Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1

Severe injuries and an admission to inflicting them can support an inference beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly killed the victim.

Doerner v. State · filed 1986-12-03

The severity of these injuries, when viewed in light of appellant's admission, is sufficient to support the inference beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knowingly killed the victim.

Circumstantial evidence linking the accused to the victim, a weapon of the same caliber, the murder scene, and flight in the victim’s car can support a murder conviction.

Blue v. State · filed 1987-03-10

This evidence indicates that appellant threatened harm to the victim, that appellant was with the victim shortly before the killing, that appellant was armed with the same caliber weapon as the murder weapon, that appellant was present at the apartment murder scene at least once after he moved out of that apartment, that appellant had a sexual relationship with the victim and that the victim experienced similar sexual contact at or immediately before the time of the killing, and that appellant fled to Gary, Indiana in the victim’s car after the killing. This is sufficient evidence to support his murder conviction.

Intent to kill for murder may be inferred from using a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.

Melendez v. Indiana · filed 1987-08-20

The necessary intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.

Intent for murder under Section 35-42-1-1 may be proved through the defendant’s conduct before, during, and after a shooting.

Hill v. State · filed 1987-10-13

The requisite intent for murder was sufficiently proven by the evidence showing that Hill grabbed the gun immediately before the shooting, that he fired the second shot after Morgan was laying on the ground, that he admitted killing Morgan, and that he threatened with death all of the people who had any knowledge of the events that night.

Section 35-42-1-1 requires a knowing or intentional killing; intent may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.

Hickman v. State · filed 1987-11-24

Under Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1, a person commits murder if he knowingly or intentionally kills the victim. ... The necessary intent to commit murder may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.

Intent to kill for attempted murder may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.

Jones v. State · filed 1988-06-01(1)

The necessary intent to commit murder may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.

Evidence of planning and deliberation can sustain a murder conviction against a claim of sudden heat.

McBroom v. State · filed 1988-11-22

Although he testified he shot Ott after Ott laughed about raping McBroom’s daughter, the evidence of premeditation and deliberation is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict for murder.

In an attempted murder prosecution, the jury may infer intent to kill from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.

Beadin v. State · filed 1989-02-02(1)

The jury may infer intent to kill from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.

The State must prove the knowing element of murder, and intent to kill may be inferred from using a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm.

Light v. State · filed 1989-12-15

Third, the State carries the burden of proof on the “knowingly” element of murder. Intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm.

Section 35-42-1-1(1) requires proof of a knowing or intentional killing, and a single hand blow causing an unusual fatal injury did not establish intent to kill under these circumstances.

Nunn v. State · filed 1992-10-23(1)

The evidence reveals that Nunn and Aldridge did not exchange words, that Nunn struck Aldridge once with his hands, and that the cause of death, a severed vertebral artery, is an unusual injury. The evidence reveals that Nunn committed a battery and that Aldridge died shortly after the battery. Although under other circumstances, an intent to kill may be inferred from a single blow, we do not believe that it is established here. ... Therefore, we hold that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a murder conviction and direct that the judgment of the trial court be modified to involuntary manslaughter in conformity with this opinion.

Section 35-42-1-1(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim; intent to kill may be inferred from using a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.

Coleman v. State · filed 1998-04-24(1)

To obtain a conviction for murder, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim. ... Further, intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.

A knowing killing under the murder statute may be inferred from using a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.

Barker v. State · filed 1998-06-12

To support a conviction of murder, knowing killing may be inferred from a defendant’s use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.

Intent to commit murder may be inferred from using a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury.

Shields v. State · filed 1998-08-21

It is well-settled that the use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury is sufficient evidence of intent to support a conviction for murder.

Murder requires proof of a knowing killing; knowledge may be inferred when the defendant was aware of a high probability that her conduct would cause death.

Jones v. State · filed 1998-11-13

As for Jones’ argument that the State failed to establish the requisite intent, we observe that in this case, a mens rea of knowledge was an essential element of the Murder charge. ... The jury could reasonably conclude that Jones was aware of a high probability that Brandon’s death would result from her act of beating him.

Murder requires a knowing or intentional killing; firing repeated shots into a victim, including after the victim falls, can support a finding of that mental state beyond a reasonable doubt.

Rascoe v. State of Indiana · filed 2000-10-25

The defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that his killing of the victim was knowing or intentional, as required to convict for murder. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. ... From this evidence, the fact-finder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the decedent.

Section 35-42-1-1 covers a knowing killing; the defendant’s state of mind distinguishes murder from reckless homicide.

Dearman v. State · filed 2001-03-09

Murder, as charged in this case, occurs when the killing is done “knowingly.”

A single vicious blow to the head with a hard object can support an inference that the defendant knowingly killed the victim under the murder statute.

Williams v. State · filed 2001-06-28

Here, in contrast to Nunn, the State presented evidence of a vicious blow to the head with a hard object. The injury was not uncommon for that kind of impact. A jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that Defendant knowingly killed the victim.

A murder conviction under subsection (1) is supported when the evidence permits a jury reasonably to find that the defendant knowingly killed another person.

Hornbostel v. State · filed 2001-10-19(1)

Consequently, we find that the jury could reasonably find that Hornbostel knowingly killed Sneed. See Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1(1).

A murder conviction may rest on evidence and reasonable inferences establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victims.

Scruggs v. State · filed 2000-10-31

From the evidence and its reasonable inferences, a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed Lucas and Oliver.

Evidence of fatal stab wounds and the defendant's admission to the stabbing can support a murder conviction.

Carroll v. State · filed 2001-03-26

The victim died from stab and slash wounds, some inflicted with great force. The defendant admitted to police that he stabbed the victim. The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's murder conviction.

Circumstantial evidence can support a murder conviction when it permits a reasonable inference that the defendant shot and killed the victim.

Hubbard v. State of Indiana · filed 2001-06-28

Defendant Chauncey Hubbard was convicted of murder for shooting a man to death. We affirm, finding that the testimony of three witnesses present at the scene of the crime, together with the other evidence presented at trial, was sufficient to support the conviction.

