Statute Annotations › Indiana › Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1

Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1

Murder: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Indiana
Case notes
400
Cited in passing
918
Citing cases indexed
1,530
Case dates
1979–2026
Screened through
2026-05-12
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-23
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

1,318 citing cases reviewed of 1,530 in the citation index: 400 interpreted the section (annotated below), 918 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-05-12 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1987 P.L.326-1987, § 2 added consumer product tampering to the felonies that can support murder under subsection (2). Source
  • 1989 P.L.296-1989, § 1 added subsection (3), making a killing during specified drug-dealing offenses murder. Source
  • 1991-04-15 Spradlin v. State held that attempted murder requires an intent to kill; the completed murder statute also permits conviction for a knowing killing. Source
  • 1993 P.L.230-1993, § 2 added carjacking as a felony-murder predicate in subsection (2). Source
  • 1998-01-22 P.L.261-1997, passed over the governor's veto on this date, added subsection (4) for knowingly or intentionally killing a viable fetus and § 35-42-1-0.5 for abortions performed in compliance with the cited abortion laws; the act states a July 1, 1997 effective date. Source
  • 2001-07-01 P.L.17-2001, § 15 revised the drug predicates in subsection (3)(A) to refer to dealing in or manufacturing cocaine, a narcotic drug, or methamphetamine. Source
  • 2006 P.L.173-2006 added human trafficking, promotion of human trafficking, and sexual trafficking of a minor to the felonies that can support murder under subsection (2); the 2006 code prints both versions. Source
  • 2006-07-01 P.L.151-2006, § 16 separately listed dealing in methamphetamine under § 35-48-4-1.1 in subsection (3)(B); methamphetamine dealing remained a murder predicate. Source
  • 2014-07-01 P.L.158-2013 and P.L.214-2013 limited the references to criminal deviate conduct and carjacking to offenses committed before those crimes' repeal; the 2013 code gives the effective date and prior versions. Source
  • 2015-09-18 Layman v. State distinguished earlier co-perpetrator felony murder decisions and reversed convictions arising from an unarmed burglary without dangerously violent or threatening conduct that caused the accomplice's death. Source
  • 2017 P.L.252-2017 separated manufacturing methamphetamine from dealing in methamphetamine in subsection (3); both remained felony-murder predicates. Source
  • 2018-07-01 Amendments to subsection (2) named additional categories of human and sexual trafficking; amendments to subsection (4) replaced its viable-fetus requirement with coverage of a fetus at any stage of development, and § 35-42-1-6.5 exempts a pregnant woman who terminates her own pregnancy or kills the fetus she carries. Source
  • 2020-08-18 Wadle v. State overruled the Richardson constitutional tests for substantive double jeopardy involving multiple statutes and adopted a statutory interpretation framework. Source

Elements of murder

Murder under § 35-42-1-1(1) requires knowingly or intentionally killing another human being.

Williams v. State · filed 1979-10-02(1)

The culpability for the commission of murder consists of knowingly or intentionally killing another human being. Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1.
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Law changed since Spradlin v. State, 569 N.E.2d 948 (Ind. Apr. 15, 1991), requires specific intent to kill for attempted murder; knowledge alone is insufficient.

Section 35-42-1-1(1) requires a knowing or intentional killing; those same culpability elements satisfy the mental-state requirement for attempted murder.

Scott v. State · filed 1980-12-31(1)

In order to be liable for murder, rather than for a less culpable form of homicide such as voluntary manslaughter or reckless homicide, one who kills another human being must do so knowingly or intentionally. The very elements of knowingness or intention which must be proved in order to establish murder satisfy the State’s burden of proving the same elements in an attempt to murder. There is no “additional burden.”
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For attempted murder under § 35-42-1-1, the intent-to-kill element is satisfied if the accused intended to kill someone, even if the person attacked was someone else.

Norris v. State · filed 1981-04-16

Under the doctrine of transferred intent, the essential element is present if the accused intended to kill someone.
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Section 35-42-1-1(1) does not require the victim of murder to be a law enforcement officer.

Smith v. State · filed 1981-07-06(1)

Under Ind. Code §§ 35-42-1-1(1) and 35-41-5-1, the elements of attempted murder are: (1) the knowing or intentional (2) taking of a "substantial step toward" (3) the killing of (4) another (5) human being. It is clear, then, that the battery described in that portion of the statute quoted in Smith's tendered instruction is not an inherently included offense of attempted murder. Obviously, the murder and attempt statutes do not require that the intended victim be a law enforcement officer.
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Section 35-42-1-1 does not make the absence of sudden heat an element of murder.

Palmer v. State · filed 1981-09-17(1)

There is no implied element of the absence of sudden heat in the crime of murder.
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Section 35-42-1-1(1) does not make malice an element of murder, so the prosecution need not prove malice to make a prima facie case.

Wolfe v. State · filed 1981-10-05(1)

We do note that our statute is similar to New York’s second degree murder statute to the extent that malice is no longer specified as an element of murder. Thus the prosecution is no longer required to prove malice in order to make a prima facie case of murder against the accused.
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The murder offense requires proof of a killing; cause of death is not a separate element absent a suggestion of intervening cause.

Wilson v. State · filed 1982-03-11

The cause of death is not an element of the offense itself; the element in question is the killing, absent a suggestion of intervening cause.
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Law changed since P.L.261-1997, § 3 (passed over veto Jan. 22, 1998) added murder of a viable fetus in subsection (4), so killing another human being is no longer required for every form of murder.

Section 35-42-1-1 requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another human being.

Askew v. State · filed 1982-10-04

The elements of murder in Indiana are that (1) the defendant (2) knowingly or intentionally (3) killed (4) another human being. I.C. § 35-42-1-1 [Burns 1979 Repl.]. In the case at bar the presence of each of these elements is supported by sufficient evidence of probative value such that the conviction can be sustained.
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Section 35-42-1-1 does not include malice as an element of murder, so an instruction on malice is irrelevant to attempted murder.

Haggenjos v. State · filed 1982-11-04

The record shows that the trial court gave final instructions, without objection, which explained the elements of attempted murder based upon the elements contained in the current Attempt and Murder statutes, in which malice is no longer an element. In light of the statutory definition of the charged offense, Defendant's tendered instructions upon the subject of malice would only have confused the jury by injecting an irrelevant issue into the case; consequently, we find no error in their refusal.
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Murder requires evidence that the defendant intended to kill or knew there was a high probability that the conduct would cause death.

Robinson v. State · filed 1983-09-23(1)

In order to sustain a conviction for murder there must be evidence that the defendant had a conscious objective to kill the victim or was aware of the high probability that his or her conduct would result in the death of the victim.
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Murder requires a knowing or intentional killing; premeditation is not an element.

Davenport v. State · filed 1984-07-06(1)

It is also clear that premeditation is no longer an element of the crime of murder. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.). In the present statute, the necessary culpability is that the act be done knowingly or intentionally.
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Section 35-42-1-1 does not require the State to prove malice for a murder conviction.

McCann v. State · filed 1984-07-24

Thus the State does not bear the burden of proving malice in order to support a murder conviction as Defendant claims.
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The State bears the burden of proving that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim, even when the defendant bears the burden on an insanity defense.

