22 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4055

Section 4055 permits termination of parental rights when clear and convincing evidence supports the required findings about the parent and the child’s best interest.

In Re William S. · filed 2000-02-25

There is substantial evidence in the record to support the court’s findings. ... There was no evidence establishing that William’s father had changed. ... Clear and convincing evidence supports the court’s decision to terminate the father’s parental rights.

Section 4055 permits termination when the evidence supports findings that a parent cannot take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs and that termination is in the child’s best interests.

In Re Elizabeth D. · filed 2006-01-12

Contrary to the mother’s contentions, competent evidence in the record supports the court’s findings that the mother was unable to take responsibility for Elizabeth within a time reasonably calculated to meet Elizabeth’s needs, and that termination of parental rights was in Elizabeth’s best interests.

Section 4055 permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that the parents are unwilling or unable to protect their children from jeopardy and that termination is in the children’s best interest.

In Re Kaleb C. · filed 2002-04-17(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)

Contrary to the parents’ assertions, the evidence was sufficient for the court to have found, by clear and convincing evidence, first that the parents were “unwilling or unable to protect the child[ren] from jeopardy” and second that termination was in the best interest of the children. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i) (1992).

Section 4055’s clear and convincing evidence standard requires the trial court to consider all the evidence before terminating parental rights.

In Re Heather G. · filed 2002-09-12(1)(B)(2)

Implicitly then the clear and convincing standard compels the court to consider all of the evidence before it.

Termination under the jeopardy ground requires evidence connecting a parent’s deficits to the parent’s inability to meet the child’s needs.

In Re Jazmine L. · filed 2004-10-01(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)

For a court to be persuaded that a parent is unable or unwilling to protect a child from jeopardy, the court must not only have evidence of the parent’s own deficits or inadequacies, but must also have evidence of the effect of those inadequacies on meeting the child’s needs.

A court’s factual findings about a child’s best interest are reviewed for clear error, while its ultimate best interest conclusion is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

In re Thomas H. · filed 2005-12-14(1)(B)(2)(a)

The Department does not challenge the court’s factual findings, but does challenge the court’s conclusion made, pursuant to 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(l)(B)(2)(a), regarding the children’s best interest. Although our articulation of the standard by which we review best interest determinations has not been entirely uniform, the standard is twofold: We review the court’s factual findings related to the child’s best interest for clear error, but its ultimate conclusion regarding the child’s best interest for abuse of discretion.

Section 4055(1)(B)(2) requires clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness to terminate parental rights.

In Re Cody T. · filed 2009-09-01(1)(B)(2)

Second, findings supporting termination of parental rights must be based on clear and convincing evidence. 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2). ... Accordingly, we must conclude that the court’s finding of parental unfitness with respect to the father, in this case, is not sufficiently supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record. Therefore, the judgment regarding termination of parental rights of the father must be vacated.

Section 4055(1)(B)(2) requires clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness and that termination is in the child’s best interest; the burden remains with the Department.

In re B.C. · filed 2014-07-31(1)(B)(2)

Because there is competent evidence in the record to support the court’s finding, by clear and convincing evidence, of parental unfitness, and the court likewise did not err or abuse its discretion in determining, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest, see 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2); In re M.S., 2014 ME 54, ¶¶ 13-15, 90 A.3d 443, we affirm the judgment.

Section 4055(1)(B)(2) requires clear and convincing evidence of at least one ground of parental unfitness and that termination is in the children’s best interests.

In Re Soriah B. · filed 2010-12-09(1)(B)(2)

We conclude that there was competent evidence in the record to support the court’s findings, by clear and convincing evidence, of at least one ground of parental unfitness and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests.

Section 4055 requires a private petitioner seeking termination of parental rights in an adoption proceeding to prove at least one ground of parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.

Adoption of Tobias D. · filed 2012-03-29(1)(B)(2)

Correctly applying section 4055 to the present matter places the burden on the guardians to first establish at least one ground of R.M.’s parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 4055(1)(B)(2) permits a finding of parental unfitness when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent’s impairments affect her ability to care for the child.

In re I.R. · filed 2015-07-28(1)(B)(2)

Contrary to the mother’s suggestion, there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s judgment by clear and convincing evidence, including its findings that the mother’s deficits—and particularly her mental illness—affected her ability to parent.

Section 4055(1)(B)(2) requires clear and convincing evidence of at least one ground of parental unfitness and that termination is in the child’s best interest.

In re Aliyah M. · filed 2016-07-12(1)(B)(2)

Contrary to the mother’s contentions, the evidence is sufficient to support the court’s findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Department proved at least one ground of parental unfitness and that termination is in the best interest of the child. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2); In re G.T., 2016 ME 2, ¶ 10, 130 A.3d 389.

Section 4055 permits a finding of parental unfitness to rest on evidence concerning issues not expressly identified in a jeopardy order.

In re Child of Troy C. · filed 2018-11-13(1)(B)(2)(b)

Moreover, we have never held that the bases for a finding of parental unfitness must be limited to the issues expressly identified in a jeopardy order. ... The court therefore did not err in considering evidence of the father’s drug usage.

Section 4055 requires clear and convincing evidence of at least one ground of parental unfitness and that termination is in the children’s best interests.

In re Children of Bradford W. · filed 2019-01-29(1)(B)(2)(a), (1)(B)(2)(b)(ii)

The record supports the court’s findings, to the clear and convincing evidence standard, that at least one ground of parental unfitness had been proved, see 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii), and that termination of the parents’ rights was in the children’s best interests, see 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a); In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶ 30, 889 A.2d 297.

Section 4055(1)(B)(2)’s clear and convincing evidence standard adequately protects a parent’s due process rights in termination proceedings.

In re Child of Shayla S. · filed 2019-05-09(1)(B)(2)

We reaffirm today that the standard of proof of clear and convincing evidence adequately protects a parent’s due process rights.

Section 4055 requires a termination judgment to contain specific, independently made factual findings; a synopsis of evidence and a recitation of statutory elements are insufficient.

In re Children of Billis S. · filed 2024-01-09(1)(B)(2)

It must contain more than “merely a synopsis” of testimony or evidence and a recitation of the elements of 22 M.R.S. § 4055.

Section 4055 permits termination when the parent cannot take responsibility for or protect the child from jeopardy within a reasonable time and termination is in the child’s best interests.

In Re Children of Destiny H. · filed 2024-08-20(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii)

Given the evidence of the mother’s inability to acknowledge any responsibility for the injuries, her continued lack of insight into the children’s needs, and her failure to comply with many of the requirements outlined in the jeopardy order, the court’s findings of unfitness and its best interests determination did not—on the record before the court—constitute clear error or an abuse of discretion.

Section 4055 requires evidence of a parent’s willful refusal to take responsibility for a child; failure or inability alone does not establish that ground for termination.

In Re Merton R. · filed 1983-10-28(1)(B)(2)(a)

This is our first opportunity to consider the meaning of the phrase “has refused to take responsibility for the child” in section 4055. We construe that language to require evidence of willfulness.

A finding that a parent is unwilling or unable to take responsibility for a child within a time that meets the child’s needs must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.

