Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for negligence claims; it does not govern an action whose substance is assault and battery.

Baska v. Scherzer · filed 2007-04-27(a)(4)

Under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4), negligence claims must be brought within 2 years. ... Because the defendants’ actions were intentional, the “substance” of Baska’s action is one for assault and battery. Failure to initiate her action within 1 year of the fight bars her action by reason of die 1-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. 60-514(b).

Subsection (a)(3) imposes a two-year limitations period for fraud claims, measured from discovery of the fraud or, if later, when substantial injury is reasonably ascertainable.

Ives v. McGannon · filed 2007-01-19(a)(3)

The law in Kansas is clear that a plaintiff must file his or her fraud claim within 2 years of discovering the fraud if plaintiff suffered ascertainable injury at that time. If not, plaintiff must file within 2 years of when substantial injury resulting from the fraud is reasonably ascertainable. ... Perhaps the most important fact comes from McGannon’s deposition where he testified about meeting with Ives and Murrill in December 1998 to raise concerns about Regional being overvalued in 1994. If McGannon was aware of potential valuation issues in 1998, his counterclaim was not timely when it was filed in March 2003. See K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3).

Section 60-513 provides a two-year limitations period for product-liability claims, generally running from when the plaintiff discovers the injury.

Cory v. Aztec Steel Building, Inc. · filed 2006-11-08(b)

In Kansas, there is a three-year statute-of-limitations period for consumer protection claims, Roy v. Young, 93 P.3d 712, 715 (K an. 2004) (citing Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-512(2)), and a two-year period for product liability claims, Fennesy v. LBI M gmt., Inc., 847 P.2d 1350, 1355 (K an. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513). The limitations periods for both claims generally begin running when the plaintiff discovers his injury, see Roy, 93 P.3d at 715; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(b).

Section 60-513(a)(3) imposes a two-year limitations period for fraud claims, accruing when the fraud is actually discovered or could have been discovered through reasonable diligence.

Cline v. Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline, Inc. · filed 2006-08-25(a)(3)

A claim for fraud does not accrue “until the fraud is discovered.” Id. § 60-513(a)(3). “Under Kansas law, a fraud is discovered at the time of actual discovery or when, with reasonable diligence, the fraud could have been discovered.” Waite v. Adler, 716 P.2d 524, 527 (Kan. 1986).

Under subsection (b), a two-year limitations period begins when the act first causes substantial (actionable) injury, or when injury becomes reasonably ascertainable if later, subject to the ten-year outside limit.

Carolina Industrial Products, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc. · filed 2001-12-18(b)

K.S.A. § 60 — 513(b) provides that a cause of action to which the two-year statute of limitations is applicable “shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party, but in no event shall an action be commenced more than 10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action.”

Under subsection (b), whether an injury is reasonably ascertainable is judged by an objective standard based on the surrounding circumstances.

Perry H. Bacon Trust v. Transition Partners, Ltd. · filed 2004-01-08(b)

The phrase “reasonably ascertainable” requires application of an objective standard to the surrounding circumstances.

Under § 60-513(b), when the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable may be a factual question for the trier of fact rather than a matter of law.

Hall v. Miller · filed 2001-12-07(b)

Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that when the fact of injury became reasonably ascertainable cannot be determined as a matter of law but rather should be submitted to the trier of fact for determination.

Section 60-513 supplies a two-year limitations period for Bivens personal-injury claims arising in Kansas.

Logan v. United States · filed 2003-07-17

Bivens actions are subject to the general personal injury statute of the state where the action arose. ... In Kansas, the statute of limitations for such claims is two years.

Subsection (a)(4) sets a two-year limitation period for personal-injury actions, and subsection (b) delays accrual—and commencement of the limitation period—until substantial injury or its reasonable ascertainability when injury follows the wrongful act.

In Re Smith · filed 2003-05-23(a)(4), (b)

The subject of accrual of causes of action for personal injury under Kansas law is addressed in Chapter 60, Section 513(a), of the Kansas Statutes Annotated under the general subject of limitations of actions. K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) prescribes a two-year limitation period for personal injury actions or in the words of the statute, “[a]n action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract....” Subsection (b) of K.S.A. 60-513 explains when a cause of action for personal injury accrues. According to this statute, a cause of action does not accrue until a wrongful act causes substantial injury. ... In the second clause of this statute, the Kansas legislature has adopted the discovery rule. It states that if the wrongful act and the resulting injury are separated in time, a cause of action does not accrue until the fact of injury is reasonably ascertainable by the injured party. Furthermore, under this statute, the period of limitation does not commence until injury becomes ascertainable to the injured party.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year catchall limitations period for injuries to another's rights that do not arise from contract and are not otherwise enumerated.

Sports Unlimited, Inc. v. Lankford Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2002-01-03(a)(4)

That subsection is a catchall provision, providing a two year limitation period for “action[s] for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated.” Kan Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4). ... Accordingly, we hold that Plaintiff’s state law claims are barred by limitations.

Under § 60-513(c), a medical-malpractice claim accrues when the injured party has objective knowledge of the injury, not necessarily its full extent.

Bradley v. Val-Mejias · filed 2004-07-23(c)

The fact of injury is reasonably ascertainable when “objective knowledge of the injury, not the extent of the injury,” is known.

The tort statute of limitations begins when the injury first occurs or, if the injury is not then reasonably ascertainable, when the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable; knowledge of the full extent of the injury is unnecessary.

Roof-Techs International, Inc. v. State · filed 2002-11-01(b)

Thus, under K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 60-513(b), the 2-year statute of limitations began to run at the point in time when the fact of injury became reasonably ascertainable to Roof-Techs.

Sections 60-513(a)(3) and (a)(4) impose two-year limitations periods for fraud and negligent-misrepresentation claims, respectively, running only after the claim accrues; accrual and the discovery of fraud may present fact questions.

Kansas Wastewater, Inc. v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc. · filed 2003-04-18(a)(3), (a)(4)

The statute of limitations on a fraud claim in Kansas is two years. K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(3). The limitations period is also two years on a negligent misrepresentation claim. K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4). But, the statute of limitations is not triggered until the claim has accrued.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions arising in Kansas.

Schroeder v. Kochanowski · filed 2004-03-31(a)(4)

In any event, even if the Complaint could be construed to state a claim of false arrest, it appears the claim would be barred by the two year statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(a)(4) requires actions for injury to another's rights, when not based on contract or otherwise enumerated, to be brought within two years.

Shaw v. Simmons · filed 2004-02-02(a)(4)

In pertinent part, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513 states: “(a) The following actions shall be brought within two years: . . . (4) An action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated.”

Subsection (a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for an action for injury to the rights of another that does not arise on contract.

Nixon v. Muehlberger Concrete Construction Co. · filed 2001-04-04(a)(4)

The applicable statute of limitations for a § 1981 claim is the two-year period of K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4), the period for “an action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract.”

Section 60-513(b) imposes a two-year limitations period on product-liability claims, including negligence and strict-liability claims and merged warranty theories.

Pedro v. Swift-Eckrich · filed 2000-09-26(b)

There is no dispute that the two-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. § 60-513(b) governs the plaintiffs claims of negligence and strict liability.

Section 60-513(b) creates a final, nonnegotiable 10-year bar to stale claims and applies prospectively when determining whether claims arising from older conduct remain viable.

Stark v. Mercantile Bank, N.A. · filed 2000-08-04(b)

We have no difficulty discerning legislative intent to erect a final, nonnegotiable bar to stale claims in the creation and articulation of the 10-year time limit of K.S.A. 60-513 and its companion 2-year transitional grace period. ... It would certainly be unreasonable if K.S.A. 60-513 was twisted to close the courthouse door to plaintiffs who wished to sue on wrongful acts committed after 1987 while it welcomed those pursuing redress for wrongful acts even more remote in time. The district court was correct in holding that 60-513 should be applied to determine the viability of plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 60-513(a)(4) requires negligence actions to be brought within two years.

Lowe v. Surpas Resource Corp. · filed 2003-03-27(a)(4)

Under Kansas law, the appropriate statute of limitations period for negligence claims is governed by K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4), which provides that actions must be brought within two years.

Subsection (a)(4) gives claims for injury to another's rights, including outrage and intentional infliction of emotional distress, a two-year statute of limitations.

Hallam v. Mercy Health Center of Manhattan, Inc. · filed 2004-09-17(a)(4)

In short, the 1 year limitation under K.S.A. 60-514 does not apply to this claim for outrage and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Instead, under K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 60-513(a)(4), the statute of limitations is 2 years.

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on the claims addressed by the court.

Ratts v. Board of County Com'rs, Harvey County, KS · filed 2001-03-28(a)(4)

As a preliminary matter, the court notes that this claim is controlled by the two-year statute of limitations imposed by Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4). See, e.g., Desmarteau v. City of Wichita, 64 F.Supp.2d 1067, 1083 (D.Kan.1999); Maus v. Belger Cartage Serv., Inc., No. 96-1257, 1996 WL 748056, at *3 (D.Kan. Dec.27, 1996). Therefore, only those incidents occurring after December 10, 1995, may be considered by the court.

Section 60-513(a)(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims when borrowed as the analogous Kansas personal-injury statute.

Laurino v. Tate · filed 2000-08-08(a)(4)

It then borrowed and applied the two-year Kansas statute of limitations for injury to the rights of another. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4); Wilson v. Garcia , 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985). ... The district court therefore appropriately applied the two-year Kansas state statute of limitations to his claims.