Green v. State · filed 1984-10-30

Second, although Defendant did bear the burden of proof on the insanity issue, the State had the ultimate burden of proving that the Defendant knowingly or intentionally killed her daughter.
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Section 35-42-1-1 requires proof that the defendant acted knowingly; proof that the defendant acted intentionally is unnecessary.

Feliciano v. State · filed 1985-04-30

Although we disagree, arguendo, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding that Defendant shot Miller intentionally, it is immaterial, inasmuch as the statute under which he was charged required only that he acted knowingly.
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A knowing murder conviction requires proof that the defendant knew his acts created a high probability of death.

Smith v. State · filed 1985-12-09(a)

It was only necessary for the prosecution to prove that appellant knew that his forcible acts of holding the girl's mouth open and pouring a large quantity of pepper into it, created a high probability of death by choking.
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Murder does not require proof that the victim was forcibly removed.

Catrabone v. State · filed 1986-03-24(1)

The commission of a criminal confinement does not require that another human being be killed and a murder conviction does not require proof that the victim was forcibly removed.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another human being.

Hadley v. State · filed 1986-08-08

To convict a person of murder, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another human being.
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A knowing murder does not require proof that the defendant desired the victim’s death; intentional violence committed with awareness of its probable consequences can establish the required mental state.

Kaufman v. State · filed 1986-08-13

It was not necessary for the State to prove that Kaufman actively wished for or desired the death of his daughter. A knowing murder was proven from the evidence that appellant intentionally squeezed, shook, and battered Tiffany and that he did so with an awareness of the probable consequences of his acts.
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Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 does not require proof of premeditation for murder.

Brown v. State · filed 1987-02-05

An earlier murder statute required proof of premeditation. Ind.Code § 85-18-4-1 (Burns 1975) (repealed 1976 Ind.Acts, P.L. 148, § 24, effective Oct. 1, 1977). The current version does not require such a showing. Ind.Code § 385-42-1-1; Davenport v. State (1984), Ind., 464 N.E.2d 1302.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Murder requires a knowing or intentional killing of another human being; malice is not an element.

Raub v. State · filed 1987-12-30

Murder is the knowing or intentional killing of another human being. Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1. Malice is not an element of murder.
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Murder requires, at a minimum, a killing committed with awareness of a high probability that the conduct is killing.

Ingram v. State · filed 1989-12-14

Murder, on the other hand, requires as a minimum a killing committed by a perpetrator who engaged in the killing with an awareness of a high probability that he was doing so. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1, in conjunction with Ind.Code § 35-41-2-2(b). Thus, an instruction on reckless homicide was warranted only if there was a serious evidentiary dispute as to whether the defendant committed the attacks recklessly but not knowingly.
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Section 35-42-1-1(2) requires proof that a person died and that the defendant committed or attempted to commit arson.

Segovia v. State · filed 1996-05-31(2)

In order to obtain a conviction on the felony murder charge, the State had to prove that (1) Flynn died and (2) Segovia committed or attempted to commit arson.
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Knowing murder and intentional murder are the same offense under subsection (1); neither is an included offense of the other.

Fleenor v. State · filed 1993-09-03(1)

The knowing murder of which appellant stood convicted and the intentional murder proved as an element of the number one aggravator do not bear the relationship of greater and lesser offense, i.e., one is not an included offense in the other, but are instead the same offense.
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Murder is a result-oriented offense; the killing must be committed knowingly or intentionally.

Corley v. State · filed 1996-03-20

Murder is a result-oriented offense. The conduct ... which must have been knowingly or intentionally committed was the killing.
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The murder statute’s requirement of another human being is separately satisfied for murder and attempted murder when the offenses involve different victims.

Butler v. State · filed 1993-11-03

Here, each offense, the violation and attempted violation of IC 35-42-1-1, was perpetrated against separate victims: Allison, the deceased, and Lark, the intended victim. There were clearly separate “other” human beings as required by the statute and the State more than adequately identified each.
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Section 35-42-1-1 requires proof that the defendant killed knowingly or intentionally; the State need not prove both mental states.

Davis v. State · filed 1994-06-15(1)

To convict Davis of murder, it was necessary for the State to prove either knowledge or intent, not both.
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Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 requires proof of a killing for murder.

Grinstead v. State · filed 1997-07-22

Murder requires proof of a killing, but conspiracy does not; and conspiracy requires proof of an agreement to commit a felony, but murder does not.
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Section 35-42-1-1(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another human being.

Hodge v. State · filed 1997-12-05(1)

To convict for murder, the State must prove that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another human being.
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Murder requires, at minimum, a killing committed with awareness of a high probability that the perpetrator is killing.

Heavrin v. State · filed 1996-12-31

Murder, on the other hand, requires as a minimum a killing committed by a perpetrator who engaged in the killing with an awareness of a high probability that he was doing so. Ind.Code §§ 35-42-1-1 and 35-41-2-2(b).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another human being; either mental state suffices.

Champlain v. State · filed 1997-06-13

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt of either mens rea suffices to convict of murder. Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1 (1993).
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Murder requires a knowing or intentional killing.

McEwen v. State · filed 1998-04-30(1)

The only element distinguishing the two offenses is the defendant’s state of mind: reckless homicide occurs when the defendant “recklessly” kills another human being and murder occurs when the killing is done “knowingly” or “intentionally.”
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Murder charged as a knowing killing requires proof that the defendant knowingly caused the victim’s death.

Anderson v. State · filed 1997-06-19(1)

The difference between Reckless Homicide and Murder is the mens rea element: Reckless Homicide requires a disregard of harm that might result from conduct, Ind.Code § 35-42-1-5; Murder as charged here requires the killing to be knowing, Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1.
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Section 35-42-1-1(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another human being.

Hodge v. State · filed 1998-12-05(1)

To convict for murder, the State must prove that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another human being.
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Section 35-42-1-1 defines murder as knowingly or intentionally killing another human being; use of a weapon or a particularly violent manner is not an element.

Garrett v. State · filed 1999-07-15

Garrett was convicted of murder, which is defined as knowingly or intentionally killing another human being. ... It is not an element of the offense that Garrett used a weapon and killed Wise in a “particularly violent” manner.
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Murder is established by proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another human being.

Williams v. State · filed 1998-10-26

The crime of murder is established by proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another human being. Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1 (1993).
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Murder requires a knowing or intentional state of mind; reckless homicide requires a reckless state of mind.

Brown v. State · filed 1998-12-03

Reckless homicide is an inherently included lesser offense of murder. The element distinguishing it from murder is a “reckless” state of mind as compared to a “knowing or intentional” state of mind. Compare Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1 (1998) with Ind.Code § 35-42-1-5 (1998).
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To convict of knowing murder, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly killed the victim.

Mitchell v. State · filed 2000-04-18

To convict the defendant of murder, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly killed Emporia.
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Murder requires a knowing or intentional state of mind.

Vermillion v. State · filed 1999-11-19

Murder requires a “knowing or intentional” state of mind, but reckless homicide requires only a “reckless” state of mind.
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A person knowingly kills under the murder statute when he is aware of a high probability that he is engaged in killing.

