22 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4055

Section 4055(1) requires the court to consider the needs of the child whose parental rights are at issue.

In Re Alexander D. · filed 1998-08-11(1)

Title 22 M.R.S.A § 4055(1) requires that the court take into consideration the needs of the child, meaning the child who is the subject of the proceedings.

Section 4055(1-A)’s rebuttable presumption does not violate due process or equal protection when used in a parental rights termination proceeding.

In Re Sarah T. · filed 1993-07-30(1-A)

The use of the rebuttable presumption, therefore, did not deprive the parents of due process. Likewise, because the presumption furthers a compelling state interest, there was no equal protection violation.

Section 4055(1-A)(A) permits a rebuttable presumption of jeopardy when a parent acts toward a child in a heinous or abhorrent manner, including by failing to notice multiple severe injuries.

In Re Brandi C. · filed 1999-04-28(1-A)(A)

Contrary to the parents’ argument, the court did not err in finding pursuant to section 4055(1-A)(A) that the parents acted “in a manner that is heinous or abhorrent to society” when neither parent noticed that Jenna suffered from multiple, severe injuries and one of them caused her death. Having made this finding, the court acted in accordance with section 4055(1-A) by applying the rebuttable presumption of jeopardy against the parents.

Section 4055(1-A)(A) requires the Department to prove the facts supporting its rebuttable presumption by clear and convincing evidence at the termination stage, even if an earlier jeopardy order found heinous and abhorrent circumstances.

In Re Zoe M. · filed 2004-07-23(1-A)(A)

Contrary to this contention, the court’s earlier finding did not relieve the Department of its burden at the termination stage of proving the facts giving rise to the rebuttable presumption by the heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence.

Section 4055(1-A) permits a presumption of parental unfitness based on misconduct toward a child other than the child in the termination proceeding.

In Re Shulikov · filed 2000-04-20(1-A)

Subsection 1-A speaks of “a” child. Thus, misconduct indicated in subsection 1-A, may raise the rebuttable presumption if it was directed towards a different child than the child who is the subject of the proceedings.

Section 4055(1-A)(E) permits a rebuttable presumption that a parent cannot protect a child from jeopardy when the child has been in DHS custody for at least nine months and the parent has made no significant effort to correct the situation.

In Re Charles G. · filed 2001-01-05(1-A)(E)

Therefore, once there is an initial finding of jeopardy, the child has been in the legal custody of DHS for at least 9 months, and the parents have made no significant effort to correct the situation that led to the jeopardy finding, there is a presumption that the parents are “unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change within a time which is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.”

Section 4055(1-A)(A)’s presumption of jeopardy can apply when a parent causes a child profound emotional injury, even without physically harming the child.

In re J.H. · filed 2015-01-29(1-A)(A)

We also reject the father’s argument that the presumption does not apply because he did not act “toward” the oldest son when he killed the mother. By inflicting a mortal injury upon the mother in full view of the oldest son and then driving off, the father acted “toward” and failed to protect the oldest son from a “profound emotional injury” in a manner that is heinous and abhorrent to society.

Section 4055(1-A) permits an inference of parental unfitness from specified circumstances, but the Department retains the burden to prove unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.

In re Evelyn A. · filed 2017-08-22(1-A)

As we clarify in our holding today, there is no burden on the parent to rebut the “presumption”; the burden remains always on the Department, and the parents have neither a burden of production nor a burden of persuasion or proof regarding the “presumption” addressed in section 4055(1-A).

Section 4055(1-A)(C) permits an inference of parental unfitness when its conditions are met, but the Department retains the burden of proof.

In re Addilyn R. · filed 2017-12-19(1-A)(C)

In this case, the court invoked the evidentiary analysis allowed by section 4055(1-A)(C), but the judgment demonstrates that the court treated that statute as the pathway to an inference, and placed the burden of proof entirely on the Department and did not require or expect the mother to meet any evidentiary burden.

Section 4055 does not require a substantial change in circumstances before the Department may bring a second termination petition; the passage of time calls for a low threshold for reconsidering the child's needs.

