17-A Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 253

A sexual act under § 253 does not require proof that either participant actually experienced sexual gratification; it is enough that the act was performed for that purpose.

State v. Alley · filed 1978-04-28(1)(A)(1)

Inherent in the requested instruction is the requirement of the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that participants subjectively derived pleasure or satisfaction from the act. We cannot believe that such an interpretation reflects legislative intent. ... In short, the construction given by the Justice in his instructions was a correct interpretation of legislative intent.

Section 253 requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a sexual act to sustain a gross sexual misconduct conviction.

State v. Terrell · filed 1979-06-14

Defendant Ralph Edward Terrell was convicted of gross sexual misconduct in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253 (Supp.1978). On appeal, defendant argues and the State concedes that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the requisite “sexual act” as defined by 17-A M.R.S.A. § 251(1)(C). We agree. The defendant’s conviction based on the indictment for gross sexual misconduct cannot stand.

Section 253(1) does not require the State to allege or prove penetration to establish gross sexual misconduct.

State v. Roberts · filed 1979-10-05(1)

From this legislative history it becomes abundantly clear that the Legislature intended that when one is charged with gross sexual misconduct, it should no longer be necessary for the State to allege or prove penetration. That, of course, is the plain meaning of the statute under which this Defendant was indicted.

Sexual intercourse is a sexual act under Section 253(1)(A)(1), so an intent to compel intercourse can support a conviction for attempted gross sexual misconduct.

State v. Furlong · filed 1980-06-17(1)(A)(1)

In the case at bar, then, a finding by the jury that defendant had intended to compel the female complainant to submit to sexual intercourse with him, rather than that he intended merely a direct physical contact (without penetration) between her sex organ and his, would authorize a jury verdict that defendant was guilty of the crime of attempted gross sexual misconduct as it was here charged against him.

Evidence that the defendant touched a child’s vagina with his penis, finger, and tongue was sufficient to support a finding of a sexual act under § 253(1)(B).

State v. Hebert · filed 1983-02-01(1)(B)

On the basis of this record, we conclude that the jury was warranted in finding, from the evidence before it, that the defendant had engaged in a sexual act with his daughter by touching her vagina with his penis, finger, and tongue.

A victim’s testimony can establish the facts needed for a gross sexual misconduct conviction under § 253(1)(B).

State v. Allen · filed 1983-07-11(1)(B)

In his testimony the stepson clearly related the essential facts necessary to make out a charge of gross sexual misconduct under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(B).

Section 253(1)(B) requires proof of direct physical contact between the sex organs, but does not require penetration.

State v. Hebert · filed 1984-07-02(1)(B)

To obtain a conviction for gross sexual contact with one under fourteen years of age and not the spouse of the defendant, the prosecution need not prove penetration, but only that direct physical contact between the sex organs has occurred.

For the gross sexual misconduct charge under § 253(1)(B), the State had to prove direct contact between the defendant’s and victim’s sex organs.

State v. Ashley · filed 1985-04-05(1)(B)

For the conviction of the Class A offense of gross sexual misconduct, the State had to prove direct physical contact of a very specific nature, that is, contact between the sex organs of defendant and the sex organs of the victim.

A jury instruction on “sexual act” for gross sexual misconduct must use the definition applicable when the offense occurred, but an incorrect definition does not require reversal if it changes no essential element or substantial right.

State v. Ouellette · filed 1988-07-29

Next, we consider Ouellette's contention concerning the jury instructions that included the current definition of “sexual act” rather than the definition applicable at the time of the offense. We find that, although the presiding justice failed to give the appropriate definition of sexual act, his charge did not change any essential element of the crime of gross sexual misconduct and therefore the substantial rights of defendant were not affected.

Section 253(1)(B) requires a sexual act; an instruction that could let the jury convict based on hand-to-genital touching misstates that element and can require a new trial.

State v. Walker · filed 1986-07-16(1)(B)

Here the key factual issue for the jury to resolve was whether Walker had engaged in a sexual act within the meaning of the statute. ... Here the court erroneously defined the crucial disputed element of the crime. The ambiguity generated by the instructions created a reasonable possibility that the jury based its verdict on an erroneous conception of the law. Accordingly, we hold that the instruction constituted obvious error under M.R.Crim.P. 52(b) and vacate the judgment.

Section 253(1)(B) requires a sexual act for gross sexual misconduct, a separate offense from unlawful sexual contact.

State v. Nickerson · filed 1988-01-05(1)(B)

Because sexual contact involves a touching “other than as would constitute a sexual act,” an indictment under section 255(1)(C) must be distinguished from an indictment for gross sexual misconduct under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(B) (1983).2 Gross sexual misconduct requires a sexual act, that section 251(1)(C)(1) defines as “any act between 2 persons involving ... direct physical contact between the genitals of one and the genitals of the other ... .”

Additional gross sexual misconduct counts based on intercourse require evidence of additional acts of intercourse.

State v. Nye · filed 1988-12-13

The State argues that the jury could find multiple incidents of sexual intercourse to support both the rape and additional gross sexual misconduct charges and that the jury could infer that sexual contact accompanied such incidents. We disagree. The victim’s somewhat confusing responses to the prosecution’s leading questions established beyond a reasonable doubt only one act of sexual intercourse each year (rape counts 2, 5 and 8).