Murder requires a knowing or intentional killing, and its required mental state may be inferred from using a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or serious bodily injury.

Booker v. State · filed 2000-12-29

Thus, it can be said that the mens rea to commit murder may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or serious bodily injury.

A murder conviction is supported when the evidence and reasonable inferences allow a fact-finder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim.

Forrest v. State · filed 2001-11-15

From the evidence and resulting reasonable inferences, a reasonable fact-finder may have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the child. The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's murder conviction.

Evidence that a defendant and his companions fired into an occupied house can support a murder conviction, either as the person who committed the murder or as an accomplice.

Bruno v. State · filed 2002-09-11(1)

We find that there was sufficient evidence that Defendant committed murder or aided or induced another in his group to commit murder. The State presented evidence that Defendant and his friends obtained weapons and assembled near the party. Witnesses stated that defendant and three others went to the back of the house and fired their weapons into the house, knowing that it was occupied.

For murder, intent to kill may be inferred from deliberately using a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury; the State need not prove intent to kill the person who died.

Driver v. State · filed 2002-01-15

The defendant also contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that "the State is not required to prove that the defendant intended to kill the actual victim" and that the "element of intent is satisfied if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly intended to kill someone." ... The intent to kill may be inferred from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury. ... Because the defendant fired his handgun at Keisha Williams, the trial court did not err in giving the instruction.

Murder requires intent to kill or awareness of a high probability that death will result; choking someone for at least forty-five seconds can establish that intent.

Erlewein v. State · filed 2002-09-30(1)

Choking someone for a minimum of forty-five seconds clearly evinces an intent to kill or, at the very least, an awareness of a high probability that death would result.

Firing a rifle toward where the victim stands can support a finding that the defendant knowingly killed the victim.

Dunlap v. State · filed 2002-01-29

From the evidence that, after an earlier argument with Ballard, the defendant returned to the Westbrook home armed with an assault rifle, and thereafter fired it two or three times at the sereen door where Ballard was standing, a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly killed Ballard.

Evidence of an admitted killing by a gunshot to the head is sufficient to support a murder conviction, including its intent element.

Alexander v. State · filed 2004-12-23

Further, with respect to Alexander's intent to kill Wife, the evidence demonstrates that Wife died of a single gunshot wound to the head. ... Accordingly, this evidence was sufficient to support Alexander's conviction for murder and retrial would not offend double jeopardy principles.

A murder conviction may rest entirely on circumstantial evidence.

Myers v. State · filed 2008-05-30

A conviction for murder may be based purely on circumstantial evidence.

Section 35-42-1-1 defines murder as knowingly or intentionally killing another human being; evidence of repeated choking can support a finding of a knowing killing.

Roberts v. State · filed 2008-10-15

A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being commits murder. I.C. § 35-42-1-1. ... This evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that Roberts knowingly killed Vanarsdale.

A person who fires repeatedly into an occupied home can satisfy murder’s knowing element when aware of a high probability that someone inside will be killed.

McClendon v. State · filed 2009-08-10

Although there were fewer people inside the house than in Jones or Bruno, these facts demonstrate McClendon was aware of a high probability he would kill someone inside the residence.

A jury may infer a knowing killing from evidence that the defendant struck the victim in the head with a pickax and boasted about it.

Rhoton v. State · filed 2010-12-22

On such evidence, the jury could reasonably have inferred that Rhoton knowingly killed Wilburn with the pickax. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Rhoton's conviction for murder.

Murder requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim; the mental state may be inferred from the circumstances of the shooting.

Lloyd v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-02-21

There is sufficient evidence to establish that Lloyd knowingly or intentionally killed Dabros, and Lloyd’s challenge to the jury’s verdict is without merit.

Circumstantial evidence that the victim was killed during a robbery can support a felony murder conviction under subsection (2).

Taylor v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-07-12(2)

From this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that Hunt was killed during the commission of a robbery. There is sufficient evidence to support the robbery underlying the felony murder conviction.

Murder requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another person; the jury may infer that mental state from the circumstances.

Logan B. Lake v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-02-29

The State was required to present evidence that Lake knowingly or intentionally killed Haynes. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. ... We conclude that the jury was presented with evidence from which it could have found that Lake knowingly or intentionally killed Haynes.

Subsection (1) defines murder as knowingly or intentionally killing another human being; the required mental state may be inferred from using a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily injury.

Mola v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-02-29(1)

Murder is defined as “knowingly or intentionally” killing another human being. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1). ... Knowing or intentional killing may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily injury. ... No serious evidentiary dispute was present regarding Mola‟s intent to kill Elkins.

Murder as a principal requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim; an accidental injury does not establish that intent.

Castillo v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-07-31

There was no evidence, however, that the defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the victim to hit her head on the table. The evidence only suggested that the injury was an accident.

Section 35-42-1-1 requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim; circumstantial evidence can support a murder conviction.

Stacey Huddleston, Jr. v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-12-10

To prove murder, a felony, the State was required to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Huddleston knowingly or intentionally killed S.G. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. ... That evidence is sufficient to support the murder conviction.

Section 35-42-1-1 requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another human being.

Jones v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-12-18

In order to convict Jones of murder, the State was required to establish that he “knowingly or intentionally kill[ed] another human being.” Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.

Admissions of killing can support a jury’s inference that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another person.

Spengler v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-05-16(1)

In light of the evidence supporting the verdict, including Spengler’s admissions to committing the crimes in question, the jury could reasonably infer that Spengler knowingly or intentionally killed Timothy M. Orman and that she aided in the knowing or intentional killing of Roy Orman.

Murder requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another person; repeated severe beatings after signs of serious injury can support a finding of a knowing killing.

Terry L. Sturgis, Sr. v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-06-27

To obtain a conviction for murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sturgis (1) knowingly or intentionally (2) killed (3) TS2. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. ... There is ample evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have determined that Sturgis knowingly killed TS2.

A murder conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly killed the victim.

Hockett v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-02-10

In order to convict Hockett of murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she knowingly killed K.H. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. ... We therefore conclude that all of this evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Hockett knowingly killed K.H. and to support her conviction for murder.

