Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513

Section 60-513(a)(4) bars a personal injury claim arising from alleged mistreatment in 1998 or 1999 when first filed in 2020.

McCarty v. Cline · filed 2020-11-25(a)(4)

McCarty's first claim, even if liberally construed as a general claim for personal injury, is extremely untimely and fails for multiple reasons. The statute of limitations has long passed. See K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-513(a)(4).

Subsection (b)'s tort statute of limitations does not govern implied contractual indemnity claims; such claims are governed by § 60-512 instead.

United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Sulco, Inc. · filed 1996-09-04(b)

The court disagrees with defendant’s position that the tort statute of limitations, Kan.Stat.Ann.. § 60-513, applies to the present case. Plaintiffs claim is for implied contractual indemnity, not negligence. ... Accordingly, the court finds the applicable statute of limitations is found in Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-512, and not in Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513. ... Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the application of Kan. StatAnn. § 60-513 is denied.

Section 60-513(a)(5) requires an action for wrongful death to be brought within two years, subject to the Kansas saving statute when applicable.

Goldsmith v. Learjet, Inc. · filed 1996-09-09(a)(5)

By removing the 2-year time limitation from the wrongful death statute and placing it in K.S.A. 60-513(a)(5), the basis for this court's decision in Rodman no longer exists. Thus, we need not overrule Rodman, because it simply does not apply to the changed circumstances. K.S.A. 60-518 does apply to a wrongful death action, and we therefore answer Question No. 2 in the affirmative.

A wrongful-death cause of action accrues, and the two-year limitations period begins, when it is reasonably ascertainable that the decedent’s death resulted from the defendant’s negligence.

Davidson v. Denning · filed 1995-06-23(a)(5), (b), and (c)

A cause of action for wrongful death does not accrue until it is reasonably ascertainable that the death was the result of the defendant’s negligence.

Section 60-513(b)'s general ten-year statute of repose does not apply to product-liability actions covered by KPLA § 60-3303(a) and (b), whose useful-safe-life provision controls.

Gorman v. Best Western International, Inc. · filed 1996-09-11(b)

The court finds that Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(b) is not applicable to those actions brought pursuant to the KPLA enumerated in Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-3303(a) & (b). Defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on the applicability of Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(b) is therefore denied.

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on an action for injury to another's rights that does not arise on contract or fall within another enumerated category; the court applied that period to a personal-injury claim arising in Kansas.

State ex rel. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. c. Dally · filed 2012-06-14(a)(4)

K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) provides that “[a]n action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated[,]” shall be brought within two years. ... Accordingly, the undisputed facts in this case establish the cause of action originated in Kansas and is barred by the Kansas two-year statute of limitations when we apply Missouri’s objective capable-of-ascertainment test.

Section 60-513(a)'s two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions applies to claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

Wanjiku v. Johnson County · filed 2016-03-29(a)

The two-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. § 60-513 for personal injury actions applies to §§ 1983 and 1985 claims.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitation period for personal-injury actions in Kansas, including § 1983 claims arising there.

Mattox v. United States of America, Inc. · filed 2019-08-26(a)(4)

Actions for personal injuries in Kansas have a two-year limitation period. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4); see also Johnson v. Johnson Cty. Com. Bd., 925 F.2d 1299, 1301 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he appropriate statute of limitations for § 1983 actions arising in Kansas is two years, under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4).”).

Section 60-513(a)(4) requires actions for injury to another's rights to be brought within two years; claims against Ms. Johnson were therefore actionable only if they accrued on or after September 11, 2016.

Schwab v. Kobach · filed 2019-09-25(a)(4)

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4) provides the Kansas limitations period for personal injury actions. It provides, “An action for injury to the rights of another . . . shall be brought within two years.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4). Ms. Johnson withdrew from her representation of Mrs. Schwab on April 27, 2016. Doc. 76-1. Plaintiffs filed this action on September 11, 2018. Thus, the only actionable personal injury claims against Ms. Johnson are those that accrued on or after September 11, 2016.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Tallie v. Pittsburg Police Department · filed 2022-08-12(a)(4)

Under Kansas law, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4). ... Because plaintiff did not commence this action until July 28, 2022, he fails to bring this matter within the two-year period provided by Kansas law.

Subsection (a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury-type actions, which Kansas applies to § 1983 claims.

Lewis v. Dodge City Community College · filed 2024-03-01(a)(4)

Because Plaintiff’s cause of action arose in Kansas, at Dodge City Community College, Kansas’s two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is applicable. ... K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4); Hamilton v. City of Overland Park, 730 F.2d 613, 614 (10th Cir. 1984) (noting that the statute of limitations for bringing a section 1983 claim in Kansas is two years, as set out in K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4)).

Subsection (a)(4) sets a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims in Kansas.

Vann v. Fewell · filed 2025-01-10(a)(4)

In Kansas, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. ... The Court agrees that based on an accrual date of October 27, 2018, and a filing date of October 2, 2023, Plaintiff’s claims against Brown are clearly barred by the two-year statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which supplies the limitations period for § 1983 claims in Kansas.

Musick v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation · filed 2025-07-16(a)(4)

In Kansas, the statute of limitations for personal-injury claims is two years. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4); see also Eikenberry v. Seward County, 734 F. App’x 572, 575 (10th Cir. 2018) (applying two-year Kansas statute of limitations to § 1983 claim). ... Three-plus years is longer than two years, so the statute-of-limitations defense bars the unlawful-detention claim.

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period for tort actions, and subsection (b) delays accrual until the act causing the action first causes substantial injury.

Potts · filed 2025-10-16(a)(4), (b)

Under Kansas law, the statute of limitations for a tort action is two years, including negligent supervision and retention claims. Causes of action under Kansas law “shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury.”

Section 60-513(4) gives an injured party two years to bring a direct tort action against a motor carrier’s insurer.

Kirtland v. Tri-State Insurance Co. · filed 1976-11-06(4)

In the instant case we hold the two-year statute of limitations applies for three reasons.

Section 60-513(a)(4) gives a plaintiff two years from an automobile accident to bring a personal injury tort claim.

Slayden v. Sixta · filed 1991-06-14(a)(4)

The cause of action to be asserted by plaintiff was one sounding in tort. Thus, the applicable statute of limitations required that he file suit within a two-year period from the date of the accident. K.S.A. 1990 Supp. 60-513.

Section 60-513(a)(4) gives a personal injury plaintiff two years to sue, and the disability provision in § 60-515 cannot shorten that period.

Smith v. Yell Bell Taxi, Inc. · filed 2003-09-12(a)(4)

Pursuant to K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 60-513(a)(4), the general statute of limitations for a personal injury action is 2 years. ... K.S.A. 60-515 extends the statute of limitations period set forth in K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 60-513 and cannot be applied to shorten it.

Section 60-513(a)(2) sets a two-year limitations period for an action seeking damages for injuries from a vehicle accident.

Cook v. Cook · filed 2003-11-21(a)(2)

The applicable statute ofhmitations is 2 years.

Section 60-513(a)(4) sets a two-year limit for commencing a tort action arising from an automobile collision.

Blue v. Tos · filed 2004-12-23(a)(4)

The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations for Blue’s claims is specified by K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 60-513(a)(4) as 2 years. Accordingly, die statute of limitations ran on Blue’s action May 16, 2003.

Section 60-513(a)(4) sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Bayless v. Dieckhaus · filed 2005-02-18(a)(4)

Under K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 60-513(a)(4), the general statute of limitations for a personal injury action is 2 years.

Section 60-513’s two-year limitation bars a personal-injury action filed more than two years after a Kansas collision when Missouri’s borrowing statute applies.

Richardson v. Watkins Bros. Memorial Chapels, Inc. · filed 1975-08-04

Under those decisions in Girth v. Beaty Grocery Company and Bowling v. S. S. Kresge Company, supra, plaintiff’s claim is barred by the Kansas statute of limitations and the trial court correctly sustained defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Section 60-513 gives personal injury claims a two-year period after accrual, which the court applied to a § 1983 claim.

Franklin v. City of Kansas City · filed 1997-03-20(a)(4) and (b)

In Kansas, a personal injury action must be brought within two years after a cause of action accrues. K.SA. § 60-513(a)(4) & (b). ... Thus, because the plaintiff filed his complaint more than one year and but less than two years after Defendant Cos-grove’s allegedly defamatory conduct, the court concludes that the plaintiff timely filed his § 1983 defamation claim, but failed to timely file his state common law defamation claim.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, including § 1983 claims brought in Kansas.

Lee v. Reed · filed 2016-11-22(a)(4)

In Kansas, the statute of limitations period for personal injury actions is two years.... This limitation applies to Plaintiffs § 1983 claim of deprivation of liberty interest.

Section 60-513(a)(4) sets a two-year limitation period for a survival action; an amendment substituting the estate administrator may relate back to the original complaint and bring the action within that period.

Shinkle v. Union City Body Co. · filed 1982-06-02(a)(4)

If such amendment is permitted, we must then decide whether the amendment will relate back to the date of the original pleading, thus bringing the survival action within the two-year statute of limitations set out in K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4). ... Since there can be no prejudice to the defendants in granting a request to amend, such an amendment will be permitted to relate back to the filing of the original complaint.

