19-A Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1653

Section 1653(3)(O)'s clear and convincing standard does not apply to a best-interest decision that is not premised on willful misuse of the protection from abuse process.

Hinkley v. Hinkley · filed 2000-04-12(3)(O)

The court’s consideration of the children’s best interest was not subject to a clear and convincing legal standard, because it was not premised on a willful misuse of the protection from abuse process.

Section 1653(3)(O) requires a court deciding parental rights to assess prior misuse of the protection from abuse process independently, after hearing fresh evidence; an earlier finding does not bind it.

Preston v. Tracy · filed 2008-02-28(3)(O)

Section 1653(3)(0) and Campbell thus instruct that when determining parental rights and responsibilities, a court hearing the family matter must make an independent examination of the totality of the circumstances after hearing fresh evidence. A court cannot perform that important function if an earlier finding is binding upon it as res judicata.

Section 1653(3)(O) requires clear and convincing evidence of tactical misuse of the protection from abuse process and its effect on future parental cooperation; explicit findings may satisfy the requirement without repeating the statute’s wording.

Grant v. Hamm · filed 2012-06-19(3)(O)

A judgment need not mirror the language of section 1653(3)(0) — that a parent’s willful misuse of the protection from abuse process was filed to gain a tactical advantage and tends to show that the parent has a lessened ability and willingness to cooperate and work with the other parent in the future — if the court’s explicit findings necessarily establish that very conclusion by the clear and convincing evidence standard.

Section 1653(2)(B) allows a court to award a third party contact with a child when the person has significant bonds with the child, but does not allow contact for someone with a limited relationship over the parents' objections.

Stitham v. Henderson · filed 2001-04-03(2)(B)

The District Court also has the statutory authority to award contact with a child to a third party. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(2)(B) (1998). Although this provision could not be interpreted to allow a court to give contact to a person with a limited relationship to the child, over the objections of the parents, Henderson is a person with significant bonds to the child, even if he needs to be placed into the status of a third party.

Section 1653(2)(B) allows a court to consider a third person’s relationship with a child and award reasonable contact if appropriate.

Young v. Young · filed 2004-04-06(2)(B)

First, section 1653(2)(B) states that courts “may award reasonable rights of contact with a minor child to a [third] person.” 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(2)(B) (1998). This section empowers the District Court to consider any third person’s relationship with a child, and award contact if appropriate.

Section 1653(2)(B) requires courts to scrutinize a third party’s request for contact with a child at least as closely as a grandparent’s petition for visitation under section 1803.

Davis v. Anderson · filed 2008-07-29(2)(B)

When third parties, including grandparents, petition for contact or for parental rights and responsibilities pursuant to section 1653(2)(B) or (C), the parents’ rights must be protected at least as well as they are when grandparents pursue an action for visitation pursuant to section 1803. For that reason, a request for access to children pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1653 must be considered with at least the same level of scrutiny.

Section 1653(2)(B) requires a third party seeking contact with a child to move to intervene, move for contact, and submit an affidavit making a prima facie showing of standing.

Curtis v. Florania Da Silva Medeiros · filed 2016-12-15(2)(B)

Consistent with the minimum procedural requirements we have announced as safeguards on the fundamental right to parent, we conclude that before a court may grant a third party contact with a child pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(2)(B), the third party must file both a motion to intervene in the matter and his or her own motion seeking such contact. The motion for contact must—at a minimum—be accompanied by an affidavit that demonstrates, on a prima facie basis, the party’s standing to interfere with the fundamental right to parent.

Section 1653(3) directs courts to consider the child's best interests, including safety and well being, when allocating parental rights and responsibilities.

Baxter v. Leadbetter · filed 2001-07-20(3)

While both parties present evidence and argue in favor of the particular limitations and burdens placed upon them in order to accommodate the desires of ... the other party with respect to the child and, accordingly, suggest proposals that are in the best interest of themselves, this court looks to 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(3) in consideration of those standards that are in the best interest of the child, including the safety and well being of the child.

Section 1653(3) requires parental rights arrangements to serve the child’s best interests.

Costa v. Vogel · filed 2001-08-08(3)

To determine the best interests of the child, the trial court must act as a “competent and cautious guardian of the child’s interest and determine what parental rights arrangements will serve that interest.” Id.; see also 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(3) (1998 & Supp.2000); Rodrigue v. Brewer, 667 A.2d 605, 606 (Me.1995).

Section 1653(3) calls for consideration of a child's best interests when making an award of parental rights and responsibilities; a court may consider those interests in a motion concerning visitation.

Ames v. Ames · filed 2003-04-28(3)

Likewise, the court did not err in considering the child's "best interest" when considering Lavon's motion. The court should consider the "best interest" of the child whenever "making an award of parental rights and responsibilities with respect to a child." 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(3) (1998 & Supp.2002).

Section 1653(3) requires courts deciding a child’s residence to consider the child’s best interests, including continuity, stability, and adjustment to home, school, and community.

