5 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4572

Section 4572(1) may apply to maritime employment, but it cannot impose liability for an employment decision required by federal maritime law.

Ellenwood v. Exxon Shipping Co., State of Maine, Intervenor. Theodore M. Ellenwood v. Exxon Shipping Co., St · filed 1993-02-23(1)

Of course, whether or not a state’s statute specifically included such a defensive provision, vessel owners obviously could not be held liable for damages under state anti-discrimination laws when federal maritime principles required the employer to make the contested employment decision. In that narrow way, maritime law would be preemptive. ... As a general matter, however, we conclude that state human rights statutes may be applied in maritime cases.

Section 4572 addresses discrimination by an employer or its employees or agents within a traditional employment relationship.

Roy v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC · filed 2019-01-28

Section 4572 addresses discriminatory conduct by an employer, or employees or agents of the employer, that occurs within the scope of a traditional employment relationship.

Section 4572’s employment discrimination prohibition is not limited to employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations, but does not cover discrimination in state licensing or regulation.

Jackson v. State · filed 1988-06-30(1)

For similar reasons, we hold that the State was not guilty of employment discrimination in violation of the fair employment provisions of the Maine Human Rights Act. We agree with the Human Rights Commission that the prohibition against employment discrimination is not limited to employers, 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1)(A), employment agencies, § 4572(1)(B), and labor organizations, section 4572(1)(C). Nevertheless, we conclude that the Legislature did not intend discrimination in state licensing or regulating to amount to employment discrimination.

Section 4572(1)(E)'s prohibition on retaliation for filing a Human Rights Act charge does not apply to uniformed Maine National Guard personnel.

HUMAN RIGHTS COM'N v. Dept. of Defense · filed 1993-07-06(1)(E)

5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1)(E), prohibiting employment discrimination in retaliation for making a charge under the Human Rights Act, is similar to the anti-retaliatory provision in Title VII. ... In view of the legislatively expressed intent that there be uniformity with federal law in the military personnel area, the interpretation of Title VII laws as not applying to uniformed military personnel, and the absence of any clearly expressed intent to make the Maine Human Rights Act applicable to military personnel, we conclude that the Human Rights Act cannot and should not be construed to apply to the allegations in the Commission's complaint.

Section 4572(1)(E) does not apply to discrimination claims concerning uniformed personnel of the Maine National Guard.

Maine Human Rights Commission v. Maine Department of Defense & Veterans' Services · filed 1993-07-06(1)(E)

In view of the legislatively expressed intent that there be uniformity with federal law in the military personnel area, the interpretation of Title VII laws as not applying to uniformed military personnel, and the absence of any clearly expressed intent to make the Maine Human Rights Act applicable to military personnel, we conclude that the Human Rights Act cannot and should not be construed to apply to the allegations in the Commission’s complaint.

Section 4572 does not impose personal liability on an employer's agent for employment discrimination, but an employer may be liable for its agent's actions.

Quiron v. LN Violette Co. Inc. · filed 1995-08-30

The Court concludes, therefore, that the inclusion in the MHRA of persons “acting in the interest of any employer,” merely ensures that respondeat superior liability can be imposed upon Maine employers for the actions of their agents. Therefore, Kevin Violette is not subject to personal liability under the MHRA.

Section 4572 does not impose individual liability for employment discrimination.

Caldwell v. Federal Express Corp. · filed 1995-11-29

However given the well accepted practice of construing the MHRA in a manner consistent with the prevailing federal caselaw, the Court finds that the MHRA does not impose individual liability.

Section 4572(1)(A) does not make an individual supervisor personally liable for employment discrimination.

Gough v. Eastern Maine Development Corp. · filed 2001-11-26(1)(A)

The MHRA makes it illegal for “any employer” to discriminate against an individual on the basis of a physical or mental disability. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1)(A). ... The Court adheres to its previous assessment that individual liability is not available under the MHRA.

Section 4572 does not impose employment discrimination liability on an entity that never employed the plaintiff.

Davidson v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 1998-02-26

Liberty Life cannot be liable for employment discrimination under either the ADA or the MHRA because Liberty Life never employed Plaintiff: 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), 12112(a); 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572.

Section 4572(1)(A)(1) excludes from the Maine Human Rights Act only discrimination claims arising from testifying or asserting a claim under the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Laskey v. Sappi Fine Paper · filed 2003-04-08(1)(A)(1)

Section 4572(1)(A)(1) does not suggest a determination by the Legislature that section 353 was intended to occupy the field of discrimination claims by injured workers to the exclusion of the Maine Human Rights Act or other laws that may provide protection for individuals with work limitations or disabilities. Instead, it exempts from the Maine Human Rights Act only those claims for discrimination which arise “in any way for testifying or asserting any claim under” the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Aggregating a school union’s employees with those of other school districts does not by itself make the union a teacher’s employer under § 4572.

Johnson v. SCHOOL UNION, 107 · filed 2003-12-11

The only apparent reason for naming School Union # 107 is that when the twenty-five Princeton School Department employees are aggregated with the four School Union # 107 employees and the over seventy-five Baileyville School District employees, the total number of employees exceeds one-hundred individuals. That fact alone does not make School Union # 107 Johnson’s employer under either Title VII or the Maine Human Rights Act.

Section 4572(1)(A) does not impose personal liability on individual managers for sex discrimination in employment.

Furhmann v. Staples, Inc. · filed 2010-04-13(1)(A)

Section 4572 prohibits certain actions by "any employer", An "employer" is defined at 5 M.R.S.A. §4553(4) to include " ... any person in this State employing any number of employees ...; any person acting in the interest of any employer, directly or indirectly ...." It is that second definition that is primarily at issue here. ... Based on all of the federal cases particularly the more recent and comprehensive Gough case I conclude that, in the absence of a definitive ruling from the Law Court, there is no potential liability for any of the individual defendants under the Maine Human Rights Act's prohibition against sex based employment discrimination.

Section 4572(1)(A) does not impose individual liability on supervisors for employment discrimination, including retaliation for whistleblowing.

Fuhrmann v. Staples the Office Superstore East, Inc. · filed 2012-12-11(1)(A)

Pursuant to either statutory definition of “employer,” there is no individual supervisor liability for employment discrimination.

Section 4572(2) does not cover prison jobs held by incarcerated individuals because inmates are not employees.