Section 253 permits a gross sexual misconduct conviction for direct physical contact between a child's sex organs and an instrument or device manipulated by the defendant when the evidence supports the charge.

State v. Shea · filed 1991-04-03

Next, Shea contends that the evidence at trial is insufficient to sustain his conviction on Count V of the indictment alleging direct physical contact between the sex organs of the six-year-old and an instrument or device manipulated by Shea. This contention is without merit. We find evidence sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict on this count.

Section 253’s sexual act and compulsion elements can be established by testimony that a defendant had intercourse with the victim while others held her down as she resisted.

State v. Reynolds · filed 1992-02-28

The testimony of the victim, alone, demonstrated that both elements were present. Her testimony that Reynolds had intercourse with her certainly satisfies the sexual act element. ... She also testified that the other two defendants held her down during the act and that she pushed them away and begged them to stop. This account meets the statutory definition of compulsion.

Children’s detailed testimony about sexual acts, together with a neighbor’s testimony, can provide sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction under section 253.

State v. Mazerolle · filed 1992-09-03

The testimony of the defendants’ children describing in detail the sexual acts perpetrated on them by their parents and the testimony given by the defendants’ neighbor provide sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdicts.

As charged here, § 253(1)(A) did not require proof of penetration; the jury could find its elements proved despite reasonable doubt about penetration.

State v. Pinkham · filed 1989-04-07(1)(A)

We also find no merit in defendant’s argument that the jury verdict was inconsistent and incapable of logical reconciliation. He correctly observes that, as charged in this case, the crime of rape includes the elements of gross sexual misconduct and the additional element of penetration. Because the victim testified to penetration and the jury found only genital to genital contact, defendant claims that the jury was compelled to reject her testimony in toto. Our review of the record, however, persuades us that a jury could rationally entertain a reasonable doubt as to penetration and yet find beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of gross sexual misconduct.

Section 253(1)(B) does not require proof of penetration; direct physical contact between the sex organs can establish the required sexual act.

State v. Philbrick · filed 1995-12-19(1)(B)

To sustain a conviction for gross sexual assault, the prosecution was not required to prove penetration, but “only that direct physical contact between the sex organs has occurred.”

Section 253 imposes liability for gross sexual assault based on sexual acts or sexual intercourse in specified circumstances; sexual contact alone is insufficient.

Jackson v. Faber · filed 1993-10-04

Gross Sexual Misconduct (now Gross Sexual Assault) imposes criminal liability on sexual acts or sexual intercourse in specified circumstances. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253. Sexual contact alone is not a basis for criminal liability for Gross Sexual Misconduct.

Section 253(1) covers touching a child’s penis with a piece of leather because the leather qualifies as an instrument or device, making the contact a sexual act.

State v. Pfeil · filed 1998-11-20(1)

The piece of leather qualifies as "an instrument or device,” making the act a "sexual act" as defined in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 251(C)(3) (Supp. 1997) and the offense gross sexual assault. See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1) (Supp. 1997).

Gross sexual assault requires a sexual act and compulsion.

State v. Filler · filed 2010-09-09(1)(A)

Gross sexual assault has two elements: (1) a sexual act, and (2) compulsion.

The State can prove a sexual act under section 253 despite the victim’s terminology.

State v. Perry · filed 1989-01-05

Perry’s argument that the State failed to prove (because of the victim’s terminology) that a sexual act occurred is frivolous.

Section 253(1)(B) classifies fellatio with an eight year old boy as gross sexual misconduct.

State v. Morgan · filed 1977-11-10(1)(B)

If the complaining witness was competent and if his testimony was believed, the fact finder would be compelled to conclude that the appellant committed fellatio with an eight year old boy, an act clearly falling within the classification of “gross sexual misconduct.”

Section 253(1)(B) imposes liability without proof of a culpable mental state, so voluntary intoxication is unavailable as a defense.

State v. Keaten · filed 1978-08-18(1)(B)

Accordingly, we hold that within the meaning of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 11(5)(B), the Legislature intended-to impose liability without culpability for violations of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(B).

Section 253(2)(B) requires no culpable mental state because a person cannot accidentally or innocently induce sexual intercourse by a threat.

State v. Saucier · filed 1980-10-22(2)(B)

The behavior constituting gross sexual misconduct under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(2)(B) bears a considerable resemblance to rape by threat of death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 252(1)(B)(2). Gross sexual misconduct likewise carries no requirement of a culpable mental state. That omission was not accidental. The statute is based on the premise that one person cannot accidentally or innocently induce another person to engage in sexual intercourse by means of a threat.

Section 253(1)(B) requires no proof of mental culpability for gross sexual misconduct.

State v. Taplin · filed 1985-04-02(1)(B)

The remaining charges of gross sexual misconduct, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(B), require no proof of mental culpability.

Section 253(1)(B) requires no mental state for gross sexual misconduct involving a victim under age 14.

State v. Borucki · filed 1986-02-20(1)(B)

While gross sexual misconduct involving a victim under age 14 includes no mens rea requirement, § 253(1)(B), unlawful sexual contact, § 255(1)(C), includes a mental element of intent.

