Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1

Felony murder requires intent to commit the underlying felony, but does not require intent to kill.

Jones v. State of Indiana · filed 2024-12-20(2)

To obtain a conviction of felony murder, the State need not prove intent to kill, but only the intent to commit the underlying felony—in this case, robbery.

Evidence that a defendant helped overpower a victim and took substantial steps toward rape can support the rape or attempted rape element of felony murder.

Kiplinger v. State · filed 2010-03-22(2)

Specifically, he asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the rape or attempted rape element of the felony murder charge and the rape or attempted rape component of the aggravating circumstance. ... In light of these facts, the jury could properly infer that Defendant’s active participation went beyond mere preparation and that substantial steps were taken with a clear intent to commit or attempt to commit rape.

Felony murder does not require proof of an intent to kill.

Taylor v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-02-06(2)

Taylor claims that his offenses were not as bad as some because he did not intend to kill either victim and because he shot Goodwin after Goodwin fired the first shots, but a conviction for felony murder does not require establishing an intent to kill, Thomas v. State, 827 N.E.2d 1131, 1133 (Ind. 2005), and Taylor does not explain how Goodwin’s initial shots at another person in any way mitigates his own actions.

A murder charge under Section 35-42-1-1 does not require medical testimony to establish the cause of death; circumstantial evidence can suffice.

Brewer v. State · filed 1981-03-06

With respect to the evidence of the cause of decedent’s death, we have heretofore held that medical testimony is not a prerequisite to establishing the cause of death in a murder case. ... From such evidence, a reasonable person could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Stephen died of a bullet wound.

The death element of murder may be proved by irreversible cessation of the victim’s total brain functions.

Swafford v. State · filed 1981-05-28(1)

On that basis, we hold that for purposes of the law of homicide proof of the death of the victim may be established by proof of the irreversible cessation of the victim’s total brain functions.

The cause of death in a murder prosecution may be established through eyewitness testimony; medical testimony is not required.

Hicks v. State · filed 1981-10-08

We have held that medical testimony is not a prerequisite to establishing the cause of the victim’s death.

A defendant is guilty of murder when the emotional stress caused by a robbery produces the victim’s death, even if the victim had a preexisting physical condition.

Thomas v. State · filed 1982-06-30

The physical debility that caused Dr. Wolfe’s death was reasonably found by the jury to have been produced by the defendant’s acts in committing the robbery. Under the statute, he is guilty of murder.

Evidence of the victim’s body and how the victim died suffices to establish the corpus delicti of murder.

Loy v. State · filed 1982-07-08

The evidence of Lykins’ body and how he met his death is all that the law requires in order to establish the corpus delecti of the charged offense, murder.

A defendant’s injury can satisfy murder’s causation requirement if it contributes to the death, even when another cause also contributes.

McCormick v. State · filed 1982-07-30

The concept of an intervening cause of death was covered in Final Instruction No. 33: “It is the law of this State that one who inflicts an injury upon another is deemed by the law to be guilty of Murder, if the injury contributes mediately or immediately to the death of such other. Thus, the unlawful act of the accused, if any, need not be the sole cause of death; the test of responsibility is whether the act to the accused contributed to the death, and, if it did, he is not relieved of responsibility by the fact that another cause also contributed. ... The refusal of an instruction is not grounds for reversal when the substance thereof is adequately covered by other instructions which are given.

A murder conviction can rest on circumstantial evidence of death without production of the victim's body.

Campbell v. State · filed 1986-11-20

The production of the victim's body is not required in a murder prosecution if circumstantial evidence shows that death did occur.

Murder requires proof of a killing, but medical testimony establishing the precise cause of death is not required.

Fouts v. State of Indiana · filed 2023-04-24(1)

However, “[w]e have held in numerous cases that medical testimony is not an absolute requirement to establishing the cause of death in a murder case.” Wilson v. State, 432 N.E.2d 30, 33 (Ind. 1982). The cause of death is not an element of the offense; “the element in question is the killing, absent a suggestion of intervening cause.” Id.

Subsection (a)(1) requires the State to prove that the defendant caused another person’s death; the eggshell skull doctrine may be used to establish causation.

Konkle v. State of Indiana · filed 2025-03-12(a)(1)

Second, the dissent overlooks the fact that the State must prove causation to satisfy a conviction for murder. See Metzler, 540 N.E.2d at 609; Hampton, 961 N.E.2d at 487 n.5; see also I.C. § 35-42-1-1(a)(1) (providing that to convict one of murder, the State must prove a person killed another human being). Because the eggshell skull doctrine is clearly one of causation, it only logically follows that it would serve a purpose in satisfying the State’s burden under that requirement.

