates that, if faced with the issue, the Supreme Judicial Court would agree with the logic of the federal decisions cited above, and would reject a claim for loss of consortium damages predicated on violations of Massachusetts civil rights statutes.

Section 11I civil rights actions for equitable relief or damages must be brought in superior court; district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction.

Sheridan v. Action 6 Bay State Travel, Inc. · filed 1993-10-13

Similarly, a G.L.c. 12, §111 action for injunctive or equitable relief or money damages for civil rights violations must be broughtin the superior court.

Section 11I permits equitable relief, but sovereign immunity bars money damages against Department of Correction defendants.

Reaves v. Correctional Medical Services · filed 2005-09-17

Principles of sovereign immunity protect the DOC defendants from a claim for money damages brought under the MCRA. See Jackson v. Verdini, 19 Mass. L. Rptr. 539, 2005 WL 1457748, *8 (Mass. Super.) (Gants, J.). Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate with regard to the claim for money damages brought under the MCRA. Reaves, however, also seeks equitable remedies, which he can pursue under the MCRA.

Section 11I does not support a loss of consortium claim based on a civil rights violation.

Kennedy v. Town of Billerica · filed 2007-03-26

Similarly, it does not appear as if the plaintiffs can state a claim for loss of consortium for violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12 §§ 11H, 111. ... The only viable loss of consortium claim is based on the alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress by Casey.

Private parties seeking a preliminary injunction under § 111 must show immediate irreparable harm.

Carroll v. Marzilli · filed 2009-10-22

As private parties seeking a preliminary injunction under § 111, the plaintiffs must show immediate irreparable harm, which they have failed to do.

Under the MCRA, normally lawful restraint can constitute coercion when used to make a person give up a constitutional right.

Spencer v. Roche · filed 2010-11-08

Although the holding in Longval is somewhat ambiguous, subsequent authorities have held that normally lawful restraint may constitute coercion under the MCRA if the causation requirement is met — in other words, if such restraint is applied in order to cause the plaintiff to give up his constitutional rights.

Section 111 applies to Title VII and ADEA violations, but a viable claim requires facts showing the violation was brought about by threats, intimidation, or coercion; mere allegations of age or sex discrimination are insufficient.

Appling v. City of Brockton · filed 1986-12-08

Following this expansive trend, this Court then agrees with the plaintiff that the Act applies to violations of Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Mere allegations of age or sex discrimination, however, will not make out a cause of action under the Act. To state a viable claim under the Act, the plaintiff must allege facts showing these violations were brought about by threats, intimidation or coercion. Even a liberal reading of the complaint fails to reveal facts that would imply the use of threats, coercion or intimidation by the defendants. The Court therefore must dismiss Count V without prejudice to the filing of an amended complaint.

Section 111 permits a Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claim to proceed at the motion-to-dismiss stage when threatened discipline and a retaliatory demotion are sufficient threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Carvalho v. Town of Westport · filed 2001-04-09

Therefore, Carvalho’s allegations that Healy threatened to discipline him and that Carvalho was ultimately demoted in retaliation for his public statements are— at the motion to dismiss stage — sufficient to state a claim under Massachusetts General Laws ch. 12, § 111.

Section 11I provides a state civil-rights remedy coextensive with § 1983, except that it does not require state action and requires interference by threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Grant v. John Hancock Mutual, Life Insurance · filed 2002-01-08

Thus, the Massachusetts “Legislature intended to provide a remedy under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 111, coextensive with 42 U.S.C. § 1983, except that the Federal statute requires State action whereas its State counterpart does not. The language requiring interference ‘by threats, intimidation or coercion, or attempt to interfere by threats, intimidation or coercion ... ’ is addressed to this private action.” ... Grant has stated a claim against all the defendants arising out of the physical altercation on September 11, 1998. There is no requirement of state action, so the status of Glancy and O’Brien as state actors is irrelevant.

Section 111 permits a Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claim based on threats, intimidation, or coercion connected to the loss of a contractual right; a politically motivated denial of a promotion may provide enough evidence of coercion to proceed past summary judgment.

McCarthy v. Szostkiewicz · filed 2002-02-25

This case presents an issue that falls on the fringe of this dispute. As Chief Judge Young has noted, the Supreme Judicial Court has not yet foreclosed a cause of action under Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 12, § 111 for “threats, intimidation, or coercion” in connection with the loss of a contractual right. ... Plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on that theory for the following reasons. ... Second, there is a material issue of fact about whether McCarthy suffered “threats, intimidation, or coercion” with regard to his right to be considered for the promotion free from political consideration. ... Given this authority, the record is sufficient to show that McCarthy was a victim of a coercive violation of his constitutional rights. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment as to Count 2 will be denied.

Section 111 requires threats, intimidation, or coercion to interfere with a person's exercise or enjoyment of a constitutional or statutory right; a direct deprivation of rights alone does not satisfy that requirement.

Goddard v. Kelley · filed 2009-03-31

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 12, § 111, provides a right of action to any person whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the federal or state constitution or laws has been interfered with by “threats, intimidation, or coercion.” ... “Coercion” means application of physical or moral force to another to constrain him to do against his will something he would not otherwise do. ... On its face, the MCRA contemplates a two-part sequence: (1) the defendant threatens, intimidates, or coerces the plaintiff, in order to (2) cause the plaintiff to give up something that the plaintiff has the constitutional right to do. ... Such a construction would torture the statute well beyond its plain meaning, and therefore the Court concludes that it simply does not apply to the present facts.

Section 111 requires a deprivation or attempted deprivation of a protected right through threats, intimidation, or coercion; merely stating an intention to use lawful process generally is not coercive absent an intimidating manner.

Piccone v. McClain · filed 2010-07-02

To establish a claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 111, a plaintiff must prove a deprivation or attempted deprivation of a protected right by “threats, intimidation or coercion.” ... In general, the stated intention to bring lawful process is not coercive for purposes of Section 111. ... However, there are no indicia of intimidation here. The DCF investigators merely insisted on an opportunity to interview the child, following a reported allegation of abuse, without videotaping. Plaintiffs’ situation might raise concerns, but the facts alleged are simply insufficient to provide grounds for Section 111 liability.

Section 111 permits a property-rights interference claim based on threats, intimidation, or coercion, but adverse administrative action alone is insufficient when it is not part of a harassment scheme.

Boston Executive Helicopters, LLC v. Maguire · filed 2016-07-06

Defendants finally seek to dismiss BEH’s claim under the MCRA that they have interfered with BEH’s right to “use, enjoy and improve its property” by means of “threats, intimidation, or coercion” intended to force BEH to withdraw its FBO application. ... For purposes of the MCRA, “a ![t]hreat’ ... involves the intentional exertion of pressure to make another fearful or apprehensive of injury or harm. ... ‘Intimidation’ involves putting in fear for the purpose of compelling or deterring conduct. ... [‘Coercion’ involves] ‘the application to another of such force, either physical or moral, as to constrain [a person] to do against his will something he would not otherwise have done.’” ... In contrast with Kennie, here there is no showing that the commissioner defendants have done anything more than refuse to act affirmatively on BEH’s application for an FOB permit. “Adverse administrative action, at least when not part of a scheme of harassment, does not amount to ‘threats, intimidation or coercion.’ ”

Section 111 authorizes a private civil action under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act for interference or attempted interference with constitutional or statutory rights, but the interference must involve threats, intimidation, or coercion; a direct rights violation alone is insufficient.

Barbosa v. Conlon · filed 2013-06-10

Since, however, the plaintiffs have failed to establish that the defendants’ conduct amounted to interference or an attempt to interfere with the plaintiffs’ rights through the use of threats, intimidation or coercion, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the MCRA claims must be allowed.