Circumstantial evidence can support a finding of intent to kill under the murder statute when it permits a reasonable inference of that intent.

Shaw v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-12-30(1)

Shaw was charged with “knowingly or intentionally kill[ing] another human being.” Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1). ... Even if the jury disregarded Blake’s testimony, the State presented DNA evidence, ballistic evidence, telephone records, text messages, and other evidence from which it is reasonable for the jury to infer Shaw intended to commit this murder.

A murder conviction under subsection (1) can rest on evidence that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim, even without another eyewitness.

Swallow v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-10-28(1)

The jury could reasonably conclude Swallow knowingly or intentionally killed Powell and, in an attempt to cover up his crime, concocted the claim of accidental shooting.

Section 35-42-1-1 requires proof that the defendant killed knowingly or intentionally; either mental state supports a murder conviction.

Byrd v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-04-28

The mens rea element of the crime of murder is disjunctive and requires the State to show either intent or knowledge. Thus, even if Byrd did not intend to kill his brother, a finding that he did so knowingly would support the conviction for the crime of murder.

A knowing killing may be inferred from using a deadly weapon in a way likely to cause death.

Miles v. State of Indiana · filed 2016-02-08(1)

Miles challenges a final instruction that stated: “A knowing killing may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a way likely to cause death.” (App. at 35.) ... Miles is right that the instruction is a correct statement of the law.

A murder conviction under subsection (1) requires proof of a knowing killing; evidence that the defendant shot the victim or was an accomplice can sustain the conviction.

Hoskin v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-11-24(1)

To convict Hoskin of Murder, as charged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Hoskin knowingly killed Ray by shooting him with a gun, thereby inflicting mortal injuries upon Ray such that he died. ... Taken together, this is sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Hoskin either shot Ray or was an accomplice to the murder and thus equally liable for the offense as charged.

Evidence that a hired shooter repeatedly shot the victim, who died from the wounds, is sufficient to support a murder conviction.

Singletary v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-12-31

The State proved that Sheaurice Major asked Singletary to kill Griffith in exchange for payment. Antoinetta Johnson facilitated the agreement between Major and Singletary and drove Singletary to Griffith’s home. Singletary waited for Griffith to return home from work and then shot him multiple times with an AK-47 or similar assault rifle. Singletary then ran to a nearby location where Antoinetta was waiting for him in her rented vehicle. Griffith died as a result of the gunshot wounds. This evidence is sufficient to support Singletary’s murder conviction. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.

Circumstantial evidence can support a murder conviction under Section 35-42-1-1 when the evidence as a whole permits the factfinder to infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Spearman v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-08-12

The aggregate evidence produces a “web of facts” that was sufficient for the trial court to infer Spearman’s guilt for murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

A conviction for murder in the perpetration of a robbery may be sustained by evidence from which a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Akeem Carpenter v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-08-11

Based upon the evidence favorable to the conviction, we conclude that the State presented evidence of a probative nature from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found Carpenter guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder in perpetration of a robbery.

The knowing or intentional killing element of murder may be established by repeated, forceful blows to the victim’s head that support an inference the defendant knew death was highly probable.

Littlejohn v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-04-10

However, the repetition as well as the force of the blows to Dial’s head support a reasonable inference that, at a minimum, Littlejohn was aware of a high probability that his actions would result in Dial’s death.

Murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly killed the victim; the jury may infer that knowledge from the force used.

Wagoner v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-10-17

To convict Wagoner of murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly killed Z.W. I.C. § 35-42-1-1. ... We find, based on the evidence in the record, that a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Wagoner knowingly killed Z.W. and we decline to reverse on this basis.

Circumstantial evidence can support a murder conviction when it permits a reasonable inference that the defendant killed the victim.

Smith v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-12-07

Based on the circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the jury’s verdict, a reasonable finder of fact could conclude as follows: Smith, who had pulled a gun on Knowles before, shot her in the head three times with her .22-caliber handgun, which her brother had brought her the day before.

A murder conviction is supported when the evidence permits a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another person.

Johnson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-06-30

The State presented sufficient evidence to permit the jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Johnson knowingly or intentionally killed Jackson and did not act in response to provocation sufficient to constitute sudden heat.

Section 35-42-1-1 permits a murder conviction based on circumstantial evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to infer that the defendant killed the victim.

Gholston v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-09-25

Although no single fact proves that Gholston murdered Dominique, we find that the collective circumstantial evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to infer that Gholston killed her.

A knowing killing under the murder statute requires awareness of a high probability that death would result from the defendant’s actions.

Decker v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-10-31(1)

We find a record replete with evidence that Decker was aware of a high probability that Thomas’ death would result from his actions.

Murder requires a knowing or intentional killing; a beating may be so severe that no reasonable person could find the killing merely reckless.

McDowell v. State of Indiana · filed 2018-05-30(1)

The beating inflicted on Rachel necessary to cause such injuries was so severe that no reasonable person could have found it to have been inflicted only recklessly without also having been done knowingly, i.e., “to engage in conduct with an awareness that the conduct has a high probability of resulting in death.”

A conviction under subsection (1) may be supported by circumstantial evidence of a knowing or intentional killing.

Dent v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-12-12(1)

Dent brutally murdered Fecht by tightly wrapping a scarf around Fecht’s neck and strangling her. Here, we conclude that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support Dent’s murder conviction.

A murder conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the defendant committed the killing.

Orr v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-02-23

Although there was no eyewitness to the crimes, or confession by Johnus of the crimes, and no single fact alone that proves Johnus killed Tiffanie and her unborn child, however, we find that the total of the collective circumstantial evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that Johnus killed Tiffanie and her unborn child.

A murder conviction under Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 is supported when the evidence permits a reasonable jury to find that the defendant shot and killed the victim.

Woody v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-05-25

Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 governs the crime of murder and provides that a person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being commits murder, a felony. ... Based upon the record, we conclude that the State presented evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found Woody guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder and robbery as a level 5 felony.

A person commits murder by knowingly or intentionally killing another human being, and circumstantial evidence alone can support a murder conviction.