Lehman v. State · filed 2000-06-28

A person knowingly kills when he is aware of a high probability that he is engaged in killing.
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Section 35-42-1-1(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim.

Crain v. State · filed 2000-10-20(1)

To obtain a conviction for murder, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1) (1993); Powers v. State, 696 N.E.2d 865, 869-70 (Ind. 1998).
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Section 35-42-1-1 requires that the defendant knowingly or intentionally kill another human being.

Fosha v. State · filed 2001-05-23

The essential elements of the offense of murder are (1) the defendant (2) with knowledge or intent (3) killed (4) another human being. Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1.
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Section 35-42-1-1 requires proof that the defendant knowingly killed another human being.

Lander v. State · filed 2002-02-15

The essential elements of the offense of murder are: (1) the defendant (2) knowingly (3) killed (4) another human being. Ind. Code §35-42-1-1 (1998).
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Murder under § 35-42-1-1 does not require the use of a deadly weapon.

McAbee v. State · filed 2002-06-28(1)

The use of a deadly weapon is not an element or a basis for a murder conviction and so such an enhancement does not violate the constitutional test set forth in Richardson.
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When murder is charged on a knowing theory, the defendant must be aware of a high probability that the conduct will cause another person’s death.

Bostick v. State · filed 2002-08-19

As charged in this case, a conviction for murder requires that the defendant had a “knowing” level of culpability, ie., that the defendant was aware of the high probability that her conduct would result in the death of another when she engaged in the activity.
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Section 35-42-1-1 requires proof that the defendant was aware of a high probability that his conduct would kill another person.

Blanchard v. State · filed 2004-01-13

To convict Blanchard of murder, the State is required to prove that Blanchard was aware of the high probability of killing Willon by placing a washcloth over his mouth. ... Based on the record and the testimony of witnesses, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to find Blanchard guilty of Willon's murder.
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Murder requires the intentional killing of another human being; a defendant charged with aiding, inducing, or causing that killing must act knowingly or intentionally.

Jack v. State · filed 2007-07-18

The essential elements of the offense of aiding, inducing, or causing murder are: (1) the defendant (2) knowingly or intentionally (3) aided, induced, and/or caused (4) another person (5) to intentionally kill another human being.
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Murder does not require proof that the killing was committed with a deadly weapon.

Ross v. State · filed 2007-12-11

Use of a deadly weapon is not an element of murder.
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The murder statute does not require proof that the defendant failed to seek medical attention for the victim.

Rogers v. State · filed 2007-12-13

However, Rogers pleaded guilty to murder, and the murder statute does not require proof that the defendant did not seek medical attention for the victim.
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Section 35-42-1-1(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim.

Ashworth v. State · filed 2009-02-20(1)

To convict Ashworth of murder, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally killed Summers. See Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1(1).
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Subsection (1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim.

Camm v. State · filed 2009-06-26(1)

In order to obtain convictions for the murders, the State had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed his wife and children. Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1(1). Sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict.
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Murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another person.

Townsend v. State · filed 2010-08-23

To convict Townsend of murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally killed Randi. See I.C. § 35-42-1-1.
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Section 35-42-1-1 requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another person.

Green v. State · filed 2010-12-06

In order to convict Green of murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally killed Ellis. See I.C. § 35-42-1-1.
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Section 35-42-1-1(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim.

Delarosa v. State · filed 2010-12-21(1)

To convict Delarosa of the murder charges, the State was required to prove that Delarosa ―knowingly or intentionally‖ killed Rebecca and George.
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Murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another human being.

Crawford v. State · filed 2011-04-12

In order to convict Crawford for murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Crawford "knowingly or intentionally kill[ed] another human being." I.C. § 35-42-1-1.
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Section 35-42-1-1(2) requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed the victim in the course of committing robbery.

Stewart v. State · filed 2011-04-18(2)

Stewart was charged with the murder and felony murder of each of the victims, and the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Stewart intentionally killed each victim and that he killed each of them in the course of committing robbery.
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Section 35-42-1-1 classifies murder as a felony, not an A felony.

Rogers v. State · filed 2008-12-12

We would observe, however, that murder is not an A felony; pursuant to the relevant statute, murder is simply "a felony.” Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1 (2004).
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Murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another person.

Pattison v. State · filed 2011-12-09

In order to convict Pattison of murder as charged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Pattison (2) knowingly or intentionally (3) killed (4) Lisa Pattison.
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Murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim.

Lawrence v. State · filed 2012-01-11

To convict Lawrence of murder as charged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Lawrence (2) knowingly or intentionally (3) killed (4) Quinton Lewis.
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Section 35-42-1-1 does not make the cause of death an element of felony murder.

Thomas v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-03-19(2)

The cause of death is not an element of the offense of felony murder.
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Section 35-42-1-1(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another human being or caused another person to do so.

Sheckles v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-05-29(1)

Accordingly, to convict Sheckles of murder, the State was required to show that he knowingly or intentionally killed another human being or that he caused Robert to knowingly or intentionally kill another human being. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).
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For the felony murder counts as charged, the State had to prove that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed each victim while committing or attempting robbery.

Jones v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-09-14

As noted above, Jones was charged with four counts of felony murder pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-42-1-1. Regarding each count, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones: (1) knowingly or intentionally; (2) killed each of the four victims in this case; (3) while committing or attempting to commit robbery.
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Murder requires a knowing or intentional killing, while reckless homicide requires a reckless killing.

Carr v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-08-09(1)

Reckless homicide occurs when one recklessly kills another, and murder occurs when one knowingly or intentionally kills another.
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Murder requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another person.

Leonard v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-11-07

To prove Leonard committed murder, a felony, the State had to prove he knowingly or intentionally killed Bell. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.
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Section 35-42-1-1(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another person.

Campbell v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-02-28(1)

To convict Campbell of murder, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally killed Donna. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1) (1989).
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Murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim.

Tiller v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-06-18

In order to prove murder, the State was required to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Tiller knowingly or intentionally killed Gregg. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.
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Section 35-42-1-1 requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another person.

Boyd v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-12-10

In order to establish that Boyd had committed two counts of murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Boyd knowingly or intentionally killed Newbill and Farmer.
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A murder conviction under subsection (1) requires proof of a knowing or intentional killing; the State may prove that the defendant participated as an accomplice.

Tuggle v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-05-22(1)

To convict Tuggle of murder as charged, the State was required to prove that Tuggle was an accomplice to the knowing or intentional killing of Lindsay. ... From this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that Tuggle went to Lindsay’s residence, fought with him, and assisted Torres in shooting him.
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Murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly killed another person.

Washington v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-07-15(1)

We note that in order to prove the offense of murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Washington knowingly killed Eader.
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Murder requires proof that the defendant caused another person’s death and acted knowingly or intentionally.

Watson v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-08-21(1)

The State must prove that Watson’s actions caused Adams’s death and that Watson acted either knowingly or intentionally.
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Murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another human being.

Francisco Villegas, Jr. v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-09-25

To convict Villegas of murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally killed C.A., another human being.
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Section 35-42-1-1 requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally caused another person's death.