Section 60-513’s two-year limit barred the personal injury action after the defendants were not served in time, giving them a vested limitations defense.

Jackson v. American Best Freight System, Inc. · filed 1985-12-06

Once it was established the defendants had never been served, the statute of limitations barred any further actions against them. Defendants had a vested right in the defense provided by the statute of limitations.

Sections 60-513(a)(1) and (b) require a trespass action within two years of substantial injury or when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable; the court held the cable installation was a permanent trespass accruing in 1990, while each later information transmission was a new trespass subject to the two-year period.

City of Shawnee, Kan. v. AT & T CORP. · filed 1995-12-22(a)(1) and (b)

Under K.S.A. §§ 60-513(a)(1) and (b), an action for trespass must be brought within two years of when the “act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.” ... The statute of limitations therefore does not bar Shawnee’s trespass claim for transmissions occurring in the two years prior to the filing of this action.

Section 60-513(a)(4) supplies a two-year personal-injury limitations period that federal courts may borrow for federal civil-rights claims in Kansas.

Alexander v. Precision MacHining, Inc. · filed 1997-12-31(a)(4)

Accordingly, if the four-year limitation period of Section 1658 does not apply, Alexander’s Section 1981 claim is barred by Kansas’ two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for a survivor’s action.

Estate of B.I.C. Ex Rel. C.S.C. v. Gillen · filed 2012-12-19(a)(4)

The appropriate limitations period for a survivor’s action is two years. K AN . S TAT . A NN . § 60-513(a)(4). ... This occurred on January 20, 2008. Therefore, filing on January 19, 2010 was within the two-year limitations period.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, which the court applied to § 1983 claims.

Jamerson (ID 74123) v. Heimgartner · filed 2020-04-21(a)(4)

All claims brought under § 1983 are uniformly characterized as personal injury torts for statute of limitations purposes. In Kansas, the statute of limitations period for personal injury actions is two years.

Section 60-513(a)(4) supplies Kansas’s two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions, including § 1983 claims arising in Kansas.

Fullen v. City of Salina, Kansas · filed 2021-09-30(a)(4)

The timeliness of claims brought under § 1983 is governed by a mix of federal and state law. ... Federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions to § 1983 claims. ... In Kansas, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. ... 37 K.S.A § 60-513(a)(4); see also Johnson v. Johnson Cnty. Comm’n Bd., 925 F.2d 1299, 1301 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he appropriate statute of limitations for § 1983 actions arising in Kansas is two years, under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4).”). ... Accordingly, the two-year statute of limitations on Melissa Fullen’s unlawful seizure claim began to run on April 18, 2018. ... Thus, absent tolling, Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest, unlawful search, and unlawful seizure brought under § 1983 are untimely.

Section 60-513 sets the limitations deadline for an injury claim arising from an automobile accident.

Comstock v. Joplin · filed 2003-04-04

The statute of limitations governing Charles’ claim expired on November 29, 1997. See K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 60-513.

Section 60-513(a)(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 actions arising in Kansas.

Gee v. Duncanson · filed 1994-11-10(a)(4)

The appropriate statute of limitations for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising in Kansas is two years. ... see also K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4).

Under subsections (b) and (c), the limitations period begins when the fact of injury is reasonably ascertainable, requiring a wrongful-death plaintiff to reasonably investigate available sources of death and wrongful causation, and it generally starts at death absent concealment or misinformation.

Davidson v. Denning · filed 1996-04-19(a)(5), (b), and (c)

The term “reasonably ascertainable” implies some obligation to investigate the factual sources available after a tragic death. The limitations period should start on the date of death unless the information from which the fact of death or negligence can be determined was either concealed, altered, falsified, inaccurate, or misrepresented. The fact of death should be a “starting point for inquiry.” The wrongful death plaintiff is charged with constructive knowledge of information that is available through a reasonable investigation of sources that contain the facts of the death and its wrongful causation.

Section 60-513(b) starts the limitations period when an injury becomes reasonably ascertainable; a plaintiff's duty to investigate is reduced in a fiduciary relationship but remains when relevant knowledge is reasonably accessible.

Murray v. Miracorp, Inc. · filed 2023-01-13(b)

Instead, the injury merely needs to be "reasonably ascertainable." K.S.A. 60-513(b). ... They had sufficient knowledge in 2011 to make the injury they suffered "reasonably ascertainable" which started the clock on the statute of limitations. See Wolf, 215 Kan. at 283-84.

Subsection (e) limits the time during which a tort cause of action against a health-care provider can arise and does not eliminate the remedy for a tortious injury.

Marzolf v. Gilgore · filed 1996-04-22(e)

The statute of repose does not abrogate a plaintiffs right of remedy for a tortious injury. It merely limits the time during which a cause of action can arise.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for Kansas retaliatory-discharge claims.

Myers v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. · filed 2000-05-16(a)(4)

In Kansas, retaliatory discharge claims are governed by the two-year statute of limitation found in K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4).

Subsection (a)(3) supplies a two-year limitations period for actions based on fraud, but it does not apply to a promissory-estoppel claim that rests on reliance rather than fraudulent misrepresentation.

Bouton v. Byers · filed 2014-03-14(a)(3)

Building on his mistaken argument that promissory estoppel depends upon the promisor's misrepresentations, Byers contends the governing statute of limitations is 2 years, as set out in K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3) for actions based on fraud. He contends Bouton waited too long to file her action and the claim is untimely. We disagree with the argument's foundation and find the 3-year limitations period in K.S.A. 60-512(1) applies.

Section 60-513(a)(4) gives legal-malpractice claims a two-year limitations period, while subsection (b) governs accrual based on substantial injury or when injury becomes reasonably ascertainable, subject to a 10-year outer limit; here, the claim accrued when the conviction was reversed for ineffective assistance.

Mashaney v. Board of Indigents' Defense Services · filed 2015-08-28(a)(4), (b)

Maslianey’s legal malpractice claim is governed by K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) and its 2-year statute of limitations. ... His malpractice action accrued on that date, and he timely filed it within the 2-year statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, while subsection (b)'s ten-year outer cap limits rather than extends that period when the injury is not reasonably ascertainable until later.

Eikenberry v. Seward County, Kansas · filed 2018-05-14(a)(4), (b)

In a claim under § 1983, we apply the period of limitations from the state’s personal-injury statute. ... Kansas has a two-year period of limitations for personal-injury claims. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4). Thus, the two-year limitations period governed. ... The outer cap of ten years applies only when the fact of an injury is not reasonably ascertainable until after a substantial injury has been inflicted. ... When triggered, the outer cap of ten years serves to limit—not extend—the time period for the plaintiff to sue. ... Thus, Kansas’s ten-year statute of repose does not extend the two-year limitations period for Mr. Eikenberry to sue.

Section 60-513(a)(4) supplies a two-year limitations period applicable to Title II ADA claims under Kansas personal-injury law.

Sullivan v. HCA Healthcare, Inc. · filed 2019-08-27(a)(4)

See K.S.A. §§ 60-513(a)(4), (7). Federal law does not provide a limitations period for claims under Title II of the ADA. ... Accordingly, Kansas personal injury law governs the statute of limitations period. ... Plaintiff’s last contact with Dr. Ruiz was on January 4, 2015. ... Accordingly, his claims expired on January 4, 2017 and January 19, 2018, respectively.

Section 60-513(a)(3) gives tort claims a two-year limitations period; claims by newly added plaintiffs are barred when they do not relate back to the timely original complaint.

Pipeline Productions, Inc. v. The Madison Companies, LLC · filed 2019-12-19(a)(3)

Because they do not relate back, the two-year statute of limitations bars the tort claims by Mosiman and OK Productions. Therefore, the Court dismisses these claims.

Section 60-513(a)(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 damages claims in Kansas by incorporating the state personal-injury limitations period.

Hines (ID 102944) v. Corizon Health, Inc. · filed 2020-09-28(a)(4)

The limitation period for a damages claim filed under § 1983 is based upon the personal injury limitations period that exists under state law. ... In Kansas, the applicable period is two years. See K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4).

Section 60-513(a) supplies a two-year limitations period for Kansas personal-injury claims, including § 1983 civil-rights actions.

Livingston (ID 60787) v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County · filed 2023-07-17(a)

“The forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs civil rights claims under both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983. In Kansas, that is the two-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. § 60-513(a).” ... Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is based on his arrest on June 8, 2019, and subsequent detention and prosecution. He filed this action on February 6, 2023, more than three years after that arrest. However, the Kansas Supreme Court tolled the state statutes of limitations in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. ... At the time the tolling began, nine months of the two-year limitations period had run. Therefore, the statute of limitations for claims based on Plaintiff’s June 8, 2019 arrest expired in July of 2022.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which the court applies to §§ 1983, 1985, and Bivens claims.

Davis v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2023-09-28(a)(4)

In Kansas, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years.

Section 60-513(a)(7) imposes a two-year limitations period on medical-malpractice claims, and § 60-513(a)(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims as personal-injury torts.

