La. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1

Section 14:30.1, read with § 14:27, requires an attempted second-degree-murder sentence to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Gatti · filed 2005-10-13

In sentencing Gatti for two counts of attempted second degree murder, the trial court failed to impose the sentences to be served without benefits, as required by La. R.S. 14:30.1 and 14:27. ... The sentences for attempted second degree murder are for a determinate time period, and will automatically be served without benefits.

Section 14:30.1 requires a second-degree-murder life sentence to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Haynes · filed 2014-05-07

La. R.S. 14:30.1 requires that the life sentence be served without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence. ... In instances where the statutory restrictions were not recited at sentencing, they are contained in the sentence, whether or not imposed by the sentencing court. La. R.S.15:301.1(A); State v. Williams, 2000-1725, p. 10 (La.11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, 799. Consequently, this Court need not correct this error.

Section 14:30.1 makes second degree murder punishable by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, and the no-benefits restriction applies to attempted second degree murder through La. R.S. 14:27.

State v. Martin · filed 2019-05-22

The offense of second degree murder carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1.

Section 14:30.1 requires a sentence for second degree murder to be imposed without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Martin · filed 2019-05-22

First, the trial court failed to order that Martin's 80-year sentence be served without the benefit of parole as required by La. R.S. 14:30.1 and 14:27.5 The trial court's failure to state that the sentence is to be served without benefits will be corrected automatically by operation of La. R.S. 15:301.1.

Section 14:30.1(A)(3) applies when a defendant acts as an intermediary who transfers a controlled substance from its source to other users, including herself, and thereby may be found to have distributed the drug and intended its distribution.

State v. Smith · filed 2004-09-24(A)(3)

However, Louisiana law also holds that "an intermediary who arranges or facilitates the transfer of narcotics from the *509 seller to the buyer may ... be charged and punished as a principal in the act of distribution." Celestine, 95-1393 at 3, 671 So.2d at 897 (citations omitted). In the present case, the state alleges that defendant took delivery of the drug from her "source" and then made a second delivery to the other members in the joint venture when she brought the drugs back to the victim's residence. See La.R.S. 40:961(10) (defining distribution of controlled substances in terms of delivery, or "the transfer of a controlled dangerous substance, whether or not there exists an agency relationship."). If the state proves these circumstances at trial, a jury may rationally conclude that defendant made herself an intermediary in the transaction by serving as a link in the distribution of the drug from its source to its ultimate users, which included herself but also included other persons not present at the initial delivery, and rendered herself a principal in the act of distribution. ... If accepted by a factfinder, that same evidence could lead the factfinder to conclude that defendant possessed the intent to distribute the drug obtained from her source to the other persons involved in the joint enterprise.

Section 14:30.1(A)(3) makes distribution of a controlled substance that directly causes the recipient's death second-degree murder, and a defendant may be treated as a principal when the alleged facts support aiding an intermediary's distribution to others.

State v. Corbett · filed 2004-11-15(A)(3)

The state’s application is granted and the rulings of the court of appeal and trial court, which granted defendant’s motion to quash the prosecution against him for second degree murder in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(3) (distribution of a controlled substance which directly causes the death of the recipient) and for possession of MDMA (ecstasy) with intent to distribute in violation of La. R.S. 40:966(A)(1), are reversed. ... Likewise, the defendant seeks to characterize his role as that of a mere purchaser and user of the drug. However, if the state proves the circumstances it has alleged at trial, the factfinder may rationally conclude that the defendant aided and abetted Smith in her actions as intermediary, in the delivery of the drugs to persons other than himself, which would make him a principal to the crimes. Moreover, it is for the factfinder to determine whether the defendant’s actions alone were sufficient to prove actual distribution.

Section 14:30.1(A)(3) defines second-degree murder to include unlawfully distributing a controlled dangerous substance that directly causes the death of the recipient who ingested or consumed it.

State of Louisiana v. Damien Dashaun Bernard A/K/A Damien Bernard · filed 2026-05-20(A)(3)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:30.1(A)(3) (footnote omitted) defines second degree murder as the killing of a human being when “the offender unlawfully distributes or dispenses a controlled dangerous substance listed in Schedules I through V of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law, or any combination thereof, which is the direct cause of the death of the recipient who ingested or consumed the controlled dangerous substance.”

Section 14:30.1(A)(3) requires proof that the victim consumed a controlled substance supplied by the defendant and that its consumption directly caused the victim’s death.