Grenier v. Grenier · filed 2006-08-16(3)

Contrary to Lisa’s contentions, the court properly considered the best interests of the children, see 19-A M.R.S. § 1658(3), and gave significant weight to the following factors: the duration and adequacy of the children’s current living arrangements; the desirability of maintaining continuity; the stability of the proposed living arrangements for the children; and the children’s adjustment to their present home, school, and community, see 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3)(D), (E), (G).

Section 1653(3) requires a court setting parental rights and responsibilities to account for the child’s age and changing developmental needs.

Hogan v. Veno · filed 2006-11-16(3)

The modification relief ordered by the court to apply during the balance of the child’s minority failed to fully account for the child’s age and the dynamic nature of child development, which are important aspects of the best interest factors set forth in 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3) (2005).

Section 1653(3) allows a court deciding a child’s residence to give significant weight to each parent’s willingness to support the child’s relationship with the other parent.

Smith v. Padolko · filed 2008-03-20(3)

The record reflects that the court accorded significant weight to Smith’s unilateral decision to move the children to Ohio without Padolko’s knowledge or consent, and her subsequent actions to prevent him from having a meaningful relationship with the children, in fashioning its new custody arrangement in their best interests.

Section 1653(3) requires courts deciding parental rights, residence, or parent-child contact to apply the child’s best interest standard.

In re Jacob C. · filed 2009-02-03(3)

In making a decision under title 19-A on parental rights and responsibilities, a child’s residence, or parent-child contact, a court must apply the best interest of the child standard set forth in 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3).

Section 1653(3) requires courts to consider a child’s safety and well-being along with other factors, including age, parental relationships, and living arrangements, when determining the child’s best interests.

Kelley v. Snow · filed 2009-12-22(3)

A child’s safety and well-being are a court’s primary consideration when determining the best interest of children, however, a host of other factors must be considered, including, the child’s age, relationship to each of the parents, and living arrangements.

Section 1653(3) requires parental rights and responsibilities to be divided according to the child's best interests, with primary concern for the child's safety and well-being.

Charalambous v. Charalambous · filed 2010-11-16(3)

These provisions of Maine law instruct that when parents of a minor child are living apart, the Court must divide parental rights and responsibilities based on the best interest of the child with primary concern for the safety and well-being of the child.

Section 1653(3) requires courts to apply the child's best interest standard when awarding parental rights and responsibilities.

Sheikh v. Haji · filed 2011-11-29(3)

In making an award of parental rights and responsibilities, the court is required to apply the best interest of the child standard.

Section 1653(3) provides best interest factors for courts to consider when modifying parental contact.

Douglas v. Douglas · filed 2012-05-22(3)

The court did consider many of the best interest factors provided in section 1653(3), and the court’s determination is supported by competent evidence in the record.

When a substantial change in circumstances is established, section 1653(3) requires the court to evaluate its best interest factors and make findings sufficient to support its decision.

Sargent v. Braun · filed 2006-08-02(3)

The court’s findings do not address the factors provided in section 1653(3), and, therefore, are insufficient, as a matter of law, to support the judgment. Because there are undisputed facts that establish a substantial change in circumstances within the meaning of section 1657(2)(A-2), (B), the court was required to fully evaluate the record evidence relative to the best interest criteria set forth in section 1653(3).

Section 1653(3) lists factors for determining a child’s best interest when deciding whether to change the child’s primary residence.

Desmond v. Desmond · filed 2011-05-10(3)

In this case, the court did reference the evidence presented in light of some of the best interest factors listed in section 1653(3) to explain why it is in the child’s best interest to maintain his primary residence with his mother. We cannot say that the court’s factual findings on this issue were clearly erroneous.

Section 1653(3) lists the factors used to determine a child’s best interest when awarding parental rights and primary residence.

Sloan v. Christianson · filed 2012-05-31(3)

Second, the court properly and very thoroughly applied each of the nineteen factors listed in 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3) to conclude that it is in the son’s best interest for the father to have sole parental rights and responsibilities and primary residence of the son.

Section 1653(3) permits a court to consider parents’ financial circumstances when they bear on a child’s living arrangements or well-being.

Bulkley v. Bulkley · filed 2013-11-14(3)

Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the parties’ financial situation as relevant to the child’s best interest. As the trial court found, a parent’s financial situation does have a bearing on statutory factors, such as the adequacy of the child’s current living arrangement, see 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3)(D), and the stability of any proposed future living arrangements, id. § 1653(3)(E).

Section 1653(3) directs courts to consider the child’s best interests when deciding primary residence and supervised parental contact.

Pearson v. Ellis-Gross · filed 2015-08-25(3)

That finding is supported by testimony at the hearing, and it supports the court’s determination that Ellis-Gross should be awarded primary residence and that Pearson’s contact with the child be supervised. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3)(F), (H)-(J) (2014).

Section 1653(3) directs courts to weigh the child’s best interest factors when deciding parental residence and contact arrangements.

Casey D. (Cavagnaro) Hamlin v. Cavagnaro · filed 2016-01-14(3)

Here, the court appropriately weighed the best interest factors pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3) in written findings, which are supported by the record.

