Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513

For these beneficiaries' claims, § 60-513's two-year limitations period did not bar claims based on concealed wrongdoing because the wrongful acts and resulting injury were not ascertained until the plaintiffs' investigation.

Gillespie v. Seymour · filed 1991-12-17

Defendants contend that K.S.A. 60-513 bars any claims arising from acts occurring more than two years prior to the filing of the action herein. ... The gravamen of the claims before us is that the defendants misapplied the Trust's investments by overcharging the Trust for drilling expenses and improperly allocating oil and gas interests to it. ... The trial court's determination that Gillespie had no knowledge of Seymour's "finagling" is supported by substantial competent evidence and, accordingly, cannot be disturbed upon appeal. So, even if Gillespie's knowledge could have triggered the running of the statute of limitations and plaintiffs are bound thereby, she did not have such knowledge. ... Under the trial court's findings, the concealed finagling only came to light upon plaintiffs' 1987 and 1988 investigation of the Arrowhead investments. At that time the wrongful acts and the resultant injury were ascertained.

Under subsection (b), fraudulent concealment tolls the 10-year repose period for fraud until the fraud is discovered; under subsection (c), a malpractice defendant is equitably estopped from invoking the applicable limitation or repose defense when the defendant's concealment caused the delay in discovery.

Robinson v. Shah · filed 1997-04-18(b) and (c)

We hold that the plaintiff has pled a valid cause of action for fraud against the defendant and that the fraudulent concealment of the defendant tolled both the 2-year statute of limitations and the 10-year statute of repose relating to causes of action for fraud until such time as the fraud was discovered by the plaintiff. ... We hold that the defendant in a malpractice case cannot take advantage of a defense based on the statute of limitations or the statute of repose where the defendant's own fraudulent concealment has resulted in the delay in discovering the defendant's wrongful actions.

Section 60-513(b)'s ten-year provision runs from the defendant's wrongful act rather than injury or accrual, operates as a substantive statute of repose, and may be unavailable when the parties stipulate to another state's substantive law.

Menne v. Celotex Corp. · filed 1989-09-13(b)

However, the court concludes that the general defense provided by K.S.A. 60-513(b) is not available to the defendants in the present case. The ten-year provision contained in K.S.A. 60-513(b) represents a statute of repose rather than a statute of limitation, and thus a substantive rule of law. Thus, the defendants’ stipulation to apply Nebraska substantive law precludes the use of K.S.A. 60-513(b) as a defense in the present action.

Section 60-513(c)'s four-year repose period does not bar a second action under § 60-518 when the initial medical-malpractice action was timely filed, including when screening-panel tolling made it timely.

See v. Hartley · filed 1995-06-02(c)

We conclude that once an action is timely filed under the provisions of a so-called ordinary statute of limitations or within the applicable time limitations of a repose statute, such as K.S.A. 60-513(b) or (c), the action is then subject to the savings provision of K.S.A. 60-518. ... In the instant case the original action, although filed more than two years after the cause of action arose, was timely filed because of the tolling provision of K.S.A. 65-4908. The first action, having been timely filed, was subject to the savings provision of K.S.A. 60-518, and therefore the second action was also timely and not barred by K.S.A. 60-513(c).

Subsection (a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for an action for injury to another's rights that does not arise on contract and is not otherwise enumerated.

Ast v. Mesker · filed 2020-12-23(a)(4)

We also find, contrary to the assertions of Ast and Hoag, that K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) is not applicable to a claim arising out of the creation or amendment of a revocable living trust. On its face, K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) establishes a two-year statute of limitations for "[a]n action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated." (Emphasis added.) A trust agreement is—by definition—a contract. See Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 Yale L.J. 625, 627 (1995). As such, because this action arises out of a revocable trust agreement or contract, K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) does not apply.

For a medical-malpractice claim, if the injury was not reasonably ascertainable when the act occurred, the limitations period begins when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable, and whether that date has arrived can be a question of fact.

Fehrenbacher v. Quackenbush · filed 1991-03-06(c)

The sole issue presented by this portion of Quackenbush’s motion for summary judgment is whether Fehrenbacher brought his cause of action within two years of the date at which his injuries were reasonably ascertainable. The court, having reviewed the submitted portions of the depositions, concludes that the issue of whether Fehrenbacher’s injuries were reasonably ascertainable is a question of fact and is not amenable to summary adjudication.

For medical-malpractice claims, the limitations period begins when substantial injury occurs or when the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable; conflicting evidence about accrual is for the trier of fact.

Jones v. Neuroscience Associates, Inc., P.A. · filed 1992-02-28(a)(7) and (c)

Under K.S.A. 60-513(c), a cause of action in medical malpractice does not accrue until such time as substantial injury results from the alleged act of malpractice or until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable. Where there is conflicting evidence as to when a cause of action for medical malpractice is deemed to have accrued under K.S.A. 60-513(c), the matter becomes an issue for determination by the trier of fact.

Section 60-513(b) generally starts the limitations period for a legal-malpractice claim when the underlying litigation is finally determined, unless the injury and its connection to the attorney's negligence are reasonably ascertainable earlier.

Ranier v. Stuart and Freida, PC · filed 1994-11-08(b)

In a legal malpractice action in which there is underlying litigation which may be determinative of the alleged negligence of the attorney, the better rule, and the one which generally will be applicable under K.S.A. 60-513(b), is that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the underlying litigation is finally determined. Ordinarily, as long as there is a good faith dispute, a layperson could not reasonably be expected to know that the dispute was caused by his attorney's negligence and the mere filing of an underlying lawsuit would not automatically trigger the running of the statute but would usually require a final determination of the action. However, the rule that underlying litigation must be finally determined before the statute of limitations begins to run cannot be arbitrarily applied in every case.

For a health-care claim, § 60-513(c) generally starts accrual when the act occurs, but delays accrual until the injury is reasonably ascertainable if that occurs later, subject to a four-year outer limit.

Downey v. United States · filed 1999-12-01(c)

Under Kansas law, a cause of action arising from the provision of or failure to provide health care services accrues at the time of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action, unless the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act. If the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until a later time, then the cause of action accrues when it becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party. However, this date cannot extend more than four years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action. K.S.A. 60-513(c). ... Under these circumstances, while the issue is very close even on summary judgment, the court shall decline to hold as a matter of law that plaintiffs claim accrued more than two years before he filed his administrative claim.

Section 60-513(a)(7) requires a medical-negligence action to be commenced within two years, while subsection (c) imposes a four-year statute of repose.

Ternes v. GALICHIA · filed 2010-06-11(a)(7), (c)

In this context, Temes was required to commence his lawsuit for medical negligence within 2 years. K.S.A. 60-513(a)(7). ... The statute of repose applicable in this medical negligence cause of action is 4 years. Meaning Temes had until March 5, 2008, to commence any lawsuit arising from Galichia’s negligence. Temes’ second lawsuit was filed on May 23, 2008, after the expiration of the statute of repose. See K.S.A. 60-513(c). ... In our view then, since we hold the first lawsuit was timely commenced because Galichia waived the statute of limitations affirmative defense, the saving statute, K.S.A. 60-518, bars the dismissal of the second lawsuit for being untimely due to either the statute of limitations or the statute of repose.

For medical-malpractice negligence, § 60-513(a)(7) provides a two-year limitations period, but under subsection (c) accrual is delayed until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable when that is later than the occurrence.

Hinnergardt v. Hoover · filed 2021-03-29(a)(7), (c)

Under Kansas law, the statute of limitations for negligence due to medical malpractice is two years. K.S.A. 60-513(a)(7). ... A negligence claim based on medical malpractice is deemed to accrue at the time of the occurrence, “unless the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.” K.S.A. 60-513(c). ... Determining when the fact of an injury is reasonably ascertainable is a fact-specific inquiry, and the trier of fact must decide the issue when the parties present conflicting evidence.

Subsection (b) imposes an absolute 10-year limit, measured from the act giving rise to the cause of action, for filing a negligence action.

Dobson v. Larkin Homes, Inc. · filed 1992-05-22(b)

We hold the Dobsons’ cause of action is barred by the 10-year limitation found in K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 60-513(b).

Section 60-513(b) starts the limitations period when the injury and its cause become reasonably ascertainable, but its ten-year clause generally operates as a statute of repose, subject to the latent-disease exception.

Koch v. Shell Oil Co. · filed 1993-03-18(b)

The court agrees, on the basis of K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 60-513(b) alone, that plaintiffs tort claim would be time-barred by the statute of repose, even assuming plaintiff could not have reasonably ascertained the cause of the injury prior to the end of the 10-year period. ... The previously cited cases make clear that for purposes of K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 60 — 513(b), the determination of when the plaintiff could have reasonably ascertained his injury and the injury’s cause is a question of fact for the jury.

Subsection (a)(4) covers noncontract injury claims, and subsection (b) makes the ten-year repose period run from the defendant’s wrongful act, which may be the manufacture of a defective replacement part.

Arnold v. Riddell, Inc. · filed 1994-04-05(a)(4) (b)

Furthermore, the parties agree that the statute requires the action to be brought within ten years of when the defendant committed the wrongful act which gives rise to the lawsuit. K.S.A. § 60-513(b). This is an absolute limitation. ... Therefore, plaintiffs allege that defendant committed a wrongful act in the manufacture of those pads. At the earliest, then, the statute of repose commenced to run in 1982, when the top pads were manufactured. This action, brought in 1990, is therefore timely under K.S.A. § 60-513.

Subsection (b) imposes an outside ten-year limit measured from the act giving rise to the cause of action, even if the injury or claim accrues later.