Bixler v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-08-09

A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being commits murder, a felony. I.C. § 35-42-1-1. ... It is well established that a murder conviction may be sustained on circumstantial evidence alone. Lacey v. State, 755 N.E.2d 576, 578 (Ind. 2001). ... Based on the foregoing, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support Bixler’s murder conviction.

Under the murder statute, a jury may infer intent to kill from evidence that the defendant aimed a gun at a person and fired.

Griffin v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-10-07(1)

And to prove that Griffin committed murder, the State had to show that Griffin knowingly or intentionally killed another human being. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1) (2012). ... The jury was free to credit this testimony over Griffin’s assessment of the bullet’s trajectory, and there is no doubt that the jury is free to find an intent to kill from such evidence. ... Hence, we affirm Griffin’s conviction for murder.

Intent to kill under the murder statute may be inferred from the collective circumstantial evidence, even when no single fact proves intent.

Burns v. State of Indiana · filed 2016-09-08(1)

Although no single fact proves Burns’ intent to kill Hurd, we find that the collective circumstantial evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to infer that Burns intended to kill Hurd.

An intentional murder conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally killed the victim.

Chavez v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-12-02(1)

Because the State charged Chavez with an intentional killing, to obtain a conviction, it had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally killed Kim.

Murder requires a knowing or intentional killing, and intent to kill may be inferred from the attack and surrounding circumstances.

Gentry Hervie Jackson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-06-19(1)

To convict Jackson as charged, the State was required to prove that he knowingly or intentionally killed Alec. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1). The requisite intent to kill may be inferred from the nature of the attack and the circumstances surrounding the crime.

Section 35-42-1-1(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim.

Schafer v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-03-21(1)

To support a conviction for murder, the State was required to establish that Schafer knowingly or intentionally killed G.S.

A murder conviction under subsection (1) may be sustained by testimony that the defendant confessed to killing the victim.

Saintignon v. State of Indiana · filed 2019-01-17(1)

Here, Saintignon confessed to Barton just hours after her death that he had murdered Brown and had cleaned it up like a professional. This was direct evidence of Saintignon’s guilt which sustains his conviction.

A murder conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence even when the murder weapon is not found.

Snow v. State of Indiana · filed 2019-01-24

The fact that a murder weapon was not found is not determinative. ... Based on the foregoing, there was more than sufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Snow murdered Clifford and Joyce.

Section 35-42-1-1(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another human being.

Ratliff v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-04-18(1)

To prove Ratliff committed murder, the State needed to present evidence Ratliff “knowingly or intentionally kill[ed] another human being[.]” Ind. Code § 35- 42-1-1(1) (2017). ... The State presented sufficient evidence to prove Ratliff committed murder, and in the process of presenting that evidence, overcame Ratliff’s claim of self- defense.

Section 35-42-1-1(1)’s knowing-killing element can be satisfied by evidence that a defendant fired into an occupied house while aware of a high probability that someone inside would be killed.

D'Angelo A. Honorable v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-04-11(1)

Here, the State was required to establish that Honorable knowingly killed Hixson, and Honorable challenges only the State’s proof that he did it “knowingly.” Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1). ... We conclude that the State produced sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that Honorable had a knowing intent to kill.

The intent to kill required for murder may be inferred from the force and circumstances of an attack, even if a resulting fall caused the fatal injury.

Dequarius Walker v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-08-21

Even if the fall is what caused Hendon’s death, Johnson heard a loud crack and then Hendon fell to the ground with such force that he sustained a fatal injury. This is the type of evidence from which a jury could infer Walker’s intent to kill Hendon.

Section 35-42-1-1 defines murder as knowingly or intentionally killing another human being; evidence of a fatal bludgeoning and an admission can support a conviction.

Jaquail Smith v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-01-31

A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being commits murder. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. ... Smith admitted to his cellmate that he bludgeoned A.M. in the head with a glass mason jar because the infant was crying. ... The State presented substantial evidence of probative value to support the jury’s verdict.

A murder conviction under subsection (1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another human being; pointing and firing a gun toward the victim can support that finding.

Spivey Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-07-14(1)

We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Spivey had knowingly or intentionally killed Ford and his conviction of murder was supported by the evidence.

A murder conviction under § 35-42-1-1 may be supported by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences sufficient to establish guilt.

Lancaster v. State of Indiana · filed 2020-08-14

We find that this evidence, albeit circumstantial, plus the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence, could lead a reasonable factfinder to find that Lancaster was guilty of the three murders.

Section 35-42-1-1 permits a murder conviction when evidence that the defendant pointed a gun at the victim and pulled the trigger supports a finding of a knowing or intentional killing.

Morgan v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-12-30

Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 governs the crime of murder and provides that a person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being commits murder, a felony. ... At some point later, Morgan pointed the gun at Eup and pulled the trigger. We conclude that the State presented evidence of probative value from which a reasonable jury could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Morgan was guilty of murder.

Section 35-42-1-1(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another person; circumstantial evidence can support a murder conviction.

Carr v. State of Indiana · filed 2025-03-17(1)

To convict Carr of murder, the State was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Carr “knowingly or intentionally kill[ed]” Smith. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1). ... The weight of this evidence was properly left to the jury, and we conclude that a reasonable jury could find Carr guilty of murder.

A murder conviction under § 35-42-1-1 may rest on circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Chambers v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-03-23

Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 provides that a person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being commits murder. A conviction for murder may be sustained on circumstantial evidence alone. ... We conclude that evidence of probative value exists from which the court as the trier of fact could have found Chambers guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder.

Shooting a victim twice in the back supports a conviction for attempted murder.

Stewart v. State · filed 1985-03-06

The evidence that the defendant shot the victim twice in the back supports his conviction for attempted murder.

A killing that occurs after property is taken but before it is carried away can occur while committing robbery under the felony murder provision.

Stroud v. State · filed 1979-10-16(2)

Appellant advances an overly technical definition of robbery, one which would have the crime completed, for the purpose of applying the felony murder statute, when appellant first had the victims’ possessions in his hand. As with other theft-related crimes, however, there must be an asportation of the property. This had not yet occurred in the present case. In fact, it is clear that Norris’ lunge for the gun and the consequent shooting intervened between the taking and the carrying away of the property, and therefore occurred during the perpetration of this robbery.