Section 1653(3) requires a court considering a modification of a divorce judgment to determine the child’s best interest by examining the statutory factors.

Boyd v. Manter · filed 2018-02-13(3)

When a court considers the modification of a divorce judgment, it must determine the best interest of the child by examining the factors in 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3) (2017). ... The court’s findings on the statutory factors were supported by competent evidence in the record.

Section 1653(3) sets out best interest factors courts consider when deciding a child’s primary residence and contact arrangements.

Akers v. Akers · filed 2012-06-05(3)

To assist in the analysis, the Legislature has set out multiple factors for the court to consider in making the very difficult decisions regarding a child’s primary physical residence and contact arrangements. 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3). ... The court’s findings on these factors were supported by the evidence and were not clearly erroneous.

Section 1653(3) provides nineteen best interest factors for deciding a child’s primary residence.

Brasier v. Preble · filed 2013-12-17(3)

The court’s careful analysis, in which it (1) detailed the significant events that had occurred since the 2007 order, (2) explained how those events constituted a substantial change in circumstances, and (3) explicitly applied each of the statutory best interest factors set out in 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3), was exemplary, and we discern no error in the court’s decision.

Section 1653(3) requires courts to consider the statutory best interest factors, but does not require detailed findings on every factor when the order shows that the court evaluated them.

Aranovitch v. Versel · filed 2015-11-17(3)

In conducting the best interest analysis, the court must consider the statutory best interest factors, 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3) (2014), and “must consider as primary the safety and well-being of the child,” Jackson, 2014 ME 110, ¶ 21, 100 A.3d 484 (quotation marks omitted). The court is not required to make detailed findings regarding every best interest factor, even when a party moves for further findings pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52, “so long as it is otherwise evident that the court has evaluated the evidence with the best interest factors in mind.” Nadeau v. Nadeau, 2008 ME 147, ¶ 35, 957 A.2d 108.

Section 1653(3) requires a court considering a modification to evaluate the evidence in light of its nineteen best interest factors.

Clark v. Leeman · filed 2016-11-29(3)

In determining whether a proposed modification is in a child’s best interest, the trial court must analyze the evidence presented in light of the nineteen best interest factors enumerated in 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3) (2015).

Section 1653(3) does not require a court to address every best interest factor in its decision.

In re Paige L. · filed 2017-05-18(3)

Even if it had been exclusively a parental rights and responsibilities order, however, the court was not required to address each best interest factor in its decision.

Section 1653(3) directs courts deciding a child’s primary residence to consider best interest factors, including parental relationships, living arrangements, and each parent’s willingness to allow contact with the other parent.

Pyle v. Pyle · filed 2017-05-23(3)

Although the court did not specify which “best interest” factors upon which it based its decision, the court’s findings of fact imply reliance on particular factors, such as the children’s relationship with their parents, the duration and adequacy of current living arrangements, the stability of proposed living arrangements, and the capacity of each parent to allow frequent and continuing contact between the children and the other parent, among other factors.

Section 1653(3) requires courts setting parental contact to consider the child’s best interest factors.

Papadopoulos v. Phillips · filed 2018-06-07(3)

The new contact schedule is supported by the court’s findings on the importance of the child’s contact with her father, and the court plainly took into account the relevant best interest factors to reach its conclusion. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3) (2017).

Section 1653(3) governs the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities according to the children’s best interests.

Susan E. (Gerakaris) Robertson v. Gerakaris · filed 2015-07-09(3)

As for Gerakaris’s remaining arguments, we discern no error or abuse of discretion in the court’s ultimate allocation of parental rights and responsibilities, see 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1653(3), 1657(1)(A), (2) (2014); Bulkley v. Bulkley, 2013 ME 101, ¶¶ 11, 14, 82 A.3d 116, or its award of attorney fees, see M.R. Civ. P. 66(d)(3)(C); Dostanko v. Dostanko, 2013 ME 47, ¶¶ 18-19, 65 A.3d 1271; Efstathiou v. Efstathiou, 2009 ME 107, ¶ 17, 982 A.2d 339.

A child’s preference is one factor in the best interest analysis and does not determine the parental rights decision.

Pearson v. Wendell · filed 2015-10-22(3)(C)

Second, even if such a right exists, it is fulfilled by the court’s overarching best interest analysis, in which the children’s preference is one of many factors, none of which is dispositive.

Section 1653(3) requires courts to treat a child’s safety and well-being as primary when deciding residence and parent-child contact.

Miller v. Nery · filed 2017-11-14(3)

The court did not misinterpret or misapply 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3) (2016) in prioritizing the children’s safety and well-being when determining their best interests.

Section 1653(3) requires the court to determine a child’s best interest by considering the statutory factors and exercising independent judgment on the full record, including any guardian ad litem recommendation.