Section 111 requires proof that a constitutional right was exercised, interference occurred or was attempted, and the interference involved threats, intimidation, or coercion; the court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove the third element.

Flaherty v. Knapik · filed 2014-02-21

To succeed on a claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 111, a plaintiff must prove “(1) their exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the constitution or laws of either the United States or the Commonwealth; (2) have been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with; and (3) that the interference or attempted interference was by “threats, intimidation or coercion.” ” ... No evidence in this record supports Plaintiffs’ assertion that Defendant’s action was done through any threat, intimidation, or coercion. ... As a result, Plaintiffs cannot succeed on their MCRA claim, and summary judgment for Defendant is appropriate on Count III.

Section 111 provides a cause of action when interference with constitutional or statutory rights is accomplished through threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Cox v. Massachusetts Department of Correction · filed 2014-03-12

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 111, provides a cause of action to any person whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the federal or state constitution or laws has been interfered with by “threats, intimidation, or coercion.”

Section 111 requires threats, intimidation, or coercion that interferes with a person's constitutional or statutory rights and compels the person to give up conduct they have a right to undertake; a direct rights violation alone is insufficient.

Hernandez v. Montanez · filed 2014-05-02

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act provides a right of action to any person whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the federal or state constitution or laws has been interfered with by- “threats, intimidation dr coercion.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 111. The statute thus contemplates a two-part sequence: liability may be found where (1) the defendant threatens, intimidates, or coerces the plaintiff in order to (2) cause the plaintiff to give up something that he or she has the constitutional right to do. ... There are no allegations that defendants physically hurt or threatened plaintiff. While they may have directly violated plaintiffs rights, they did not employ threats, intimidation, or coercion to do within the meaning of the MCRA.

Section 111 requires interference with rights secured by the Constitution or laws through threats, intimidation, or coercion, and those tactics may be directed at a third party.

Bazinet v. Thorpe · filed 2016-06-03

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA) provides a cause of action against a person who has “interfere[d] by threats, intimidation or coercion”, with the exercise of rights secured by the state or federal constitutions or laws. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, §§ 11H, 111. ... Thus, construing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could find that Thorpe and Desrosiers interfered with Bruce’s constitutional rights by way of threats, intimidation, and coercive tactics against Lori, which resulted in the false APO and police report. Desrosiers and Thorpe are not entitled to summary judgment on count II.

Section 111 requires an interference with protected rights through threats, intimidation, or coercion for a Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claim.

Gable v. Borges Constraction, Inc. · filed 2011-06-17

Defendant Borges contends that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently plead a cause of action under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (“MCRA”), Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 12, § 111, ... because there is no allegation of the requisite interference by “threats, intimidation or coercion.” ... Defendant Borges is correct. ... There is simply no reading of this allegation that permits a conclusion that Plaintiffs were intimidated or threatened by Defendant Borges. ... See Bally, ... (holding that complaint must allege either “an individualized threat” or “a threat of serious harm”).

Section 111 does not make a city’s failure to train, supervise, or discipline officers actionable unless the city interferes with rights by threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Hathaway v. Stone · filed 1988-06-27

In this case, even assuming the City or the Department failed to train, discipline, or supervise its officers, such a failure did not involve threats, intimidation, or coercion by the City or the Department. Therefore, even if the plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to state a claim under § 1983, failure to train, supervise, or discipline is not actionable under M.G.L. c. 12 § 111.

Section 11I requires threats, intimidation, or coercion; pursuing legal rights alone does not satisfy that requirement.

Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, Lodge No. 65 v. Planning Board · filed 1988-12-13

The plaintiffs’ factual allegations concern only the defendants’ pursuit of legal rights. The defendants’ actions thus lack any element of coercion, threat, or intimidation actionable under § 11I.

Section 11I requires a private plaintiff to prove interference with secured rights by threats, intimidation, or coercion; exclusion from intercollegiate sports for refusing drug testing did not satisfy that requirement.

Bally v. Northeastern University · filed 1989-01-09

To establish a claim under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (Act), G. L. c. 12, § 111, Bally must prove that (1) his exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of either the United States or of the Commonwealth, (2) has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, and (3) that the interference or attempted interference was by “threats, intimidation or coercion.”

Section 111 requires proof that the defendant threatened, intimidated, or coerced the plaintiff; unlawful interference with subsidized occupancy alone does not establish that element.

Serreze v. YWCA of Western Massachusetts, Inc. · filed 1991-06-05

Although we conclude that the YWCA interfered with the plaintiffs’ protected interest in the continuation of their subsidized occupancy, we do not think its behavior rose to the level of a civil rights violation under G. L. c. 12, § 111. There is no evidence that the YWCA ever threatened, intimidated, or coerced the plaintiffs; thus, one of the elements necessary for a statutory violation is lacking.

Section 11I does not provide a claim for an employer’s refusal to renew an expired contract when the refusal does not involve threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Willitts v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston · filed 1991-11-18

Because the plaintiff did not have a contract for the 1987-1988 school year, the violation of the Act she alleges consists only in the defendant’s failure to renew its contract with her. Such action by the school falls outside the scope of what we recognize as “threats, intimidation or coercion” required to state a claim under the Act.

Section 111 requires proof that threats, intimidation, or coercion interfered with a person’s rights; a § 1983 claim alone does not establish that requirement.

Courville Ex Rel. Ypina v. Town of Barre · filed 1993-04-16

Section 1983 contains no similar requirement of a showing of threats, intimidation, or coercion. Consequently, this Court has held that “stating a claim under § 1983 does not automatically mean that plaintiff has also stated a claim under § 111.” ... It is for a jury, not the Court, to determine whether Ryder used threats, intimidation or coercion to deprive Ypina of his rights.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act requires threats, intimidation, or coercion; complaints and criticism about an employee’s work performance do not satisfy that requirement.

Battenfield v. Harvard University · filed 1993-08-31

Further, Shinagel’s and Schopfs complaints and criticism regarding plaintiffs work performance do not constitute coercion within the meaning of this section.

Section 11I does not treat an unlawful taking as coercion when the taking does not seek to force the landowner to act or refrain from acting.

Pheasant Ridge Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Town of Burlington · filed 1987-04-30

Although the purported taking of the plaintiffs’ property was unlawful because done in bad faith, the taking did not itself interfere or attempt to interfere with the plaintiffs’ rights by coercion. The taking was an attempted direct, preemptive act and did not seek to coerce any plaintiff to do or not to do anything.

Section 11I requires a claimant to show interference with protected rights through threats, intimidation, or coercion; the alleged negligence and inaction here did not establish coercion.

Deas v. Dempsey · filed 1988-12-07

To sustain her burden under G. L. c. 12, § 11I,1 Deas must demonstrate that Dempsey has interfered or attempted to interfere with the exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the United States Constitution, laws of the United States, the Massachusetts Constitution, or laws of the Commonwealth through threat, intimidation or coercion. ... In conclusion, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact on the required element of coercion.

Section 111 requires proof that the defendant, including a governmental agency, used threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Silvia v. BLDG. INSPECTOR OF WEST BRIDGEWATER · filed 1993-10-28

That statute requires a showing that the person charged with the offense, including a governmental agency, has used threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Section 111 does not provide relief when an employer conditions at-will employment on participation in a universal drug testing program, because the threatened loss of employment is not actionable threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Webster v. Motorola, Inc. · filed 1994-07-21

In the present case, the defendants conditioned the plaintiffs’ continued employment on their submission to the program. The plaintiffs were employed “at will.” Thus, the defendants allegedly attempted to interfere with the plaintiffs’ rights by threatening the loss of their “at-will” positions. This is not actionable conduct. No physical confrontation is alleged, and because the plaintiffs were employed “at will,” they had no contract right to their positions.