Section 60-513 generally accrues a cause of action when the wrongful act first causes substantial injury, or when an initially unascertainable injury becomes reasonably ascertainable; subsection (a)(4) covers noncontractual injuries to another’s rights not otherwise enumerated.

WADDEKK & REED FINANCIAL, INC. v. Torchmark Corp. · filed 2003-02-04(a)(4)

The Court need not pinpoint an exact accrual date for each count, but all of the Kansas Plaintiffs' claims had accrued by May 5, 2000 — when UILIC filed suit in Alabama. ... K.S.A. § 60-513 (cause of action accrues when act giving rise to cause of action first causes substantial injury or, if fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after initial act, when the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to injured party); see also ...; K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4) (limitations period of K.S.A. § 60-513 applies to action for injury to rights of another, not arising on contract, and not otherwise enumerated in statute).

Section 60-513 requires property-damage actions to be brought within two years.

Philippine American Life Insurance v. Raytheon Aircraft Co. · filed 2003-02-26

Under Kansas law, actions for property damage must be brought within two years. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513. The date of the airplane incident was October 19, 2000. Thus, any claims brought by plaintiffs against fourth-party defendant Metal Improvement must have been filed no later than October 19, 2002. ... Under these facts, the court deems plaintiffs’ amended complaint to have been effectively filed on the date that plaintiffs filed their motion for leave to add fourth-party defendant Metal Improvement: September 30, 2002. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint was therefore effectively filed within two years of the date the airplane incident occurred. ... Accordingly, the court finds that neither the economic loss doctrine nor the statute of limitations bars plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 60-513(b) imposes a ten-year absolute limit on actions running from the act that caused the injury, functioning as a statute of repose.

Pagel v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Co. · filed 2004-02-10(b)

The Kansas courts have held that the legislature intended the 1987 amendment to § 60-513(b) to be a statute of repose, with ten years from the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action as the absolute limit for filing actions. ... “The plain language of K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 60-513 and the applicable case law require that after July 1,1989, a negligence action must be brought within 10 years of the original wrongful act or the action is barred.” ... In this case, the alleged wrongful act-defendant’s discarding of the batteries-occurred at least twenty five years ago. As such, any claims relating to the batteries is barred by § 60-513.

The statute of repose imposes an absolute 10-year limit measured from the act giving rise to the cause of action, and a nonactionable design act does not trigger the period for later actionable conduct.

Dunn v. Unified School District No. 367 · filed 2002-02-08(b)

U.S.D. No. 367's actions in the late 1960s, designing and planning a door with plate glass, is not an act that can give rise to a cause of action because that act is not actionable pursuant to K.S.A. 75-6104(m). Thus, the date of the planning and designing of the plate glass doors is immaterial to a statute of repose argument. ... In the present case, any tortious act or failure to act which gave rise to plaintiffs' cause of action occurred well within the statute of repose.

Section 60-513 addresses the statute of limitations for certain state-law claims and does not create a claim for excessive force.

Nicol v. Auburn-Washburn USD 437 · filed 2002-11-01

However, the statute cited in support of this claim does not address a claim for excessive force. Instead, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513 references the statute of limitations applicable to certain state law claims.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for § 1983 actions arising in Kansas.

Parker v. Bruce · filed 2004-09-16(a)(4)

We have held that “the appropriate statute of limitations for § 1983 actions arising in Kansas is two years, under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4).” ... Accordingly, his March 5, 2004, complaint fell well outside Kansas’s two-year limitations period and was untimely unless Mr. Parker is entitled to tolling.

Section 60-513 imposes a two-year limitations period on negligence-based claims, running from knowledge of the fact of injury rather than the full extent of the injury.

Med James, Inc. v. Barnes · filed 2003-01-10

The critical date in this case is July 31, 1997, when Med James’ attorney took Simental’s statement that she was alleging Barnes had not asked her any questions except for her address and driver’s license when filling out the application for insurance. Med James knew or should have known as of July 31, 1997, of Simental’s allegations and that those allegations gave rise to a potential indemnity action against Barnes. Med James filed its petition on October 17, 2000 — outside the 2-year period. Med James’ claims for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and comparative implied indemnity are barred by the 2-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 60-513.

Section 60-513(a)(4) gives a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, beginning when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. · filed 2005-02-09(a)(4)

The appropriate limitations period for personal injury actions is two years from the time that the injury becomes “reasonably ascertainable” to the injured party. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4). Determination of whether an injury is “reasonably ascertainable” requires application of an objective standard to the pertinent circumstances to determine when a plaintiff obtains knowledge of an injury. ... Although Kansas law imposes an obligation on persons to investigate available sources of information, that obligation arises only after a party has acquired sufficient facts placing him on notice that he has suffered an injury. ... We hold that Burton’s addiction based negligent failure to warn claim is not barred by the statute of limitations and that his addiction and PVD based negligent failure to warn claims are supported by sufficient evidence.

Section 60-513(a)(3) and (a)(4) impose two-year limitations periods for the claims identified by the court, while subsection (b) makes a negligence claim accrue when the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable.

SG Metals Industries, Inc. v. New England Life Insurance · filed 2002-11-26(a)(3), (a)(4), (b)

Kansas has a two-year statute of limitation on fraud claims. K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(3). In determining when the causes of action accrued, I must apply a discovery rule. ... Under Kansas law, “[f]raud is discovered at the time of actual discovery or when, with reasonable diligence, the fraud could have been discovered.” ... Kansas also has a two-year statute of limitation on claims for negligence and negligent supervision. K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4). Negligence claims do not accrue until the “fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.K.S.A. § 60-513(b). ... Under Kansas law, a breach of fiduciary duty is governed by a two-year statute of limitation. K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4). To determine when the cause of action accrued, I must look to when the plaintiff knew or reasonably could have been expected to know of the breach of the duty.

For fraud claims, the two-year limitations period accrues when the fraud is discovered.

Moore v. Luther Ex Rel. Luther · filed 2003-09-08(a)(3)

An action for fraud in Kansas has a two-year statute of limitations. K.S.A. 60—513(a)(3). Such a cause of action accrues when the fraud is discovered. ... Accordingly, the court finds plaintiffs’ fraud claim against State Farm is barred by the statute of limitations since this action was not filed until July 3, 2002.

For fraud claims, the two-year limitations period begins when the fraud is discovered or reasonably discoverable, and reasonable discoverability is generally a fact question.

Granite Management Corp. v. Gaar · filed 2001-03-07(a)

Under Kansas law, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered or discoverable. Fraud is deemed discoverable at the point when, with reasonable diligence, it could have been discovered. ... In sum, the question when a plaintiff could have with reasonable diligence discovered the alleged fraud is one of fact for the jury.

For damage to land, § 60-513 provides a two-year limitations period, accruing when substantial injury occurs or becomes reasonably ascertainable, with an absolute ten-year limit from the causative act.

Deisher v. Kansas Department of Transportation · filed 1998-04-24(a)(4), (a)(1), (b)

The limitation for bringing an action for damage to land is governed by K.S.A. 60-513(a)(l), which requires that the action be brought within 2 years. Actions for damage to land are not deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the action accrues when the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party. In no event shall the action be commenced more than 10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action. K.S.A. 60-513(b).

The statute applies a discovery rule to tort claims: accrual occurs when wrongful conduct causes substantial injury or the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable, and substantial injury need only be ascertainable enough to support a damages action regardless of its extent.

Gottstein v. National Ass'n for the Self Employed · filed 1999-06-18(a)(4), (b), (a)(3)

Kansas applies a discovery rule in calculating the accrual date for tort claims. ... A cause of action accrues at the time the wrongful conduct causes substantial injury or when the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party. ... Substantial injury means that plaintiff has sufficient ascertainable injury to justify an action for recovery of damages, regardless of the extent of injury.

Under § 60-513(a)(4) and (b), a tort claim accrues when substantial injury occurs or, if the injury is not reasonably ascertainable then, when it becomes reasonably ascertainable; the plaintiff need not know the injury’s full extent.

F.J. Joseph, Inc. v. Lida Advertising, Inc. · filed 1998-04-17(a)(4), (b)

The term “substantial injury,” however, does not mean that a plaintiff must have knowledge of the full extent of its injury before the statute of limitations commences. ... The extent of the injury is irrelevant.

Under the discovery rule, a tort claim accrues when substantial injury occurs or becomes reasonably ascertainable; the claimant need not know the full extent of the injury.

Rigby v. Clinical Reference Laboratory, Inc. · filed 1998-02-05(b)

The use of the term “substantial injury” in this statute is not intended to suggest that a plaintiff must have knowledge of the full extent of his injuries before the statute of limitations commences.

The two-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff has notice sufficient to discover the injury through due diligence; particularized or ironclad actual knowledge is unnecessary.

Kansas Public Employees Retirement System v. Blackwell, Sanders, Matheny, Weary & Lombardi, L.C. · filed 1997-05-13(a)

To the contrary, Kansas law does not require that the plaintiff have ironclad actual knowledge about his injury, but rather that he have such notice as would permit him to discover the injury with the use of due diligence. "'Reasonably ascertainable' does not mean 'actual knowledge.'" Davidson v. Denning, 914 P.2d 936, 948 (Kan. 1996). Accord Miller v. Foulston, Siefkin, Powers & Eberhardt, 790 P.2d 404, 417 (Kan. 1990); Brueck v. Krings, 638 P.2d 904, 908 (Kan. 1982); Kelley v. Barnett, 932 P.2d 471, 476-77 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997). The public statements that the St. Louis acquisition was unlikely were enough to put KPERS on notice that its money might not be used to buy the St. Louis thrift.