In Re Chesley B. · filed 1985-10-07(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii)

The limitations on our appellate function, therefore, require us to deny the appeal if any evidence in the record can rationally be read to establish as highly probable the District Court’s factual conclusion that Mary is unwilling or unable to take responsibility for her young sons within a time to meet their needs.

Under § 4055, a parent is unable to take responsibility for a child when the parent is incapable of doing so; inability is distinct from unwillingness.

In Re John Joseph V. · filed 1985-11-04(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii)

We understand the word “unable” to be synonymous with incapable, and, as employed in its relevant statutory context, to mean that a parent is incapable, for whatever reason, to take responsibility for his or her child.

Years of virtual inactivity as a parent can support a finding that the parent is unwilling or unable to take responsibility within a time that meets the child’s needs.

In Re Shane T. · filed 1988-07-29(1)(B)(2)

22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(1)(B)(2) (Supp.1987), made applicable to this proceeding in the Probate Court by 19 M.R.S.A. § 533-A(2), requires, for termination of parental rights, that the court find, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the best interests of the child and “[t]he parent has been unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child within a time which is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.” ... In light of the evidence of record, the Probate Court rationally could find to a high probability that George “by his years of virtual inactivity as a father” has shown himself to be unwilling or unable to take responsibility for his son within a time reasonably calculated to meet his needs.

Section 4055 treats a parent’s inability to take responsibility for the children within a time that meets their needs as a ground for terminating parental rights.

In re Kevin H. · filed 1990-09-28(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii)

The court further found that the father is unable to take responsibility for his children within a time reasonably calculated to meet the needs of the children, 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii). ... Contrary to the contentions of the father, there is ample support in the record for those findings.

Section 4055 permits a finding of parental inadequacy when a parent is unable to take responsibility for a child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, even if the parent is willing.

In Re Justin S. · filed 1991-08-12(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii)

But the statute also permitted the court to base its finding on Vanessa’s inability to take responsibility. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(l)(B)(2)(b)(ii). ... We hold that the court’s finding that she was unable to take responsibility within a time reasonably calculated to meet Justin’s needs was not clearly erroneous.

Section 4055 permits termination when a parent is unable to protect a child from jeopardy and that condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

In Re Cassandra B. · filed 1987-10-09(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)

In view of Deborah H.’s record of unsuccessful attempts with detoxification programs, the court was warranted in finding that the prospects for alcohol rehabilitation were remote. The court did not err in concluding that Deborah H.’s condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable time to meet the needs of her children. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(l)(B)(2)(b)(i).

Section 4055 permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent cannot protect a child from jeopardy and that the condition is unlikely to change in time to meet the child’s needs.

In re Merton R. · filed 1988-08-19(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)

We further conclude that the record supports the finding on the second prong of the statute’s two-pronged test for termination of parental rights, i.e., that it is highly probable that Beatrice is unable to protect her son from jeopardy. ... There is ample evidence that Beatrice was unable to protect Merton from serious emotional injury or impairment and that this circumstance was unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to meet his needs.

A parent's inability to protect a child from jeopardy within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child's needs is an independent ground for terminating parental rights.

In re Ryan L. · filed 1990-10-30(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)

Because we uphold the court’s finding of the inability of the mother to protect Ryan L. from jeopardy, an independent ground for terminating parental rights, we need not and do not address the findings of the court concerning the mother’s unwillingness to take responsibility for the child, and the mother’s failure to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the child.

Under section 4055, a parent is “unable” when incapable, for any reason, of protecting a child from jeopardy or taking responsibility for the child.

In Re Joseph P. · filed 1987-10-28(1)(B)(2)

We have previously construed the word “unable,” as it is employed in this statute, to be synonymous with incapable, for whatever reason, either to protect a child from jeopardy or to take responsibility for a child. ... The evidence was sufficient in justifying the District Court in finding that the grounds for termination set out in 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(l)(B)(2)(b) were satisfied.

A court may consider a child’s special medical needs when deciding whether a parent can protect the child from jeopardy, even if no medical emergency exists or is imminent or certain to recur.

In Re Jeffrey E. · filed 1989-04-25(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)

In order for a court to take into account the special medical needs of a child, a present medical emergency need not exist, nor does such a medical emergency have to be imminent or even certain to recur.

Section 4055 permits termination when a parent cannot protect a child from jeopardy and that circumstance is unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

In Re Annette P. · filed 1991-04-10(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)

Given this evidence, the court properly determined that the parents’ circumstances were unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to meet the special needs of the children.

Years of virtual inactivity as a parent may support a finding that the parent is unwilling to take responsibility for a child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

In Re Peter M. · filed 1992-02-11(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii)

The Probate Court could find to a high probability that Charity, by her years of virtual inactivity as a parent, showed herself to be unwilling to take responsibility for her son within a time reasonably calculated to meet his needs.

Section 4055 permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent cannot take responsibility for a child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

In Re Leona T. · filed 1994-05-20(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii)

On this evidence, the District Court could reasonably have been persuaded to a high degree of probability that Leo T. is unable to care for Leona T. within a time reasonably calculated to meet her needs.

A parent’s mental illness, continuing treatment needs, and likely delay in assuming parental responsibilities can support a finding that the parent cannot take responsibility within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

In Re David G. · filed 1995-06-09(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii)

Given the history of the mother’s illness, her continued need for treatment, at least in the form of medication, and the length of time that it would take before she could realistically assume parental responsibilities, if she ever could, the court’s finding that she is unable to take responsibility for her son within a time reasonably calculated to meet his needs is supported by the evidence.

Section 4055 permits termination when a parent is unwilling or unable to protect a child from jeopardy and those circumstances are unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

In Re Serena C. · filed 1994-12-15(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)

The court can terminate parental rights on the basis of a finding that the parent is unwilling or unable to protect the children from jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

Section 4055 permits termination when a parent cannot protect a child from jeopardy, even if the parent did not cause the jeopardy.

In Re Colby E. · filed 1995-12-18

The statutory provision for terminating parental rights refers to a parent who is “unable to protect the child from jeopardy.” 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055 (1992 & Supp.1994). ... The State is not required to prove that the parent is the cause of the child’s jeopardy, or that the parent is generally unfit. The inquiry is whether the parent can protect the child from those circumstances that either will cause or threaten serious harm.

Section 4055 permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent is unable or unwilling to take responsibility for a child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

In re Lisa C. · filed 1996-10-30(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)

We find no error in the judgment of the District Court. There is clear and convincing evidence in the record that the mother is unable or unwilling to take responsibility for Lisa within a time reasonably calculated to meet her needs.

Section 4055 requires the court to consider whether a parent’s inability to protect or take responsibility for a child is unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

In re Michele M. · filed 1996-11-15(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)–(ii)

Moreover, we cannot conclude that the court ignored the relationship between the temporal limitations of subsections (i) and (ii) of section 4055(l)(B)(2)(b) and those factors relating to permanency expressed in section 4050. The court directed that certain steps be taken, with a view toward reevaluation of the mother’s circumstances within one year. The evidence before the court did not compel a contrary conclusion.

Section 4055 sets no fixed time limit on the evidence a court may consider when assessing parental unfitness, and failure to rehabilitate and reunify is assessed retrospectively.