State of Louisiana v. Bartie · filed 2025-02-06(A)(3)

Because there was no evidence the victim ingested or consumed the methamphetamine that the defendant sold to her on the day she died, and the medical testimony established that the methamphetamine in the victim’s body at the time of her death could have been consumed before her purchase of methamphetamine from the defendant, an essential element of the crime alleged was not established.

Section 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second degree murder to include killing with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, and subsection (B) requires life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Lemons · filed 2004-04-07(A)(1) (B)

Due to the number of stab wounds, together with the serious nature of the wounds, a reasonable jury could have found that the defendant had the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon his wife, without provocation, when he stabbed her. ... The defendant was convicted of second degree murder, a violation of La. *509R.S. 14:30.1, which carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 14:30.1 requires a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor.

State v. Davis · filed 2010-09-14

In this case, since the defendant was sentenced pursuant to La.R.S. 14:30.1, which requires a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor, the trial court’s error was harmless.

Section 14:30.1(B) mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for second degree murder.

State v. Johnson · filed 2012-04-11(B)

The mandatory sentence for second degree murder is punishment by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). ... The defendant has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that his particular circumstances are an exception to the constitutional application of his mandatory sentence. ... As such, the legislatively mandated sentence is life imprisonment without benefits.

Section 14:30.1(B) mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for second-degree murder.

State v. Quinn · filed 2013-08-21(B)

Mr. Quinn’s life sentence for second degree murder is mandatory pursuant to La. R.S 14:30.1(B). ... At the sentencing, the trial court stated that it was required by law to impose a mandatory life sentence without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. ... Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly applied the statutory provisions contained in La.C.Cr.P. art. 894.1, and did not abuse its discretion in imposing the statutorily mandated life sentence.

Section 14:30.1(B) mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension unless the defendant proves an exceptional case warranting a constitutionally required departure.

State v. Lavy · filed 2014-03-11(B)

Whoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). ... Moreover, the trial court’s statement that it was “mandated by law” as to the sentence to be imposed was a reference to the sentence set forth in La. R.S. 14:30.1(B), which is “mandatory,” unless the defendant rebuts the presumption that the sentence is constitutional and establishes he is “exceptional,” as set forth in Dorthey and Johnson. ... Accordingly, there was no reason for the trial court to deviate from the provisions of La. R.S. 14:30.1(B) in sentencing him.

Subsection (B) mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for second-degree murder.

State of Louisiana v. Jorie Jakell Walker · filed 2023-04-19(B)

Second degree murder carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La.R.S. 14:30.1(B). ... A life sentence for second degree murder is statutorily mandated, and as discussed in Parker, there was no need for the trial court to justify the sentence under La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1. Additionally, we find Defendant’s young age, his first offender status, and this single, impulsive incident were not enough to justify a downward departure from the mandatory life sentence.

Section 14:30.1(B) prescribes life imprisonment without parole as its sole statutory penalty, but that no-parole mandate cannot constitutionally apply to offenders who committed their crimes as juveniles.

Jackson v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden · filed 2020-11-24(B)

Louisiana’s second-degree murder statute prescribes only one possible penalty irrespective of the offender’s age: mandatory “life imprisonment at ... hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). Under Miller and Montgomery, that sentence cannot constitutionally be applied to those who were juveniles when they committed their underlying offenses, including Jackson.

Section 14:30.1(B) requires a sentence for second degree murder to be served at hard labor.

State v. Davis · filed 2005-10-26(B)

The transcript reflects that the trial court failed to specify that the sentence would be served at hard labor as required by La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). The minutes indicate, however, that the sentence was imposed with hard labor. When there is a discrepancy between the minutes and the transcript, the transcript prevails. State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732 (La.1983). Because of this failure to state that the sentence was to be served at hard labor, the sentence is illegally lenient.

Section 14:30.1 requires a sentence for second-degree murder to include hard labor.

State v. Christian · filed 2006-02-03

We also note that there is a discrepancy between the commitment and the sentencing regarding the correct count of the indictment and that the sentence imposed fails to impose hard labor as required by La. R.S. 14:30.1.

Section 14:30.1(B) mandates that the sentence be served at hard labor.

State v. Adams · filed 2013-05-16(B)

The trial court imposed defendant’s sentence pursuant to La. R.S. 14:30.1(B), which mandates the sentence to be at hard labor.

Section 14:30.1 requires a sentence under its provisions to be served at hard labor.