Section 60-513(a)(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for injuries to personal rights, including these federal civil-rights claims.

Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc. · filed 1999-03-10(a)(4)

Plaintiffs claims under § 1981, § 1983, § 1985 and § 13981 are best characterized as claims for injuries to personal rights and, accordingly, borrow the two-year statute of limitations set forth in K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4).

Subsection (a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for a general personal-injury claim, including this Bivens claim.

Canell v. Ken McClain · filed 1998-08-06(a)(4)

Mr. Macaiba-Canell's Bivens claim is subject to Kansas's two-year general personal injury statute. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4) (1994); Industrial Constructors Corp. v. United States Bureau of Reclamation, 15 F.3d 963, 968 (10th Cir. 1994). The face of the complaint indicates Mr. Macaiba-Canell's claim is time-barred, and we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in determining that his tolling arguments were legally insufficient.

Section 60-513 imposes a two-year statute of limitations on negligence actions.

Darius C. Leavens v. James F. Foster, Special Administrator of the Estate of James O. Shields, Deceased · filed 1997-12-04

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513 provides a two-year statute of limitations for negligence actions. ... Accordingly, subsection (a)(2) governs, and the action was not commenced until the time of service of process, which was beyond Kansas' two-year statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year statute of limitations for this personal-injury action, running from the automobile accident.

Jenkins v. City of Topeka · filed 1997-04-28(a)(4)

It is not disputed that the defendants have not received proper service of process under Kansas law in this case. As noted above, this case arose from an automobile accident on September 8, 1994. The appropriate statute of limitations is two years. K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4). Therefore, the statute of limitations would have expired in this case on September 8, 1996.

For legal-malpractice claims involving underlying litigation that may determine the attorney’s negligence, the limitations period generally does not begin until that litigation is finally resolved.

Berberich v. Payne & Jones, Chartered · filed 1998-04-07(b)

In a legal malpractice action in which there is underlying litigation which may be determinative of the alleged negligence of the attorney, the better rule, and the one which generally will be applicable under K.S.A. 60-513(b), is that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the underlying litigation is finally determined. ... Therefore, plaintiffs’ claim against defendant, based on defendant’s alleged failure to file protective refund claims, has not accrued at this time.

Subsection (a)(7) supplies a two-year limitation period for medical-malpractice actions, while subsection (c) provides the accrual rule and a four-year repose period; the claim was not barred because the injury's reasonable ascertainability was a fact question and could not be determined as a matter of law before the cancer diagnosis.

Swafford v. Wortman · filed 1998-04-23(a)(7) (c)

K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(7) provides a two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. K.S.A. § 60-513(c) establishes when such a cause of action accrues: ... The defendant argues that any claim of negligence on the part of defendant which occurred on or before November 16, 1991, is barred under K.S.A. § 60-513(c). The court agrees. Section 60-513(c) operates as a statute of repose, barring any action for medical malpractice brought more than four years after the act constituting malpractice. ... Finally, the court considers the two-year statute of limitations under K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(7). ... Based on the evidence in the record, the court cannot conclude as a matter of law that Velda Swafford’s injury was reasonably ascertainable at any time before she was actually diagnosed with cancer in December 1993. Accordingly, plaintiffs medical malpractice claim is not barred by the two-year statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(b) starts the limitations period when a tortious act causes reasonably ascertainable actionable injury, including when recurring flooding from a permanent structure makes damages permanent.

Moon v. City of Lawrence · filed 1999-07-09(b)

If the Second and Michigan Street Drainage System is a permanent structure and plaintiffs have experienced flooding since 1993, plaintiffs’ damages are permanent, not temporary, and the statute of hmitations began to run in 1993.

Section 60-513(a)(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for invasion-of-privacy and other state-law claims, subject to tolling under § 60-515 when the claimant is legally incapacitated.

Blackwell v. Harris Chemical North America, Inc. · filed 1998-06-18(a)(4)

Invasion of privacy actions are governed by a two-year statute of limitations under K.S.A. § 60-513 ... but plaintiffs in this case have pled the tolling provisions of K. S.A. § 60-515. Thus, defendants’ motion to dismiss Count III must be overruled.

Subsection (a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period for negligence claims, and the period bars a claim that accrued when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the negligence.

Steinle v. Knowles · filed 1997-11-21(a)(4)

The applicable statute of limitations for negligence is 2 years. K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4). ... Because the causes of action accrued at least by 1986, they are time barred. ... “ ‘ “[A]n injured party has a positive duty to use diligence in discovering his cause of action within the limitations period. Any fact that should excite his suspicion is the same as actual knowledge of his entire claim.” ’ [Citation omitted.]”

Subsection (a)(4) requires actions for injury to another's rights, not arising on contract and not otherwise enumerated, to be brought within two years; an excessive-force claim falls within this limitation period.

Swinehart v. City of Ottawa · filed 1997-08-15(a)(4)

A claim of excessive use of force by officers is governed by the 2-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4), which provides that an action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract and not otherwise enumerated, must be brought within 2 years.

Section 60-513 supplies a two-year limitations period for tort claims arising from a proprietary function; claims arising from a governmental function are not subject to that period under § 60-521.

Kansas Public Employees Retirement System v. Reimer & Koger Associates, Inc. · filed 1997-06-27(a)(4)

If it does, then K.S.A. § 60-521 leaves no room for doubt that the City’s action is not subject to the statute of limitations. If it does not, then the two-year statute of limitations under K.S.A. 60-513 comes into play.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim, accruing when the claimant objectively knows of the injury.

Desmarteau v. City of Wichita, Kan. · filed 1999-08-12(a)(4)

For the same reasons, plaintiffs claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, which is subject to a two-year limitations period under K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4), is also time-barred.

Section 60-513(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for the plaintiff's § 1983 claims arising from his arrest.

Gaschler v. Scott County, Kan. · filed 1998-04-01(4)

We agree with the district court that plaintiff's claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, regarding his arrest on March 11, 1992, are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Those claims are subject to the two-year limitations period in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(4).

Section 60-513(a)(3) provides a two-year limitations period for common-law and federal securities fraud claims, while subsection (a)(4) provides a two-year period for breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims.

Koch v. Koch Industries, Inc. · filed 1997-07-11(a)(3), (a)(4)

The plaintiffs’ other claims are governed by two-year statute of limitations: common-law fraud — K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3); breach of fiduciary duty — K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4), ... For this reason, the court denies summary judgment on this statute of limitations issue.

Subsections (b) and (c) start the limitations period when substantial injury occurs, or when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable if later; subsection (b) has a 10-year outside limit and subsection (c) a 4-year outside limit.

P.W.P. v. L.S. · filed 1998-12-18(b) and (c)

Both subsections (b) and (c) are similar in that the statute of limitations is triggered either when substantial injury occurs or, if the injury is not reasonably ascertainable at that time, when it is reasonably ascertainable. They differ only in that under subsection (b) the action must be commenced within 10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the action while under (c) the action must be commenced within 4 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action.

The two-year limitations period begins when substantial injury occurs or, if the injury is not then reasonably ascertainable, when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable under an objective standard; subsections (b) and (c) also impose 10-year and four-year outer limits, respectively.

Pwp v. Ls · filed 1998-12-18(a)(4), (a)(7), (b), and (c)

We further stated that the term "reasonably ascertainable," as applied in K.S.A. 60-513(b) and (c), suggests an objective standard based upon an examination of the surrounding circumstances. 259 Kan. at 669. See Bonin v. Vannaman, 261 Kan. 199, 929 P.2d 754 (1996); Bold v. Spitcaufsky, 24 Kan. App.2d 135, 942 P.2d 652 (1997); Kelley v. Barnett, 23 Kan. App.2d 564, 932 P.2d 471 (1997). It is clear that Kansas courts have held the objective knowledge of the injury, not the extent of the injury, triggers the statute both in medical and nonmedical malpractice cases.

Section 60-513(b) delays accrual of the limitations period until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Benedetto v. PaineWebber Group · filed 1998-09-01(b)

The statute of limitations on Kansas securities law and common law tort actions runs for three and two years, respectively, from the time at which wrongful conduct becomes reasonably ascertainable. ... Second, Kansas authority indicates that whether Benedetto or her mother could have continued to rely on PaineWebber’s representations of safety following the PWMP V and PWIP VI disclosures in 1990 and 1991 is properly a question for the jury.

Section 60-513(a) sets a two-year statute of limitations for tort claims.

Griffin v. Security Pacific Automotive Financial Services Corp. · filed 1998-11-03(a)

In Kansas, the statute of limitations for tort claims is two years.

Section 60-513 provides a two-year limitation period for actions seeking relief for injury to another’s rights that do not arise from contract, including this tort claim.