Section 253(1)(B) does not require a culpable mental state for gross sexual misconduct by genital-to-genital contact.

State v. Day · filed 1988-03-11(1)(B)

The court’s omission does not affect an essential element of the offense. The offense of gross sexual misconduct by genital to genital contact carries no require*1169ment of a culpable mental state.

Section 253(1)(B) does not require the State to prove intent to convict a defendant of gross sexual misconduct.

State v. Giovanini · filed 1989-12-29(1)(B)

While the State was not required to prove Giovanini’s intent in order to convict him of gross sexual misconduct, intent is an essential element of unlawful sexual contact, ... the other crime with which Giovanini was charged.

Section 253(1)(A) does not require proof of a culpable state of mind for gross sexual assault.

State v. Rega · filed 2005-01-10(1)(A)

Rega’s argument that the abnormal condition of mind had not been raised at the time the State’s expert testified goes only to the kidnapping charge because the crime of gross sexual assault does not require a culpable state of mind.6 See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(A).

Section 253(2)(I) does not require a finding of intentional or knowing conduct.

Dragomir v. Med. Mut. Ins. Co. · filed 2012-08-28(2)(I)

The specific provision of the gross sexual assault statute under which Richardson was convicted did not require a finding of intentional or knowing conduct.

Section 253(1)(B) makes gross sexual assault a strict liability crime.

State of Maine v. Morrison · filed 2016-03-31(1)(B)

Gross sexual assault is a strict liability crime.

Section 253 does not require proof of a culpable state of mind for gross sexual assault.

State of Maine v. Proia · filed 2017-07-27

The crime of gross sexual assault does not contain a mens rea element.

Section 253 does not require proof of a culpable state of mind for gross sexual assault.

State v. Proia · filed 2017-07-27

The crime of gross sexual assault does not contain a mens rea element.

Section 253(2)(M) does not impose strict liability, although the court did not decide which mental state it requires.

State of Maine v. Asaad · filed 2020-01-28(2)(M)

We do, however, reject the State’s contention that section 253(2)(M) is a strict liability statute; the statute’s plain language precludes such an interpretation.

Section 253(2)(D) requires the State to prove criminal negligence as to whether the other person consented to the sexual act.

State of Maine v. Idris · filed 2025-02-20(2)(D)

The trial court needed to have instructed the jury only that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Idris failed to be aware of the risk of having nonconsensual sex.

Section 253(1)(A) treats actual physical force and threats of death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping as separate forms of compulsion for Class A gross sexual misconduct.

State v. Colson · filed 1979-08-31(1)(A)

Both for that reason and because of the bifurcated structure of the rape statute, we conclude that the Criminal Code defines two distinct forms of rape, distinguished by the method used to compel the sexual intercourse: (1) rape compelled by physical force, and (2) rape compelled by threat of death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping of a human being. The Code in the same way also defines two distinct forms of Class A gross sexual misconduct.

Section 253(2)(B) requires a threat that is objectively sufficient to compel or induce sexual intercourse and that actually does so.

State v. Meyer · filed 1985-09-19(2)(B)

For Class C gross sexual misconduct, all that section 253(2)(B) requires is proof of “any threat” by the defendant that, viewed objectively, is reasonably sufficient to compel or induce another person, not his spouse, to submit to sexual intercourse and that did in fact compel or induce submission.

Section 253(1)(A) requires proof that the other person submitted to a sexual act as a result of compulsion; an implied threat can provide sufficient evidence of compulsion.

State v. Ricci · filed 1986-04-07(1)(A)

It is of no consequence that the Defendant never expressly threatened her; a threat of death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping may be implied from his conduct. ... We conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the State satisfied its burden under section 251(1)(E).

Gross sexual misconduct under section 253 includes an element of compulsion that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Walker · filed 1988-03-31

Examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the factfinder rationally could find beyond a reasonable doubt every element of each offense charged, including the element of compulsion in the offense of gross sexual misconduct.

An instruction using the later definition of compulsion does not prejudice a defendant charged under section 253(1)(A) when the victim submitted solely because of physical force.

State v. Dupont · filed 1986-07-10(1)(A)

For the earlier requirement of compulsion “by force and against the will of such other person,” there is now substituted language that defines compulsion not only in terms of “physical force” but also in terms of “a threat of physical force or a combination thereof which makes a person unable to physically repel the actor or which produces in that person a reasonable fear that death, serious bodily injury or kidnapping might be imminently inflicted upon that person or upon another human being.” The record before us shows that here on this single encounter the victim submitted as a result of physical force only. On such facts the Defendant was not prejudiced.

Section 253(1)(A) requires the State to show that the victim submitted to a sexual act as the result of compulsion.

State v. Nile · filed 1989-04-21(1)(A)

The State had to prove that Mrs. Nile was placed in fear of imminent bodily injury in order to prove criminal threatening under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 209, and, under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(A), the State had to show that Mrs. Nile submitted to a sexual act as the result of compulsion.

Section 253(1)(A) requires proof of compulsion, which the State may support with evidence of both physical force and the victim’s fear.