Section 35-42-1-1 permits only one murder sentence for the homicide of one person, even when the defendant is convicted on multiple murder counts.

James v. State · filed 1980-10-28

We note at the outset of our consideration of this appeal that this cause involves the homicide of one individual. Therefore, the trial court could not impose sentence on three counts of murder.

A defendant may not be sentenced for both murder and felony murder under § 35-42-1-1 when both counts arise from one homicide.

Williams v. State · filed 1982-01-19

In this case the charged offenses of murder and felony murder arose out of the homicide of one individual. Therefore, the trial court could not impose a sentence on both counts of murder.

Section 35-42-1-1 does not permit separate sentences for murder and felony murder when only one person died.

Fletcher v. State · filed 1982-12-13

The record of proceeding reflects that there was but one person who died in the course of the felonious assault at the Balsam Street address. Under these circumstances the trial court could not impose sentence upon two counts of murder.

Section 35-42-1-1 permits only one murder sentence for a single homicide, even when the defendant is convicted under multiple murder theories.

Sandlin v. State · filed 1984-04-19

Since this case involves the homicide of only one person, the trial court improperly sentenced Appellant on three counts of murder.

Section 35-42-1-1 does not permit separate convictions for intentional murder and felony murder arising from one homicide.

Robinson v. State · filed 1985-05-10

In this direct appeal he correctly argues, and the state concedes, that his convictions for both murder and felony murder constitutes double punishment because the charges resulted from just one homicide.

The murder of each person is a separate offense, so multiple murder convictions do not merge merely because they arose from one act.

Fisher v. State · filed 1996-10-07

Fisher's argument that concurrent sentences are warranted because these crimes all purportedly arose out of "one act" flies in the face of applicable law: murder of one person is a separate offense. Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1 (Supp.1992). Hence, the merger doctrine does not apply here.

Section 35-42-1-1 defines a separate murder offense for each death, even when multiple deaths occur in one incident.

Davis v. State · filed 1998-02-25

Thus, the offense prohibited by Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1 is violated each time a death occurs, even if more than one death occurs in the course of a single incident.

Convictions for murder and felony murder under this section cannot both stand for one homicide; when the defendant is also convicted of another felony, the felony murder conviction is vacated.

Phelps v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-11-20(1), (2)

Our Supreme Court has made clear that a defendant cannot be convicted of both murder and felony murder for a single homicide. ... We believe that this reasoning is sound and that it applies to the facts of this case. Consequently, on remand, the trial court is instructed to vacate Phelps’s conviction for felony murder.

Murder committed in the course of a robbery does not require the mental state required for voluntary manslaughter, so voluntary manslaughter is not a lesser included offense.

Wilber v. State · filed 1984-03-05(2)

In this case, voluntary manslaughter does not satisfy the first step because it is composed of a mental state element not required of murder in the course of a robbery.

Assisting a criminal is not an inherently included lesser offense of murder because murder can be committed without it.

Reynolds v. State · filed 1984-03-14

It is obvious that one may commit murder without committing the crime of assisting a criminal; hence, assisting a criminal is not an "inherently included" lesser offense of murder.

Reckless homicide is generally a lesser included offense of murder, but an instruction requires evidence that the killing was merely reckless.

Mitchell v. State · filed 1989-07-18

The murder count alleged the appellant knowingly killed Lowe by shooting him. This pleading is not cast in such a manner as to exclude reckless homicide as a possible lesser and included offense. The evidence here, however, shows that the victim was shot in the back of the head in the middle of the night along a country road after being kidnapped and robbed and while his hands were taped behind his back. There is a dearth of evidence from which a jury could conclude that the state of mind of the person who inflicted that fatal wound was merely reckless. The refusal to give an instruction on reckless homicide was clearly warranted by the evidence.

Battery is not inherently a lesser included offense of murder, but a murder charge can allege all the elements of battery.

Ratcliffe v. State · filed 1990-05-17(1)

Battery is not inherently a lesser included offense of murder. The information charging Ratcliffe with murder, however, contained all the elements of battery.

A murder charge permits a voluntary manslaughter instruction when either party introduces evidence of sudden heat, even if the charge does not allege sudden heat.