A felony-murder conviction may stand when the record supports a finding of every element beyond a reasonable doubt.

Baldwin v. State · filed 1980-10-07(2)

It is clear from this record, that substantial probative evidence was presented from ■which the jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, every element of felony murder and armed robbery, the charges for which the defendant was sentenced.

Under subsection (2), evidence that force applied during a sexual assault caused the victim’s death can support a murder conviction.

Goodrich v. State · filed 1981-10-28(2)

The evidence was such that the trier of fact could reasonably infer to a certainty beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant applied such crushing force to the head of the victim during a sexual assault upon her that severe brain damage and asphyxiation was caused and that she died as a result thereof. The evidence regarding the cause of death was ample and sufficient.

A killing occurs during a robbery for felony murder when the shooting precedes the carrying away of the victim’s property and the robbery and shooting form one continuous transaction.

Thompson v. State · filed 1982-10-28(2)

It is clear in this case that the shooting of the cab driver occurred before defendant and his accomplices carried away any of the victim’s possessions. Furthermore, the robbery and the shooting were so closely connected in point of time, place, and continuity of action as to be one continuous transaction.

The felony-murder rule applies only when a death results during the commission or attempted commission of an enumerated felony; attempted felony murder does not exist without a death.

Head v. State · filed 1982-12-14(2)

We conclude, however, that whether the underlying felony has been completed or attempted, the felony-murder rule cannot be applied unless the death of another occurred by virtue of the commission or attempted commission of the underlying felony. In other words, absent death the applicability of the felony-murder rule is never triggered.

Felony murder requires intent to commit the underlying felony, but does not require a specific intent to kill; the absence of that requirement does not make the statute unconstitutional.

Brown v. State · filed 1983-04-27(2)

Appellant contends the information was filed on the basis of an unconstitutional statute, I.C. § 35-42-1-1(2) [Burns 1979 Repl.]. ... The only intent required to be proven in a prosecution for felony murder is the intent to commit the underlying felony. ... We conclude the trial court did not err in denying appellant's Motion to Dismiss as premised on the unconstitutionality of the felony murder statute.

Felony murder requires intent to commit the underlying felony, not intent to kill.

Miller v. State · filed 1983-05-06(2)

The intent that must be shown in a felony murder prosecution is not an intent to kill but rather only the intent to commit the underlying felony.

Subsection (1) permits an attempted murder conviction when the defendant intends to kill during a robbery but no death occurs; attempted felony murder is not a crime.

Anderson v. State · filed 1983-05-26(1)

Based on the record in this case, we find that defendant was charged, convicted, and sentenced for the attempted murder under subsection (1) of Ind.Code § 85-42-1-1 and not for the nonexistent crime of attempted felony murder.

When a defendant is convicted of felony murder and the underlying felony, sentencing may occur only for murder.

Coleman v. State · filed 1984-07-25(2)

When convictions for both felony murder and the underlying felony are obtained, sentencing can occur only upon the greater felony of murder.

When felony murder results from a killing during a robbery or attempted robbery, the underlying robbery is a lesser included offense, and the defendant cannot be sentenced for both.

Collier v. State · filed 1984-11-29(2)

This Court has consistently held that when a felony murder results from a killing in the commission of a robbery or attempted robbery, the underlying robbery is a lesser included offense of the felony murder and a defendant cannot be sentenced on both the felony murder and the underlying robbery.

Felony murder liability extends to a killing during escape with stolen property when the robbery and shooting form one continuous transaction.

Mauricio v. State · filed 1985-04-02(2)

However, this robbery and shooting were so closely connected in point of time, place and continuity of action as to constitute one continuous scheme or transaction. ... Consequently, he cannot disavow responsibility for the murder just because he was transporting stolen property and exacting his escape at the moment the murder occurred.

Felony murder requires intent to commit the underlying felony, but does not require intent to kill the victim.

Richardson v. State · filed 1985-04-17(2)

We have also stated that the State, in attempting to prove a felony murder charge, need only establish that the defendant intended to commit the underlying felony, and is not required to establish the intent to kill the victim.

For felony murder, a killing during a robbery need not occur before every statutory element of the robbery is complete.

Eddy v. State · filed 1986-08-01(2)

This Court has long declined to define the phrase, "while committing", in terms of the chronological completion of the statutory elements of the underlying felony. To require that the murder occur before each of the statutory elements of the robbery have been completed would elevate form over substance.

The State may charge knowing or intentional murder under subsection (1) or felony murder under subsection (2), depending on the evidence available to meet their differing burdens of proof.

Swafford v. State · filed 1986-10-21

The State retains the choice of whether to allege a knowing or intentional murder under subsection (1) of the murder statute or to allege a murder in the commission of a felony under subsection (2). That choice depends on the evidence available to sustain the differing burdens of proof.

Section 35-42-1-1(2) supports a felony murder conviction when the defendant participates in a burglary during which the victim is fatally wounded.

Drew v. State · filed 1987-02-10(2)

The evidence most favorable to the State discloses that defendant and two others broke into Robert Smith's home with the intent of obtaining money and property. During the course of that burglary, Robert Smith was fatally wounded. The evidence is clearly sufficient to support the jury's determination of defendant's guilt.

A felony underlying a felony murder conviction merges with the murder, so the defendant may not be sentenced separately for both.

Scott v. State · filed 1987-07-16(2)

When an indictment for murder in the commission of a felony is filed under Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1(2), the indictment may include an additional count for the felony itself. Biggerstaff v. State (1982), Ind., 432 N.E.2d 34. If the defendant is convicted of the felony murder, merger occurs and the defendant may not be sentenced on both counts.

Section 35-42-1-1 treats intentional murder and felony murder as equal-ranking forms of murder, and a felony-murder conviction does not preclude a finding that the killing was intentional.