Roalsvik v. Comack · filed 2019-05-14(3)

This ties into the second element of the court’s comment quoted above, namely, that the court intended to adjudicate the question of where the parties’ child should primarily reside “based solely on the best interest of the child, using the statutory factors that the Court needs to consider” and not based “just” on a “rubber stamp” acceptance of the GAL’s recommendation. ... This is an indelibly correct statement of the court’s responsibility to exercise its independent judgment based on the record as a whole and within the analytical framework established by the Legislature.

Section 1653(3) requires courts to consider the child’s best-interest factors before allocating parental rights and responsibilities.

Bergin v. Bergin · filed 2019-08-13(3)

The court’s judgment includes extensive factual findings regarding the background of the case as well as additional findings specific to each of the best interest factors that it was required to consider before setting parental rights and responsibilities between the parties.

Section 1653(3) requires findings sufficient to show how the relevant best-interest factors support parent-child contact and transportation arrangements after a parent relocates.

Gooley v. Fradette · filed 2024-01-18(3)

Requiring that Fradette make these midweek trips from Massachusetts to Portland could impact Fradette’s employment opportunities; the stability of Fradette’s housing, especially if economic constraints result from her employment opportunities being limited by the contact and transportation obligations; the children’s adjustment to ... their new community and their schooling; the parties’ capacity to communicate and co-parent; and the parties’ capacity to encourage and maintain Gooley’s parent-child contact. See, e.g., 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3)(E), (H), (I), (N); see also supra n.8. The court’s factual findings, however, are silent as to these considerations, and we cannot determine from the record before us whether the court considered them. We therefore conclude that the findings are insufficient to reasonably support the decision to couple Gooley’s midweek, evening parent-child contact with Fradette’s obligation to provide all of the interstate transportation required by that contact.

Section 1653(3) makes the child’s best interest the basis for allocating parental rights and responsibilities, including consideration of parental cooperation and the child’s safety.

Landeen v. Burch · filed 2025-01-23(3)

The touchstone for the allocation of parental rights is the best interest of the child. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3).

Section 1653(3) supplies the best interest factors for deciding whether to modify parental rights and responsibilities; the trial court has discretion to weigh those factors.

Kelley v. McKee · filed 2019-10-31(3)

In support of its decision, the court made factual findings relevant to the best interest factors stated in section 1653(3). ... The court’s findings are supported by evidence in the record. ... Accordingly, the District Court acted within its discretion in denying McKee’s motion to modify.

Section 1653(3) requires a court deciding parental rights, residence, and contact to consider the child’s best interest factors and make findings that show how the relevant factors support its decision.

Whitmore v. Whitmore · filed 2023-01-10(3)

According to 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3), in making an award of parental rights and responsibilities and determining a child’s residence and parent-child contact, a divorce court “shall apply the standard of the best interest of the child” and “shall consider” a list of factors set forth in the statute. The court ... need not “robotically” address every factor in an effort to make clear that it has considered them, “so long as it is otherwise evident that the court has evaluated the evidence with the best interest factors in mind.”

Section 1653 requires allocations of parental rights and responsibilities to serve the child’s health and well-being.

Seymour v. Seymour · filed 2021-11-23(3)

When a court makes such an allocation, the ultimate touchstone must remain the health and well-being of the child, see 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3), and the court cannot prefer a parent because of the parent’s gender, see 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(4); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 507 A.2d 596, 599 (Me. 1986).

Section 1653 requires a parental-rights order to state whether rights are allocated, shared, or sole in accordance with the child’s best interest.

Daniel v. McCoy · filed 2023-03-02(2)(D)(1)

A court order establishing parental rights and responsibilities, whether entered by a magistrate or a judge, must state whether parental rights will be allocated, shared, or sole in accordance with the standard of the best interest of the child.

Section 1653(3)(L) makes domestic violence a factor in determining a child’s best interest; a contact award must be reconsidered when an erroneous finding about that factor may have affected the decision.

Francoeur v. Berube · filed 2023-04-18(3)(L)

Here, however, we are unable to determine affirmatively that the court’s erroneous characterization of Francoeur’s testimony did not affect its decision to limit Francoeur’s contact with his child to a few hours of supervised contact per week.

A parent seeking to change a child’s established educational placement under a parental-rights order must, absent agreement, pursue dispute resolution or petition to modify the order.

Austin v. Austin · filed 2002-09-18(10)

The divorce judgment’s award of shared parental rights and responsibilities obligated Stephen to consult in advance with Valerie regarding his desire to discontinue the children’s enrollment in Hebron Academy and, absent Valerie’s agreement, to either seek a nonjudicial method of dispute resolution before bringing the issue to court, or proceed directly to court by the filing of a motion to modify. See 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(10) (1998) (“Upon the petition of one or both of the parents, an order for parental rights and responsibilities with respect to a minor child may be modified or terminated as circumstances require.”).

Section 1653(5-A) requires a court in a separate parental rights action to consider that a protective order was issued, decide parental rights and contact anew, and give no precedential effect to the protective order’s awards.

