14 Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 156

Section 156 does not apply when no negligence or tort claims remain, so evidence relevant solely to comparative negligence may be excluded.

Arundel Valley, LLC v. Branch River Plastics, Inc. · filed 2017-07-07

This Motion seeks to preclude the Defendant from presenting any evidence for the purpose of demonstrating comparative negligence on the part of Plaintiff, see 14 M.R.S. § 156. Given that there are no negligence or tort claims remaining in this case, as a result of the court's prior summary judgment ruling, the Motion is appropriate, and perhaps for that reason, was unopposed. The Plaintiffs Motion In Limine To Exclude Evidence Of Comparative Fault is granted. It is ORDERED that evidence relevant solely to comparative negligence is excluded.

Section 156 reduces damages according to the claimant’s share of fault when harm results partly from the claimant and partly from others, and its comparative-negligence doctrine applies to legal-malpractice tort claims without a categorical exception.

Pinkham v. John A. Burgess, Kay I. Pinkham v. John A. Burgess · filed 1991-05-22

Where any person suffers ... damage as a result partially of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, ... the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the jury thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage. ... Fault means negligence, breach of statutory duty or other act or omission which gives rise to a liability in tort or would, apart from this section, give rise to the defense of contributory negligence. ... This language suggests no exceptions to the applicability of the doctrine for certain kinds of torts. ... And we find no Maine cases indicating that this type of comparative negligence does not fall within the statute.

Section 156 bases recovery on comparative fault and excludes negligence that did not proximately cause the injury.

Packard v. Whitten · filed 1971-02-24

Our own Comparative Negligence statute predicates recovery on comparative fault, an apt choice of word because the statute' is not concerned with negligence, however great, which is not a proximate cause of the injury.

Section 156 permits a jury that finds the defendant’s breach caused the plaintiff’s injuries to compare the plaintiff’s causal fault with the defendant’s.

Boetsch v. Jaycees · filed 1972-03-08

Should the jury decide that the defendant violated the duty owed the plaintiff, and that such violation was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, it might also appraise the conduct of the plaintiff to determine whether the plaintiff’s causal fault, if any, was lesser, equal to or greater than that of the defendant. 14 M.R.S. A. § 156.

Section 156 leaves the comparison of the parties’ fault to the jury.

Lyman v. Bourque · filed 1977-06-13

Thus, the statute makes clear that it is the sole prerogative of the jury to determine the comparative degrees of fault of each of the parties to a negligence action.

Section 156 allows a negligent plaintiff to recover unless the jury finds the plaintiff equally at fault, and leaves the parties’ relative fault to the jury.

Reed Ex Rel. Reed v. Rule · filed 1977-07-22

Under the Maine Comparative Negligence Statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 156, a plaintiff’s cause of action is not barred by his own negligence. ... The statute makes manifest that the jury should decide the quantum of negligence, if any, attributable to each party.

Section 156 precludes liability when the claimant’s negligence equals or exceeds the defendant’s negligence.

Weeks v. Kelley · filed 1977-09-06

Merrill’s liability can arise only if Kelley (1) was guilty of negligence (2) that was greater than that of Weeks and (3) that proximately caused the accident.

Section 156 leaves the comparison of the parties’ causal fault to the jury when both parties’ fault is disputed.

Bourgeois v. Hoyt · filed 1978-03-31

We have carefully reviewed the facts which, in our view, presented a simple jury issue as to the causative fault, if any, of both plaintiff and defendant. The answer, favorable to the defendant, is dispositive of this appeal.

Section 156 bars recovery when the plaintiff is at least equally at fault for the accident.

Moses v. Scott Paper Company · filed 1968-02-08

For the foregoing reasons, the Court is compelled to the conclusion that this accident and the resulting damage sustained by Moses were the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of Bacon, but that Moses was at least equally at fault, and therefore the plaintiff cannot recover. 14 M.R.S.A. § 156 (1964) as amended, (1967 Supp.).

Section 156 bars recovery when the plaintiff’s causative negligence is at least equal to the defendant’s.

Thomas v. Wilson · filed 1976-04-30

Under the provisions of 14 M.R.S.A. § 156, this factual determination by the jury bars any recovery by the plaintiff for damages which he sustained.

Section 156 bars a plaintiff’s recovery only if the plaintiff’s fault is at least equal to the defendants’ fault.

Herrick v. Theberge · filed 1984-04-11

Furthermore, Mrs. Herrick’s comparative fault, if any, would bar her recovery only if her fault was found at least to equal that of defendants.

Section 156 permits a jury to treat a plaintiff’s comparative fault as trivial and leave the damages award unreduced despite finding legal fault.

Stubbs v. Bartlett · filed 1984-07-18

We are persuaded that plaintiff’s blameworthiness could have been considered trivial by the jury and yet still have constituted a degree of legal fault. ... We find no impropriety on the part of the jury.

Section 156 compares the parties’ causative fault when each party breached a duty and that breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries.