Perdue v. Bruce · filed 2024-08-27(a)(7), (a)(4)

Kansas law establishes a two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(7). The same statute also provides a 2-year limitations period for plaintiff’s federal § 1983 claim. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4).

Section 60-513(a) gives tort claims a two-year statute of limitations.

Kingsley v. Geo Transport, Inc. · filed 2025-07-21(a)

Under Kansas law, tort claims have a two-year statute of limitations period under K.S.A. § 60-513(a). See Wille v. Davis, 650 F. App’x 627, at n.2 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished). ... Thus, it appears that Plaintiff filed this case more than two years after the incident that forms the basis for his claims in this case.

Section 60-513(a) provides a two-year limitations period for Kansas personal-injury-based civil-rights claims.

Livingston (ID 60787) v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County · filed 2023-03-28(a)

“The forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs civil rights claims under both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983. In Kansas, that is the two-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. § 60-513(a).”

Subsection (a)(4) supplies a two-year statute of limitations for the plaintiff’s § 1983 and state-law negligence claims.

McGuire v. Allen · filed 2024-08-28(a)(4)

For Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims asserted under § 1983, the applicable statute of limitations is two years according to K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4). ... Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state law claims against Movants are also timely under K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4).

Section 60-513 does not govern KCPA claims; those claims are subject to the three-year statute of limitations under § 60-512.

Volcsko · filed 2026-02-25

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s KCPA claim is time-barred by a two-year statute of limitations under K.S.A. § 60-513. However, the KCPA is governed by the three-year statute of limitations under K.S.A. § 60-512.30 As such, utilizing the dates in the Complaint, which are the same dates used in Defendants’ two-year calculation, the Court finds Plaintiff’s KCPA claim is not time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations.

Subsection (a)(4) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which the court applied to § 1983 claims.

Zesiger · filed 2026-03-13(a)(4)

In Kansas, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years.

For a workers’ compensation subrogation claim against the employee, the two-year limitations period does not accrue before the employee collects a third-party settlement.

Brown v. Globe Union, a Div. of Johnson Controls · filed 1988-08-25

While Sigma’s claim for subrogation against Globe Union probably accrued when the plaintiff’s injury occurred, its claim for subrogation against Brown came into existence when Brown collected on the settlement of his lawsuit against Globe Union on April 14, 1988. ... I therefore conclude that Sigma’s subrogation claim against Brown did not accrue before April 14, 1988, and therefore it is not barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 60-513 generally requires a tort action within two years after substantial injury, but if the injury is not reasonably ascertainable until later, the period starts when the injury and its cause become reasonably ascertainable.

Koch v. Shell Oil Co. · filed 1998-07-07(b)

As a general rule, the cited statute requires that a tort action be brought within two years from the date the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury. Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(a), (b). However, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until sometime after the initial tortious act, the limitation period commences at the time the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party. Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(b). Ascertainment of the “fact of injury” for purposes of triggering the discovery rule contained in Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(b) includes not only ascertainment of the injury itself, but also the cause of the injury.

The limitations bar under § 60-513 is unavailable as a defense when the petition is not facially time-barred and the defendant did not plead the bar.

Washington Avenue Investments, Inc. v. City of Kansas City · filed 1973-11-03

The petition does not disclose on its face that plaintiffs cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations, nor is the statute pleaded by the defendants as a bar. Under these circumstances, the bar of the statute is not available to the defendants as a defense.

In Kansas, § 60-513(a) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury-based civil-rights claims under § 1983.

Twitty v. Holliday · filed 2009-02-13(a)

“The forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs civil rights claims under both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983. In Kansas, that is the two-year statute of limitations in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a).” Brown v. Unified School Dist. 501, Topeka Public Schools, 465 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on § 1983 and § 1985 claims, beginning when the alleged acts occur.

Schwab v. Kobach · filed 2020-04-28(a)(4)

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 and § 1985 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. ... And the statute of limitations began to run when the alleged acts occurred in March 2016. ... Thus, even if plaintiffs had moved to substitute new parties for Does 1–10, the applicable statute of limitations would bar their federal claims because more than two years have passed since March 2016.

Section 60-513(a) supplies a two-year limitations period for civil-rights actions arising in Kansas.

Powell v. Laurie · filed 2020-06-05(a)

The limitation period for a civil rights action arising in Kansas is two years. See Brown v. Unified Sch. Dist. 501, Topeka Pub. Sch., 465 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted)(explaining that the governing two-year limitation period in Kansas is borrowed from K.S.A. § 60-513(a)). Therefore, plaintiff’s claims in Count 1 concerning events in December 2016 and January 2017 are subject to dismissal.

Section 60-513(a) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 and Bivens personal-injury claims, barring claims accruing before the applicable cutoff unless tolling applies.

Marshall v. English · filed 2021-03-29(a)

The statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 and Bivens actions is determined from looking at the appropriate state statute of limitations and tolling principles. See Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989); Logan v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1185 (D. Kan. 2003). “The forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs civil rights claims under both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983. In Kansas, that is the two-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. § 60-513(a).” Brown v. Unified School Dist. 501, Topeka Public Schools, 465 F .3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2006)(citations omitted); see United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120 (1979); Johnson v. Johnson County Comm’n Bd., 925 F.2d 1299, 1301 (10th Cir. 1991). The same two-year statute of limitations governs actions under Bivens. See Logan, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1185. A district court may dismiss a complaint filed by an indigent plaintiff if it is patently clear from the allegations as tendered that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 2006)(citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214 (2007)), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1059 (2007); Hawkins v. Lemons, No. 09-3116-SAC, 2009 WL 2475130, at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 12, 2009). Plaintiff claims his Complaint covers a period spanning more than thirty (30) years. Any claim that accrued prior to July 16, 2018 is barred by the limitations period unless tolling applies.

Section 60-513(a)(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for a § 1983 takings claim, with accrual governed by federal law.

Snodgrass v. City of Wichita, Kansas · filed 2022-04-01(a)(4)

In Kansas, the statute of limitations for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is the two-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. 60-513(a). ... Their takings claim under § 1983 is thus barred by the two-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4), absent tolling. See Gragg v. McKune, 28 Kan. App. 2d 256, 260-61, 16 P.3d 311 (2000).

Section 60-513(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims.

Lawton v. Medevac Mid-America, Inc. · filed 1991-08-21(4)

The statute of limitations for a section 1983 claim is two years. ... K.S.A. 60-513(4) (negligence); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985).

Section 60-513 supplies the two-year limitations period for Rehabilitation Act claims filed in Kansas.

Umholtz v. Kansas, Department of Social & Rehabilitation Services · filed 2013-02-20

The Tenth Circuit has held that the statute of limitations period for a claim under the Rehabilitation Act is the two-year period borrowed from K.S.A. 60-513. ... The court believes we are bound to follow the Baker decision.

Section 60-513(b) imposes a ten-year statute of repose running from the wrongful act giving rise to a personal-injury claim, barring the claim once ten years have passed even if the injury occurs later.

O'NEILL v. Dunham · filed 2009-03-20(b)

The rule is clear. The statute of repose operates as a general grant of immunity against claims arising more than 10 years after the defendant’s actions and abolishes a cause of action even if if has not yet accrued. ... Here, it is clear that the plaintiff s claims are barred by the statute of repose in K.S.A. 60-513(b). ... We conclude 14 years passed between the defendant’s wrongful act of failing to install the required handrail and plaintiff s 2004 injury. We hold his claim is barred by law.

Section 60-513(b) starts the 10-year statute of repose at the defendant's last original wrongful act giving rise to the cause of action, rather than at later contacts, and later contacts do not restart it.

Deters v. Nemaha-Marshall Electric Cooperative Ass'n · filed 2019-05-24(b)

But K.S.A. 60-513(b) and our caselaw does not support this interpretation. Under Kansas law it is the last act giving rise to the cause of action, not the last contact between the plaintiff and defendant, that starts the running of the statute of repose clock: "[B]ut in no event shall an action be commenced more than 10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action." (Emphasis added.)

Section 60-513 requires negligence claims to be filed within two years, with the period beginning when the fact of substantial injury becomes reasonably ascertainable; identifying the person who caused the injury is not required to start the period.

Foxfield Villa Assocs. v. Robben · filed 2019-08-02(a)(4), (b)

Even assuming FVA did not know of Lori's involvement until 2016, FVA's negligence claims are still barred under K.S.A. 60-513. FVA first sued BBV in district court on September 1, 2011. By the time FVA filed suit, FVA knew it was injured, but it did not know who caused the injury. FVA had a duty to reasonably investigate all available sources for facts relevant to its injuries. See Davidson, 259 Kan. at 675. FVA may not have known whether Lori caused FVA's injuries, but this is irrelevant under K.S.A. 60-513(b). See Dumler, 49 Kan. App. 2d at 576. At the very latest, the statute of limitations begins to run when "the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 60-513(b).

Section 60-513(b) bars a tort claim 10 years after the act causing the injury, and for a general contractor's home-construction negligence, the period cannot begin later than the owners' taking possession of the completed home.