Thompson v. Liberty · filed 2022-01-20(2)

The federal precedent under Title I of the ADA and the explicit language of the Maine Human Rights Act, leads the court to conclude that the unlawful employment discrimination provisions of 5 M.R.S. § 4572(2) do not apply in the context of prison jobs for incarcerated individuals.

Section 4572(1)(A) does not make individual supervisors liable for employment discrimination.

Nash v. State of Maine · filed 2022-10-17(1)(A)

This Comi is satisfied that under Fuhrmann, Fitzpatrick is not subject to individual supervisor liability pursuant to the MHRA.

Section 4572(1) covers employment discrimination based on a person’s known association with a member of a protected class.

MACDONALD v. BREWER SCHOOL DEPARTMENT · filed 2023-01-12(1)

As for the Plaintiff’s associational discrimination claim, the analysis under the MHRA is far more straightforward than under Title VII. That is, as the Plaintiff points out, and the Defendant concedes, the MHRA explicitly covers discrimination “based on [a] person’s known relationship or association with a member of a protected class.” 5 M.R.S. § 4553(1-D). Moreover, the MHRA does not incorporate Title VII’s “because of such individual’s” language. See id. at § 4572(1). Thus, the Plaintiff’s MHRA associational discrimination claim survives at this stage.

Section 4572 permits a claim against a related entity only when the facts plausibly establish that it is an integrated or joint employer under Maine law.

GOODWILL v. THE MASIELLO GROUP LIMITED · filed 2023-06-15

The claims at issue arise under both Maine law (26 M.R.S. §§ 591-A, 621-A, 626, 626-A, 629, 664 and 5 M.R.S. § 4572) and federal law (29 U.S.C. § 623). ... For these reasons, I find that Goodwill fails to allege plausible employer integration as between Anywhere and Masiello Group. ... As with the integration factors, Ms. Goodwill has failed to allege a plausible joint employer scenario. ... Cormier is solid authority that the Law Court would approve the application of factors consistent with those discussed previously to evaluate the existence of either an integrated- or joint-employer scenario. However, Cormier does not suggest that the standard to be applied under Maine law is any looser than what is applied for federal claims.

When discriminatory hiring is established, the employer bears the burden of proving that its remaining employment tests are job-valid.

Maine Human Rights Commission v. City of Auburn · filed 1981-02-17(1)(A)

On remand, continuing in this relief phase of the case, the Superior Court having previously determined that women are unlawfully discriminated against in the recruitment of Auburn police officers, the City should reasonably bear the burden of establishing the job-validity of its agility and psychological tests.

Section 4572(1)(A) does not require an employer to check an applicant’s references before relying on its own assessment of the applicant’s fitness for a job.

Maine Human Rights Commission Ex Rel. Kellman v. Department of Corrections · filed 1984-04-11(1)(A)

By reasoning in this way, the court effectively deprived Farr of his right to come to an independent assessment of Kellman’s fitness for the job, and imposed on the employer an obligation, where none existed in law, to do a reference check on a job applicant.

A plaintiff alleging disparate treatment under section 4572(1)(A) bears the ultimate burden of proving that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Maine Human Rights Commission v. Maine Department of Corrections · filed 1985-03-27(1)(A)

The Superior Court was entitled to weigh that testimony heavily against the Commission’s statistics and qualifications in concluding that the Commission had not met its burden of proving pretext.

Section 4572(1)(A) prohibits ad hoc employment preferences based on sex, including rejecting a qualified male nominee to appoint a woman.

Doran v. University of Maine at Farmington · filed 1986-02-25(1)(A)

Because the record does not support UMF’s contention that it acted pursuant to an affirmative action plan, we conclude that Doran was subjected to discrimination in his employment in violation of 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572.

Section 4572(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment, and a claim under it must satisfy the federal prima facie case rule.

Dewilde v. Guy Gannett Publishing Co. · filed 1992-07-01(1)

In Count II Plaintiff alleges that the same acts of Defendants which formed the basis for her claim in Count I also constitute sex discrimination in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1), Maine’s counterpart to the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964. ... Since Plaintiff has failed satisfactorily to produce ... evidence on all the elements of her case under Title VII, summary judgment for Defendants is also mandated on the Maine Human Rights Act claim.

Section 4572(1)(A) prohibits employment discrimination based on sex or physical handicap, and a claim under it fails when no discrimination is established.

Barker v. St. Mary's Regional Medical Center · filed 1995-08-02(1)(A)

Since no discrimination has been established, Barker’s further contention that St. Mary’s violated the Maine Human Rights Act also fails.

Section 4572 does not recognize mixed-motive employment discrimination claims.

Forrest v. Stinson Seafood Co. · filed 1998-01-05

The Court concludes that despite the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act incorporating mixed-motive discrimination into federal law, Maine does not recognize this type of discrimination claim.

A later job offer does not automatically defeat a claim that an employer unlawfully discharged an employee.

Webber v. International Paper Co. · filed 2003-02-03(1)

Nor is the subsequent job offer an iron-clad defense to Webber’s discrimination claim. It would be permissible for a factfinder to view it as a belated effort to make up for prior, discriminatory conduct, although that is certainly not the only way it might be viewed.

Section 4572(1)(A) prohibits sex discrimination in hiring, and a claim requires sufficient evidence of discrimination to survive summary judgment.

Lakshman v. University of Maine System · filed 2004-08-06(1)(A)

This Court concludes the Dr. Lakshman’s evidence of sex discrimination in the University’s 1997 decision to fill the mycology position is inadequate to withstand summary judgment.

An employee claiming discriminatory refusal to hire under section 4572 can survive summary judgment by presenting record facts from which a reasonable fact-finder could reject the employer’s stated reason and find discrimination.

Cookson v. Brewer School Department · filed 2009-06-02(1)(A)

Rather, the employee need only assert sufficient facts, supported in the summary judgment record, from which a reasonable fact-finder could disbelieve the employer’s proffered rationale and conclude that illegal discrimination was the true motivating factor.

Section 4572(1)(A) does not require a formal application when an employer prevents an interested person from completing the application process.

Duckworth v. MID-STATE MACHINE PRODUCTS · filed 2010-09-03(1)(A)

The more sensible view of “applicant” under the MHRA includes the question of whether the claimant took the employer’s application process as far as the employer allowed it to go. In other words, the employer cannot use its successful attempt to waylay the application as a basis for its denial that a claimant who had attempted to apply was an applicant for purposes of Maine law.