Kerns Ex Rel. Kerns v. G.A.C., Inc. · filed 1994-05-27(b)

A statute of repose limits the time during which a cause of action can arise and usually runs from an act of the alleged tortfeasor. A statute of repose abolishes the cause of action after the passage of time, even though the cause of action may not have yet accrued. By contrast, a statute of limitations extinguishes the right to prosecute an accrued cause of action after a period of time. K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 60-513 contains both a statute of limitations, subsection (a), and a statute of repose, subsection (b). ... K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 60-513(b) states the causes of action listed shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party, but in no event shall an action be commenced more than 10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action. ... The trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on 60-513(b).

Section 60-513(b)'s general ten-year statute of repose withstands the constitutional challenge raised in this case.

prod.liab.rep. (Cch) P 14,215 Charles G. Koch v. Shell Oil Company and Feed Specialties Co., Inc. · filed 1995-04-13(b)

If Mr. Koch’s constitutional broadside is to be so read, we reject it. The Kansas Supreme Court has upheld the statute of repose.

Section 60-513 provides a two-year limitations period for conversion and injury to another’s rights, while its ten-year statute of repose applies to claims under subsections (a)(2) and (a)(4) but not fraud claims under subsection (a)(3).

Hemphill v. Shore · filed 2010-09-24(a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), and (b)

“Hemphill’s claim for conversion is barred by the 2-year statute of limitations period contained in K.S.A. 60-513(a)(2) or by the 10-year statute of repose period under K.S.A. 60-513(b). Moreover, Hemphill’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty is barred by the 10-year statute of repose period contained in K.S.A. 60-513(b). ... K.S.A. 60-513(b) states that certain causes of action, including those sounding in negligence, “shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury... but in no event shall an action be commenced more than 10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action.” Although Hemphill correctly points out that this 10-year statute of repose is not applicable to claims sounding in fraud under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3), there is no such limitations with respect to its application to claims arising under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(2) and (a)(4), as in the present case. Based on Hemphill’s second amended petition that Jay breached his fiduciary duty and converted the assets of the Trust in 1992 or 1993, the 10-year statute of repose under K.S.A. 60-513(b) commenced to run, at the latest, by 1993, giving Hemphill until 2003 to present the previously mentioned claims against Jay. Because he failed to do so, these claims are also time barred by the statute of repose.”

Subsection (b) bars an action subject to the two-year limitation from being commenced more than ten years after the act giving rise to the cause of action.

Karlin v. Paul Revere Life Insurance · filed 2010-09-24(b)

K.S.A. § 60-513(b) provides, however, that “in no event shall an action [subject to the two-year statute of limitation] be commenced more than 10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action.” This ten year statute of repose “require[s] a negligence action to be brought within 10 years of the wrongful act.”

Section 60-513 imposes a two-year period for specified injury actions and an absolute ten-year limit running from the act giving rise to the cause of action, with accrual rules for when substantial injury or ascertainable injury occurs.

Stonebarger v. Union Pacific Railroad · filed 2015-01-05(a), (b)

To determine if the statute of repose is applicable, it must be decided when the act giving rise to the cause of action occurred. ... Accordingly, although the Court acknowledges that the application of. the statute of repose is a question of law, it cannot decide that question upon the summary judgment record before it. Summary judgment is denied on this defense.

Section 60-513(b) bars tort actions more than 10 years after the act giving rise to the cause of action, even if the cause of action has not yet accrued.

Kaminski v. United States · filed 2016-11-03(b)

The Kansas statute of repose bars negligence claims that are premised on acts that occurred more than 10 years before the initiation of a lawsuit. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60—513(b) provides that tort actions “in no event shall.. .be commenced more than 10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(b). The Kansas Supreme Court has explained that the statute of repose “usually runs from an act of a defendant” and “abolishes the cause of action after the passage of time even though the cause of action may not have yet accrued.” Harding v. K.C. Wall Prods., Inc., 250 Kan. 655, 831 P.2d 958, 967 (1992). ... Because a reasonable jury could conclude from the facts here that defendant made changes to the northwest downspout and the drainage conditions on that side of the building within the last 10 years, the statute of repose does not bar plaintiffs negligence claim to the extent he alleges that he slipped on ice that was created by water draining from the northwest downspout onto the sidewalk.

Section 60-513(b) bars an action more than 10 years after the act giving rise to the cause of action, even if the injury was not reasonably ascertainable earlier.

Kastner v. Intrust Bank · filed 2014-06-24(b)

These claims were premised on alleged wrongful conduct concerning the 1996 creation and execution of the trust agreement, yet Kastner’s suit was filed fourteen years after execution of the trust agreement. Consequently, the court held these claims were barred by the ten-year statute of repose under § 60-513(b). We agree.

Under subsection (b), a cause of action arising from breach of an ongoing duty is barred by the statute of repose only if 10 years have passed since the defendant last breached that duty.

Bonnette v. Triple D Auto Parts Inc. · filed 2017-12-15(b)

Our present case does not involve a claim of liability for improper construction or design of the premises. Causes of action related to the breach of an ongoing duty, such as failure to warn of a nonopen and nonobvious dangerous condition, are abolished by the statute of repose only if 10 years have passed since the defendant last breached the ongoing duty.

Subsection (b) bars an action more than 10 years after the act giving rise to the cause of action, extinguishing the claim even if it has not accrued or the plaintiff has not yet been injured.

Fahey v. Fahey · filed 2018-04-13(b)

The statute of repose provides that notwithstanding the statute of limitations, "in no event shall an action be commenced more than 10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 60-513(b). ... The 10-year statutory period begins to run when the defendant completes the last act giving rise to the cause of action. Klose v. Wood Valley Racquet Club, Inc., 267 Kan. 164, 167-68, 975 P.2d 1218 (1999). ... Once the 10-year period of repose has run, claims against the party are extinguished even if an action has not yet otherwise accrued and even if the plaintiff has not yet been injured. See 267 Kan. at 168. ... Accordingly, even if Nancy were able to legally and factually prove her claims, her claims are barred by the 10-year statute of repose.

Section 60-513(b)'s general 10-year statute of repose does not bar a product-liability suit when the exceptions in K.S.A. § 60-3303(b)(2)(D) apply, even if the harm was caused less than 10 years after delivery.

Ehrenfelt v. Janssen Pharmaceuticals · filed 2018-06-11(b)

In sum, the Tenth Circuit has answered the question before us. Its interpretation of an ambiguous statute is supported by state caselaw. We therefore defer to our sister circuit’s interpretation and hold that the exceptions in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3303(b)(2)(D) apply even when the harm was caused less than ten years after delivery. The general statute of repose in § 60-513 does not operate to bar Ehrenfelt’s suit.

Subsection (c) imposes a four-year statute of repose on actions arising from a health care provider’s rendering or failure to render professional services, and the court held it applies to all of plaintiff’s claims, including outrage and battery.

Doe T.G. v. United State of America Reminder to Counsel: Case Consolidated for Discovery All Non-Di · filed 2019-10-29(c)

First, Wisner was a health care provider, making § 60-513(c) applicable. ... Second, § 60-513(c) applies to all of plaintiff’s claims, including outrage and battery. ... Third, the FTCA administrative process tolls the statute of repose. ... And fourth, equitable estoppel does not further toll the statute of repose.

Section 60-513(b) imposes a ten-year statute of repose measured from the act giving rise to a tort claim, regardless of when the claim accrues or the injury is discovered.

Black v. Union Pacific Railroad Company · filed 2024-04-12(b)

As evident from § 60-513(b), statutes of repose run not from the time a cause of action accrues but rather from “the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action.” Therefore, statutes of repose may “abolish[] a cause of action even if it has not yet accrued.”

Section 60-513(c) imposes an absolute four-year repose period running from the act giving rise to the claim, and the court held that equitable estoppel does not prevent its application here.

Zeiner v. United States of America, Department of Veteran's Affairs · filed 2025-03-19(c)

The statutory language states that “in no event shall such an action be commenced more than four years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action.” K.S.A. § 60-513(c). Moreover, the Tenth Circuit has held, “because a statute of repose creates a substantive right in those protected to be free from liability after a legislatively-determined period of time, it is not subject to equitable tolling or equitable estoppel.” Fulghum v. Embarq Corp., 785 F.3d 395, 416 (10th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). This is a substantive law that clearly indicates the legislature intended that all causes of action would expire after four years. C.f. Doe, 55 Kan. App. 2d at 20. The court will not apply equitable estoppel to prevent application of the statute of repose in this negligence case.

Section 60-513(c) imposes a four-year statute of repose on an action arising out of rendering or failure to render professional services by a health care provider, even when some alleged negligent actors were not themselves health care providers, and the repose period is not preempted by the FTCA.

Chadwell v. United States of America, The · filed 2025-04-21(c)

“Under 60-513(c), a “cause of action arising out of the rendering of or the failure to render professional services by a health care provider” is subject to the four-year statute of repose. ... Therefore, the court finds that the appropriate statute of repose for the wrongful death claim is § 60-513(c) because it arises out of rendering of or failure to render professional services by a provider. ... Therefore, the court finds that the statute of repose is not preempted by the FTCA.”

Section 60-513(b) bars an action more than ten years after the act giving rise to the cause of action, and a subsequently enacted reviver statute cannot retroactively defeat a vested repose defense.

prod.liab.rep. (Cch) P 12,973 Larry D. Waller v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp. John Crane, Inc. Carlock, Inc. Celotex Corporation: And Carey-Canada, Inc. · filed 1991-10-21(b)

That statute provides that “in no event shall an action be commenced more than 10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action.” ... The right to the defense provided by that statute was therefore vested. Accordingly, under Kansas law as articulated in Jackson, the subsequently enacted reviver statute, effective May 16, 1990, could not operate retroactively to defeat that vested defense.

Section 60-513(b) sets a 10-year statute of repose that the continuous representation rule does not toll.

