Statute Annotations › Louisiana › La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1

La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1

Second degree murder: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Louisiana
Case notes
1,102
Cited in passing
1,285
Citing cases indexed
3,046
Case dates
1974–2026
Screened through
2026-06-29
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-02
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

2,387 citing cases reviewed of 3,046 in the citation index: 1,102 interpreted the section (annotated below), 1,285 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-29 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Second-degree murder—juvenile and parole rules

Subsection (B) mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for second degree murder, and the court rejected a constitutional excessive-punishment challenge.

State v. Turner · filed 2016-01-20(B)

The mandatory sentence for second degree murder is punishment by life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). The argument that the mandatory life sentence for second degree murder is a violation of the prohibition against excessive punishment in the Louisiana Constitution has been repeatedly rejected.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and § 14:30.1(D) requires life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Lambert · filed 2016-01-20(A)(1), (D)

Second degree murder is defined by La. R.S., 14:30.1 A(l) as “the killing of a human being ... [wjhen the offender has a specific intent to. kill or to inflict great bodily harm.” ... Second, degree murder carries a sentence of life imprisonment. Under La. R.S. 14:30.1 D, “[w]hoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” (Emphasis added.).
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Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:30.1 mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for second degree murder, and informing the defendant that the sentence is mandatory satisfies the sentencing-factor discussion requirement.

State of Louisiana v. Joseph · filed 2016-04-06

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:30.1 mandates a sentence of life imprisonment and provides, in pertinent part, “[w]hoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” ... Under Perkins, the trial court fulfilled its duty to discuss aggravating and mitigating factors when it informed Defendant that he was receiving the mandatory sentence under the statute.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Thibodeaux · filed 2016-04-13(A)(1)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:30.1(A)(1) defines. second degree murder as the killing of a human being, “[w]hen the offender has a specific -intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]”
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Subsection (B) requires a mandatory life sentence for second degree murder, subject to a constitutionally required downward departure only in exceptional circumstances.

State v. Isidore · filed 2016-04-15(B)

There is nothing párticularly unusual about the defendant’s circumstances that would justify a downward departure from the mandatory sentence under La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). The record before us clearly established an adequate factual basis for the sentence imposed. The defendant has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that he is exceptional such that a mandatory life sentence would not be meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the cáse. See Johnson, 709 So.2d at 676. Accordingly, no downward departure from the presumptively constitutional mandatory life sentence is warranted. The sentence imposed is not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense and, therefore, is not unconstitutionally excessive.
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Section 14:30.1(B) requires a second-degree-murder sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Nelson · filed 2016-06-22(B)

However, La. R.S. 14:30.1(B) mandates that the sentence be served “at hard labor.”
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder as the killing of a human being with the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Speaks · filed 2016-12-07(A)(1)

Defendant was convicted of second degree murder in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1).
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Section 14:30.1 defines second degree murder to include a killing committed with the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Alexander · filed 2016-04-13

The offense of second degree murder requires specific intent “to kill or inflict great bodily harm.”
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Section 14:30.1(B) provides life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for a person who commits second degree murder.

State v. Pierce · filed 2017-02-15(B)

Whoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B).
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Section 14:30.1 remains the governing second degree murder statute for resentencing a juvenile homicide offender, read with the parole-eligibility procedures in Article 878.1; the offender is not resentenced to manslaughter.

State v. Plater · filed 2017-05-17

The trial court properly utilized La. R.S. 14:30.1 and La. C. Cr. P. art. 878.1 when resen-tencing Plater, who is not entitled to be resentenced to the next lesser included offense of manslaughter.
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Section 14:30.1 requires the sentence for attempted second degree murder, through its interaction with the attempt statute, to be served at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Williams · filed 2017-04-05

However, because it is mandatory for Defendant’s sentence to be served at hard labor and without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence as provided by La.R.S. 14:27 and La.R.S. 14:30.1, we amend Defendant’s sentence to provide that the sentence for attempted second degree murder is to be served at hard labor without benefit or parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
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Section 14:30.1(B) requires a mandatory life sentence at hard labor for second degree murder, subject to a constitutionally required downward departure only when the defendant clearly and convincingly proves exceptional circumstances.

State v. Scott · filed 2017-09-15(B)

Furthermore, there is nothing particularly unusual about the defendant’s circumstances that would justify a downward departure from the mandatory sentence under La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). The record before us clearly established an adequate factual basis for the sentence imposed. The defendant has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that he is exceptional such that a mandatory life sentence would not be meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case. ... Accordingly, no downward departure from the presumptively constitutional mandatory life sentence is warranted.
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Section 14:30.1 mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for a conviction of second degree murder.

State v. Marshall · filed 2017-11-29

Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:30.1, the penalty for a conviction of second degree murder is a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.
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Section 14:30.1 requires a person convicted of second-degree murder to receive life imprisonment at hard labor, without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, subject to the juvenile-offender parole rules applied here.

State v. Bradley · filed 2018-01-10

La. R.S. 14:30.1 provides a sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for offenders convicted of second degree murder in Louisiana.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder, in relevant part, as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and provides for a mandatory life sentence.

State v. Cox · filed 2018-02-21

Second degree murder is defined, in pertinent part, as the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second degree murder as the killing of a human being when the offender has the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and imposes a mandatory life sentence at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. McBride · filed 2018-03-21

Under La. R.S. 14:30.1, second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. ... Under La. R.S. 14:30.1, the punishment for second degree murder is a mandatory life sentence at hard labor with no benefit of parole, probation, or suspended sentence.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second degree murder as killing a human being with the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Coleman · filed 2018-04-13(A)(1)

Louisiana Revised Statute 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second degree murder, in pertinent part, as the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.
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Section 14:30.1(B) requires a mandatory life sentence at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for second degree murder.

State v. Fredieu · filed 2018-06-27(B)

The penalty for second degree murder is a mandatory life sentence at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B).
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Subsection (B) requires a person convicted of second degree murder to serve life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Roderick Jermaine Cawthorne, Jr. · filed 2018-10-03(B)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:30.1(B) requires that anyone convicted of second degree murder “shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” ... Given this court’s ruling in Monceaux, we find that Defendant has not proven that his youth creates circumstances to make the mandatory denial of parole for a second degree murder conviction unconstitutionally excessive.
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Section 14:30.1(B) requires a person convicted of second-degree murder to receive life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Coleman · filed 2018-11-14(B)

Whoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). ... For the foregoing reasons, the conviction and sentence of Cortez Coleman are affirmed.
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Section 14:30.1 requires a person convicted of second degree murder to receive life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence; for a juvenile offender resentenced under Miller, the court considers parole eligibility rather than a downward departure from that mandatory sentence.

State v. Brooks · filed 2018-11-14

A conviction for second degree murder carries a mandatory sentence of life at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1. ... Accordingly, there is no consideration of whether there should be a downward departure from the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor. Instead, the trial court considers only whether the mandatory sentence should include parole eligibility.
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 277 made juveniles indicted for second-degree murder from August 1, 2017 through July 31, 2026 parole-eligible after twenty-five years without a hearing; Acts 2026, No. 585 allows a hearing for later indictments when the State timely seeks life without parole. The former hearing rule still governs qualifying earlier indictments.

Section 14:30.1's life-imprisonment penalty for a juvenile second-degree-murder offender is subject to a hearing determining whether the sentence includes parole eligibility.

State v. Rubin · filed 2017-08-31

Moreover, also contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the Louisiana Legislature has codified the parameters for deviating from the La.R,S. 14:30.1 penalty in cases where the offender was a juvenile at the time of the offense: ... A. In any case where an offender is to be sentenced to life imprisonment for a conviction of first degree murder (R.S. 14:30) or second degree murder (R.S. 14:30.1) where the offender was under the age of eighteen years at the time of the commission of the offense, a hearing shall be conducted prior to sentencing to determine whether the sentence shall be imposed with or without parole eligibility pursuant to the provisions of R.S. 15:574.4(E).
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Second-degree murder—attempt and sentencing consequences

Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State of Louisiana v. Charles P. Mayeux, Jr. AKA Charles P. Mayeux · filed 2019-02-06(A)(1)

Louisiana Revised Statute 14:30.1(A)(1) defines, in pertinent part, second degree murder as “the killing of a human being . . . when the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]”
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State of Louisiana v. Burton · filed 2019-06-05(A)(1)

“Second degree murder is the killing of a human being . . . [w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm . . . .” La.R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1).
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Section 14:30.1(B) requires a mandatory life sentence without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for second-degree murder unless that sentence is unconstitutional.