Tinsley v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-11-18

In order to convict Tinsley of murder, the State was required to prove that Tinsley knowingly or intentionally fired a gun against Stewart, causing his death.
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Murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another human being.

Weisheit v. State of Indiana · filed 2015-02-18(1)

To prove that Weisheit was guilty of murder, the State had to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Weisheit; (2) knowingly or intentionally; (3) killed; (4) another human being.
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Murder requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another person.

Malcom Cobb, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-02-19(a)

Turning to Cobb’s murder conviction, to convict Cobb of murder, the State was required to prove that Cobb knowingly or intentionally killed Smith.
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Murder requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another human being.

Anderson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-02-19

A person commits murder when he “knowingly or intentionally kills another human being.” Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (2012). Thus, the State needed to prove Anderson knowingly or intentionally killed Roberts.
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Murder requires proof of a knowing or intentional killing; the charge need not allege that the defendant acted in concert with a named person.

Howard v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-02-25

To prove Howard guilty of murder, the State was merely required to prove that he knowingly or intentionally killed Howard.
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Section 35-42-1-1(2) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed a person while committing a robbery.

Seward v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-03-23(2)

To convict Seward of felony murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he killed Barnes while committing a robbery.
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Section 35-42-1-1(1) requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly killed another person.

Webb v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-05-21(1)

To convict Webb of murder, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly killed Cherlyn.
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Section 35-42-1-1 permits a finding of knowing murder when the evidence shows that the defendant fired at the victim as he walked away.

Spivey v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-09-25

This evidence is more than sufficient to support an inference that Spivey acted knowingly in killing Ball.
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Murder requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another person.

Brown v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-06-11(1)

To prove Brown committed murder, the State had to present evidence he knowingly or intentionally killed Fesler.
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Murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knowingly or intentionally killed another person.

T.J. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-11-09

To support T.J.’s true finding for murder as a principal or an accomplice, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that T.J. knowingly or intentionally killed Ty.A.
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Murder requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim.

Gonzales v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-07-13(1)

To convict Gonzales of murder, the State was required to prove that she knowingly or intentionally killed Miller.
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Murder requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another human being; repeated blows to the head can support an inference of a knowing killing.

Scott-Manna v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-07-27(1)

In order to convict Scott-Manna of murder, the State was required to prove that he knowingly or intentionally killed another human being. ... Looking at the evidence most favorable to the jury’s verdict, as we are required to do, we conclude that the jury could reasonably infer that, at the least, Scott-Manna knowingly killed Griffin. The evidence was sufficient to support Scott-Manna’s conviction for murder.
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To knowingly commit murder under § 35-42-1-1, a defendant must be aware of a high probability that death will result from the defendant’s actions.

Massey v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-10-14

With respect to the crime of murder, to “knowingly” kill requires, at a minimum, an awareness on the part of the defendant of a high probability that death will result from his actions.
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Murder under subsection (1) requires that the defendant knowingly or intentionally kill another person.

Takesha Lashawn Sanders v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-02-15(1)

The only element distinguishing murder and reckless homicide is the defendant’s state of mind: reckless homicide occurs when the defendant “recklessly” kills another human being, and murder occurs when the killing is done “knowingly” or “intentionally.”
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Section 35-42-1-1(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another person.

Raggs v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-08-31(1)

In order to convict Raggs of murder as charged, the State had to prove that he knowingly or intentionally killed Tony. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).
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Subsection (1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim.

L.C. Strong v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-12-15(1)

To convict Strong of murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally killed Linda Martin. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).
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Murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another human being.

Sir Christopher Lee Jones v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-07-31

To convict Jones of murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally killed another human being. I.C. § 35-42-1-1.
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In this opinion, the court phrased the required killing as knowing and intentional; the statutory text and other opinions use “or.”

Tinajero-Garcia v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-08-09(1)

To convict a defendant of murder, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and intentionally killed another human being. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).
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Murder requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim.

Gonzalez v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-08-16(1)

To convict Gonzalez of murder, the State was required to prove that he knowingly or intentionally killed Smith.
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Section 35-42-1-1(1) defines murder to include both knowing and intentional killing; an instruction mentioning only knowing killing gives an incomplete definition.

Kadrowvach v. State of Indiana · filed 2016-09-30(1)

He then directs our attention to the first sentence of Instruction 8, which omits from its definition of murder the statutory phrase “or intentionally.” Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1). He correctly asserts that this amounts to an incomplete definition of murder.
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Murder under Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 requires an intentional or knowing killing; recklessness alone is insufficient.

Cain v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-06-22

Either an intentional or a knowing killing is required for a murder conviction.
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Section 35-42-1-1(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another person.

Hodge v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-11-30(1)

To convict Hodge of murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally killed Joshua. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1) (2014).
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Section 35-42-1-1(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim.

Landry v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-06-11(1)

In order to convict Landry of murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Landry did knowingly or intentionally kill Hyler. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).
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Murder requires an intentional or knowing killing; shooting at a person while aware of a high probability of death satisfies the knowing mental state.

Reichler v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-10-31

Murder requires proof of a mental state of intentionally or knowingly killing another person. ... This evidence establishes that Reichler shot twice at Alexius knowing there was a high probability that Alexius would be killed, rather than that he fired without regard for the risk of Alexius’ death.
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Subsection (1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim.

Carylon Young v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-10-17(1)

To support Young’s conviction of murder, the State was required to show that Young (1) knowingly or intentionally (2) killed (3) Means. I.C. § 35-42-1-1(1).
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Section 35-42-1-1(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another person.

Smith v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-12-03(1)

To support Smith’s conviction of murder, the State was required to show that Smith (1) knowingly or intentionally (2) killed (3) Krawczenia.
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Section 35-42-1-1(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another person.

Garcia v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-01-30(1)

To support Garcia’s conviction of murder, the State was required to show that Garcia (1) knowingly or intentionally (2) killed (3) Moreno. I.C. § 35-42-1-1(1).
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Murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim.

Zion Smith v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-02-13

To convict Smith of murder, as charged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally killed Staten.
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Murder requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim.

Farris v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-03-12

To obtain a conviction for murder as charged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Farris (2) knowingly or intentionally (3) killed Howard.
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Murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another human being.

Abd v. State of Indiana · filed 2019-04-04

To convict Abd of murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Abd (1) knowingly or intentionally (2) killed another human being.
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Section 35-42-1-1(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another person.

Davis v. Sate of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-05-16(1)

To convict Davis of murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally killed Rees. I.C. § 35-42-1-1(1).
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Felony murder requires a killing during an attempted robbery but does not require an agreement between coconspirators.

Dorsey v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-09-26(2)

On the other hand, the felony murder did not require an agreement between coconspirators but did require a killing during the attempted robbery.
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Section 35-42-1-1 does not make the absence of self-defense an element of murder.

Hicks v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-10-29

Self-defense is not an element of the crime of murder or its lesser-included offenses.
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A person commits murder under § 35-42-1-1 by knowingly or intentionally killing another human being.

Hernandez-Ramirez v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-02-17

Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 provides that a person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being commits murder. ... Based upon the record, we conclude the State presented evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found Hernandez-Ramirez guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder.
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Murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another person.