In Re Nathaniel B. · filed 1998-05-05(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii), (iv)

As to section 4055(l)(B)(2)(b)(iv), concerning the parents’ failure to rehabilitate and reunify, its plain meaning requires the court to undertake a retrospective analysis. There is nothing in the statute, and nothing in our past decisions, that limits the temporal scope of the court’s examination of evidence to any particular period. We decline to impose such a limit.

Section 4055 treats a parent's inability to protect a child from jeopardy, when unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child's needs, as one statutory ground for termination.

In Re Kafia M. · filed 1999-12-23(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)

Although the trial court found three bases for the termination, only one basis is necessary. Because we conclude that there is sufficient evidence that Mohamed is unable to protect Kafia from jeopardy and that this situation is unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to meet her needs, we do not address the sufficiency of the evidence on the other two bases.

Section 4055 permits a finding of parental unfitness when a parent cannot protect a child from jeopardy and that inability is unlikely to change in time to meet the child’s needs.

In Re Kayla M. · filed 2001-12-10(1)(B)(2)(b)

A parent is “unable,” within the meaning of section 4055, to protect a child from jeopardy when “that parent is incapable for whatever reason.” ... [¶ 9] Examining the record, we conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to persuade the trial court that it is highly probable that the father is incapable of protecting Kayla from jeopardy and that these circumstances are unlikely to change in a time reasonably calculated to meet Kayla’s needs.

Section 4055 permits a finding of parental unfitness when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent cannot take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

Adoption of L.E. · filed 2012-11-13(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii)

Based on these findings, the court rationally could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the mother is unwilling or unable to take responsibility for L.E. within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

Section 4055 permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent cannot protect a child from jeopardy and that the circumstances are unlikely to change in time to meet the child’s needs.

In re B.P. · filed 2015-10-29(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)

On this record, the court did not err in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the father is unable to protect B.P. from jeopardy and that these circumstances are unlikely to change within a time that will meet B.P.’s needs.

Section 4055 permits a court to consider whether the length of a parent’s incarceration prevents the parent from taking responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

In Re Hannah S. · filed 2016-02-18(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii)

Respecting the strong policies in favor of permanency and against children remaining in long-term foster care, see 22 M.R.S. § 4003 (2015); In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶¶ 23-24, 889 A.2d 297, a court may consider, in light of the child’s particular needs, whether the length of a parent’s incarceration will prevent the ... parent from (1) protecting the child from jeopardy, or (2) taking responsibility for the child, within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, see 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii) (2015); In re L.D., 2015 ME 123, ¶ 15, 123 A.3d 990; In re Randy Scott B., 511 A.2d at 455; In re Daniel C., 480 A.2d 766, 769 (Me. 1984).

A parent’s incarceration is a factor in determining parental unfitness; the court must consider the parent-child relationship and how incarceration has affected and will affect it.

In re Alijah K. · filed 2016-08-30(1)(B)(2)(b)

We agree that a parent’s incarceration is but one factor to be considered by a court faced with a termination petition, but it is a factor—a factor that may, in some cases, lead a court to terminate that parent’s rights. Each case involving an incarcerated parent is different. In each case, the court is required to consider the underlying parent-child relationship and the effect incarceration has had, is having, and will continue to have on that relationship.

Section 4055 permits a finding of parental unfitness when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent cannot protect a child from jeopardy within a reasonable time.

In re Aubrey R. · filed 2017-03-07(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)

Based on this and other evidence, the court did not err by finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the mother is unable to protect the child from jeopardy and will not be able to do so in a reasonable time.

Section 4055(1-A)(C) does not limit chronic substance abuse to cases where a parent has been unable to provide safe care for nine months.

In re Caleb M. · filed 2017-04-06(1-A)(C)

Contrary to the mother’s contention, the plain meaning of the statutory language that a parent’s inability to provide safe care of a child for ... nine months “constitutes” a chronic substance abuse problem does not mean that a “chronic substance abuse problem” is limited to only those circumstances.

Section 4055 allows a court to consider the risk a parent’s behavior poses to a child regardless of whether the parent has a sexual abuse conviction or the behavior involves legal recreational marijuana.

In re Richard M. · filed 2017-10-31(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)

In addition, the lack of a sexual abuse conviction on the father’s record and the legal status of recreational marijuana—which the parents suggest are inoculants for some of their deficiencies—are irrelevant to a court’s inquiry into the jeopardy that these behaviors pose to a child.

Section 4055 permits a finding of parental unfitness when a parent cannot protect a child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

In re Child of Gustavus E. · filed 2018-03-22(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii)

Regardless, viewing the evidence in its entirety, there is competent evidence to support the court’s findings that (1) the father is unable to protect the child from jeopardy, and that is unlikely to change in a time which is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, and (2) the father is unable to take responsibility for the child in a time which is reasonably calculated to meet her needs.

Section 4055 allows termination when clear and convincing evidence establishes at least one ground of parental unfitness.

In re Child of Kelcie L. · filed 2018-04-26(1)(B)(2)(b)

Although the father contends that he made progress towards rehabilitation, the evidence was sufficient to support the court’s finding, by clear and convincing evidence, of at least one ground of his parental unfitness.

Section 4055 requires clear and convincing evidence of at least one ground of parental unfitness.

In re Kelcie L. · filed 2018-04-26(1)(B)(2)(b)

In examining all relevant factors, there is sufficient evidence to support the court's finding, by clear and convincing evidence, of at least one ground of unfitness as to the mother.

Section 4055 permits a finding of parental unfitness when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent cannot protect a child from jeopardy within a reasonable time or has failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify.

In re Child Daniel Q. · filed 2018-04-03(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (iv)

Based on competent evidence in the record, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that the father (1) is unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy within a time reasonably calculated to meet his needs, and (2) failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with him. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (iv). ... Given these findings, all of which are supported by competent evidence in the record, the court did not err in its determination of unfitness.

Section 4055 allows termination when a parent cannot protect a child from jeopardy or meet the child’s special needs within a time reasonably calculated to meet those needs.

In re Child of James R. · filed 2018-04-10(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii)

Given these and other findings made by the court, the court did not err by determining that the father is unable to “meet his son’s special needs and take responsibility for him in a reasonable time to meet those needs” and is unable to “protect his son from jeopardy in a reasonable time to meet his needs.”

Section 4055 permits termination when a parent cannot protect the children from jeopardy or take responsibility for them within a time reasonably calculated to meet their needs.

In re Dani B. · filed 2018-05-03(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii)

Based on the facts that the court found, all of which have evidentiary support, the court did not err in finding that, despite many years of effort by the mother and the Department, the instability, chaos, and observation of violence to which the children have been subjected must end if they are to have any chance for healthy lives. As the court found, the mother remains unable to protect the children from jeopardy or take responsibility for them within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet their needs.

Section 4055 permits a finding of parental unfitness when parents cannot protect their child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

In re Child of Everett S. · filed 2018-07-10(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii)

The court therefore did not clearly err when it found that, based on the parents’ own limitations and “their failure to make changes in their living environment and their lives that are necessary to keep [the child] safe,” the parents were unwilling and unable to protect their child from jeopardy or ... take responsibility for their child, and that these circumstances are unlikely to change within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s high needs. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii); see also In re Logan M., 2017 ME 23, ¶ 3, 155 A.3d 430.