Morrison v. Watkins · filed 1995-01-27(b)

Because K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 60-513(b) is a statute of repose rather than a statute of limitations, the continuous representation rule does not toll the time for those complained-of actions which occurred more than 10 years before filing of the suit.

Section 60-513(b) requires a negligence action to be brought within 10 years of the wrongful act, even if the injury is immediately ascertainable.

Klose Ex Rel. Klose v. Wood Valley Racquet Club, Inc. · filed 1999-04-16(b)

Since being amended to its present version, the statute has been held to require a negligence action to be brought within 10 years of the wrongful act. ... Thus, the district court’s application of 60-513(b) as a bar to Klose’s action is correct.

Section 60-513(b)’s ten-year statute of repose bars a tort claim when the claimant cannot establish that the latent disease exception applies.

Koch v. Shell Oil Co. · filed 1993-05-13(b)

As the court has previously held in denying summary judgment to Feed Specialties, plaintiffs claims would be time-barred on the basis of the ten-year statute of repose in K.S.A. 60-513(b), if that statute applies to plaintiffs claims. ... Because the court has determined as a matter of law that Rabón is not a “harmful material” for purposes of K.S.A.1992 Supp. ... 60-3303(d), plaintiff may not invoke the statutory exception to the ten-year statute of repose in K.S.A. 60-513(b).

Section 60-513(b) accrues a claim when the wrongful act causes substantial injury or the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable, and both the injury and wrongful act must be reasonably ascertainable.

Comeau v. Rupp · filed 1992-10-29(b)

Under this statute, the action accrues when “the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or ... [when] the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party____” K.S.A. § 60-513(b). ... It is not only the injury, but also the wrongful act that must be “reasonably ascertainable” before the action accrues. ... Actual knowledge, however, and not mere suspicion of a wrong is required to trigger the running of the Kansas statute, and the action does not accrue during that time when the plaintiff has been lulled into confidence to forego further investigation.

Section 60-513 generally imposes a two-year limitations period for tort claims, with fraud or misrepresentation claims accruing upon actual or reasonably diligent discovery and other tort claims accruing upon reasonably ascertainable injury.

Mid Kansas Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n Ex Rel. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Orpheum Theater Co. · filed 1992-11-24

The court will first consider whether cross-claimants complied with the two-year statute of limitations on their tort claims, found at K.S.A. 60-513. ... A cause of action in fraud or misrepresentation accrues when the fraud is actually discovered or when, with reasonable diligence, the fraud could have been discovered. ... As for the other tort claims, these causes of action accrue when there is a reasonably ascertainable injury. Therefore, the cross-claim defendants’ statement that the statute of limitations began to run when the cross-claimants invested in the limited partnership is incorrect. ... Again, there is a genuine factual dispute as to when the cross-claimants' causes of action accrued.

Section 60-513 provides a two-year limitations period for a tort-based negligent-entrustment claim.

Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc. v. Marshall · filed 1995-01-05

Mr. Germunson’s negligent entrustment claim against Miles is a tort based claim. Accordingly, the claim is subject to the two-year statute of limitations period provided in K.S.A. 60-513. In the present case, the vehicle was provided to Mr. Marshall on April 25, 1991. On April 27, 1991, Mr. Marshall and the occupants of the vehicle were involved in the accident for which Mr. Germunson now seeks a recovery against Miles. Mr. Germunson did not file his suit against Miles until June 30, 1994, which is well beyond the two-year statute of limitations period.

Section 60-513 starts fraud accrual when the fraud is discovered, conversion accrual when substantial injury appears or is reasonably ascertainable, and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress accrual when the injury and emotional impact occur.

Cline v. Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline, Inc. · filed 2005-02-18(a)(3), (a)(2), (a)(4), (b)

A claim based on fraud does’ not accrue “until the fraud is discovered.” K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(3). “Under Kansas law, a fraud is discovered at the time of actual discovery or when, with reasonable diligence, the fraud could have been discovered.” ... Second, “a cause of action in tort for conversion ... accrues when substantial injury first appears or when it becomes reasonably ascertainable.” ... K.S.A. § 60-513(b). ... Finally, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress accrues “on the date when the injury was incurred and the emotional impact was felt.”

A fraud claim accrues when the plaintiff discovers the fraud.

Enneking v. Schmidt Builders Supply Inc. · filed 2013-01-07(a)(3)

As with Plaintiffs’ negligence claim, the fraud claim accrued when the fraud was discovered in July 2011.

For tort claims, the two-year limitations period runs from when the act causes substantial, or actionable, injury; if the injury is not reasonably ascertainable until later, the period begins when it becomes reasonably ascertainable.

LCL, LLC v. Falen · filed 2017-02-17(a)(4), (b)

On appeal, the Falens do not dispute that their negligence claim is subject to the 2-year statute of limitations set forth in K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4). ... With limited exception, a tort action in Kansas is not deemed to accrue "until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury." K.S.A. 60-513(b). If, however, "the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party." K.S.A. 60-513(b). ... In construing the statute of limitations for tort actions, our Supreme Court consistently has interpreted the phrase "substantial injury" to mean "actionable injury." ... Because a cause of action does not accrue until all of the essential elements are satisfied, an injury allegedly caused by a defendant's negligence does not become actionable until the plaintiff sustains damages as a result of the injury.

A tort cause of action accrues when the act first causes substantial (actionable) injury, or, if the injury is not reasonably ascertainable then, when it becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Balmer Fund, Inc. v. City of Harper · filed 2018-02-16(b)

K.S.A. § 60-513(b) instructs that a cause of action for trespass upon real property, for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, and for an injury to the rights of another (not arising on contract or otherwise specifically enumerated) "shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then...[when] the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party."

Section 60-513(a) gives tort claims a two-year limitations period that begins when the injury is reasonably ascertainable through due diligence.

Kansas Public Employees Retirement System v. Blackwell · filed 1997-06-12(a)

To the contrary, Kansas law does not require that the plaintiff have ironclad actual knowledge about his injury, but rather that he have such notice as would permit him to discover the injury with the use of due diligence.

The two-year limitation period for a tort claim begins when actual damages result; pending proceedings that prevent suit postpone or toll the period.

Keith v. Schiefen-Stockham Insurance Agency, Inc. · filed 1972-06-10

Plaintiffs were effectively prevented from suing defendants until it was finally determined in Otta v. Johnson, supra, that insurance had not been procured, nor an election caused to be filed, and with respect to the action sounding in tort actual damages did not result until a final determination of those matters.

Section 60-513 starts the limitations period when an injury becomes substantial or reasonably ascertainable; discovering its precise cause later does not delay the period.

Uhock v. Sleitweiler · filed 1988-07-08(b)

When an act results in injury not immediately apparent to the injured party or when the injury is delayed for a period of time, the statute of limitations does not run from the date of the wrongful act, but begins to run when the injury is substantial or reasonably ascertainable. ... The trial court did not err in concluding that plaintiffs’ claim against third-party defendant Sherve was barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(b)’s limitations period for tax preparer malpractice begins when assessment of a negligence penalty first causes substantial injury.

Bick v. Peat Marwick & Main · filed 1990-09-21(b)

Assessment of the negligence penalty is the essential factor completing the wrong and the statute of limitations cannot commence until the tort complained of is completed.

Under § 60-513(c), the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable when the injured person knew or should have known of an injury caused by the defendant’s acts or omissions.

Asselin v. Shawnee Mission Medical Center, Inc. · filed 1995-10-25(c)

“Fact of injury” refers to the point in time when plaintiff knew or should have known he had an injury caused by defendant’s acts or omissions. ... On this record, taking all of plaintiffs relevant allegations as true, the Court cannot find that the fact of plaintiffs injury was reasonably ascertainable by January, 1993.

Section 60-513(a)(3) gives fraud actions a two-year limitations period that begins when the fraud is discovered.

Nash Finch Co. v. Caspar · filed 1993-02-04(a)(3)

K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3) provides that an action for relief on the ground of fraud shall be brought within two years, but the cause of action does not accrue until the fraud is discovered. Caspar filed his counterclaim well beyond the two year statute of limitation.

For fraud actions, the limitations period is two years after discovery, but the action cannot be commenced more than ten years after the fraudulent act.

Billinger v. Weinhold · filed 2013-09-04(a)(3)

Under Kansas law, although the limitation period for commencing a fraud action is two years from the time the fraud is discovered, no such action may be commenced more than ten years after the fraudulent act itself. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(3), (b). Because the alleged fraudulent act occurred more than ten years before the suit was commenced, it was time barred.

Subsection (a) supplies a two-year limitations period for the personal-injury claims governing § 1983 actions in Kansas.

Wooten-Newhouse v. Sedgwick County Adult Detention Facility · filed 2021-08-09(a)

In Kansas, such claims are governed by the two-year period in K.S.A. 60-513(a).

Section 60-513(a)(3) requires a fraud claim to be filed within two years after the plaintiff discovers the facts supporting it.

Richards v. Bryan · filed 1994-08-12(a)(3)

The filing of the present lawsuit three years later was untimely under K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 60-513(a)(3).

Section 60-513 sets a two-year limit for personal injury actions, subject to delayed ascertainment of injury, and a ten-year outer limit measured from the act giving rise to the claim.

Wayne v. Lederle Laboratories · filed 1989-04-10

In personal injury actions, K.S.A. § 60-513 applies a two-year limitation unless substantial injury or the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until more than two years after the wrongful conduct. However, even if injury or ascertainment occurs later, the lawsuit must be filed within ten years of “the act giving rise to the cause of action.”

Section 60-513(a)(4) applies only when no other limitations period covers the injury.

Burnett v. Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P. · filed 2007-02-02(a)(4)

This “catchall phrase” indicates that K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) should only apply if there is no other limitations period that encompasses the injury in question.

Section 60-513(a)(3) supplies the Kansas fraud limitations rule applicable to these claims, subject to federal tolling doctrines.