Young v. Young · filed 2002-11-21(5-A)

[¶ 6] Jeffery correctly asserts that the award of parental rights and responsibilities contained in the most recent interim order entered in the parties’ divorce action supersedes the award of parental rights and responsibilities contained in the earlier protective order that is the subject of this appeal. ... Title 19-A, section 1653(5-A) also limits the effect an award of parental rights and responsibilities in a protective order has in a separate action involving a determination of parental rights and responsibilities for the same child or children: Although the court shall consider the fact that a protective order was issued under chapter 101, the court shall determine the proper award of parental rights and responsibilities and award of rights of contact de novo and may not use as precedent the award of parental rights and responsibilities and rights of contact included in the protective order.

Section 1653(2) provides for a parental rights order that establishes the parties’ rights and responsibilities, including contact, child support, and access to the child’s records.

Leonard v. Boardman · filed 2004-08-13(2)

A parental rights order, pursuant to 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(2), is the appropriate means of establishing parental rights and responsibilities. A parental rights order specifies the parties’ rights and responsibilities, such as the frequency and duration of contact, child support, and access to the child’s records.

A parent awarded sole parental rights and responsibilities under section 1653(2)(D)(1) has legal custody of the child.

In re Austin T. · filed 2006-03-29(2)(D)(1)

A parent who is awarded sole parental rights and responsibilities of a child pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(2)(D)(1) (2005) has legal custody of that child.

Section 1653(10) allows a parental rights order to be amended when a parent shows a substantial change in circumstances and readiness to become appropriately involved.

Schulz v. Doeppe · filed 2018-04-05(10)

In contrast to a termination of parental rights order, the order at issue here is not permanent and can be amended upon his showing that there is a substantial change in circumstances and that he is ready to take responsibility for his own actions and become an appropriately involved parent.

An order awarding parental rights and responsibilities must include a child support provision or explain why child support is not ordered.

Abby L. King v. King · filed 2013-06-06(2)(D)(3)

Title 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(2)(D)(3) (2012) requires that any order awarding parental rights and responsibilities must include “[a] provision for child support . . . or a statement of the reasons for not ordering child support.”

Section 1653 permits parental rights and responsibilities orders, but a court abuses its discretion by imposing rigid, specific discipline for future events that leaves parents no discretion.

Christine v. Violette v. Randy R. Violette · filed 2015-07-30

Trial courts issue parental rights and responsibilities orders pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1653 (2014). ... Here, under the third prong of the abuse of discretion test, it cannot be said that the court made choices within the bounds of reasonableness when it ordered the parties to discipline their children in such a very specific and inflexible fashion upon the occurrence of particular future events with no discretion left to the parents in this case. Although we acknowledge the challenging nature of the problem the court was attempting to address, we must conclude that the court’s rigid order of isolation constitutes an abuse of discretion that we now vacate.

Section 1653 permits allocation of transportation for child contact, but assigning one parent sole responsibility based on an unsupported factual finding is an abuse of discretion.

Emerson v. Laffan · filed 2021-11-02(2)(D)

In short, it was clear error to find that Emerson could not be expected to drive for a year after giving birth, and it was an abuse of discretion to allocate sole responsibility for all transportation to Laffan from the birth of Emerson’s twins until July 1, 2022, based on that unsupported finding.

Section 1653(8)(C) does not justify requiring a parent to provide health insurance when its cost, combined with support obligations, leaves the parent almost no income to live on.

Jarvis v. Jarvis · filed 2003-04-16(8)(C)

Although “reasonable cost health insurance,” as defined in the order, is available to Robert, ordering Robert to provide such insurance at the current cost was an abuse of discretion.

Section 1653(8)(C) requires an obligated parent to provide health insurance when employment-related or other group coverage is available, even if that coverage is costly.

Jarvis v. Jarvis · filed 2003-08-11(8)(C)

Section 1653(8)(C) requires the court to order the obligated parent to provide health insurance coverage for children covered by the child support order as long as “reasonable cost health insurance” is available to the parent. “Reasonable cost health insurance” is defined in 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1501(4) (1998) as “health insurance that is employment-related or other group health insurance.” Robert testified that employment-related health insurance was available to him through his present position at the Town of Fort Fairfield, but at a cost of approximately $600 per month. ... Although “reasonable cost health insurance,” as defined in section 1501(4), is available to Robert, the substantial cost of that insurance suggests that, on remand, a deviation from the amount of child support to be paid by Robert under the child support guidelines may be appropriate.

Section 1653(7)(A) and (B) allow a court, after finding contempt of a parental rights order, to impose more specific conditions and award visitation to replace visits wrongfully denied.

Richards v. Thompson · filed 2004-02-27(7)(A), (B)

In addition, 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(7)(A), (B) (1998), recognizes that upon a finding that a parent is in contempt of an order concerning parental rights and responsibilities, it may “[r]equire additional or more specific terms and conditions consistent with the order [and order] that additional visitation be provided for a parent to take the place of visitation that was wrongfully denied.” ... Accordingly, the court acted within its discretion by modifying the parties’ parental rights and responsibilities for the purpose of giving effect to those rights and responsibilities, and by conferring additional parent/child contact to Thompson in view of the lengthy period during which he had been wrongfully deprived of contact with his son.