Reinbold v. State · filed 1990-06-08(1)

In a murder trial, once evidence of sudden heat is introduced by either party, an instruction on voluntary manslaughter is appropriate.

Battery is not an inherently included offense of murder; a battery instruction on an attempted murder charge depends on whether the charging language supports it.

Hoskins v. State · filed 1990-12-12

In Johnson, we stated that battery is not an inherently included offense of murder and then, by comparing the statutory elements of the lesser offense with the factual allegations set forth in the charge on the greater offense, we determined that the instruction was properly given. ... An examination of the statutes and the charging instrument here shows that the State did, in fact, draft its charge against appellant so as to foreclose to him the possibility of conviction on the lesser charge of battery.

Reckless homicide is an inherently included offense of murder, so the wording of a murder charge cannot preclude an instruction on reckless homicide.

Wright v. State · filed 1995-11-17

Because Reckless Homicide is an inherently included offense of Murder, an information charging Murder cannot be drafted so as to preclude an instruction on Reckless Homicide.

Murder requires a knowing or intentional killing; an involuntary manslaughter instruction is warranted when the evidence seriously disputes whether the defendant intended to kill or batter.

Lynch v. State · filed 1991-05-17(1)

Murder is defined as knowingly or intentionally killing another human being. ... Here, where the distinguishing element is intent, the lesser included instruction will be warranted only if there is a serious evidentiary dispute about what Lynch intended to do — kill or batter.

Voluntary manslaughter is an inherently lesser included offense of murder because sudden heat mitigates conduct that otherwise has the same elements.

Horan v. State · filed 1997-06-27

A comparison of the Murder and Voluntary Manslaughter statutes demonstrates that the elements of these crimes are identical save for the mitigating factor of “sudden heat.” Voluntary Manslaughter is an inherently lesser included offense of Murder.

Assisting a criminal is not an inherently included lesser offense of felony murder under subsection (2).

Wright v. State · filed 1997-12-29(2)

Accordingly, the crime of assisting a criminal is neither an inherently nor factually included lesser offense of murder, and the court properly refused to give the requested instruction.

Reckless homicide is inherently included in murder because it requires a lesser degree of culpability.

Charlton v. State · filed 1998-12-07

A comparison of these two statutes indicates that Reckless Homicide is an inherently lesser included offense of Murder; the only distinguishing factor between Reckless Homicide and Murder is the lesser culpability.

Reckless homicide is an inherently included lesser offense of murder because the offenses differ in the required state of mind.

Fish v. State · filed 1999-05-19

Because the only distinguishing element between Murder and Reckless Homicide is the state of mind required for commission of the offenses (“knowing or intentional” for Murder and “reckless” for Reckless Homicide), ... Reckless Homicide is an inherently included lesser offense of Murder.

Voluntary manslaughter differs from murder by the mitigating factor of sudden heat.

Wilson v. State · filed 1998-07-17

The offense of voluntary manslaughter differs from murder in that it involves the mitigating factor of sudden heat.

Section 35-42-1-1(1) makes a knowing or intentional killing murder; repeated blows with a bat can establish awareness of a high probability of death and leave no basis for a reckless homicide instruction.

Lyttle v. State · filed 1999-04-16(1)

If the killing was by a knowing or intentional act, the defendant has committed the crime of murder. Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1(1) (1998). ... We do not believe that Lyttle, by repeatedly hitting James with a bat, could have acted without an awareness of the high probability that this conduct could result in death.

Voluntary manslaughter is inherently included in murder because sudden heat mitigates murder to voluntary manslaughter.

Allen v. State · filed 1999-09-28

‘Voluntary manslaughter is simply murder mitigated by evidence of ‘sudden heat,’ ” ... and as such is an inherently lesser included offense of murder.

Criminal recklessness is an inherently lesser included offense of murder because culpability is the sole distinguishing element.

Miller v. State · filed 1999-11-18

Culpability remains the sole distinguishing element, and as such, makes criminal recklessness an inherently lesser-ineluded offense of murder.

Murder does not inherently include assisting a criminal as a lesser offense because their statutory elements differ.

Hauk v. State · filed 2000-06-08

Assisting a criminal is not an inherently lesser-included offense of murder or robbery because a comparison of the statutory elements reveals several differences between the elements in each of the charged crimes and those of assisting a criminal.

Reckless homicide and involuntary manslaughter are inherently included offenses of murder because they require a lesser degree of culpability.