Section 4055 permits a finding of parental unfitness when a parent cannot take responsibility for a child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

In re Child of Ronald W. · filed 2018-07-26(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii)

From this language, it is evident that the court found that the father was unfit pursuant to section 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii), which provides that parental unfitness may be found when “[t]he parent has been unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child within a time which is reasonably ... calculated to meet the child’s needs.”

Section 4055 permits a finding of parental unfitness when a parent cannot protect a child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

In re Child of T'Mara C. · filed 2018-10-04(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii)

Based on these factual findings, which are fully supported by the record, the court did not err in its ultimate finding that, despite the mother’s efforts to improve her circumstances, she remains unable to protect the child from jeopardy or take responsibility for him within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet his needs. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii) (2017); In re Thomas D., 2004 ME 104, ¶ 21, 854 A.2d 195.

Section 4055 permits termination when a parent cannot protect a child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

In re Child of Kimberlee C. · filed 2018-10-04(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii)

The court, therefore, did not err in its conclusion that the mother was unable to protect the child from jeopardy or take responsibility for him within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii); In re Thomas D., 2004 ME 104, ¶ 21, 854 A.2d 195.

Section 4055 permits a finding of parental unfitness when competent evidence supports the statutory grounds for termination.

In re Heath D. · filed 2018-10-04(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii), (iv)

[¶ 6] Based on these findings of fact, all of which are supported by competent evidence in the record, the court did not err in its unfitness determination.

Section 4055 treats a parent’s inability to protect a child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs as grounds for parental unfitness.

In re Child of Charles V. · filed 2018-10-23(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii)

The court did not err in finding that, despite more recent efforts by the father, he remains unable to protect the child from jeopardy or to take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii); In re Thomas D., 2004 ME 104, ¶ 21, 854 A.2d 195.

Recent progress does not preclude an unfitness finding when the parents are unlikely to become fit within a time reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs.

In re Children of Anthony M. · filed 2018-11-06(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii)

On this record, the court did not clearly err by finding that, despite their recent progress, the parents are unlikely to become fit within a time reasonably calculated to meet the needs of the children.

Section 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i) measures a parent's ability to protect a child from jeopardy against the time reasonably calculated to meet the child's needs.

In re Child of Matthew R. · filed 2018-11-08(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)

Based on these facts, which have strong evidentiary support, the court did not err in finding that, despite his efforts to comply with the services ... arranged by the Department, the father remains unable to understand the child’s needs and protect him from the jeopardy presented by the mother’s substance abuse and related conduct within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

Section 4055 permits termination when a parent cannot protect a child from jeopardy or take responsibility within a time suited to the child’s needs, or fails to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify.

In re Child of Mercedes D. · filed 2018-11-13(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii), (iv)

Beyond that, the court’s findings, which are not limited to the deficiencies noted above, are supported by the record and are sufficient to support the court’s determination that the father is unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, and that he failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the child.

Section 4055 permits a finding of parental unfitness when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent cannot protect the child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

In re Child of Domenick B. · filed 2018-12-06(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii)

Contrary to his argument, competent evidence supports the court’s determination that the father is unable to protect the child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet her needs.

Section 4055(1-A)(A) does not require a criminal conviction for a finding that a parent acted toward a child in a manner heinous or abhorrent to society.

In re Children of Anthony L. · filed 2019-04-30(1-A)(A)

The language of section 4055(1-A)(A) requires only a finding that “[t]he parent has acted toward a child in a manner that is heinous or abhorrent to society”; it does not require a criminal conviction.

Section 4055 requires clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness, and findings of unfitness are reviewed for clear error.

In re Child of Raul R. · filed 2019-06-11(1)(B)(2)(b)

Reviewed for clear error, the record contains competent evidence to support the court’s findings, by clear and convincing evidence, of both parents’ parental unfitness.

Section 4055(1)(B)(2)(b) permits a finding of parental unfitness when clear and convincing evidence supports at least one of its alternative grounds.

In re Child of Scott A. · filed 2019-07-30(1)(B)(2)(b)

On this record, the court was entitled to conclude—as it did—that the father was parentally unfit within the meaning of at least one statutory definition of that legal standard.

Section 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii) allows a finding of parental unfitness when a parent is unwilling or unable to take responsibility for a child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

In re Children of Corey W. · filed 2019-01-10(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii)

Given these supported findings and the court’s determination that “[e]ach child’s present need for certainty simply cannot wait for her to develop and demonstrate her future capacity to parent,” the court did not err by concluding that the mother was unwilling or unable to take ... responsibility for the children within a time reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii).

A parent is unfit under Section 4055 when the parent cannot take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child's needs.

In re Ivan M. · filed 2019-02-12(1)(B)(2)(b)(ii)

Despite the parents' assertions, there is competent evidence in the record to establish as highly probable that both parents are unable to take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child's needs.

Section 4055 permits a finding of parental unfitness when a parent cannot protect a child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

In re Child of Amanda H. · filed 2019-03-12(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii)

Based on the court’s actual findings, all of which have evidentiary support, the court did not err in determining that, despite the mother’s efforts, she is unable to protect her child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

Section 4055 requires the reasonable time for a parent to protect or take responsibility for a child to be measured from the child’s perspective.

In re Child of Carl D. · filed 2019-05-09(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii)

In every case, the court must gauge the reasonable timeframe from the child’s perspective.

A parent’s failure to engage with offered services can support a finding that the parent cannot protect or take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

In re Child of Radience K. · filed 2019-05-21(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii)

Moreover, the mother’s failure to engage meaningfully with the Department or the services provided to her is further proof of her inability to protect or take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

Section 4055 requires the court to assess whether a parent can protect the child from jeopardy within a reasonable timeframe measured from the child’s perspective, using past evidence to make that prospective judgment.

In re Child of Amey W. · filed 2019-07-02(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)

As we have made clear on previous occasions, while the inquiry concerning parental unfitness is prospective, the evidence to be considered is retrospective. In every case, the court must gauge the reasonable timeframe from the child’s perspective.

Section 4055 permits a court to consider incarceration alongside other supported findings when determining parental unfitness.

In re Children of Matthew G. · filed 2019-07-09(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii)

Given these findings, all of which are supported by competent record evidence, the court did not impermissibly consider the father’s incarceration in reaching its parental unfitness determination, and therefore it did not err in finding that the father is unfit.

Section 4055 permits a finding of parental unfitness when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent is unable or unwilling to protect a child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

In re Child of Shaina T. · filed 2019-07-09(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii)

Contrary to the mother’s arguments, there is competent evidence in the record to support the court’s finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that she is unable or unwilling to protect the child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child in a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii); In re Thomas D., 2004 ME 104, ¶ 21, 854 A.2d 195.

Section 4055 permits termination when a parent cannot protect a child from jeopardy and that is unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

In re Child of Lacy H. · filed 2019-07-11(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)

Based on the court’s findings of fact, which are supported by the evidentiary record, the court did not err in its ultimate finding that, despite her recent efforts, the mother remains unable to protect the child from jeopardy and those circumstances are unlikely to change within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i); In re Thomas D., 2004 ME 104, ¶ 21, 854 A.2d 195.