Section 11I requires interference with a protected right through threats, intimidation, or coercion; discharge for refusing to cooperate with this private employer’s investigation did not satisfy those requirements.

Nuzzo v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. · filed 1995-05-23

Here, there were no physical threats, intimidation or coercion. ... In sum, this court concludes that plaintiffs discharge for failure to comply with orders to cooperate in a company investigation did not interfere with any contractual or constitutional rights under state or federal law.

A private action under this section requires interference through a threat, intimidation, or coercion.

Bowman v. Heller · filed 1995-06-13

The distribution of the two photocopies did not constitute a threat, intimidation, or coercion as defined by the MCRA. We vacate the judgment to the extent that it is based on any violation of the MCRA.

Section 111 requires interference with protected rights through threats, coercion, or intimidation; a police order to surrender property against a person’s will can satisfy that requirement at the pleading stage.

Britton v. Maloney · filed 1995-09-10

The complaint specifically states that Britton did not wish to give up his gun, but was ordered to do so by the police. At this preliminary stage, these allegations are sufficient to satisfy the requirement under Section 111 that the violation of rights occur through threat, coercion or intimidation.

Section 11I requires threats, intimidation, or coercion for a civil rights claim based on interference with protected rights.

Abdullah v. Rapone · filed 1995-11-15

Accordingly, I rule that although defendants did interfere with plaintiffs rights, there is no evidence that defendants’ actions amounted to threat, intimidation or coercion, amounting to a violation of the State Civil Rights Act.

Section 111 requires allegations that a defendant interfered with protected rights through threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Suarez v. Belli · filed 1997-01-13

In the State Constitutional claims under Article XI and G.L.c. 12, §111, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants interfered with their Article XI rights by threats, intimidation and coercion. ... Because of the absence of any fact allegations alleging a threat, intimidation or coercion by any defendant other than Workman, the defendants other than Workman are entitled to dismissal of the state’s Civil Rights Act claims alleging interference with the plaintiffs’ rights under Article XI.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act requires sufficiently serious threats, intimidation, or coercion to support a claim.

Tedeschi v. Reardon · filed 1998-04-21

Tedeschi’s claim Under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act fails because there is no evidence of any “threat, intimidation or coercion” involving physical or morally coercive force sufficiently serious to satisfy the entry level burden of the Act.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act requires interference with a protected legal right through threats, intimidation, or coercion; continued at-will employment is not such a right.

Raffaele v. Ryder Dedicated Logistics, Inc. · filed 1996-07-15

Continuation of the plaintiffs at-will employment is not a legal right. ... Furthermore, plaintiffs suspension before the issuance of a citation and his subsequent termination did not constitute coercion, intimidation or threats. In short, because the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to satisfy the requisite elements for a violation of the MCRA, defendant’s motion to dismiss Count III will be allowed.

The Act requires interference through threats, intimidation, or coercion; deliberate delays that directly deprive an owner of property rights do not, by themselves, constitute coercion.

Swanset Development Corp. v. City of Taunton · filed 1996-08-01

To the extent that the plaintiffs allege that various delays were a deliberate attempt to frustrate their development plans, they have alleged a direct deprivation of rights rather than an attempt at coercion.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act requires an allegation of threats, intimidation, or coercion involving physical or morally coercive force.

Chilson v. Polo Ralph Lauren Retail Corp. · filed 1998-07-07

Chilson’s Civil Rights Act claim fails because there is no allegation of any "threat, intimidation or coercion” involving physical or morally coercive force that satisfies the entry level burden of the Act.

Section 111 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant used threats, intimidation, or coercion to interfere with, or attempt to interfere with, a protected right.

Brum v. Town of Dartmouth · filed 1999-01-21

In order to make out a claim under § 111,15 which incorporates by reference G. L. c. 12, § 11H, the plaintiff must prove that the defendants used “threats, intimidation or coercion” to interfere with, or attempt to interfere with, rights secured by the. Constitution or laws of the United States *708or the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

A Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claim requires threats, intimidation, or coercion; a direct violation of rights without them is insufficient.

Ahearn v. Vose · filed 1999-02-15

Threats, intimidation and coercion are essential elements of a claim under the MCRA. ... In their complaint, the plaintiffs fail to assert any facts demonstrating threats, intimidation or coercion by officials or employees of the DOC. Furthermore, the summary judgment record evinces no such facts. Without an allegation of such facts, and without any supporting factual basis in the record, summary judgment is appropriately granted to the defendants on this claim. See Smith, supra, at 547.

A Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claim fails when the complaint alleges no threats, intimidation, or coercion by the defendant.

Barthelmes v. Martineau · filed 1999-04-27

The complaint does not allege any conduct by Olympus, or its employees, that would constitute threats, intimidation, or coercion. Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim under the MCRA.

Section 11I requires threats, intimidation, or coercion to support a civil rights claim and an associated claim for attorney’s fees.

Brunelle v. Lynn Public Schools · filed 2001-01-11

Given the lack of coercion, threats, or intimidation in this case, the plaintiffs did not satisfy the elements of a G. L. c. 12, § 11I, claim, and therefore, their claim for attorney’s fees must fail.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act requires interference with a protected right through threat, intimidation, or coercion.

Jiles v. Department of Correction · filed 2002-08-26

Additionally, the MCRA claims lack an essential element of that law because a plaintiff must demonstrate that interference with the exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by United States Constitution, laws of the United States, the Massachusetts Constitution, or laws of the Commonwealth was effectuated “through threat, intimidation or *665coercion.”

Section 111 requires threats, intimidation, or coercion; filing a disciplinary report that does not constrain a prisoner’s conduct is insufficient.

Shedlock v. Department of Correction · filed 2002-10-03

The filing of a disciplinary report in this case cannot reasonably be deemed to constitute “coercion” in violation of MCRA. The filing of the report did not constrain Shedlock from doing anything; it simply initiated an administrative disciplinary proceeding to sanction him for refusing to comply with Sgt. Wilson’s directive.

Section 111 requires conduct that can reasonably be understood as threats, intimidation, or coercion interfering with a person's protected rights.

Indian Hill Associates, Inc. v. City of Worcester · filed 2002-11-05

Turning first to the July 2, 1996, meeting in Robert Moylan’s office at the DPW, I find that the words and message intended to be conveyed by city officials, Moylan included, were not reasonably to be interpreted by the plaintiff as threats, intimidation or coercion that interfered with the rights of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff did not change any aspect of its plan as a result.

Section 11I allows a jury to consider defendants’ conduct as a whole when deciding whether they threatened or intimidated property owners in the enjoyment of their land.

Ayasli v. Armstrong · filed 2002-12-18

While no single point is determinative, the aggregate facts of this case are sufficient to create a jury question whether the defendants’ conduct as a whole violated G. L. c. 12, § 111.

Section 11I does not treat an employer’s failure to train or manage employees to prevent harassment as threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Cuddi v. Gallery Gift Shoppes d/b/a Kitchen · filed 2003-10-24

Accepting as true Cuddi’s allegation that Kitchen, Etc. failed to properly train or manage its employees to protect him from sexually harassing and discriminating conduct, this failure does not involve actions rising to the level of threats, intimidation or coercion under MCRA.

Section 11I requires a claim to allege threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Lopes v. Commonwealth · filed 2004-07-09

In addition, the complaint fails to allege any threats, intimidation, or coercion by the Commonwealth, an essential element of a claim under the State civil rights act.

A Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claim requires facts showing threats, intimidation, or coercion attributable to the defendant.

Fromm v. Boston Redevelopment Authority · filed 2005-05-13

Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ MCRA claim must fail as well for insufficient facts demonstrating threats, intimidation or coercion.