Schiro v. State · filed 1989-02-08(1), (2)

A person convicted of either type of murder, that is, intentional killing under IC 35-42-1-1(1), or felony murder IC 35-42-1-1(2), can be shown to contain the aggravator of intentional killing justifying the imposition of the death penalty.

Felony murder requires intent to commit the underlying felony, but does not require intent to kill.

Chavez v. State · filed 1989-03-01(2)

In proving a felony murder charge, the State need only show that the defendant intended to commit the underlying felony; it need not establish intent to kill.

Felony murder requires the intent required for the underlying offense.

Clark v. State · filed 1990-10-30(2)

... the intent to commit felony murder is that required for the underlying offense.

For felony murder during a robbery, the State need not prove intent to kill; it must prove intent to rob and that the victim was killed during the robbery.

Landress v. State · filed 1992-10-15(2)

Thus, during the guilt phase, the State was not required to prove that Landress had any intent to kill the victim, but only that Landress intended to rob and that the victim was killed during the robbery.

Felony murder requires a killing during a robbery; a finding of sudden heat does not negate the felony murder verdict.

Jeffers v. State · filed 1992-12-28(2)

The jury’s verdict on felony murder required it to find that Jef-fers killed the victim during the commission of a robbery. I.C. § 35-42-1-1(2). The finding of the mitigating factor of sudden heat in no way negates the jury’s conclusion that Jeffers knowingly robbed the victim or that the victim was killed during the robbery.

Section 35-42-1-1(2) does not require intent to kill for a felony murder conviction.

Schiro v. Farley · filed 1994-01-19(2)

Under Indiana law, a person who either "knowingly or intentionally kills another human being" or "kills another human being while committing or attempting to commit . . . rape" is guilty of "murder." Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (Supp. 1978). Thus, intent to kill is not required for a felony murder conviction.

When a defendant is convicted of murder, felony murder, and an additional felony, the felony murder conviction must be vacated and the murder conviction remains.

Fuller v. State · filed 1994-08-29

We hold that when a defendant stands convieted of murder, felony murder, and an additional felony, the felony murder should be vacated and the murder conviction should remain.

For felony murder, the State need prove no intent beyond the intent to commit the underlying felony.

Harrison v. State · filed 1995-01-04(2)

As to Jordan Hanmore, because the charge was felony murder, no intent beyond the intent to commit the underlying felony of arson need be proven.

Felony murder under this section does not require proof of specific intent to kill.

Burris v. Parke · filed 1996-12-26(2)

Under Indiana law, specific intent to kill need not be proved to convict a defendant of felony murder.

Subsection (2) permits felony-murder liability for a death caused by a nonparticipant when the felony foreseeably creates the danger that leads to the death.

Sheckles v. State · filed 1997-07-25(2)

The Indiana ease law, in light of the above definitions, comports with the view that a person who commits or attempts to commit one of the offenses designated in the felony-murder statute is criminally responsible for a homicide which results from the act of one who was not a participant in the original criminal activity. Where the accused reasonably should have been foreseen that the commission of or attempt to commit the contemplated felony would likely create a situation which would expose another to the danger of death at the hands of a nonparticipant in the felony, and where death in fact occurs as was foreseeable, the creation of such a dangerous situation is an intermediary, secondary, or medium in effecting or bringing about the death of the victim.

Section 35-42-1-1(2) permits a felony murder conviction when a designated felony contributes to a death, even if someone other than the felon causes it.

Palmer v. State · filed 1998-01-07(2)

The statutory language “kills another human being while committing” does not restrict the felony murder provision only to instances in which the felon is the killer, but may also apply equally when, in committing any of the designated felonies, the felon contributes to the death of any person.

Section 35-42-1-1(2) treats all participants in a robbery or attempted robbery as equally guilty of felony murder when one robber kills someone, regardless of who killed the victim.

Williams v. State · filed 1998-02-19(2)

During the guilt phase, each co-defendant's arguments regarding who pulled the trigger were of little relevance because both were convicted for felony murder under Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2). All participants in a robbery or attempted robbery which results in killing by one robber are deemed equally guilty of murder, regardless of which participant actually killed the victim.

Section 35-42-1-1(2) makes every participant in a robbery that results in a killing guilty of felony murder, regardless of which participant killed the victim.

Rouster v. State · filed 1999-02-19(2)

First, each co-defendant’s arguments regarding who pulled the trigger were actually of little relevance since both were convicted of felony murder under Ind.Code § 35^42-1-1. All participants in a robbery or attempted robbery that results in killing by one robber are deemed equally guilty of murder, regardless of which participant actually killed the victim.

Indiana’s felony murder provision can apply when a designated felony foreseeably causes a death, even if someone other than the felon kills the victim.

Palmer v. State · filed 1999-01-07(2)

The statutory language “kills another human being while committing” does not restrict the felony murder provision only to instances in which the felon is the killer, but may also apply equally when, in committing any of the designated felonies, the felon contributes to the death of any person.

Every participant in a robbery or attempted robbery that results in a killing by one robber is guilty of felony murder, regardless of who killed the victim.

Williams v. State · filed 1999-02-19(2)

During the guilt phase, each co-defendant’s arguments regarding who pulled the trigger were of little relevance because both were convicted for felony murder under Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1(2). All participants in a robbery or attempted robbery which results in killing by one robber are deemed equally guilty of murder, regardless of which participant actually killed the victim.

Section 35-42-1-1(2) does not require a knowing or intentional killing for felony murder; it requires a killing while committing or attempting to commit a listed felony, including robbery.

Griffin v. State · filed 1999-10-01(2)

This instruction misstates the law in a manner favorable to the defendant. The crime of murder may occur, essentially, in either of two forms: (1) as a knowing or intentional killing, or (2) as felony murder, which does not require a knowing or intentional killing, but rather only a killing while committing or attempting to commit one of the prescribed felonies.

A killing during a robbery is an element of felony murder by robbery, so the taking of a life cannot be used to enhance the murder sentence.

Bonds v. State · filed 2000-06-09

Killing another person during the commission of a robbery are material elements of the offense of felony murder by robbery, and thus the taking of a life cannot be used to enhance the sentence for murder.