An employee need not apply for a position to bring a discrimination claim if affirmative evidence shows that the employer’s discriminatory actions or statements made applying futile; subjective discouragement alone is insufficient.

Russell v. ExpressJet Airlines, Inc. · filed 2011-12-06(1)(A)

[¶ 14] Accordingly, the futility exception to the usual rule that an individual must apply for a position before he can claim that he was denied that position requires affirmative proof that applying for a specific employment position would have been futile based upon the employer’s discriminatory actions or statements. An employee’s subjective sense of discouragement, without more, is insufficient to sustain his burden of proving futility.

A complaint under section 4572(1) must allege enough facts to show how the claimed gender discrimination affected an employment-related matter.

Savage v. Maine Pretrial Svs. · filed 2012-01-27(1)

However, it is not clear that the alleged conduct amounts to a violation of the section 4572(1). ... It would be speculation for the court to find that alleged conduct was discrimination as to one of these categories without any additional factual information as to the contours of the alleged discriminatory action.

Section 4572(1)(A) prohibits discharge because of sex; a plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must show that the employer's stated nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual.

Johnson v. York Hospital · filed 2018-11-28(1)(A)

Even if these facts are sufficient to meet Johnson's initial burden, he has not sufficiently rebutted York Hospital's non-discriminatory reason provided for his termination, i.e., that he was fired based on reports from co-workers uncovered during the investigation of Johnson's complaint regarding Ms. Cataldi and Nurse True.

Section 4572(1)(A) requires a plausible allegation that an adverse employment action was taken because of the employee’s sex; a supervisor’s preference for a particular former employee does not alone establish that link.

CRAWFORD v. CITY OF WESTBROOK · filed 2024-04-24(1)(A)

Similarly, the Maine Human Rights Act makes it unlawful for an employer “to discharge an employee or discriminate with respect to hire, tenure, promotion, transfer, compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment or any other matter directly or indirectly related to employment” because of sex. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1)(A) (West 2024). ... The Complaint does not plausibly allege that Post’s preference or the adverse employment action that flowed from it were “because of” Crawford’s sex.

Section 4572(1)(A) bars sex discrimination in employment; a claim may proceed when evidence could allow a jury to infer that sex influenced a reduction in duties or termination.

HOWLAND · filed 2026-03-16(1)(A)

Summary judgment is not appropriate because Plaintiff has offered evidence from which a rational jury could infer that gender discrimination informed ElleVet’s decision to reduce the scope of her role and terminate her MSA. Whether ElleVet’s reasons were, in fact, pretextual is an issue for trial. Consequently, ElleVet is not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s gender discrimination claims.

Section 4572(1) requires an employer asserting a privacy-based bona fide occupational qualification to show that reasonable accommodation was not feasible, regardless of the relief sought.

Percy v. Allen · filed 1982-08-13(1)

However, the availability of relief in any form authorized by the Act rests on a conclusion that the defendant engaged in unlawfully discriminatory conduct under 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1). In order to reach such a conclusion, the presiding justice must determine whether a valid BFOQ exception existed at the time of the events giving rise to this action. As discussed supra, such determination necessarily implicates consideration of whether an accommodation was feasible. Therefore, at the initial, liability phase in which the legality of the defendants' conduct is assessed, plenary consideration must be given to the issue of accommodation, regardless of the nature of the requested relief.

Section 4572(1)'s bona fide occupational qualification defense requires an employer excluding people with physical handicaps to prove that the essence of its business requires the practice and that it had a factual basis to believe all or substantially all excluded people could not safely or efficiently perform the job.

MAINE HUMAN RIGHTS COM'N, ETC. v. Canadian Pac. · filed 1983-04-15(1)

We noted in Percy that successful assertion of a BFOQ defense in a gender discrimination case requires satisfaction of the two-pronged test [12] adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Dothard: the employer must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that the essence of the business operation requires the discriminatory practice and (2) that it had a factual basis to believe that all or substantially all persons in the excluded category would be unable to safely or efficiently perform the duties of the job involved. ... We now specifically adopt that test to apply to cases under the MHRA involving employment discrimination against the physically handicapped.

Section 4572(1) permits a bona fide occupational qualification defense to physical handicap discrimination only if the employer proves that its business requires the practice and that it had a factual basis to believe all or substantially all excluded people could not safely or efficiently perform the job.

Maine Human Rights Commission ex rel. Gordon v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. · filed 1983-04-15(1)

We noted in Percy that successful assertion of a BFOQ defense in a gender discrimination case requires satisfaction of the two-pronged test ... adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Dothard: the employer must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that the essence of the business operation requires the discriminatory practice and (2) that it had a factual basis to believe that all or substantially all persons in the excluded category would be unable to safely or efficiently perform the duties of the job involved. ... We now specifically adopt that test to apply to cases under the MHRA involving employment discrimination against the physically handicapped.

An employer asserting a bona fide occupational qualification defense must prove that no reasonable accommodation was feasible.

Percy v. Allen · filed 1984-03-06(1)

In order to prevail on a BFOQ defense, defendants were required to prove the infeasibility of any reasonable accommodation.

Section 4572 permits discrimination in hiring based on a physical handicap when it is based on a bona fide occupational qualification.

Rozanski v. A-P-A Transport, Inc. · filed 1986-07-11

The Superior Court also rejected A-P-A’s BFOQ defense, and properly so. It is unlawful to discriminate against the handicapped in hiring unless that discrimination is “based on a bona fide occupational qualification.” 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572 (1979).

The broad accommodation duty associated with § 4572(1)’s bona fide occupational qualification defense applies narrowly to gender discrimination cases involving third-party privacy interests.

Plourde v. Scott Paper Co. · filed 1989-01-12(1)

That broad obligation of accommodation outlined in Percy, however, is not applicable generally. Rather, it is very narrowly applied to gender discrimination cases where privacy interests, not of the persons alleging discrimination, but of third persons with whom they have contact, are asserted.

Section 4572 permits a bona fide occupational qualification defense only when the employer establishes that its business requires the exclusion and that all or substantially all people in the excluded group cannot perform the job safely or efficiently.

LeBlond v. Sentinel Service · filed 1993-12-22

Sentinel did not prove it had an established and justified policy for excluding blind applicants, nor did it show that the “essence” of its business operations required the exclusion of such applicants. The BFOQ defense does not, in this instance, excuse discriminatory conduct in the hiring process.