Slatten v. R&B Builders, Inc. · filed 2021-12-10(b)

This case poses an exceptionally narrow question for our consideration: Does the 10-year statute of repose in K.S.A. 60-513(b) begin to run when the general contractor of a home custom built for the property owners obtains a final certificate of occupancy from the appropriate local government agency? We conclude the issuance of the certificate as a bureaucratic function dependent upon the indefinite schedule and disposition of a government agent bears no sound relationship to a potentially tortious act of the contractor triggering the period of repose. So the answer is, in a word, "No."

Section 60-513(b)’s ten-year repose period begins when the defendant commits the wrongful act.

A.S.I., Inc. v. Sanders · filed 1993-10-29(b)

The ultimate conclusion, the court finds, based upon the most recent decisions of the Kansas Supreme Court, is that the 10-year period of repose should be deemed to begin to run from the time the drums were buried.

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim, running from the conduct causing substantial injury.

Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline, Inc. v. Cline · filed 2011-01-23(a)(4)

Generally, a plaintiff must bring a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress within two years of the conduct causing substantial injury.

Section 60-513(a)(7) requires a medical-negligence action to be commenced within two years of the injury or when the injury is reasonably ascertainable.

Mangus v. Stump · filed 2011-06-03(a)(7)

Pursuant to K.S.A. 60-513(a)(7), a cause of action alleging medical negligence must be commenced within 2 years of the date of injury or the time the injury is reasonably ascertainable in order to satisfy the statute of limitations. Mangus alleges the defendants negligently performed a surgical procedure on June 2, 2006, and the parties agree the applicable statute of limitations expired on June 2, 2008. Mangus originally filed his petition on May 29, 2008, and his original lawsuit was timely commenced against both defendants.

Section 60-513(a)(7) requires a medical-negligence action to be commenced within two years after the injury occurs or becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Popanz v. Krueger · filed 2018-12-07(a)(7)

Under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(7), a cause of action alleging medical negligence must be commenced within two years of the date of injury or the time the injury is reasonably ascertainable in order to satisfy the statute of limitations. Here, Popanz had two years from January 21, 2015, to commence her action against Krueger because she had ascertained the fact of her injury on that date.

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on negligence and intentional-tort actions, with accrual generally beginning when the injury occurs.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1989-05-16(a)(4)

K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) provides that actions for negligence and for intentional torts, such an intentional infliction of emotional stress, are governed by a two year statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(4) applies a two-year limitation to claims for injury to another’s rights that do not arise from contract; an accounting claim with a corresponding legal remedy is subject to that limitation.

Yeager v. National Cooperative Refinery Ass'n · filed 1970-06-13(4)

The end result would be the same should her action be one defined in 60-513 (4), which covers by its terms “an action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract and not herein enumerated.” ... We are forced to conclude that the doctrine of laches has no relevance to the facts in this case, but that the two-year statute of limitations applies.

Section 60-513(a)(4) sets a two-year limitation period for negligence actions.

Mast v. Kinnard · filed 2001-06-15(a)(4)

The statute of hmitations for a cause of action based on negligence is 2 years. K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 60-513(a)(4).

Section 60-513’s two-year limitations period applies to this type of civil rights action, but it did not bar substitution of a successor before the claimant had notice that the original party was abolished.

Flanigan v. City of Leavenworth · filed 1983-01-14

Initially, it should be noted that since this action is not one for libel, slander, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment or an action upon a statutory penalty or forfeiture, the two-year statute of limitations of K.S.A. 60-513 is properly applied here. ... Notice that the LRC had been abolished did not come until the district court’s opinion of February 1982. At that time the City had already substituted itself as a party so the question was moot. For these reasons the application of Gatewood v. Bosch, of, for that matter, the statute of limitations, is improper.

Section 60-513(a)(4) requires an action for injury to another's rights, not arising on contract, to be brought within two years.

CHELF v. State · filed 2011-09-23(a)(4)

Under the Kansas Code of Civil Procedure, “[a]n action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract,” shall be brought within 2 years. K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4). For purposes of fifing a timely KTCA claim, Chelf had to file his civil lawsuit for negligence against the State of Kansas within 2 years of June 18, 2007, the date of the accident. Chelf filed his petition with the district court in October 2008; thus, the lawsuit was filed in a timely manner for purposes of the KTCA.

Section 60-513 imposes a two-year limitations period on personal-injury claims, including § 1983 claims.

Dartez (ID 87393) v. Peters · filed 2019-07-24(a)(4)

Under K.S.A. § 60-513, the limitations period expires after two years.

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on personal-injury suits, including § 1983 actions brought in Kansas federal court.

Caballero v. Wyandotte County Sheriff's · filed 2019-10-15(a)(4)

Kansas has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury suits. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4). ... we have held that Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4) establishes a two-year limitations period for § 1983 actions brought in the District of Kansas. See Hamilton v. City of Overland Park, 730 F.2d 613, 614 (10th Cir. 1984).

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, including the § 1983 claims at issue here, and bars a claim that accrued before that period.

Countryman-Roswurm v. Wichita State University · filed 2022-08-02(a)(4)

And in Kansas, “the statute of limitations period for personal injury actions is two years.” Lee v. Reed, 221 F. Supp. 3d 1263, 1269 (D. Kan. 2016) (citing Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4)). So, plaintiff’s claims are timely only if they accrued during the two years before this case’s filing, i.e., October 25, 2019. ... For that reason, her § 1983 claim against defendant Hippisley is time-barred. See Herrera v. City of Espanola, 32 F.4th 980, 991 (10th Cir. 2022) (“If from the complaint, the dates on which the pertinent acts occurred are not in dispute, then the date a statute of limitations accrues is a question of law suitable for resolution at the motion to dismiss stage.” (quotation cleaned up)). So, the court dismisses this claim with prejudice.

Section 60-513(a)(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, including the § 1983 claims addressed here.

McRoberts v. Overland Park, Kansas, City of · filed 2022-09-27(a)(4)

In Kansas, the limitations statute for personal injury claims is two years. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4); see also Eikenberry v. Seward Cnty., Kan., 734 F. App’x 572, 575 (10th Cir. 2018). So, the court applies Kansas’s two-year statute of limitations to plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.

Section 60-513(a)(4) requires personal injury claims in Kansas to be brought within two years.

Boldridge v. Atchison, Kansas, City of · filed 2024-10-09(a)(4)

In Kansas, personal injury claims must be brought within two years.

Section 60-513 bars a cross-claim seeking affirmative relief when it is filed more than two years after the cause of action accrued, absent an applicable exception or tolling provision.

Rochester American Insurance v. Cassell Truck Lines, Inc. · filed 1965-06-12

For the reasons heretofore stated, we are compelled to hold the appellant’s cross-claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations, there being no statutory exception or tolling provision applicable to the cross-claim which was filed for the purpose of obtaining affirmative relief.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for actions in Kansas alleging injury to or denial of a person's civil rights.

Cooper v. Hutchinson Police Department · filed 1981-11-13(a)(4)

We now hold that K.S.A. 60-513 is the appropriate statute of limitations for actions brought in Kansas for the injury to or denial of a person’s civil rights.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitation for injury-to-rights actions that do not arise on contract, while an implied-warranty claim between buyer and seller is a contract action governed by the Uniform Commercial Code's four-year limitation.

Saraniero v. Safeway, Inc. · filed 1982-06-14(a)(4)

The applicable statute of limitations in cases like this is K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4), which provides a two-year limitation on actions “for injury to the rights of another not arising on contract .... ” ... The two-year statute of limitations does not govern this case, however. As between the buyer and the seller, Kansas case law is clear that an action for breach of implied warranty is a contract action that accrues from the date of delivery and that the four (4)-year statute of limitations contained in the Uniform Commercial Code applies.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for an action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract and not otherwise enumerated; in a § 1983 action, the claim accrues when the assessments are made.

Dutoit v. Board of Johnson County Comm'rs · filed 1983-07-15(a)(4)

The statute is applicable in this case, and the action accrued when the assessments were made January 15, 1982. The plaintiffs’ § 1983 action has been timely filed.

The two-year limitations period under § 60-513 begins when the plaintiff discovers the previously undisclosed facts giving rise to the claim.

Borg Warner Acceptance Corp. v. KANSAS SECRETARY OF ST. · filed 1987-01-16

The statute of limitations did not begin to run until March of 1984, when the existence of the Bank’s 1977 financing statement was discovered. This action was filed on August 17, 1984, well within the two-year statute of limitations provided for by K.S.A. 60-513.

For trespass and conversion claims, the two-year limitations period accrues when the act first causes substantial injury, but a continuing trespass does not trigger accrual until it is complete.

Dexter v. Brake · filed 2012-01-20(a) and (b)

Under K.S.A. 60-513(a) and (b), the statute of hmitations for claims of trespass and conversion requires that the claims must be brought within 2 years, and the time begins to accrue when “the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury.” ... In the case of a continuing trespass, the statute of hmitations does not begin to accrue until the continuing trespass is complete. ... It was the Lease cancellation that served to legally recognize Brake’s status as a trespasser. And Brake’s trespass was a continuing trespass which fails to implicate the statute of limitations until it is completed.