Section 35-42-1-1 permits felony murder liability when a felon contributes to a death during an enumerated felony, including the death of a co-perpetrator.

Jenkins v. State · filed 2000-04-03

The statutory language "kills another human being while committing" does not restrict the felony murder provision only to instances in which the felon is the killer but also applies when, in committing any of the designated felonies, the felon contributes to the death of any person.

A person can commit felony murder by aiding, inducing, or causing another person to kill during a burglary.

Ledo v. State · filed 2001-02-07(2)

At minimum, a reasonable jury could infer that Defendant committed Felony Murder by aiding, inducing, or causing Fitzhugh to kill the victim in the course of the burglary.

A participant in a robbery may be guilty of felony murder as an accomplice when a killing occurs during the robbery.

Fry v. State · filed 2001-06-07(2)

This evidence establishes that at a minimum Fry was an accomplice to the robbery of Taylor and thus was also guilty in the felony murder of Jones.

Felony murder requires intent to commit the underlying felony, but not intent to kill.

Holsinger v. State · filed 2001-06-29(2)

The State need not prove intent to kill in a felony murder charge, only the intent to commit the underlying felony.

Section 35-42-1-1(2) makes a participant in a burglary guilty of felony murder when an accomplice kills someone during the burglary.

Spivey v. State · filed 2002-01-29(2)

The defendant's joint participation with Singleton in the class A felony burglary of Hughes renders the defendant guilty of murder for any killing while committing the burglary.

Section 35-42-1-1(2) requires intent to commit the underlying felony for felony murder, but does not require intent to kill.

Luna v. State · filed 2001-11-16(2)

A felony murder conviction requires proof of intent to commit the underlying felony (in this case, robbery) but not of intent to kill.

A sentence for felony murder based on kidnapping cannot be imposed alongside a separate sentence for that kidnapping.

Wentz v. State · filed 2002-04-15(2)

We further note that the trial court entered sentences for both felony murder and the kidnapping which was the felony supporting the felony murder conviction. This is impermissible under both state and federal double jeopardy rules. It amounts to sentencing for a crime and its lesser- included offense.

A felony murder conviction and a conviction for the robbery underlying it cannot both stand.

Sanchez v. State · filed 2003-08-27

Sanchez contends, and the State concedes, he was improperly sentenced for both felony murder and armed robbery. See Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 58, 59-60 (Ind.1995), reh'g denied ("It would have been a violation of double jeopardy to con-viet and sentence a defendant for both felony murder and the underlying robbery because conviction for felony murder could not be had without proof of robbery.") We consequently vacate Sanchez's conviction of armed robbery.

Section 35-42-1-1(2) permits a felony murder conviction when a killing precedes the breaking and entering required for burglary, if the intent to burglarize is connected to the killing.

State v. Seabrooks · filed 2004-02-26(2)

Thus, a felony murder conviction may be had if a perpetrator kills an individual before committing burglary's lone actus reas element of breaking and entering.

To sustain a felony murder conviction under this section, the State must prove each element of the underlying felony.

Mathews v. State · filed 2005-03-31(2)

First, we agree with Mathews that to sustain a felony murder conviction, the State must prove each element of the underlying felony.

The felony murder statute covers a co-perpetrator's death at the hands of a robbery victim when the defendant reasonably should have foreseen the danger and contributed to the death, even if the defendant was unarmed or fled before the shooting.

Exum v. State · filed 2004-07-27(2)

For these reasons, we find that there is sufficient evidence that Exum should have reasonably foreseen that the crime of attempted robbery with deadly force was likely to create a situation where the death of one of his co-perpetrators from the victim's act of self-defense or defense of his dwelling would occur. Also, Exum was an active participant in the robbery, and as a result of that robbery, Duff was killed. Therefore, despite the fact that Exum was not armed, and may have fled shortly prior to the shooting, he was a mediate cause of Duff's death.

Section 35-42-1-1(2) permits a felony murder conviction when the defendant participated in the underlying robbery, even if an accomplice killed the victim.

Glenn v. State · filed 2008-04-15(2)

As such, even if Glenn did not physically kill David, he can be convicted of felony murder if there is proof that he participated, either directly or as an accomplice, in the underlying robbery.

Subsection (2) makes a killing during the commission or attempted commission of robbery felony murder.

Kenney v. State · filed 2009-06-25(2)

Thus, to con-viet Kenney of felony murder, the State needed to prove that Kenney, while committing or attempting to commit the offense of robbery, did kill Noyd. ... Thus, we conclude that evidence of probative value exists from which the jury could have found Kenney guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder.

A felony murder conviction based on dealing in a controlled substance cannot stand when the evidence does not establish the underlying dealing offense.

Hyche v. State · filed 2010-09-23(3)(C)

As such, we hold that the evidence is insufficient to support his dealing conviction. Because his felony murder conviction was based on the commission of the underlying offense of dealing, it too cannot stand.

Felony murder under this subsection requires intent to commit the underlying felony, but not intent to kill.

Nick Khanthamany v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-01-31(2)

The State does not need to prove intent to kill, only the intent to commit the underlying felony.

A robbery participant may be convicted of felony murder when the killing is a probable and natural consequence of the participants’ actions.

Lewis v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-08-31

Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have reasonably inferred from the evidence presented that Lewis possessed the requisite intent to participate in the robberies, that he was an accomplice to the robberies and murders, and that the killings of Rogers and Wilson were probable and natural consequences of the actions of Lewis, Hale, and Mays.

Section 35-42-1-1(2) does not require a knowing or intentional killing for felony murder; an accidental killing can suffice.

Berkman v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-09-04(2)

However, the State is not required to prove a knowing or intentional killing in order to sustain a felony murder conviction, only a killing–even an accidental one.

Subsection (2) requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, acting with accomplices, killed someone while committing or attempting robbery.

Poindexter v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-10-12(2)

In order to convict Poindexter of Murder, as charged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he, acting in concert with Canady, Moore and Carter, killed Rodezno, while committing or attempting to commit the crime of Robbery.

A felony murder conviction based on robbery requires a jury finding that the predicate robbery occurred.