Under Section 4572(2), safety risk is an affirmative defense the employer must prove, not part of the employee’s burden to show qualification.

AUSTIN v. MAINELY CONSTRUCTION RENTALS LLC · filed 2022-02-23(2)

I agree with Austin that, as it pertains to the MHRA claim, the safety risk issue is not part of the qualified individual analysis. Rather, as the First Circuit has held, “the burden of proving safety risk under [the MHRA] rest[s] solely with the defendant” as part of an affirmative defense.

Section 4572(1)(A) prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because of a physical handicap.

Higgins v. Maine Central Railroad · filed 1984-02-09(1)(A)

The Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA), 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4551-4632, prohibits any employer from discharging an employee because of a physical handicap. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1).

Section 4572(2) protects qualified employees with disabilities from disability-based employment discrimination and is ordinarily analyzed like the ADA.

Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. · filed 2001-12-17(2)

The Maine Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), like the ADA, protects “qualified” individuals with disabilities from employment discrimination based on their disabilities. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(2). The Court ordinarily does not distinguish between analysis under the ADA and the MHRA. ... Therefore, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the claims under the MHRA as well.

Section 4572 prohibits disability discrimination in employment; after an employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse action, the employee must show that the reason was pretextual or irrelevant and that discrimination caused the action.

Doyle v. Department of Human Services · filed 2003-04-28

The MHRA renders it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of a physical or mental disability. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572 (2002). ... Because the foregoing reasons constitute a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis to terminate Doyle’s probationary period, the burden shifts back to Doyle to demonstrate pretext or irrelevance and that the unlawful discrimination brought about the adverse employment action.

Section 4572(2) requires evidence that disability caused the discharge; evidence that the employer’s stated reason was false is insufficient when it cannot support an inference of disability discrimination.

Webber v. International Paper Co. · filed 2004-06-09(2)

To sum up, even if there were sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that the reasons offered by IP for Mr. Webber’s termination were untrue, Mr. Webber simply did not present enough evidence to allow an inference that the true reason for his dismissal was disability discrimination.

Section 4572 permits an employment discrimination claim based on an employer’s failure to reasonably accommodate a disability it perceives an employee to have.

Jewell v. Reid's Confectionary Co. · filed 2001-11-21

The Court does not distinguish between the ADA and MHRA as to their scope or general intent, nor do the parties argue that it should. ... Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has also adequately stated a claim of employment discrimination pursuant to the MHRA.

Section 4572(2) prohibits disability discrimination in discharge and other terms and conditions of employment. A claim may proceed when the evidence raises a jury question about discriminatory motive.

Brown v. Hartt Transportation, Systems, Inc. · filed 2010-07-14(2)

The MHRA provides analogous protection. It, too, prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities in regard to, among other things, discharge and the terms, conditions and privileges of employment. 5 M.R.S. § 4572(2). ... I conclude that Brown has made a sufficient prima facie showing under both the ADA and the MHRA and that there is enough circumstantial evidence in the record to raise a jury question on the existence of discriminatory motive.

Section 4572(2) permits discharge when an employee cannot perform the essential functions of the job even with reasonable accommodation.

Thain v. Henrietta D. Goodall Hosp., Inc. · filed 2005-01-07(2)

The Maine Human Rights Act also states that, “A covered entity may not discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of the individual in regard to ... (the) discharge of employees.” 5 M.R.S.A. §4572(2). ... However, if the person cannot, even with reasonable accommodations, perform the essential functions of the job the employer is permitted to discharge the individual. ... In this case Ms. Thain has not demonstrated that she could do the essential functions of her job.

Section 4572(2) prohibits an employer from firing a qualified employee because of the employee’s disability.

Norton v. Lakeside Family Practice, P.A. · filed 2005-08-17(2)

The ADA and the MHRA prohibit an employer from firing a “qualified individual with a disability because of the disability” of the individual. ... On February 28, 2003, LFP intentionally terminated Norton’s employment solely because of her disability.

Section 4572(2) prohibits disability-based discharge of an employee who can perform the job’s essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.

Pinkham v. Rite Aid of Maine, Inc. · filed 2006-02-01(2)

The question of whether or not Pinkham was able to perform the cashier duties, with or without reasonable accommodation, certainly affects the outcome of the present case, and is a material fact. ... Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Pinkham, which we must in the summary judgment context, a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning whether Pinkham was capable of performing the essential functions of the cashier job, and moreover, what exactly those functions were.

An employee establishes a prima facie disability discrimination claim by showing a disability, qualification to perform the essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation, and adverse treatment based at least partly on the disability.

Daniels v. Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility · filed 2012-06-21(1)(A)

Pursuant to this analysis, an employee must first establish a prima facie case that (1) he has a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified, with or without reasonable accommodations, to perform the essential functions of his job; and (3) his employer adversely treated him based in whole or in part on his disability.

Section 4572 does not require an employer to grant an accommodation when the employee has not provided proof of the disability or information about the needed accommodation.

Rothaus v. H.D. Goodall Hosp. · filed 2013-05-09

An employer is required by law to provide reasonable accommodation where the employee has shown the employer proof of the disability and that a reasonable accommodation can be granted without undue burden to the employer. 5 M.R.S. § 4572 (2012); C.M.R. 94 348 3.08(D)(1)(2008). An employer is not required to grant accommodation where the employee has not offered proof of the disability or information on the needed accommodation.

Section 4572 prohibits disability discrimination in employment, including failure to reasonably accommodate an otherwise qualified employee’s known disability.

Maloney v. Mainegeneral, Health, Inc. · filed 2014-02-18

The MHRA prohibits disability discrimination in employment, 5 M.R.S. § 4572, and defines discrimination to include the failure to make reasonable accommodations for the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, whether the individual is an applicant or an employee. ... At a minimum, Maloney has made a prime facie showing that she substantiated her claim. Summary judgment on this basis is not appropriate.

Section 4572(2) prohibits disability discrimination against a qualified individual; an employee who has not been medically cleared to return to work is not qualified to perform the essential functions of the job.

Carnicella v. Mercy Hospital · filed 2016-11-03(2)

The MHRA prohibits an employer from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability on the basis of a physical or mental disability. 5 M.R.S. § 4572(2) (2015). ... Plaintiff therefore was not qualified to perform the essential functions of her job.

Section 4572(2) prohibits disability-based discharge of a qualified employee; an employee who cannot perform essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation is not qualified.