Tri-City Constr. Co. v. A.C. Kirkwood & Associates · filed 1987-10-27

The Kansas limitation statutes are K.S. A. § 60-512 (1983) which provides a limitation of three years for filing actions on contract and K.S.A. § 60-513 (1983) which allows two years to bring an action for injury to the rights of another not arising on contract. Under Kansas law, a cause of action accrues as soon as the right to maintain a legal action arises. ... The latest date on which Tri-City’s cause of action against Kirkwood could have accrued was June 18, 1982, the last date on which Tri-City performed any work in connection with the water system project. Under Kansas law, Tri-City had until June 18, 1985 in which to bring suit against Kirk-wood if the claim were upon a contract, but only until June 18, 1984 if the cause of action were in tort. ... The date on which the first petition was filed was within the two year limitation (May 16, 1984 vis-a-vis June 18, 1984), but concurrently with the filing of the petition, the court clerk was instructed to withhold summons and service of process until further notice. ... In summary, it is held that Tri-City’s claim set out in the petition filed May 16, 1984 was barred by the statute of limitations which expired before service of process was ordered or accomplished on Kirk-wood.

Section 60-513(a)(3) does not delay accrual until discovery when the alleged breach of fiduciary duty was clearly ascertainable when the agreements were made.

Cornett v. Roth · filed 1983-07-15(a)(3)

The Cornetts contend that they were not aware of the alleged actions of Roth until the interest payments upon one of the notes ceased in May of 1980, and that the statute of limitations did not commence to run until that date based upon K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3). We conclude the trial court was correct in its ruling. ... Assuming that a fiduciary or contractual duty existed, which is not borne out by the existing record; any alleged breach of that duty was clearly ascertainable at the time of the agreements were entered into.

Section 60-513(a)(3) gives fraud actions a two-year limitations period that begins when the fraud is actually discovered or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.

Waite v. Adler · filed 1986-03-28(a)(3)

This court has concluded that the appeal in this case should be determined on the basis that the plaintiff s claims, assuming they have validity, are barred by the two-year statute of limitations under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3), which provides, in substance, that an action for relief on the ground of fraud must be brought within two years, but the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the fraud is discovered. Under Kansas law, a fraud is discovered at the time of actual discovery or when, with reasonable diligence, the fraud could have been discovered.

Section 60-513(a)(3) sets a two-year limitations period for fraud that begins when the fraud is discovered, but that period does not apply to Kansas Consumer Protection Act claims for actual damages.

Agristor Leasing v. Gene E. · filed 1986-04-29(a)(3)

Under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3), the 2-year statute of limitations for fraud begins to run when the fraud is discovered or could reasonably have been discovered.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for claims governed by that subsection, while subsection (b) delays accrual until the injury is discovered or reasonably could have been discovered.

NL Industries, Inc. v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. · filed 1986-08-07(a)(4)

The claims for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and tortious interference with fiduciary relations are governed by K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4), which provides a 2-year statute of limitations. However, under 60-513(b), the cause of action is not deemed to have accrued until the plaintiff discovers the injury or could reasonably have discovered the injury.

Section 60-513 gives fraud claims a two-year limitations period, measured from actual discovery or when reasonable diligence would have discovered the fraud; a claimant's suspicions may not trigger accrual while the defendant's representations lull the claimant into confidence.

Mattingly, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Company · filed 1987-12-24

In Kansas, " '[d]iscovery of the fraud' has been defined ... to mean the time of actual discovery or when, with reasonable diligence, the fraud could have been discovered." Augusta Bank & Trust v. Broomfield, 231 Kan. 52, 643 P.2d 100, 108 (1982). Nevertheless: It ... [implies] actual knowledge, not mere suspicion of wrong. Further, even though his suspicions might have been aroused a party may be lulled into confidence by certain representations and forego any further investigation.

For a tort-based attorney-malpractice claim, the two-year limitations period begins when the client suffers substantial injury sufficient for the tort to accrue.

Pancake House, Inc. v. Redmond Ex Rel. Redmond · filed 1986-03-28(a)(4)

Here, PHI alleges that the malpractice committed by the defendant was the filing of the suit against PHI. PHI contends, however, that substantial damage was not suffered by it until after the trial and the filing of the journal entry on September 7, 1982. It argues that the malpractice claim accrued at that time because PHI could not file the action against its former attorney until the original action filed by its former attorney had been decided in its favor. ... We agree that PHI did not suffer any damages until it had to defend against the suit filed by its former attorneys. It was not until the journal entry of judgment was filed on September 7, 1982, that it suffered sufficient damages for the tort to accrue. PHI filed this suit on October 25, 1983, within two years of the date when the action accrued. Therefore, the district court should not have ordered PHI’s tort claims dismissed.

For tort claims, § 60-513(b) starts the limitations period when substantial injury occurs, or, if the injury is not reasonably ascertainable then, when it becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Knight v. Myers · filed 1988-01-07(b)

K.S.A. 60-513(b) specifically states that a tort action accrues either at the time at which (1) the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or (2) if the fact of the injury is not reasonably ascertainable, the time at which the injury does become reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.

Section 60-513(a)(3) permits a fraud action to be brought within two years.

Oehme v. Oehme · filed 1984-12-14(a)(3)

Independent of K.S.A. 60-260, Nancy always had a right to utilize K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3), which permits this action, brought within two years.

Section 60-513(a)(3) gives fraud actions a two-year limitations period measured from discovery of the fraud.

Phelps v. Eagle-Beacon · filed 1986-04-01(a)(3)

Defendants base their motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint on the ground that the amended cause of action under RICO is time-barred by K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3), the statute of limitations for fraud. Such statute limits actions brought for fraud to two years from the date in which the fraud was discovered. Clearly, if the amended complaint does not relate back to the initial pleading filed by the plaintiff, plaintiff’s cause of action under RICO would be time-barred. ... The court finds that while plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges additional facts and violations, such as mail fraud and use of interstate phone wires to publish such articles, the court finds that the RICO claim arises out of the same transactions and occurrences as alleged in plaintiff’s original complaint. The court therefore finds that for purposes of the statute of limitations, plaintiff’s amended complaint does relate back to the filing of plaintiff’s original complaint on March 7, 1983, thus not barring plaintiff’s claim under RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962.

Section 60-513 requires a fraud action to be filed within two years after the fraud is discovered, or when it could have been discovered with reasonable diligence; actual knowledge, rather than mere suspicion, is required.

Augusta Bank & Trust v. Broomfield · filed 1982-04-03

“Discovery of the fraud” has been defined by this court to mean the time of actual discovery or when, with reasonable diligence, the fraud could have been discovered. ... It does, however, imply actual knowledge, not mere suspicion of wrong. ... Here the evidence indicates Broomfield was lulled into confidence by the representations of Paul Mann that he would eventually be paid. ... We hold the fraud was not discovered until after June of 1977. Consequently, Broomfield’s action was timely filed.

The two-year limitations period applies to common-law fraud actions, not Kansas Consumer Protection Act claims that do not require proof of intent to injure.

Haag v. Dry Basement, Inc. · filed 1987-02-05(3)

K.S.A. 60-513(3) is the two-year statute of limitations which applies to fraud actions. Defendant asserts that because an action under the KCPA is, in fact, an action based on fraud, the provisions of that statute should apply to bar plaintiffs action. As stated and cited above, and as supported by other Kansas authority, a plaintiff pursuing a cause of action under the KCPA may establish a supplier’s liability without proof that the supplier intended to injure the consumer. This difference clearly distinguishes the KCPA action from the common-law fraud action. A violation of the KCPA is not the same as a common-law action for fraud such as is contemplated by the provisions of K.S.A. 60-513(3). Therefore, the defendant’s argument that K.S.A. 60-513(3) bars plaintiff s action is not persuasive.

Section 60-513 gives fraud actions a two-year limitations period that runs from actual discovery or when the fraud could have been discovered with reasonable diligence, although mere suspicion may not suffice when representations lull the claimant into inaction.

Mattingly, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co. · filed 1987-12-24

In Kansas, “ ‘[discovery of the fraud’ has been defined ... to mean the time of actual discovery or when, with reasonable diligence, the fraud could have been discovered.” ... It ... [implies] actual knowledge, not mere suspicion of wrong. Further, even though his suspicions might have been aroused a party may be lulled into confidence by certain representations and forego any further investigation. ... The trial judge found that “any reasonable suspicions on plaintiffs’ part were lulled by defendant’s steadfast representation that only plaintiffs had complaints, and defendant’s apparent willingness to help with plaintiffs’ warranty expenses.” Consequently the court concluded that the Mattinglys neither knew of Farboil’s fraud before March 10, 1976 nor had knowlege of sufficient facts to require further investigation. Mem. at 49. These findings have ample evidentiary support.

Section 60-513 imposes a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Murphy v. Klein Tools, Inc. · filed 1988-08-22

As it appears that a three-year statute of limitations governs an action for personal injuries in New Mexico, N.M.Stat.Ann. 37-1-8, this court must apply the shorter two-year Kansas statute of limitation for personal injury actions provided at K.S.A. 60-513.

Section 60-513(a)(7) covers professional-negligence actions against health care providers, and subsection (c) generally accrues such claims when the act occurs, subject to delayed ascertainability but an absolute four-year limit from the act.