State v. Smith · filed 1992-07-20(1)(A)

Compulsion is an element of the crime of gross sexual assault. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(A). ... Absent a stipulation by Smith that the victim had submitted to the charged offense as a result of compulsion, the State is entitled to present evidence of both force and fear.

For gross sexual assault based on submission through compulsion, an instruction on reasonable fear is sufficient when it requires proof that the complainant actually feared death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping and that the fear was reasonable under the circumstances.

State v. Steen · filed 1993-04-06(1)(A)

In its instruction on reasonable fear, the trial court stated: ... [T]he State must prove two facts: first, that the alleged victim did in fact fear that death or serious bodily injury or kidnapping would occur; and second, that the alleged victim’s fear was reasonable under the circumstances. ... We find no error in this instruction or in the court’s refusing to adopt Steen’s proposed instruction.

Section 253(1)(A) supports a gross sexual assault conviction when the victim engages in a sexual act because of a reasonable fear of serious bodily injury.

State v. Whitten · filed 1995-11-21(1)(A)

In reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State the jury rationally could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim feared serious bodily injury, that such fear was reasonable, and that she engaged in the sexual act as a result of compulsion.

Section 253(1)(A)'s compulsion element can be satisfied when the actor's physical force leaves the victim unable to repel him.

State v. Almurshidy · filed 1999-06-25(1)(A)

On the gross sexual assault, the victim testified that Almurshidy put her on the ground, got on top of her, and she was unable to repel him. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the jury rationally could have found that the victim submitted to the gross sexual assault as a result of compulsion.

Section 253(1)(A) permits a gross sexual assault conviction when the evidence supports a finding that physical force compelled the victim to submit to a sexual act.

State v. Bates · filed 2003-05-08(1)(A)

It was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the same physical force that caused Dickson’s death by strangulation was also used to overpower Dickson’s resistance to sexual intercourse with Bates. There was sufficient evidence to support the conviction for gross sexual assault.

Section 253(1)(A) does not require the State to prove that the victim cried out or physically resisted to establish compulsion.

State v. Rackliffe · filed 2010-07-27(1)(A)

Proof of compulsion properly focuses on the acts of the perpetrator of a sexual assault. As the statute indicates, the State need not prove that the victim cried out or physically resisted the assault to prove compulsion.

Section 253(1)(A) prohibits a sexual act to which another person submits because of compulsion, even if that person does not physically resist.

State v. Aboda · filed 2010-11-30(1)(A)

As we concluded above, the gross sexual assault statute and the definition of compulsion are unambiguous. ... The statutes are sufficiently definite to allow ordinary people to understand that it is against the law to compel another person to have intercourse through the use or threat of physical force, even if the other person does not physically resist.

Section 253(1)(A) allows a gross sexual assault conviction when the other person submits to a sexual act because of compulsion; proof that the person tried to push the actor away is unnecessary.

State v. Maizeroi · filed 2000-10-30(1)(A)

A reasonable jury could have found that the victim submitted to sexual intercourse with Maizeroi as a result of compulsion. Here the victim continued to resist throughout the assault. There is no evidence that she initially consented to intercourse with Maizeroi. Moreover, although she did not specifically testify that she tried to “push” Maizeroi off, she testified that she was “still saying no, moving around and stuff’ when Maizeroi was having sexual intercourse with her.

Section 253(1)(A) requires proof of compulsion for a gross sexual assault conviction.

State of Maine v. Fahnley · filed 2015-07-07(1)(A)

Although Fahnley argues that the jury’s verdict finding guilt on the sexual abuse of a minor charge is inconsistent with its verdict on the gross sexual assault charge, a conviction of gross sexual assault requires proof of compulsion, which the conviction of sexual abuse of a minor did not.

Under § 253(1)(A), an instruction that the force required for compulsion is physical force correctly states the law.

State of Maine v. Cummings · filed 2023-06-13(1)(A)

The court’s answer informed the jury for a second time that the force required to find Cummings guilty was “physical force.” That answer was neither incomplete nor incorrect.

For attempted gross sexual misconduct under § 253(1)(A), evidence that the victim did not fear harm can negate compulsion; any fear must also be objectively reasonable.

State v. Benson · filed 1982-12-06(1)(A)

Where, however, as here, the substantial step toward the commission of the underlying offense of gross sexual misconduct may be the placing of the victim in a state of fear by the use of force or the threat of its use, such fear must be reasonable by an objective standard. Therefore, the subjective state of mind of the victim is here in issue as an element of an attempt to commit the underlying offense.

Section 253 defines distinct forms of gross sexual misconduct, so an indictment must allege the attendant circumstances that identify the charged offense and its penalty.

State v. Pierce · filed 1981-12-11

Considering the indictment without reference to its caption as we must, we find it fatally deficient in not alleging the attendant circumstances which form an integral part of the definition of the crime of gross sexual misconduct and serve to identify the particular crime with which the accused is charged and the distinct penalty to which she is exposed on conviction.

Section 253 defines distinct gross sexual misconduct offenses based on the type of compulsion, so an information must specify the type allegedly used.