Carnicella v. Mercy Hospital · filed 2017-07-20(2)

It further provides that “[a] covered entity may not discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of the individual in regard to ... [the] discharge of employees.” 5 M.R.S. § 4572(2); see also 5 M.R.S. § 4553(1-B) (defining “covered entity”). ... Therefore, because Carnieella was unable to perform the essential functions of her job with or without a reasonable accommodation, there is no genuine issue of material fact that she is not a qualified individual with a disability, and the district court properly granted summary judgment on her disability discrimination claims.

Section 4572(2) prohibits disability discrimination in hiring against a qualified individual, and a genuine factual dispute about qualification precludes summary judgment.

Forbes v. York County Sheriff's Department · filed 2017-08-18(2)

Taking the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Forbes raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not he is a qualified individual.

Section 4572(2) protects qualified individuals from disability discrimination, but an employer need not treat a temporary assignment or a set of duties as a vacant position for reassignment.

Ouellette v. Hannaford Bros Co., LLC · filed 2018-01-25(2)

The MHRA provides, "A covered entity may not discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of the individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement or discharge ofemployees, employee compensation, job training and other terms, conditions and privileges of employment." 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(2). ... Because the TWP and the role of navigator are not independent, vacant positions, plaintiff has not met her burden of proving the existence of a vacant position that she could perform, with or without reasonable accommodation.

Section 4572(2) prohibits an employer from discriminating against a qualified individual because of a disability in hiring, advancement, discharge, or other terms of employment.

Rose v. Eastern Maine Medical Center · filed 2019-12-12(2)

Employers "may not discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of the individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training and other terms, conditions and privileges of employment." 5 M.R.S. § 4572(2).

Section 4572 requires a disability discrimination plaintiff to show a disability, ability to perform essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation, and adverse treatment based at least partly on the disability.

Benson v. Wal-Mart Stores East L.P. · filed 2021-09-15

Mirroring the ADA, to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under MHRA, Benson must show that: "(1) [she] has a disability; (2) [she] is otherwise qualified, with or without reasonable accommodations, to perform the essential functions of [her] job; and (3) [her] employer adversely treated [her] based in whole or in part on [her] disability." Daniels v. Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility, 45 A.3d 722, 726 (Me. 2012).

Section 4572(2) prohibits discharging a qualified employee because of disability, and evidence that the employer’s stated reason is pretext can defeat summary judgment.

Behnke v. City of Portland · filed 2023-02-08(2)

Pursuant to the Maine Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), 5 M.R.S. § 4572, it is unlawful for any employer to discriminate against a qualified employee on the basis of a disability. ... The court is persuaded that Nute's email is sufficient evidence of a pretext to overcome summary judgment, and it cannot find that judgment as a matter of law is watTanted in the City's favor.

Section 4572(1)(A) allows an employer to discipline disability-related misconduct, but prohibits harsher discipline than it would impose for the same conduct by an employee without a disability.

TRAHAN v. WAYFAIR MAINE LLC · filed 2019-09-06(1)(A)

Both the ADA and the MHRA prohibit discrimination in employment based on an employee’s disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); 5 M.R.S. § 4572(1)(A). ... An employer can sanction disability-related misbehavior, but cannot sanction it more harshly than it would sanction the same behavior in non-disabled employees.

Section 4572’s reasonable accommodation requirement covers an employee’s access to the workplace as well as the employee’s work station.

BURNETT v. OCEAN PROPERTIES LTD · filed 2019-09-30

From the Court’s perspective, the concepts of reasonable accommodation in the ADA and Maine Human Rights Act are sufficiently broad to capture not just an employee’s duty station but also his access to the place of employment in the first place.

Section 4572(1)(A) protects job applicants from age discrimination regardless of their age, including applicants under 40.

Maine Human Rights Commission Ex Rel. Trudel v. Kennebec Water Power Co. · filed 1983-11-15(1)(A)

5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1)(A) thus extends the protection afforded by the federal statute by declining to create a limited, specially protected age group.

Section 4572 permits an employment age discrimination claim regardless of the claimant's age.

Graffam v. Scott Paper Co. · filed 1994-04-04(1)

Anyone, regardless of age, may maintain a claim based on age discrimination in employment under the MHRA.

An MHRA age discrimination claim generally has the same elements as an ADEA claim, so the court applies the same disparate impact analysis to both.

Graffam v. Scott Paper Co. · filed 1994-12-02(1)

Because the elements of proving a MHRA age discrimination claim are, with one notable exception ... , the same as those under the federal statute, the Court finds for Defendants on Plaintiffs’ age discrimination claim based on the MHRA for the same reasons stated with regard to the ADEA.

An age discrimination plaintiff must present evidence that her work met her employer's legitimate expectations to establish a prima facie case under section 4572.

McSorley v. Inhabs. of the Town of Carmel · filed 2001-05-30(1)(A)

Although McSorley worked as town manager for years, she ... has presented no evidence that her recent job performance was sufficient to meet the Selectmen's legitimate expectations. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to meet requirement #2, and the Court grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to the age discrimination claim.

Age discrimination claims under § 4572(1)(A) are analyzed under the same standards as ADEA claims.

Phair v. New Page Corp. · filed 2010-04-15(1)(A)

Maine courts apply the MHRA in accordance with federal anti-discrimination law, including the ADEA.

Section 4572(1)(A) prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because of age.

Donahue v. Clair Car Connection, Inc. · filed 2010-09-09(1)(A)

In similar fashion, the MHRA makes it illegal, in relevant part, for any employer to discharge an employee “because of’ age. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1)(A).

Section 4572(1)(A) evaluates disparate impact age discrimination claims under the business necessity framework.

Scamman v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. · filed 2017-03-07(1)(A)

We answer the certified question as follows: “A claim for disparate impact age discrimination pursuant to the Maine Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S. § 4572(1)(A), is evaluated according to the ‘business necessity’ framework.”

Section 4572(1)(A) prohibits age-based discharge; an age discrimination claim can survive dismissal when the employee alleges satisfactory work, adverse action, and a replacement with comparable qualifications.

Gallagher v. Penobscot Community Healthcare · filed 2017-03-21(1)(A)

Here, Dr. Gallagher has made sufficient allegations of age discrimination against PCHC to withstand the motion to dismiss.