A claim under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act may proceed to a jury when material facts are disputed about threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Lockhart-Bembery v. Town of Wayland Police Department · filed 2005-12-07

The pleadings demonstrate that with respect to threats, intimidation and coercion, there are genuine issues of material fact. Thus, the claim will be left to the jury for its reasoned determination.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act requires threats, intimidation, or coercion beyond a direct violation of rights, even if that violation is unlawful.

Walsh v. Town of Lakeville · filed 2006-04-10

Direct violations of rights, even if unlawful, are not subject to liability under the MCRA unless they are accompanied by a further attempt to force the plaintiff to take some action.

Section 11I reaches persistent threats and intimidation that interfere with a person’s use and enjoyment of property, including conduct directed at workers on the property.

Haufler v. Zotos · filed 2006-04-12

Threatening, intimidating, or coercive actions directed at third parties should be included in considering any *504conduct that forms the basis of a claim under the civil rights act. ... On balance, and in light of our earlier discussion, we conclude that Zotos did violate the act.

Section 111 requires interference with secured rights by threats, intimidation, or coercion; a direct restriction of those rights alone does not qualify.

T & D Video, Inc. v. City of Revere · filed 2006-06-08

To recover under the Act, the plaintiff had to prove “that (1) [its] exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of either the United States or of the Commonwealth, (2) have been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, and (3) that the interference or attempted interference was by ‘threats, intimidation or coercion.’ ” Swanset Dev. Corp. v. Taunton, 423 Mass. 390, 395 (1996), citing G. L. c. 12, § 111.

Section 11I requires a civil rights claimant to show interference through threats, intimidation, or coercion; Amtrak’s response to a perceived workplace threat did not meet that requirement.

Carmack v. National RR Passenger Corp. · filed 2007-03-22

To the extent Mr. Carmack is asserting a claim based on unlawful retaliation for protected conduct, he cannot establish, based on the record before this court, that the defendant’s actions constituted “threats, intimidation or coercion,” as required under the MCRA.

Section 111 requires interference by threats, intimidation, or coercion; unauthorized disclosure of an academic transcript alone does not meet that requirement.

Ali v. University of Massachusetts Medical Center · filed 2001-04-11

Even if the defendants did, as alleged, unlawfully disclose Ali’s academic transcript, such disclosure does not, as a matter of law, constitute the kind of physical confrontation contemplated by the words “threats, intimidation or coercion.” Indeed, Ali does not contend that the defendants violated his right to privacy by “threats, intimidation or coercion.”

Section 111 requires interference or attempted interference with protected rights through threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Alphagary Corp. v. Gitto · filed 2007-05-21

Newline’s claim for violation of G.L.c. 12, §111 must fail. This cause of action requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that “(1) [his] exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of either the United States or of the Commonwealth, (2) [has] been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, and (3) that the interference or attempted interference was by threats, intimidation or coercion.” ... Newline’s allegations simply do not constitute any of these actions.

Vigorous opposition to a permit, even if it prompts an applicant to reconsider the expense of proceeding, does not constitute intimidation actionable under § 11I.

Kennie v. Natural Resource Department · filed 2007-05-29

Marcy’s words, fairly considered, were no more than a promise of vigorous opposition. While such a promise would reasonably stimulate a reconsideration of the effort and expense necessary to secure the permit, it does not rise to the level of intimidation defined in Haufler, supra.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act requires interference with a legally secured right through threats, intimidation, or coercion; a factual dispute over those means can prevent summary judgment.

Kilgallon v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc. · filed 2007-07-31

Kilgallon asserts Count I against the defendants for violation of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, (“MCRA”), G.L.c. 12, §111. To establish a cognizable claim under the MCRA, Kilgallon must prove: (1) his exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of either the United States or the Commonwealth, (2) has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, and (3) that the interference or attempted interference was by “threats, intimidation or coercion.” ... Therefore DLC’s motion as to count I is denied because Kilgallon had a right to sell his tickets, especially in light of the fact that the Massachusetts anti-scalping statute6 did not prohibit Kilgallon’s actions. ... However, because there is a dispute as to whether DLC’s interference was done by way of threats, intimidation, or coercion, Kilgallon’s cross motion is also denied.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act’s coercion requirement is not met by complaints about job performance, even if deliberately false, unless they attempt to force someone to do something the person is not lawfully required to do.

Horne v. City of Boston · filed 2007-09-19

The most that is said is that defendants complained about aspects of plaintiffs’ job performance. Even if the complaints were deliberately false (as alleged), this does not amount to “an attempt to force someone to do something the person is not lawfully required to do,” as the MCRA requires.

The MCRA covers economic coercion standing alone and judges threats, intimidation, or coercion from the perspective of a reasonable person in the claimant’s circumstances.

Cook v. Cullen · filed 2007-12-28

Economic coercion, standing alone, is actionable under the MCRA. Id. at 648. An objective standard applies — whether a reasonable person in the victim’s circumstances would be threatened, intimidated, or coerced by the defendant’s conduct. See Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Blake, 417 Mass. 467, 474-75 (1994). This determination requires a finding of fact, and a decision on summaiy judgment is not appropriate in this case.

Section 111 permits a claim for interference with property rights through threats, intimidation, or coercion; statements about blocking development can present a question for the jury.

Three-A Sac Self-Storage, LP v. Lisciotti · filed 2008-10-06

Therefore, in their totality, Lisciotti’s alleged statements and conduct create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a reasonable person in Casey’s position would have felt threatened, coerced, or intimidated as required by G.L.c. 12, §111.

Section 11I requires interference with constitutional rights through threats, intimidation, or coercion; a threat to use lawful means is generally insufficient.

Mirsky v. Barkas · filed 2011-01-31

While a police officer’s statement that she would return with a warrant may be a threat, generally “a threat to use lawful means to reach an intended result is not actionable under Section 111.” Sena v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 250, 263 (1994); see also Buster v. George W. Moore, Inc., 438 Mass. 635, 648 (2003).

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act requires a plaintiff to allege interference with secured rights through threats, intimidation, or coercion to survive dismissal.

Baggett v. Clarke · filed 2011-02-04

To survive a motion to dismiss a claim under the state Civil Rights Act, G.L.c. 12, §1II, a plaintiff must allege “that (1) his exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of either the United States or of the Commonwealth, (2) has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, and (3) that the interference or attempted interference was by threats, intimidation or coercion." Bally v. Northeastern University, 403 Mass. 713, 717 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Baggett has alleged no facts suggesting “threats, intimidation or coercion.” Therefore, his action under the state Civil Rights Act cannot survive.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act permits a claim to proceed when disputed facts could establish threats, intimidation, or coercion interfering with a constitutional right.

Parsons v. Willette · filed 2012-01-20

It is sufficient to say that there are triable issues of whether Willette’s conduct amounted to threats, intimidation or coercion towards plaintiff. ... Thus, on this motion for summary judgment, the court finds that there are sufficient facts in dispute with respect to the conduct alleged to require the denial of the motion so that the claim may proceed to trial.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act requires interference through threats, intimidation, or coercion; alleged unlawful foreclosure alone does not satisfy that requirement without conduct aimed at compelling or deterring someone.

Sovereign Bank v. Sturgis · filed 2012-03-22

Although the Sturgises argue that foreclosure is “economic coercion,” they do not allege that Sovereign foreclosed or engaged in any conduct in order to constrain the Sturgises to do something against their wills.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act requires evidence that an officer threatened, intimidated, or coerced someone with the specific intent to prevent the exercise of a constitutional right.

Howe v. Town of North Andover · filed 2012-04-11

Accordingly, to survive summary judgment with respect to their MCRA claim, plaintiffs must offer enough evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the Officers threatened, intimidated or coerced Mr. Howe with the specific intent to prevent him from exercising a constitutional right. Spencer v. Roche, 755 F.Supp.2d 250, 267 (D.Mass.2010). Finding none, the Court concludes that the Officers are entitled to summary judgment with respect to Count V.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act requires threats, intimidation, or coercion; participation in a corrupt promotion process alone does not meet that requirement.