Section 4055 permits a finding of parental unfitness when a parent cannot protect a child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

In re Child of Walter C. · filed 2019-07-25(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii)

Contrary to the father’s contention, ... the court did not err in determining that, despite the father’s progress, he remains unable to protect the child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

A parent’s failure to acknowledge a partner’s risk to the child can show an inability or unwillingness to protect the child and that the circumstances are unlikely to change in time to meet the child’s needs.

In re Child of Vanessa G. · filed 2019-12-30(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii)

The mother’s failure to acknowledge the risks posed to her child by the boyfriend demonstrates that she is presently unable or unwilling to protect her child from jeopardy and to take responsibility for the child. See id. That the mother had not ended her relationship with the boyfriend by the date of the hearing shows that these circumstances are unlikely to change in a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

Section 4055 measures the time a parent has to protect or take responsibility for a child according to the child’s needs, from the child’s perspective.

In re Child of Corey B. · filed 2020-01-07(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii)

The Legislature measures a parent’s ability to “protect the child from jeopardy” or “take responsibility for the child,” in terms of a “time which is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.” 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii). As we have frequently noted, the trial court must assess the time frame within which the parent can protect the child from the perspective of the child rather than the parent.

Section 4055 permits termination based on a parent’s inability or unwillingness to protect a child from jeopardy or take responsibility within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, or failure to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify.

In re Child of Nicholas W. · filed 2020-01-30(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii), (iv)

These findings, all of which are supported by competent evidence, are sufficient to support the court’s ultimate findings that the parents are unable or unwilling to protect the child from jeopardy or take responsibility for her in a time reasonably calculated to meet her needs, and that both parents ... have failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the child.

Section 4055 requires clear and convincing evidence of at least one statutory ground of parental unfitness to terminate parental rights.

In re Child of Amelia C. · filed 2020-03-05(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii), (iv)

“In order to terminate parental rights, the court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, at least one of the four statutory grounds of parental unfitness.” ... Viewing the record in its entirety, we conclude that competent evidence in the record supports the court’s finding that the mother is parentally unfit.

Section 4055(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii) allows a finding of parental unfitness when a parent is unwilling or unable to protect a child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

In re Child of Kenneth S. · filed 2022-02-17(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii)

The trial court identified two bases of parental unfitness as to the parents—(1) their unwillingness or inability to protect the child from jeopardy and the unlikelihood these circumstances would change within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs and (2) their unwillingness or inability to take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs. 22 M.R.S. § 4055(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii). The court’s findings with regard to the father’s unfitness were fully supported by the testimony presented during the trial that demonstrated, inter alia, that the father struggled to attend therapy, declined to engage with intensive outpatient therapy, did not engage in parenting classes despite urging from the Department, and had multiple inappropriate visits with the child.

A finding that a parent cannot protect a child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child must account for medical care the child is legally entitled to receive.

In Re Child of Barni A. · filed 2024-01-31(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii)

Absent evidence that the mother—not on her own but with the benefit of 24/7 private nursing care—is unable to alleviate jeopardy or take responsibility for the child, the record was not sufficient to find by clear and convincing evidence that ... the mother is unfit.

Section 4055 permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent cannot protect a child from jeopardy within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.

In Re Child of Danielle H. · filed 2026-02-26(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)

The court concluded that the mother was unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy and those circumstances were unlikely to change within a ... time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs. ... We conclude that the court did not clearly err because there is competent evidence in the record to support the court’s finding that the mother is parentally unfit.

Section 4055 does not require the department to prove its reunification efforts as a separate element in a parental rights termination proceeding.

In Re Daniel C. · filed 1984-08-03(1)(B)(2)

Second, there is no indication in the express terms of section 4041 that failure of the department to fulfill its requirements will preclude the termination of parental rights under section 4055. The latter section provides in some detail the "grounds for termination" without express requirement of proof by the department of compliance with section 4041. We do not, of course, condone any disregard of the department's obligation to facilitate reunification. We simply do not detect any legislative intent that the department's reunification efforts be made a discrete element of proof in termination proceedings.

Section 4055(1) does not make the Department’s failure to fulfill its section 4041 obligations an independent ground to deny a termination petition.

In re Walter C. · filed 1984-10-02(1)

As we observed in the recent case of In re Daniel C., 480 A.2d 766 at 770 (Me.1984), the failure of the Department to fulfill its obligations under section 4041 does not constitute an independent ground for denial of a petition for termination under section 4055(1).

Section 4055 requires courts to consider the Department’s reunification efforts when evaluating whether clear and convincing evidence supports termination of parental rights.

In Re Crystal S. · filed 1984-10-31(1)(B)(2)(a)

Instead, the Department’s efforts, or lack thereof, are a factor to be considered in evaluating the parents’ conduct to determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence to support an order of termination under section 4055.

Section 4055 does not make the department’s reunification efforts a separate element of proof in a parental rights termination proceeding.

In Re Maria C. · filed 1987-06-24

“We simply do not detect any legislative intent that the department’s reunification efforts be made a discrete element of proof in termination proceedings.”

Section 4055 does not require the Department of Human Services to prove reunification efforts as a separate element in a parental rights termination proceeding.

In re Scott R. · filed 1988-10-19(1)(B)(2)

Reunification efforts are not a discrete element of the Department of Human Services’ burden of proof in termination proceedings.

A failure by the Department of Human Services to meet its reunification duties under section 4041 does not bar termination of parental rights under section 4055; it is one factor in assessing the parents’ efforts to reunify with the child.

In Re Christina H. · filed 1992-12-30(1)(B)(2)

The father concedes, however, as he must, that the failure of the DHS to fulfill any requirements of section 4041 ... will not preclude the termination of parental rights under section 4055, but is only one factor to be considered in evaluating the parents’ efforts to rehabilitate and reunify with the child.

Section 4055 requires a parent to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the child; the effort need not succeed.

In Re Howard P. · filed 1989-08-07(1)(B)(2)(b)(iv)

The requirement is “a good faith effort,” not a successful effort.

A failure to comply with section 4041 reunification duties does not, by itself, preclude a finding of parental unfitness in a termination proceeding.

In re Doris G. · filed 2006-12-19(1)(B)(2)(b)

The Department’s compliance with its rehabilitation and reunification duties as outlined in section 4041 does not constitute a discrete element requiring proof in termination proceedings, nor does the failure of the Department to comply with section 4041 preclude findings of parental unfitness.

Section 4055 requires clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness; when a finding rests on a parent’s failure to complete services, the absence of a rehabilitation and reunification plan is an important factor to evaluate.

In Re Thomas D. · filed 2004-08-04(1)(B)(2)(b)

We similarly conclude that the Department’s and a parent’s failure to complete a rehabilitation and reunification plan is not alone a basis to deny a termination petition, but is an important factor that must be carefully evaluated particularly when, as here, the court’s determination of parental unfitness is premised on a parent’s failure to obtain and complete specific services.

A finding that a parent failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.