Seiffer v. Topsy's International, Inc. · filed 1980-03-19(a)(3)

As we have held in earlier orders, the Kansas statute of limitations for fraud [K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3)] and the federal tolling doctrines are applicable in this case.

Section 60-513's two-year limitations period is not extended by later acts that are not plausibly alleged to continue the original conspiracy.

Cochran v. City of Wichita, Kansas · filed 2019-06-28

The district court ruled that a two-year period of limitations exists, and Mr. Cochran does not argue to the contrary. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513. ... The officers’ alleged acts in 2016 thus cannot extend the limitations period.

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period for tort claims, and § 60-513(b) starts accrual when substantial injury occurs or, if not reasonably ascertainable then, when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Reich v. Braun · filed 1993-02-11(a)(4), (b)

For substantially the reasons stated in the district court's memorandum and order dated March 12, 1992, a copy of which is attached, we affirm the summary judgment granted to defendant. ... Plaintiff's malpractice action, based upon the alleged negligence of Braun in failing to obtain a release of liability for her as co-obligor on a promissory note to the FLB, is governed by the two-year statute of limitations provided in K.S.A.1990 Supp. 60-513(a)(4). K.S.A.1990 Supp. 60-513(b) provides that a cause of action based upon a tort accrues when: ... "[T]he act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party, ..." ... The language of K.S.A.1990 Supp. 60-513(b) establishes that the statute of limitations in a tort liability cause of action accrues when substantial injury occurs or when substantial injury is reasonably ascertainable after the negligent act. ... Therefore, on July 7, 1987, plaintiff could legally have filed suit against Braun and prosecuted her legal malpractice action to a successful conclusion. Thus, her cause of action against Braun accrued on that date and the statute of limitations began to run. Plaintiff's suit was filed January 5, 1990, more than two years after the cause of action accrued and, therefore, is barred by the statute of limitations.

For a legal-malpractice claim based on breach of a legal duty, subsection (a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period, beginning when the claim accrues; for this claim, accrual occurred when the plaintiff obtained post-sentencing relief correcting his illegal sentence.

Garcia v. Ball · filed 2015-12-31(a)(4)

Turning to the statute of limitations, Garcia's legal malpractice claim based on Ball's breach of a legal duty is governed by K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4), which provides for a 2-year statute of limitations. ... Here, Garcia obtained postconviction relief, and his legal malpractice claim accrued, on February 4, 2011, when the nunc pro tunc order correcting his illegal sentence was filed. Garcia filed his legal malpractice action on May 5, 2011, well within the 2-year statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, and subsection (b) starts that period when substantial injury occurs or the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Espinosa v. Allen · filed 2024-07-22(a)(4) (b)

To fill this gap, courts apply “the most analogous limitations period provided by state law.” ... In Kansas, that’s the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury torts. Id. (citing Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4)); ... The parties agree that Kansas’s two-year statute of limitations applies to these claims. ... Kansas’s statute also prescribes an accrual rule: [An action for injury to the rights of another] shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party[.] Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(b). ... This state accrual rule is the same as the federal accrual rule. ... So, plaintiff’s state law claims are time-barred for the same reason’s plaintiff’s federal claim is time-barred.

Section 60-513(b) delays the start of the limitations period until the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Boyle v. Harries · filed 1996-08-02(b)

In this case, the jury found that substantial injury to Mega was not reasonably ascertainable until October 1991. K.S.A. 60-513(b) specifically states: “[I]f the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.”

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year statute of limitations for tort actions.

Master Mortgage Investment Fund, Inc. v. American National Fire Insurance (In Re Master Mortgage Investment Fund, Inc.) · filed 1993-03-09(a)(4)

Master Mortgage has characterized all of the actions which are the subject of this summary judgment motion as tort actions. Since Kansas prescribes a two year statute of limitations for tort actions, Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(a)(4) (1991 Sup.), Master Mortgage’s original lawsuit was timely filed under the Kansas statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides the two-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions in Kansas.

McCue v. State of Kansas, Dept. of Human Resources · filed 1996-08-08(a)(4)

Kansas law specifies a two-year statute of limitations for actions “for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated.” Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(a)(4). Section 60-513(a)(4) is thus the applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 actions in Kansas.

Section 60-513(a) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, which governs § 1983 civil-rights claims in Kansas.

Ventris v. State of Kansas · filed 2013-06-11(a)

Kansas’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 60-513(a) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, including § 1983 claims brought in Kansas.

Jamerson v. Heimgartner · filed 2018-09-21(a)

“The forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs civil rights claims under . . . [42 U.S.C.] § 1983.” ... “Here, Kansas law sets the limitations period at two years. Id. (citing Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)).” ... “The two-year statute of limitations therefore ran in June 2012, long before he filed his complaint on November 22, 2017.”

Section 60-513(a)(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 personal-injury claims in Kansas.

Loggins (ID 63088) v. Norwood · filed 2020-01-15(a)(4)

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 action is “drawn from the personal-injury statute of the state in which the federal district court sits.” Id. In Kansas, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4). Federal law determines when a § 1983 claim accrues. Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006). Under federal law, a § 1983 cause of action accrues “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action when he “‘knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.’” Johnson v. Johnson Cty. Comm’n Bd., 925 F.2d 1299, 1301 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1980)). Here, plaintiff knew of his injury, i.e., his status as a sex offender, in 2003 when KDOC denied his override request. Under Kansas law, he had two years to bring a § 1983 claim based on that decision. Plaintiff filed his lawsuit January 25, 2018—some fifteen years after he had a “complete and present cause of action.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388. So, the statute of limitations on plaintiff’s individual capacity claims based on his sex offender status has expired.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Kansas.

Briscoe v. Johansen · filed 2020-02-14(a)(4)

This portion of the complaint is subject to dismissal due to plaintiff’s failure to file it within the two-year limitation period that applies to claims arising in Kansas filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute of limitations for a § 1983 action is “drawn from the personal-injury statute of the state in which the federal district court sits.” Mondragon v. Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 2008). In Kansas, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4).

Subsection (a)(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Kansas.

DeVilbiss v. Meade County, Kansas Board of County Commissioners · filed 2021-03-29(a)(4)

While Defendants admit Joshua’s Estate has standing, they pivot and argue the claims of the estate are barred by the statute of limitations. (Doc. 73 at 4, 9); see also Johnson v. Johnson Cty. Comm’n Bd., 925 F.2d 1299, 1301 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he appropriate statute of limitations for § 1983 actions arising in Kansas is two years, under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4).”). Joshua’s death occurred on August 28, 2017, which gave the estate until August 28, 2019 to assert any § 1983 claims. However, the Estate’s first attempt to assert its claims was the motion to amend filed April 24, 2020—almost eight months after the statute of limitations expired. ... Because “nothing in Rule 17(a) requires that the original plaintiff have capacity to sue” the proposed Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 67-1) corrects the standing issue raised by Defendants and is not subject to dismissal based on the statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(a) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury-based civil-rights claims in Kansas.

Livingston (ID 60787) v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County · filed 2023-11-02(a)

“The forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs civil rights claims under both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983. In Kansas, that is the two-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. § 60-513(a).” ... “Plaintiff moved to add Jane and John Doe defendants on October 4, 2023, which is beyond the applicable two-year statute of limitations.”

Subsection (a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on tort actions, including the § 1983 claims addressed here.

Shanklin v. Kansas, State of · filed 2024-10-29(a)(4)

The events which led to this lawsuit appear to have taken place in Kansas, where the applicable statute of limitations period for § 1983 claims is two years. See Snodgrass v. City of Wichita, No. 123,486, 2022 WL 982008, at *6 (Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2022) (citing K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) limiting tort actions to two-years).

Subsection (a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions in Kansas, which applies to federal civil-rights claims under §§ 1983 and 1985.

Moore v. Hebert · filed 2024-06-11(a)(4)

Federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions to claims asserted under §§ 1983 and 1985. ... In Kansas, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years.

Subsection (a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims seeking redress for injury to personal rights, subject to Kansas’s accompanying tolling rules.

Lyman v. Geary County, Kansas, Board of Commissioners · filed 2025-10-08(a)(4)

As most § 1983 actions are actions for injury to a personal right, courts “apply the statute of limitations applicable for personal injury actions in the state where the claim accrued.” ... That precedent requires this Court to apply Kansas’s two-year statute of limitations and Kansas’s accompanying tolling rules to this action.

For a product-liability claim alleging defective replacement padding, the act giving rise to the claim occurs no sooner than manufacture of the padding, and subsection (b) does not apply when an exception to the Kansas Product Liability Act's statute of repose applies.

Arnold v. Riddell, Inc. · filed 1995-03-24(a)(4) and (b)

The court holds, as it held before trial, that because the plaintiffs allege a defect in the helmet padding, the act giving rise to the cause of action occurred no sooner than when the padding was manufactured. The court rejects defendant’s argument that the date of the helmet shell's manufacture controls. ... The crown padding in J.R. Arnold’s helmet was manufactured in 1982 and was installed as part of a periodic reconditioning and recertification process in either 1983 or 1986. Therefore, this action, commenced in 1990, is timely under K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4) and (b). ... Furthermore, the Kansas Supreme Court has held that K.S.A. § 60-513(b) does not apply in product liability actions that involve exceptions to the statute of repose found in the Kansas Product Liability Act. ... As discussed below, this is such a ease.

Section 60-513's limitations period depends on when reasonable inquiry would have revealed the injury, and a genuine factual dispute about that timing precludes summary judgment.