State of Louisiana v. Daniel Heath Kight · filed 2019-06-05(B)

It is well-accepted that a trial court is required to impose sentences the legislature prescribed unless the sentences are unconstitutional. State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La.1993). Under La.R.S. 14:30.1, second degree murder has only one possible constitutional sentence—mandatory life imprisonment without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.
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Section 14:30.1 requires a mandatory life sentence for second-degree murder.

State of Louisiana Versus Terrance Darnell Calloway · filed 2019-12-30

Second degree murder carries a mandatory life sentence. See La. R.S. 14:30.1.
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Section 14:30.1(B), together with the attempt statute, bars a suspended sentence for a conviction of attempted second-degree murder.

State of Louisiana v. Eschenbach · filed 2020-01-15(B)

A person convicted of attempted second degree murder is not eligible for a suspended sentence, which is restricted by La. R.S. 14:30.1 and 14:27.
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Section 14:30.1(B) mandates a life sentence for second-degree murder.

State of Louisiana v. Nabors · filed 2020-04-22(B)

La. R.S. 14:30.1(B) mandates a life sentence for second degree murder. The trial court was not required to particularize or tailor the sentence to the defendant or to comply with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder under either a specific-intent theory or an enumerated-felony-murder theory and generally mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana Versus Emmett Garrison, IV AKA "Lil Emmet" · filed 2020-04-23

La. R.S. 14:30.1 defines second degree murder as the killing of a human being when the offender: 1) has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or 2) is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of one of several enumerated felonies, even though the offender has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. ... For those offenders convicted of second degree murder in Louisiana, La. R.S. 14:30.1 mandates a sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
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Section 14:30.1(A) defines second-degree murder as a killing committed with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, or a killing during one of the listed felonies even without that intent.

State of Louisiana v. Williams · filed 2020-05-06(A)

Additionally, second degree murder is relevantly defined in La.R.S. 14:30.1(A), in pertinent part, as the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or (2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated or first degree rape, forcible or second degree rape, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, second degree kidnapping, aggravated escape, assault by drive-by shooting, armed robbery, first degree robbery, second degree robbery, simple robbery, cruelty to juveniles, second degree cruelty to juveniles, or terrorism, even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. There is no question in this case that Mrs. Gordon was attempting to rob Mr. Ellis when she shot him in the back of the head after he refused to hand over his money. By definition, her actions qualify as second degree murder, despite her plea to manslaughter.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second degree murder to include a killing committed while the offender is perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate second degree kidnapping, even without intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State of Louisiana v. Braneon Sr. · filed 2020-02-05

Under La. R.S. 14:30.1, second degree murder is defined, in pertinent part, as the killing of a human being when the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of second degree kidnapping, even though he had no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.
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Section 14:30.1 mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for offenders convicted of second degree murder.

State of Louisiana v. Davis · filed 2020-07-01

For those offenders convicted of second degree murder in Louisiana, La. R.S. 14:30.1 mandates a sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State of Louisiana v. Robert Lee Heard, Jr. · filed 2022-11-23

La.R.S. 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as the “killing of a human being . . . [w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.” ... Therefore, we find that the record contains sufficient evidence upon which the jury could have found Defendant guilty of second-degree murder, and therefore conclude that this assignment of error has no merit.
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Section 14:30.1 provides alternative theories of second-degree murder, including specific-intent murder and felony murder during armed robbery, and jurors need not unanimously select one theory when properly instructed on both.

State of Louisiana v. Clardis Edward Galloway, Jr. · filed 2023-02-01(A)(1), (A)(2)

After closing arguments, the judge instructed the jury on both theories of second-degree murder and manslaughter. There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found Galloway guilty under either theory, including his theft of the murder weapon, his return to the crime scene in Ms. Foley’s car, which he took after having shot her, and his confession that he shot the victim in the back of the head as he was just about to rob her at gunpoint. As held by the court in State v. Seals, 09-1089, p. 81 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/29/11), 83 So. 3d 285, 346, writ denied, 12-293 (La. 10/26/12), 99 So. 3d 53, cert. denied, 569 U.S. 1031, 133 S. Ct. 2796, 186 L. Ed. 2d 863 (2013), a jury is not required to agree on a single theory to convict a defendant when it is instructed as to alternate theories.
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Section 14:30.1 requires a sentence for second degree murder to be imposed at hard labor.

State of Louisiana v. Vice · filed 2023-04-19

The trial court failed to impose the sentence at hard labor even though a sentence for second degree murder must be imposed at hard labor. La.R.S. 14:30.1. Thus, the sentence is illegally lenient.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State of Louisiana v. Bethley · filed 2023-06-21(A)(1)

Second-degree murder is defined as “the killing of a human being…when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm… .” La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1).
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and subsection (B) mandates life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, subject to juvenile parole eligibility provided by La. R.S. 15:574.4.

State Of Louisiana v. Campbell · filed 2023-11-03(A)(1), (B)

Second degree murder is defined, in pertinent part, as the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). ... A conviction for second degree murder in Louisiana mandates a sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B).
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Attempted second-degree-murder sentencing

La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.1 together provide a ten-to-fifty-year sentencing range for attempted second-degree murder.

State of Louisiana Versus Darval B. Ledet · filed 2021-01-27

The trial court advised defendant that the sentencing range on count two, attempted second degree murder, was zero to fifty years; however, La. R.S. 14:27 and La. R.S. 14:30.1 provide that the sentencing range was ten to fifty years.
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Section 14:30.1(B) makes life imprisonment at hard labor, without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, mandatory for second-degree murder.

State of Louisiana Versus Teddy Chester · filed 2021-02-03(B)

For those offenders convicted of second degree murder in Louisiana, La. R.S. 14:30.1 mandates a sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
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Section 14:30.1(B) mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension for second-degree murder, but a downward departure from that sentence may be considered.

Laura Eugene Versus Frederick M. Boutte, Warden · filed 2021-08-12(B)

Relator was convicted of second degree murder which carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. See La. R.S. 14:30.1 B. In addition, similar to Harris, relator received a life sentence that was statutorily mandated, the trial judge believed that he had no discretion in the imposition of the sentence, and relator’s counsel did nothing to correct the trial judge’s mistaken belief that there was no possibility of a downward departure from the life sentence required by law. The sentencing transcript shows that the trial judge stated, “In this matter, because of the very language of 30.1, the Court is endued with no discretion at all.”
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Section 14:30.1(B)'s life-imprisonment penalty for second-degree murder, applied with the attempt statute, yields a 10-to-50-year hard-labor range for attempted second-degree murder.

State of Louisiana Versus Jonathon Brown · filed 2023-06-21(B)

In the present case, defendant was found guilty of attempted second degree murder and was subsequently adjudicated a third felony offender on this count. Based on the applicable sentencing provisions, defendant was exposed to a sentencing range of not less than twenty-five years and not more than one hundred years. See La. R.S. 14:30.1, La. R.S. 14:27, and La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3). ... Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:30.1(B) and La. R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a), the sentencing range for attempted second degree murder was imprisonment at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
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Section 14:30.1(B), read with the attempt statute, makes attempted second degree murder punishable for a first offense by 10 to 50 years at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Smith · filed 2023-11-08(B)

The sentence for a first offense attempted second degree murder was not less than ten nor more than 50 years at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a); La. R.S. 14:30.1(B).
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Penalty for first-degree murder

Law changed since Acts 1975, No. 380 (effective September 12, 1975) lengthened the former twenty-year no-parole period to forty years for later offenses, and Acts 1979, No. 74 (effective June 29, 1979) ended ordinary parole eligibility for later second-degree murders. Current § 14:30(C) supplies the first-degree murder penalty; use of § 14:30.1 as a substitute penalty concerns the earlier convictions described in these opinions.

Section 14:30.1 supplied the valid penalty for first-degree murder at the time of the offense: life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for twenty years.

State v. Smith · filed 1976-10-14

For the reasons stated in State v. Jenkins, 340 So.2d 157 (La.1976), we conclude that the appropriate sentence to be imposed upon conviction for first degree murder is the most severe valid penalty established by the legislature for criminal homicide at the time of the offense (March 26, 1975), La.R.S. 14:29, et seq. This penalty is imprisonment at hard labor for life without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence for a period of twenty years. See La.R.S. 14:30.1 as added by Acts 1973, No. 111, § 1.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 14:30.1 provides imprisonment at hard labor for life without eligibility for parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for twenty years as the applicable penalty for first degree murder committed when that provision was in effect.