Keith B. Ivory, Jr. v. State of Indiana · filed 2020-02-20

To convict Ivory of murder as charged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Ivory (2) knowingly or intentionally (3) killed Smallwood. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.
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Section 35-42-1-1 defines murder as the knowing or intentional killing of another human being; premeditation is not an element.

Baldwin v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-05-05

Murder is defined as the knowing or intentional killing of another human being. See I.C. § 35-42-1-1. As such, the element of pre-meditation is not specifically included as an element of the crime.
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Murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another human being.

McNair v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-05-21(1)

Therefore, to obtain a conviction of murder in this case, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) McNair (2) knowingly or intentionally (3) killed Burnett.
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Section 35-42-1-1 requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim.

Sanders v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-07-09

To prove Sanders committed murder, the State had to present evidence he knowingly or intentionally killed Naugle.
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Murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another person.

Mirabal v. State of Indiana · filed 2024-06-25(1)

To convict Mirabal of murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mirabal knowingly or intentionally killed Baca.
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Section 35-42-1-1(1) does not require proof of a specific intent to rob for a murder conviction.

Lei Gamble v. State of Indiana · filed 2025-03-27(1)

Although relevant to the felony murder charge in Count II, the showing of a specific intent to rob Cruz was not required to convict Gamble of Cruz’s murder in Count I.
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Section 35-42-1-1 defines murder as knowingly or intentionally killing another human being.

Littlefield v. State of Indiana · filed 2023-07-13

In accordance with Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1, the offense of murder is committed when a defendant “knowingly or intentionally kills another human being.”
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Murder does not require a specific intent to kill.

James v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-02-11

Unlike the present case, however, these factors had a bearing on a requisite element of Kiefer’s offense—i.e., whether Kiefer acted with the specific intent to kill the victim. That element is not required for the offense of murder; thus, Kiefer is inapposite to this case.
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Felony murder under subsection (2) requires a killing during the commission or attempted commission of a listed felony; the killing need not be intentional.

Grimes v. State of Indiana · filed 2026-04-13(2)

Moreover, felony murder never requires that the killing be done with purpose, i.e., knowingly or intentionally; instead, the felony murder statute requires only the killing of another human being while committing (or attempting to commit) one of the listed felonies.
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Section 35-42-1-1 does not require proof of premeditation for murder.

Landske v. State of Indiana · filed 2020-05-14

The State was not required to prove premeditation to convict Landske of murder.
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Murder requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another person.

Brown v. State of Indiana · filed 2023-10-26(1)

To prove Brown committed murder, the State had to prove he “knowingly or intentionally” killed Lieutenant Allan. ... Based thereon, we conclude the State presented sufficient evidence Brown knowingly and intentionally killed Lieutenant Allan.
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Section 35-42-1-1(1) permits a murder conviction for a knowing killing without proof that the defendant intended to kill.

Esequiel Trejo, Jr. v. State of Indiana · filed 2025-09-29(1)

This argument fails because the State did not have to prove Trejo intentionally killed Hernandez-Acosta, but rather that he did so knowingly.
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Evidence and intent

Intent or knowledge for murder may be inferred from an adult’s violent attack on a young child and the adult’s statements during the attack.

Burkhalter v. State · filed 1979-12-11

In the instant case, the evidence revealing the dunking and kicking of a four year old boy by an adult man together with defendant’s statements to the boy would enable a jury to draw an inference of intent or the requisite knowledge.
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Intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily injury can support a murder verdict.

Hardin v. State · filed 1980-06-03(1)

Malice may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner reasonably calculated to cause death or great bodily injury. ... The evidence was sufficient for the jury to have returned a verdict of guilty to the charge of murder.
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The intent element of murder can be established by substantial evidence of an intentional killing.

Price v. State · filed 1980-11-26

In the case at bar, there was substantial evidence of probative value to support the jury's conclusion that appellant intentionally killed the decedent.
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Intent to kill may be inferred from a stealthy attack and repeated stabbing.

Smith v. State · filed 1981-04-22

Based upon the same considerations as above, we conclude that the jury was warranted in concluding beyond a reasonable doubt from the stealth employed, and the repeated acts of stabbing, that appellant intended on this occasion to kill Foster.
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A murder conviction under subsection (1) is supported when the evidence permits a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knowingly caused the victim’s death by shooting.

Reburn v. State · filed 1981-06-09(1)

If believed, it was sufficient to warrant the jury in concluding to a moral certainty beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knowingly caused her husband to die by shooting him.
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The intent required for murder may be inferred from using a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm.

Armstrong v. State · filed 1982-01-07

The element of intent required in a killing to constitute murder may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm.
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Intent to kill may be inferred from evidence that the defendant used a shotgun to enter an apartment and kill the victim after she rejected him.

Oates v. State · filed 1982-01-13

From such evidence the jury could have found that something “cracked” as Defendant claims, or that he intentionally used a shotgun to break into an apartment and to kill the victim in response to her rejection.
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Intent to kill for murder may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner reasonably calculated to cause death or great bodily harm.

Vasseur v. State · filed 1982-02-11

There was sufficient evidence to support each element of murder. Intent to kill can be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner reasonably calculated to produce death or great bodily harm so that a purpose to kill may be inferred from the act of killing.
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Intent to commit murder may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.

Williams v. State · filed 1982-04-13

The intent to commit murder may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.
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Subsection (1) permits a murder conviction when the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly caused the victim’s death.

Powell v. State · filed 1982-07-26(1)

In his confession, he admitted placing his hand and the blanket over her mouth, and persisted in this conduct against her physical resistance until she no longer moved. From this evidence the jury was warranted in concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct was accompanied by the requisite knowledge.
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A jury may find the knowing or intentional mental state for murder despite a claim of intoxication when evidence shows the defendant remained in control of his conduct.

Roell v. State · filed 1982-08-10

There was ample evidence presented to the jury from which they could properly find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had committed the crime of murder and that he did so knowingly and intentionally.
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The intent required for murder may be inferred from intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.

Ballard v. State · filed 1982-08-10

This Court has held the necessary intent to commit murder may be inferred from intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death. ... The victim sustained six gunshot wounds. Testimony was heard that the assailant continued to shoot the victim after she fell. Under our standard of review, we hold the evidence was sufficient on the issues of identification and intent to support the conviction.
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Intent to murder may be inferred from using a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.

Russell v. State · filed 1982-08-12

We have often recognized that malice and intent may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death. ... While the jury might have found otherwise, the evidence was sufficient to sustain its verdict that defendant was guilty of murder.
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Intent to murder may be established by using a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm.

Clay v. State · filed 1982-10-06

The use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm may be sufficient to establish a defendant’s intent to commit murder.
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Intent to commit murder may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.

Andrews v. State · filed 1982-11-03

It is well-settled that the necessary intent to commit murder may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.
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Intent to kill for murder may be inferred from using a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm.

Davidson v. State · filed 1982-12-27

It is also well settled that the element of intent required in the killing to constitute murder may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm.
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Evidence that the defendant unlawfully and knowingly killed the victim can support a murder conviction despite a claim of sudden heat.