In Re Hope M. · filed 1998-07-09(1)(B)(2)

The father argues that the Department of Human Services must demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances prior to filing a second petition for the termination of parental rights. We disagree. Termination cases require that the trial court carefully evaluate both the best interests of the child and the ability of the parent to care for that child within the time frame established by the child’s needs. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(l)(B)(2)(i) & (ii). The court is charged with a continuing concern for the safety and health of the child, and the statutory sensitivity to the passage of time mandates a low threshold for further consideration of the merits of this case.

Section 4055’s removal-of-custody prerequisite is met when custody is removed under a conditional order authorized by section 4038.

In re Tyler H. · filed 1999-11-18(1)(A)(1)(a)

This was a removal of custody from a parent pursuant to an order authorized by section 4038. Thus, the prerequisite for a termination order set forth in section 4055(l)(A)(l)(a) was met.

Section 4055 permits a termination petition based on custody removed under 19-A M.R.S. § 1653 without a prior child protection order.

In re Austin T. · filed 2006-03-29(1)(A)(1)(b)

If the father is correct that a termination petition may not be filed until there is a child protection order, then the provision in section 4055(1)(A)(1)(b) that allows a court to grant a termination order upon a finding that custody has been removed from a parent in an order issued pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1653 would be meaningless and pure surplusage. ... Because the mother’s petition alleged all the statutory prerequisites to termination pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1), the court erred in dismissing her petition.

Section 4055(1)(B) requires an evidentiary hearing before a court may terminate parental rights based on parental unfitness.

In Re Robert S. · filed 2009-02-26(1)(B)

The court made this “finding” in a non-evidentiary hearing that, over her lawyer’s objection, denied the mother the opportunity to introduce evidence, present witnesses or respond to any evidence the State may have offered. In doing so, the court violated the mother’s constitutional right to be heard and failed to comply with the procedural requirements of 22 M.R.S. §§ 4054, 4055(1)(B) (2008).

Section 4055(1)(B)(1) requires clear and convincing evidence to terminate parental rights based on a parent’s consent.

In re H.C. · filed 2013-11-12(1)(B)(1)

In light of the statute’s silence on the requisite standard of proof for terminating parental rights pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(1)—that is, by parental consent—we take this opportunity to clarify that the standard is likewise clear and convincing evidence.

Section 4055(1)(B)(1) requires clear and convincing evidence that a parent knowingly and voluntarily consented before the court may terminate parental rights on that basis.

In re Child of Rebecca J. · filed 2019-05-21(1)(B)(1)

Before it may terminate a parent’s rights pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(1),4 the District Court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the parent consented to the termination voluntarily and knowingly.

Section 4055(1)(B)(1) requires clear and convincing evidence that a parent knowingly and voluntarily consented to termination of parental rights.

In re Child of Ronald P. · filed 2020-05-12(1)(B)(1)

To order the termination of parental rights pursuant to section 4055(1)(B)(1), the court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that a parent voluntarily and knowingly consented to the termination.

Section 4055 requires clear and convincing evidence that a parent knowingly and voluntarily consents to termination of parental rights.

In re Children of Brandon D. · filed 2020-06-04(1)(B)(1)

“Before it may terminate a parent’s rights pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(1), the District Court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the parent consented to the termination voluntarily and knowingly.” In re Child of Rebecca J., 2019 ME 76, ¶ 12, 208 A.3d 405. ... Therefore, based on the court’s colloquy with the mother, we discern no error in the court’s finding that the mother knowingly and voluntarily consented to the termination of her parental rights.

Section 4055’s clear-and-convincing-evidence burden for terminating parental rights does not violate a non-Indian mother’s equal protection rights because the Indian Child Welfare Act applies to differently situated parents.

In Re Marcus S. · filed 1994-03-14(1)(B)(2)

The mother of Marcus and Derrick S. appeals from a judgment entered in the District Court (Presque Isle, Griffiths, J.) terminating her parental rights pursuant to the Maine Child Protection Act, 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(1)(B)(2) (1992 & Supp.1993). The mother, a non-Indian, argues that the Act’s requirement of “clear and convincing” evidence violates the Equal Protection Clause because it is a lesser burden of proof than that required by the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”), 25 U.S.C.A. § 1912(f) (West 1983 & Supp.1993). ... Consequently, the different burdens of proof do not violate the mother’s right to equal protection.