State v. Roberts · filed 1976-11-30

In the instant case, the offense was committed on August 18, 1973, at which time the most severe valid penalty for homicide was imprisonment at hard labor for life without eligibility for parole, probation or suspension of sentence for a period of twenty years. See La.R.S. 14:30.1, as added by Acts 1973, No. 111, § 1.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 14:30.1 provides imprisonment at hard labor for life without eligibility for parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for twenty years, and that term supplies the applicable sentence when the death penalty for a valid first-degree-murder conviction is invalidated.

State v. Tyler · filed 1977-01-24

Accordingly, we conclude that the appropriate sentence to be imposed upon a valid conviction for first degree murder is the most severe penalty established by the legislature for criminal homicide at the time of the offense, La.R.S. 14:29 et seq., which we may presume to be constitutional in the wake of Roberts v. Louisiana, supra. This penalty is imprisonment at hard labor for life without eligibility for parole, probation or suspension of sentence for a period of twenty years. See La.R.S. 14:30.1, as added by Acts 1973, No. 111, § 1.
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Law changed since Acts 1975, No. 380 (effective September 12, 1975) lengthened the former twenty-year no-parole period to forty years for later offenses; Acts 1979, No. 74 (effective June 29, 1979) ended ordinary parole eligibility for later second-degree murders. The earlier sentencing law remains relevant to offenses committed while it governed.

For second-degree murder committed on August 8, 1973, § 14:30.1 supplied a penalty of life imprisonment at hard labor without eligibility for probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for twenty years.

State ex rel. Richardson v. Augustine · filed 1977-11-11

Granted. District judge ordered to vacate and set aside previously imposed sentence and sentence relator to life imprisonment at hard labor without eligibility for probation, parole or suspension of sentence for twenty years, the penalty for second degree murder at the time this offense was committed on August 8, 1973. La.R.S. 14:30.1, as added by acts 1973, No. 111. See State v. Jenkins, 340 So.2d 157 (La.1976).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 14:30.1 requires life imprisonment at hard labor for second-degree murder, while making the offender ineligible for parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for twenty years.

State v. Jones · filed 1976-12-22

The penalty for second degree murder (La.R.S. 14:30.1) provides that whoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be imprisoned at hard labor for life and shall not be eligible for parole, probation or suspension of sentence for a period of twenty years. The sentence imposed herein renders defendant ineligible for parole, probation or suspension of sentence for the rest of his natural life rather than for twenty years, as provided in the statute.
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Law changed since Acts 1975, No. 380 (effective September 12, 1975) lengthened the former twenty-year no-parole period to forty years for later offenses, and Acts 1979, No. 74 (effective June 29, 1979) ended ordinary parole eligibility for later second-degree murders. Current § 14:30(C) supplies the first-degree murder penalty; use of § 14:30.1 as a substitute penalty concerns the earlier convictions described in these opinions.

Section 14:30.1 supplied the most severe valid homicide penalty at the time of the 1974 offense: life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension for twenty years.

State v. Roberts · filed 1977-09-19

In the instant case, the offense was committed on February 26, 1974, at which time the most severe valid penalty for homicide was imprisonment at hard labor for life without eligibility for parole, probation or suspension of sentence for a period of twenty years. See La.R.S. 14:30.1, as added by Acts 1973, No. Ill, § 1.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 14:30.1 established imprisonment at hard labor for life, without eligibility for parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for twenty years, as the applicable severe penalty for homicide at the time of the offense.

State v. Washington · filed 1976-11-30

In the instant case, the offense was committed on July 4, 1973, at which time the most severe valid penalty for homicide was imprisonment at hard labor for life without eligibility for parole, probation or suspension of sentence for a period of twenty years.
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Law changed since Acts 1975, No. 380 (effective September 12, 1975) lengthened the former twenty-year no-parole period to forty years for later offenses; Acts 1979, No. 74 (effective June 29, 1979) ended ordinary parole eligibility for later second-degree murders. The earlier sentencing law remains relevant to offenses committed while it governed.

Section 14:30.1 provided that, for an offense committed on August 1, 1975, a second-degree-murder conviction carried imprisonment at hard labor for life without eligibility for parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for twenty years.

State v. Brown · filed 1978-06-28

At the time of the commission of this offense on August 1, 1975, the appropriate penalty following a conviction for second degree murder was imprisonment at hard labor for life without eligibility for parole, probation or suspension of sentence for a period of twenty (20) years. La.R.S. 14:30.1, added by Acts 1973, No. 111, § 1.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

At the time of this offense, Section 14:30.1 prescribed life imprisonment at hard labor, without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for 20 years, for a second-degree murder conviction.

State v. Tyler · filed 1978-10-18

At the time of the commission of this offense on March 20, 1975, the appropriate penalty following a conviction for second degree murder was imprisonment at hard labor for life without eligibility for parole, probation or suspension of sentence for a period of twenty (20) years. La.R.S. 14:30.1, added by Acts 1973, No. 111, § 1. Accordingly, the case must be remanded for resentencing.
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Law changed since Acts 1975, No. 380 (effective September 12, 1975) lengthened the former twenty-year no-parole period to forty years for later offenses, and Acts 1979, No. 74 (effective June 29, 1979) ended ordinary parole eligibility for later second-degree murders. Current § 14:30(C) supplies the first-degree murder penalty; use of § 14:30.1 as a substitute penalty concerns the earlier convictions described in these opinions.

Section 14:30.1 prescribes imprisonment at hard labor for life without eligibility for parole, probation or suspension of sentence for twenty years as the most severe constitutional penalty for criminal homicide at the time of the offense.

State v. Adams · filed 1978-12-22

However, the death penalty imposed is annulled and set aside, and the case is remanded to the district court with instructions to sentence the defendant to imprisonment at hard labor for life without eligibility for parole, probation or suspension of sentence for twenty (20) years, the most severe constitutional penalty for criminal homicide at the time the offense was committed. La.R.S. 14:30.1, as added by Acts 1973, No. Ill, § 1.
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Section 14:30.1 makes second-degree murder punishable by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Edwards · filed 1982-09-07

The indictment for second degree murder was a proper indictment. Second degree murder is punishable by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La.R.S. 14:30.1. Only cases in which punishment may be capital require a unanimous verdict. La.C.Cr.P. Art. 782. Manslaughter is a responsive verdict to the crime of second degree murder; therefore, no unanimous verdict is required. La.R.S. 14:31; La.C.Cr.P. Art. 814.
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Section 14:30.1(B) requires a person convicted of second-degree murder to receive life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence; for a fourteen-year-old transferred and convicted under Children's Code article 857(B), that sentence remains applicable but is limited so confinement cannot extend beyond the offender's thirty-first birthday.

State v. Wilkerson · filed 1997-11-07(B)

However, upon consideration of defendant's arguments, we adhere to our original conclusion that article 857(B) does not replace the ordinary sentencing provisions of the Louisiana Criminal Code, particularly Revised Statute 14:30.1(B). ... Revised Statute 14:30.1(B) provides the penalty for second-degree murder is life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Reading this provision together with article 857(B), it is clear the two provisions may be harmonized by reading article 857(B), not as a replacement of the former provision, but as a limitation upon it in certain situations involving fourteen-year-old offenders. In all other respects, the penalty provision of Revised Statute 14:30.1(B) is applicable.
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Subsection (B) mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for second-degree murder.

State v. Hansbro · filed 2001-09-26(B)

Second degree murder is punishable by life imprisonment. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). Therefore, the defendant's prosecution for second degree murder should have been instituted by a grand jury indictment. ... Thus, the district attorney had the power to amend the charge to second degree murder without a formal indictment.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder to include a killing committed with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, or during an armed robbery even without such intent, and mandates life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Allen · filed 2004-05-19

La. R.S. 14:30.1 defines second degree murder, in relevant part, as follows: A. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or (2)(a) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of ... armed robbery ... even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. ... Mr. Allen was convicted of second degree murder, and La. R.S. 14:30.1 provides that "[w]hoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence."
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Section 14:30.1(B) makes attempted second degree murder punishable by 10 to 50 years at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Hollingsworth · filed 2007-08-15(B)

A conviction of attempted second degree murder is punishable by imprisonment at hard labor for not less than 10 nor more than 50 years, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B) and 14:27(D)(1)(a); ... Since the reference statutes provide for the penalty for attempted second degree murder to be served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence, the trial court correctly denied the defendant the benefit of parole when it sentenced him as a third felony offender.
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Section 14:30.1(B) makes second-degree murder punishable by life imprisonment.