Zavatsky v. O'Brien · filed 2012-09-30

Viewed objectively, the participation and acquiescence of Chief Mulligan and Lucci in a corrupt promotion process, without more, does not instill in an applicant the fear of anything.

Section 111 requires a deprivation of rights secured by federal or state law through threats, intimidation, or coercion; merely enforcing a written policy is not coercion.

Doe v. Town of Weston · filed 2013-02-07

Doe’s claim under G.L.c. 12, §111 fails for the same reason. There was no deprivation of rights secured by federal or state laws. In addition, Doe did not allege, nor could he, the required element under c. 12 of state action by threats, intimidation or coercion. Mere enforcement of written policy does not amount to coercion.

Section 11I requires threats, intimidation, or coercion to support a civil rights claim; a store manager’s statement of a policy against signature solicitation, without an indication of arrest or other serious consequences, does not suffice.

Glovsky v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc. · filed 2014-10-10

Without further indication, however, that Visconti would seek Glovsky’s arrest, or cause him to suffer other serious adverse consequences, his mere declaration of Roche Bros.’ policy against signature solicitation does not rise to the level of threats, intimidation, or coercion.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act permits a claim when an officer uses force to coerce a person into allowing an unlawful search.

Walker v. Jackson · filed 2014-10-31

Summary judgment as to Count VI will nevertheless be denied because 1) there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Officer Jackson’s search was lawful and 2) a reasonable juror could find that his use of force was intended to coerce Mr. Walker into allowing him to perform an unconstitutional second search.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act requires evidence that an arrest or use of force was intended to coerce someone into giving up a protected right beyond the right allegedly violated by that act.

Ciolino v. Eastman · filed 2015-09-03

Therefore, to survive Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs would need to come forth with some evidence that Defendants falsely arrested and/or allegedly assaulted Mr. Ciolino with the intent to achieve “some further purpose” of violating one or more of Plaintiffs’ rights, beyond Mr. Ciolino’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful searches or seizures.

Section 111 requires threats, intimidation, or coercion used to make a plaintiff give up a constitutional right.

McGunigle v. City of Quincy · filed 2015-09-18

On its face, the MCRA contemplates a two-part sequence: (1) the defendant threatens, intimidates, or coerces the plaintiff, in order to (2) cause the plaintiff to give up something that the plaintiff has the constitutional right to do.

Under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, an official’s words may be coercive when his conduct gives them force and causes a property owner to abandon a permit application.

Kennie v. Natural Resource Department · filed 2008-07-10

Rather, a fact finder could conclude that Marcy’s words, considered in the context of the action that he took to inflate the shellfish survey, were sufficiently coercive to force the plaintiffs to do something against their will that they would not have done otherwise, namely, to give up their application for a permit pertaining to location 3, their preferred location.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act requires coercion to interfere with a protected right; denying additional exam break time to express breast milk is not coercion when a private room is available during the exam.

Currier v. National Board of Medical Examiners · filed 2012-04-13

In circumstances where the NBME offered Currier a private examination room with a power outlet where she could express breast milk during the exam, we cannot say, objectively assessed, that the NBME’s denial of additional break time to Currier effected coercion within the meaning of the civil rights act.

Section 111 permits a claim when a jury could find that coercive conduct was intended to interfere with a person’s right to use and enjoy property.

Simonelli v. LaFramboise · filed 2009-11-24

In the present case, the court cannot say, as a matter of law, that a jury would be unable to find that the conduct described above constituted coercive acts intended to interfere with Simonelli’s use and enjoyment of her property and to coerce her into selling it to the defendants.

Section 111 permits a claim for attempted interference with civil rights even when the plaintiff does not yield to the alleged intimidation.

Hetherson v. Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety & Security · filed 2016-12-07

But this is irrelevant, because the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act also creates a claim for a person whose exercise of her rights “has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with,” by a defendant.

Section 11I does not authorize attorney’s fees to plaintiffs who are not prevailing parties.

Stefan v. Laurenitis · filed 1988-09-29

Also, since the definition of prevailing party is the same under both federal and state law, the Court holds plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney’s fees under Mass.Gen. Law ch. 12, § 11I.

Section 111 permits prevailing-party attorney’s fees when the party achieves success on a substantial question of law arising from a common nucleus of facts giving rise to a claim under the statute; a recovery on a separate wrongful-arrest claim did not satisfy that standard.

Zurakowski v. D'OYLEY · filed 1999-04-12

Such an analysis, however, fails to give the Batchel-der court’s generous construction of the Massachusetts civil rights statute its due. It appears, rather, that the proper ground of distinction rests on whether the “success ... arising out of a common nucleus of facts [is] on a substantial question of law.” Ibid, (emphasis supplied). That was the case in Batchelder. Ibid. That is not the case here. Accordingly, Zurokow-sky’s application for attorney’s fees must be denied as matter of law.

Section 111 authorizes a court to award attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing party in a civil rights action.

Ciulla v. Rigny · filed 2000-03-08

Both 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 111 authorize the Court to award attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing party in a civil rights action. A determination of qualified immunity does not prevent a party who otherwise prevailed from obtaining a fee award.

Section 111 uses the same prevailing-party standard as 42 U.S.C. § 1988 when determining eligibility for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

Richardson v. City of Boston · filed 2001-01-22

The meaning of “prevail” in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 111 must have been intended to be the same as that in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because the Massachusetts legislature “is presumed to have been aware of the use and meaning of this term in the Federal statute.” ... The same inquiry will thus determine the prevailing party status under both statutes. Since this Court has held that Richardson is not a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Richardson may not receive attorney’s fees and litigation expenses under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 111.

Section 111 allows attorney’s fees to a prevailing person whose protected civil rights were interfered with or threatened, but not to a defendant merely for successfully defending a civil rights claim.

Bailey v. Shriberg · filed 1991-08-26

We hold that an “aggrieved person” within the meaning of § 111 is a person who has suffered interference with, or attempts to interfere with, rights that are protected by the remedial scheme of §§ 11H and 111. One who successfully defends a claim under §§ 11H and 111 is “aggrieved” only in the sense that any person made to defend himself in a court of law is aggrieved. Attributing that meaning to the words “aggrieved person” in § 111 would be inconsistent with “the statutory goal of encouraging private enforcement of civil rights relations.”

An applicant for attorney’s fees and costs under § 111 must allege or show a violation of that section.

Highland Tap of Boston, Inc. v. Commissioner of Consumer Affairs & Licensing · filed 1992-11-16

There was no error in the denial of Highland Tap’s application. It is enough to say that our preceding discussion demonstrates that the denial was proper for the reasons, if no other, that (a) Highland Tap failed to allege or show that there was any violation of G. L. c. 12, § 111,17 and (b) pre-scinding from consideration of the nature of the claims, Highland Tap was not the “prevailing party” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, that is, it cannot “point to a resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relationship between itself and the defendant[s].”

Section 111 permits a prevailing party in a civil rights action to seek reasonable attorneys’ fees, but appellate fees are waived if the party does not request them by motion or brief.

Champagne v. Commissioner of Correction · filed 1985-07-11

The plaintiff did not, either by motion or brief, request an award by this court of fees incurred in pursuing his appeal, although the defendants answered that no fees should be allowed. We therefore treat the matter as waived under G. L. c. 12, § 111 (1984 ed.).

Section 111 does not authorize an award of attorney’s fees against the Commonwealth for postjudgment work.