Section 4572(1)(A) permits an age discrimination claim to proceed when alleged facts plausibly show that an employer treated an older employee less favorably because of age.

MELANSON v. WALGREEN CO · filed 2022-02-28(1)(A)

Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint states a prima facie claim for age discrimination.

Section 4572(1)(A) prohibits age discrimination in hiring, and circumstantial evidence that an employer’s stated reason was pretextual can allow a hiring claim to proceed to trial.

GAUDETTE · filed 2026-02-04(1)(A)

Under First Circuit precedent, this “aggregate package of proof”—though indirect and circumstantial—when viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, could suffice to carry the Plaintiff’s burden.

Section 4572(1)(A) prohibits employers from discharging or otherwise discriminating against employees because of age.

TUCKER v. LANTMANNEN UNIBAKE USA INC · filed 2023-12-14(1)(A)

The Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA) “prohibits employers from discharging and otherwise discriminating against employees because of their age.”

Section 4572(1)(C) prohibits a labor organization from causing religious discrimination through a practice that has a discriminatory effect, even without an intent to discriminate.

Maine Human Rights Commission v. Local 1361, United Paperworkers International Union AFL-CIO · filed 1978-02-27(1)(C)

As in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra , the touchstone of our statutory prohibition is whether in fact the disputed practice results in unlawful employment discrimination. ... The combined effect of the Union and Company's conduct was to discriminate against Ms. Michaud in violation of 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572.

Section 4572(1)(A) covers religious harassment when workplace comments occur because of an employee’s religious beliefs or would not have occurred but for the employee’s religion.

Finnemore v. Bangor Hydro-Electric Co. · filed 1994-08-03(1)(A)

A test for determining whether a comment is of a religious nature is whether it occurred because of an individual’s religious beliefs or would not have occurred but for the individual’s religion.

Section 4572(1)(A) does not bar a religious institution from preferring employees of its own religion; § 4573-A(2) exempts that practice.

CROSSPOINT CHURCH v. MAKIN · filed 2024-02-27(1)(A)

Both Crosspoint and the state interpret § 4573-A(2) to exempt Crosspoint, as a religious institution, from § 4572(1)(A)’s prohibition on employment discrimination based on religion. The Court’s own reading of the statute’s operation confirms this interpretation.

Section 4572(1)(A) does not apply to Crosspoint Church because it is exempt from that provision.

CROSSPOINT CHURCH v. MAKIN · filed 2024-06-04(1)(A)

Specifically, the Court determined that ... “Crosspoint is not entitled to a preliminary injunction on its challenge to 5 M.R.S. § 4572(1)(A) because the parties agree that Crosspoint is exempt from this provision.” Id. at 19. ... Accordingly, since the Court agrees with the parties that there are no material factual disputes and that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary, see Jt. Mot. for Order on Permanent Inj. at 2, the Court adopts and restates all of the legal conclusions contained in its February 27, 2024 Order on Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

Section 4572(1)(A) permits a hostile work environment claim when harassment is sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of employment.

Flood v. Bank of America Corporation · filed 2015-02-27(1)(A)

The MHRA makes it unlawful for an employer to "discriminate with respect to . . . terms, conditions or privileges of employment." Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4572(1)(A). That provision, in turn, authorizes a claim for hostile work environment. ... To the contrary, a reasonable jury could find Flood had endured sufficiently pervasive harassment to alter the conditions of her employment.

Section 4572(1)(A) covers hostile work environment sexual harassment when conduct occurs because of the employee’s sex and is severe and pervasive enough to alter working conditions.

Bowen v. Department of Human Services · filed 1992-04-17(1)(A)

Sexual discrimination is prohibited federally under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1981), and in the State of Maine under 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1)(A) (Supp.1991). ... Fatal to Bowen’s claim, however, is her inability to generate any genuine issue of material fact on whether the offensive conduct would not have occurred but for her sex. ... In order for conduct to create a “hostile work environment” it must be so severe and pervasive that it alters the conditions of employment and creates an abusive working environment.

Section 4572(1) covers discrimination in conditions of employment even when the conduct does not cause an employee to resign.

King v. Bangor Federal Credit Union · filed 1992-07-23(1)

The court’s finding that this isolated comment did not cause King to resign her position does not preclude a finding that it nonetheless constituted unlawful discrimination in a condition of employment.

Section 4572(1)(A) permits a hostile work environment claim based on a single incident of sexual harassment if the conduct is sufficiently severe.

Nadeau v. Rainbow Rugs, Inc. · filed 1996-05-07(1)(A)

The standard contemplates conduct that is either severe or pervasive. Although the conduct may be both, only one of the qualities must be proved in order to prevail.

Section 4572(1)(A) covers hostile work environment sexual harassment, for which a plaintiff must establish a basis for employer liability.

Reed v. MBNA Marketing Systems, Inc. · filed 2002-11-18(1)(A)

The MHRA provides that it is unlawful employment discrimination for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the basis of sex “with respect to hire, tenure, promotion, transfer, employment.” 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1)(A) (2002). ... Nonetheless, in light of the above discussion on Title VII, the Court finds Plaintiff similarly fails to establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment sexual harassment under the MHRA.

Section 4572(1)(A) prohibits sex discrimination in employment, and Title VII standards govern hostile work environment sexual harassment claims under it.

Paquin v. MBNA Marketing Systems, Inc. · filed 2002-11-22(1)(A)

Maine courts have relied on federal case law surrounding Title VII for the purpose of construing and applying the provisions of the MHRA. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that the discussion above regarding Plaintiffs Title VII sexual harassment claim applies with equal force to Plaintiffs MHRA claim.

A reshuffling of job responsibilities, without a material change in employment, is not an adverse employment action under § 4572(1)(A).

Berry v. City of South Portland, Me. · filed 2007-11-19(1)(A)

Accordingly, the Court will apply the same legal standard in considering whether the case survives summary judgment under both federal and state law. ... A mere reshuffling of responsibilities, on its own, is insufficient to establish an adverse employment action.

Section 4572(1)(A) covers sex-based harassment that is severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment.

Daigle v. Jameson Tavern · filed 2008-02-11(1)(A)

Because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Herzog's alleged harassment of Daigle was gender-based and whether it was severe or pervasive, summary judgment is not appropriate on Daigle's hostile work environment claim.

Section 4572(1)(A) covers sexual harassment sufficiently pervasive to create an abusive work environment when there is a basis for employer liability.