State v. Martinez · filed 2010-03-23(B)

In the present case, the defendant was convicted of attempted second degree murder. A conviction for second degree murder is punishable by life in prison. If the offense so attempted is punishable by death or life imprisonment, the defendant shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Therefore, the maximum sentence for the offense of attempted second degree murder is fifty years.
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Section 14:30.1's specific intent definition of second degree murder gives the jury a standard for distinguishing it from first degree murder, which requires a valid aggravating circumstance.

State v. Edwards · filed 1981-11-16

Defendant contends that the second definition of second degree murder, with its overlap with first degree murder, leaves the jury without a standard to guide its choice between the greater and lesser offenses. This Court answered the defense contention when it decided State v. Payton, 361 So.2d 866 (La.1978). In Payton, the Court held that in amending La.R.S. 14:30.1, the legislature also tacitly amended La.R.S. 14:30, introducing the aggravating circumstances of La.C.Cr.P. Art. 905.4 as specific essential elements of the crime of first degree murder. ... These assignments lack merit.
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Penalty for first-degree murder—relationship to second-degree murder

Section 14:30.1(B) makes second-degree murder punishable by mandatory life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Marlowe · filed 2011-12-22(B)

The offense of second degree murder is punishable by mandatory life imprisonment at hard labor. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). Therefore, the sentence for attempted second degree *960murder must be served without benefit of probation, suspension of sentence or parole.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second degree murder as killing with the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and Subsection (B) prescribes life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Bannister · filed 2012-02-14(A)(1), (B)

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). ... La. R.S. 14:30.1(B) states: "Whoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence."
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Section 14:30.1(B) requires a sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for second degree murder.

State v. Lewis · filed 2013-02-27(B)

The mandatory sentence for second degree murder is punishment by life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.
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Section 14:30.1(B) makes life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence the exclusive punishment for second degree murder, subject to a constitutionally authorized downward departure in rare and exceptional cases.

State v. Pernell · filed 2013-10-02(B)

The exclusive punishment authorized by the Legislature upon conviction of second degree murder is “life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” La. R.S. 14:30.1 B.
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Subsection (B) makes second-degree murder punishable by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension, thereby classifying it as a life-punishable offense for the conspiracy-sentencing rule.

State v. Lang · filed 2013-10-09(B)

Under La. R.S. 14:30.1(B), whoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Therefore, under La. R.S. 14:26(B) and R.S. 14:30.1(B), defendant in the instant case was exposed to a sentencing range of not more than thirty years.
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Section 14:30.1 prescribed life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for second-degree murder.

State v. Hamilton · filed 2013-11-20

At the time of the commission of the crime, La.R.S. 14:30.1 provided a penalty of life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Additionally, La. R.S. 14:27 provided that if the offense attempted was punishable by life imprisonment, as in this case, the penalty was ten to fifty years at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Consequently, the trial court imposed an illegally lenient sentence by stating that only eighty percent of the attempted second degree murder sentence would be served before parole eligibility. However, this court will not ordinarily consider an illegally lenient sentence unless it is raised error. We do not do so under the present circumstances.
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Section 14:30.1(B) makes second-degree murder punishable by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, so an attempted second-degree murder falls within the attempt sentencing range.

State v. Austin · filed 2014-07-16(B)

Whoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B).
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Section 14:30.1(B) requires a person convicted of second-degree murder to receive life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, subject to the juvenile-sentencing framework discussed by the court.

State v. Ross · filed 2014-10-15(B)

In 'this matter, defendant was convicted of second degree murder. La. R.S. 14:30.1 provides that “[wjhoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” La. R.S. 14:30.1(B).
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and Section 14:30.1(B) requires life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Hughes · filed 2014-11-25(A)(1), (B)

Defendant was convicted of second degree murder of Mr. Williams in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). ... In the present case, defendant was convicted of second degree murder in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1 (count one). Defendant’s life sentence is mandatory under La. R.S. 14:30.1(B), which provides that second degree murder is punishable Issby life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
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Section 14:30.1, read with § 14:27, makes attempted second degree murder punishable by 10 to 50 years of imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Cotten · filed 2016-08-10

Read together, La. R.S. 14:30.1 and 14:27 provide that attempted second degree murder is punishable by a term of imprisonment at hard labor of not less than 10 years nor more than 50 years, without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
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Section 14:30.1(B) mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for second degree murder, and the court held the juvenile/non-homicide sentencing rules in Graham and Miller inapplicable to this adult homicide defendant.

State v. Wells · filed 2016-09-14B

In any case, La. R.S. 14:30.1 B states: Whoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. ... Wells first cites language from Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), which held that the Eighth Amendment precludes sentencing a juvenile to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for commission of a non-homicide offense. This decision is inapplicable to the defendant, who was not sentenced for commission of a non-homicide offense, nor was he a juvenile when he committed the crime for which he was convicted and sentenced. ... He also cites language from Miller v. Alabama, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which held that a sentence of mandatory life imprisonment without parole for those under the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments,” This decision is likewise inapplicable to Wells, who was not under the age of eighteen when he committed the crime for which he was convicted and sentenced.
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Section 14:30.1 sets the penalty for second degree murder at life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Keith · filed 2017-06-21

For those offenders convicted of second degree murder in Louisiana, La. R.S. 14:30.1 provides for a sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
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At the time of the offense, Section 14:30.1 made second-degree murder punishable by life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Hall · filed 2017-07-19

At the time of the offense, second degree murder was punishable by life imprisonment, at hard labor, without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La.R.S. 14:30.1.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder and mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Harrison · filed 2018-03-21

A conviction for second degree murder in Louisiana, La. R.S. 14:30.1 mandates a sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, or while committing or attempting an enumerated felony, and exposes the offender to mandatory life imprisonment.

State of Louisiana Versus Maurice T. Leach AKA "marlo" · filed 2022-12-28

La. R.S. 14:30.1 defines second degree murder as the killing of a human being when the offender: 1) has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or 2) is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of one of several enumerated felonies, even though he has no intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. ... In this case, the evidence adduced at trial could have supported a second degree murder conviction and the exposure to a mandatory life sentence under La. R.S. 14:30.1.
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Section 14:30.1 requires a sentence for second-degree murder of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefits.

State of Louisiana v. Branch · filed 2023-04-05

The sentence for second-degree murder is life imprisonment at hard labor without benefits. La. R.S. 14:30.1. If a defendant who has been convicted of an offense is sentenced to imprisonment, the court shall impose a determinate sentence. La. C. Cr. P. art. 879. The trial court’s failure to use the term “life” makes Branch’s sentence indeterminate. Therefore, defendant’s sentence must be vacated and remanded for resentencing.
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Section 14:30.1(B) makes life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence mandatory for second-degree murder.

State of Louisiana Versus Lawrence Sly · filed 2023-11-02(B)

Sly’s life sentence is mandatory under La. R.S. 14:30.1(B), which provides that second degree murder is punishable by life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
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Section 14:30.1 makes second-degree murder punishable by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana Versus Dartanya O. Spottsville AKA "Lo" · filed 2024-10-30

The sentence on Count 3, attempted second degree murder (La. R.S. 14:30.1, 14:27), was imposed without restrictions on probation, parole or suspension of sentence, as required under R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a). At the time this offense was committed, the penalty for second degree murder was “life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.”
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Section 14:30.1(B) makes second-degree murder punishable by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Patton · filed 2024-12-30(B)

Because second-degree murder carries a mandatory life sentence, see La. R.S. 14:30.1 (B),2 prosecution of Defendant therefore required it be initiated as set forth above.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second degree murder as a killing committed with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and requires a sentence of life at hard labor without benefits.

State of Louisiana v. Combs · filed 2025-04-09(A)(1), (B)

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). ... The mandatory sentence for second degree murder is life at hard labor without benefits. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B).
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Section 14:30.1 defines second degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and provides a life-imprisonment penalty without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Henderson · filed 2025-07-16(A)(1) (B)

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). The penalty is life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B).
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder to include a killing committed with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and subsection (B) mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Horton · filed 2025-07-24(A)(1), (B)

Second degree murder is defined, in pertinent part, as “the killing of a human being…[w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm… .” La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). ... Mr. Stone was found guilty of second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1, which provides that “[w]hoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). Thus, the applicable statute mandates a life sentence for second degree murder.
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Section 14:30.1(B) mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without benefits as the penalty for second degree murder.