State v. Levasseur · filed 1988-03-07

The language of the instant information does not advise Levasseur which of the distinct crimes of gross sexual misconduct defined in section 253(1)(A)(1), 253(1)(A)(2) or 253(2)(B) he allegedly committed. By failing to inform him of the type of compulsion used to effect the alleged sexual act, the information failed to set forth an essential element of the crime of gross sexual misconduct and is, therefore, insufficient to charge a criminal offense.

An indictment under section 253(1)(A) is sufficient when it identifies the charged crime, its elements, and the applicable penalty.

State v. Langill · filed 1989-12-12(1)(A)

In the case at bar, the defendants were clearly indicted under section 253(1)(A) and were adequately notified regarding all the elements of the crime charged and the penalty to which they were exposed.

Section 253(4) reduces gross sexual misconduct from Class A to Class B when the voluntary social companion defense is raised and the State fails to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Giglio · filed 1982-02-17(4)

The Class B sexual crimes are distinguished from the Class A crimes by the “voluntary social companion defense”: it is a defense to prosecution for Class A rape and Class A gross sexual misconduct that at the time of the crime the victim was a voluntary social companion of the defendant and on that occasion permitted the defendant sexual contact. This “defense” has the effect of reducing the classification of the sexual crimes from Class A to Class B.

A section 253 gross sexual misconduct instruction is not made misleading by the ordinary use of “sexual act” while explaining the separate offense of unlawful sexual contact.

State v. Finson · filed 1982-07-13

The defendant contends that the jury may have been misled into finding that conduct amounting to unlawful sexual contact, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 255, was sufficient to support a conviction for gross sexual misconduct, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253. He bases that argument upon a single sentence, not objected to at trial, wherein the presiding justice used the words “sexual act” in the course of explaining the statutory definition of “sexual contact.” Although the State and defendant believed that the justice inadvertently substituted the technical terms of the statutory definition, we disagree. We believe the word “act” was used in the more ordinary sense of “action” or “conduct.” While the term may have been an unfortunate choice of words, we do not think that, in this context, the jury was misled to the defendant’s prejudice.

Section 253(2)(C) allows proof that the actor knew of the victim’s mental disability or that the disability was reasonably apparent.

State v. Chabot · filed 1984-08-06(2)(C)

17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(2)(C) provides that the victim must suffer from “mental disability that is reasonably apparent or known to the actor which in fact renders the [victim] substantially incapable of appraising the nature of the contact involved ...” (emphasis added). Thus, the statute allows, in the alternative, either a subjective awareness or an objective manifestation of the required disability.

Section 253(1)(B) requires proof that the sexual act occurred before the victim turned fourteen.

State of Maine v. Paquin · filed 2020-04-23(1)(B)

Consequently, in order to return a verdict of guilty on Count 31 the jury was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that direct physical contact between the genitals of Paquin and the anus of the victim occurred on or before August 21, 1988.

Section 253(1)(B) requires the victim to have been under fourteen at the time of the sexual act.

State v. Brunette · filed 1985-11-05(1)(B)

That the victim had not yet attained his fourteenth birthday is an element of both 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253 and § 255 (1983).

Section 253(1)(B) does not require proof of the precise date of the sexual act, but the State must show that the victim was underage when it occurred.

State v. Walker · filed 1986-03-25(1)(B)

We have observed before that time is not an element in the crime of gross sexual misconduct, except insofar as the State must show that the victim was underage when the offense was committed.

The date of a gross sexual misconduct offense is not an element, except that the State must prove the victim was underage when the act occurred.

State v. Greene · filed 1986-07-11(1)(B)

The date of the offense is not an element of the crime of gross sexual misconduct, except to the extent that the State must prove that the victim was underage when the act took place.

Section 253(1)(B) does not require proof of an exact offense date, but the State must prove the act occurred while the victim was under 14 and within the limitation period.

State v. Rubino · filed 1989-09-15(1)(B)

In this circumstance, “the date of the unlawful sexual conduct is not an essential element of the offense except to the extent that the State must prove that the alleged act took place within the applicable statute of limitations and the prescribed age limits of the alleged victims.”

For gross sexual assault involving a victim under fourteen, the jury need not find the exact age alleged in the indictment if it finds the act occurred before the victim’s fourteenth birthday and the evidence does not materially vary from the indictment.

State v. Cloutier · filed 1997-05-06(1)(B)

Moreover, the jury need not have found the abuse occurred while she was thirteen, if the evidence did not materially .vary from the indictment and the jury found the abuse occurred before the victim’s fourteenth birthday.

Section 253(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the sexual act occurred before the victim turned 14.

State v. Brown · filed 2000-02-11(1)(B)

The State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the event actually occurred before the child turned 14. Evidence on that issue is simply absent from the record.

Subsection (1)(B) requires proof of a sexual act with a person under fourteen who is not the actor’s spouse.

State v. Standring · filed 2008-12-16(1)(B)

The crime of gross sexual assault alleged in the third count of the indictment requires proof that Standring engaged in a sexual act with a person under the age of fourteen who was not his spouse.

Section 253(1)(B) requires proof that the victim was under fourteen when the offense occurred.

State of Maine v. Hodgdon II · filed 2017-06-20(1)(B)

To return a guilty verdict on Count 5, gross sexual assault, and Count 6, unlawful sexual contact, the jury was required to find that at the time of the alleged offenses the victim was less than fourteen years old.