Schmidt v. Farm Credit Services, Formerly D/B/A Federal Land Bank of Wichita and Schmidt C & R Co., Inc. · filed 1992-10-13

The laches and statute of limitations defenses raise similar factual questions. The doctrine of laches is based not on mere delay, but delay that works to the disadvantage of another party. ... The tolling of the statute of limitations also involves the question, of reasonableness. As Farm Credit itself points out, the time from which the statute of limitations runs depends on when reasonable inquiry would have uncovered .the injury. ... When there is a genuine dispute as to when an injury was reasonably ascertainable summary judgment is precluded.

Section 60-513(c) delays accrual of a medical-malpractice claim until the injury is reasonably ascertainable when it was not ascertainable at the time of the act, subject to a four-year outside limit.

Thurston v. Page · filed 1996-07-09(a)(7), (c)

K.S.A. § 60-513(c) governs the accrual of a medical malpractice action: ... A cause of action arising out of the rendering of or the failure to render professional services by a health care provider shall be deemed to have accrued at the time of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action, unless the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitations shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party, but in no event shall such an action be commenced more than four years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action. ... “Fact of injury” refers to the point in time when plaintiff knew or should have known she had an injury caused by defendant’s acts or omissions. ... The court concludes that on the state of the record now before it, the court is unable to determine whether plaintiffs alleged injuries were reasonably ascertainable on the day that Dr. Galbraith treated plaintiff. Defendant has not set forth sufficient uncontroverted facts in support of his motion to enable the court to make such a determination. Defendant’s motion is denied.

Section 60-513(a)(4) gives two years for these tort claims, and subsection (b) starts accrual when substantial injury occurs or, if not reasonably ascertainable then, when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable; permanent, determinable flood damages must be claimed together.

Isnard v. City of Coffeyville · filed 1996-05-31(a)(4) and (b)

Under McAlister, the Isnards’ claims for all damages, past, present, and future, should have been brought in one action within 2 years of the time when those damages were capable of being determined.

Section 60-513(a)(2), together with the discovery rule in subsection (b), gives conversion claims a two-year limitations period running when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Nash Oil & Gas, Inc. · filed 2008-05-19(a)(2), (b)

In Kansas, the statute of limitations for conversion is two years. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(2). Under the so-called “discovery rule,” a cause of action for conversion accrues when the “fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.” ... Although Northern may not have known to a certainty that the gas was storage gas, it is clear that such fact was capable of being known to Northern at that time. Thus, Northern’s injury was reasonably ascertainable by 2000 at the latest, and the claims for conversion and unjust enrichment, which were filed in 2004, are untimely.

Section 60-513(a)(2) gives breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims a two-year limitations period, which under subsection (b) begins when substantial injury occurs or the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable; when that point is factually disputed, the trier of fact decides it.

Denny v. Crump · filed 2016-07-22(a)(2) and (b)

An action for breach of fiduciary duty is subject to a 2-year statute of limitations under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(2). ... The statute of limitations does not accrue until either substantial injury occurs or the injury suffered becomes reasonably ascertainable. ... The central issue here is whether the district court or the trier of fact should decide when Denney's injury became reasonably ascertainable. ... In short, we are persuaded that it was error for the district court to conclude, as a matter of law, that there could not be a reasonable dispute about when Denney had knowledge of Crump's depletion of funds. We believe this is an issue for the trier of fact.

The two-year limitations period starts when the plaintiff can determine that the injury may have been caused by the defendant’s act; discovering later why the act was wrongful does not postpone accrual.

Watson v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals · filed 2019-12-18(b)

Kansas’s statute of limitations only “postpones the running of the limitations period until the time the plaintiff is able to determine that her injury may be caused by some act of the defendant.” ... It “does not give plaintiff an infinite amount of time, after learning the cause of her injuries, to ponder whether [defendant’s actions] injured her because of defendant’s negligence or because of other reasons.” ... Here, Plaintiff must have been aware of the basis for her allegations that Amnesteem caused her injuries and that its warnings were inadequate no later than June 21, 2016, when she filed her first complaint. That is the latest time the limitations period could have begun to run. Plaintiff’s subsequent discovery of the reasons for the warning’s inadequacy is of no consequence.

For fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims, the two-year limitations period begins when the act first causes substantial injury or the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party, and it may be equitably tolled.

McNamara v. Intercept Corporation · filed 2020-03-31(a)(3) and (b)

Kansas law applies a two-year statute of limitations to fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(3)–(4) and (b). The limitations period begins to run when “the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury” or “the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(3)–(4) and (b). ... The Kansas statute’s text dictates the result—the claims began to accrue either when the acts “first cause[d] substantial injury” or when “injury bec[ame] reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.” See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(b); see also Cornett v. Roth, 666 P.2d 1182, 1187 (Kan. 1983). ... Unlike this Court explained with respect to fraudulent transfer claims, the text of the statute prescribes no Monitor-friendly discovery rule here because it bases the timeliness of the claim on the injured party’s discovery rather than the claimant’s. ... As a result, unless McNamara’s claims have been equitably tolled, they are time barred.

Under § 60-513(b), the limitations period begins when substantial injury occurs and is reasonably ascertainable; if the timing is disputed, the issue is for the jury.

Bryson v. Wichita State University · filed 1994-09-09(b)

The statute of limitations does not begin to run until the claim accrues, and that occurs when substantial injury occurs.

Under § 60-513(b), a tort claim accrues when the act first causes substantial injury, or when the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable if not immediately ascertainable; the period does not await the plaintiff’s later realization that the defendant was negligent.

Sneath v. Apertus Technologies · filed 1996-10-11(b)

Except as provided in subsection (c), the causes of action listed in subsection (a) shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party . . . . Sneath did not file her complaint until October 16, 1992, and accordingly her action is time-barred by the two year Kansas statute of limitations.

The two-year limitations period starts when the act first causes substantial, actionable injury, even if the plaintiff does not yet know the full extent of the injuries.

Watson v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2019-07-18(b)

In Kansas, the two-year statute of limitations begins to run as soon as “the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(b). A “substantial injury” is one that “justif[ies] an action for recovery of the damages,” and does not require a plaintiff to have full knowledge of the extent of her injuries.

Section 60-513(b) applies the two-year limitations period to continuing pollution injuries accruing within the statutory period before suit, so temporary damages from the continuing nuisance were recoverable from May 31, 1975.

Miller v. Cudahy Co. · filed 1984-08-13(b)

The Court concludes that the defendants are liable to the plaintiffs in the amount of $3,060,000 for the temporary damages to the plaintiffs’ annual crops wrought by the defendants’ continuing abatable nuisance in the period from May 31, 1975, the date to which the two-year statute of limitations found at K.S.A. § 60-513 extends from the date the original complaint in this case was filed, to December 31, 1983.

Under § 60-513(b), the “act giving rise to the cause of action” has the same meaning each time it appears and refers here to the claimant’s ingestion of tetracycline.

Cowan Ex Rel. Cowan v. Lederle Laboratories · filed 1985-02-19(b)

Therefore, both appearances of the phrase “act giving rise to the cause of action” must refer to Lisa Cowan’s ingestion of tetracycline.

Under § 60-513(b), a negligence claim accrues when the act first causes substantial injury, or when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable if that occurs later, subject to the ten-year outside limit.

Dowling v. Southwestern Porcelain, Inc. · filed 1985-06-21(b)

Claims for negligence are controlled by the two-year statute of limitations, K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4), with the exception that causes of action are not deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, K.S.A. 60-513(b).

For a tort claim, the two-year limitations period begins when the act first causes substantial injury, while the ten-year cap applies only when the injury was not reasonably ascertainable until later.

Kinell v. N. W. Dible Co. · filed 1987-01-16(b)

Under the facts herein, the “substantial injury” provision in K.S.A. 60-513(b) means when the act giving rise to the injury first caused substantial injury to the plaintiffs.

Section 60-513(b) makes temporary nuisance injuries accrue when land or crops are actually harmed, with each injury starting a new limitations period until the injury becomes permanent.

Miller v. Cudahy Co. · filed 1988-09-28(b)

If the injury or wrong is classified as temporary, the limitation period starts to run only when the plaintiff’s land or crops are actually harmed, and for purposes of the statute of limitations, each injury causes a new cause of action to accrue, at least until the injury becomes permanent.

Section 60-513(4) delays the limitations period when the injury itself could not reasonably be ascertained until after the act that caused it.

Seymour v. Lofgreen · filed 1972-04-08(4)

The belated discovery provision in 60-513, supra, was obviously intended to apply to situations where the injury itself is of such a nature that it could not reasonably be ascertained until sometime after the commisison of the act which caused it.

Section 60-513(a)(4) bars a negligence claim filed more than two years after the injury becomes apparent enough to trigger a duty to investigate.

Henrichs v. Peoples Bank · filed 1999-03-19(a)(4)

Therefore, Gertrude and her family were aware, as of September 1993, that Gertrude’s assets had been mostly depleted and had, at that point, a duty to investigate. Henrichs’ petition was not filed until June 1996. K.S.A. 1998 Supp. 60-513(a)(4) bars her claim.

Section 60-513 is not tolled merely because a plaintiff does not know the exact scientific nature of an apparent severe injury.

Benne v. International Business Machines · filed 1994-10-18

Where it was clearly apparent that the plaintiff has suffered severe injuries, her “failure to know the exact scientific nature of the problem” will not toll the operation of K.S.A. 60-513.

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on actions for injury to another's rights not arising on contract or otherwise enumerated, including § 1983 actions in Kansas.

Oyler v. Finney · filed 1994-12-16(a)(4)

Kansas law specifies a two-year statute of limitations for “[a]n action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated.” K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4). Section 60-513(a)(4) is the applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 actions in Kansas.