For certain tort claims, § 60-513(a) uses a two-year limitations period tied to discoverable injury, while § 60-513(b) imposes a ten-year repose deadline.

Dunn v. Dunn · filed 2012-05-18(a)(2), (b)

On the other hand, certain tort actions controlled by the 2-year limitation period found in K.S.A. 60-513(a) do not accrue until the fact of injury is discoverable. K.S.A. 60-513(b). To avoid an open-ended time for bringing such actions, the legislature has created a statute of repose in K.S.A. 60-513(b) that imposes a 10-year drop-dead date for commencing the action.

The fraudulent-concealment exception tolls limitations only for fraud claims, and the discovery rule does not apply to unjust-enrichment claims because that claim is not among the actions listed in § 60-513(a).

Freebird, Inc. v. Merit Energy Co. · filed 2012-08-01(a)(3), (b)

The statutory fraudulent concealment exception currently states that an action for relief on the ground of fraud “shall be brought within two years ... but the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the fraud is discovered.” K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(3). ... Although the Kansas Supreme Court has not been entirely consistent in applying the fraudulent concealment doctrine to toll the statute of limitations, it has repeatedly and most recently held that it only tolls the statute of limitations on fraud claims. ... Plaintiffs claims are for breach of lease, unjust enrichment and accounting, but not fraud. Therefore the fraudulent concealment tolling doctrine does not toll the five-year statute of limitations on plaintiffs claims. ... The statute expressly applies this discovery rule to seven different types of actions including trespass, fraud and wrongful death, but not unjust enrichment. ... Without any authority to support applying the discovery rule to plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim, the Court declines to do so — particularly given the reluctance of Kansas courts to soften statutes of limitations by interpreting them to include provisions not expressly contained in the statutes.

Section 60-513(2) provides a two-year limitations period for torts involving the taking, detaining, or injuring of personal property, and the claim accrued when the bailee sold the property.

Schoenholz v. Hinzman · filed 2012-10-12(2)

The statute of limitations for torts involving taking, detaining, or injuring personal property is 2 years. K.S.A. 60-513(2). ... This conclusion was erroneous. A bailment relationship remained in effect because Hinzman still voluntarily retained possession of Schoenholz’ property. The statute of limitations did not begin to run until Hinzman sold the property in 2006. Schoenholz filed suit on May 3, 2007, well within the limitation periods for both contract and tort claims.

Section 60-513(a) gives two years for claims involving the taking, detaining, or damaging of personal property, and subsection (b) starts the period when the claim accrues, including when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Moulden v. Hundley · filed 2017-10-27(a) (b)

Kansas has a two-year time limit on claims for the taking, detaining, or damaging of personal property. See K.S.A. 60-513(a). The two-year time limit begins to run when the claim accrues, either (1) when the act giving rise to the claim first causes substantial injury or (2) if the injury isn't reasonably ascertainable until some later time, when a person could reasonably ascertain the injury. See K.S.A. 60-513(b); LCL, LLC v. Falen, 53 Kan. App. 2d 651, 658-64, 390 P.3d 571 (2017), rev. granted September 29, 2017. ... We conclude that Dustin was the bailee of a constructive bailment that began on Hope's death. Davis' claim did not accrue, starting the statute-of-limitations clock, until Dustin refused Davis' request for return of the property. Accordingly, Davis' suit wasn't barred.

Subsection (b) provides that a tort cause of action accrues when the plaintiff suffers substantial injury; if the injury is not reasonably ascertainable until later, accrual waits until the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Jeanes v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2013-03-08(b)

K.S.A. 60-513(b) clearly instructs that a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff suffers “substantial injury”—and not necessarily when the negligent act occurred that ultimately caused the injury.

Section 60-513(c) uses an objective reasonable-ascertainability test for medical-malpractice accrual, and subsection (a)(5)'s two-year wrongful-death period starts at death unless information about the death or negligence was concealed, altered, falsified, inaccurate, or misrepresented.

Martin v. Naik · filed 2013-05-03(a)(5) and (c)

Second, in construing K.S.A. 60-513(c), which controls when the statute of limitations period begins to ran in a medical malpractice action, we hold that the legislature stated an objective standard when it provided that a cause of action accrues at the time of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action “unless the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable.” Consequently, the fact a particular patient is incapacitated, which would be a subjective factor, does not affect whether the fact of injury was reasonably ascertainable. ... We reiterate and hold that the 2-year statute of limitations under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(5) that governs a wrongful death action “should start on the date of death unless the information from which the fact of death or negligence can be determined was either concealed, altered, falsified, inaccurate, or misrepresented.”

Section 60-513 starts a wrongful-death limitations period on the date of death, unless qualifying information about the death or the wrongful act was concealed, altered, falsified, inaccurate, or misrepresented.

Osborn v. Kansas Dept. for Children and Families · filed 2022-05-13

The law is straightforward on this point. A cause of action for wrongful death accrues on the date of death unless information about the fact of death or the wrongful act that caused the death was concealed, altered, falsified, inaccurate, or misrepresented. K.S.A. 60-513; Martin v. Naik, 297 Kan. 241, 242, 300 P.3d 625 (2013). ... He has not alleged that he conducted a reasonable investigation before the statute of limitations had expired, but that the records were concealed.

Section 60-513(c) requires a plaintiff who knows an injury is substantial and permanent to reasonably investigate whether negligence caused it.

Kelley v. Barnett · filed 1997-02-28(c)

As explained in Davidson and Jones, however, once an injuiy is known to be substantial and permanent, there is a duty placed on the plaintiff to reasonably investigate in order to determine whether negligence caused the damage.

For a medical malpractice injury that is not reasonably ascertainable when the act occurs, § 60-513(c) starts the limitations period when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable; actual knowledge is unnecessary.

Bradley v. Val-Mejias · filed 2002-11-06(c)

Despite his intimation to the contrary, “actual knowledge” is not the standard by which the court determines when the statute of limitations begins to run. As noted, the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action, or if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable at the time of the initial act, at the time when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Section 60-513(c) may extend the wrongful death limitations period when the facts needed to determine negligent causation were misrepresented, and reasonable ascertainability may present a fact question.

Dreiling v. Davis · filed 2008-01-18(c)

Davidson did not establish a bright fine rule that the wrongful death hmitations period may never be extended beyond 2 years from the date of death. ... Resolution of this issue will likely involve credibility determinations, and it appears reasonable persons could reach different conclusions. The district court erred in granting summary judgment to Dr. Davis and Dr. Austin and that issue is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for a retaliatory-discharge claim based on exercising workers compensation rights, and a contract cannot shorten that period when the claim implicates a strongly held public policy interest.

Pfeifer v. Federal Express Corp. · filed 2013-06-07(a)(4)

We hold that die private contract entered into between FedEx and Pfeifer violates public policy and is invalid to the extent it limits the applicable 2-year statute of limitations under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) for filing a retaliatory discharge claim based on her exercise of rights under the workers compensation laws.

Section 60-513 requires the two-year limitations period for criminal legal-malpractice claims to begin when postconviction proceedings set aside the conviction and order a new trial.

Mashaney v. Board of Indigents' Defense Services · filed 2013-11-08(a)(4), (b)

In conclusion, we have determined that Mashaney’s cause of action against his former defense counsel for legal malpractice accrued, for the purpose of calculating the beginning date for the running of the 2-year statute of limitations under K.S.A. 60-513, when Mashaney was “exonerated” in postconviction proceedings which resulted in setting aside his convictions and ordering a new trial.

Section 60-513(b) permits a legal malpractice claim to accrue when substantial injury occurs and tolls the limitations period while an appeal prevents the claim from being prosecuted to a successful conclusion.

Pizel v. Zuspann · filed 1990-07-13(b)

The plaintiffs were effectively precluded from bringing this action against Zuspann and Whalen until a final determination was made on the appeal. Until that final determination was made, the plaintiffs could have filed, but not prosecuted, this action to a successful conclusion.

Section 60-513(b) starts the limitations period when substantial injury occurs or, if the injury is not then reasonably ascertainable, when it becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.

Webb v. Pomeroy · filed 1982-12-16(b)

The limitation is governed by K.S.A. 60-513(b). ... Thus, there could be no cause of action until that decision went against them. ... This is a surprising argument as we believe the injury was not “reasonably ascertainable” so long as he, purporting to act as their lawyer, kept assuring them they had a binding repurchase agreement.

Section 60-513(b) generally delays accrual of a legal malpractice claim involving underlying litigation until that litigation ends, but the period begins earlier if the injury and its connection to the attorney’s negligence are reasonably ascertainable.

Dearborn Animal Clinic, P.A. v. Wilson · filed 1991-03-01(b)

In a legal malpractice action in which there is underlying litigation which may be determinative of the alleged negligence of the attorney, the better rule, and the one which generally will be applicable under K.S.A. 60-513(b), is that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the underlying litigation is finally determined. ... However, the rule that the underlying litigation must be finally determined before the statute of limitations begins to run cannot be arbitrarily applied in every case. If it is clear that the plaintiff in a potential legal malpractice action has incurred injury and if it is reasonably ascertainable that such injury was the result of the defendant attorney’s negligence, then under K.S.A. 60-513(b) the statute begins to run at the time that it is reasonably ascertainable that the injury was caused by the attorney’s malpractice even though the underlying action may not have been finally resolved.