Williams v. State · filed 2001-09-26(1)

The only feature distinguishing reckless homicide and involuntary manslaughter from murder is that a lesser culpability is required to establish the commission of the lesser offenses; they are, therefore, inherently included offenses of murder.

When murder is charged, a reckless homicide instruction is proper if the evidence creates a serious dispute over whether the killing was knowing or intentional rather than reckless.

Garrett v. State · filed 2001-09-28

Therefore, there was a serious evidentiary dispute as to whether Garrett knowingly or intentionally killed her son, as alleged in the charging information, or whether she did so recklessly. As a result, the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury regarding reckless homicide.

A murder charge alleging that the defendant killed by shooting can make involuntary manslaughter a factually included lesser offense because the alleged shooting constitutes a battery.

Ketcham v. State · filed 2003-01-09(1)

Killing an individual with a handgun is necessarily accomplished by touching someone in a rude, insolent, or angry manner. See Lynch v. State, 571 N.E.2d 537, 539 (Ind.1991), reh'g denied. As such, we find that the information did assert a battery, and involuntary manslaughter was a factually included lesser offense of murder.

Murder requires a knowing or intentional killing, and criminal recklessness is an inherently lesser-included offense because culpability is the sole distinguishing element.

Hamilton v. State · filed 2003-03-05(1)

Murder occurs when a person (1) knowingly or intentionally (2) kills (8) another human being. Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1(1). Culpability remains the sole distinguishing element between erimi-nal recklessness and murder and as such makes criminal recklessness an inherently lesser-included offense of murder.

An involuntary manslaughter instruction is not required in a murder case when the evidence raises no serious dispute that the killing was knowing.

Wilson v. State · filed 2002-04-16

We agree with the trial court that this evidence does not raise a serious evidentiary dispute as to whether the killing was done knowingly. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's tendered instruction on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense.

Reckless homicide is an inherently included lesser offense of murder.

Fisher v. State · filed 2004-06-17(1)

Thus, reckless homicide is an inherently included lesser offense of murder.

Reckless homicide is an inherently included lesser offense of murder because the two offenses differ only in the required state of mind.

Pinkston v. State · filed 2005-01-26

In comparing the elements of these statutes, it is apparent that reckless homicide is an inherently included lesser offense of murder, because the only element distinguishing the two offenses is the defendant's state of mind.

A murder charge inherently includes voluntary manslaughter, and appreciable evidence of sudden heat can require a voluntary manslaughter instruction.

Clark v. State · filed 2005-09-14

Because voluntary manslaughter is inherently included in a murder charge, we turn to the final step of the Wright analysis to determine whether Clark's instruction should have been granted. ... Accordingly, the trial court should have given an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.

When a murder charge alleges only a knowing or intentional killing and does not allege a battery, involuntary manslaughter is not a factually included lesser offense requiring a jury instruction.

Norris v. State · filed 2011-01-31(1)

Because the charging information alleges only a knowing or intentional killing and does not assert a battery, involuntary manslaughter is not a factually included lesser offense of murder. Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter.

Murder requires a knowing or intentional killing, and a reckless homicide instruction is unwarranted when the evidence leaves no serious dispute that the defendant knew his conduct could cause death.

Jones v. State · filed 2011-05-23

Here, as in Horan and Lyttle, the protracted nature of the conduct is such that Jones could not have been without an awareness that his actions could result in Takash’s death. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding no serious evidentiary dispute; the Reckless Homicide instruction was properly refused.

Reckless homicide is an inherently included offense of murder because it requires a lesser degree of culpability.

Griffin v. State · filed 2012-03-21

Thus, reckless homicide is an inherently included offense of murder.

Voluntary manslaughter is an inherently included lesser offense of murder because both require proof of the same material elements.

Y. Collins v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-03-23

Voluntary manslaughter is an inherently included lesser offense of murder because proof of the same material elements is required.

Murder under subsection (1) requires a knowing or intentional killing; reckless homicide is an inherently included lesser offense when the evidence seriously disputes the defendant’s state of mind.

Webb v. State · filed 2012-03-23(1)

Applying the foregoing framework, as to the first two prongs of the Wright test the only element distinguishing murder and reckless homicide is the defendant’s state of mind: reckless homicide occurs when the defendant “recklessly” kills another human being, and murder occurs when the killing is done “knowingly” or “intentionally.” ... Thus, reckless homicide is an inherently included lesser offense of murder.