Subsection (a)(4) requires a product-liability claim to be filed within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Dierksen Ex Rel. Dierksen v. Navistar International Transportation Corp. · filed 1996-01-25(a)(4)

Plaintiffs claim is therefore subject to the statute of limitations governing claims by persons not under a disability, K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4). Under that section, a product liability claim must be filed within two years of accrual of the cause of action. In a ease such as this where the fact of injury was reasonably ascertainable at the time of the accident, the cause of action accrued at the time of injury. § 60-513(b). Plaintiffs claim was not filed within two years of the injury. For the reasons set forth above, the claim is barred by the statute of limitations in K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4).

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on actions for injury to the rights of another.

Gee v. Campbell · filed 1996-02-20(a)(4)

The district court correctly determined that the applicable statute of limitations for a civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.1983 in the district court in Kansas is the Kansas statute applying to "actions for injury to the rights of another." K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4). Petitioner's claims were not filed until July 10, 1995. The record contains no evidence that would support the application of either the tolling statute or equitable tolling. We therefore agree with the district court that the applicable Kansas statute of limitations which was to be applied in this case required that the actions be filed within two years and that petitioner's claims are now time-barred.

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on claims for injury to another's rights that do not arise from contract, including negligence claims.

Henry v. Federal Deposit Insurance · filed 1996-07-25(a)(4)

According to K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4), a two-year statute of limitations governs actions “for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract.” This section applies to claims of negligence.

Subsection (a)(4) provides a two-year statute of limitations for an injury to the rights of another.

Boyice v. UPS, Inc. · filed 1996-07-26(a)(4)

K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) provides for a two year statute of limitations for “an injury to the rights of another.” Because Boyice did not file this lawsuit until June 10, 1994, more than two years after his claims accrued, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of UPS.

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on claims for either negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Home Quest Mortgage, L.L.C. v. American Family Mutual Insurance · filed 2005-10-12(a)(4)

Indeed, the two-year statute of limitations period applies regardless of whether the complaint alleges either negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Subsection (a)(4) gives a plaintiff two years to bring an action for injury to another's rights when no more specific limitations provision applies.

LE v. Joslin · filed 2009-02-27(a)(4)

Here, the applicable statute of limitations for Le’s claims is 2 years under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4). As a result, the statute of limitations for Le’s claims ran on February 20, 2006. Le filed her petition on February 17, 2006, which was 3 days before the statute of limitations ran on her claims. Le did not serve her'petition until after the statute of limitations had expired. Thus, to determine whether Le “commenced” her action within the statute of limitations period, we must examine whether Le properly obtained service of process within the time limits of K.S.A. 60-203(a)(1). ... We determine that the trial court properly held that good cause did not exist for the 30-day extension of service of process and that Le’s action must be deemed commenced on the date that service was obtained upon Joslin. Because Le’s action was not commenced within the 2-year statute of limitations period, her claims are now barred.

Section 60-513(a)(4) requires actions for injury to another's rights that do not arise on contract and are not otherwise enumerated to be brought within two years.

Lyons v. Kyner · filed 2010-02-10(a)(4)

Thus, we apply Kansas’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions to Lyons’s § 1983 claim and his § 1985(3) claim. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4) (“The following actions shall be brought within two years . . . [a]n action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated.”) ... Accordingly, we conclude that the applicable two-year statute of limitations had already run on Lyons’s § 1983 and § 1985(3) claims by the time Lyons filed his complaint in January 2009.

Section 60-513(a)(4) requires actions for injury to another's rights, when not arising on contract or otherwise enumerated, to be brought within two years.

Jacobs v. Lyon County Detention Center · filed 2010-03-31(a)(4)

“Under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4) (1976), ‘[a]n action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated’ must be brought within two years.” ... Because Mr. Jacobs did not file his Complaint until July 8, 2008—based upon injuries that allegedly occurred more than three years earlier—we agree with the district court that Mr. Jacobs’s action is time-barred.

Section 60-513(a)(4) requires actions for injury to another's rights, not arising on contract and not otherwise enumerated, to be brought within two years.

Levy v. Kansas Department of Social & Rehabilitation Services · filed 2015-06-16(a)(4)

Thus, we are bound by our previous holding in Baker—not the Kansas Supreme Court’s holdings in Burnett or Wagher—that Rehabilitation Act claims are subject to the two-year statute of limitations under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513. Because Levy joined this lawsuit in March 2011, and his alleged termination from SRS took place in February 2009, his Rehabilitation Act claim is time-barred.

Subsection (a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period, barring actions that accrued more than two years before the complaint was filed.

Berkemeier v. Standard Beverage Corp. · filed 2016-03-18(a)(4)

Under K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4), any actions that accrued two years before the Complaint in this case was filed on July 22, 2014, are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitation on § 1983 claims brought in state court, beginning when the plaintiff first learns of the termination or other rights violation, and an administrative appeal does not toll the period.

Srivastava v. University of Kansas · filed 2018-04-13(a)(4)

"K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) provides that "action[s] for injur[ies] to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated," "shall be brought within two years." Our Supreme Court has held that § 1983 claims brought in state court are bound by K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4)'s two-year statute of limitations. See Whye, 278 Kan. at 459. ... Given this holding in Whye, it follows that in a wrongful discharge case such as this one, the date that triggers the statute of limitations would be when the person learns of his or her termination. Clearly, this date would be the date the person first had notice of a violation of his or her rights. ... In summary, the only law that Dr. Srivastava cites to support his argument that the two-year statute of limitations for his § 1983 claims did not start to run until he received the January 9, 2015 letter telling him that he had lost his administrative appeal is clearly distinguishable. Meanwhile, Kansas caselaw and federal caselaw support that the filing of an administrative appeal does not toll the two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims from running. Thus, we reject Dr. Srivastava's argument that the two-year statute of limitations to bring his § 1983 claims did not start to run until he received the January 9, 2015 letter stating that he had lost his administrative appeal."

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on noncontractual injury claims such as the aiding-and-abetting claim at issue.

In re CEC Entertainment · filed 2019-09-27(a)(4)

The applicable statute of limitations for Twin City Pipe's stated cause of action is K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4), which limits the filing of such actions to two years. The parties agree that the statute of limitations for Twin City Pipe's aiding and abetting claim against Goldman, Sachs & Co. expired on February 14, 2016, which was two years after the transaction closed.

Subsection (a)(4) requires an action for injury to the rights of another, when not arising on contract and not otherwise enumerated, to be brought within two years.

Standifer v. Kieser · filed 2020-02-12(a)(4)

The applicable statute of limitations is K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4), which requires “[a]n action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated” to be brought within two years.

Subsection (a)(4) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims, including § 1983, § 1985, and tort claims.

E.H. v. Kansas Dept. for Children and Families · filed 2021-09-10(a)(4)

Each state has a single statute of limitations for § 1983 claims—the state's residual personal injury statute of limitations. Kansas provides a two-year statute of limitations for such claims. Gragg v. McKune, 28 Kan. App. 2d 256, 261, 16 P.3d 311 (2000); see K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4). Although a Kansas court has not yet addressed the appropriate statute of limitations for § 1985 actions, the Tenth Circuit has held that K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) should also apply to such claims. Lyons v. Kyner, 367 Fed. Appx. 878, 882 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished opinion). We will follow the lead of the Tenth Circuit and apply K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4)'s two-year statute of limitations to E.H.'s § 1985 claim.

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on actions for injury to the rights of another, including § 1983 civil-rights claims.

Richards v. Lawson · filed 2021-11-12(a)(4)

Civil rights cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by the applicable state statute of limitations. Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 2005). “Because both section 1983 and 1981 claims are actions for injury to the rights of another, the appropriate state statute of limitations is [K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4)].” Baker v. Bd. of Regents, 991 F.2d 628, 630 (10th Cir. 1993). K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4) provides for a two-year statute of limitations. Here, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges events that occurred on May 19, 2019. He filed the complaint on May 26, 2021—a week outside the statute of limitations. Thus, based on the allegations in the complaint and the date of filing, Plaintiff’s complaint is untimely.

Section 60-513(a)(4) requires an action for injury to another's rights, including a § 1983 claim, to be brought within two years.

Allen v. Sedgwick County District Attorney's Office · filed 2022-01-03(a)(4)

“In Kansas, that is the two-year statute of limitations in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a).” ... As to the facts alleged by Plaintiff, Defendants’ actions or omissions in regard to Plaintiff’s claims clearly occurred more than two years before Plaintiff filed his federal court Complaint on December 30, 2021. ... As a result, Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred and dismissal is appropriate.

Section 60-513(a)(3) and (a)(4) impose a two-year statute of limitations on fraud, tortious-interference, and false-light claims; a fraud claim accrues when the fraud is discovered.

Smith v. Williams · filed 2022-09-15(a)(4), (a)(3)

A two-year statute of limitations is applicable to Plaintiff’s claims of tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, fraud, and false light invasion of privacy.

Subsection (a)(4) supplies a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims, including § 1983 claims arising in Kansas and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.

Davis v. Males · filed 2023-04-03(a)(4)

The statute of limitations for intentional infliction of emotion distress in Kansas is two years from when the conduct causes substantial injury. K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4); S. Star Cent. Gas Pipeline, Inc. v. Cline, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262 (D. Kan. 2010).

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which the court applies to § 1983 claims arising in Kansas.

Bateast v. Orunsolu · filed 2024-08-12(a)(4)

Because plaintiff’s § 1983 claims arose in Kansas, the court applies Kansas’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions to his claims. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4). ... Under Kansas’s two-year statute of limitations, plaintiff had until June 27, 2022, to sue Nurse Mislap. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4). He missed that deadline.

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period for injury-to-person actions, so a motion to add unknown defendants filed after that period was untimely.