Section 1653(7) provides a process for a parent to seek enforcement of a parental rights order when the other parent violates it.

Burrell v. Anderson · filed 2005-01-13(7)

Although these defendants clearly had responsibilities to investigate any violations of the criminal law by Ryan stemming from the allegations that he harmed A.B., it is evident that if Morse was violating the June 2003 order then the process available to Burrell was available vis-á-vis 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(7).

Section 1653(10) permits modification or termination of parental rights and responsibilities orders; the District Court retains jurisdiction over those orders.

In re Jacob B. · filed 2008-11-13(10)

Title 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(10) (2007) permits modification or termination of orders regarding parental rights and responsibilities. These orders originate in the District Court, and the District Court retains jurisdiction to amend or terminate such orders. The Probate Court properly declined to interfere with a child support order of the District Court.

Section 1653(7)(C) permits a civil penalty for violating a parental rights and responsibilities order only after a motion and a finding of contempt.

Jackson III v. Sally A. (Jackson) Macleod · filed 2014-09-09(7)(C)

First, the court may assess a civil penalty for noncompliance with a parental rights and responsibilities order upon motion and a finding that the party is in contempt. ... Because no motion for contempt was pending at the November 2013 hearing, there was no procedure under which the court could validly enter a contempt finding. Therefore, the court lacked authority to impose the civil penalty.

Section 1653 permits a court to consider awarding parental rights and responsibilities to a judicially established de facto parent based on the child's best interest.

Cew v. Dew · filed 2004-04-06(2)(D)

Accordingly, when an individual's status as a de facto parent is not disputed and has been so determined by a court properly exercising jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action pursuant to Title 19-A, the court may consider an award of parental rights and responsibilities to that individual as a parent pursuant to section 1653(2)(D), based upon a determination of the child's best interest pursuant to section 1653(3).

Section 1653 requires a person seeking parental rights as a de facto parent to make a prima facie showing of that status.

Philbrook v. Theriault · filed 2008-10-07

In this context, standing to seek parental rights and responsibilities requires a prima facie demonstration of de facto parent status.

Section 1653 governs the award of parental rights and responsibilities after a person is found to be a de facto parent.

Pitts v. Moore · filed 2014-04-17

Finally, if, and only if, the individual is a de facto parent, the court must establish the extent of the de facto parent’s rights and responsibilities pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1653.

Section 1653 provides parental rights and responsibilities remedies that are broader than those available through a guardianship appointment.

Gardner v. Greenlaw · filed 2022-11-01(2)(A)-(D)

Simply put, there are less expansive remedies regarding parental duties and responsibilities available to a court when it appoints a person as a guardian than when it adjudicates a person to be a de facto parent. Compare 18-C M.R.S. § 5-207(1)-(2) (2022), with 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1653(2)(A)-(D), ... 1891(4)(B) (2022).

Section 1653(12) does not automatically reduce an undifferentiated child support obligation when one of several covered children turns eighteen and graduates from high school.

Bartlett v. Anderson · filed 2005-01-18(12)

However, section 1653(12) specifies no formula or method to adjust payment obligations when one child, among several covered by a single, undifferentiated child support payment obligation, reaches age eighteen.

Section 1653(13) permits a child support order to provide automatic payment adjustments when a child reaches specified ages or leaves secondary school.

Lund v. Lund · filed 2007-07-31(13)

Section 1653(13) provides that the court order may provide for automatic adjustments to child support payments “when the child attains 12 or 18 years of age; or when the child graduates, withdraws or is expelled from secondary school, attains 19 years of age or is otherwise emancipated, whichever occurs first.” 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(13) (2006). ... Accordingly, by the terms of the child support order, Harvey was entitled to adjust his overall child support obligation upon the graduation of each of the two older daughters.

Section 1653(8)(B) excludes a child’s uninsured medical and dental expenses incurred after the child turns eighteen and graduates from secondary school from the parent’s child support obligation.

Levasseur v. Levasseur · filed 2010-01-26(8)(B)

He contends that the court’s calculation of his share of the uninsured medical and dental expenses erroneously included certain expenses for the son that were incurred after the son had turned eighteen and graduated from high school. ... With the elimination of these expenses from the determination, John owes Susan $91.61 for his share of the uninsured medical and dental expenses.

Section 1653(12) ends future child support when a child reaches majority, but accrued arrearages remain enforceable by the custodial parent.

Cloutier v. Turner · filed 2012-01-19(12)

Although the obligation to provide future support ends when the child reaches majority pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(12), liability for arrearages does not terminate then, and therefore Turner has standing to bring a motion to enforce.

Section 1653(12) provides for a child support order to terminate when the child turns eighteen, or at nineteen if the child has not graduated, withdrawn, or been expelled from high school.

Molly G. (Lachance) Jandreau v. Lachance · filed 2015-05-14(12)

The child support order will automatically terminate in June 2018, when the parties’ daughter turns eighteen, unless she has not graduated, withdrawn, or been expelled from high school, in which case it will terminate when she turns nineteen. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(12) (2014).