Voluntary manslaughter is an inherently included lesser offense of murder because both require proof of the same material elements.

Collins v. State · filed 2012-04-19

Voluntary manslaughter is an inherently included lesser offense of murder because proof of the same material elements is required.

Murder requires an intentional or knowing killing; a reckless homicide instruction is unwarranted when there is no serious evidentiary dispute over that mental state.

Griffin v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-03-21

Murder is the intentional or knowing killing of another. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. ... Thus, reckless homicide is an inherently included offense of murder. Fields v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1315, 1322 (Ind. 1997). ... The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding no serious evidentiary dispute; the reckless homicide instruction was properly refused.

A reckless homicide instruction in a murder prosecution requires evidence supporting a serious dispute over whether the defendant killed recklessly rather than knowingly or intentionally.

Johnson v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-04-30(1)

We see no serious evidentiary dispute concerning Johnson’s state of mind when he shot Bell. ... Therefore, it reasonably can be inferred Johnson knowingly fired his gun with the intent to hit Bell. ... Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to instruct the jury on reckless homicide because the evidence did not support such an instruction.

For a murder charge based on a knowing killing, a reckless homicide instruction is unwarranted without a serious evidentiary dispute over whether the killing was knowing or reckless.

Lane v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-10-25

On the specific facts of this case, a jury could not reasonably conclude that Lane acted recklessly but not knowingly when he fired the shot that killed Hooper. An instruction on reckless homicide was, therefore, not warranted.

A murder charge alleging only a knowing or intentional killing does not support an instruction on involuntary manslaughter as a factually included lesser offense when the charging information does not allege battery.

Petty v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-05-07(1)

Because the information did not assert a battery, involuntary manslaughter in this case was not a factually included lesser offense of murder. The trial court therefore did not err in refusing to give the instruction involuntary manslaughter.

A murder charge does not support an attempted aggravated battery conviction as a lesser included offense when the conviction rests on facts different from those alleged in the murder information.

Young v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-06-12

The trial court found the alleged facts underlying Young’s murder charge were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and his conviction for attempted aggravated battery was based on other evidence presented at trial. Thus, Young’s attempted aggravated battery conviction is not a lesser included offense of the murder charge.

Reckless homicide is an inherently included lesser offense of murder.

Abbott v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-10-07(1)

Reckless homicide is an inherently lesser included offense of murder.

Attempted voluntary manslaughter is an inherently included lesser offense of attempted murder.

Samelton v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-06-16

For the same reasons, attempted voluntary manslaughter is an inherently included offense of attempted murder.

A reckless-homicide instruction as a lesser included offense of murder requires a serious evidentiary dispute over whether the defendant killed recklessly or knowingly.

Jones v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-05-26(1)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to instruct the jury on reckless homicide as a lesser included offense of murder because there was no serious evidentiary dispute regarding Jones’ mens rea when he shot at Kimmons.

Reckless homicide is an inherently included offense of murder because the offenses differ in the required mental state; an instruction requires a serious evidentiary dispute about culpability.

Pitts v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-11-30

The only difference between the two is the mens rea element, and therefore, reckless homicide is an inherently included offense of murder. ... Based on the evidence presented at Pitts’s trial, we conclude that no serious evidentiary dispute existed regarding Pitts’s culpability, and the evidence did not warrant an instruction on reckless homicide.

Reckless homicide is an inherently included lesser offense of murder because the two offenses differ in the required culpability.

Walker v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-12-20

Reckless homicide is an inherently included lesser offense of murder, as the only element distinguishing the two is the requisite culpability.

Reckless homicide is an inherently included lesser offense of murder; the two differ in the required culpability.

Connors v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-04-30

Reckless homicide is an inherently included lesser offense of murder, as the only element distinguishing the two is the requisite culpability.

Involuntary manslaughter is not an inherently lesser included offense of murder.

Blackburn v. State of Indiana · filed 2019-08-19

It is well established, as Blackburn concedes, that involuntary manslaughter is not an inherently lesser included offense of murder.

Murder requires proof of a knowing or intentional killing; when repeated shots leave no serious evidentiary dispute about that mental state, a reckless homicide instruction is unwarranted.

Jefferson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-03-12

When the State seeks to prove the crime of murder, it must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant “knowingly or intentionally” killed another human being. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. ... Shooting a victim multiple times is evidence of an awareness of a high probability that the victim will be killed. ... The Webb case is factually distinguishable from Jefferson’s case, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give Jefferson’s proposed jury instruction on reckless homicide.