Allen v. Hunter · filed 1986-02-25

A comparison of the parties’ causative fault pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 156 presupposes that each party breached a duty and that the breach was a proximate cause of the Plaintiff’s injuries.

Section 156 bars a claimant from recovering for another party’s negligence if the claimant is equally at fault.

Central Maine Power Co. v. Foster Wheeler Corp. · filed 1988-04-18

Under Maine law, which is here applicable, a party may not recover for another’s negligence “if such claimant is found ... to be equally at fault.” 14 M.R.S.A. § 156. The Court must therefore examine whether actions or omissions by CMP contributed to the damage incurred at Wyman IV and, if so, to what extent.

Section 156 bars recovery when a plaintiff’s negligence is equal to or greater than the defendant’s.

Everett v. United States · filed 1989-06-30

If the Court finds Plaintiff’s negligence to be equal to or greater than Defendant’s, Plaintiff may not recover under the statute. ... Because Plaintiff’s negligence is greater than the assumed negligence of Defendant in leaving a dangerous condition on the premises, Plaintiff may not recover in this action.

Section 156 bars recovery when the plaintiff’s negligence is equal to or greater than the defendant’s, and leaves the assessment of relative causative fault to the factfinder.

Fournier v. Rochambeau Club · filed 1992-08-07

Finally, the Club argues that the court erred in failing to hold, again as a matter of law, that Fournier’s negligence was equal to or greater than the Club’s negligence, thus precluding any recovery under section 156. We disagree. As in Jackson, the assessment of the relative causative fault of the parties regarding liability is in the instant case a determination properly left to the court in its role as trier of fact. See id.

A comparative fault instruction may be refused when the proposed instruction would confuse the jury with speculative conduct predating the defendant’s representation and the damages charge limits recovery to harm the defendant caused.

Burton v. Merrill · filed 1992-08-24

The trial court’s refusal to instruct on comparative fault was based on its determination that such an instruction would confuse the jury with matters relating back before Merrill was retained by Burton, the speculative chances of success of such a challenge or appeal, and because the instruction actually given made clear that the jury could award damages only for Merrill’s conduct that actually caused harm to Burton. There was no error in the court’s refusal to instruct the jury on comparative fault.

Section 156 requires the factfinder to compare the parties’ causative fault and, when damages are awarded, reduce them by a just and equitable dollar amount reflecting the claimant’s responsibility.

Beale v. Chisholm · filed 1993-06-04

If the defendant’s liability has been determined by a comparison of the relative causative fault of the parties, then in the damages phase, pursuant to section 156, the factfinder must apportion the award of damages by reducing “the total damages by dollars and cents, and not by percentage, to the extent deemed just and equitable, having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damages.”

Section 156 permits recovery when the plaintiff was negligent but the defendant was more negligent.

Kaechele v. Kenyon Oil Co., Inc. · filed 2000-02-29

Although he also witnessed Roddy’s outburst, he was neither trained to deal with such situations nor regularly exposed to them. A jury could reasonably conclude that although both he and Xtra Mart were negligent, Xtra Mart was more so.

Section 156 does not allow the same conduct by a plaintiff to reduce damages through both comparative negligence and mitigation of damages.

Walter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2000-04-12

The fact that Walter did not call her doctor as soon as she discovered the bruising and skin rash ought not to lower damages by apportioning fault under the comparative damages statute and be used again by a factfinder to reduce damages because Walter failed to avoid the consequences of Wal-Mart’s negligence. The jury should not be instructed on both comparative negligence and mitigation of damages for the same act of the plaintiff.

Section 156 bars a claimant from recovering when the claimant and defendant are equally at fault.

Hammond v. Gaboury · filed 1992-07-01

In order for Hammond to recover, the court would have to find that Gaboury was negligent and that Gaboury’s negligence exceeded any negligence on the part of Hammond. ... The court determined that Hammond and Gaboury were equally negligent. ... We discern no error.

Section 156 allows damages to be reduced for a plaintiff's share of responsibility, but partial fault does not bar recovery.

Ricker v. Brooks Dairy Farm, Inc. · filed 2000-01-25

Although the statute in one instance refers to a plaintiff's “contributory negligence,” the doctrine of comparative negligence does not bar Plaintiffs recovery if Plaintiff was partially at fault for his injuries.

Section 156 requires the jury to subtract a dollar amount for comparative negligence from total damages before a statutory cap is applied to consortium damages.

Brown v. Crown Equipment Corp. · filed 2008-12-11

The statute mandates that the jury is to assess a sum for comparative negligence and then subtract that sum on a dollars and cents basis from its total damages award. See 14 M.R.S. § 156. If the accounting for comparative fault occurs first, and the statutory damage cap pursuant to 18-A M.R.S. § 2-804(b) is then applied against the specific, reduced amount of damages awarded for consortium, the jury’s intention will most accurately be reflected, and the statutory cap will be imposed only against that portion of the award that is to be “capped.”