Section 1653(12) ends a support order as to a child upon a listed event, but an order for multiple children does not automatically change the amount owed unless it specifies the new amount.

Higgins v. Wood · filed 2018-07-03(12)

We now clarify that, for any court judgment ordering the payment of child support entered after Bartlett, a change in child support is self-effectuating only if the judgment includes a specific, quantifiable amount of support ordered to replace the original obligation on a specific date or upon the occurrence of a specific event.

Section 1653(5) does not bar a court from considering a parent’s departure from the family residence when the other parent asked them to leave only after they had already moved out.

Nadeau v. Nadeau · filed 2008-09-25(5)

In this context, Kimberly’s demand that he leave the house, after he had already moved out of the home earlier in the morning, is not the type of “request or insistence of the other parent” contemplated by section 1653(5).

Section 1653(14) requires a parent who intends to relocate a child’s residence outside Maine to give the other parent prior notice.

Malenko v. Handrahan · filed 2009-09-01(14)

If, in the future, Handrahan desires to relocate the child’s residence outside of Maine, she must give Malenko prior notice.

Section 1653(3) requires a court deciding a child’s residence after a parent’s relocation to focus on the child’s best interest while balancing the rights of the parents and child.

Light v. D'Amato · filed 2014-12-02(3)

Because fundamental rights are at stake for a relocating parent, a nonrelocating parent, and a child, and because the court’s determination must be focused on the child’s best interest, see 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3) (2013), a divorce judgment’s effect on a parent’s decision to relocate will not, per se, constitute a constitutional violation.

Section 1653(3) requires courts to consider the child’s best interest, including the listed factors, when deciding parental rights and contact.

Stacey-Sotiriou v. Eve A. Sotiriou · filed 2014-12-18(3)

These findings are supported by ... competent evidence in the omnibus hearing record, and each finding is directed toward examining the child’s best interest. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3)(B), (D), (F), (G), (H), (N), (S). Therefore, the court did not err or abuse its discretion in its award of rights of contact, including unsupervised contact, to Eve.

Section 1653(3) requires courts assessing a child’s best interest to consider whether a parent’s impaired ability to meet the child’s needs affects the parent’s capacity to care for the child.

Daggett v. Sternick · filed 2015-01-29(3)

Regardless of the cause, if a parent’s capacity to meet the needs of his or her child is compromised, a court must consider that in assessing the best interest of the child.

Section 1653(3) makes the child’s best interest the guiding consideration in decisions about parental rights and responsibilities.

State of Maine v. Collins · filed 2015-05-07(3)

The touchstone of a court’s decision on parenting issues in a family action is the best interest of the child. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3) (2014); Daggett v. Sternick, 2015 ME 8, ¶ 11, --- A.3d ---.

Section 1653(3) requires courts deciding a child’s residence and parent-child contact to give priority to the child’s safety and well-being.

Erin (Wallace) Little v. Wallace · filed 2016-06-21(3)

The court took into account all of the applicable factors and gave priority to the child’s safety and well-being as the statute requires, ultimately entering an order that is appropriately focused on the child’s best interest.

Section 1653(14) requires notice before a parent relocates a child, but does not require thirty days’ notice before a hearing that may address the relocation.

Verite v. Verite · filed 2016-11-08(14)

The statute requires a court order awarding shared or allocated parental rights and responsibilities to contain a provision requiring notice to be given prior to a ... parent’s relocation with a child. It does not, as Eric asserts, require thirty days’ notice to be given prior to a court proceeding where the relocation may be addressed pursuant to a pending motion.

Section 1653(3) requires a full best-interest analysis when a parent seeks to relocate with a child; the inquiry cannot be limited to the parents’ proposed homes.

Riemann v. Toland · filed 2022-02-15(3)

The best interest factors, 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3), which the referee assessed fully, do not permit such a narrow inquiry when considering the best interest of a child.

Section 1653(2)(D)(4) does not require both parents to have full or equal access to a child’s records regardless of their circumstances.

Hatch v. Anderson · filed 2010-09-30(2)(D)(4)

Section 1653(2)(D)(4) does not require both parents to have full access to records, nor does it require both parents to have equal access irrespective of their personal circumstances.

Section 1653(2)(D)(4) requires a court denying a parent access to a child’s records because access is not in the child’s best interest to state its reasons.

Sullivan v. Doe · filed 2014-08-28(2)(D)(4)

The law requires that a parent must have access to records and information relating to his child “unless that access is found not to be in the best interest of the child,” in which case the court must state its reasons for denying access. 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(2)(D)(4). ... The court complied with section 1653(2)(D)(4) by stating its reasons for denying Sullivan access to the child’s records and information, which were the same reasons it awarded Doe sole parental rights and responsibilities and no rights of contact “at this time” to Sullivan.

A judgment awarding parental rights and responsibilities must address each parent’s access to the child’s records and information, and state reasons if access is denied.