Livingston (ID 60787) v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County · filed 2025-02-13(a)(4)

Plaintiff also appears to dispute the Court’s finding that the statute of limitations had run as to the addition of the John Doe defendants. Plaintiff’s calculations, however, are not clear. Plaintiff was detained from September 21, 2021, to September 23, 2021. His motion for leave to amend was filed October 4, 2023, which was beyond the two-year statute of limitations.19 Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under Rule 59(e) as to his motion to file a supplemental pleading.

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on actions for injury to the rights of another.

Cortishae-Etier (ID 102990) v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2025-03-19(a)(4)

“The relevant Kansas statute, K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4), provides a two-year statute of limitations for an ‘injury to the rights of another.’ ... Thus, any claim under this statute appears to be time-barred.”

Section 60-513's two-year limitations period for personal injury suits leaves the claims timely when filed within two years of the alleged injuries.

Martin v. Sedgwick County, Kansas, Board of County Commissioners Case Consolidated for Discovery; All Non-Dispositive fi · filed 2025-03-31

Plaintiffs assert that that the suit is not time-barred as it was brought within the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury suits in Kansas.70 Burnett’s alleged actions that constitute the basis of this suit occurred on July 17, 2022. Plaintiffs commenced this suit on July 16, 2024. Although close, it is apparent that Plaintiffs filed this suit within two years of Burnett’s crimes against them.

Section 60-513(a) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions in Kansas, and that period governs § 1983 claims filed in Kansas.

Hyatt v. Owens · filed 2025-08-20(a)

“The forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs civil rights claims under both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983. In Kansas, that is the two-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. § 60-513(a).”

Section 60-513(a) gives Kansas tort claims a two-year statute of limitations.

Kingsley v. Geo Transport, Inc. · filed 2025-08-25(a)

Under Kansas law, tort claims have a two-year statute of limitations period under K.S.A. § 60-513(a). See Wille v. Davis, 650 F. App’x 627, at n.2 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished).

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims in Kansas and supplies the limitations period for § 1983 claims.

Merryfield v. Howard · filed 2023-03-29(a)(4)

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims “is drawn from the personal-injury statute of the state in which the federal district court sits.” Mondragón v. Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). In Kansas, the statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4); see also Eden v. Webb, No. 22-3064, 2022 WL 17576354, at *1 (10th Cir. Dec. 12, 2022); Eikenberry v. Seward Cnty., Kan., 734 F. App’x 572, 575 (10th Cir. 2018). So, honoring controlling precedent, the court applies Kansas’s two-year statute of limitations to plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.

Section 60-513(a) supplies a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury-based civil-rights claims in Kansas.

Zesiger · filed 2026-03-17(a)

In § 1983 actions, “[t]he forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs civil rights claims.” ... In Kansas, the statute of limitations is two years. ... Thus, Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims brought under § 1983 are barred by the two-year statute of limitations.

The two-year limitations period under subsection (a)(4) applies to noncontractual injury-to-rights claims, but whether it bars a claim depends on whether the alleged injury is permanent or temporary.

Maxedon v. Texaco Producing, Inc. · filed 1989-04-20(a)(4)

This is the statute of limitations for an action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not otherwise enumerated in K.S.A. 60-513. ... The court finds that there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to the nature of the damages in Counts II, V, VII, VIII, IX, and that part of XIII which relates to area 19 on the survey map, and that summary judgment on these counts on the ground that the statute of limitations completely bars these claims is inappropriate.

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on an action for injury to another's rights that does not arise on contract or fall within another enumerated category, and permanent pollution damages are barred when the action is filed more than two years after the injury.

McAlister v. Atlantic Richfield Co. · filed 1983-04-29(a)(4)

Correctly determining that plaintiff s action was for permanent damages as alleged in the petition, the court concluded that such claim was barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(a)(4) requires an action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract and not otherwise enumerated, to be brought within two years.

Hamilton v. The City of Overland Park, Kansas the City of Kansas City, Kansas Norman Justice and W. Bozarts · filed 1984-03-30(a)(4)

Under Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(a)(4) (1976), “[a]n action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated” must be brought within two years.

Section 60-513(a)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for an action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract and not otherwise enumerated.

Cowdrey v. City of Eastborough, Kansas David Wilson, and David Vickery, Defendants · filed 1984-03-30(a)(4)

Under this analysis, Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(a)(4) (1976), which provides a two-year limitations period for “[a]n action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated,” is clearly the most analogous state statute.

Subsection (a)(4) requires actions for injury to another's rights, when not arising on contract or otherwise enumerated, to be filed within two years; it supplies the limitations period for § 1983 claims.

Pike v. City of Mission · filed 1984-03-30(a)(4)

Under Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(a)(4) (1976), “[a]n action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated” must be brought within two years. For the reasons set out in Garcia, we hold that the Kansas two-year statute is the most appropriate limitations period.

Section 60-513(a)(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 actions in Kansas, with claims accruing when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Johnson v. Johnson County Commission Board · filed 1991-02-19(a)(4)

The district court correctly relied upon this court’s ruling in Hamilton v. City of Over*1301land Park, 730 F.2d 613 (10th Cir.1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1052, 105 S.Ct. 2111, 85 L.Ed.2d 476 (1985), that the appropriate statute of limitations for § 1983 actions arising in Kansas is two years, under Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(a)(4). ... Section 1983 claims accrue, for the purpose of the statute of limitations, “ ‘when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.’ ” ... Claims alleging denial of a fair trial are presumed to have accrued at the time the trial concludes. ... Claims arising out of police actions toward a criminal suspect, such as arrest, interrogation, or search and seizure, are presumed to have accrued when the actions actually occur. ... Accordingly, the claims accrued in January 1988 and May 1988 and the suits were not brought in a timely manner. They are now barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 60-513(a)(4) gives § 1983 claims arising in Kansas a two-year limitations period, with accrual when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Williams v. Olathe, Kansas Police Department, and William Sullivan · filed 1991-09-26(a)(4)

"[T]he appropriate statute of limitations for § 1983 actions arising in Kansas is two years, under Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(a)(4)."

Section 60-513(a)(4) gives § 1983 actions arising in Kansas a two-year limitations period, so claims arising more than two years before filing are untimely.

Benhardt v. BOARD OF COUNTY COM'RS OF WYANDOTTE · filed 1998-06-18(a)(4)

We evaluate first what alleged acts are the basis of plaintiffs section 1983 claim. Plaintiff apparently concedes that the appropriate statute of limitations for section 1983 actions arising in Kansas is two years pursuant to Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(a)(4). See Johnson v. Johnson County Comm’n Bd., 925 F.2d 1299, 1300-01 (10th Cir.1991). Accordingly, only plaintiffs claims that arose after April 28,1995, are timely. The Williams and Mar-tone incidents are not part of this claim because those claims arose in 1993 and 1994.

Section 60-513(b) delays accrual until substantial injury occurs, or, when the injury is not immediately reasonably ascertainable, until the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.

City of Wichita v. United States Gypsum Co. · filed 1996-01-05(b)

Kansas law provides a cause of action does not accrue until substantial injury is caused or, if the injury is not immediately reasonably ascertainable, until the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party. K.S.A. § 60-513(b).

Section 60-513(b) starts the limitations period when substantial injury occurs or becomes reasonably ascertainable, and substantial injury need not encompass the full extent of the damages.

Johnson v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1996-03-08(b)

The K.S.A. 60-513(b) term “substantial injuiy” does not require an injured party to have knowledge of the full extent of the injury to trigger the statute of limitations. Rather, “substantial injury” means the victim must have sufficient ascertainable injuiy to justify an action for recovery of the damages, regardless of extent.

Section 60-513(b) delays accrual until the injury occurs, or until the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable when it could not reasonably be known at the time of the act.

Wiley v. Hoang · filed 1996-04-11(b)

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(b) (1994), which provides for the accrual of a cause of action when “the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then . . . [when] the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party. . . .”

The two-year limitations period begins when the defendant’s act causes substantial injury, or, if the injury is not reasonably ascertainable at first, when the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.

Brown v. Apertus Technologies · filed 1996-10-11(b)

Except as provided in subsection (c), the causes of action listed in subsection (a) shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party. . . .

Subsection (b) starts the limitations period when the act first causes substantial injury or, if the injury is not reasonably ascertainable, when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.

Merica v. Apertus Technologies · filed 1996-10-11(b)

Except as provided in subsection (c), the causes of action listed in subsection (a) shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party. . . . ... Merica did not file her complaint until October 16, 1992, and accordingly her action is barred by the two year Kansas statute of limitations.

Subsection (b) begins the limitations period when an act causes substantial, meaning actionable, injury, or when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable, subject to a 10-year outer limit.

Kansas Public Employees Retirement System v. Reimer & Koger Associates, Inc. · filed 1997-04-18(b)

The phrase “substantial injury” in K.S.A. 60-513(b) has been construed to mean “actionable injury.”

Under subsection (b), a cause of action accrues when a breach first causes substantial injury, even if the breach occurred earlier.

Bold v. Spitcaufsky · filed 1997-07-18(b)

This is not always true, as 60-513(b) demonstrates. There are and can be occasions when a duty is breached but causes no damage. In those cases, the cause of action does not accrue until the breach first causes substantial injury.

Under subsection (b), the limitations period begins when an injury is substantial or, if not then reasonably ascertainable, when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Hutton v. Deutsche Bank AG · filed 2008-03-24(b)

The term “substantial injury” is not intended to imply that the plaintiff must have knowledge of the full extent of his injuries before the statute of limitations begins; rather, a plaintiff simply must have “sufficient ascertainable injury to justify an action for recovery of the damages.” ... Because Plaintiffs here claim similar injuries in addition to tax penalties and interest, they, too, allege immediate and definite injury sufficient to commence the statute of limitations running, and their claims would thus be untimely for the reasons discussed above, and dismissed, even under the alternative argument.

Section 60-513(b) provides that a tort claim accrues when the act first causes substantial injury, or when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable if it was not reasonably ascertainable initially.