Section 253(1)(C) requires proof that the victim had not yet attained the age of twelve.

State of Maine v. Saucier · filed 2024-04-30(1)(C)

For Saucier to be found guilty of Counts 5 and 6, the State needed to prove that the victim had not yet attained the age of twelve. See 17-A M.R.S. §§ 253(1)(C), 255-A(1)(E-1).

Section 253 does not make the time of an assault an element of gross sexual assault, except as needed to determine the victim's age and apply the statute of limitations.

State v. Miller · filed 2018-08-09(1)(H)

Contrary to Miller's contention, we have consistently held that time is not an element of gross sexual assault except to determine the age of the alleged victim and to apply the statute of limitations.

Class C gross sexual misconduct under section 253(2)(B) is not a lesser included offense of Class A gross sexual misconduct under section 253(1)(A) because the Class A offense can be committed by physical force without a threat.

State v. Grant · filed 1986-07-10(2)(B)

We hold, therefore, that Class C gross sexual misconduct is not a lesser included offense of Class A gross sexual misconduct since it is possible to commit the Class A gross sexual misconduct as defined without necessarily committing Class C gross sexual misconduct as defined.

Section 253(1)(B) imposes no minimum age on the person prosecuted for gross sexual misconduct.

State v. EDWARD C. · filed 1987-10-02(1)(B)

The language of section 253(1)(B) requires us to hold that any person, regardless of age, can be prosecuted for gross sexual misconduct.

Section 253(1)(B) applies to juveniles under fourteen who are prosecuted for gross sexual misconduct.

State v. Danny A. · filed 1988-02-10(1)(B)

This case is governed by our recent holding in State v. Edward C., 531 A.2d 672 (Me.1987), that a juvenile under fourteen years of age can be prosecuted for gross sexual misconduct. Although Danny A. invites us to overrule Edward C., we decline to do so.

Section 253(1)(C) permits prosecution of a person of any age for a sexual act with a nonspouse under twelve.

State of Maine v. Fulton · filed 2018-01-18(1)(C)

By the plain terms of this statute, any person—regardless of age—can be prosecuted for this crime.

Section 253(1)(C) sets no minimum age for prosecution for gross sexual assault.

State v. Fulton · filed 2018-01-18(1)(C)

By the plain terms of this statute, any person — regardless of age— can be prosecuted for this crime.4 Thus, the concern we acknowledged in Edward C. persists and may call for an examination of whether parameters should be legislatively imposed on the universe of juveniles who may be considered truly culpable for the conduct proscribed by section 253(1)(C) and brought into the juvenile justice system.

When both charges arise from a single act of compelled intercourse, gross sexual misconduct under § 253(1)(A) requires no fact beyond those required for rape, so both convictions cannot stand.

State v. Poulin · filed 1988-03-04(1)(A)

Although rape requires proof of the additional element of penetration, the genital-to-genital touching involved in the proof of the sexual act is a necessary part of the penetration. Therefore, the proof of gross sexual misconduct involved no facts other than those necessary to prove rape. In this particular case, rape and gross sexual misconduct constitute the same offense for purposes of double jeopardy.

Section 253(1)(B) cannot support a separate gross sexual misconduct conviction alongside a rape conviction when the same act supplies the facts for both offenses.

State v. Thornton · filed 1988-04-27(1)(B)

Because the “gross sexual misconduct did not involve the proof of any fact beyond the facts required for the charge of rape,” ... Thornton’s double jeopardy rights have been violated by his conviction of both offenses.

Section 253(1)(B) requires proof of a sexual act with a person under 14, so gross sexual assault has elements distinct from assault and may be prosecuted separately.

State v. Fairfield · filed 1994-07-21(1)(B)

And, Fairfield’s conviction for gross sexual assault required proof that a sexual act had taken place with a person who was under 14, elements not required to prove assault.

Section 253(1)(A) and (1)(B) provide alternative grounds for a gross sexual assault conviction; one criminal act cannot support a separate conviction under each provision.

State v. Robinson · filed 1999-06-03(1)(A), (1)(B)

Counts I and II were presented, not to charge separate criminal acts, but as alternative charges for the same criminal act. Charging a defendant with two separate and essentially identical crimes for the same criminal act subjects a defendant to double jeopardy.

Sleep falls within the meaning of “unconscious” under § 253(2)(D).

State v. Preston · filed 1990-10-17(2)(D)

Courts in other jurisdictions that have considered this issue have concluded that sleep is within the meaning of the term “unconscious.” ... We conclude, on the basis of the legislative policy underlying the Maine statutes and the construction given the term “unconscious” in other states, that the court committed no error in refusing to give the requested instruction.

Former section 253(2)(G) covers a facility that provides treatment and child care alongside schooling, and its scope can overlap with subsection (2)(F).

State v. Calor · filed 1991-02-08(2)(G)

Contrary to Calor’s contentions, section 253(2)(F) applies to more orthodox full-time schools, while Homestead Project, with its multipurpose functions, more appropriately fits within the definition of section 253(2)(G). Moreover, there is no indication that the legislature intended these sections to be mutually exclusive.