Section 60-513(b) ties accrual of a tort claim to substantial injury; an estate-planning malpractice claim does not accrue before death when the alleged injury is estate tax liability arising afterward.

Jeanes v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2008-08-29(b)

In the present case, Anton suffered no ascertainable injury to justify an action for recovery of damages until after her death. ... No injury occurred until die estate’s tax liability was determined, which would have been after Anton’s death. It was at that point in time that the estate suffered substantial injury.

Section 60-513’s two-year limit bars a legal malpractice claim filed more than two years after the injury and its connection to the attorney’s alleged negligence were reasonably ascertainable.

Elder v. Herlocker · filed 2010-12-21(a)(4)

Accordingly, we hold that the district court correctly determined that Mr. Elder’s malpractice claim accrued no later than June 2005. As such, Mr. Elder had until June 2007 to file his claim. He did not, however, file this action until December 2008. Therefore, the district court properly granted Mr. Herlocker summary judgment based on Kansas’s statute of limitations.

For trespass and conversion claims, the two-year limitations period begins when the injury is reasonably ascertainable, but no action may be filed more than 10 years after the act causing the claim.

Armstrong v. Bromley Quarry & Asphalt, Inc. · filed 2016-09-09(b)

Generally, the limitations period commences when "the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party." K.S.A. 60-513(b). But our law also contains a statute of repose, which provides that despite any tolling of the limitations period, no action may be commenced "more than 10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action." K.S.A. 60-513(b).

Under § 60-513(b), an injury is substantial when it is actionable, and a trespass by subsidence claim accrues when the subsidence is reasonably ascertainable.

Kowalsky v. S & J Operating Company · filed 2013-10-30(b)

Because trespass by subsidence does not occur until the defendant has allowed the surface to fall and the surface has subsided, see Nida, 855 P.2d at 86-87, the action accrues when the subsidence is reasonably ascertainable. Although K.S.A. 60-513(b) refers to “substantial injury,” Kansas courts have held that an injury is substantial when it is actionable.

Subsection (b) imposes a 10-year statute of repose on some tort claims, but it does not apply to battery, libel, or slander claims.

Kuri v. Addictive Behavioral Change Health Group · filed 2017-12-15(b)

But even if the statute of repose contained in K.S.A. 60-513(b), which applies a 10-year statute of repose to some tort claims, was somehow to act as a time extender, this statute does not apply to battery, libel, and slander claims.

Section 60-513(b) bars claims based only on defective design or construction more than 10 years after the act giving rise to the claim, but it does not bar claims based on an ongoing duty to warn of nonopen and nonobvious dangers or maintain streets safely when the alleged breach occurred on the date of injury.

Grey v. City of Topeka · filed 2018-03-16(b)

We agree with the district court that Grey's claim against the City for negligently installing the bridge is barred by the statute of repose at K.S.A. 60-513(b). The pleadings establish that the redesign of the bridge was completed on December 5, 1997, and Grey did not bring her action within 10 years of that date. ... Grey's claim that the City breached its continuing duty to warn her of the alleged unsafe condition created by the bridge is a different matter. Based on the reasoning in Dunn, O'Neill, and Bonnette, we agree with Grey that the City has a duty to maintain its streets in a reasonably safe condition and a duty to warn the public of any nonopen and nonobvious dangerous conditions. As to Grey's claim based on a failure to warn or a failure to maintain, the last day the City could have breached its duty was the day Grey was injured. Thus, Grey's claim against the City for failure to warn or failure to maintain, assuming that such a claim can be established, is not barred by the statute of repose.

Section 60-513(a)(7) provides a two-year limitations period for medical-malpractice claims, and under subsection (c) the period begins when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable—when the plaintiff can determine that the injury may have been caused by the defendant; if ascertainability is factually disputed, the issue goes to the trier of fact.

Velasquez v. Leidich · filed 2018-11-16(a)(7), (c)

Medical malpractice claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. K.S.A. 60-513(a)(7). The statute of limitations does not begin to run "until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party." K.S.A. 60-513(c). This means the statute of limitations is tolled "'until the time the plaintiff is able to determine that [his or her] injury may be caused by some act of the defendant.'" Michaelis v. Farrell, 48 Kan. App. 2d 624, 631, 296 P.3d 439 (2013) (quoting Benne v. International Business Machines Corp., 87 F.3d 419, 427 [10th Cir. 1996]). ... Before the second surgery, all the uncontroverted facts show is that Velasquez experienced the same symptoms before and after her operation by Dr. Leidich and that the continuation of her symptoms was one of the possible surgery outcomes Dr. Leidich had predicted. It is very unlikely that Velasquez could have successfully prosecuted her medical malpractice claim on those facts alone.

Section 60-513(a)-(b) imposes a two-year limitations period that begins when a substantial, or actionable, injury becomes reasonably ascertainable, meaning the claimant has an obligation to reasonably investigate the injury and its causation.

Bartlett Family Real Estate Fund v. Robben · filed 2024-08-09(a) (b)

The parties agree that 14 of the Plaintiffs' causes of action are governed by the two-year statute of limitations found in K.S.A. 60-513(a). Under K.S.A. 60-513(b), the statute of limitations only begins to run once a "substantial injury" becomes "reasonably ascertainable" to the party asserting the cause of action. Moreover, our Supreme Court has defined "substantial injury" to mean an "actionable injury." LCL, 308 Kan. at 582. Likewise, our Supreme Court has defined "reasonably ascertainable" to mean that the party asserting the cause of action has an obligation to reasonably investigate both the injury and causation. Davidson v. Denning, 259 Kan. 659, 678-79, 914 P.2d 936 (1996).

Section 60-513(a)(7) generally requires a medical-malpractice claim to be filed within two years, while § 60-513(c) delays accrual until the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable when it was not ascertainable at the initial act.

Foley v. Kellenberger · filed 2025-05-06(a)(7), (c)

In Kansas, a plaintiff must file a medical malpractice claim within two years of the act giving rise to the plaintiff’s injury. Generally, a medical malpractice action “shall be deemed to have accrued at the time of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action.” But when “the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.”

Section 60-513(a)(3) gives a fraud claimant two years from discovery, while subsection (b) delays accrual until substantial injury is reasonably ascertainable but bars suit more than 10 years after the act giving rise to the claim.

Jenkins v. Green Valley Farms · filed 2019-10-18(a)(3), (b)

Under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3), a claimant must bring a claim of fraud within two years of the fraud, but the claim "shall not be deemed to have accrued until the fraud is discovered." K.S.A. 60-513(b) provides that any claim under K.S.A. 60-513(a) "shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until sometime after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party, but in no event shall an action be commenced more than 10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action."

Section 60-513’s limitation period for fraud does not begin while the defrauded person has no information putting them on inquiry and may continue to rely on the defendant’s representations.

Wolf v. Brungardt · filed 1974-07-17

Where, under all of the circumstances of the case, there is nothing to put the appellees on inquiry they may continue to rely on the representations made by the appellants. The appellees did not have a duty to investigate further.

A fraud claim accrues when the plaintiff knew or, with reasonable diligence, should have known of the conduct causing the injury.

Schrag v. Dinges · filed 1992-01-07(a)(3), (b)

Under Kansas law, a cause of action based on fraud accrues when “the fraud is discovered.” K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(3). ... Thus, a plaintiff is deemed to have discovered the fraud when he knew or, with reasonable diligence, should have known of the acts or conduct giving rise to the injury.

Section 60-513(b) starts the limitations period for fraud and negligence claims when substantial injury first occurs, or when a later injury becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Whittenburg v. L.J. Holding Co. · filed 1993-08-13(b)

The defendant’s argument misconstrues K.S.A. 60-513(b). For both the fraud and the negligence actions, the claims did not accrue until the act giving rise to the cause of action first caused substantial injury, or if the fact of injury was not reasonably ascertainable until sometime after the initial act, when the fact of injury became reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.

Section 60-513(a)(3) requires a fraud action to be filed within two years after the fraud is discovered.

Myzer v. Baldwin · filed 2020-11-06(a)(3)

Pursuant to K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3), an action for fraud must be brought within two years after the fraud is discovered. ... As reflected on the face of the petition, Myzer was aware of the alleged fraudulent conspiracy by the defendants at least by 2003 when he filed his complaint in federal court. ... Accordingly, we conclude that this lawsuit—which was filed in 2019—is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(b)'s limitations period begins when the fact of injury is reasonably ascertainable, even if its extent is unknown.

Brueck v. Krings · filed 1982-01-15(b)

The critical information to trigger the running of the statute of limitations is knowledge of the fact of injury, not the extent of injury.

Section 60-513(b) does not delay the limitations period until the injured person identifies who caused the injury.

Dumler v. Conway · filed 2013-10-25(b)

The statute contains no language requiring the identification of the party who caused die injury.