Section 156 bars recovery when a plaintiff’s comparative negligence equals or exceeds the defendant’s negligence.

Patterson v. United States · filed 2009-02-19

The Court concludes that the United States Postal Service was not negligent in causing the injuries William Patterson sustained at its premises on December 23, 2006 and, if it was negligent, Mr. Patterson’s comparative negligence was equal to or greater than the negligence of the Postal Service.

Section 156 lets a defendant seek to reduce a plaintiff’s damages based on the plaintiff’s own negligence; it does not provide a basis for the plaintiff’s claim.

Santiago v. Adamen · filed 2009-03-11

In his opposition, Plaintiff mistakenly relies on the doctrine of contributory negligence as a basis for his claim. The doctrine of contributory negligence is a doctrine raised by a defendant that works to decrease any award of damages to the plaintiff by accounting for a plaintiffs own negligence. 14 M.R.S. § 156 (2008).

Section 156 permits a defaulted defendant to seek a reduction of damages for the plaintiff's fault, but not to use comparative fault to defeat liability.

In Re Game Tracker, Inc. · filed 2011-07-28

Nonetheless, the default does not preclude the Eastman defendants, in Game Tracker's stead, from raising the separate comparative negligence issue that arises in Maine during the apportionment-of-the-damages phase: whether, on principles of justice and equity, the total damages recoverable should be reduced on account of the plaintiff's fault, and, if so, by how much in dollars and cents, having regard to the plaintiff's share in the responsibility for the damages.

Section 156 permits a defaulted defendant to seek a just and equitable reduction of damages based on the plaintiff’s fault, but not to use comparative fault to defeat liability.

Edwards v. Eastman Outdoors, Inc. · filed 2011-07-28

Nonetheless, the default does not preclude the Eastman defendants, in Game Tracker’s stead, from raising the separate comparative negligence issue that arises in Maine during the apportionment-of-the-damages phase: whether, on principles of justice and equity, the total damages recoverable should be reduced on account of the plaintiffs fault, and, if so, by how much in dollars and cents, having regard to the plaintiffs share in the responsibility for the damages.

Section 156 requires a just and equitable reduction in a plaintiff's recovery when both parties are at fault.

Pelletier v. Jackson · filed 2011-08-25

Because both parties were at fault, the Court must reduce Plaintiff's recovery by an amount that the Court finds to be just and equitable given Plaintiff's responsibility for the collision and the resulting injuries. 14 M.R.S. § 156 (2010). The Court, therefore, reduces the amount of Plaintiff's recovery by $2,500 to $10,213.24.

Section 156 requires the jury to compare a product seller’s conduct with the plaintiff’s contributory negligence when deciding a comparative negligence defense to strict product liability.

Hinton v. Outboard Marine Corp. · filed 2011-11-21

Moreover, as the Maine Law Court made clear in Austin, the jury’s task under section 156 is to “compare the conduct of the seller of an unreasonably dangerous product with the contributorily negligent conduct of the plaintiff.” 471 A.2d at 285. On this record, which contains virtually no information about the nature of the defect, the Court is in no position to make that evaluation-and to compare degrees of negligence — and is certainly in no position to rule that, as a matter of law, Mr. Hinton’s negligence was equal to or greater than the Defendants’ liability.

Section 156’s comparative fault rules do not reduce the full indemnification required by the more specific overhead high-voltage line statute.

Central Maine Power Company v. Devereux Marine, Inc. · filed 2013-03-26

The comparative fault statute cannot be interpreted to nullify the narrowly applicable indemnification provision of section 760, which explicitly contemplates that the line owner or operator may independently become liable for damages and nonetheless requires indemnification of the line owner or ... operator for “all . . . injuries to persons” by a person who violates the Act by engaging in work that brings a person or materials within ten feet of the overhead high-voltage line without notifying the line owner or operator, resulting in contact with the line.

Section 156 applies when a rescuer acts negligently during a rescue; the parties' causal negligence is apportioned and the rescuer's damages are reduced accordingly.

Pray v. Morrissette · filed 2015-12-22

The undersigned has read many, many cases from across the country as well as various legal annotations regarding the issue of whether comparative negligence applies in a case where the rescue doctrine is implicated, and agrees with the reasoning of the Court in Pachesky v. Getz, 510 A.2d 776 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) as well as the Court in Cords v. Anderson, 259 N.W.2d 672 (Wis. 1977), specifically that if a plaintiff under the rescue doctrine acts negligently in performing a rescue, the relative causal negligence of the parties shou ld be apportioned in accordance with the comparative negligence statute.

Section 156 calls for a just and equitable reduction in damages based on the claimant’s share of responsibility.

Blackler v. Dairyland · filed 2016-12-01

The last step in the analysis is for the court to reduce the damages award to the extent of what is "just and equitable having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for the damage.".

Section 156 bars recovery when a claimant is at least equally at fault.