State v. Ross · filed 2014-05-28(B)

Defendant was sentenced pursuant to La. R.S. 14:30.1, which mandates the sentence be served at hard labor.

Section 14:30.1 requires a sentence for second degree murder to be served at hard labor and gives the trial court no discretion on that requirement.

State v. Thomas · filed 2017-06-21

Because La. R.S. 14:30.1 requires that the sentence be served at hard labor, allowing no discretion to the trial court, the trial court’s omission was harmless error and requires no corrective action.

Section 14:30.1 classifies second-degree murder as a mandatory felony and requires any sentence to be served at hard labor.

State v. Evans · filed 2018-01-10

Because La. R.S. 14:30.1 is a mandatory felony, requiring any sentence to be served at hard labor, the error is harmless and self-correcting.

Section 14:30.1(B) makes second-degree murder punishable by life imprisonment at hard labor, with parole restrictions subject to the applicable law.

State v. Hudson · filed 2017-11-15(B)

Louisiana R.S. 14:30.1 is a mandatory felony, requiring any sentence to be served at hard labor. The trial court's resentencing of Hudson to "life imprisonment with benefit of parole" was too lenient as it failed to include the requirement that Hudson's life imprisonment be served at hard labor. The error is harmless and self-correcting; therefore, Hudson's life sentence is hereby amended to reflect that it is to be served at hard labor with the benefit of parole in accordance with La. R.S. 15:574.4(E).

Section 14:30.1 requires a sentence for second degree murder to be imposed at hard labor.

State of Louisiana v. Raven Lamar Wiltz · filed 2019-12-30

The trial court failed to impose the sentence at hard labor even though a sentence for second degree murder must be imposed at hard labor. La.R.S. 14:30.1. Thus, the sentence is illegally lenient. State v. Williams, 16-579 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/15/17), 216 S0.3d 107. We hereby amend the sentence to order that it be served at hard labor and order the trial court make a minute entry reflecting the amendment.

Section 14:30.1 requires a sentence for second degree murder to be imposed and served at hard labor.

State of Louisiana v. Lacon · filed 2019-12-30

The trial court failed to impose the sentence at hard labor even though a sentence for second degree murder must be imposed at hard labor. La.R.S. 14:30.1. Thus, the sentence is illegally lenient. State v. Williams, 16-579 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/15/17), 216 S0.3d 107. We hereby amend the sentence and order that it be served at hard labor and order the trial court to enter a minute entry reflecting this amendment.

Section 14:30.1 requires a sentence for second-degree murder to be imposed at hard labor.

State of Louisiana v. Hills · filed 2024-04-03

A sentence for second-degree murder must be imposed at hard labor. La.R.S. 14:30.1. Thus, Defendant’s sentence is illegally lenient.

Under § 14:30.1(A)(3), a controlled substance is a direct cause of death even when it acts together with another drug and is not the sole cause.

State v. Hano · filed 2006-06-09A(3)

Defendant has cited, and we have found, no jurisprudence to support a finding that the direct cause required to be proven under La. R.S. 14:30.1 A(3) must be the only cause of the death of the recipient who ingested or consumed the controlled dangerous substance. The evidence established that the ingestion of the methadone T.J.J. obtained from defendant set in motion the train of events which brought about T.J.J.'s death. But for the ingestion of the methadone that defendant distributed to T.J.J., he would not have died. That the methadone acted in concert with the benzodiazepine in his body does not eliminate its effect in directly causing T.J.J.'s death.

Section 14:30.1(B) mandates life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for second degree murder, subject to constitutional review.

State v. Davis · filed 2006-06-28(B)

The sentence for second degree murder is found in La. R.S. 14:30.1(B) which reads: Whoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. ... The decision to assess mandatory life sentences for certain felonies is within the prerogative of the legislature. Further, the argument that the mandatory life sentence for second degree murder is a violation of the prohibition against excessive punishment in the Louisiana Constitution has been repeatedly rejected.

For a juvenile convicted of second-degree murder, imprisonment until the juvenile’s thirty-first birthday is mandatory under § 14:30.1 and La. Ch.C. art. 857(B).

State v. Duncan · filed 2012-05-02

Defendant’s sentence of imprisonment until his thirty-first birthday under La. R.S. 14:30.1 and |flLa. Ch.C. art. 857(B)13 was mandatory.