Burris v. State · filed 1983-02-17

The jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt from the State’s evidence that Defendant unlawfully and knowingly killed the decedent as charged in the information.
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Circumstantial evidence can support a murder conviction if a reasonable person could find every element beyond a reasonable doubt.

Napier v. State · filed 1983-03-16

Circumstantial evidence alone may support a murder conviction so long as a reasonable man could find each element of the crime therefrom beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Under § 35-42-1-1(1), intent to kill may be inferred from repeatedly striking a victim with a metal bar in a manner likely to cause death.

Pendrick v. State · filed 1983-04-26(1)

The intentional aspect of his conduct may be inferred from his having repeatedly struck the victim, with a metal bar and in consort with others, in a manner likely to cause death.
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A knowing murder conviction may rest on evidence that the defendant was aware of a high probability that his act would kill another human being.

Bryan v. State · filed 1983-06-28

From this evidence the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt appellant committed the act of killing another human being while aware of a high probability that he was doing so.
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Intent to kill may be inferred from using a deadly weapon in a manner reasonably calculated to cause death.

Brewer v. State · filed 1983-10-31(1)

Appellant's intent to kill the victim may be inferred from his using a deadly weapon, ie., a pistol, in a manner reasonably calculated to cause death.
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Intent to murder may be established by using a weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm.

Burgess v. State · filed 1984-04-17(1)

The use of a weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm may be sufficient to establish a defendant’s intent to commit murder.
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A murder conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence from which the jury can infer that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim.

Corder v. State · filed 1984-08-20

From the evidence produced at trial the jury could logically have inferred that defendant knowingly and intentionally shot his father.
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Intent to kill may be inferred from intentionally using a deadly weapon in a manner reasonably calculated to cause death or great bodily harm.

McMurry v. State · filed 1984-09-12

It is well settled that intent to kill can be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner reasonably calculated to produce death or great bodily harm.
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Section 35-42-1-1 defines murder as knowingly or intentionally killing another human being; shooting an unarmed person as he walks away can support a finding of a knowing killing.

Wilson v. State · filed 1984-10-18

A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being commits murder. Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.). ... The evidence here showed that appellant pulled a gun from his pocket and shot an unarmed man in front of several witnesses as the victim walked away from him following an argu*1375ment. There was substantial probative evidence from which the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knowingly killed Donald Robinson.
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A murder conviction is supported by evidence that the defendant knowingly and intentionally killed the victim absent provocation or sudden heat.

Green v. State · filed 1984-11-09

The evidence most favorable to the state was sufficient to support the verdict that the defendant knowingly and intentionally killed the victim absent provocation or sudden heat.
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Intent to kill for murder may be inferred from using a deadly weapon in a manner reasonably calculated to cause death or great bodily harm.

Alfaro v. State · filed 1985-05-28

The intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a manuer reasonably calculated to produce death or great bodily harm.
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Evidence that the defendant returned to the station office and shot the victim was sufficient to support a murder conviction.

Rounds v. State · filed 1985-07-18(2)

This is a direct appeal from a conviction of murder, I.C. § 35-42-1-1(2). ... Thereafter, appellant walked back into the station office and shot the victim. The victim was pleading for his life right before he was shot. ... The evidence is clearly sufficient to support appellant's conviction for murder.
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Section 35-42-1-1(1) requires a knowing or intentional killing, which the jury may infer from circumstantial evidence.

Richardson v. State · filed 1985-08-28(1)

Rather, he claims that the shooting was an accident, and that the State failed to show that he acted "knowingly or intentionally" as required for a conviction of murder under Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1. ... It cannot be said, as a matter of law, that the State presented no substantial evidence from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that Defendant acted knowingly or intentional ly. Rather, the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.
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Circumstantial evidence of a struggle before the shooting, hurried departure afterward, and possession of the victim's gun can support a murder conviction.

Gerald v. State · filed 1986-03-31

The evidence most favorable to the judgment sufficed to convict Gerald of the murder. The proof of his struggle with the victim immediately before the four gun shots, his hurried activity thereafter, and his possession of her .25 gun, warranted a reasonable person in concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant killed the victim.
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Murder requires a knowing or intentional killing, and intent to kill may be inferred from intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.

Brumley v. State · filed 1986-05-13

Under ind. Code § 85-42-1-1 a person commits murder if he knowingly or intentionally kills the victim. ... The necessary intent to commit murder may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.
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Intent to commit murder may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon.

Sears v. State · filed 1986-07-17(1)

Her intent can be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon against the unarmed defendant.
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Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to support a murder conviction.

Allen v. State · filed 1986-08-06

Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to support a murder conviction.
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Intent to commit murder may be inferred from using a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm.

Jenkins v. State · filed 1986-09-17

To the contrary, the intent to commit murder may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause a death or great bodily harm.
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Notes 1–150 of 400, oldest cases first.