Reckless homicide is an inherently included lesser offense of murder because the offenses differ only in the required mental state.

Lairson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-08-31

Reckless homicide is an inherently included offense of murder, as the only element distinguishing the two is the mens rea.

A reckless homicide instruction on a murder charge requires a serious evidentiary dispute over whether the killing was reckless rather than knowing.

Bennett v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-09-18(1)

Because there was no serious evidentiary dispute as to whether Bennett acted recklessly instead of knowingly, the trial court properly denied his request to instruct the jury regarding the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide.

Section 35-42-1-1(1) requires a knowing or intentional killing; reckless homicide differs from murder in its required mental state.

Hileman v. State of Indiana · filed 2023-11-22(1)

As the only difference between reckless homicide and murder is the mens rea element, reckless homicide is an inherently included offense of murder.

Assisting a criminal is not inherently included in murder and is not factually included when the murder charge alleges participation in the killing rather than assistance afterward.

Shabazz v. State of Indiana · filed 2025-03-18(1)

Our Indiana Supreme Court has consistently held that assisting a criminal is not inherently included in the offense of murder, and this is readily apparent upon comparing the two statutes. ... This charge contemplates Shabazz’s direct participation in the murder of Ferris and does not allege that the crime charged could be proven by showing that Shabazz merely assisted others after they had killed Ferris. Accordingly, assisting a criminal was not factually included in the crime charged and the trial court properly declined to instruct the jury as such.

Murder requires a knowing or intentional killing; reckless homicide is an inherently lesser-included offense because it differs only in the required level of culpability.

Kelley Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-07-02

The only difference between murder and reckless homicide is the level of culpability. Murder requires the perpetrator to act knowingly or intentionally, whereas reckless homicide requires only that the perpetrator act recklessly. Consequently, reckless homicide is an inherently lesser-included offense of murder.

A reckless homicide instruction is unwarranted when there is no serious evidentiary dispute that the defendant knowingly killed the victim.

Perkins v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-07-14

In light of Mona’s gunshot injuries, including two on the left side of her back, and the record, we cannot say there was a serious evidentiary dispute that Perkins knowingly shot her, and we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give the proposed instruction on reckless homicide.

Murder requires a knowing or intentional killing; a reckless homicide instruction requires a serious evidentiary dispute over that state of mind.

Vanryn v. State of Indiana · filed 2020-09-30(1)

Murder, on the other hand, occurs when the killing is done “knowingly” or “intentionally.” I.C. § 35-42-1-1. ... Accordingly, Vanryn was entitled to an instruction on reckless homicide if there was a serious evidentiary dispute permitting the jury to find that he recklessly but not knowingly killed M.G. See McEwen v. State, 695 N.E.2d 79, 85 (Ind. 1998). ... Based on this evidence, there was no serious evidentiary dispute permitting the jury to find that Vanryn recklessly killed M.G. See id. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to give the jury Vanryn’s tendered instruction on the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide.

A killing during a robbery can be felony murder even if the shooting was accidental; a reckless homicide instruction requires a serious evidentiary dispute about whether the killing occurred during the robbery.

Shannon v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-07-22(2)

Here, even if Shannon had only shot Dowell accidentally, he would still be guilty of felony murder, not reckless homicide. As such, he would not be entitled to the instruction on reckless homicide unless he could additionally show that there was a serious evidentiary dispute as to whether the shooting occurred during the commission of an armed robbery.

When sudden heat is introduced, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not committed in sudden heat to sustain a murder conviction.

Ronk v. State · filed 1984-11-29

It is well settled that both murder and voluntary manslaughter can be proved by evidence of the knowing or intentional killing of another human being and that sudden heat is a mitigating factor in conduct that would otherwise be murder. ... When the presence of sudden heat is introduced into the case, the state carries the burden of negating the presence of sudden heat beyond a reasonable doubt.

Murder is a knowing or intentional killing; a guilty verdict for murder is consistent with an acquittal of voluntary manslaughter when sudden heat is insufficient to mitigate the killing.

Bane v. State · filed 1992-02-25

Murder is the knowing or intentional killing of another person. Voluntary manslaughter is the knowing or intentional killing of another person while acting under the condition of sudden heat. Sudden heat is a mitigating factor that reduces what otherwise would be murder to a lesser degree felony. By returning a verdict of guilty of murder and not guilty of voluntary manslaughter, the jury has simply concluded that the condition of sudden heat was not sufficiently present to warrant mitigation. The verdicts are not contradictory.