Little v. Saint Joseph's Manor · filed 2010-07-23(1)(A)

Mr. Mitchell's conduct was sufficiently pervasive to create an abusive work environment.

An employer may be liable for a co-worker’s sexual harassment when it knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.

Watt v. UniFirst Corp. · filed 2009-05-05(1)(A)

Consistent with that standard, employers may be liable for the sexual harassment of an employee by a co-worker or workers under a hostile environment claim where the employer knew or should have known of the charged sexual harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.

Section 4572 allows constructive discharge to satisfy the discharge or adverse employment action element of an otherwise actionable discrimination claim, but does not create an independent claim for constructive discharge.

Levesque v. Androscoggin County · filed 2012-10-04(1)(A)

In Maine, a plaintiff may use the doctrine of constructive discharge to satisfy the elements of “discharge” or “adverse employment action” in an otherwise actionable claim pursuant to section 4572 of the Maine Human Rights Act. ... However, notwithstanding its application in the labor and discrimination contexts, constructive discharge does not exist as an independent cause of action under Maine statutory or common law.

Section 4572(1)(A) requires a hostile work environment claim based on homophobic slurs to allege harassment because of the employee’s actual or perceived sexual orientation.

Boynton v. CPM Constructors · filed 2015-02-10(1)(A)

The statute prohibits discrimination against an individual because of that individual's sexual orientation or perceived sexual orientation. 5 M.R.S. § 4572(1)(A). See 5 M.R.S. § 4553(9-C) (sexual orientation includes perceived sexual orientation). Where Boynton's complaint does not allege that he was subjected to homophobic slurs because of his sexual orientation or perceived sexual orientation, Boynton has failed to set forth a necessary element of a cause of action for unlawful employment discrimination.

Section 4572(1)(A) covers a sex-based hostile work environment when the conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment.

Roy v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC · filed 2018-03-30(1)(A)

The MHRA and Title VII provide that it is unlawful employment discrimination for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the basis of sex with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment. ... The remaining conduct Roy cites in support of her claims of a hostile work environment are not, considered together, so objectively severe or pervasive as to alter the terms and conditions of her employment.

Section 4572(1)(A) requires sexual harassment to be severe or pervasive enough to create an actionably hostile or abusive work environment.

Johnson v. York Hospital · filed 2019-12-30(1)(A)

Even when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Johnson, the two separate incidents underlying his discrimination claim do not, as a matter of law, rise to the level of sexual harassment that resulted in an actionably hostile or abusive work environment.

Section 4572(1) permits a disability discrimination claim based on a hostile work environment when harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive workplace.

Andersen v. Department of Health and Human Services · filed 2025-07-03(1)

Whereas a claim of an adverse employment action requires proof of a triggering event such as demotion or termination, a claim of a hostile work environment requires proof of “repeated or intense harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive working environment.”

Section 4572(1)(A) uses the Title VII retaliation framework for claims that an employee was treated adversely for exercising rights under the Maine Whistleblowers’ Protection Act.

Green v. Maine School Administrative District 77 · filed 1999-05-06(1)(A)

The analytical framework used in Title VII retaliation claims applies to MHRA retaliation claims.

Section 4572 retaliatory discharge claims use the same analysis as Title VII retaliation claims.

Muehlhausen v. Bath Iron Works · filed 1993-01-20

The analysis of the retaliatory discharge claim under state law is identical to the Title VII analysis contained herein.

Retaliation claims under section 4572(1)(A) use the same analytical framework as Title VII retaliation claims.

Roussel v. St. Joseph Hospital · filed 2003-04-02(1)(A)

The analytical framework used in Title VII retaliation claims applies to MHRA retaliation claims as well.

Section 4572(1)(E) requires a retaliation claimant to show an adverse employment action resulting from protected conduct.

Lerman v. Mt. Sinai Cemetery · filed 2001-02-28(1)(E)

The plaintiff has established that she engaged in protected activity under the MHRA, the first requirement to establish a retaliation claim. However, on the undisputed facts, she has failed to establish that she suffered an adverse employment action as a result of that protected conduct. Neither the alleged shouting and intimidation by Harrisburg nor the list of additional work given to the Plaintiff by Rhea Attias rises to the level of an adverse employment action.

Section 4572 requires a retaliation claimant to show protected conduct, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection between them.

Bishop v. Bell Atlantic Corp. · filed 2002-08-09

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ... MHRA, Bishop must show that: (1) he engaged in protected conduct under the statute; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected conduct and the adverse action.

Under § 4572(1)(E), employment actions are considered together when deciding whether retaliation was materially adverse; inadequate job credit may qualify when combined with a suspension and an action plan.

Bishop v. Bell Atlantic Corp. · filed 2001-05-22(1)(E)

Plaintiff brought to trial claims against his employer for violating the MHRA, which prohibits an employer from discriminating against individuals because “they have made a charge, testified or assisted in any investigation, proceeding or hearing under this Act.” 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1)(E). ... Taken together with the three-day suspension and the action plan, however, the inadequate job credit could constitute a materially adverse action. Based on the aggregate of the circumstances, a reasonable jury could find that giving Plaintiff credit for only two jobs when he actually performed three was an adverse employment action.

Section 4572(1)(A) requires an applicant claiming retaliation to have personally engaged in protected conduct.

Higgins v. TJX Companies, Inc. · filed 2004-08-19(1)(A)

Given the MHRA’s plain language and the federal precedents rejecting third party retaliation claims under Title VII’s similar language, I conclude that the MHRA'does not create cause of action for retaliation against a person who has not personally engaged in protected conduct.

Section 4572(1)(E) retaliation requires protected conduct, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection between them.

Bishop v. Bell Atlantic Corp. · filed 1999-11-19(1)(E)

To fulfill these elements, Plaintiff must prove that (1) he engaged in protected conduct under the MHRA; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected conduct and the adverse action.

An employee’s opposition is protected if the employee reasonably believes the conduct violates the MHRA, even if the underlying discrimination claim fails.

Curtis v. SULLIVAN TIRE, INC. · filed 2008-10-27(1)(E)

The plaintiff need show only that he had a reasonable belief that the conduct complained of amounted to an unlawful employment practice under the MHRA, and need not prevail on his underlying claim.

Section 4572(1)(A) prohibits an employer from firing an employee for conduct protected by the Whistleblowers' Protection Act.