Balmer Fund, Inc. v. City of Harper · filed 2018-02-16(b)

K.S.A. § 60-513(b) instructs that a cause of action for trespass upon real property, for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, and for an injury to the rights of another (not arising on contract or otherwise specifically enumerated) "shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then...[when] the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party."

Section 60-513(b) starts the two-year limitations period when the injury becomes substantial or actionable, or, if the injury is not initially reasonably ascertainable, when its fact becomes reasonably ascertainable; conflicting accrual evidence is for the factfinder.

Roeder v. American Medical Systems, Inc. · filed 2021-10-15(b)

The two-year statute of limitations begins to run as soon as “the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party....” K.S.A. 60-513(b). A “substantial injury” is one that “justif[ies] an action for recovery of the damages,” and does not require a plaintiff to have full knowledge of the extent of her injuries. Roe v. Diefendorf, 236 Kan. 218, 222, 689 P.2d 855, 859 (1984) (construing “substantial injury” in § 60-513(b) to mean “actionable injury”); Brock v. Gatz, 237 F. App'x 321, 325 (10th Cir. 2007). The trier of fact must decide the issue when the parties present conflicting evidence. Jones v. Neuroscience Assocs., Inc., P.A., 250 Kan. 477, 489, 827 P.2d 51, 59 (1992).

Section 60-513(4)'s two-year limit begins when the plaintiff suffers substantial injury, even if some damages accrue later.

Johnston v. Farmers Alliance Mutual Insurance · filed 1976-01-24(4)

Although some damages to the plaintiff may not have accrued under the accounting principles until installments of salary had ceased, plaintiff sustained substantial injuiy upon receipt of official notice of termination on March 3, 1972, and his cause of action accrued on that date. Not having brought his action until more than two years after that date, his remedy was barred by 60-513 (4) and the trial court properly so held.

An action for injury to another’s rights must be brought within two years; the period begins when the plaintiff can first file and prosecute the action.

Braun v. Roth · filed 2001-01-05(a)(4)

K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 60-513(a)(4) states that an action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated, shall be brought within 2 years. In general, the running of the statute of limitations for a cause of action commences as soon as the right to maintain a legal action arises, the true test being at what point in time the plaintiff could first have filed and prosecuted his or her action to a successful completion.

Under § 60-513(b), a cause of action accrues when the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.

Beck v. Kansas University Psychiatry Foundation · filed 1984-02-10(b)

The causes of action did not accrue herein against these defendants until the fact of injury was reasonably ascertainable to the injured parties. K.S.A. 60 — 513(b); Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir.1975). The fact of injury here was not reasonably ascertainable until March 20, 1981, the date of the shootings. Plaintiffs’ complaints were timely filed on March 18, 1983.

Section 60-513(b) delays accrual until the wrongful act first causes substantial injury or the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.

Olson v. State Highway Commission · filed 1984-03-24(b)

However, K.S.A. 60-513(b) provides that a cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or until the time the fact of injury (inferentially, the fact of substantial injury) becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.

Section 60-513(b) starts the limitations period when a substantial injury is reasonably ascertainable, even if its full extent is unknown.

City of Wichita v. United States Gypsum Co. · filed 1993-07-14(b)

Thus, it is only the fact of a substantial injury, not its extent, that must be reasonably ascertainable to the injured party.

Section 60-513(b) provides that a breach of fiduciary duty claim accrues when the breach first causes substantial injury or, if the injury is not then reasonably ascertainable, when it becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Mohr v. Tatro (In Re Tatro) · filed 2008-05-22(b)

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60—513(b) makes clear that Mohr’s causes of action against Tatro did not accrue until Tatro’s actions “first cause[d] substantial injury”, or “if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act,” until “the fact of injury becomes reasonable ascertainable to the injured party....”

Section 60-513(b) delays accrual when an injury is not reasonably ascertainable; uncertainty about when it became ascertainable can prevent dismissal on limitations grounds.

Unified School District 467 v. Leland A. Gray Architects, LLC · filed 2015-06-30(b)

It is not clear from the face, of the school district’s complaint when the problems of the HVAC system became reasonably ascertainable to it. Although MEUS, argues that the school district should have known of the cause of their injuries much earlier, the court finds that this issue requires further development of the record.

Section 60-513(c) imposes a four-year statute of repose on claims against health care providers, measured from the act giving rise to the cause of action, without tolling for continuous treatment or treating a series of treatments as one act.

Marzolf v. Gilgore · filed 1996-01-19(c)

Certain claims against health care providers, such as those alleged by plaintiffs, are only valid if “commenced [no] more than four years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action.” ... The language of the provision is “unmistakably plain”, ... and nowhere includes a tolling provision of any kind. ... Under these circumstances, the court concludes that the Kansas Supreme Court would reject the fiction plaintiffs seek to create by their one event theory.

Section 60-513(c)’s four-year repose period can bar a malpractice-based wrongful death action before the patient dies.

Natalini v. Little · filed 2004-06-25(c)

In circumstances like Natalini’s, even if a malpractice plaintiffs premature death is highly likely to be caused by the malpractice, plaintiffs survival for more than 4 years beyond the negligent act means no wrongful death action will ever be possible. K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 60-513(c) and K.S.A. 60-1901 will combine to cut it off before it can accrue, he., before the death giving rise to the action has occurred.

Section 60-513(a)'s two-year limitations period applies to legal-malpractice claims sounding in tort, while a claim alleging breach of specific contractual obligations is governed by the applicable contract limitations period.

Turner and Boisseau v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. · filed 1996-02-12(a)

Legal malpractice generally constitutes both a tort and a breach of contract. ... Kansas courts have applied the following analysis in determining whether a particular claim is subject to the two-year statute of limitations for torts, or one of the longer limitations periods governing contracts: ... Where the act complained of is a breach of specific terms of the contract without any reference to the legal duties imposed by law upon the relationship created thereby, the action is contractual. Where the gravamen of the action is a breach of a duty imposed by law upon the relationship of attorney/client and not of the contract itself, the action is in tort. ... Thus, where a plaintiff alleges that his attorney failed to do that which he agreed to perform, the plaintiffs claim for relief is governed by the statute of limitations for contracts. ... Applying this standard, the court finds that Nationwide has sufficiently pled the existence of specific contractual duties on the part of Turner and Boisseau so as to state a claim for breach of contract.

Section 60-513’s two-year tort limitation does not govern a claim against an attorney for breaching a specific unwritten agreement to file an appeal; the three-year contract limitation applies.

Juhnke v. Hess · filed 1973-03-03

The real basis of his claim for relief is financial loss resulting from failure to discharge a contractural obligation (proof of which contract, breach and loss is another matter). Consequently we hold that the claim for relief alleged in appellant’s petition is one founded on unwritten contract to be governed by the three year statute of limitations provided in K.S.A. 60-512 (1).

Section 60-513 places the limitation for wrongful-death actions in the general limitations article and sets a two-year limitation period.

McDonald v. Ward · filed 1996-02-20

The new enactment places the death act limitations [§ 60-513] in the general limitation article [Article 5] and in the same section fixing a 2-year limitation for other actions.

Section 60-513(a)(5) sets a two-year limitations period for Kansas wrongful-death actions, which the court treats as substantive law.

Morningstar v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1994-02-09(a)(5)

The fact that a statute of limitations has been moved to another part of the statute books does not necessarily transform the statute from one involving substance to one involving procedure. ... The court finds that this action is barred by the applicable Kansas two-year statute of limitations. See Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-513(a)(5).

Section 60-513(a) imposes a two-year limitations period on actions for taking or detaining personal property, while § 60-513(b) delays accrual until substantial injury occurs or the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable.

Charles Lester Newland, A/K/A Charles L. Newland v. Clifford A. Newland, Defendant-Cross Claimant v. The First National Bank in Goodland, Goodland, Kansas; Jerry D. Fairbanks, Defendants-Cross Claim Defendants-Appellees · filed 1996-04-19(a), (b)

Accordingly, we hold that any claims by Charles that Fairbanks and the Bank acted negligently or fraudulently in attempting to locate Charles or in distributing the estate to Lester's siblings are barred by the two-year statute of limitations. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a).

The two-year limit for taking or detaining personal property does not govern an implied-contract claim for failure to return bailed property.

JAY-OX, INC. v. Square Deal Junk Co., Inc. · filed 1972-03-04(2)

Appellant contends the action is one governed by that which is now K. S. A. 1971 Supp. 60-513 which in part provides: ... Appellee’s theory from the beginning in asserting this claim has been that its action is one in contract. Under the particular facts disclosed we think it appropriate that the action be so treated. ... In any event the action was commenced well within the three year period of time authorized for actions upon implied contracts (K. S. A. 60-512 [1]).

Section 60-513(a)(4) gives personal-injury actions a two-year limitations period, and subsection (b) generally starts that period when substantial injury occurs or the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable, including when the plaintiff can determine that the injury may have been caused by an act of the defendant.

Benne v. International Business MacHines Corp. · filed 1996-06-20(a)(4), (b)

The Kansas statute of limitations provides that an action for personal injuries must be brought within two years. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4). Such a cause of action: shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury or, if the fact of the injury is not reasonably ascertainable until sometime after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party . . . . Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(b).

Section 60-513(a)(4) imposes a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which the court applied to the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.

McCoy (ID 76894) v. Burris · filed 2020-09-22(a)(4)

Plaintiff’s claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims “is drawn from the personal-injury statute of the state in which the federal district court sits.” ... In Kansas, the statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4); see also Eikenberry v. Seward Cnty., Kan., 734 F. App’x 572, 575 (10th Cir. 2018). So, the court applies Kansas’s two-year statute of limitations to plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and turns to the gist of the real disagreement here—when that two-year clock started to run.