918 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Na-Son D. Smith v. State of Indiana, the court applies general accomplice liability to the killing, without resolving a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Damion Martin v. State of Indiana, the court decides whether evidence identified Martin as a shooter, without resolving a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Shidler v. State of Indiana, the court decides intent for conspiracy to commit murder under a separate statute. opinion →
Ball v. State of Indiana, the court decides intent for the separate attempted-murder offense. opinion →
Alejandro v. State of Indiana, the court decides the separate attempted-murder offense. opinion →
McManomy v. State of Indiana, the court decides intent for the separate attempted-murder offense. opinion →
Williams v. State of Indiana, the court decides the separate attempted-murder offense. opinion →
John W. Taylor, IV v. State of Indiana, the court decides intent for the separate attempted-murder offense. opinion →
Nelson v. State of Indiana, the court decides the separate attempted-murder offense. opinion →
Baltazar v. State of Indiana, the court decided whether evidence identified the killer, without resolving a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Robertson v. State of Indiana, the court decided whether evidence identified the shooter, without resolving a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Patrick Dewayne Carr, Jr. v. State of Indiana, the court decided attempted murder under the separate attempt statute. opinion →
Alvies v. State, the court applied accomplice liability to the killing; it did not decide a rule of § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Jones v. State, the court decides the separate attempted-murder offense, not a rule of § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Corbin v. State, the court decides the separate attempted-murder offense, not a rule of § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Wofford v. State, the court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence but does not decide any rule of this section. opinion →
Ottman v. State, the court decides sufficiency under the former first-degree murder statute; it cites § 35-42-1-1 only as the current version. opinion →
State v. McCormick, the court identifies § 35-42-1-1 as the basis for the murder charge, but decides the constitutionality of an aggravating circumstance under § 35-50-2-9(b)(8). opinion →
Hinton v. State, the court cites this section only to identify the murder charge; it decides no rule under the section. opinion →
Blood v. State, the court reviews the sufficiency of the voluntary manslaughter conviction; it does not decide a rule of the cited murder section. opinion →
Morris v. State, the court decided whether evidence from an unlawful arrest was admissible, not any rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Brownlow v. State, the court identifies § 35-42-1-1 as the offense of conviction, but decides the abandonment issue under a different statute and does not decide this section’s rules. opinion →
Hicks v. State, the court decides whether the evidence supports the conviction, without deciding a rule of this section. opinion →
Dailey v. State, the court identifies the murder conviction but does not decide any rule of § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Campbell v. State, the court identifies the attempted murder charge but decides disclosure and evidentiary sufficiency, not this section’s rules. opinion →
Collins v. State, the court decided whether the evidence identified Collins as the killer, not any rule of this section. opinion →
Morse v. State, the section identifies the murder charge, but the court decides jury, evidence, and mistrial issues rather than the section’s rules. opinion →
Webster v. State, the court decides evidentiary sufficiency and retrial, not a rule of this section. opinion →
Judy v. State, the court identifies the murder convictions as background for its review of the death sentence, but does not decide a rule of § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Abbott v. State, the court cites § 35-42-1-1(1) for the attempted-murder charge, but decides whether attempted voluntary manslaughter exists under the attempt and manslaughter statutes. opinion →
Wilson v. State, the court decided whether the evidence identified Wilson as the perpetrator; it did not decide any rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Chandler v. State, the court identifies the statute of conviction but decides trial and evidentiary issues, not any rule of this section. opinion →
Cox v. State, the court cites the section to identify the murder conviction but does not decide any rule of that section. opinion →
Brown v. State, the discussion of this section appears only in a dissent; the majority decided the case under the prior murder statute. opinion →
Basham v. State, the court identifies the murder conviction but does not decide any rule of § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Clemons v. State, the court decided whether the attempted-murder jury instructions were adequate, not a rule of § 35-42-1-1 itself. opinion →
McCraney v. State, the court decides whether evidentiary errors were preserved for review, not any rule of this section. opinion →
Scott v. State, the court identifies the felony-murder conviction under this section but decides trial procedure and evidence issues, not the section’s rules. opinion →
Follrad v. State, the court decided a juror-separation issue under a different statute; it did not decide any rule of § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Johnson v. State, the concurrence mentions this section as an overlapping offense but decides no rule of the murder statute. opinion →
McGraw v. State, the court cites the section to identify the murder conviction but decides evidentiary and continuance issues, not any rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Music v. State, the citation reports the charge below; this court decides whether interception of an attorney interview warrants a new trial, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Suggs v. State, the court mentions the murder charge but does not decide any rule of § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Turner v. State, the court cites the section to identify the conviction but decides no rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Cambridge v. State, the court decided whether the evidence warranted a voluntary manslaughter instruction, without deciding a rule of § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Akins v. State, the court identifies the murder conviction but does not decide any rule of § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Hopkins v. State, the court cites the section to identify the charge but decides no rule of the section. opinion →
Allen v. State, the court cites the section to identify the conviction but decides issues about the confession, identification, and flight evidence, not the section’s rules. opinion →
Collins v. State, the court decided whether the evidence supported attempted murder, but did not decide a rule of § 35-42-1-1 itself. opinion →
Coleman v. State, the section identifies the charge; the court decides cross-examination and mistrial issues, not the section’s rules. opinion →
Ramos v. State, the citation reports the jury’s conviction, not this court’s decision about the section. The court decides other issues without construing § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Strong v. State, the court decided whether identification evidence was admissible, not any rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Chittenden v. State, the court decides evidentiary and jury-instruction issues, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Enmund v. Florida, this statement appears in a dissent’s survey of state statutes, not the Court’s decision about Indiana’s murder statute. opinion →
Fielden v. State, the court applies general accomplice-liability, intoxication, and sufficiency principles without deciding a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Bryan v. State, the citation identifies a conviction below, not this court’s decision about the murder section. opinion →
Dunn v. State, the court decides whether the evidence supports the verdict in light of the sudden-heat argument, but does not decide a rule of the murder section itself. opinion →
Dunaway v. State, the court identifies the murder conviction but does not decide any rule of § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Taylor v. State, the court decides issues about insanity, mental illness, and notice; it does not decide a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Hoskins v. State, the court decides accomplice liability under Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4, rather than a rule of the murder section. opinion →
Murray v. State, the court mentions the murder statute as a conviction but decides no rule of that section. opinion →
Webster v. State, the section identifies the murder charges, but the court decides double jeopardy and evidentiary sufficiency without deciding the section’s rules. opinion →
Dier v. State, the court rejected an evidence-based challenge to the verdict but did not decide any rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Huff v. State, the court decides whether conspiracy is an exception to sentence suspension under Ind. Code § 35-50-2-2. It does not decide any rule of the murder section; that section appears only as a parenthetical identifier in the quoted exception list. opinion →
Tucker v. State, the court decides the sufficiency of an attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction and the sentence; it does not decide a rule of the murder section. opinion →
Burgess v. State, the court decides jury instructions, voir dire, and sentencing issues, but does not decide a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Lane v. State, the court decides evidentiary and general sufficiency issues, not a rule of the murder statute. The citation identifies the conviction. opinion →
Schiro v. State, the citation reports the trial court conviction; the opinion contains no decision by this court about the murder section. opinion →
Tunstall v. State, the court decides whether criminal recklessness is a lesser included offense of attempted murder under the attempt statute; it does not decide a rule of the murder section itself. opinion →
Daniels v. State, the court identifies the felony murder conviction under § 35-42-1-1(2), but the opinion does not decide that section’s rules. opinion →
Peterson v. State, the court decides evidence and mistrial issues, but no rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Woolston v. State, the court cites the murder section to identify the conviction but does not decide any rule of that section. opinion →
Partlow v. State, the citation reports the trial court conviction; the court does not decide a rule of this section. opinion →
Caldwell v. State, the court decided juvenile court jurisdiction under Ind. Code §§ 31-6-2-1(d) and 31-6-2-4(c), not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Johnson v. State, the court decides the guilty plea advisement requirements under a different statute, not the murder section’s rules. opinion →
Dillon v. State, the court identifies the felony-murder convictions but decides issues concerning counsel, confession admissibility, and the separate death-penalty statute, not the rules of § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Dresser v. State, the court decides issues of prosecutorial argument and photographic evidence, not the murder statute’s rules. opinion →
McDowell v. State, the court decides juvenile jurisdiction under other statutes, not the murder section’s rules. opinion →
Gibson v. State, the court decides the validity of the guilty plea and the applicable sentencing advice, not the murder section’s rules. opinion →