Page v. Amtrak, Inc. · filed 2016-03-03

Thus, absent any evidence that Amtrak was negligent, let alone evidence that Amtrak was more negligent than Page, the plaintiff cannot recover. See 14 M.R.S.A. § 156 (2003 & Supp. 2015) (“If [a] claimant is found by the jury to be equally at fault, the claimant may not recover.”).

Section 156 bars a claimant from recovering when the claimant is equally at fault with the tortfeasor.

Wuestenberg v. Rancourt · filed 2019-01-15

14 M.R.S. § 156 (2017) provides, in part, that when a claimant "is found by the jury to be equally at fault [with the tortfeasor], the claimant may not recover." ... By foregoing these inspections and indeed advancing the closing by fifteen days, the Wuestenbergs failed to exercise ordinary care to at least the same degree as they attribute to the Rancourts.

Section 156 allows comparative negligence to reduce a plaintiff's damages without absolutely barring recovery.

Mutrie v. McDonough · filed 2016-04-26

Comparative negligence could limit a plaintiffs damages, but unlike contributory negligence, it is not an absolute bar to recovery.

Section 156 apportions contribution among defendants by their percentages of causal fault without requiring a separate cross-claim for contribution.

Hinton v. Boyce · filed 2020-02-20

that statute, contribution is now based upon percentages of causal fault among defendants, independent of any cross-claim for contribution.

Section 156 gives a nonsettling joint tortfeasor the option to have the court determine the respective causative-fault shares of all joint tortfeasors for the plaintiff’s entire damage.

Burleigh v. General Electric Company · filed 2018-05-09

GE’s position that Maine law always requires a reduction based on proportionate fault (Docket Entry # 162, pp. 4-5) (citing Lavoie v. Celotex Corp., 505 A.2d 481, 483 (Me. 1986), and Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 156) as opposed to the dollar amount of the settlement, is not entirely accurate. ... the nonsettling joint tortfeasor against whom a verdict is entered possesses two distinct statutorily-based adjudicative options in respect to his contribution right: (1) the right to have the court precisely adjudicate the respective levels of the causative fault of all joint tortfeasors causing the plaintiff’s entire damage under 14 M.R.S.A. § 156; or (2) the right to have any verdict rendered against him reduced by the amount of the plaintiff’s settlement with other joint tortfeasors under 14 M.R.S.A. § 163. Stacey v. Bangor Punta Corp., 108 F.R.D. at 75.

Section 156 bars recovery by a claimant whose fault equals the defendant’s, but it does not bar contribution from that defendant to a joint tortfeasor who paid the claimant’s judgment.

Otis Elevator Co. of Maine v. F.W. Cunningham & Sons · filed 1983-01-04

We conclude that the policies underlying modified comparative negligence are not frustrated by allowing contribution from a negligent joint tort-feasor not directly liable to the injured party because that injured party’s fault was equal to or greater than that of the tort-feasor. Since the rationale supporting modified comparative negligence concerns only plaintiff’s disability and does not disavow a tort-feasor’s fault, the policies underlying modified comparative negligence simply do not come into play once an injured party has been paid his judgment by a joint tort-feasor found more negligent than he was and, therefore, directly liable to him.

Section 156 gives a nonsettling defendant the right to have each joint tortfeasor’s share of causal fault adjudicated; a settlement made without that defendant’s agreement cannot take away that right.

Stacey v. Bangor Punta Corp. · filed 1985-10-23

The election of the desired course is, however, the prerogative of the nonsettling defendant, of which he cannot be deprived without his agreement, for the right to the precise adjudication is one given by section 156. The nonsettling defendant cannot be stripped of the benefit of that right because of a bargain between one or more of his fellow joint tortfeasors and the plaintiff, to which he is not a party.

Section 156 makes each concurrent tortfeasor jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff’s full damages.

Gagne v. Carl Bauer Schraubenfabrick, GmbH · filed 1984-10-19

Under Maine law, each concurrent tortfeasor is jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for the full amount of the plaintiff's damages. 14 M.R.S.A. § 156 (1980).

Section 156’s joint and several liability does not prevent an allocated several judgment when plaintiffs consent to a summary judgment implementing a Pierringer release.

Clockedile v. Town of Yarmouth · filed 1987-02-12

Although the Pierringer release in this case purports to release “all persons” from liability for that portion of the cause of action attributable to the fault of N.E. Construction, plaintiffs argue that such a contractual discharge is incapable of altering joint and several liability, as recognized under 14 M.R.S.A. § 156. ... By entering a several and allocated judgment against Yarmouth in the sum of $60,000, the Superior Court correctly carried out the terms of the summary judgment.

Section 156 permits apportionment of damages only in cases involving multiple defendants.

Jacobs v. Painter · filed 1987-08-21

The allocation the defendant seeks is available only in cases “involving multi-party defendants.” 14 M.R.S.A. § 156 (1980).