State of Louisiana v. Quinton Terell Peace · filed 2025-08-27(B)

Additionally, Peace’s life sentence without benefits is lawful and not excessive. The trial court properly considered the aggravating and mitigating factors found in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The penalty for second degree murder is a mandatory life sentence at hard labor without benefits. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B); See State v. Fredieu, 52,042 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/27/18), 250 So. 3d 1157, writ denied, 18-1315 (La. 10/29/18), 254 So. 3d 1218.
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Constitutionality of mandatory penalty

Section 14:30.1's mandatory penalty for second-degree murder does not violate the federal or Louisiana constitutions.

State v. Cook · filed 1977-04-11

With respect to statutes not requiring capital punishment, the Court indicated that mandatory sentencing provisions are not constitutionally prohibited. We find no merit in defendant's contention that the mandatory penalty prescribed by La.R.S. 14:30.1 violates the federal constitution. Nor are we persuaded that defendant's due process rights under our state constitution have been infringed.
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Law changed since Miller v. Alabama (June 25, 2012) barred mandatory life without parole for offenders under eighteen; juvenile homicide sentencers must be able to consider youth before imposing that punishment.

The mandatory life sentence for second-degree murder, without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, is not unconstitutionally excessive when imposed on a juvenile.

State v. Payne · filed 1986-01-15

We likewise find no merit in Payne's third assignment that the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence is unconstitutionally cruel and excessive under the state and federal constitutions when the defendant is a juvenile convicted of second degree murder. ... Nonetheless, mandatory sentences are subject to judicial review for excessiveness. ... Accordingly, we do not find the sentence imposed on Payne to be out of proportion to the crime for which he has been convicted.
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Specific intent requirement

Section 14:30.1(1) requires the State to prove that the accused had a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.

State v. George · filed 1977-05-16(1)

In the instant case, the state relied in its prosecution of defendant on that portion of La.R.S. 14:30.1 which provides that second degree murder is the killing of a human being "when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm." Specific intent was therefore an essential element of the state's proof of guilt under La.R.S. 14:30.1(1).
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Under the specific-intent branch of § 14:30.1, the jury must determine whether the accused had specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and intoxication may be considered on that question.

State v. Mart · filed 1977-11-14

It was for the jury, not the judge, to determine what effect, if any, this intoxication had upon the presence or absence of the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm required for guilt of second degree murder (and not required for the responsive lesser verdict of manslaughter).
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Law changed since Acts 1979, No. 74 (effective June 29, 1979) ended the former forty-year no-parole limit for later second-degree murders. The forty-year rule remains relevant to earlier offenses, and § 15:574.4(H), added by Acts 2017, No. 280, permits parole consideration after forty years for qualifying 1973–1979 offenses.

Section 14:30.1 provides for a life sentence without eligibility for parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for forty years when the 1975 amendment was in effect at the time of the homicide.

State v. Trombino · filed 1977-11-14

The homicide occurred in September, 1976. At that time, Act 380 of 1975, effective September 12, 1975 (prior to the offense), had amended La.R.S. 14:30.1 to provide, upon conviction, for a sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole, etc., for a period of forty years. Accordingly, the sentence as imposed was in accordance with the penal statute in effect at the time of the crime.
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Law changed since Acts 1975, No. 380 (effective September 12, 1975) lengthened the former twenty-year no-parole period to forty years for later offenses; Acts 1979, No. 74 (effective June 29, 1979) ended ordinary parole eligibility for later second-degree murders. The earlier sentencing law remains relevant to offenses committed while it governed.

Section 14:30.1 made second-degree murder punishable by life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for twenty years.

State v. Brumfield · filed 1977-11-23

At the time the crime was committed (April 8, 1974), it was punishable by a term of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence for a period of twenty years. La.R.S. 14:30.1, as added by Acts 1973, No. 111, § 1. The sentence imposed herein renders defendant ineligible for parole for the rest of his natural life rather than for twenty years, as provided by statute.
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Section 14:30.1 requires the specific intent necessary for second-degree murder, and evidence of drug use does not necessarily preclude a finding that the defendant formed that intent.

State v. Junak · filed 1983-08-03

Richoux testified, however, that it is possible that Preludin would not preclude the forming of the requisite intent to commit a crime. This testimony was of such an equivocal nature, and in connection with Beavers’s testimony that defendant had planned much earlier in the day to find the victim, as well as their subsequent flight to Atlanta, there was sufficient evidence to convince the jury that the defendant was able to form specific intent and knew the logical consequences of his act.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as the killing of a human being when the offender has the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Hardeman · filed 1985-04-03

La.R.S. 14:30.1 defines second degree murder as: ... the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm .... * * * * * * Specific intent is defined by La.R.S. 14:10: Criminal intent may be specific or general: (1) Specific criminal intent is the state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.
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Section 14:30.1's specific-intent-to-kill element may be established by evidence of multiple stab wounds to the neck, chest, and abdominal cavity.

State v. Jackson · filed 1986-02-25

The testimony of the coroner showed Mr. Tillotson sustained six stab wounds, which were inflicted to the neck, chest and abdominal cavity. These numerous stab wounds furnish adequate evidence to support a finding of specific intent to kill as required to sustain a conviction of second degree murder.
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Under § 14:30.1(1), second-degree murder requires proof that the defendant had the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Trahan · filed 1989-04-19(1)

Appellant was charged with second degree murder under the provisions of La.R. S. 14:30.1(1) which required the state to prove he had the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.
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Section 14:30.1 requires specific intent to kill for a second-degree murder conviction.

State v. Simms · filed 1989-12-13

In convicting the defendant of second degree murder, the jury necessarily found that the defendant had specific intent to kill Mary Justina Robertson. Defendant contends in his second assignment of error that the State failed to prove the requisite specific intent to kill. We disagree. To begin with, the coroner testified that the cause of death was strangulation. This is corroborated by the defendant’s confession in which he acknowledged that he grabbed the victim around the neck, pulled her to his sister’s room and starting choking her. He further stated that after she stopped breathing, he drug her outside and pushed her body in a septic pond. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could conclude that the State proved the essential elements of second degree murder, including specific intent to kill, beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Section 14:30.1 requires proof of specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm for second-degree murder.

State v. Sheehan · filed 1990-03-14

The disputed element of second-degree murder in this case is whether the defendant had a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm, as required by the statute defining the crime, La.R.S. 14:30.1, and the definition of specific criminal intent, in La.R.S. 14:10(1).
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Section 14:30.1 permits second-degree murder based on specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm, but attempted second-degree murder requires specific intent to kill when combined with the attempt statute.

State v. Hall · filed 1992-10-06A(1)

While specific intent to either kill or to inflict great bodily harm will support a conviction of second degree murder under La.R.S. 14:30.1, only specific intent to kill will support a conviction of attempted second degree murder in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1 and La.R.S. 14:27.
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For a charged specific-intent homicide under Paragraph (1), the state must prove more than the defendant's involvement in related conduct; it must prove that the defendant specifically intended the victim's death.

State v. Pierre · filed 1994-02-03(1)

In this case, the state charged defendant with a specific intent homicide under the provisions of La.R.S. 14:30.1(1). The state therefore had to show more than the defendant's direct or indirect involvement with the rape of the victim in the abandoned house shortly before the murder. The state had to show that the defendant specifically intended Contrell Alexander's death.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second degree murder, in pertinent part, as killing with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Bordenave · filed 1995-08-23

Second degree murder is defined in pertinent part as: The killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La.R.S. 14:30.1. Attempt requires the specific intent to commit a crime and the commission or omission of an act toward accomplishing that object. La.R.S. 14:27. Bordenave shot Lewis in the hand, chased him, and shot several more shots, two of which hit Lewis. The evidence clearly supports a conviction for attempted second degree murder under La.R.S. 14:27(30.1).
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Section 14:30.1 requires specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and a conviction may stand when the evidence also fails to establish manslaughter mitigation by a preponderance.

State v. Milligan · filed 1996-12-11

Certainly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational fact-trier could have found the requisite specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and, also, that the mitigatory factors for manslaughter (sudden passion or heat of blood)[1] had not been established by a preponderance. See La. R.S. 14:30.1; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and the court found that requirement satisfied by Hampton’s participation in the shooting.

State v. Hampton · filed 1996-12-27

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. ... The evidence clearly proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant participated in or aided and abetted in the murder of Robinson with the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. State v. Marshall, supra.
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Section 14:30.1 requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant specifically intended to kill a human being to establish second-degree murder.

State v. Evans · filed 1999-05-05

To prove second degree murder, the state must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant specifically intended to kill a human being. La.R.S. 14:30.1.
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Section 14:30.1 requires specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm for second-degree murder under subsection (1), and the court found the defendant's intoxication did not prevent him from forming that intent.