Maine Human Rights Comm'n v. Saddleback, Inc. · filed 2008-10-31(1)(A)

As discussed above, it is unlawful employment discrimination for an employer to discharge an employee because of actions taken by an employee that are protected by the WPA. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1)(A).

Section 4572(1)(A) prohibits discrimination for activity protected by the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act; a disputed reason for termination can require a factfinder to decide the claim.

Theriault v. Hi Tech Insulation Svs. · filed 2011-01-05(1)(A)

The MHRA prohibits employers from discriminating against employees for actions protected under the WPA. ... In light of the statement of material facts and record evidence offered by the parties, the court concludes that it is more appropriate for a fact-finder to determine whether the Plaintiff was fired for abandoning his job, as the Defendant claims, or whether he was fired in violation of the WPA.

Section 4572(1)(E) prohibits firing an employee for a good faith complaint of ancestry-based harassment when the employer knew or should have known the complaint concerned unlawful discrimination.

Pape v. Bridgton Hosp. · filed 2009-12-01(1)(E)

Whether or not Pape was actually being subjected to a hostile work environment based on her ancestry, it would potentially constitute unlawful retaliation under § 4572(1)(£) if Pape had complained in good faith about a hostile work environment based on ancestry and if those complaints were a motivating factor for the employer's decision to terminate her.

Section 4572(1)(E) permits a retaliation claim based on filing an MHRC charge; filing the charge satisfies the protected-conduct element of a prima facie claim.

Carmichael v. Verso Paper, LLC · filed 2010-01-05(1)(E)

Mr. Carmichael has established a prima facie case of retaliation under § 4572(1)(E). The first element, engaging in protected conduct, is satisfied by filing a MHRC claim.

A claim for adverse employment action based on exercising rights under the MWPA must be framed as a violation of § 4572(1)(A).

Daigle v. STULC · filed 2011-06-27(1)(A)

More precisely, the claim must be that Redington-Fairview violated the Maine Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S. § 4572(1)(A) by subjecting Ms. Daigle to an adverse employment action for exercising her rights under the MWPA.

Section 4572(1)(E) protects opposition to prohibited discrimination and participation or assistance in proceedings under the Maine Human Rights Act; a complaint about being targeted may not qualify if it does not connect the targeting to discrimination or earlier protected complaints.

Levesque v. Androscoggin County · filed 2012-02-10(1)(E)

Under the MHRA, a protected activity is an action taken to oppose statutorily prohibited discrimination or participation or assistance in any investigation, proceeding or hearing under the Act. See 5 M.R.S. § 4572(1)(E). ... Therefore, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the e-mail did not constitute either a complaint about gender discrimination or a complaint that· she was being targeted because of her past reports of sexual harassment.

Section 4572(1)(E) prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for complaining of sexual harassment or gender discrimination.

Wieburg v. Lucas Tree Expert Co. · filed 2013-04-01(1)(E)

Under the Maine Human Rights Act, an employer may not discriminate against an employee in retaliation for making complaints by the employee that the employee was being subjected to sexual harassment or gender discrimination. 5 M.R.S. §§ 4572(1)(E), 4633(1). ... The court concludes that Wieburg has raised a factual dispute for trial on her claim of employment discrimination retaliation separate and apart from her whistleblower claim.

Section 4572(E) protects an employee who reasonably believes she is opposing unlawful discrimination, even if no underlying discrimination occurred.

Randall v. Central Maine Medical Center · filed 2015-06-03(E)

Although the incident may not have happened the way Randall initially reported, the law is clear that there need not be any underlying discrimination for a plaintiff to prevail on a retaliation claim. ... Randall's belief was not objectively unreasonable as a matter of law.

Section 4572(1)(A) prohibits adverse employment action because of protected activity; an employee’s termination for refusing to cooperate in an investigation does not violate it.

Pastulovic v. Scarborough Operations LLC · filed 2017-04-18(1)(A)

Under the MHRA, unlawful employment discrimination includes an employer discriminating "with respect to hire, tenure, promotion, transfer, compensation , terms, conditions or privileges of employment or any other matter directly or indirectly related to employment" because of a protected activity. 5 M.R.S. § 4572(l)(A) (2016). ... Plaintiff was terminated for that reason and only that reason.

Section 4572(1)(E) protects employees who oppose conduct they reasonably believe violates the MHRA; at summary judgment, a retaliation claim requires evidence that the complaint concerned a protected category.

Charette v. St. John Valley Soil & Water Conservation Dist. · filed 2018-08-17(1)(E)

At the summary judgment stage, there must be trialworthy evidence that any alleged retaliation was the result of a complaint tied to one of the MHRA's protected categories, such as sex.

Section 4572 provides a remedy for employees who face retaliation after reporting violations of Maine labor law.

SWENSON v. FALMOUTH PUBLIC SCHOOLS · filed 2019-09-27(1)(A)

The Maine Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), 5 M.R.S.A. § 4551 et seq., provides a private right of action against retaliatory discharge of employees who report violations of Maine’s labor statutes.

Section 4572(1)(E) covers retaliation through litigation against someone who opposed an unlawful employment practice.

PAPKEE v. MECAP LLC · filed 2022-02-18(1)(E)

But the language of both statutes is broad enough to encompass adverse actions beyond employment actions, including retaliatory litigation.

Section 4572(1)(E) requires evidence that the employee opposed a practice prohibited by the MHRA; complaints that do not identify protected-category discrimination do not establish protected activity.

Churchill v. The Aroostook Medical Center · filed 2022-04-29(1)(E)

The Plaintiff produced no evidence that prior to the Plaintiff's discharge, she engaged in any protected activity within the meaning of 5 M.R.S. § 4572(1)(E). Prior to being fired, the Plaintiff did not file a complaint with the MHRC, nor did she complain to or make any report to TAMC about what she perceived as discrimination on the basis of age or any other protected category under the MHRA.

An employer cannot retaliate for an employee’s accommodation request through actions taken before the request was made.

Andersen v. Maine Department of Health and Human Services · filed 2022-08-24(1)(E)

DHHS cannot have retaliated for Andersen's request for an accommodation based on a hostile environment before that request was made.

Section 4572(1)(A) provides a cause of action for discriminatory refusal to hire that is substantively equivalent to Title VII.

Perez Ex Rel. Estate of Perez v. Maine · filed 1984-05-03(1)(A)

These two statutes are obviously virtually alike in substance as well as in language.