Judge Rotenberg Educational Center, Inc. v. Commissioner of Department of Mental Retardation · filed 1997-03-13

There is no provision for postjudgment costs in G. L. c. 12, § 111. The fact that the Legislature specifically authorized attorney’s fees in cases brought under G. L. c. 12, § 11H, does not lead to the conclusion that attorney’s fees may be awarded against the Commonwealth for postjudgment work.

Section 111 entitles a prevailing aggrieved person to reasonable attorney’s fees, with the award analyzed similarly to awards under federal civil rights fee statutes.

Kadlick v. Department of Mental Health · filed 2000-06-28

In contrast, the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act provides that “[ajny aggrieved person or persons who prevail in an action authorized by this section shall be entitled to an award of the costs of the litigation and reasonable attorneys’ fees in an amount to be fixed by the court.” G. L. c. 12, § 111. Although this statute is worded in language that appears to afford the judge less discretion, we have commented that the analysis of the award of fees under this statute is similar to the analysis under the Federal statutes.

A prevailing plaintiff under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act is entitled to a mandatory award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation costs.

Davignon v. Clemmey · filed 2001-11-21

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act parallels the Fees Act except in two respects: (i) the award is mandatory and (ii) only a prevailing plaintiff is eligible for an award.

Section 111 entitles a person who prevails in an action under it to litigation costs and reasonable attorneys fees; the standard for assessing a fee request is essentially the same as under federal civil rights law.

Trapp v. Dubois · filed 2003-12-10

Likewise, plaintiffs rely on G.L.c. 12, §111 which provides that “[a]ny aggrieved person or persons who prevail in an action authorized by this section shall be entitled to an award of the costs of the litigation and reasonable attorneys fees.” ... The standard is essentially the same in assessing a request for attorneys fees under state law.

Section 11I permits a successful Massachusetts Civil Rights Act plaintiff to recover reasonable expert witness fees.

T&D Video, Inc. v. City of Revere · filed 2004-02-10

Accordingly, G.L.c. 12, §11I entitles T&D to an award for expert fees, which this court incorporates in its final lodestar figure listed below.

Section 111 reaches defendants’ coercive removal of elected public officials for speaking out and voting on a contested public project.

Miller v. Town of Hull, Massachusetts, Etc. · filed 1989-06-21

The entire course of conduct by the defendants supports the conclusion that the plaintiffs were suspended because of the position they took as HRA members with respect to the housing project for the elderly. Defendants had harassed the HRA by threats of abolition and the actual withholding of funds. ... The evidence supports the jury finding that plaintiffs were removed for speaking out and voting for a project to which the Board was opposed. This was a violation of their first amendment rights. It was also a violation of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. We, therefore, need not discuss the other claims made by plaintiffs.

Section 111 authorizes a private civil action by a person whose protected rights have been interfered with or whose interference has been attempted, applying the § 11H requirement that the interference involve threats, intimidation, or coercion.

O'NEIL v. Daimlerchrysler Corp. · filed 2008-01-07

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 111 authorizes civil actions by any person who has suffered the interference or attempted interference of the rights described in § 11H.

Recovery under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act requires interference with the exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by federal or Massachusetts law.

MacLean v. Delinsky · filed 1990-07-09

Interference with the “exercise or enjoyment ... of rights secured by the constitution or laws” of the Commonwealth or the United States is a prerequisite to recovery under that statute.

Section 111 permits a civil rights action for wrongful confiscation of an inmate’s property as part of a plan to harass the inmate.

Jackson v. Hogan · filed 1983-03-09

We do not view the State Tort Claims Act, G. L. c. 258, as an adequate remedy for the wrongs Jackson alleges. A civil rights action may lie for the wrongful confiscation of an inmate’s property, especially if; as is here alleged, the confiscation is part of a plan to harass the inmate.

Section 11I permits a civil rights claim against a private person when sexual harassment through threats, intimidation, or coercion interferes with rights secured by the Massachusetts Constitution.

O'CONNELL v. Chasdi · filed 1987-08-12

Hence, we also conclude that sexual harassment by a person not acting under color of law may violate secured rights within the meaning of G. L. c. 12, § 11I. ... Sexual harassment accomplished by threats, intimidation, or coercion constitutes precisely the kind of conduct proscribed by the act, and is similarly directed toward a class explicitly protected by art. 1.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act requires a plaintiff to identify a secured right; an at-will employee has no secured constitutional right to retain the employment contract.

Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp. · filed 1991-08-08

He has failed to identify a secured right within the meaning of the MCRA. Summary judgment was properly granted.

Section 11I requires interference with a right secured by federal or Massachusetts law; denial of a discretionary sewer connection did not establish such a right.

K. Hovnanian at Taunton, Inc. v. City of Taunton · filed 1994-11-21

That narrow focus fails to implicate any remedy provided under G. L. c. 12, § 11I.

A § 111 free speech claim against public officials that relies on federal rights requires a First Amendment violation.

Therrien v. Hamilton · filed 1995-03-24

Second, as discussed, the First Amendment of the United States Constitution is a necessary element of Plaintiffs claim under M.G.L. ch. 12, § 111.

Section 111 requires threats, intimidation, or coercion that cause a deprivation of a federal or Massachusetts constitutional or statutory right, and an actual deprivation is essential to the claim.

Therrien v. Hamilton · filed 1994-04-19

A person states a claim under [§ 111] upon showing (1) ‘threats, intimidation or coercion’ that (2) lead to violation of a federal or Commonwealth constitutional right or statutory provision. ... Like § 1983, MCRA requires an actual deprivation of constitutional rights. ... Absent an actual deprivation of a constitutional right, the MCRA claim must fall with the § 1983 claim.

Section 111 requires a Massachusetts Civil Rights Act plaintiff to show interference or attempted interference with a constitutional or statutory right through threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Sietins v. Joseph · filed 2003-01-06

To prevail under the MCRA, “plaintiffs must prove that (1) their exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of either the United States or of the Commonwealth, (2) have been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, and (3) that the interference or attempted interference was by ‘threats, intimidation or coercion.’ ”

Section 111 requires a plaintiff to show interference with constitutional or statutory rights through threats, intimidation, or coercion to establish a Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claim.

Thomas v. Town of Chelmsford · filed 2017-07-25

“To establish a claim under the [Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (‘MCRA’) ], the plaintiffs must prove that (1) their exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of either the United States or of the Commonwealth, (2) have been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, and (3) that the interference or attempted interference was by ‘threats, intimidation or coercion.’”

Section 111 prohibits interference with rights secured by the federal or state constitution or laws through threats, intimidation, or coercion, but a municipality cannot be sued under the Act.

Showtime Entertainment LLC v. Ammendolia · filed 2012-08-09

The MCRA prohibits interference with the exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the federal or state constitution or laws by means of “threats, intimidation or coercion.” ... However, “a municipality cannot be sued under the MCRA.”

Section 111 requires a plaintiff to show that the exercise or enjoyment of a constitutional or statutory right was interfered with or threatened through threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Manchester v. City of Amesbury · filed 2015-09-30

Plaintiffs claim under the MCRA must fail because, as discussed earlier, there has been no showing that Manchester’s constitutional or other rights weré violated. Nor has Manchester demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue of material fact that the parties attempted to interfere with his rights using “threats, intimidation, or coercion.” As a result, the entry of summary judgment in Defendants’ favor is warranted on Plaintiffs state civil rights claim.

Section 111 requires interference with constitutional or statutory rights by threats, intimidation, or coercion; the court held that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the third prong.

Bennett v. City of Holyoke · filed 2002-11-07

(1) his exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of either the United States or of the Commonwealth (2) has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, and (3) that the interference or attempted interference was by threats, intimidation or coercion. ... However, the plaintiffs fail to satisfy the third prong. ... Accordingly, the court will allow defendants’ motion for summary judgment under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act.

A claim under Section 111 requires interference or attempted interference with a legally secured right by threats, intimidation, or coercion; the claim fails if no such right was violated.