State v. Tolliver · filed 2000-03-01(1)

The determination of whether the requisite intent is present is a question for the trier of fact. ... Based on the evidence, we agree with the jury's determination that the defendant was not so intoxicated that he could not form specific intent. These assignments of error lack merit.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(2) makes a killing with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm second-degree murder, and an attempted violation requires specific intent plus an act tending directly toward accomplishing the killing.

State v. Sanders · filed 2000-10-04(A)(2)

Before firing into a crowd, he expressed his intent to "get" one of the men in the crowd. ... One of the shots missed the man the defendant said he was going to get, but struck the victim. ... Defendant, having a specific intent to kill a human being, did an act—the firing of a pistol into a crowd—which tended directly toward the accomplishment of his object. This assignment of error lacks merit.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm; a participant who holds the victim while others beat and stab her may possess that intent.

State v. McCullough · filed 2000-12-06

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. La.R.S. 14:30.1. ... It was established at trial that Rita Rabalais was eighty-two at the time of the offense and that the Defendant, as part of a gang initiation, was personally involved in the beating and stabbing attack of Rita Rabalais which resulted in her death. Although there was no evidence that the Defendant actually hit or stabbed the victim, he held her while other defendants did so. Under these circumstances, there is no doubt the Defendant possessed the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon the victim.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and that intent may be inferred from firing a gun at a person at close range.

State v. Brooks · filed 2003-03-05

La. R.S. 14:30.1 defines second degree murder as follows: The killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. Specific intent is a state of mind and need not be proved as a fact; it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of the defendant. ... The law is that the discharge of a firearm at close range and aimed at a person is indicative of a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon that person. ... Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that the testimony and evidence were legally sufficient and would justify any rational jury's finding that Defendant had the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, without provocation, when he fired his weapon at Fuller at close range.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder to include a killing committed with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and the State must prove that intent beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Ware · filed 2008-03-05(A)(1)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:30.1 states, in pertinent part, "[s]econd degree murder is the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. . . ." Accordingly, at trial, the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant had the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon the victim. ... Based on the court's holding in Brown, Defendant's admissions in his brief that he caused Burnitt's death, the testimony of Dr. Trant that the victim was beaten for ten minutes resulting in at least thirty-five distinct wounds and strangled to death, which strangulation was estimated to have taken up to four minutes, we find that sufficient evidence was submitted by the State for a jury to find that Defendant possessed the requisite state of mind to be found guilty of the crime of murder in the second degree.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as a killing committed with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State of Louisiana v. Narcisse · filed 2008-11-19

Second degree murder is defined as a killing “[w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.” La.R.S. 14:30.1. The act of pointing a gun directly at a person and pulling the trigger six times is indicative of the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.
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Section 14:30.1 requires specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, which exists when the circumstances show that the offender actively desired those criminal consequences.

State v. Reed · filed 2008-12-03

The charge of second degree murder requires "specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm." La. R.S. 14:30.1. Specific intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow from his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:30.1.
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After subsection (B) was deleted, unaggravated specific intent killings fell outside second degree murder and were covered by first degree murder.

State v. Toomer · filed 1981-03-02(B)

After Payton, the legislature re-amended the second degree murder statute to delete subsection (B), effective as of September 8, 1978, to remove unaggravated specific intent killings from the scope of second degree murder and to recast such killings to be covered by first degree murder.
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Attempted second degree murder under subsection (A)(1) requires specific intent to kill, which a jury may infer from an accomplice urging the use of deadly force during a robbery.

State v. Bordenave · filed 1996-04-26(A)(1)

These circumstances support the conclusion that a rational trier-of-fact could have reasonably determined that Anderson had the specific intent to kill Lewis because he urged the use of deadly force to conclude the armed robbery of Lewis as quickly as possible. ... Accordingly, on the state's application for review only as to Anderson, we reinstate the jury's verdict but, for the reasons assigned by the court of appeal in Bordenave's case, reduce the judgment to guilty of attempted second degree murder.
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Section 14:30.1 includes a killing committed with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm; repeated aimed shots supported a finding of intent to kill for attempted second degree murder.

State v. Jones · filed 2011-11-02(A)(1)

“Second degree murder is the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]” La. R.S. 14:30.1. ... By aiming his gun at Kesiah and firing multiple shots at her, Defendant exhibited the specific intent to kill that is required by La.R.S. 14:27. Therefore, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there is sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s attempted second degree murder conviction.
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Second degree murder under subsection (A)(1) requires a killing with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm; eyewitness testimony that the defendant shot the victim several times can establish that intent.

State v. Robinson · filed 2014-09-24(A)(1)

Second degree murder is defined, in pertinent part, as the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). ... We find this testimony, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that *904defendant acted with the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) requires specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm for second degree murder.

State v. Mire · filed 2014-10-08(A)(1)

Second degree murder is “the killing of a human being ... [w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]” La.R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1).
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Specific intent requirement—proof and inference

Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder to include a killing committed with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm; that intent may be inferred from the defendant's circumstances and actions and formed instantly.

State v. Sartain · filed 2008-12-30(A)(1)

Second degree murder is defined in pertinent part as “the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.” La. R.S. 14:30.1. La. R.S. 14:10(1) defines specific criminal intent as “that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or his failure to act.” Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances and actions of the defendant. ... Specific intent can be formed in an instant.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) requires proof that the accused specifically intended to kill or inflict great bodily harm for a second-degree-murder conviction.

State v. Trahan · filed 2011-07-06(A)(1)

For the following reasons, we find that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient for a finding of specific intent to support a verdict of second degree murder.
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For an attempted second-degree murder conviction, § 14:30.1(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant personally had the specific intent to kill; a principal cannot be convicted merely because a shooter had that intent.

State v. Cooks · filed 2011-12-14(A)(1)

To prevail on its charge that defendant was guilty as principal to the attempted second degree murder of Donnie Floyd, the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant harbored specific intent to kill Donnie Floyd, and not merely that defendant knew of Joshua Lyons’ specific intent to kill Floyd. ... “The shooter’s specific intent [to kill] cannot be transferred to the principal; ‘[a]n individual may only be convicted as a principal for those crimes for which he personally has the requisite mental state.’ ” ... Accordingly, proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had specific intent to kill is necessary to sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the offense for which defendant in the instant case was convicted. ... Viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have inferred that this vague signal or gesture by defendant to Lyons or another person was a signal for that person to shoot Floyd, such that it could be inferred that defendant had the specific intent to kill Donnie Floyd. It necessarily follows that no rational trier of fact could have found defendant a principal to the attempted second degree murder of Donnie Floyd, or that defendant, having the specific intent to kill Floyd, aided and abetted, or counseled or procured the shooter to shoot Donnie Floyd.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder to include a killing committed with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State in the Interest of D. D. · filed 2012-03-07

D.D. was charged with second degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. That statute states, in pertinent part that ―[s]econd degree murder is the killing of a human being . . . [w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]‖ ... Given the surfeit of evidence indicating that D.D. was capable of ―sufficient forethought, planning, and understanding‖ and the lack of evidence showing the amounts and timing of D.D.’s ingestion of any intoxicating substances, we find no error in the trial court’s determination that D.D. was not so intoxicated that he could not form specific intent at the time of the offense.
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Section 14:30.1 requires specific intent to kill for attempted second-degree murder, and that intent may be inferred from the circumstances and the defendant’s actions.

State v. Tillman · filed 2012-08-08

A specific intent to kill is an essential element of the crime of attempted second degree murder, and also of the responsive crime of attempted manslaughter. ... The simple act of pointing a gun at Cortavian Baker and firing the gun at him shows specific intent to kill. Considering these facts, we believe that any rational trier of fact could conclude that Tillman had specific intent to kill Cortavi-an.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second degree murder to include killing with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm; for attempted murder, specific intent to kill may be inferred from pointing and firing a gun at a person.

State of Louisiana v. Dexter Holder · filed 2012-11-07

―Second degree murder is the killing of a human being . . . [w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.‖ La.R.S. 14:30.1. ... Specific criminal intent to kill is a required element of the crime of attempted murder. ... It ―may be established by the circumstances surrounding an accused‘s actions. It is well-settled that the act of pointing a gun at a person and firing the gun is an indication of the intent to kill that person.‖ ... Defendant pointed a loaded rifle at Honore and fired it while pursuing him, striking him once. ... The evidence was sufficient to find Defendant committed attempted second degree murder.
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Section 14:30.1 requires specific intent to kill for second-degree murder; an allegation of intent to inflict great bodily harm does not replace that requirement.