Section 35-42-1-1 does not require proof that sudden heat was absent; sudden heat mitigates murder to voluntary manslaughter.

Misztal v. State · filed 1992-09-17(1)

The absence of sudden heat is not an element of the crime of murder.

For murder, the State need not disprove sudden heat unless the defendant puts it in issue; once raised, the State must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt.

Harris v. State · filed 1999-05-21

But once a defendant places sudden heat into issue, the State then bears the burden of negating the presence of sudden heat beyond a reasonable doubt.

When a defendant raises sudden heat, the State must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a murder conviction.

Earl v. State · filed 1999-09-16

However, once a defendant places sudden heat into issue, the State then bears the burden of negating the presence of sudden heat beyond a reasonable doubt.

Once a defendant puts sudden heat at issue, the State must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a murder conviction.

Evans v. State · filed 2000-05-04

However, once a defendant places sudden heat into issue, the State then bears the burden of negating the presence of sudden heat beyond a reasonable doubt.

The absence of sudden heat is not a statutory element of murder, but when evidence of sudden heat is presented, the State must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a murder conviction.

Massey v. State · filed 2011-10-19

We observe that the absence of sudden heat is not a statutory element of murder. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. To be clear, if there is no evidence of sudden heat, the State is not required to prove the absence of sudden heat beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a murder conviction. It bears repeating that only when evidence of sudden heat is presented does the State assume the burden of proving the absence of sudden heat to obtain a murder conviction.

Murder does not include the absence of sudden heat as an implied element; the State need not disprove sudden heat unless the defendant puts it in issue.

Finney v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-12-17

Because there is no implied element of the absence of sudden heat in the crime of murder, the State is under no obligation to negate the presence of sudden heat to obtain a conviction. Id. However, once a defendant places sudden heat into issue, the State bears the burden of negating the presence of sudden heat beyond a reasonable doubt.

A murder conviction may stand despite a sudden-heat claim when the evidence supports the jury’s rejection of sudden heat.

Whitt v. State of Indiana · filed 2018-02-13

The fact that the jury convicted Whitt of murder was a rejection of his sudden-heat contention, and there is ample evidence in the record to support the jury’s verdict.

Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to murder because no element of murder contains the phrases required for that defense.

Sills v. State · filed 1984-05-14

Since intoxication is only a defense in crimes involving an element with the words "with intent to" or "with an intention to," and since no element of murder contains these words, it was not error to refuse to give defendant's tendered instructions numbered 6, 7, and 8, all dealing with intoxication.

A conviction for knowing murder under subsection (1) does not merge with a robbery conviction, so sentences may be imposed for both.

Swafford v. State · filed 1986-10-21(1)

Here, we find the merger doctrine inapplicable to the con-viections for murder under Ind.Code § 85-42-1-1(1) and for robbery.

A murder charge under subsection (1) does not make robbery an underlying element, so separate convictions for voluntary manslaughter and robbery may stand.

Smith v. State · filed 1990-02-15(1)

Smith was charged with murder pursuant to I.C. 35-42-1-1(1). Hence, the robbery conviction was not an underlying element of proof necessary for the murder conviction, and the State became bound to prove an intent to kill. As charged, then, each crime required proof of at least one element which the other did not. Conviction of both voluntary manslaughter and robbery was therefore proper.

Murder requires a killing, an element distinct from confinement and robbery, and separate convictions are permitted when the crimes occur in sufficiently separate episodes.

Brown v. State · filed 1996-08-07

Clearly the murder, confinement, and robbery statutes here contain mutually exclusive elements-the killing of another human being, the confinement of another person without the person's consent, and the taking of property from another person. ... Here there was abundant evidence that the victims were confined, robbed and killed in sufficiently separate episodes as to not violate double jeopardy-there was an initial attack rendering the victims immobile (the confinement), followed by the cutting of their throats (the killing), which in turn was followed by the taking of their property (the robbery).

The murder statute does not permit separate convictions and sentences for intentional murder and felony murder for the same killing. A defendant may be convicted of intentional murder and the felony underlying a felony murder charge if the felony murder conviction is vacated.