In re Ryan G. · filed 2017-11-09(1)(B)(2)(b)(iv)

The court also found that the father failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify, but this finding was not supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 4055 permits termination despite a defect in the reunification plan when the parent knew what she needed to address to reunify with her child; the defect remains relevant to parental unfitness.

In re Child of Rebecca J. · filed 2019-07-25(1)(B)(2)(b)

When the parent is otherwise aware of what she needs to address to reunify with her child, we have concluded that the lack of strict compliance with section 4041 is relevant to a determination of parental unfitness but is not a bar to the termination of that parent’s rights.

Section 4055 requires a court deciding a termination petition to consider DHHS’s efforts to reunify the family.

Miller v. Nichols · filed 2009-01-09

The petition was then decided by the state court in accordance with the standard laid out in 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055. While the overriding focus of the court’s decision is “the best interest of the child,” the statute requires the court hearing the petition to consider, in relevant part, all of the efforts made by DHHS to reunify the family.

Section 4055(2) requires courts to consider the child’s needs when deciding whether termination is in the child’s best interests; a parent’s inability to protect the child is one factor in that decision.

In Re Jason B. · filed 1988-12-14(2)

We also recognized that a parent’s inability or unwillingness to protect the child from jeopardy, although a separate inquiry, is a factor among others that must be considered in determining the needs of the child.

Section 4055 requires a finding that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests.

In re James · filed 1989-06-01(1)(B)(2)(a)

In addition, the record supports the court’s conclusion that it is highly probable that termination of Debra’s parental rights is in James’ best interests. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(l)(B)(2)(a); In re Amanda, 549 A.2d 1133 (Me.1988).

Section 4055 requires clear and convincing proof that termination is in the child’s best interests, independently of proof of abandonment or failure to take responsibility.

In Re Caroline M. · filed 1990-06-19(1)(B)(2)(a)

The grandmother contends that the court’s findings on the mother’s abandonment and failure to take responsibility are dispositive of a finding that termination is in the child’s best interests. We disagree. “Both the statute and our case law make clear that ... best interests [is a] distinct element[] that must be proved independently.”

Section 4055(2) requires courts assessing a child’s best interest to consider the child’s attachments and periods of separation, making evidence about the child’s foster home relevant.

In Re Elijah R. · filed 1993-02-04(2)

In determining the best interest of a child the court must consider “the child’s attachments to relevant persons [and] periods of attachment and separation....” 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(2). ... Therefore the pediatrician’s testimony as to Elijah’s need for a stable home environment and statement that the foster mother has provided such an environment to date are relevant in determining Elijah’s best interest.

The Department must prove independently by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.

In Re Justin T. · filed 1994-04-15(1)(B)(2)(a)

In addition to meeting its burden of proof as to jeopardy, it is also necessary for the Department to prove independently by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interests of the child.

Section 4055(2) treats a child's attachment to a parent as one of several factors in deciding whether termination is in the child's best interest.

In Re Michaela C. · filed 2002-10-22(2)

Such attachment, however, is only one of several factors that the trial court must consider in determining what is in the best interest of the child.

Section 4055(1) requires clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit and that termination is in the child’s best interest.

In re Brandon D. · filed 2004-07-27(1)

The petitioner must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is unfit and that termination is in the best interest of the child. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(1). ... [¶ 15] The evidence of the children’s best interests was insufficient and failed to establish as highly probable that it is in the best interests of the children to terminate Gary’s parental rights.

Section 4055’s best interest determination considers multiple factors and does not require proof that contact with an absent parent would harm the child.

In re Jacob B. · filed 2008-11-13(1)(B)(2)(a)

The father’s argument is misplaced because the best interest standard looks to many factors that affect the best interests of the child — it is not limited to whether or not there is affirmative evidence that contact with an absent parent will be harmful to the child.

A child's bond with foster parents may inform the best-interest inquiry, but it cannot control the separate determination of the natural parents' fitness.

In Re Alana S. · filed 2002-08-02(1)(B)(2)

The “bonding” factor and the fully predictable emotional disruption that any child is likely to encounter when any long-term parenting arrangement changes are appropriate for consideration in the court’s “best interest” analysis. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(l)(B)(2)(a). However, the fact that a very young child may have bonded with the child’s foster parents, because the child has lived with those parents for a significant portion of the child’s life, cannot control an evaluation of the parenting capacity or parental fitness of the natural parents pursuant to 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(l)(B)(2)(b).

Section 4055 requires courts to consider permanency when deciding a child’s best interests; permanency can be achieved through arrangements other than adoption.

In Re Marcus S. · filed 2007-02-06

In In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶ 30, 889 A.2d 297, 307-08, we explained the need for courts to consider the statutorily mandated concept of permanency when making best interest determinations pursuant to section 4055. Although permanency is often achieved through adoption, permanency can also be achieved through other arrangements.

Section 4055 requires an explicit finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest; the finding cannot be inferred from other findings.

In re Amanda H. · filed 2007-03-20(1)(B)(2)(a)

Here, the court did not make an explicit finding that termination was in the children’s best interests. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand the matter to the District Court.

In deciding whether termination is in a child’s best interest under section 4055, the court may consider whether adoption offers greater stability and certainty than a permanency guardianship.

In Re David W. · filed 2010-11-23(1)(B)(2)

A permanency guardianship in this case would not have ensured certainty and stability for the child. Thus, the court did not err in determining that placement for adoption, rather than a permanency guardianship, was in the child’s best interest.

Section 4055 permits termination when it is in a child’s best interests, even if adoption is uncertain, where an adoptive home is the child’s only real hope for a permanent home.

In re C.P. · filed 2013-06-11(1)(B)(2)(a)

In such circumstances, where the only real hope for children is to be placed in a healthy, supportive, and permanent adoptive home, the court does not err or abuse its discretion in finding termination to be in the best interests of the children, even if the possibility of adoption is less than certain.

Section 4055(1)(B)(2)(a) requires a best interest analysis before parental rights are terminated.

In re J.I. · filed 2015-10-13(1)(B)(2)(a)

The father also contends that the trial court did not engage in the best interest analysis required by 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a) because, he alleges, the court considered only evidence related to his unfitness when it terminated his ... parental rights. Contrary to his contention, however, the court engaged in the statutorily required best interest analysis, and the record supports the court’s underlying findings.

Section 4055(2) requires a court deciding whether to terminate parental rights to consider the child’s best interest, without weighing the State’s financial interest in reimbursement for TANF benefits.

Adoption of Liam O. · filed 2016-05-03(2)

A court considering whether to terminate a parent’s rights must consider whether termination is in the child’s best interest. Whether the termination will affect the State’s financial interest occasioned by the child’s receipt of TANF benefits is not a factor the court may consider in making that determination.

Section 4055(1)(B)(2)(a) requires termination of parental rights to be in the child’s best interest; the trial court’s determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

In re Carlos C. · filed 2016-12-13(1)(B)(2)(a)

Second, given the evidence in the record, the court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination is in the child’s best interest.

Section 4055 requires a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest; a court may consider the stability of adoption when weighing termination against a permanency guardianship.

In re Cameron B. · filed 2017-01-26(1)(B)(2)(a)

The potential challenges to Cameron’s stable home and consistent parenting along with the possible costs and stress on his caretakers were appropriate for the court to consider. ... The court did not err or abuse its discretion in determining that termination was in the best interest of the child.