State of Louisiana v. Christopher Marshall, Jr. · filed 2013-05-08

In this case, the trial court correctly charged the jury on the offense of attempted second degree murder, the charged offense. ... The defendant is charged with attempting to commit second degree murder. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill. ... Thus, in order to convict the defendant of attempted second degree murder, you must find: One (1), that the defendant had the specific intent to commit the crime of second degree murder; and two (2), the defendant did an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the commission of the crime of second degree murder. ... Given this instruction and the supreme court‟s guidance in Cavazos, 610 So.2d 127, we find that the defendant‟s complaint regarding the bill of information does not require correction on review. Rather, the proper charge, as provided by the trial court cured the defect alleged by the defendant.
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Section 14:30.1 makes a killing second-degree murder when the offender specifically intends to kill or inflict great bodily harm; aiming and firing a gun can support that intent.

State v. Anderson · filed 2013-07-03

Second degree murder is defined as the killing of a human being “[w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]” La.R.S. 14:30.1. ... He shot at her on two occasions, thus, exhibiting the requisite intent to kill her. Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances; aiming a gun directly at a victim and pulling the trigger supports a finding of specific intent to kill.
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Section 14:30.1(1) defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm; for attempted second-degree murder, the required intent is specific intent to kill.

State of Louisiana v. Williams · filed 2013-11-06(1)

As relevant herein, La.R.S. 14:30.1 states that “[s]econd degree murder is the killing of a human being: (1) [w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]” ... With regard to the charges for attempted second degree murder, the State had to establish that the defendant had specific intent to kill a human being and committed an act in furtherance of that purpose. State in the Interest of L.H., 94-903 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/15/95), 650 So.2d 433. Firing into a crowd is sufficient to establish specific intent to kill. Id. We find that the State presented evidence that, if credited by the jury, is sufficient to establish those elements.
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Section 14:30.1(A) covers second degree murder committed with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and that intent may be inferred from the circumstances, including pointing a gun at a victim and shooting him.

State v. Lively · filed 2014-02-12(A)

“Second degree murder is the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm; or (2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of ... armed |inrobbery....” ... “We find that Defendant armed himself with the motive to rob Mr. Prejean at gunpoint. He then shot Mr. Prejean at close range. He subsequently fled the scene and went to New Orleans, never contacting the police to report the gunfire he said he heard. We find that these facts clearly indicate that Defendant had the specific intent to kill Mr. Prejean. This assignment of error lacks merit.”
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder to include a killing committed with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Edwards · filed 2015-02-26(A)(1)

The defendant’s actions prove that he had the specific intent “to kill or to inflict great bodily harm,” as required by La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1).
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as the killing of a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State of Louisiana v. Baumberger · filed 2016-06-01

Defendant was convicted of second degree murder. The offense is defined as “the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]” La.R.S. 14:30.1. ... Considering the totality of the evidence and the circumstances in a light most favorable to the State, we find that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that Defendant exhibited the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm on the victim.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) makes second-degree murder require specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Carter · filed 2018-04-11(A)(1)

Carter demonstrated that he acted with specific intent to kill when he fired a gun multiple times into a crowd of unarmed people.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second degree murder as killing a human being when the offender has the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Mingo · filed 2017-09-27(A)(1)

Second degree murder is defined in La. R.S. 14:30.1, which provides, in pertinent part: A. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. ... Viewing the evidence as a whole in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury could have reasonably found the elements of second degree murder were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Section 14:30.1 makes specific intent to kill an element of second-degree murder, including attempted second-degree murder.

State v. Latique · filed 2019-02-20

A jury may return any legislatively provided responsive verdict, if the evidence sufficiently supports a conviction of the originally-charged offense. State ex rel. Elaire v. Blackburn , 424 So.2d 246 (La.1982), cert. denied , 461 U.S. 959, 103 S.Ct. 2432, 77 L.Ed.2d 1318 (1983) ; State v. Sepulvado , 10-435 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/9/11), 59 So.3d 463, writ denied , 11-1151 (La. 11/14/11), 75 So.3d 941 ; see La.Code Crim.P. art. 814. Further, specific intent to kill is an element of both attempted first and second degree murder as well as attempted manslaughter. La.R.S. 14:30, La.R.S. 14:30.1, La.R.S. 14:31 ; State v. Stafford , 17-714 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/7/18), 241 So.3d 1060, writ denied , 18-549 (La. 11/20/18), 256 So.3d 997.
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Section 14:30.1 permits a second-degree-murder conviction based on specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm, but an attempted second-degree-murder conviction requires specific intent to kill.

State v. Harris · filed 2019-02-27

To sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the state must prove that the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim's death. La. R.S. 14:27 ; 14:30.1. Although the statute for the completed crime of second degree murder allows for a conviction based on "specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm," La. R.S. 14:30.1, attempted second degree murder requires specific intent to kill.
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Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as killing with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, but an attempted second-degree-murder conviction requires proof of specific intent to kill.

State v. Ross · filed 2019-03-13(1)

With regard to the defendant's convictions for attempted second degree murder, La.R.S. 14:30.1 provides, in relevant part, that "[s]econd degree murder is the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]" ... Thus, although La.R.S. 14:30.1 provides that second degree murder requires "specific intent to kill" or "to inflict great bodily harm," in order to be convicted of attempted second degree murder, the State must prove that the defendant had the specific intent to kill.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances, the defendant's actions, and the severity of the victim's injuries.

State v. Cohen · filed 2019-05-08(A)(1)

The indictment in this case charged Defendant with second degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1), which provides that second degree murder is the killing of a human being "[w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]" Specific criminal intent is defined as "that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act." La.R.S. 14:10(1). Because it is a state of mind, specific intent need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from the circumstances and the defendant's actions. It may also be inferred from " 'the extent and severity of the victim's injuries.' " State v. Julien , 13-1327, p. 13 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/21/14), 139 So.3d 1152, 1160, writ denied , 14-1406 (La. 5/15/15), 169 So.3d 383 (quoting State v. Patterson , 10-415, p. 11 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/11/11), 63 So.3d 140, 148, writ denied , 11-338 (La. 6/17/11), 63 So.3d 1037 ).
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Second-degree murder under § 14:30.1(A)(1) requires a killing committed with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, which may be inferred from the circumstances.

State of Louisiana v. Bull · filed 2020-05-20(A)(1)

Louisiana Revised Statute 14:30.1(A)(1) provides that second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. ... The totality of the evidence presented was sufficient to establish that the defendant shot the victim with the intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder as the killing of a human being with the specific intent to kill.

State of Louisiana v. Romero · filed 2021-12-15(A)(1)

Second degree murder includes the killing of a human being with the specific intent to kill. La. R.S.14:30.1 (A)(1). ... The common elements of attempted first degree murder and attempted second degree murder are findings that the accused actively desired to kill the victim, and that the accused did something for the purpose of intending directly toward the killing of the victim. ... Accordingly, the jury’s verdict that Defendant is guilty of attempted first degree murder necessarily included findings that the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the responsive verdict of attempted second degree murder, without the necessity of a finding of armed robbery. ... Accordingly, we amend the verdict and reduce Defendant’s conviction of attempted first degree murder to attempted second degree murder, such that the plea of double jeopardy is inapplicable.
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Section 14:30.1 supports a second-degree murder conviction when the evidence permits the jury to find specific intent to kill despite a claimed mistake of fact.

State of Louisiana v. Johnson · filed 2022-02-23

Considering the record evidence outlined above, we find the jury’s decision was reasonable and the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, fully supports the jury verdict. Defendant was tried for second degree murder by a twelve-member jury of his peers, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged. Since the jury is the ultimate trier of fact, they have necessarily reached a conclusion that specific intent was present, along with all the other elements, for second degree murder.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) requires specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm for second-degree murder, and that intent may be inferred from the defendant’s actions despite a claimed intoxication defense.

State of Louisiana v. Jewel Demon Humphrey · filed 2023-03-29(A)(1)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second degree murder, in pertinent part, as a killing committed “[w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]” ... Based on the severity of the injuries, Defendant’s actions demonstrated his specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon Ms. Vital. ... We find the evidence was sufficient to support the second degree murder guilty verdict.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, while attempted second-degree murder requires specific intent to kill.

State of Louisiana v. Scott · filed 2023-08-30(A)(1)

La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second degree murder as the “killing of a human being…when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.” ... “Although the statute for the completed crime of second degree murder allows for a conviction based on ‘specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm,’ La. R.S. 14:30.1, attempted second degree murder requires specific intent to kill.”
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Effect of repeal

Repeal of former § 14:30.1(1) does not extinguish liability for a specific-intent killing committed while that provision was in effect, because La. R.S. 24:171 preserves prosecution for offenses incurred under repealed laws.