Section 156 does not require a jury reducing damages for the claimant’s fault to consider the negligence of a party the claimant voluntarily dismissed.

Hoitt v. Hall · filed 1995-07-07

Eileen voluntarily dismissed Thurlow. The court correctly refused to instruct the jury to consider Thurlow’s negligence when it reduced Eileen’s damages to the extent it thought just and equitable.

Section 156 makes each defendant in a case involving multiple defendants jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff’s full damages, regardless of the jury’s allocation of fault.

Peerless Division, Lear Siegler, Inc. v. United States Special Hydraulic Cylinders Corp. · filed 1999-12-17

If the Manns had chosen to proceed against either Hunger or Peerless for the full amount of the verdict, the defendant thus singled out could not have used the jury’s apportionment of fault to escape payment to the Manns of the entire verdict.

Section 156 allows an injured person without fault to recover all damages from any jointly and severally liable tortfeasor, even one who was only partly at fault.

Peerless Insurance v. Progressive Insurance · filed 2003-05-05

We adopt the Superior Court’s sound and well-reasoned conclusion that “[t]he dispositive principle is that of joint and several liability, under which an injured party without fault may collect the entire amount of damages from a joint tort feasor who was only 25% at fault.”

Section 156 permits a defendant to seek fault apportionment, but a ruling limiting liability to a proportionate share is premature before liability is established or apportionment is requested.

Barday v. Donnelly · filed 2006-01-27

It is premature to request a ruling from this court limiting defendant's liability to h s proportionate share before Defendant has been found liable or requested an app~rtionment.

Section 156 entitles a settling defendant to dismissal with prejudice and bars contribution claims when the plaintiff agrees not to collect that defendant’s share of damages from the remaining parties.

Colonial Square Condo. Assocs. v. Prime Care Med. Supplies, Inc. · filed 2009-06-10

Prime Care is entitled to be dismissed from the case with prejudice and immunized against Empire's cross-claim for contribution.

Section 156 lets a nonsettling defendant use special interrogatories to ask the jury to assign each defendant a percentage of fault.

Laudermilk v. Wellpath, LLC · filed 2019-11-27

A non-settling defendant has the right "through the use of special interrogatories to request of the jury the percentage of fault contributed by each defendant." 14 M.RS. § 156.

Section 156(1) allows a qualifying Pierringer release to bar related common law indemnification claims as well as contribution claims against the released party.

Pixelle Androscoggin LLC v. Trico Mechanical Contractors, Inc. · filed 2022-05-25(1)

This Court is following the Law Court’s interpretation of Section 156 as applying to both contribution and indemnification. Moreover, this is a common law indemnity claim.

Section 156, as amended in 1969, directs the jury to deduct a dollar amount for the claimant’s fault and return the lesser figure as the final verdict.

Jamison v. Shepard · filed 1970-11-06

The effect of this change was to direct the jury to make the deduction and return a verdict in which the “lesser figure” (remainder) governed for purposes of judgment-.

Section 156 calls for comparison of causative fault to determine liability and consideration of the parties’ relative blameworthiness when apportioning damages.

George v. Guerette · filed 1973-06-18

Our own comparative negligence statute envisions a comparison of causative fault as to liability and, as to apportionment of damages, the jury must be told that it should give consideration to the relative blame-worthiness of the parties.

Section 156 allows a jury to reduce damages by more than half even when the claimant’s fault is less than the defendant’s; the reduction need not match the parties’ relative fault mathematically.

Jackson v. Frederick's Motor Inn · filed 1980-08-12

The statutory caveat that the jury have regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damages in reaching a just and equitable assessment does not require an apportionment of equal mathematical proportion as the jury may have viewed the parties’ causative fault in determining the liability issue, but merely directs that consideration should be given to that particular factor with such weight or significance given to it as under all the circumstances it should merit. ... We conclude that the reduction of the total damage award by more than one half was not error.

Section 156 compares the plaintiff’s and defendant’s legal fault and, when the plaintiff’s fault is less, reduces recoverable damages according to an equitable assessment of that fault.

McKellar v. Clark Equipment Co. · filed 1984-03-13

Maine law contemplates that the determination as to whether or not any comparative fault of a plaintiff is equal to or greater than that of a defendant is to be reached on the basis of concepts of legal fault. If it is not equal to or greater than that of the defendant, the resultant reduction in recoverable damages is to be based upon an equitable judgment as to the significance of the plaintiff’s level of fault, taken in the context of the fault of the defendant.

Section 156 requires the court to reduce the total damages after determining the damages owed.

Hood v. Mercier · filed 1985-10-11

On remand the court must make a new determination of other damages, if any, and then reduce the new total damages pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 156 (1980).

Section 156 requires a just and equitable reduction from total damages when the plaintiff is partly at fault.