In an attempted second-degree-murder case, the applicable sentencing provisions require the sentence to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Hudson · filed 2018-05-23

In the instant case, the transcript reflects that Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted second degree murder in count two in violation of La. R.S. 14:27 and La. R.S. 14:30.1 and was sentenced to imprisonment in the Department of Corrections for 30 years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. A review of those statutes indicates that the trial judge correctly ordered the sentence on count two to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Section 14:30.1 does not authorize restricting a defendant's ability to earn good-time credit.

State v. Gonzalez · filed 2007-11-28

Neither La. R.S. 14:30.1 nor La. R.S. 14:27 provide for a restriction of the right to earn good time.

Under the 1985 version of § 14:30.1, second-degree murder included a killing committed while the offender was perpetrating or attempting aggravated rape, even without intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

State v. Tolliver · filed 2009-05-13(2)

In 1985, second degree murder was defined as follows: ... (2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kid-naping, aggravated escape, armed robbery, or simple robbery, even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. ... As in Moms, the evidence in the instant case shows the defendant committed a violent offense against Mrs. Theriot immediately before her death, so it was reasonable for the jurors to find the defendant was the person who committed the murder. Thus, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was guilty of the second degree murder of Yolande Theriot. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

Section 14:30.1(A)(2) permits second-degree-murder liability without proof of specific intent when the defendant is engaged in cruelty to a juvenile, because the underlying felony supplies the culpable mental state.

State v. Kelly · filed 2018-02-21(A)(1) and (A)(2)

The felony murder prong of La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(2) does not require proof of specific intent because the underlying felony supplies the culpable mental state. State v. Small , 11-2796 (La. 10/16/12), 100 So.3d 797, 805. The underlying felony allegedly committed by defendant was cruelty to a juvenile, which is defined in La. R.S. 14:93(A)(1) as the "intentional or criminally negligent mistreatment or neglect by anyone seventeen years of age or older of any child under the age of seventeen whereby unjustifiable pain or suffering is caused to said child." Thus, in order for the State to prove defendant guilty of second degree murder while in engaged in the perpetration of cruelty to a juvenile, it had to establish either: (1) that defendant intentionally mistreated or neglected S.B.; or (2) that defendant was criminally negligent in his mistreatment or neglect of S.B., which caused unjustifiable pain or suffering to S.B. The term "intentional" within the meaning of this statute, requires general criminal intent to cause a child unjustifiable pain and suffering. State v. Victor , 15-339 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/26/16), 195 So.3d 128, 151. Mistreatment, as used in this statute, means "abuse." Id. Moreover, to be criminally negligent in his mistreatment or neglect of the child, the defendant must have such disregard for the interest of the child that his conduct amounted to a gross deviation below the standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful person under like circumstances. Id. ; see also La. R.S. 14:12.

Section 14:30.1(B) requires a mandatory life sentence for second-degree murder, but the defendant may seek an evidentiary hearing to show that the sentence is constitutionally excessive.

State v. Lawrence · filed 2010-08-25(B)

We instruct the trial court to schedule an evidentiary hearing, which shall be contradictory with the prosecution, at which hearing Mr. Lawrence shall be permitted to introduce relevant evidence and argument that the imposition upon him of the mandatory sentence provided by La. R.S. 14:30.1 B violates his constitutional protection against excessive punishment.

Section 14:30.1 defines second degree murder through alternative theories: specific-intent murder under (A)(1) and felony murder during certain enumerated felonies under (A)(2).

State v. Pegues · filed 2011-02-18(A)(1), (A)(2)

The state charged defendant with a specific intent homicide in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1) because simple burglary (or its attempt) is not one of the enumerated felonies in La.R.S. 14:30.1(A)(2), defining the offense of second degree felony murder.

Section 14:30.1 permits the State to proceed under both the specific-intent/great-bodily-harm and felony-murder theories when the facts support both, without electing one subsection in a bill of particulars.

State of Louisiana v. Sepulvado · filed 2011-03-09(A)(1) (A)(2)

Second degree murder is defined as a killing when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La.R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). ... In this case, the State filed a “State’s Notice to Proceed Under Alternative Theories of Second-Degree Murder,” indicating it would proceed under the theory of specific intent murder and a murder perpetrated during an aggravated arson. We find that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars which required that the State elect a subsection of second degree murder it was prepared to prove. ... Finally, because what actually caused the victim’s death was undetermined prior to trial, the facts of the case were applicable to both subsections. Here, it seems that the defendant knew as much of the basis of the charge as did the State in this case.

Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder through alternative theories: specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, or felony murder during an enumerated felony; either theory is sufficient for conviction.

State v. McElveen · filed 2011-09-28(A)

Second, unlike the federal continuing criminal enterprise statute, Louisiana’s second-degree murder statute does not require a conjunctive ... finding that a defendant committed a certain number of enumerated felonies or committed both felony murder and specific intent murder in order for a jury to convict. Louisiana’s ^statute is disjunctive — that is, the jury must have found only that the defendant killed Mr. Lorino either with specific intent or during the commission of an enumerated felony; either is sufficient to sustain a conviction. A legal verdict of “guilty of second-degree murder” suffices to assure that the requisite number of jurors must have found one or the other. ... Under Louisiana law, the “felony murder” and “specific intent” prongs do not represent independent elements of second-degree murder, but, rather, independent theories of the mens rea required to have been possessed by the defendant. The jury’s factual finding of either, to the complete exclusion of the other, is sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty. The jury’s verdict form reflecting that it found the defendant guilty of second-degree murder was constitutional.

Section 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder as killing a human being with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, or while perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate an enumerated felony, even without that intent.

State v. Stipe · filed 2015-02-11

Under La. R.S. 14:30.1, second degree murder is defined as the killing of a human being when the offender: 1) has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm or 2) is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of one of several enumerated felonies, even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. See State v. Lewis, 05-170 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/29/05), 917 So.2d 583, 589-90, writ denied, 06-757 (La.12/15/06), 944 So.2d 1277.

Section 14:30.1(A)(2) does not support second-degree-murder liability based solely on criminally negligent failure to supervise when an intervening act causes the death; felony murder requires a direct act of killing by the defendant or an accomplice.

State v. Small · filed 2012-10-16(A)(2)

Reading the second degree murder statute in conjunction with the cruelty to juveniles and second degree cruelty to juveniles statutes creates doubt as to whether lack of supervision was intended by the legislature as a underlying felony sufficient for a second degree murder conviction. An interpretation of the felony murder statute to allow a second degree murder conviction anytime a parent is criminally negligent in failing to supervise her child and the child dies as a result of some intervening act would be contrary to the rule of lenity and could result in unintended consequences.

Under § 14:30.1(A), pointing a gun at a person's face and shooting, even if the bullet strikes the leg, indicates the specific intent to kill required for second degree murder.

State of Louisiana v. Isiah Demon Lively · filed 2014-02-12(A)

“Second degree murder is the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm; or (2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of . . . armed robbery . . . .‖ La.R.S. 14:30.1(A). ... We find that pointing a gun in someone‘s face and then shooting him, albeit the bullet entered the leg, is an indication of intent to kill.

Section 14:30.1 requires intent and an act for second-degree murder, but it does not require premeditation.

State v. Harrington · filed 2013-02-13

The elements of the crime include intent and act but not premeditation. La.R.S. 14:8; La. R.S. 14:30.1.

Section 14:30.1 provides a life-imprisonment sentence without parole, probation, or suspension for second-degree murder, but a juvenile sentenced under it must receive resentencing that allows parole eligibility after consideration of the juvenile’s youth and attendant characteristics.

State v. Jones · filed 2013-05-23

Defendant was sentenced on March 26, 2012, in accordance with La. R.S. 14:30.1 to life imprisonment without the benefít of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Defendant was 17 years old at the time the charged offense was committed. ... Under the recent United States Supreme Court case Miller v. Alabama, supra, a juvenile may not be sentenced to a mandatory life sentence without parole without the trial court first considering an “offender’s youth and attendant characteristics as mitigating circumstances before deciding whether to impose the harshest possibly [sic] penalty.” In this case, the trial court did not consider these factors prior to sentencing Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Notably, Defendant was sentenced before the Miller decision. ... Accordingly, given the apparent retroactive applicability of the' Miller case, we vacate the portion of Defendant’s sentence that removes any meaningful opportunity to secure release, ie., parole from this offender, who was a juvenile at the time of this offense. Accordingly, the matter is remanded to the trial court to allow the trial judge to sentence Defendant in a manner allowing parole eligibility in accordance with the principles annunciated in Miller v. Alabama, supra.

Section 14:30.1 need not be amended for juvenile killers because life without parole remains constitutional for adult second-degree murderers and is not prohibited for every juvenile killer; juvenile parole eligibility is addressed by accompanying statutes.