Section 4055 requires termination of parental rights to be in the children’s best interests.

In re Mackenzie P. · filed 2017-06-22(1)(B)(2)(a)

Nor did the court err or abuse its discretion in determining that termination of the mother’s parental rights with a permanency plan of adoption is in the children’s best interests.

Section 4055’s best-interests determination concerns whether to terminate parental rights; it does not decide who will adopt the children or where they will be placed.

In re Dominic B. · filed 2017-07-11(1)(B)(2)(a)

The court’s best interests determination in connection with the termination of the mother’s parental rights, however, was not a determination of who will adopt the children or that any particular placement is in their best interests.

Section 4055 permits a court deciding a child’s best interest in a termination proceeding to consider whether the current foster placement advances the child’s permanency plan; the choice of adoptive parent belongs to a separate adoption proceeding.

In re Kenneth S. · filed 2017-03-09(1)(B)(2)(a)

Additionally, we note that permanency planning for a child in foster care, 22 M.R.S. § 4038-B(4) (2016), and the best interest determination to be made in a termination proceeding, 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), are distinct from the question of who should adopt the child, which is addressed in an adoption proceeding governed by 18-A M.R.S. §§ 9-301 to 9-315 (2016). Nonetheless, in conducting a best interest analysis, the court may consider evidence that the current foster placement is furthering the child’s permanency plan, especially where that plan is to place the child for adoption.

Section 4055 requires a determination that terminating parental rights serves the child’s best interest.

In re Ryder C. · filed 2017-07-20(1)(B)(2)(a)

The findings of parental unfitness were supported by the evidence, and the court did not abuse its discretion or err in determining that termination of the parental ... rights of the mother and father will serve the child’s best interest.

Section 4055(2) requires courts deciding a child’s best interest to consider periods of separation, including foster care from an earlier proceeding.

In re Noah B. · filed 2017-10-05(2)

In fact, far from constituting error, the applicable statute requires the court to consider such periods of separation when determining if terminating parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

Section 4055 does not require a finding that a relationship with the parent would harm the child before the court may find termination, rather than a permanency guardianship, in the child’s best interest.

In re Asanah S. · filed 2018-01-23(1)(B)(2)(a)

Second, the court was not required to find that a relationship with the father would harm the child before determining that termination of the father’s parental rights with a permanency plan of adoption, rather than a permanency guardianship, is in the child’s best interest.

A child’s bond with a parent is one factor in deciding the child’s best interest and does not prevent termination of an unfit parent’s rights.

In re James C. · filed 2018-01-23(1)(B)(2)(a)

As for the child’s best interest, we have said that a child’s bond with his or her natural parent is “only one of several factors” and does not preclude a determination that terminating an unfit parent’s rights is in that child’s best interest.

Section 4055 requires the court to determine that termination is in the child’s best interest.

In re Tyrel L. · filed 2017-10-31(1)(B)(2)(a)

Contrary to the father’s contentions, the court’s findings are supported by competent evidence in the record and the court did not err or abuse its discretion in determining that termination of the father’s parental rights, with a permanency plan of adoption, is in the child’s best interest.

Termination may be in a child’s best interests even when the current foster family is not ready to adopt, if the parents cannot provide permanency.

In re Children of Amber L. · filed 2018-04-24(1)(B)(2)(a)

Based on the record before us, the court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that termination is in the best interests of these two children when the parents have demonstrated that they are unable to offer the children any semblance of ... permanency, due to their failure to alleviate jeopardy over a twenty-month period of time even with ample support from the Department.

Section 4055 requires a determination that terminating parental rights is in each child’s best interest.

In re Children of Dani B. · filed 2018-05-03(1)(B)(2)(a)

Nor did the court err or abuse its discretion in determining that the termination of the mother’s parental rights was in each child’s best interest.

Section 4055’s best-interest requirement can support termination of parental rights even when a permanency guardianship is also in the child’s best interest.

In re Children of Nicole M. · filed 2018-06-12(1)(B)(2)(a)

For these reasons, we conclude that a permanency guardianship is not necessarily incompatible with a court’s determination that a termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

Section 4055(1)(B)(2) requires clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is in the children’s best interests.

In re Children of Jeremy A. · filed 2018-06-26(1)(B)(2)

The parents also challenge the court’s determination that termination of their parental rights is in the children’s best interests. There is competent evidence in the record supporting that conclusion by a clear and convincing standard of proof, see In re Children of Amber L., 2018 ME 55, ¶ 4, --- A.3d ---; 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2) (2017), and we do not discuss it further.

Section 4055(2) does not require evidence that giving a parent more time to rehabilitate would harm the child before a court may find termination in the child’s best interest.

In re Child of Amber L. · filed 2018-07-05(2)

Contrary to the mother’s contention, the court was not required to base its best interest determination on evidence of harm to the child resulting from additional time for the mother to further attempt rehabilitation and reunification with the child.

Section 4055 permits termination when the evidence supports parental unfitness and shows that termination is in the child’s best interest.

In re Child of Joshua S. · filed 2018-10-04(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii)

Based upon the above facts, all of which have evidentiary support in the record, the court did not err in finding that the father is unfit and that termination of his parental rights is in the best interest of the child.

Section 4055(1)(B)(2)(a) allows a court to find termination in a child's best interest over permanency guardianship with a relative when the evidence supports adoption.

In re Joshua S. · filed 2018-10-04(1)(B)(2)(a)

In light of this testimony, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that termination of the father's parental rights and "[a]doption with [the] [g]randmother is best for the child."

Section 4055 requires a court that finds a parent unfit to also determine whether terminating parental rights is in the child's best interest.

In re Domenick B. · filed 2018-12-06(1)(B)(2)(a)

Once a court determines that a parent is unfit, it must also determine whether termination of that parent's parental rights is in the child's best interest.

A finding that termination serves the children’s best interests must be supported by evidence; the ultimate determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

In re Children of Benjamin D. · filed 2018-10-04(1)(B)(2)(a)

The court did not err in finding, or abuse its discretion in its ultimate conclusion, that the termination of the father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests.

Termination of parental rights must be supported by evidence that it is in the children's best interests.

In re Benjamin D. · filed 2018-10-04(1)(B)(2)(a)

Additionally, the evidence supports the court's determination that termination of the father's parental rights is in the children's best interests.

Section 4055 permits a best-interest finding supporting termination without relying on adoption by a specific person.

In re Children of Bethmarie R. · filed 2019-04-18(1)(B)(2)(a)

Those findings, which acknowledge our oft-stated recognition of the Legislature’s emphasis on permanency for children, see, e.g., In re Child of Amanda H., 2019 ME 39, ¶ 5, --- A.3d ---, are not predicated on an adoption by a specific person.

Section 4055 requires clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest; sufficient evidence of that finding can support termination instead of a permanency guardianship.

In re Children of Danielle F. · filed 2019-05-07(1)(B)(2)(a)

Contrary to the mother’s contentions, the evidence is sufficient to support the court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best interest, and, as such, the court did not abuse its discretion in terminating the mother’s parental rights instead of ordering a permanency guardianship.