Frederick Winn, of the Estate of Marguerite Winn v. Lafayette Town House, Etc. · filed 1988-01-27

The total damage, which the $45,000 finding represents, is exactly what, under the statute, the second jury should equitably reduce if it finds negligence on plaintiff’s part.

Section 156 does not require a jury to reduce damages in direct proportion to the claimant’s share of fault.

Pelletier v. Fort Kent Golf Club · filed 1995-07-19

We conclude that pursuant to section 156, a jury is not required to award damages in proportion to the causative fault of the parties.

Section 156 permits a damages award to be reduced by the plaintiff’s percentage of comparative fault.

Sullivan v. Young Bros. and Co. Inc. · filed 1995-07-26

Plaintiff’s comparative fault is determined to be forty percent (40%). Because Plaintiffs comparative fault will be taken into consideration on each count, the total damage award against Defendant Vemay is reduced by forty percent (40%). 14 M.R.S.A. § 156.

Section 156 permits a jury to reduce damages by an amount it deems just and equitable without using a percentage equal to the plaintiff’s share of fault.

Pomeroy v. Glidden · filed 1997-05-28

In Pelletier v. Fort Kent Golf Club, 662 A.2d 220 (Me.1995), we concluded that Maine’s comparative negligence statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 156 (1980), “allows a jury to award damages in disproportion to its determination of liability.” Id. at 223. We recognized that the statute dictates that the jury should not be governed by percentages in reducing a damage award and instead is directed to reduce the award “to the extent deemed just and equitable.” Id. The Pomeroys’ reliance on the disproportionality of the award to Dorothy’s total damages is unavailing.

Section 156 permits a jury to reduce damages by an amount that is disproportionate to the plaintiff’s share of fault.

Fortin v. Titcomb · filed 2010-10-31

However, Maine case law clearly holds that a jury’s dollar reduction for comparative negligence need not be commensurate with its assessment of the plaintiffs quantum of liability for his own injury.

Section 156 requires a just and equitable reduction in damages when the plaintiff has some comparative fault that does not exceed the defendant’s fault.

Reagan v. Cahee · filed 2022-02-18

In circumstances where the Plaintiff has some comparative fault that does not exceed that of the Defendant the court is however required to make a just and equitable reduction of the total damages.

Section 156 does not apply to an accident that occurred before the 1967 comparative negligence statute.

Thompson v. Johnson · filed 1970-11-16

The accident occurred in May 1965. Liability is to be determined at common law, and not under the “comparative negligence” statute of 1967.

Section 156 does not apply to an accident that occurred before its effective date.

Quinn v. Moore · filed 1972-07-13

The incident occurred before the effective date of our Comparative Negligence Statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 156 (enacted in 1965, P.L. c. 424), and the plaintiff, therefore, in order to recover was not only required to prove negligence of the defendant which was a proximate cause of his injury but also his own freedom from any negligence which contributed to his injury.

Section 156 does not apply to a collision that occurred before its effective date.

Laferriere v. Paradis · filed 1972-07-20

The collision was prior to the effective date of our comparative negligence statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 156; heneé, the parties and the Court recognized that recovery by plaintiff is to be denied if he was guilty of any contributory negligence.

Section 156 places the burden of proving an injured party’s causal negligence on the opposing party, who must prove it by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

Crocker v. Coombs · filed 1974-11-19

Since the enactment of 14 M.R.S. A. § 156 was motivated by humanitarian reasons and the consequent need to eliminate the unfairness of the contributory negligence doctrine, we do not hesitate to hold that the burden of proving the causal negligence of the tortiously injured party now falls upon his adversary, who must support this burden by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

Section 156 places the burden on a defendant to prove a plaintiff’s contributory fault by a preponderance of the evidence.

Minott v. FW Cunningham & Sons · filed 1980-04-28

Under the comparative negligence statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 156, a defendant has the burden of showing the contributory fault of a plaintiff by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 156 places the burden of proving the plaintiff’s negligence on the defendant.

Ingalls v. Brown · filed 1983-06-10

Since the adoption of the comparative negligence statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 156, the burden has rested on the defendant to prove plaintiff’s negligence.

Section 156 allows a comparative negligence defense, which the defendant bears the burden of proving.

Gray v. United States · filed 2012-02-17

Under Maine law allowing a comparative negligence defense, 14 M.R.S.A. § 156, the burden of proof is on the defendant.

The defendant bears the burden of proving comparative negligence.

Estate of Paul J. Gagnon v. Anthony · filed 2015-11-10

First, as to the jury’s finding that Gagnon was at least as negligent as Anthony, it is important to note that Anthony, not the Estate, had the burden of proof at trial on the challenged issue of comparative negligence.

Section 156 requires a defendant asserting comparative negligence to offer prima facie evidence that the plaintiff's fault proximately caused the harm.

Sellars v. Osborne · filed 2015-08-25

Thus, to maintain a defense of comparative negligence, the defendant must produce prima facie evidence that the plaintiff's own fault was a proximate cause of the underlying harm that gave rise to the plaintiff's claim. ... Defendant has produced prima facie evidence in support of its comparative negligence defense.