Langton v. Commissioner of Correction · filed 1993-06-07

To establish a claim under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, the plaintiffs must prove that their exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States or the Commonwealth was interfered with or attempted to be interfered with by “threats, intimidation or coercion.” ... As we have found that no rights of the plaintiffs were violated by the mandatory TB testing program, they fail to meet the first prong of the test, and further inquiry into their civil rights violations claim is not necessary.

Section 111 does not create an independent claim based solely on age discrimination that could have been addressed under chapter 151B.

Sereni v. Star Sportswear Manufacturing Corp. · filed 1987-07-07

The State Civil Rights Act claim is governed — adversely to Serení — by our decision in Mouradian v. General Elec. Co., 23 Mass. App. Ct. at 543. We said there that G. L. c. 12, §§ 11H and 111 (in circumstances which rely solely on age discrimination), “do not create an independent right to vindicate an alleged wrong which might have been the subject of investigation and possible vindication under G. L. c. 151B.”

Section 111 does not provide a remedy for workplace racial harassment when chapter 151B supplies the specific employment discrimination remedy.

Butler v. RMS Technologies, Inc. · filed 1990-07-12

The plaintiffs harassment claim under M.G.L. c. 12, § 11/ is nevertheless precluded by the specific remedy for employment discrimination accorded by M.G.L. c. 151B.

Section 111 does not provide a remedy for workplace harassment or termination when the rights asserted are protected by chapter 151B.

Bester v. Roadway Express, Inc. · filed 1990-07-25

Since the only rights which the plaintiff claims were violated by his harassment and termination are those protected by c. 151B, I hold that the defendant’s conduct up to the plaintiffs termination is not actionable under c. 12, § 111.

Section 111 does not treat an employer’s firing of an at-will employee who has become ineffective as interference with secured rights.

Korb v. Raytheon Corp. · filed 1991-07-08

Korb’s SCRA claim cannot stand for the same reason his wrongful discharge claim cannot stand: there is no improper interference with secured rights when an employer fires an at-will employee who has become ineffective.

Section 111 does not provide a remedy for employment discrimination covered exclusively by Chapter 151B, and a claim under it requires threats, intimidation, or coercion.

LaFleur v. Bird-Johnson Co. · filed 1994-11-03

Where, as noted above, c. 15 IB is the exclusive remedy for employment-related civil rights violations, LaFleur’s claim under G.L.c. 12, §111 must fail. See Mouradian v. General Electric Co., 23 Mass.App.Ct. 538, 543 (1987). Even if LaFleur could proceed under c. 12, LaFleur fails to present evidence that Bird-Johnson’s actions involved the requisite “threats, intimidation or coercion” necessary to make out a G.L.c. 12, §111 claim.

The Civil Rights Act provides no independent remedy for workplace sexual harassment when G.L.c. 151B applies and the employee has not preserved a claim under it.

Green v. Wyman-Gordon Co. · filed 1995-12-15

Plaintiff failed to preserve her rights under G.L.c. 151B, and the Civil Rights Act does not provide an independent basis for relief.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act does not provide a separate remedy for these workplace claims when G. L. c. 151B supplies the exclusive remedy.

Doe v. Purity Supreme, Inc. · filed 1996-05-03

For the reasons set forth in Green v. Wyman-Gordon Co., supra, we agree with the judge that the plaintiffs’ claims under the civil rights act, equal rights act, and G. L. c. 214, § 1C, were barred by the exclusivity provision of G. L. c. 151B.

Section 111 permits a claim for interference with civil rights by threats, intimidation, or coercion; allegations of that interference, taken as true, state a claim.

Felix v. Commissioners of Middlesex County · filed 1994-12-29

In the amended complaint, Felix alleges that the Commissioners, through their agents and employees, interfered with his civil rights by threats, intimidation or coercion in violation of G.L.c. 12, §1II. As the court must accept as true the factual allegations of the complaint, the amended complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted with respect to c. 12.

An employee cannot bring a claim under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act for discharge because of age because Chapter 151B preempts such claims.

Galdauckas v. Interstate Hotels Corp. No. 16 · filed 1995-09-18

Massachusetts courts have also recognized that a claim by an employee who is allegedly discharged because of her age cannot be brought under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, M.G.L. c. 12, § 111. Such claims are likewise preempted by M.G.L. c. 151B.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act cannot be used to pursue workplace discrimination claims covered by chapter 151B.

Andrews v. Cressy · filed 1998-03-04

Here, plaintiffs’ claims for intentional interference with contractual rights and violations of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act and the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act are, in part, based upon Cressy’s alleged wrongful discrimination on the basis of their race and age. ... The complaint clearly states claims for workplace discrimination against Cressy, and the exclusivity provision of c. 15IB applies. Thus, to the extent that plaintiffs’ complaint states workplace discrimination claims against Cressy, these claims are barred.

Section 111 allows a claim to proceed when the complaint alleges threats, intimidation, and force intended to deprive a person of civil rights.

Gerakaris v. Champagne · filed 1996-01-30

Gerakaris has plead a prima facie case of threats, intimidation and force intended to deprive him of his civil rights.

A Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claim requires interference with a secured civil right by threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Wigfall v. Goncalves · filed 1998-01-14

Even if the plaintiff had a viable Bounds claim, his claim under G.L.c. 12, §11 (H) and (I) must fail since he failed to allege or raise a triable issue that the defendants interfered with any of his secured civil rights “by threats, intimidation or coercion.”

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act does not provide a separate remedy for workplace sexual harassment when G. L. c. 214, § 1C, applies.

Guzman v. Lowinger · filed 1996-05-03

Where, as here, G. L. c. 214, § 1C, applies to a claim of sexual harassment, it is the exclusive statutory remedy and therefore bars recovery under the civil rights act.

Section 111 does not permit a civil rights claim when chapter 151B provides an adequate remedy for the claimed injury.

Blick v. Pitney Bowes Management Services, Inc. · filed 1996-07-23

A plaintiff may not pursue a claim under G.L.c. 12, § 1II where an adequate remedy exists for his or her claimed injury under c. 15IB.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act does not provide a separate remedy for employment discrimination claims covered by chapter 151B.

Silva v. Hit or Miss · filed 1999-08-23

Silva’s M.G.L. c.12, § 11I claim, which alleges discrimination in employment, is therefore preempted.

Section 11I does not provide a civil rights claim for employment misconduct covered by Chapter 151B, which supplies the exclusive remedy.

Richards v. Walter Fernald State School · filed 2000-07-31

As to defendant Bruk, plaintiff cannot pursue a civil rights act claim that would be covered by G.L.c. 151B, as G.L.c. 151Bisthe exclusive remedy for such misconduct.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act provides no separate remedy for employment discrimination when Chapter 151B remedies are available, even if the plaintiff complied with Chapter 151B’s procedural requirements.

Dahms v. Cognex Corp. · filed 2000-11-20

There is no reason to distinguish a suit brought under c. 93, §103 from one brought under c. 12, §111. ... Accordingly, because G.L.c. 15 IB remedies are available to Dahms, the exclusivity provision of that statute bars her Civil Rights Act claim.

MCRA claims based on employment discrimination covered by chapter 151B are barred even when the plaintiff satisfied chapter 151B’s procedural requirements.

Evans v. Maxx · filed 2005-02-15

Evans’s claims pursuant to the MCRA, G.L.c. 12, §§111 and 1 III, arise from the same set of facts as his claims under G.L.c. 151B. As such, Evans may not recast his G.L.c. 151B claims as violations of the civil rights act even though he has fulfilled the procedural requirements of G.L.c. 151B.

An MCRA claim requires interference or attempted interference, by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with a right secured by federal or Massachusetts law.