Henson v. State · filed 1999-03-16

We conclude that the trial court acted properly. ... Kennedy reiterated the following principles: a defendant may not be convicted and sentenced for both intentional murder and felony murder with respect to the same killing. Nor may a defendant be convicted and sentenced for both felony-murder and the underlying felony. But in appropriate circumstances, a defendant may be convicted and sentenced for both intentional murder and a felony which serves as the predicate for a felony-murder charge so long as the felony-murder conviction is vacated.

Intent to kill one person can support a murder conviction when the defendant accidentally kills another person instead.

Corbett v. State · filed 2002-03-19

By the language of the instruction, the jury was essentially told that if the defendant, acting with the intent to kill Davis, accidentally killed Massengill; the defendant may be found guilty of the murder of Massengill, This is not a mandatory instruction. It permitted, but did not require, the jury to find guilt.

A person may knowingly or intentionally kill under the murder statute even when the person mistakes the victim for someone else.

Caruthers v. State · filed 2009-07-15(1)

In order to convict Caruthers of murder, the State had to prove that he "knowingly or intentionally kill[ed]" Turner. I.C. § 35-42-1-1(1). As enumerated in the facts above, there is ample evidence from which a jury could find that Caruthers knowingly or intentionally killed Turner, even though he was under the mistaken impression that it was Miller he was shooting.

A defendant who intends to kill one person may be convicted of murdering another person under the doctrine of transferred intent.

Gutierrez v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-10-21

We therefore conclude that, under the doctrine of transferred intent, the evidence is sufficient to support Gutierrez’s conviction for murdering Herrera.

A murder conviction may rest on knowingly or intentionally aiding a shooter who aims at one person but kills another.

Bradbury v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-05-15

This is sufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Bradbury knowingly or intentionally aided, induced, or caused Griffin to shoot at L.B., striking and killing J.S. instead.

A murder jury may be instructed on transferred intent when evidence supports that the defendant’s shots were intended for someone other than the person killed, even if that evidence is weak or inconsistent.

Brumfield v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-04-01

While there was conflicting evidence as to whether T.C. was the only occupant inside the red vehicle, Gavin’s testimony, although weak and inconsistent as compared to J-Dot’s testimony, supported the jury instruction on transferred intent.

For accomplice liability for murder, the person aided must have knowingly or intentionally killed another human being.

Taylor v. State · filed 2005-01-14(1)

However, the jury was not instructed that the person that Taylor was aiding, inducing, or causing to kill Anderson had to do so with a knowing or intentional mens rea to constitute murder.

Firing a firearm at a group of fleeing people can support a finding of intent to kill under the murder statute.

Ware v. State · filed 2007-01-09

We agree with the State's argument that Ware's intent to kill can be demonstrated by the fact that Ware fired a firearm at a group of fleeing boys.

A murder conviction under subsection (1) can rest on proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally aided another person’s knowing or intentional killing.

McDuffy v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-09-10(1)

To convict McDuffy of murder as charged, the State was required to prove that McDuffy knowingly or intentionally aided, induced, or caused another to commit the knowing or intentional killing of Keys. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1). ... This evidence was sufficient to support McDuffy’s conviction for murder under a theory of accomplice liability.

Section 35-42-1-1(1) supports a murder conviction for an accomplice who knows the shooter could kill someone and helps position the shooter for the fatal shots.

Vargas-Rodriguez v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-08-09(1)

Ramirez announced that he found more bullets as he reloaded his gun, and Vargas-Rodriguez knew that there was a high probability that Ramirez could kill someone when he pulled his car next to the truck on Olive Street. Therefore, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Vargas- Rodriguez committed murder when he chased the truck, pulled up next to it, and aided Ramirez to make his final two shots.

Section 35-42-1-1 permits a felony murder conviction when the evidence supports an inference that the defendant aided the underlying robbery as a getaway driver.

Hayes v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-03-18

Therefore, the State presented sufficient evidence to support Hayes’ conviction of felony murder.

The murder statute does not clearly permit or prohibit separate punishment for murdering and robbing the same victim.

Diaz v. State of Indiana · filed 2020-10-02(1)

Applying the test here, we first observe that neither the murder statute nor the robbery statute clearly permits (or prohibits) multiple punishment for the murder and robbery of the same victim.

Felony murder and robbery involving different victims are separate offenses, so the robbery is not an included offense of felony murder.

Bryant v. State of Indiana · filed 2025-11-17(2)

Here, Bryant’s robbery conviction was not factually or inherently included in the felony-murder conviction because they involved different victims and, therefore, the State has charged a separate material element.