Section 156 treats voluntary assumption of risk as contributory fault to be weighed against the defendant’s negligence.

Wilson v. Gordon · filed 1976-03-31

While it is true that 14 M.R.S.A. § 156 does not specifically abolish the defense of assumption of the risk, ... in most cases the apportionment of fault which the statute is designed to effectuate obviates the need for and alleviates much of the harshness of that common law doctrine. In those cases where assumption of the risk is based upon the plaintiff’s lack of due care in encountering a known risk created by the negligence of the defendant — so-called “voluntary” assumption of the risk — the concept overlaps contributory fault. In such circumstances the plaintiff’s conduct should be judged in terms of contributory fault and weighed against the causal negligence of the defendant.

Section 156's comparative negligence principles abolish assumption of risk as a defense to negligence claims.

Johnson v. Chrysler Corp. · filed 1999-07-09

It is clear that the doctrine of assumption of the risk was abolished as an available defense to claims of negligence in Maine when the state legislature adopted comparative negligence principles. See 14 M.R.S.A. § 156; Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398, 401-03 (Me.1976). Accordingly, the doctrine of assumption of the risk is not applicable to Plaintiffs negligence claims.

Section 156 requires the jury to compare the relative blameworthiness of the parties’ causative fault; a rational comparison cannot be set aside by the judge.

Lowery v. Owen M. Taylor & Sons, Inc. · filed 1977-06-13

The jury was required to compare the blameworthiness of the causative fault of Taylor and the plaintiff and, proceeding on appropriate instructions, it responded. We cannot say on this record that this response was irrational.

Section 156 does not limit a court’s review of whether sufficient evidence supports the jury’s findings on liability.

Manzo v. Malone · filed 1979-11-02

Nothing in that provision limits the responsibility of the trial court or this ... Court to review the jury’s findings relative to liability where it is claimed that the evidence to support those findings is legally insufficient.

Where section 156 applies, failing to guard against a possible product defect does not justify a comparative fault instruction without evidence of voluntarily and unreasonably encountering a known danger.

Prentiss & Carlisle Company, Inc. v. Koehring-Waterous Division of Timberjack, Inc. · filed 1992-08-06

Maine’s comparative fault statute applies to actions based on “fault,” which is defined as “negligence, breach of statutory duty or other act or omission which gives rise to a liability in tort_” Me. Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 14, § 156. ... Even assuming, arguendo, that the statute does apply to this express warranty action, the evidence did not warrant a comparative negligence charge. ... Given this evidence, failure to turn off the switch was, at most, a failure to “guard against the possibility of [a defect’s] existence,” rather than a “voluntary and unreasonable” exposure to a “known danger.” There was no basis for a comparative fault instruction.

When evidence raises a jury question about the defendant’s causative negligence, Section 156 leaves the parties’ comparative fault exclusively to the jury.

Ferguson v. Bretton · filed 1977-07-05

Since a jury question as to the ap-pellee’s causative negligence was presented, the comparative fault of the parties was a matter exclusively for the jury.

Section 156 leaves the parties’ comparative fault to the jury when the evidence presents a question of the plaintiff’s causative negligence.

Binette v. Deane · filed 1978-08-21

Since a jury question as to Mr. Binette’s causative negligence was presented, the comparative fault of the parties was a matter exclusively for the jury.

Section 156 allows a jury to decide whether a plaintiff’s causative fault equals or exceeds the defendant’s when the evidence makes that comparison a factual question.

Souza v. Bangor Hydro-Electric Co. · filed 1978-09-28

In the similar circumstances of the case at bar we likewise conclude that it was a question of fact to be decided by the jury whether plaintiff’s causative fault, if any, was equal to or greater than the causative fault of the defendant.

Section 156 leaves the comparison of the parties’ causative negligence to the jury.

Libby ex rel. Libby v. Legrow · filed 1979-04-19

Under appropriate instructions mandated by our comparative negligence statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 156, and in response to interrogatories, the jury determined that the negligence of the infant plaintiff exceeded that of the defendant. ... We have consistently delegated to the jury the obligation of reaching an ultimate conclusion on the comparative fault of the parties involved in situations where their causative negligence is in issue. This case is typical. The judgment of the jury on the facts must stand.

Section 156 does not bar recovery when the evidence supports a jury’s finding that the defendant was more negligent than the plaintiff.

Thibodeau v. Slaney · filed 2000-06-21

After that evaluation, the jury determined that, while both parties were negligent, Slaney’s negligence was greater than Thibodeau’s. ... With our limited and deferential review of factfindings by juries, we cannot say as a matter of law that the jury’s finding on the comparative fault issue was clearly erroneous.

Section 156 requires a factfinder to assess employer and employee negligence separately, then compare them and bar the employee’s recovery if his negligence equals or exceeds the employer’s.