Guevin v. Amick · filed 2000-05-25

To offer an actionable claim in Count IV, to wit, a violation of the MCRA, Guevin must allege that (1) her exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of either the United States or of the Commonwealth, (2) have been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, and that (3) the interference or attempted interference was by threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Section 11I requires proof that threats, intimidation, or coercion interfered or attempted to interfere with the exercise of a protected right.

American Lithuanian Naturalization Club, Athol, Mass., Inc. v. Board of Health · filed 2006-03-22

Even if the Civil Rights Act applies, to succeed in their claim under G. L. c. 12, § 111, “the plaintiffs must prove that (1) their exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of either the United States or of the Commonwealth, (2) have been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, and (3) that the interference or attempted interference was by ‘threats, intimidation or coercion.’ ” Id. at 395. With the exception of their takings claim, the plaintiffs have not established that the town regulation interferes with, or attempts to interfere with, any of their constitutional rights. There is no basis for recovery under G. L. c. 12, § 11I.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act requires plausible allegations that threats, intimidation, or coercion interfered with a right secured by state or federal law.

Vranos v. Skinner · filed 2010-07-19

To state a claim for violation of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G. L. c. 12, § 111, the complaint must contain factual allegations plausibly suggesting that the defendants (1) interfered with, or attempted to interfere with (2) the plaintiff’s exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of either of the United States or of the Commonwealth (3) by threats, intimidation, or coercion.

An MCRA claim requires notice pleading, with no heightened pleading burden.

Powercomm, LLC v. Holyoke Gas & Electric Dept. · filed 2010-10-19

Contrary to Defendants’ argument, Plaintiff correctly observes that this court's holding in Lecrenski Bros. v. Johnson, 312 F.Supp.2d 117, 122-23 (D.Mass.2004) (notice pleading sufficient in MCRA claim), relieves it of any heightened burden in pleading.

Damages claims under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act are preempted by chapter 151B when they concern employment discrimination covered by that chapter.

Shipley v. Nagel Cutrell Wendell & Associates · filed 2013-09-26

The Motion is ALLOWED IN PART with respect to the portions of Count II that seek damages for acts constituting discrimination covered by G.L.c. 151B. Since the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G.L.c. 12, §111 provides a statutory remedy not known to the common law, they are preempted by the exclusivity provision of G.L.c. 151B, §9 for the same reasons as the comparable damages claims under G.L.c. 258E.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act does not provide a separate remedy for an employment discrimination claim covered by Chapter 151B.

Dyer v. East Coast Diners, LLC · filed 2014-07-23

However, as Chapter 151B provides the exclusive statutory scheme for resolving employment discrimination complaints, the plaintiffs MCRA claim is preempted by Chapter 151B.

Section 11I does not permit holding a municipality liable under a theory of vicarious liability.

Chaabouni v. City of Boston · filed 2001-02-27

This Court, therefore, rules that the MCRA does not permit holding a municipality liable under the theory of vicarious liability.

A state department's liability under Section 11I does not follow federal agencies' immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Elm Medical Laboratories Inc. · filed 1981-08-11

The assertion that the Department’s liabilitv under G.L. c. 12, § 111 should parallel Federal immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is inapposite.

Section 111 does not make an employer liable under respondeat superior for an employee’s civil rights violation.

Jones v. City of Boston · filed 1990-05-30

Analogizing to the parallel Federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this Court opines that the doctrine of respondeat superior would not apply to the Massachusetts statute.

Section 11I does not make a municipality liable for its officers’ threats, intimidation, or coercion solely because it employed them or failed to train or supervise them.

Sheehy v. Town of Plymouth · filed 1996-12-12

The purported “threats, intimidation and coercion” perpetrated by Officer Quinn or Plymouth police officers are being attributed to the Town of Plymouth. However, as noted at oral argument, a municipality cannot be held liable for civil rights violations on a theory of vicarious liability.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act does not make employers liable for employees’ acts solely under respondeat superior.

Theresa Lyons and Dennis Lyons v. National Car Rental Systems, Inc. (Of Delaware) · filed 1994-09-12

Accordingly, we hold that claims against employers under the MCRA cannot rest on the doctrine of respon-deat superior.

Section 111 does not impose respondeat superior liability for Massachusetts Civil Rights Act violations.

Torres v. Dubois · filed 1997-02-15

There is no respondeat superior liability for G.L.c. 12, §§11H and 111 violations, however.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act does not impose respondeat superior liability for another person’s threats, intimidation, or coercion.

O'Brien v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. · filed 1997-04-15

Further, respondeat superior liability is not recognized under MCRA. Lyons v. National Car Rental Systems, Inc., 30 F.2d. 240, 245-46 (1st Cir. 1994). Thus, O’Brien cannot bring an action against Avis or Delgado based solely upon Reardon’s actions.

Municipalities are not persons under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act and cannot be sued under it.

Carroll v. City of Quincy · filed 2006-06-09

In marked distinction to § 1983, Massachusetts courts have indicated that a municipality is not a “person” within the terms of the MCRA and, as such, cannot be sued under the statute.

Section 111 does not cover municipalities as persons who can be sued under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act.

Fiske v. Town of North Attleboro · filed 2007-02-14

Because a “municipality is not a ‘person’ covered by the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA), G.L.c. 12, §§11H, 111,” the Town is entitled to summary judgment on Fiske’s MCRA claim.

Municipalities are not persons subject to suit under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act.

Eisenberg v. Wall · filed 2009-03-12

Plaintiff's state law civil rights claims pursuant to M.G.L. c. 12, § 111 are inapplicable to the municipal defendants because “a municipality is not a 'person' covered by the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act.”

Section 111 does not allow a Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claim against a municipality.

Spanish Church of God of Holyoke, Mass., Inc. v. Scott · filed 2011-06-20

However, as Defendants argue and as Plaintiffs conceded at the motion hearing, a municipality cannot be sued under the MCRA.

The MCRA does not allow claims against municipalities because they are not covered persons.

Meagher v. Andover School Committee · filed 2015-03-31

In accordance with this Memorandum of Decision, this court holds that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to Meagher’s claims against them under the MCRA, as Marinel McGrath is entitled to qualified immunity and the plaintiffs claims against the municipal defendants are not actionable.

A Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claim fails here when the plaintiff cannot establish the underlying § 1983 claim.

Garcia v. City of Boston, John Doe, John Doe, Ii, Boston Emergency Service Team, and New England Medical Center · filed 2001-06-12

We also affirm the district court’s holding that Garcia’s failure to establish a § 1983 claim essentially equates to a failure to establish a claim under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act.

Section 11I permits a civil action against private actors for interference with constitutional rights; the plaintiff need not allege state action.

Bell v. Mazza · filed 1985-03-04

The plaintiff need not allege “State action” to state a cause of action under G. L. c. 12, § 11I.

Section 111 permits civil rights claims against private actors even when the federal Constitution does not itself protect the asserted right against them.

Bally v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n · filed 1988-02-08

Thus, the reference in Mass.Gen.Laws c. 12, § 111 to “rights secured by the constitution ... of the United States” has been given an interpretation more aptly described as metaphorical than literal.

A federal employee may bring a Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claim against a federal officer in his individual capacity despite Title VII.

Wood v. United States · filed 1991-01-29

Count IV, for violation of M.G.L. c. 12, § 111, also stands against Owens.

The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act bars a claim that would undermine a criminal conviction unless the conviction has first been invalidated.

Lombard v. Salisbury Police Department · filed 1995-06-14

Given the strong policy against collateral attack of a criminal conviction, the importance of finality in criminal judgments, and the various avenues which remain open to a plaintiff who seeks a new trial or reversal or expungement of his criminal conviction, I conclude that the Massachusetts Civil Rights Acts adopt a limitation similar to that announced in Heck v. Humphrey.