State v. Meshell · filed 1977-11-23(1)

The amending legislation, providing that “all laws or parts of laws in conflict herewith are hereby repealed,” Acts 1976, No. 657, § 4, repealed former La.R.S. 14:30.1(1) insofar as it had defined a category of second degree murder. ... Under the general saving provision, the amendment of La.R.S. 14:30.1 did not extinguish or alter defendant’s liability for the offense committed under the former statute.
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Specific intent and diminished capacity

Under § 14:30.1(1), a mental defect or disorder short of legal insanity cannot negate the specific intent required for second-degree murder or reduce the offense to manslaughter.

State v. Jones · filed 1978-05-22(1)

Nevertheless, her counsel was arguing that her neurotic, prone-to-hysteria mental condition precluded the specific intent required for murder, the intentional killing of another human being. ... In Louisiana, a mental defect or disorder, short of legal insanity (i. e., the incapability to distinguish between right and wrong, La.R.S. 14:14), cannot serve to negate the specific intent and reduce the degree of the crime. ... The trial court's ruling was therefore not erroneous, in so limiting argument.
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Criminal responsibility for killings during attempted armed robbery

Section 14:30.1(2) makes a principal in an attempted armed robbery criminally responsible for any killing resulting from the attempted perpetration.

State v. Johnson · filed 1978-11-13(2)

Under the evidence presented to the jury, it could reasonably infer that beyond a reasonable doubt Porter, Johnson, and Winfield were in a group which intended through Porter and Johnson to rob the store, with Winfield through his vehicle to provide the means of escaping from the scene after the intended robbery. Winfield, as a principal in the attempted armed robbery, La.R.S. 14:24, is thus criminally responsible for any killing which resulted from its attempted perpetration, La.R.S. 14:30.1(2) (1975).
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Sentencing

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 14:30.1 requires a sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without eligibility for parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for twenty years for second-degree murder.

State v. McGraw · filed 1979-01-29

Therefore, the case must be remanded for resentencing to the most serious penalty at the time for the next lesser included offense, State v. Jenkins, 340 So.2d 157 (La.1976), that being second degree murder requiring life imprisonment without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence for a period of twenty years. R.S. 14:30.1, Acts 1973, No. 111, § 1.
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Section 14:30.1's mandatory sentencing provision does not violate separation of powers because the legislature may determine the length of sentences for felonies.

State v. Berry · filed 1996-11-08

He urges, without authority, that the mandatory sentencing provisions of La. R.S. 14:30.1 and 14:42 are unconstitutional in that they violate the separation of powers doctrine. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court has consistently held that it is within the legislature's prerogative to determine the length of the sentence imposed for crimes classified as felonies.
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A sentence imposed under § 14:30.1(B)'s carefully tailored penalty provision is strongly presumed to be constitutionally permissible.

State v. Guy · filed 1996-01-31(B)

When a trial judge determines a sentence from a carefully tailored penalty statute, such as La.R.S. 14:30.1(B), there is a strong presumption that the sentence is within constitutional parameters.
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Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder as killing with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and subsection (B) requires the sentence to be served at hard labor.

State v. Huls · filed 1996-05-29(A)(1) (B)

The applicable definition of second degree murder in this case is the killing of a human being "[w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]" La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). Specific criminal intent is the "state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act." La. R.S. 14:10(1). ... We also notice the sentence is illegally lenient as the court did not order it to be served at hard labor. See La. R.S. 14:30.1(B).
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Section 14:30.1 makes the life sentence without parole, probation, or suspension mandatory for second-degree murder, leaving no sentencing discretion.

State v. Green · filed 1999-03-31

Defendant was sentenced in accordance with the mandatory sentence given in La.R.S. 14:30.1 and was not subject to the judge's discretion.
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Section 14:30.1 requires a life sentence for second-degree murder to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

State v. Davis · filed 2019-04-10

Our review reflects that the trial judge failed to order that defendant's sentence of life imprisonment be served without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence as mandated by La. R.S. 14:30.1. However, under La. R.S. 15:301.1, statutory restrictions on probation, parole, or suspension of sentence are self-activating.
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Aggravating circumstance as an essential element of first-degree murder

Law changed since Acts 1979, No. 74 again separated specific-intent second-degree murder from first-degree murder; the 1978 scheme allowing prosecution of unaggravated specific-intent killings as first-degree murder no longer governs later offenses.

The deletion of subsection B meant that an aggravating circumstance was not an essential element of first-degree murder at the time of the offense.

State v. LaFleur · filed 1981-05-18(B)

This contention is without merit since the legislature, by subsequent amendment, deleted subsection B of La.R.S. 14:30.1 which was the source of the implied amendment rationale. As in State v. Perkins, 375 So.2d 1179 (La.1979) and State v. Martin, 376 So.2d 300 (La.1979) an aggravating circumstance was not an essential element of first degree murder at the time of the subject offense.
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Law changed since Acts 1978, No. 796 (effective September 8, 1978) deleted the former offense-defining subsection (B); current subsection (B) sets the life sentence, while current (A)(1) defines specific-intent second-degree murder.

Section 14:30.1(B), as then in effect, made an aggravating circumstance an essential element distinguishing first-degree murder from a specific-intent killing otherwise classified as second-degree murder.

State v. Liner · filed 1979-04-24(B)

By implication, this provision redefined first degree murder as a specific intent homicide accomplished with a statutorily prescribed aggravating circumstance. State v. Payton, 361 So.2d 866 (La.1978). The presence of at least one aggravating circumstance, then, is an essential element of the crime charged.
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Law changed since Acts 1979, No. 74 again separated specific-intent second-degree murder from first-degree murder; the 1978 scheme allowing prosecution of unaggravated specific-intent killings as first-degree murder no longer governs later offenses.

After the 1978 amendment deleting paragraph B, § 14:30.1 no longer classified unaggravated specific-intent killings as second-degree murder, so such killings could be prosecuted as first-degree murder.

State v. Perkins · filed 1979-09-18(B)

After Payton was decided, however, the legislature re-amended R.S. 14:30.1 to *1181 delete paragraph B, supra. Acts 1978, No. 796, § 1. Removed from the scope of the second degree murder statute, unaggravated specific intent killings were recast within the definition of first degree murder. Accordingly, any specific intent killing committed under this statutory scheme might validly be prosecuted as first degree murder.
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The 1978 amendment to § 14:30.1 did not apply to an offense committed before the amendment's effective date; the former version governed under the general saving provision.

State v. Kelly · filed 1979-10-08

Under the general saving provision, the amendment of La.R.S. 14:30.1 did not extinguish liability for the offense committed under the former statute. ... The trial judge, therefore, was correct in refusing to charge the jury with the definition of second degree murder contained in Act 796 of 1978 and in denying defendant's motion for a new trial grounded on the same contention.
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Second-degree murder—specific intent without aggravating circumstances

Law changed since Acts 1978, No. 796 (effective September 8, 1978) deleted the former offense-defining subsection (B); current subsection (B) sets the life sentence, while current (A)(1) defines specific-intent second-degree murder.

Section 14:30.1(B) defines second-degree murder as a specific-intent killing that would otherwise be first-degree murder but was committed without any aggravating circumstance listed in La. Code Crim. P. art. 905.4.

State v. Mattheson · filed 1981-11-16(B)

We find no substance in this contention because La.R.S. 14:30.1(B) defines second degree murder as a murder that would otherwise be first degree murder but is accomplished without any of the aggravating circumstances listed in La.Code Crim.P. art. 905.4. One of the aggravating circumstances listed in art. 905.4 provides "[t]he offender was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of ... armed robbery." La.Code Crim.P. art. 905.4(a). Defendant himself testified to the fact that he was committing an armed robbery. Hence, the jury could not properly have returned a second degree murder verdict under La.R.S. 14:30.1(B) because the killing was accomplished with one of the aggravating circumstances. Therefore, the omission of this provision from the jury charge did not prejudice defendant.
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Section 14:30.1(1) defines second-degree murder to include a killing committed with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and that intent may be inferred from the circumstances and the defendant’s actions.

State v. Graham · filed 1982-10-18(1)

However, specific intent is a state of mind, and need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of defendant. ... A rational trier of fact could certainly have found from this evidence that defendant had the specific intent to kill or commit great bodily harm and that the state has proven these essential elements of the crime of second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt (La.R.S. 14:30.1).
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Notes 151–300 of 1,102, oldest cases first.

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