Section 253(2)(F) requires proof that the actor had instructional, supervisory, or disciplinary authority over the student when the sexual act occurred.

State of Maine v. Conroy · filed 2020-01-30(2)(F)

By their plain language, the statutes, which employ the term “having” in the present tense, require nothing less than that, at the time of the sexual act or sexual contact, the actor have instructional, supervisory, or disciplinary authority over the student.

Section 253(2)(F) covers a person whom a school has empowered to exercise disciplinary, instructional, or supervisory authority over students comparable to that of a teacher or school employee.

State of Maine v. Duane Marquis · filed 2023-03-02(2)(F)

“[O]ther official” must therefore mean a person on whom the ... school has conferred the ability to exercise disciplinary, instructional, or supervisory authority over students that is akin to the authority exercised by a teacher or school employee.

A jury may find the elements of gross sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt based on the victim’s testimony and a doctor’s testimony about injuries consistent with sexual abuse.

State v. Palmer · filed 1993-04-29(1)(B)

After reviewing the evidence before the jury in the case at bar, we conclude that based on the victim’s testimony, as well as that of Dr. Ricci who examined the victim, the jury rationally could find beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the charged offenses.

Section 253(1)(A) covers a sexual act with a nonspouse who submits because of compulsion; testimony of force, threats, and penile contact can support a conviction.

State v. Sargent · filed 1995-03-31(1)(A)

She further testified that he confronted her in an isolated place, and that he “threw me down on the ground,” “took off my clothes,” and “threatened me with his fist.” Any trier of fact could rationally find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim submitted as a result of compulsion. The victim also testified that Sargent “forced his penis into” her vagina and that he put his penis in her mouth. Dr. Walker testified regarding his findings of vaginal redness, the presence of sperm, and the forest debris he retrieved from the victim’s clothing and body. There was sufficient evidence that a rape and an act of gross sexual misconduct occurred.

Section 253(1) permits a gross sexual assault conviction when the evidence proves genital-to-genital contact with a person under fourteen who is not the actor’s spouse.

State v. CHAD B. · filed 1998-06-17(1)

Based on these facts, the court rationally could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had engaged in genital-to-genital contact with the victim, who was not his spouse ... and who had not yet attained the age of fourteen. The defendant’s conviction is supported by sufficient evidence.

Evidence is sufficient to support a gross sexual assault conviction under § 253(1)(A) when a jury can find every element beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Lobozzo · filed 1998-10-14(1)(A)

Furthermore, contrary to defendant’s contention, there was sufficient evidence to allow a jury rationally to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed each of the elements of gross sexual assault, kidnapping, unlawful sexual contact, and assault.

A gross sexual assault conviction under § 253(1)(A) requires sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find each element beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Drewry · filed 2008-05-01(1)(A)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Drewry committed each element of the crimes of which he was convicted. See 17-A M.R.S. §§ 2(9), 208(1)(A), (B), 209(1), 253(1)(A), 255-A(l)(P), 301(1)(A)(3)(2007).

A victim’s testimony that her father had sexual intercourse with her when she was seventeen can support a conviction under § 253(2)(H).

State v. Poblete · filed 2010-04-27(2)(H)

Here, the victim testified that prior to leaving for Job Corps on June 5, 2006, her father, Poblete, subjected her to sexual intercourse. The victim was seventeen at the time. The jury was entitled to rely on this testimony, which fully supports Poblete’s conviction of gross sexual assault pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 253(2)(H).

A gross sexual assault conviction under section 253(1)(A) may rest on evidence and reasonable inferences sufficient to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt.

State of Maine v. Keene · filed 2020-08-06(1)(A)

We also conclude that, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there is sufficient competent evidence in the record on which a jury reasonably could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Keene committed each element of both crimes. ... This evidence, including all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it, amply supports Keene’s convictions for both intentional or knowing or depraved indifference murder2 and gross sexual assault.

Circumstantial evidence can support a conviction under section 253(1)(A) when it permits a rational finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Moores · filed 2009-10-06(1)(A)

Because the evidence described above is sufficient for the trial court to rationally find beyond a reasonable doubt that Moores committed both crimes, we affirm Moores’s convictions for murder and gross sexual assault pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. §§ 201(1)(A), (B) and 253(1)(A).

A conviction under section 253(1)(A) may rest on the complainant’s uncorroborated testimony when it supports each element and is neither contradictory, unreasonable, nor incredible.

State v. Lovejoy · filed 1985-05-21(1)(A)

We reject the defendant’s contention that the complainant’s uncorroborated testimony was insufficient to support his conviction. The Superior Court rationally could find each element of the crime based on the complainant’s testimony, which was neither contradictory, unreasonable, nor incredible.

Section 253(4) classifies gross sexual assault as a Class A offense.

State v. Roberts · filed 1994-04-25(4)

Gross sexual assault is classified as a Class A offense.

Section 253(1)(B) does not require the State to prove a particular location where the charged conduct occurred.

State v. Waldron · filed 1994-05-16(1)(B)

The location of the occurrence of the charged conduct was not in issue nor was the State obliged to prove any particular location.