Brubaker Ex Rel. Brubaker v. Cavanaugh · filed 1982-07-14(a)(7), (c)

K.S.A. 60-513(c), the applicable statute to this action, states that a cause of action arising out of the rendering of or failure to render professional services by a health care provider shall be deemed to have accrued at the time of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action. If, as plaintiff alleges, the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until sometime after the initial act, then the limitation period does not commence until the act of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party. However, the running of the statute is not tolled indefinitely. The key statutory phrase in this action is that which states “in no event shall such an action be commenced more than four (4) years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action.” Therefore, plaintiff’s causes of action against defendant, a health care provider, were barred on December 18, 1972. ... It is clear that the claims for wrongful birth and wrongful life arise from defendant’s alleged failure to inform plaintiff and Shirley Brubaker of the hereditary nature of the familial polyposis. Because we have determined that the latest date this failure could have occurred was 1968, K.S.A. 60-513 would bar such actions against the health care provider. ... The action Shirley Brubaker might have maintained had she lived would have been “a cause of action arising out of the rendering of or the failure to render professional services by a health care provider.” Thus, the limitations of K.S.A. 60-513(c) apply in the wrongful death action as well. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff’s causes of action are barred by the provisions of K.S.A. 60-513.

Section 60-513 gives medical-malpractice plaintiffs two years from when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable, but absolutely bars suit more than four years after the causative act or omission.

Brubaker v. Cavanaugh · filed 1984-08-22(a), (c)

The statute establishes a "discovery rule." In cases such as this where the injury is not discovered until sometime after the alleged negligent act, the plaintiff has two years from the date of discovery to bring suit. The "discovery rule" is limited in that no action may be commenced more than four years after the act or omission alleged to have caused the injury.

Subsection (a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on the personal-injury claim at issue.

Schmid v. Roehm GmbH · filed 1982-07-21(a)(4)

There is no question that the accident occurred on August 16,1978, and the two-year statute of limitations is applicable. (K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4). K.S.A. 60-203 provides that a civil action is commenced with the filing of the petition if service of process is obtained within ninety days after such filing. If service is not effected within ninety days of filing, the action is “deemed commenced” at the time of the service of process. ... Plaintiff’s claim is therefore barred by the applicable statute of limitations and this action must be dismissed in accordance with defendant Roehm’s motion.

Section 60-513 generally imposes a two-year limitation for personal-injury actions, subject to delayed ascertainment, but requires suit within ten years of the act giving rise to the claim.

In Re Tetracycline Cases · filed 1989-04-10

In personal injury actions, K.S.A. § 60-513 applies a two-year limitation unless substantial injury or the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until more than two years after the wrongful conduct. However, even if injury or ascertainment occurs later, the lawsuit must be filed within ten years of "the act giving rise to the cause of action." The alleged wrongful conduct occurred prior to ingestion of the tetracycline product. Therefore, the two-year limit was exceeded long before plaintiff reasonably could ascertain her injury. However, the ten-year limit also expired at least by 1976, ten years after the product last was ingested. Thus, plaintiff's claims would be barred.

Section 60-513(a)(4) supplies a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions and may be borrowed for a Title VI race-discrimination claim.

Baker v. Board of Regents of State of Kan. · filed 1989-09-01(a)(4)

Therefore, we hold that the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Kansas, K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4), should apply to plaintiffs Title VI claim.

For a wrongful-death claim, the two-year limitations period begins when the death—the substantial injury—is reasonably ascertainable.

Clark v. Prakalapakorn · filed 1982-07-29(a)(7)(b)

Accordingly, we hold the fact of injury in this case was the death of Elgin Clark, which was reasonably ascertainable on August 15, 1978. Since this action was not commenced until September 24, 1980, which was beyond the limitation prescribed by K.S.A. 60-513, summary judgment was properly entered for defendant.

For a tort conversion or personal-property-recovery claim, the limitations period begins when substantial injury first appears or becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Jewelers v. Satterthwaite · filed 1983-05-12(h)

However, the dispositive issue before us at this time is the nature of plaintiff s claim and whether that claim is barred by the provisions of K.S.A. 60-513(a)(2). ... Although plaintiff s remedy sounds in tort for the recovery of personal property and an action in conversion might lie, the nature of the present action is the enforcement of a written agreement which created a security interest in that property. ... Because plaintiff is asserting its right to repossess the property under that agreement, the 5-year statute is deemed controlling and this action timely commenced.

Subsection (b) sets a two-year limitations period for tort claims, accruing when the act causes substantial injury or when that injury is discovered.

Grey v. Bradford-White Corp. · filed 1984-03-22(b)

This court finds that in light of the reasoning in the recent cases cited above the Kansas Supreme Court would now. find that in a products liability action for breach of express or implied warranty where death, personal injury or property damage is alleged the applicable statute of limitations in Kansas would be the two-year tort statute of limitations at K.S.A. 60-513 accruing at the time of substantial injury or its discovery rather than the four-year UCC statute of limitations accruing at the tender of delivery.

Section 60-513(b) starts the limitations period when a negligent act causes an actionable injury that is reasonably ascertainable, without requiring knowledge of the injury's full extent.

Roe v. Diefendorf · filed 1984-10-26(b)

Our decisions are reconcilable. The rule which has developed is: The statute of limitations starts to run in a tort action at the time a negligent act causes injury if both the act and the resulting injury are reasonably ascertainable by the injured person. ... Therefore, we construe the phrase “substantial injury” in K.S.A. 60-513(b) to mean “actionable injury.”

Section 60-513 bars recovery for injuries sustained more than two years before suit, but does not bar claims for temporary damages accruing within the two-year period.

Miller v. Cudahy Co. · filed 1983-06-21(a)(4), (b)

Because this Court has concluded that the plaintiffs’ allegations in this case entitle them to attempt to show at trial that the American Salt facility constitutes an abatable nuisance causing temporary damages through salt pollution of the aquifer, the assertion that K.S.A. § 60-513 bars the plaintiffs’ claims in their entirety is without merit. This does not mean, however, that the section is irrelevant to this case. K.S.A. § 60-513 does operate to preclude the plaintiffs from recovering for injuries sustained more than two years prior to May 31, 1977, the day this suit was filed. American Salt’s motion for partial summary judgment must therefore be overruled in all particulars not expressly granted above, and the plaintiffs are entitled to attempt to prove and recover their damages that have accrued between May 31, 1975 and the date of judgment in this case.

Subsection (a)(4) requires an action for injury to another's rights, when not arising on contract and not otherwise enumerated, to be brought within two years.

City of Attica v. Mull Drilling Co. · filed 1984-02-16(a)(4)

Thus, the applicable statute of limitations is K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4), which provides for a two-year period. Concededly, this period had run against all defendants at the time plaintiff instituted this suit. Therefore, the trial court’s summary judgment for defendants, on the ground that plaintiff s action was time-barred, was correct.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for injury to another's rights not arising on contract and not otherwise enumerated, but it does not apply to civil-rights cases governed by § 60-512(2).

Sullivan v. LaMunyon · filed 1983-10-05(a)(4)

These three areas of significant substantive difference between the cause of action created by § 1983 and the common law causes of action for state wrongs are sufficient to demonstrate that the § 1983 cause of action simply did not exist at common law when § 1983 was adopted, and that the § 1983 cause of action is, therefore, one “created by a statute” within the meaning of K.S.A. § 60-512(2). Because civil rights cases predicated on §§ 1981-88 seek to vindicate specific and discrete rights by invoking the unique liabilities created by the Constitution and the civil rights statutes, K.S.A. § 60-512(2) is applicable to those cases. Because K.S.A. § 60-512(2) is applicable to those cases, K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4) must be inapplicable because civil rights cases are actions “herein enumerated [in K.S.A. § 60-512(2) ]” within the meaning of that subsection.

Section 60-513(b) does not begin the limitations period for a latent disease claim based on invisible, preclinical, asymptomatic changes; the claim accrues when substantial injury becomes clinically manifest or reasonably ascertainable.

Colby v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. · filed 1984-07-09(b)

The transparent spirit, or thrust, of K.S.A. 60-513(b) is to relieve the plaintiff from his own blameless ignorance and soften the harshness of the previously applied rule. ... This Court categorically rejects any such notion. ... Invisible, preclinical, asymptomatic cellular changes, which can be seen only through the vigorous exercise of 20-20 speculative hindsight, cannot, in reason and fairness, be deemed to trigger the running of the statute.

Section 60-513(c) delays accrual of a medical-malpractice claim until the fact of injury is reasonably ascertainable when that occurs after the negligent act, subject to the statute's outer limit.

Cleveland v. Wong · filed 1985-06-21(a)(7), (c)

The present statute provides that a cause of action against a health care provider accrues at the time of the occurrence of the act “unless the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act.” ... Thus, while plaintiff knew that he was both incontinent and impotent immediately after the surgery, he had no reason to suspect that those conditions were permanent or that those conditions were the result of any negligence or malpractice on the part of the defendant. ... The symptoms of the injury were known to the plaintiff, but the fact of injury was not reasonably or immediately ascertainable. We conclude that the action was timely filed.

Section 60-513(a)(4) requires an action for injury to another's rights that does not arise from contract to be filed within two years.

Smith v. United Technologies, Essex Group, Inc. · filed 1987-01-16(a)(4)

Defendant correctly notes that this action is an action for injury to rights of another, not arising on contract, and so must be brought within two years. K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4). ... It is true plaintiff was not terminated until much later. However, we cannot conclude that it was improper to admit testimony such as this although it refers to matters occurring outside the two-year statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(b) delays accrual until substantial injury or reasonably ascertainable injury, and for temporary injuries each injury creates a new claim until the injury becomes permanent.

Williams v. Amoco Production Co. · filed 1987-03-27(b)

K.S.A. 60-513(b) provides: ... “Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the cause of action in this action [section] shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party, but in no event shall the period be extended more than ten (10) years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action.” ... Since appellees’ actions were originally filed for temporary damages, each injury caused a new cause of action to accrue. The court ordered the action amended to one for permanent injury because, during the pendency of the action, the injury had changed from temporary to permanent. Accordingly, we hold appellees’ claims were timely filed and are not barred by the two-year statute of limitations as a matter of law.