Section 4055’s best interest determination in a termination proceeding does not decide who will adopt the child.

In re Child of Erica H. · filed 2019-05-07(1)(B)(2)(a)

However, we have held that the question of who will adopt a child after parental rights have been terminated is not an issue that is determined in a termination proceeding.

Section 4055(1)(B)(2)(a) requires a finding that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

In re Child of Nathaniel B. · filed 2019-07-25(1)(B)(2)(a)

The findings are also sufficient to support the court’s determination that termination of the father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a) (2018); In re Caleb M., 2017 ME 66, ¶¶ 33-34, 159 A.3d 345.

Section 4055(1)(B)(2)(a) permits termination in a child’s best interests even when the current foster family cannot adopt, if the parents cannot provide permanency.

In re Children of Meagan C. · filed 2019-08-06(1)(B)(2)(a)

Based on the record before us, the court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that termination is in the best interests of these two girls when the parents have demonstrated that they are unable to offer the children any semblance of permanency due to their failure to alleviate jeopardy over the two years since the removal of the girls, even with ample support from the Department.

Section 4055(2) requires the court to consider a child’s age, attachments, ability to integrate into a placement or the parent’s home, and physical and emotional needs when deciding whether termination is in the child’s best interest.

In re Children of Benjamin W. · filed 2019-09-17(2)

In determining whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interest, the court must consider “the needs of the child, including the child’s age, the child’s attachments to relevant persons, periods of attachments and separation, the child’s ability to integrate into a substitute placement or back into the parent’s home and the child’s physical and emotional needs.” 22 M.R.S. § 4055(2) (2018).

Section 4055(1)(B)(2)(a) requires a determination that termination of parental rights is in the children’s best interests.

In re Children of Christine A. · filed 2019-04-16(1)(B)(2)(a)

We also discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s determination that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children; the children have now been in the Department’s care for more than three years and they are thriving in their foster home, while the mother is only just restarting her rehabilitation efforts after a series of relapses. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a); In re Child of James R., 2018 ME 50, ¶ 14, 182 A.3d 1252.

In deciding whether termination serves a child’s best interest, a court may consider the child’s need for a stable, permanent placement and the delay before a parent could provide safe care.

In re Child of Peter T. · filed 2019-04-16(1)(B)(2)(a)

On this record, the court did not err or abuse its discretion by concluding that the best interest of the child would be served, not by prolonging the impermanence and uncertainty of foster care, but by terminating the father’s parental rights so that the child can be placed in a stable and permanent setting.

In deciding whether termination is in a child’s best interest, the court may consider adoption as a permanency plan without deciding who will adopt the child.

In re Child of Shannon S. · filed 2019-06-11(1)(B)(2)(a)

The court, therefore, stopped just short of determining who the adoptive parent would be, but nonetheless determined that the child’s best interest would be served through the permanency plan of adoption.

Section 4055(1)(B)(2)(a) requires the court to consider the child’s needs when deciding whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

In re Child of Scott L. · filed 2019-07-02(1)(B)(2)(a)

In determining whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest, the court is required to consider “the needs of the child, including the child’s age, the child’s attachments to relevant persons, periods of attachments and separation, the child’s ability to integrate into a substitute placement or back into the parent’s home and the child’s physical and emotional needs.” 22 M.R.S. §§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (2) (2018); see also In re Child of Mercedes D., 2018 ME 149, ¶ 21, 196 A.3d 888.

Section 4055 permits termination when it serves the child’s best interest, even if the permanency plan includes guardianship with a relative.

In re Child of Kimberly K. · filed 2019-09-17(1)(B)(2)(a)

These findings are not clearly erroneous, and the court did not err or abuse its discretion in determining that termination of the parents’ parental rights would ensure permanency for the child and would be in the child’s best interest.

Section 4055 requires clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest.

In re Children of Danielle M. · filed 2019-12-30(1)(B)(2)(a)

Then, the court must determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence to support a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. Id. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).

Section 4055(2) requires consideration of each child’s best interest when deciding whether to terminate parental rights.

In re Child of Shem A. · filed 2020-05-12(2)

Contrary to the father’s contentions, the court was presented with evidence regarding the best interest of each individual child, including testimony from the four older children’s counselors and the GAL’s reports that the children are “comfortable and well supported” in their current placement with a relative. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(2) (2020).

Section 4055 requires termination of parental rights to be in the child’s best interest, assessed in light of the child’s need for permanency.

In re Child of Angela S. · filed 2020-05-12(1)(B)(2)(a)

These findings are supported by competent evidence in the record, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that termination of the mother’s ... parental rights was in the child’s best interest.

Section 4055 does not require an identified adoptive home before a court may find that termination is in a child’s best interests.

In re Children of Jamie P. · filed 2020-06-09(1)(B)(2)(a)

Contrary to the parents’ contentions, the record is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of each parent’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests, and the identification of adoptive ... homes is not a prerequisite to a finding that termination is in the children’s best interests.

Section 4055 requires a reason beyond a child’s general need for permanency to find that termination for adoption is in the child’s best interest.

In re Children of Quincy A. · filed 2023-08-15(1)(B)(2)(a)

In sum, to ensure that terminating a parent’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child, there must be some reason besides a general need for permanency that adoption is the best permanency option for that child.

Section 4055 permits the same factual findings to support both parental unfitness and the child’s best interest.

In re Child of Sherri Y. · filed 2019-12-10(1)(B)(2)(a)

However, a court may draw from the same findings in making its unfitness and best interest determinations.

Section 4055 requires the court to consider the child’s best interest, including the child’s age, attachments, ability to adjust to a placement, and physical and emotional needs.

In re Child of Stacy H. · filed 2020-05-12(1)(B)(2)(a), (2)

The statute requires the court to consider “the best interest of the child, the needs of the child, including the child's age, the child’s attachments to relevant persons, periods of attachments and separation, the child’s ability to integrate into a substitute placement or back into the parent’s home and the child’s physical and emotional needs.”

Section 4055 requires clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest; a child’s need for permanency after extended foster care can support that finding.

In re Child of Louise G. · filed 2020-06-09(1)(B)(2)(a)

Based on competent evidence in the record, the court also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. ... The court found that the child has a need for permanency after spending more than fourteen months in foster care, and we discern neither error nor abuse of discretion in that determination.

In deciding whether termination serves a child’s best interest, the court must consider an existing safe and nurturing guardianship, but that guardianship does not necessarily prevent termination.

Adoption by Jessica M. · filed 2020-10-06(1)(B)(2)(a)

We agree with the father and amici that evidence of a safe and nurturing guardianship in place at the time of the termination hearing—with the parent’s consent, if not at his or her direction—is evidence that the court should consider in determining whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest. ... Contrary to the father’s and amici’s arguments, however, we cannot say that ... evidence of that nature will necessarily preclude a finding that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest, even where it indicates a responsible choice.

Section 4055 does not require an identified adoptive home before termination can be found to be in a child’s best interests.

In re Children of Jason C. · filed 2020-06-09(1)(B)(2)(a)

Contrary to his contention, the record is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the children’s best interests, and the identification of adoptive homes is not a prerequisite to a finding that termination is in the children’s best interests.