Section 253(3) makes a victim’s knowing, voluntary consumption of the substance a complete defense to gross sexual assault; when evidence raises that defense, the jury must be instructed on it.

State v. Begin · filed 1995-01-12(3)

As discussed above, the evidence adduced in this case, both by the State and by the defense, is sufficient to generate the question whether the victims consumed marijuana voluntarily. As a result, Begin and LaMarche were entitled to an instruction on the voluntary consumption defense to gross sexual assault.

Placing a victim in fear through force can be a substantial step toward gross sexual assault.

State v. Taylor · filed 1995-07-06(1)(A)

Placing the victim in fear by the use of force constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of gross sexual assault, and makes relevant the victim’s fear that she was going to be raped.

Section 253(1)(B), together with the attempt statute, covers an attempt to engage in a sexual act with someone the actor believes is under fourteen, even if that person is actually an adult.

State v. Webster · filed 2008-07-17(1)(B)

In this case, 17-A M.R.S. § 253(1)(B) and 17-A M.R.S. § 152(1)(B), which together form the crime of attempted gross sexual assault, are clearly intended to make it a criminal offense to attempt to engage in a sexual act with another person, not one’s spouse, who has not yet attained the age of fourteen years. ... It is irrelevant that Bringard was not actually under the age of fourteen years. It is relevant, however, that Webster believed her to be under that age; when he believed her to be thirteen years old and attempted to engage in a sexual act with her, he was guilty of attempted gross sexual assault.

Section 253(1)(B) covers forcing a ten-year-old to put her mouth on an adult’s genitals and putting a tongue on a twelve-year-old’s genitals.

State of Maine v. Reynolds · filed 2018-08-21(1)(B)

In addition, the victim testified that when she was ten years old, Reynolds forced her to put her mouth on his genitals, and when she was twelve years old, Reynolds put his tongue on her genitals, both in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(B).

Section 253(1)(B) covers placing one's mouth on and kissing a child's penis.

State of Maine v. Ramirez · filed 2005-11-09(1)(B)

Based on the defendant's own testimony, the court concludes that she committed Gross Sexual Assault as alleged in the indictment by placing her mouth on Isaac's penis and hssing it.

Section 253(1)(A) permits evidence of multiple qualifying sexual acts under one gross sexual assault count when the acts occurred within the same offense.

State v. Eaton · filed 1995-12-12(1)(A)

Evidence of separate unlawful sexual acts, each specified by statute as chargeable within the offense of gross sexual misconduct, may be admitted if the act occurred within the same offense charged against the defendant.

Section 253(2)(D) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim had not consented to the sexual act.

State v. Garrison · filed 1997-05-01(2)(D)

[¶2] Lack of consent is an element of both the crimes that Garrison was charged with violating.2 The court had already instructed the jury that to find Garrison guilty of the crimes charged in the indictment, it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim had not consented to the conduct charged.

Consent is irrelevant to gross sexual assault under section 253(1)(B).

State v. Howe · filed 2001-12-27(1)(B)

There are no issues here concerning the source of semen or the injury, or whether the victim consented to the sexual behavior, because consent is irrelevant with respect to 17-A M.R.S.A § 253(1)(B).

Section 253(2)(H) covers a sexual act with a person under eighteen when the actor is that person's parent.

State v. Shulikov · filed 1998-05-14(2)(H)

The crime of sexual abuse of a minor generally prohibits sexual acts between adults and children between the ages of fourteen and sixteen, while the crime of gross sexual assault prohibits the more specific instance of such conduct when the actor is a parent of the other person.

An “other similar person responsible for the long-term care and welfare” of a minor is someone acting in a role like a parent, stepparent, foster parent, or guardian.

State v. Patton · filed 2012-07-26(2)(H)

Furthermore, considering the court’s instructions as a whole, the term “other person responsible for the long-term care and welfare of a child” necessarily describes a person who is acting in a role similar to that of a parent, stepparent, foster parent, or guardian.

Section 253(2)(A) permits the State to prove that the defendant or an accomplice administered or employed drugs or intoxicants.

State v. Cormier · filed 2003-12-23(2)(A)

Counts I and II required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Cormier or an accomplice of Cormier “administer[ed] or employ[ed] drugs, intoxicants or other similar means.” 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(2)(A).

Section 253(2)(H)'s caregiver language can apply to an adult living with a minor who assumes a parent-like duty of care, and a vagueness challenge may require fuller factual development.

State of Maine v. Begin · filed 2017-08-21(2)(H)

Accordingly, it would seem to be premature for this court to dismiss the Indictment in this case before the facts have been more fully developed. Living with a minor child may result in an adult assuming a duty of care and protection, like a parent, step-parent, foster parent or guardian.

Section 253(1)(B)’s requirement that the victim not be the actor’s spouse may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

State of Maine v. Fyans · filed 2025-08-19(1)(B)

Under the law in effect at the time of the alleged offenses, a person is guilty of gross sexual assault (Class A) “if that person engages in a sexual act with another person and . . . [t]he other person, not the actor’s spouse, has not in fact attained the age of 14 years.” 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(B). ... Here, the victims did not testify that they were not married to Fyans, but the circumstantial evidence adduced at trial was more than sufficient to support a finding that Fyans was not married to either of the victims.