White v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-07-27(2)

Indeed, the jury’s verdict on the Class A felony robbery allegation was an essential predicate to the State’s felony murder charge.

A participant in an attempted robbery may be guilty of felony murder when the robbery foreseeably creates a situation in which the victim might resist and a death might occur, even if the participant did not know an accomplice was armed.

Tymon Brown v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-12-12(2)

Therefore, we conclude that regardless of whether Brown knew that Seabury was armed, it was reasonably foreseeable that Brown’s commission of the crime of attempted robbery was likely to create a situation where the victim of the robbery might defend himself, thus creating a situation where a death might occur.

Felony murder does not require an intent to kill when a person is killed during a robbery.

Chaunsey L. Fox v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-10-28(2)

In addition, they could have concluded that Fox accidentally shot Williams during the robbery, which would eliminate the intent to kill necessary for a murder conviction but would not prevent a conviction for felony murder.

Felony murder based on robbery requires proof that a person was killed during the commission or attempted commission of a robbery.

Porche v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-06-18(2)

To prove that Porche committed the offense of felony murder, the State was required to prove that Smith was killed during the commission of or the attempted commission of a robbery.

Felony murder under subsection (2) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed someone while committing or attempting to commit robbery.

Perry v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-09-11(2)

To convict Perry of felony murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Perry killed Graves while committing or attempting to commit robbery. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2).

Section 35-42-1-1(2) requires intent to commit the underlying felony, but does not require intent to kill.

Blake Layman v. State of Indiana Levi Sparks v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-09-12(2)

The State need not prove intent to kill, only the intent to commit the underlying felony.

Felony murder under this section is murder, even though its elements differ from those of a knowing or intentional killing.

Gray v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-10-23(2)

Contrary to Gray’s unsubstantiated assertion, we find no legal distinction that precludes characterizing a felony murder as a murder. Felony murder is codified under the “Murder” section of the Indiana Code, which provides that “[a] person who . . . kills another human being while committing or attempting to commit . . . robbery . . . commits murder, a felony.” I.C. § 35-42-1-1(2) (emphasis added).

Murder and felony murder under Section 35-42-1-1 cannot both result in convictions for a single killing.

Shelly v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-03-17

Since Shelly cannot be convicted of both murder and felony murder, a choice must be made.

Felony murder does not require proof that the defendant was armed or knew that a co-perpetrator was armed.

Anthony P. Sharp, Jr. v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-09-12(2)

To the extent Sharp argues that a felony murder conviction should require proof that a defendant was armed or that he knew that his co-perpetrators were armed, we disagree with this contention.

Felony murder is established when a defendant knowingly takes property by force or fear and someone is killed while the defendant does so.

Kirkland v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-02-09(2)

To convict Kirkland of murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly took property from Bowen by using or threatening the use of force or by putting Bowen in fear, and that while doing so, Bowen was killed. ... Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we find the evidence sufficient to sustain the verdict.

Felony murder requires intent to commit the underlying felony, but does not require intent to kill.

McMahan v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-03-14(2)

McMahan argues there is insufficient evidence that he knowingly or intentionally killed A.S.; however, a felony murder conviction requires proof of intent to commit the underlying felony (in this case, attempted robbery), but not proof of intent to kill.

A defendant can be convicted of felony murder when the evidence establishes that he aided a robbery that led to a killing.

Bell v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-04-13(2)

The foregoing evidence is more than sufficient to establish that Bell aided in the robbery that led to Robbie’s murder. Accordingly, we affirm Bell’s conviction.

Section 35-42-1-1(2) requires intent to commit the underlying felony, but does not require intent to kill.

Trevon Drakkar Walker v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-06-27(2)

Thus, to establish guilt pursuant to the felony murder statute, the State need not prove the intent to kill, but only the intent to commit the underlying felony.

Section 35-42-1-1(2) permits a felony murder conviction when a robbery results in the death of a co-perpetrator.

Rhodes v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-08-26(2)

Under the felony murder statute, the State was required to prove that Rhodes killed Rodgers while committing or attempting to commit robbery. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2). The fact that the robbery resulted in the death of a co-perpetrator does not save Rhodes from criminal liability for murder.

As charged in this case, felony murder based on robbery required proof that the defendant knowingly killed the victim while committing or attempting robbery.

Coleman v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-12-19(2)

To convict Coleman of felony murder as charged in Count I, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly killed Kitchens while committing or attempting to commit robbery.

Felony murder based on dealing in a narcotic drug requires the defendant’s conduct to be a mediate or immediate cause of the death.

Trimnell v. State of Indiana · filed 2018-12-31(3)(A)

Using the Court’s rationale in Layman, there was nothing about Trimnell’s conduct that was clearly the mediate or immediate cause of Rachel’s death.

When a felony-murder conviction merges with a murder conviction, there is no separate felony-murder judgment whose evidentiary sufficiency can be reviewed on appeal.

Cardosi v. State of Indiana · filed 2019-08-07(2)

As this Court has held before, when a trial court merges a felony-murder and murder conviction, we don’t need to address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the felony-murder conviction because there is no judgment on that charge.

Section 35-42-1-1(2) permits a felony-murder finding of probable cause when the evidence supports that a person took property by force and the victim died as a result.

State of Indiana v. O.E.W. · filed 2019-08-19(2)

From this evidence, the juvenile court properly concluded that there was probable cause to believe that O.E.W. took Gonzales’s phone from her by force and that she died as a result. These acts would be theft, robbery resulting in serious bodily injury, and felony murder if committed by an adult.

Felony murder liability extends to a bystander's death that was a foreseeable result of committing a designated felony.

Sage v. State of Indiana · filed 2018-12-05(3)(B)

Because James’ death was the foreseeable result of Sage’s methamphetamine dealing, we conclude that the State proved that Sage killed James while committing the alleged felony.

Felony murder requires intent to commit the underlying felony, but does not require intent to kill.

Nakeyah Shields v. State of Indiana · filed 2024-12-20(2)

To obtain a conviction of felony murder, the State does not have to prove intent to kill but does have to prove intent to commit the underlying felony—in this case, robbery.