Section 60-513(b) starts the limitations period when injury becomes reasonably ascertainable but never permits more than ten years after the act giving rise to the claim, and § 60-513(a)(3)’s fraud tolling applies only when fraud must be pleaded or proved to obtain relief.

Lester v. Eli Lilly and Co. · filed 1988-09-12(b), (a)(3)

The alternative interpretation, adopted by Judge Rogers, construes both phrases as referring to the same act. Under this view, the ten-year limitation begins to run from the occurrence of the act referred to in the first “act giving rise” phrase, which in this case is the ingestion of DES by plaintiff’s mother. Under this analysis, the ten-year limitation began to run from the time of ingestion, and expired at the latest, in 1970, ten years after plaintiffs birth. ... In essence, all of plaintiff’s arguments are directed at convincing the court that it should ignore the “in no event shall the period be extended” language of 60-513(b). For the reasons discussed we cannot do so. Accordingly, we hold that plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Kansas statute of limitations.

Subsection (b)'s ten-year period is a statute of limitations rather than a statute of repose.

Unified School District No. 500 v. United States Gypsum Co. · filed 1989-08-02(b)

Therefore, we conclude that the ten-year period included in K.S.A. 60-513(b) is a statute of limitations. As such, it is inapplicable to the school districts’ causes of action.

Section 60-513(a)(3) imposes a two-year limitations period for fraud claims, accruing when the claimant discovers or reasonably should have discovered the facts necessary to know of the fraud.

Ramada Franchise Systems, Inc. v. Tresprop, Ltd. · filed 1999-10-28(a)(3)

As noted above, Kansas law imposes a two year statute of limitations for fraud claims. ... A cause of action for fraud accrues when claimant discovers or reasonably should have discovered the facts necessary to know of the fraud.

Section 60-513(a)(4) gives tort claims a two-year limitations period, running under subsection (b) when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Rajala v. Donnelly Meiners Jordan Kline, P.C. · filed 1999-10-06(a)(4), (b)

The Trustee’s tort claims must have been brought within two years of the date on which “the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party. . . .” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(b); Boyle v. Harries, 923 P.2d 504, 510 (Kan. App. 1996). Determining the accrual date for tort claims is therefore a less precise task. The Kansas statutory clock starts ticking when a negligent act causes substantial injury, Resolution Trust Corp. v. Scaletty, 891 P.2d 1110, 1115 (Kan. 1995), or at the point ... Since U.S.C.I. was furnished sufficient evidence “that would have led a reasonable person to discover” its injury and to ascertain the injury’s alleged cause more than two years prior to its filing for bankruptcy in 1994, Donnelly’s statute of limitations defense is valid.

Subsection (a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for actions for injury to another's rights that do not arise on contract and are not otherwise enumerated.

Ditch v. Bd. of County Com'rs of County of Shawnee · filed 1986-11-02(a)(4)

Therefore, the most applicable Kansas statute of limitation is either K.S.A. 60-512 (three-year statute for actions upon liability created by statute) or K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) (two-year statute for actions for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not otherwise enumerated). ... The proper statute of limitation would thus be K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4).

For a medical negligence claim, subsection (c) generally makes the claim accrue when the act occurs unless the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until later.

Humes v. Clinton · filed 1990-05-25(c)

K.S.A. 60-513(c) provides that a medical negligence claim shall be deemed to accrue at the time of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action, “unless the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act.” ... Thus, there is no fact of injury to be reasonably ascertained at a later date and the two-year statute of limitations controls. We find no error in the trial court’s decision.

Section 60-513(a)(4) gives a two-year limitations period for an action for injury to another's rights not arising in contract, while subsection (b) delays accrual until substantial injury occurs or the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Hatfield v. Burlington Northern Railroad · filed 1990-09-24(b), (a)(4)

The court has already found in its findings of facts that the railroad has presented unrefuted evidence that it did not know of the alleged braking problem until February 7, 1990. Furthermore, the court has also found that there is evidence to support a finding that the railroad could not have reasonably concluded from the physical evidence at the accident that brakes caused or contributed to the accident. Thus, there is evidence to support a finding that the alleged “fact of injury” by the negligent maintenance of the brakes by Bingham was not “reasonably ascertainable” until the railroad learned of such on February 7, 1990. As a result, Bingham’s motion for summary judgment against the railroad’s third party claim must be denied. ... In this case it is an established fact that within 24 hours of the collision Bingham learned that its truck had been damaged in a collision with the railroad’s train. Thus, the evidence before the court establishes that Bingham had knowledge of the accident on September 30, 1987. Since there is not any argument made that the two-year statute of limitations set forth in K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) should be tolled, Bingham’s counterclaim became barred on September 30, 1989. As a result, since Bingham’s counterclaim was not brought until April 5, 1990, it is barred by the statute of limitations set forth in K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4).

Section 60-513 supplies a two-year residual limitations period for personal-injury actions in Kansas.

Elam v. Williams · filed 1990-12-13

In 1989, the Supreme Court held “that where state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering § 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions.” ... As the defendants are attempting to apply one of several statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in Kansas, this court must look to the residual two-year limitations period set forth in K.S.A. 60-513.

Subsection (a)(4) supplies a two-year limitations period that may be borrowed for federal claims when Kansas law provides the applicable period.

Baker v. Board of Regents of State of Kan. · filed 1991-06-13(a)(4)

We continue to believe that a two-year statute of limitations period should be applied to the federal law claims plaintiff has asserted under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000d. The same period would apply to the federal law claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 29 U.S.C. § 794 plaintiff has moved to add to the complaint. This limitations period is borrowed from K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4). See discussion at 721 F.Supp. at 274-75. ... Under the Kansas law of equitable tolling or equitable estoppel, the limitations period started running when plaintiff received the January 29, 1986 letter and was not interrupted unless defendants did something which amounted to an affirmative inducement to plaintiff to delay bringing the action.

Subsection (a)(3) imposes a two-year limitations period on noncontractual injuries to another's rights that are not otherwise enumerated.

Marsh v. Coleman Co., Inc. · filed 1991-10-10(a)(3)

For these reasons, the court finds the plaintiff’s fraud claim does not relate back to the filing of the original complaint and, therefore, is barred by the two-year statute of limitations, K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3).

Section 60-513(b) governs the statute-of-limitations issue, and the court held that the statute did not bar this action.

Unified School District No. 500 v. United States Gypsum Co. · filed 1992-03-31(b)

Defendant Grace argues first that this case is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, K.S.A. 60-513(b). ... For the reasons stated in those opinions, the court rejects defendant Grace’s statute of limitations argument.

Section 60-513(a) is a two-year statute of limitations, while subsection (b)'s 10-year period is a statute of repose that bars a cause of action even before it accrues.

Harding v. K.C. Wall Products, Inc. · filed 1992-04-10(a) and (b)

The standard two-year limitation of actions found in K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 60-513(a) is a statute of limitations. It fits the definition completely. However, the 10-year provision in K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 60-513(b), “but in no event shall an action be commenced more than 10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action,” is a statute of repose. It bars the cause of action after the 10-year period even though the action may not have yet accrued.

Section 60-513(b) starts the two-year limitations period when substantial injury occurs or becomes reasonably ascertainable, subject to a ten-year outer limit, while subsection (d) preserves the pre-1987 provisions for two years for acts occurring before July 1, 1987.

Admire Bank & Trust v. City of Emporia · filed 1992-04-10(b), (d)

The 1987 amendment to K.S.A. 60-513 governs the Bank’s cause of action. The amended statute still contains the substantial injury test: If the original wrongful act causes substantial injury, the two-year statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the original act. If substantial injury does not occur at the time of the original act but occurs later, then the two-year statute of limitations begins to run when the injury is reasonably ascertainable. Both prongs of the substantial injury test are subject to the ten-year “discovery” rule. The plain language of the statute and the applicable case law require that after July 1, 1989, a negligence action must be brought within 10 years of the original wrongful act or the action is barred.

Section 60-513(a)(7) requires a medical-malpractice action to be brought within two years, while subsection (c) governs accrual based on the act or ascertainable injury and imposes an absolute four-year limit from the act giving rise to the claim.

Martindale v. Tenny · filed 1992-04-10(a)(7) and (c)

Generally, a medical malpractice action must be brought within the statute of limitations as provided by K.S.A. 60-513(a)(7) and (c). ... “A cause of action arising out of the rendering of or the failure to render professional services by a health care provider shall be deemed to have accrued at the time of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action, unless the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party, but in no event shall such an action be commenced more than four (4) years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action.” ... Here, there was never any mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, and we hold the trial court erred in not granting summary judgment to Dr. Tenny on the ground the statute of limitations had run and in ruling that the amended petition related back under K.S.A. 60-215(c).

Subsection (a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on actions for injury to the rights of another, including § 1983 civil-rights claims.

Keith v. Koerner · filed 2016-12-09(a)(4)

Applying this rule here, the statute of limitations for Ms. Keith’s claim is two years. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4); see also Cameron v. Stotts, 43 F.3d 1482, at *1 (10th Cir. 1994) (unpublished) (“The two-year statute of limitations for injuries to the rights of others, Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-513(a)(4), applies to civil rights actions brought pursuant to section 1983.”).