Rearick v. Kohout · filed 2015-12-03(2)(D)(4)

As Kohout correctly argues, the judgment here did not include a statement regarding the nature and extent of the parties’ access to records, and we therefore remand this matter so that the court may supplement the judgment in order to satisfy this statutory requirement.

An order awarding parental rights and responsibilities must address each parent’s access to the child’s records and information and give reasons if access is denied.

Mayberry v. Janosky II · filed 2022-06-23(2)(D)(4)

We therefore remand this matter for the court to amend the order to satisfy section 1653(2)(D)(4).

Section 1653 allows a court to limit parent-child contact to daytime visits when that serves the children’s best interest, even without a finding of domestic abuse.

Gordon v. Cheskin · filed 2013-12-24(6)(B)(6)

Contrary to Cheskin’s assertions, the trial court was not required to make a finding of domestic abuse, explicit or otherwise, in order to terminate Cheskin’s overnight visitation. The court may prohibit overnight parent-child contact in cases involving domestic abuse. 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(6)(B)(6). However, nothing in the statute prohibits the court from limiting contact to daytime visits even in cases where domestic abuse is not present, if it finds that to do so is in the best interest of the children. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3).

Section 1653(6)(B) does not require conditions on parent-child contact after domestic abuse when contact is in the child’s best interest and conditions are unnecessary to protect the child.

Karamanoglu v. Catherine (Karamanoglu) Gourlaouen · filed 2016-06-07(6)(B)

We therefore construe section 1653(6)(B) in a way that does not mandate a court to impose conditions where the court is satisfied that contact is in the child’s best interest, see 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(6)(A), and that no such conditions are needed to protect the child.

When a parent's crimes against children trigger the presumption against contact, the parent bears the burden of showing that contact would not create jeopardy and would be in the child's best interest.

In re Nicholas G. · filed 2019-01-24(6-B)(A)

Here, the father had the burden to rebut the presumption that, due to his crimes against children, his contact with the child would create a situation of jeopardy and would not be in the child's best interest.

Section 1653(3) requires the court to decide a child’s best interests when modifying parental rights; it may consider a therapist’s recommendation but may not make contact depend on it.

In re Children of Richard E. · filed 2020-03-10(3)

Therefore, we vacate the parental rights orders in part and remand for the court to clarify that decisions regarding contact between the father and each child, as set forth in paragraph 1 of the court’s judgment modifying the 2016 order amending divorce judgment regarding the younger child, and paragraph 2 of the court’s judgment modifying the 2007 parental rights judgment regarding the older child, must be made by the court after considering the best interests of each child, and that these decisions may be guided by, but not dependent on, the recommendations of each child’s therapist.

Section 1653(3) requires courts to decide parent-child contact based on the children’s best interests.

Proctor v. Childs · filed 2023-01-17(3)

The court did not abuse its discretion in granting Proctor contact with the children three weekends per month because factual findings supported by evidence in the record support the court’s conclusion that such contact is in the best interests of the children: Proctor cared for the children when they were younger, is bonded with the children, and has provided continued support and contact since he and Childs separated.

Section 1653(1)(C) favors shared parental rights and continuing contact with both parents unless the court determines that doing so would not serve the child’s best interests.

Jessica A. (Nadeau) Potila v. Nadeau · filed 2014-01-16(1)(C)

Particularly, it is evident that the court did not discriminate in any way ... based on gender or any other status, but instead attempted to respect the direction of the statute favoring the award of shared parental rights absent an explicit finding that it would not be in a child’s best interests.

When a parent requests shared primary residential care, the court must explain why it is not in the child’s best interest; findings supporting primary residence with one parent can implicitly provide those reasons.

Wechsler v. Simpson · filed 2016-01-26(2)(D)(1)

This is an express conclusion that the grant of the children’s primary physical residence to Wechsler is in the children’s best interests, and an implicit explanation of the reasons why shared primary residential care is not in their best interests.

A shared parental rights award may be upheld when the court makes factual findings about the parties and child and addresses the statutory best-interest factors.

Ewing-Wegmann v. Allerding · filed 2023-08-10(2)-(3)

Contrary to Allerding’s contentions, the court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion in ordering shared parental rights. ... The court’s judgment included ... “extensive factual findings” regarding the parties and the child as well as additional findings related to the best interest factors enumerated in 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3).

Section 1653(2)(D)(1) permits shared primary residence even when the child’s time at each parent’s home is not precisely equal.

Flagg v. Bartlett · filed 2024-08-13(2)(D)(1)

Shared primary residence allows a court to designate residential arrangements that are not necessarily precisely equal as nonetheless shared, to convey that both residences are equally a child’s home.

Section 1653(8)(A) permits past child support from a child’s nonprimary care provider in an action under section 1654, calculated under the child support guidelines.

Valerie R. (Bishop-Martel) Winn v. Martel · filed 2020-01-07(8)(A)

“In an action filed under section 1654 [‘Parenting and support when parents live apart’], the court may require the child’s nonprimary care provider to pay past support.” 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(8)(A) (2018). By statute, the child support guidelines apply to an award of past support. See id.; see also 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(2) (2018).