Hurd v. Hurd · filed 1981-01-02

The enactment of 14 M.R.S.A. § 156 in 1965 changed the manner in which the trier of fact should analyze, on those infrequent occasions when it arises, the problem of whether an injured employee may recover from his employer on a common law negligence theory in instances in which the danger that caused the employee’s injury was or should have been obvious to him. Rather than equating the employee’s failure to avoid an obvious danger with a total lack of duty on the employer’s part, the factfinder should first determine independently whether the employer has violated either his duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace or his duty to instruct the employee on risks inherent in the nature of the work. If the employer has been negligent in either or both respects, the focus of the inquiry then shifts to the employee’s duty to refrain from negligent conduct. If the factfinder determines that the employee’s own negligence was equal to or greater than the employer’s, the employee will be barred from recovery.

An obvious danger is a factor in determining the parties’ relative degrees of negligence under section 156.

Brubach v. Almy · filed 1987-01-16

Whether the danger causing the injury was obvious is a factor to be considered in determining the parties’ relative degrees of negligence under the comparative negligence statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 156 (1980).

Section 156 permits recovery when the plaintiff is less at fault than the defendant; its comparative negligence rule does not apply to claims under the dog damage statute because the dog keeper’s fault is immaterial.

Pettitt v. Lizotte · filed 1982-12-28

If, under section 3651, the fault of the defendant is immaterial to a recovery, there is no conduct of the defendant against which plaintiff’s fault can be weighed comparatively. ... We find no compelling reasons to expand this statute to include the “ameliorating effect” of comparative negligence principles.

Section 156 applies to strict liability claims, where a plaintiff’s comparative fault can include voluntarily and unreasonably encountering a known danger.

Boise Cascade Corp. v. Colt Industries · filed 1991-04-25

Maine’s comparative negligence statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 156 defines a plaintiff’s fault which must be considered under the statute as that which would, apart from this section, give rise to the defense of contributory negligence. In Austin v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 471 A.2d 280, 286 (Me.1984), the Maine Law Court held that section 156 applies to strict liability cases. The court described the plaintiffs fault that must be considered in such cases as “contributory negligence of a form commonly passing under the name of assumption of the risk, consisting in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger.” Id. at 286. ... The issue of assumption of the risk, as now propounded by Defendant, was not litigated in the previous trial. ... Therefore, Plaintiff’s comparative fault in regard to his strict liability claim has not been conclusively determined.

Section 156 applies to strict products liability claims when the claimant voluntarily and unreasonably encounters a known danger.

Austin v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. · filed 1984-01-17

Yes; section 156 is applicable to plaintiff’s strict liability claim, to the extent of requiring comparison of defendant’s fault, if any, under section 221 with Blaine Austin’s fault, if any, consisting in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a danger known to him.

Section 156’s comparative negligence defense requires an individual inquiry into whether a plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably encountered a known danger.

Millett v. Atlantic Richfield Co. · filed 2000-03-02

Thus, the defense of comparative negligence requires an inquiry into whether each class member acted in such a way as to voluntarily and unreasonably encounter a known danger.

Section 156 does not reduce damages for a plaintiff’s comparative negligence when the defendant is liable for intentional assault and battery.

McLain v. Training and Development Corp. · filed 1990-04-02

We have never recognized contributory or comparative negligence as a defense to the intentional tort of assault and battery and we decline to do so now.

Section 156 does not permit a patient’s recovery for negligent medical treatment to be reduced because the patient’s earlier conduct created the need for treatment.

Harvey Ex Rel. Harvey v. Mid-Coast Hospital · filed 1999-01-08

This Court holds, in its prospective view of Maine law, that the jury is not to be permitted to find that although Mid-Coast Hospital’s subsequent treatment did constitute malpractice which is a proximate cause of Julian’s injuries, a recovery by the Harveys is barred, or may be reduced under the comparative fault doctrine, because the original ingestion of Tegretol was intentionally or negligently caused by Julian.

Section 156’s comparative fault law does not eliminate the emergency doctrine or bar a jury instruction on it when the circumstances support one.

Coyne v. Peace · filed 2004-12-14

We have continued to recognize the validity of the emergency doctrine for jury instructions approved since the 1965 adoption of the comparative fault law, 14 M.R.S.A. § 156 (2003).

Section 156 does not support a comparative negligence defense based solely on a motorcycle passenger’s failure to wear a helmet without reliable evidence connecting that failure to the damages.

Piche v. Nugent · filed 2006-07-05

The mere fact that Ms. Laprise did not wear a helmet, standing alone without the aid of reliable expert testimony, does not generate a comparative negligence defense.

Section 156 bars a wrongful death beneficiary from recovering damages when that beneficiary’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the death.

Amica Mutual Insurance v. Estate of Pecci · filed 2008-06-10

Because the personal representative admits that Lawrence’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of Esther’s death, the comparative negligence statute bars any recovery by Lawrence.