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for noncontractual injury claims, making May 8, 2010 the look-back date for a May 8, 2012 filing.

Idstrom v. Alliance Radiology, P.A. · filed 2017-01-13(a)(4)

The May 8, 2010, date starts the beginning of the 2-year look-back provision of the statute of limitations in Kansas because Idstrom filed this action on May 8, 2012. See K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4).

Section 60-513(b) imposes a hard ten-year repose period on personal-injury actions, including product-liability claims involving harm caused less than ten years after delivery.

Ehrenfelt v. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2017-02-14(b)

In short, a natural reading of the plain language of the Kansas statutes necessitates interpreting the KPLA statute of repose as limiting those product .liability claims that fall within its scope to ones “that involve harm caused more than 10 years after time of delivery,” For claims that, by contrast, involve harm caused less than 10 years after time of delivery, § 60-3303(c) explicitly, reserves the applicability of § 60-513(b), which imposes a hard ten-year period of repose on personal injury actions.

For a conversion claim, the two-year limitations period begins when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable, not necessarily when the plaintiff has actual knowledge.

Leathers v. Leathers · filed 2017-05-02(a)(2), (b)

As relevant here, a cause of action for conversion typically accrues—and thus starts the clock on the limitations period—when “the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.” Id. § 60-513(b); Armstrong v. Bromley Quarry & Asphalt, Inc., 378 P.3d 1090, 1096 (Kan. 2016).

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims in Kansas.

Moore · filed 2026-03-19(a)(4)

First, plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are governed by a two-year statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims “is drawn from the personal-injury statute of the state in which the federal district court sits.” Mondragón v. Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 2008). In Kansas, the statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4); Eikenberry v. Seward County, 734 F. App’x 572, 575 (10th Cir. 2018).

This subsection provides a two-year limitations period for negligence claims based on personal injury.

Rawlings · filed 2026-03-25(a)(4)

Plaintiff’s Counts I and II are state-law negligence claims and subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Because the underlying tort in Plaintiff’s Count IV Civil Conspiracy claim appears to be based upon a personal injury negligence theory, this claim is also subject to a two year statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(b) bars an action more than ten years after the act giving rise to it, even when the resulting disease did not appear until later.

Jefferies · filed 2026-04-09(b)

The statute of repose also bars their claims, since their injuries occurred when they were exposed to the toxic emissions, even though their diseases did not manifest until years later. See id.

Section 60-513(4)’s two-year limitation period begins anew for each injury caused by a temporary or recurring condition, when the land or crops are actually harmed.

Gowing v. McCandless · filed 1976-03-06(4)

Where the injury or wrong is classified by the courts not as original or permanent, but as temporary, transient, recurring, continuing or consequential in nature, it has been held that the limitation period starts to run only when the plaintiffs’ land or crops are actually harmed by overflow, and for purposes of the statute of limitations, each injury causes a new cause of action to accrue, at least until the injury becomes permanent.

Under § 60-513, temporary or recurring flood injuries give rise to separate claims when each injury occurs; damages that cannot reasonably be determined in one action do not accrue when the drainage condition is created.

Clawson v. Garrison · filed 1979-03-23(a)(4)

In Dougan, as in the present case, the applicable statute of limitations was K.S.A. 60-513(o)(4). ... We find Dougan and Gowing applicable. Here there is evidence that no substantial flooding and injury occurred on defendant’s property as a result of plaintiff’s land leveling until 1973. Flooding is an infrequent and virtually unpredictable occurrence. The amount of both present and future damages to defendant could not reasonably be determined in a single action.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in Kansas.

Massey v. Shepack · filed 1988-06-24(a)(4)

K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 60-513(a)(4) specifies a two-year period of limitations for “[a]n action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated.” ... The rationale of the United States Supreme Court in affirming the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Garcia establishes the continuing validity of Hamilton and reinforces the imposition of a two-year statute of limitations on Kansas § 1983 claims.

Section 60-513(a)(4) requires personal-injury actions to be filed within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Woodward v. Sedgwick County Jail · filed 1997-01-27(a)(4)

In Kansas, a personal injury action must be brought within two years after a cause of action accrues. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4) & (b).

Section 60-513(a)(4) requires personal-injury actions, including § 1983 claims borrowing Kansas's limitations period, to be filed within two years after accrual, which occurs when the supporting facts are or should be apparent.

Woodward v. Sedgwick County Jail Administrator Mitchell Paige Melissa Day Mike Hill · filed 1997-01-27(a)(4)

In Kansas, a personal injury action must be brought within two years after a cause of action accrues. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4) & (b). A civil rights action accrues when the "facts that would support a cause of action are or should be apparent." Fratus v. DeLand, 49 F.3d 673, 675 (10th Cir.1995) (quotations omitted).

Subsection (a)(4) provides a two-year limitation period for § 1983 claims in Kansas.

Stewart · filed 2026-05-14(a)(4)

In Kansas, the two-year limitation period in K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) governs § 1983 claims.

Section 60-513(a)(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1981 failure-to-promote claims that could have been brought under Patterson, including claims involving a promotion that would create a new and distinct employment relationship.

Spears · filed 2026-05-28(a)(4)

Section 1981, originally enacted in 1866, doesn’t have its own statute of limitations. ... In Kansas, that means a two-year statute of limitations. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4). ... This statute-of-limitations question thus boils down to whether plaintiff could’ve brought her failure-to-promote claim under Patterson. ... If the job plaintiff sought would’ve produced such a change, then the statute of limitations is two years. If not, the statute of limitations lasts four years.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for § 1983 suits in Kansas.

Gragg v. KcKune · filed 2000-12-08(a)(4)

In Kansas, the residual personal injury statute of limitations is found at K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 60-513(a)(4), which provides a 2-year statute of limitations. As a result, the appropriate statute of limitations for § 1983 suits in Kansas is 2 years.

Section 60-513(a)(4)'s two-year period does not apply to every § 1983 action; claims based solely on conduct covered by § 60-514 have a one-year limit.

Miller v. City of Overland Park · filed 1982-06-11(a)(4)

We are of the opinion that the rule laid down in Cooper is overly broad and that all § 1983 actions are not covered by K.S.A. 60-513(o)(4).

Section 60-513(a)(4)'s limitations period does not apply to § 1983 actions filed before Garcia; a three-year period governs those actions.

Scott v. City of Overland Park · filed 1984-09-11(a)(4)

The appropriate statute of limitation in Kansas is K.S.A. 60 — 513(a)(4). The instant case was filed, however, before the Garcia decision. ... Therefore, the appropriate statute of limitations in this case is three years.

Section 60-513(a)(4) gives § 1983 claims brought in Kansas state court a two-year limitations period.

Jarvis v. Wood · filed 2018-11-09(a)(4)

"Our Supreme Court has held that § 1983 claims brought in state court are bound by K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4)'s two-year statute of limitations." Srivastava v. University of Kansas, No. 118,329, 2018 WL 1770325, at *6 (Kan. App. 2018) (unpublished opinion) (citing Whye v. City Council for City of Topeka, 278 Kan. 458, 459, 102 P.3d 384 [2004]). As with many of Jarvis' other claims, it is undisputed that this claim is based on events that occurred more than two years before Jarvis filed his lawsuit. Thus, this claim is also barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(2) sets a two-year limit for actions involving the taking, detention, or injury of personal property; a bailor who alleges breach of a bailment contract may pursue a contract remedy instead.

Continental Insurance v. Windle · filed 1974-04-06(2)

The rule is inapplicable here for two reasons: First, we fail to discern any conflict between the statutes mentioned, one deals with actions upon contract the other with actions for the taking, detention or injury to personal property. ... We hold plaintiff-bailor has a choice of remedies and that his position states a cause of action sounding in contract.

Section 60-513(4)’s two-year limit does not bar a state action arising from a governmental function unless a statute specifically makes the action subject to limitations.

State Highway Commission v. Steele · filed 1974-12-07(4)

The sole question is whether the action is barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in K. S. A. 1973 Supp. 60-513 (4). ... An examination of the entire text of 8-5,124 reveals no provision, specific or general, which would make an action brought thereunder subject to the statute of limitations. Consequently, the cause of action in the instant case is not barred.

Section 60-513’s two-year tort limitation applies to a Kansas action arising from an out-of-state accident even when the other state allows more time to sue.

Muzingo v. Vaught · filed 1993-09-24

The sole issue on appeal is whether Kansas’ two-year statute of limitations (60-513) or Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations (Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120 [1986]) applies to this action. ... However, when filed in this state, the action must be timely filed under this state’s applicable statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(b)'s statute of repose is an affirmative defense that must be pled.

Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Manufacturing Co. · filed 1993-10-29(b)

Additionally, HWR has not pled K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 60-513(b) as an affirmative defense in the federal suit. Although not included in the listed affirmative defenses in K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 60-208(c), the statute is an affirmative defense and must be pled.

Section 60-513(b) bars an action commenced more than 10 years after the act giving rise to the cause of action.

Bi-State Development Co. v. Shafer, Kline & Warren, Inc. · filed 1999-10-01(b)

The statute of repose states: “[I]n no event shall an action be commenced more than 10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action.” K.S.A. 1998 Supp. 60-513(b) (this provision has been reworded since 1986 but the effect here is unchanged). The act giving rise to substantial injury occurred more than 10 years before this suit was filed. Therefore, the action is barred by the statute of repose.