State v. Fletcher · filed 2014-10-01

Contrary to the defendant’s claim, the legislature was not required to amend the second degree murder statute itself to provide for sentencing of juvenile killers. As noted by the attorney general, life without parole is still a constitutionally acceptable sentence for adult killers and it is not a prohibited sentence for all juvenile killers. Our legislature carefully designed an adequate solution by adding a new statute pertaining to parole eligibility for juvenile killers which is to be read in conjunction with the first and second degree murder statutes.

Section 14:30.1 remains constitutional after Miller; it need not itself be amended for juvenile offenders because the parole-eligibility provisions are read together with the second-degree murder statute.

State v. Graham · filed 2015-04-24

Contrary to the defendant’s claim,, the legislature was not required to amend the second degree murder statute itself to provide for sentencing of juvenile killers.... [L]ife without parole is still a constitutionally acceptable sentence for adult killers and it is not a prohibited sentence for all juvenile killers. Our legislature carefully designed an adequate solution by adding a new statute pertaining to parole eligibility for juvenile killers which is to be read in conjunction with the first and second degree murder statutes.

Section 14:30.1(B) authorizes life imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for a juvenile convicted of second-degree murder.

State v. Wilson · filed 2015-04-29(B)

A life sentence without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for a juvenile defendant convicted of second degree murder is authorized by La. R.S. 14:30.1(B).

Section 14:30.1 continues to require life imprisonment at hard labor for second-degree murder, while a juvenile offender's Miller hearing determines whether that sentence includes parole eligibility.

State v. Sumler · filed 2017-05-02

The punishment for a conviction of second degree murder remains the same today as it was in 1993, at the time Sumler committed the offense, and subjects him to life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole eligibility, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1. However, the Miller and Montgomery cases apply to defendants who were juveniles at the time they committed first or second degree murder, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30 and La. R.S 14:30.1. As previously noted, Miller v. Alabama, supra, held that a sentencing court must consider a juvenile homicide offender’s youth and its attendant characteristics before sentencing such a defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

Section 14:30.1 remains a valid sentencing statute for juvenile second-degree murder offenders, read together with provisions governing parole eligibility after a Miller hearing.

State of Louisiana v. Harvin · filed 2018-02-15

Contrary to the defendant’s claim, the legislature was not required to amend the second degree murder statute itself to provide for sentencing of juvenile killers. ... Our legislature carefully designed an adequate solution by adding a new statute pertaining to parole eligibility for juvenile killers which is to be read in conjunction with the first and second degree murder statutes. In the event that the trial court imposes a life sentence with parole eligibility, La. R.S. 15:574.4(E) provides conditions which must be satisfied before the defendant can apply to the parole board for parole consideration.

Section 14:30.1 mandates life imprisonment without parole for second degree murder, but a juvenile offender must have a meaningful opportunity for parole.

State v. Williams · filed 2012-12-11

In this case, defendant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced, before Miller became law, to life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence as mandated by La. R.S. 14:30.1. ... Thus, relying on the Graham, Shaffer, and, most recently, Miller, we vacate that portion of defendant’s sentence that removes any meaningful opportunity to secure release, i.e. parole, from this offender, who was a juvenile at the time of this offense.

Section 14:30.1 requires a second-degree-murder sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor, without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Morehead · filed 2024-10-23

La. R.S. 14:30.1 states that the punishment for second degree murder shall be life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Morehead’s sentence was not imposed at hard labor. In addition, it was imposed only without benefit of parole, but did not include the additional required conditions of without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

Second degree murder and conspiracy to commit second degree murder each require proof of a fact the other does not, so convictions for both do not violate double jeopardy.

State of Louisiana v. John L. Fussell, Sr. · filed 2024-02-28

Under Louisiana law, second degree murder and conspiracy to commit second degree murder are separately defined crimes under La. R.S. 14:30.1 and La. R.S. 14:26. Under these statutes, second degree murder and conspiracy to commit second degree murder require proof of at least one fact ... the other does not.

Section 14:30.1(A)(1) permits a second degree murder conviction based on specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm alongside a separate armed robbery conviction.

State of Louisiana v. Boyer · filed 2011-02-02(A)(1)

However, a defendant can be convicted of second degree murder where he had the specific intent to kill the victim or to cause great bodily harm and of armed robbery where he took something of value from the victim by force or intimidation while armed with a dangerous weapon.