Section 60-513(a) gives breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims a two-year limitations period, accruing when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Rainbow Communications, LLC v. Landover Wireless Corp. · filed 2019-07-18(a)

As to the breach of fiduciary duty claims, the statute of limitations under Kansas law is two years, beginning to accrue when the injury became reasonably ascertainable.

For fraud claims, the two-year limitations period begins when the fraud is discovered and the resulting injury is reasonably ascertainable.

Doyle v. Nordstrom · filed 2021-01-08(a)(3), (b)

The statute of limitations for fraud is 2 years and accrues at the time the fraud is discovered. ... Because Doyle had knowledge of the fact of exposure to an increased tax liability when Nordstrom furnished the 1099-C form in December 2016, the statute of limitations for any fraud action began to run at that time.

For conversion claims, the two-year limitations period begins when the injury occurs or, if the injury is not reasonably ascertainable then, when it becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.

Howard's Optical Dispensary, Inc. v. United States Small Business Administration · filed 2025-04-30(a)(2), (b)

Conversion is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(2); Armstrong, 378 P.3d at 1096. ... Under Kansas law, a cause of action “shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(b); see also Schoenholz v. Hinzman, 289 P.3d 1155, 1161 (Kan. 2012) ... Howard’s Optical’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations because it accrued on or about February 8, 2022.

Subsection (d) delays accrual of a corporation’s claim until the injury is reasonably ascertainable and a disinterested majority of nonculpable directors exists, determined by an objective three-question test.

Mid-Continent Anesthesiology, Chtd. v. Bassell · filed 2021-12-17(d)

Under K.S.A. 60-513(d), the statute of limitations for claims against a corporation is tolled based on adverse domination when a majority of the corporation's board of directors is alleged to be involved in the wrongdoing underlying the cause of action. The relevant statutory language provides a cause of action does not accrue until "there exists a disinterested majority of nonculpable directors of the corporation." This plain statutory language is clear and unambiguous.

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on wrongful-termination claims under Kansas law.

Sprowls v. Western Plains Medical Complex · filed 2022-02-16(a)(4)

Claims for wrongful termination under Kansas law have a two-year statute of limitations. Whye v. City Council for City of Topeka, 102 P.3d 384, 385 (Kan. 2004); see also K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4). Sprowls alleges he was wrongfully discharged on May 9, 2017. Doc. 1-1 at 3. This case was filed September 6, 2021, well outside the statute of limitations for wrongful termination.

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period for breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims, while subsection (b) delays accrual until the injury is reasonably ascertainable; a fiduciary's concealment may toll the period.

Kansas Heart Hospital, LLC v. Smith · filed 2022-02-17(a)(4) (b)

The statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty is two years. K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4); Mynatt v. Collis, 274 Kan. 850, 866, 57 P.3d 513 (2002). A cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty accrues when the “act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.” K.S.A. § 60-513(b). The term “reasonably ascertainable” suggests an objective standard based upon an examination of the surrounding circumstances. P.W.P. v. L.S., 266 Kan. 417, 425, 969 P.2d 896 (1998). Plaintiff’s claim is not “reasonably ascertainable” until it is clear that plaintiff had “knowledge of his or her injury and that the defendant was the likely cause.” Michaelis v. Farrell, 48 Kan. App. 2d 624, 631, 296 P.3d 439, 445 (2013). Further, when a fiduciary relationship exists and defendants’ silence prevents plaintiff from discovering the claim, the statute of limitations may be tolled. Doe v. Popravak, 55 Kan. App. 2d 1, 16, 421 P.3d 760, 770 (2017). ... Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts that its claim for breach of fiduciary duty was not reasonably ascertainable until August of 2020. Therefore, the Court declines to dismiss claims for damages prior to April 29, 2019 on the grounds that they are time-barred.

Section 60-513 gives breach of fiduciary duty claims a two-year limitations period that runs from when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Mynatt v. Collis · filed 2002-11-01(a) and (b)

An action for an alleged breach of fiduciary duty is governed by the 2-year statute of limitations of K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 60-513. ... The statute of limitations would act to bar any affirmative action by Collis against Mynatt for breach of fiduciary duty 2 years after “the fact of injury [became] reasonably ascertainable.” K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 60-513(a) and (b).

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on the RESS-related malpractice and fiduciary-duty claims, and continuing representation in unrelated matters does not toll that period.

Lanier Trucking v. Long · filed 2020-08-14(a)(4)

Here, although Long continued to represent LTI in other cases, it is undisputed that his representation in the RESS lawsuit ended on October 1, 2013. ... LTI fails to show that the district court erred by finding that its RESS-related claims were barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(b)'s repose period for a nuisance claim runs from a defendant's act, but a continuing nuisance claim may proceed at the pleading stage when it alleges ongoing migration and continued action or conscious inaction that could abate the nuisance.

Black v. Union Pacific Railroad Company · filed 2024-08-09(b)

To be sure, the statute of repose applicable to a nuisance claim “runs from an act of a defendant.” ... But plaintiffs’ proposed continuing nuisance claim alleges that Union Pacific knows about the continued migration of contaminants onto plaintiffs’ land, a nuisance that Union Pacific could abate, but that Union Pacific continues to fail to properly investigate and remediate contaminants from the Site. Thus, plaintiffs have alleged continued action (or conscious continued inaction) by Union Pacific. ... Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the court finds that plaintiffs’ proposed continuing nuisance claim alleges a plausible claim for relief. Accordingly, the court grants plaintiffs’ motion to the extent it seeks to add this claim.

Section 60-513(b) imposes a ten-year repose period measured from the act giving rise to the claim, and continuing nuisance conduct can constitute a later act so the period does not bar the claim.

Black v. Union Pacific Railroad Company · filed 2025-02-21(b)

Thus, the “act” giving rise to Plaintiffs claim is Union Pacific’s continuing failure to remove the contamination. Accordingly, the 10-year statute of repose does not bar Plaintiffs’ private continuing nuisance claim.

Section 60-513(a)(4) gives two years to bring a nuisance claim; later flooding does not restart the period against a defendant with no continuing duty to abate the nuisance.

Bowen v. City of Kansas City · filed 1982-06-11(a)(4)

Assuming Wilcox was a party to creating a nuisance, any cause of action against him would accrue at the first loss following his work on the property. ... All agree that the appropriate statute of limitations is two years under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) and as there was no continuing obligation on the part of Wilcox, the summary judgment in his favor was correct.

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitation period on actions for injury to another's rights, whether the plaintiff seeks money damages or injunctive relief.

Grissom (ID 33728) v. Bell · filed 2025-02-03(a)(4)

Kansas’s two-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4) applies to any “action for injury to the rights of another” irrespective of whether money damages or injunctive relief is sought. There is nothing to Plaintiff’s argument that a different statute of limitations applies to official capacity § 1983 claims seeking injunctive relief.

Section 60-513(a)(4)'s two-year negligence limitation does not govern childhood-sexual-abuse damages claims when the specific limitation in § 60-523 applies.

A.S. v. Vineyard Church of Overland Park · filed 2025-06-27(a)(4)

Bloom first takes the position that, because A.S. only asserts claims for negligence, the two-year statute of limitations for negligence in K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) applies. But this argument ignores the fact that A.S. alleges Bloom sexually abused her when she was under the age of 16, acts that place her claims squarely within the ambit of K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-523, as it is tailored specifically to actions for damages associated with childhood sexual abuse claims. See Eastman v. Coffeyville Resources Refining & Marketing, 295 Kan. 470, 478, 284 P.3d 1049 (2012) (noting that general statutes pertaining to limitations only apply when there is no specific statute speaking to limitations for the type of action at issue).

For an action under § 60-513(4), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 controls when the action is commenced in federal court because K.S.A. 60-203 is procedural and not part of the Kansas statute of limitations.

Donnie R. Chappell and S. Eugene Schrock v. Noble J. Rouch, and Mid-Continent Casualty Company, Appellee-Intervener · filed 1971-10-12(4)

As indicated, we need not here make that determination as in our view K.S.A. 60-203 is not under the circumstances an integral part of K.S.A. 60-501 and K.S.A. 60-513(4).

For fraud claims, § 60-513(a)(3)'s two-year limitations period turns on when the fraud should have been discovered with reasonable diligence, and constructive discovery from a public record may not apply where a fiduciary relationship or lack of an obligation to inspect the record exists.

Doll v. Chicago Title Insurance · filed 2007-10-15(a)(3)

In the absence of the specific constructive notice urged by plaintiffs, the application of the statute of limitations turns on the general rule — when plaintiffs should have discovered the fraud by the exercise of reasonable diligence. The Court concludes that that question is one of fact for the jury in this case.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for accounting malpractice, accruing under subsection (b) when substantial injury occurs or the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable.

First State Bank v. Daniel and Associates, PC · filed 2007-03-20(a)(4), (b)

Under the statute, a cause of action accrues when “the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or ... [when] the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party....” K.S.A. § 60-513(b). The statute of limitations begins to run in a tort action at the time a negligent act causes injury if both the act and the resulting injury are reasonably ascertainable by the injured person.