Section 60-513(c) bars a medical malpractice action commenced more than four years after the act giving rise to the claim.

Handy v. Reed · filed 2003-12-24(c)

The 4-year statute of repose of K.S.A. 60-513(c) had clearly expired.

Section 60-513(b)’s statute of repose does not bar claims based on additional misconduct within the repose period.

Arnold v. Maxmind, Inc. · filed 2016-10-20(b)

While the statute of repose bars any claim for injuries arising from a defendant’s original misdeed, it will not apply where the defendant engages in additional misconduct within the period of repose.

Section 60-513(a)(4) sets a two-year limitations period for abuse of process claims.

King v. Pimentel · filed 1995-02-24(a)(4)

A two-year limitations period applies to claims for abuse of process. K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 60-513(a)(4).

Section 60-513(a)(4) gives an abuse of process claim a two-year limitations period.

Stegall v. Great American Insurance · filed 1998-02-05(a)(4)

An abuse of process claim is governed by the two-year statute of limitations, K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4).

Section 60-513(a)(4) applies a two-year limitations period to an accounting between cotenants.

Heller v. Heller · filed 2002-02-01(a)(4)

K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 60-513(a)(4) sets a 2-year statute of limitations for an action for injury not arising under contract or not otherwise provided for. The 2-year limitation would apply for an accounting between cotenants.

Section 60-513(a)(4) gives an abuse of process claim two years to be filed; the period is tolled while a related appeal prevents the claim from being prosecuted to a successful conclusion.

Lindenman v. Umscheid · filed 1994-06-03(a)(4)

We find that the cause of action for abuse of process was tolled until KDHE dismissed its appeal on November 7, 1989. The petition was filed March 11, 1991, within the two year limitation of K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 60-513(a)(4).

A constructive discharge claim accrues when the employee tenders a resignation or announces a plan to retire.

Whye v. City Council of Topeka · filed 2004-12-03(b)

In line with these authorities and the language of K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 60-513(b), and consistent with the nature of a claim for constructive discharge, i.e., that the plaintiff has been forced to leave an intolerable workplace, we hold that the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff tenders his or her resignation or announces a plan to retire.

A plaintiff seeking to recover property conveyed through alleged fraud must seek to nullify the conveyance within two years after the fraud was or should have been discovered.

Sutton v. Sutton · filed 2005-09-02(a)(3)

Thus, the trial court correctly held that Shirley must first nullify the alleged fraudulent conveyance within 2 years from the time the fraud was, or should have been, discovered pursuant to K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 60-513(a)(3).

Section 60-513(c)’s four-year medical malpractice statute of repose is tolled while an FTCA claimant pursues the required administrative claim.

Barroca v. United States · filed 2021-01-27(c)

After tolling Kansas’s statute of repose for the period when plaintiff was pursuing his Administrative Claim, plaintiff’s claims about acts occurring between November 2014 to February 8, 2015, are not barred by Kansas’s four year statute of repose.

For a tort claim still unbarred at the defendant’s death, § 59-2239 controls the filing deadline and may extend the time otherwise allowed by § 60-513(4).

Valentine v. Cunningham · filed 1967-03-04(4)

Plaintiff filed his claim in the probate court within the time specified by the nonclaim statute K. S. A. 59-2239 but it was filed six days after the time prescribed by K. S. A. 60-513 (4) as extended by K. S. A. 60-515 (a). ... It is consistent to further hold that K. S. A. 59-2239 becomes the controlling statute of limitations to be applied to all claims which exist at the date of death of a decedent.

Section 60-513’s two-year limitations period is not tolled for a defendant first added after it expires merely because the action was filed against someone else in time.

Schmidt v. Nauman · filed 1968-11-09

It is conceded that the two year statute of limitations (K. S. A. 60-513) applies to this action. ... It is the intention of the statute of limitations that a party to be bound must have a claim filed against him or attempted to be filed against him — not someone else — before the expiration of the period provided in the statute.

Section 60-513(4) governs when a claim for an insidious disease accrues, based on when the disease and its cause become manifest or reasonably ascertainable.

Miller v. Beech Aircraft Corporation · filed 1969-11-08(4)

In our judgment, the accrual of a right of action for damages resulting from such insidious disease would be governed by the foregoing statutory provision. ... Without getting into specifics, we incline to the belief it was for the jury to determine in this case when plaintiff’s disabling disease and its cause became manifest or when, in the exercise of due care, the same was reasonably ascertainable.

Section 60-513(b)'s ten-year limit applies to latent disease claims, runs from the defendant’s wrongful act, and is constitutional as applied to an asbestos injury discovered after that limit.

Tomlinson v. Celotex Corp. · filed 1989-03-03(b)

Thus, by its express terms, the statute makes the ten-year limitation provision contained in subsection (b) applicable to all personal injury actions, whether based upon negligence or strict liability. ... Applying this interpretation to the instant case, we conclude that the ten-year limitation contained in subsection (b) began, at the latest, upon the last exposure of the plaintiff to asbestos produced, sold, and distributed by the defendants in 1971. ... We find that K.S.A. 60-513(b) is constitutional as applied to the plaintiff and therefore answer the question certified by the United States District Court in the affirmative.

Section 60-513(a)(4) gives a PIP insurer two years from the injury to bring a subrogation action against a tortfeasor or liability insurer.

Farmers Insurance v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance · filed 1980-04-05(a)(4)

A tort action is limited to two years from the time the action accrues under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4). Under (b) of this statute the action accrues when the act giving rise to the cause of action (the car accident in this case) first causes substantial injury. ... Any tort action brought by either the injured person or his PIP insurer against the tortfeasor or the liability insurer pursuant to K.S.A. 40-3113(c) is limited by K.S.A. 60-513(c)(4) to two years from the date of the injuries.

Section 60-513(a) applies a two-year limit to a fraud-based derivative action; additional fraudulent diversions within that period are not barred.

Oberhelman v. Barnes Investment Corp. · filed 1984-11-30(a)

However, under the facts of this case where additional funds have been diverted to Nease during the two-year period prior to filing suit, the derivative action is not barred.

Section 60-513(a)(3)’s two-year period would apply to a claim seeking only a constructive trust based on fraud; an alternative equitable-estoppel claim to recover land falls under the fifteen-year period.

Potucek v. Potucek · filed 1986-05-15(a)(3)

Rather, the defendant argues that plaintiffs’ claim was for a constructive trust based on defendant’s fraudulent conduct; therefore, the two-year statute of limitations, K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3), barred plaintiffs’ claim. Defendant’s contention would be meritorious if plaintiffs sought only the imposition of a constructive trust. ... However, plaintiffs also sought recovery under the alternate theory that defendant was equitably estopped to deny their interest in the property. ... Considering the relief plaintiffs sought, the trial court did not err in determining that K.S.A. 60-507 was the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(a)(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for Section 1981 actions accruing after Garcia v. Wilson.

Payne v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1990-02-14(a)(4)

The applicable state statute of limitations in Kansas is two years. K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4); see also Garcia v. Univ. of Kansas, 702 F.2d 849, 851 (10th Cir.1983) (Kansas limitation statute most nearly describing plaintiff’s cause of action is K.S.A. § 60-513).

Section 60-513(e) cannot revive a claim already barred by the limitations period because the defendant has a vested limitations defense.

Waller v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp. · filed 1990-07-16(e)

Thus, it is clear that the revival provisions contained in the amendments to K.S.A. 60-513 are invalid under Kansas law, since they represent an attempt to remove vested rights on behalf of the defendants.

Section 60-513 provides a two-year period for tort claims, tolled by adverse domination while the alleged wrongdoers control the bank.

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ashley · filed 1990-11-20

The relevant question is whether the Kansas two (2) year period of limitations for tort claims (K.S.A. 60-513) had expired at the time the FDIC acquired the claims and the federal statute of limitations began to run. ... Thus, even if the FDIC took control of the Bank as early as December 13, 1984, the two year limitations period would not have run as of December 20, 1984. Consequently, the court finds that the FDIC’s tort claims had not yet expired under state law when the FDIC acquired them.

Section 60-513(a)(4)'s two-year period for tort claims may be tolled by adverse domination even when culpable directors are less than a board majority, if they exert sufficient control.

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Thomas · filed 1993-10-15(a)(4)

This court is persuaded that control sufficient to warrant the tolling of the statute of limitations may occur where culpable directors constitute less than a majority of a board of directors—particularly in a case like this where one director was the sole shareholder of the institution.

Under § 60-513(b), adverse domination prevents the limitations period on a corporation’s claims against its directors from running until a disinterested majority of nonculpable directors exists, regardless of shareholder knowledge.

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Fleischer · filed 1995-06-06(b)

After careful consideration, the court finds that Scaletty does not contemplate an assessment of shareholder knowledge or action in determining when a financial institution is capable of discovering injuries caused by those who control it and that, pursuant to Scaletty, the limitations period in K.S.A. 60 — 513(b) does not begin to run, regardless of shareholder knowledge, until there exists a disinterested majority of nonculpable directors.

Section 60-513(a)(4)’s two-year limitations period does not bar claims based on a continuing violation.

Harris v. Board of Public Utilities of Kansas City · filed 1991-01-18(a)(4)

Defendants assert that plaintiff’s claims are governed by the two-year statute of limitations of K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4). ... We disagree. We feel that under the circumstances of this case that if there was a violation of plaintiff’s rights that violation was a continuing one. ... Therefore, plaintiff’s claims are not time barred.