Section 60-513 generally gives wrongful-death and medical-malpractice claims a two-year limitations period tied to when the injury is reasonably ascertainable, and gives fraud claims two years from when the fraud is discovered; reasonable investigation can trigger accrual.

Bonura v. Sifers · filed 2008-05-02(a)(5), (b), and (c); (a)(4) and (c); (a)(3)

Regardless of the nature of the underlying claim, a wrongful death action is subject to a 2-year statute of limitations. K.S.A. 60-513(a)(5). Generally, the limitations period starts when the “fact of injuiy” is “reasonably ascertainable.” Moreover, the “fact of injury” generally means the date of death. ... Nevertheless, the commencement of the limitations period may be tolled until the fact of the death or the wrongful nature of the death becomes reasonably ascertainable. K.S.A. 60-513(b) and (c). ... A medical malpractice claim is subject to the same 2-year limitations period and discovery rule discussed in the analysis of the wrongful death claim. See K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) and (c). ... K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3) provides that an action for fraud must be brought within 2 years but that “the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the fraud is discovered.” Our Supreme Court has interpreted “discovered” to mean that a cause of action for fraud accrues when the defrauded party possesses actual or constructive notice of the fraud or when, with reasonable diligence, the fraud could have been discovered.

Section 60-513(b) delays accrual until the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable when the injury was not reasonably ascertainable at the time of the act.

Spicer v. New Image International, Inc. · filed 2006-08-18(b)

Under K.S.A. § 60 — 513(b), an action accrues when “the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.” The Kansas Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to mean that the statute of limitations starts to run “at the time a negligent act causes injury if both the act and the resulting injury are reasonably ascertainable by the injured person.”

Section 60-513(a)(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Worrell v. Bruce · filed 2008-10-15(a)(4)

As the district court noted, the limitations period for a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is borrowed from the pertinent state statute of limitations, in this case the two-year period specified in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4).

Subsection (a)(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for these Kansas § 1983 claims.

Mitchell v. Langley · filed 2006-03-31(a)(4)

In this case, Kansas’s two-year statute of limitations, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4), applies.

Section 60-513(a)(7) gives medical-negligence plaintiffs two years from the injury or its reasonable ascertainability to sue.

Smith v. Graham · filed 2006-12-08(a)(7)

Medical negligence actions must be brought within 2 years of the date of injury or die date the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to tire injured party. K.S.A. 60-513(a)(7), (c). ... Smith filed her Memorandum Requesting Medical Malpractice Screening Panel on April 24, 2001, within the 2-year statute of limitations period. ... Her second petition was filed well beyond the 30 days tolled by K.S.A. 65-4908 and well past the 2-year statute of hmitations under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(7). As such, her second petition was untimely.

Section 60-513(a)(4) requires a negligence action to be brought within two years, applying the applicable rules for when the action is commenced.

Underhill v. Thompson · filed 2007-05-25(a)(4)

Under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4), a negligence action must be brought within 2 years.

For a medical-malpractice claim, the limitations period begins when it is reasonably ascertainable that an injury may have been caused by the provider's negligence, even if the full extent of the legally recoverable injury is not yet known.

Brock v. Gatz · filed 2007-06-04(c)

Hecht and Cleveland, therefore, stand for the proposition that under Kansas law it is not enough to start the statute of limitations running that it is reasonably ascertainable to a party that he or she has sustained an injury. Instead it must be reasonably ascertainable that an injury has been sustained that may have been caused by some negligent act or omission of the defendant such that legal recovery is possible. But the full extent of that legally recoverable injury need not be known.

Section 60-513 gives fraud claims a two-year limitations period that begins at actual or reasonably diligent discovery, and medical-negligence claims a two-year period from injury or reasonable ascertainability plus a four-year repose period; fraudulent concealment may support equitable estoppel to those defenses.

Culp v. TIMOTHY M. SIFERS, MD, PA · filed 2007-02-04(a)(3), (a)(7), (c)

In Kansas, a fraud claim has a two-year statute of limitations. K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(3). The claim does not accrue “until the fraud is discovered.” ... Under Kansas law, fraud is discovered at the time of actual discovery or when, with reasonable diligence, the fraud could have been discovered. ... Mere suspicion of wrongdoing will not suffice where the plaintiff foregoes further investigation by virtue of having been lulled into confidence by the offending party. ... The issue of when a plaintiff discovered or should have discovered alleged fraud is a question of fact. ... Medical negligence actions must be brought within two years of the date of injury or the date the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party. ... Additionally, no such action shall be commenced more than four years “beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action.” ... This creates a four-year statute of repose on medical malpractice actions. ... Similarly, here, the record raises a genuine issue of fact concerning whether Dr. Sifers should be equitably estopped from raising the defenses of the statute of limitation and the statute of repose on the grounds that his own fraudulent conduct and misrepresentation resulted in the delay in plaintiff discovering that he performed the wrong bariatric surgery on her.

Subsection (c) imposes a four-year outside limit on actions arising from a health care provider’s rendering or failure to render professional services, including wrongful-death and personal-injury actions.

Natalini v. Little · filed 2006-02-28(c)

The applicable Kansas statute of limitations provides that a cause of action “arising out of the rendering or the failure to render professional services by a health care provider” may not, in any event, be commenced “more than four years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action.” K.S.A. 60-513(c). This language applies to both wrongful death actions and personal injury actions, so long as they arise out of the rendering of or the failure to render professional services by a health care provider.

Section 60-513(a)(4) gives tort claims a two-year limitations period, measured here from the accident, so the claim had to be filed by July 13, 2005.

Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. PROGRESSIVE DIRECT INS., CO. · filed 2008-08-22(a)(4)

In light of the 2-year statute of limitations for torts, Farm Bureau had until July 13, 2005, to bring a timely action against Binkley. See K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4).

Section 60-513(b)'s two-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff suffers substantial injury, meaning damages recoverable under Restatement § 552B principles.

First State Bank v. DANIEL AND ASSOCIATES, PC · filed 2007-10-18(b)

Specifically, the court has ruled as a matter of law that the bank suffered “substantial injury” within the meaning of K.S.A. § 60-513(b) so as to trigger the running of the statute of limitations when it suffered damages that would be recoverable under the principles set forth in the Restatement § 552B.

Section 60-513(a)(4) gives tort-based legal-malpractice claims a two-year limitations period, and subsection (b) delays accrual until substantial injury occurs or the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Moss v. Mamalis · filed 2006-07-14(a)(4), (b)

Nevertheless, the determination of the accrual date for a cause of action in tort is governed by K.S.A. 60-513. ... The term “substantial injury” means an injury for which a legal action lies. ... It is knowledge of the fact of an actionable injury, not the extent, which triggers the statute of limitations. ... Under the damage theory, a cause of action does not accrue until the negligent representation has caused a legally cognizable injury to the client. ... Because a cause of action for legal malpractice did not accrue until the plaintiff was injured by being erroneously assigned to serve a postrelease supervision term, the 2-year statute of limitations did not run until September 21, 2003.

Subsection (a) provides a two-year limitations period for conversion and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims, with accrual under the discovery rule depending on when the injury became reasonably ascertainable.

Doll v. Chicago Title Insurance · filed 2007-12-06(a)

In this case, plaintiffs’ conversion and breach of fiduciary duty claims are governed by a two-year statute of limitations, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a). ... Application of the statute of limitations and the discovery rule involves the consideration of facts unique to each class member.

Section 60-513 gives personal injury claims a two-year statute of limitations, measured here from the date of the accident.

Estate of Norris ex rel. Norris v. Hastings · filed 2006-09-01

This case involves a personal injury claim against the defendant. The statute of limitations on such a claim is 2 years. K.S.A. 60-513. Because the incident on which the claim is based occurred on April 27, 2000, plaintiff s civil action must have “commenced” prior to April 27, 2002, or somehow x'elate back to a date prior to April 27, 2002, in order to have been timely filed.

Section 60-513(a)(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Kansas.

Bernal v. Kline · filed 2006-04-25(a)(4)

“In civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we apply the applicable state statute of limitations.” ... In this case, Kansas’s two-year statute of limitations applies. See Laurino, 220 F.3d at 1216. The dispositive question for this appeal is when, exactly, the two-year limitations period began to run. We agree with the district court that it began to run on October 14, 2002, and therefore the filing deadline for the present action was October 14, 2004.

Section 60-513(a)(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims arising in Kansas.

Wolters v. Smith · filed 2006-02-22(a)(4)

Mr. Wolters’s Bivens claims are “subject to the statute of limitations of the general personal injury statute in the state where the action arose.” ... In Kansas, that time period is two years. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4). Because the alleged assault in Count One and related incidents in Count Three occurred two-and-a-half years prior to the filing of this complaint, the District Court dismissed that portion of Mr. Wolters’s suit as time-barred.

Under § 60-513(c), a medical-malpractice claim accrues when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable, even if the plaintiff does not yet know negligence caused it; the plaintiff then must investigate possible negligence.

Berndt v. Kramer · filed 2007-09-18(c)

Furthermore, when the plaintiff has reason to know the injury is permanent, the cause of action accrues even if the plaintiff does not know that a negligent act caused the injury.