Heartfield v. State, the court decided insanity, confession admissibility, and arraignment issues, but no rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Thomas v. State, the court cites the murder statute to identify the conviction but decides jury and expert-assistance issues, not a rule of this section. opinion →
Finch v. State, the court decided whether photographs were admissible, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
McReynolds v. State, the court cites the murder section to identify the conviction but decides venue, search, and sentencing issues without deciding a rule of that section. opinion →
Almodovar v. State, the court cites the murder section to identify the conviction, but decides the sentencing issue under other law. opinion →
Burris v. State, the opinion reports the conviction and lists an issue on appeal but contains no decision about this section’s rules. opinion →
Ashford v. State, the court identifies the murder conviction but decides self-defense and trial-error issues without deciding a rule of this section. opinion →
Johnson v. State, the court decides whether battery was a lesser included offense under the charging instrument; it does not decide a rule of the murder section. opinion →
Terry v. State, the court decides the availability of voluntary intoxication under § 35-41-3-5(b), not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Kappos v. State, the court cites the murder section to identify the conviction but does not decide that section’s rules. opinion →
Anderson v. State, the court decides whether the guilty plea was valid, not any rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Smith v. State, the cited murder conviction is the trial court’s ruling, and the opinion contains no decision by this court about the section. opinion →
Bevill v. State, the court decides factual sufficiency and a constitutional double jeopardy issue, but does not decide a rule of the murder section itself. opinion →
Cardine v. State, the court identifies the murder conviction but decides evidentiary and instruction issues without deciding a rule of this section. opinion →
Pyle v. State, the court decides whether the evidence supports attempted murder and whether the defendant abandoned the attempt; it does not decide a rule of the murder section itself. opinion →
Burtley v. State, the court decides whether replacing a juror was error, not any rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Matthews v. State, the court mentions the murder section when reporting the convictions but decides attempted battery and juror issues, not any rule of the murder section. opinion →
Rust v. State, the court decides sentence enhancement and double jeopardy issues, not the rules of the murder statute. opinion →
Robinson v. State, the court identifies the murder conviction and reviews the sufficiency of the evidence, but does not decide a rule of this section. opinion →
Davis v. State, the court mentions the murder section to identify the charges, but the issue it addresses concerns the death penalty statute. opinion →
Moore v. State, the court mentions the murder section as the basis for the guilty pleas but decides no rule of that section. opinion →
Harlan v. State, the court decides jury instruction issues; the citation to this section only identifies the conviction. opinion →
Flowers v. State, the court identifies murder as an underlying offense, but its rulings address other law, including lesser included offenses and double jeopardy, rather than a rule of § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Eagan v. State, the court cites the murder section to identify the charged offense, but decides confession, instruction, and trial procedure issues rather than the section’s own rules. opinion →
Inman v. State, the court cites the murder section to identify the charges, but decides discovery and sentencing issues without deciding any rule of that section. opinion →
Woodson v. State, the court decides consent instructions for the sexual offenses and a habitual offender sentencing error; it does not decide any rule of the murder section. opinion →
Fowler v. State, the court decides whether a voluntary manslaughter instruction was proper; it does not decide a rule of the murder section. opinion →
Brownlow v. State, the citation appears in the appellant’s argument; the court decided juvenile court jurisdiction under a different statute. opinion →
Brown v. State, the court cites the section to identify the conviction but does not decide a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Wallace v. State, this is a dissenting opinion, not the court's holding. opinion →
Carpenter v. State, the court mentions the murder section only when listing the charges; it decides no rule of that section. opinion →
Vincent v. State, the court decides whether the evidence supported a lesser included offense instruction; it does not decide a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Seltzer v. State, the court decides evidentiary and search issues, not the murder statute’s rules. opinion →
Fine v. State, the court decides evidentiary, competency, and counsel issues, but does not decide a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Guinn v. State, the section identifies the conviction; the court decides confession voluntariness and courtroom smoking, not the section’s rules. opinion →
Phillips v. State, the court decides interrogation, arrest, and general evidentiary sufficiency issues without deciding a rule of the murder section. opinion →
McCune v. State, the court decides the sufficiency of the charging information and the availability of defenses, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Moore v. State, the court decides evidentiary issues, not the murder statute’s rules; the statute is cited only to identify the conviction. opinion →
Roby v. State, the court decides whether repudiated out-of-court statements were sufficiently corroborated, not any rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Morgan v. State, the court decides the admissibility of experimental evidence, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Hill v. State, the court decides witness credibility and self-defense issues, but does not decide a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Spranger v. State, the opinion identifies the murder charge but does not decide a rule of this section. opinion →
Robinson v. State, the court decided impeachment and prosecutorial misconduct issues, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Budd v. State, the court decides whether the evidence supports the attempted-murder conviction, but does not decide any rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1; the section appears only in a footnote citation. opinion →
Stratton v. State, the court mentions the murder statute only to identify the charge; it decides issues about psychiatric examiners and autopsy photographs. opinion →
Roberts v. State, the court cites § 35-42-1-1 to identify the conviction but decides no rule of that section. opinion →
Dodson v. State, the court cites § 35-42-1-1 only as the current version of the repealed statute under which Dodson was convicted; it does not decide any rule of § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Ford v. State, the court decides the voluntariness of the confession, not any rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Martin v. State, the court decides the self-defense and rebuttal-evidence issues, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Rogers v. State, the court decided Rogers' insanity defense and an evidence issue, not the murder section's rules. opinion →
McBride v. State, the court reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence but did not decide any rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Patton v. State, the court decided whether the guilty plea could stand after Patton denied intent to kill at sentencing; it did not decide a rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
King v. State, the court decided whether the attempted murder instruction adequately conveyed specific intent, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Larry v. State, the court cites the murder section to identify the conviction, but decides whether the charging information supports a battery instruction, not a rule of the murder section. opinion →
Collins v. State, the court decides a general issue about charging multiple counts and imposing one sentence, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Whipple v. State, the court identifies the murder section as the charged offense but decides the defenses and trial issues under other rules, without deciding this section's own rules. opinion →
Ward v. State, the court cites the murder section to explain the seriousness of child molesting; it decides the rules for attempted child molesting, not the murder section's rules. opinion →
Mitchell v. State, the court cites the murder statute to identify the conviction but does not decide the section's own rules. opinion →
Haggard v. State, the court decided whether the evidence supported the guilty but mentally ill verdict; it did not decide a rule of the murder section. opinion →
Cooper v. State, the citation reports the prosecutor’s charge, not this court’s decision about the murder statute. opinion →
Rabadi v. State, the court cites the murder section to identify the conviction but does not decide any rule of that section. opinion →
Perigo v. State, the court decides the provocation rule under the voluntary manslaughter section, § 35-42-1-3, rather than a rule of the murder section. opinion →
Siglar v. State, the court identifies the murder conviction and reviews the evidence and trial issues, but does not decide a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Woods v. State, the opinion cites the section only while reporting the charge; the opinion contains no decision by this court about it. opinion →
Gasaway v. State, the court decided issues involving involuntary manslaughter and neglect, but did not decide a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Bustamante v. State, the court cites the section to identify the charges but does not decide any rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Coleman v. State, the court cites the murder section to identify the convictions but decides no rule of that section. opinion →
Burris v. State, the court cites the murder section as background but bars the challenge to the felony-murder instruction without deciding the section's rules. opinion →
Robinett v. State, the court decides sentencing and trial issues, but does not decide a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Abner v. State, the court rejected a claim about the killing method contemplated in an agreement to kill; that is an accomplice or agreement issue, not a rule of § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Elswick v. State, the court decided whether a jury instruction improperly shifted the burden of proof; it did not decide a rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. The section appears only in a footnote identifying the murder charge. opinion →
Spradlin v. State, the court decides the intent and instruction requirements for attempted murder under the attempt statute; it mentions § 35-42-1-1(1) only as the murder definition read to the jury. opinion →
Brown v. State, the court cites the section to identify the convictions but does not decide any rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Sims v. State, the court reviewed the sentencing court’s treatment of mitigating circumstances, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Pointer v. State, the court recites the murder provision as an alternative to the voluntary manslaughter conviction, but decides the sufficiency of that conviction and the self-defense claim. opinion →
Johnson v. State, the opinion reports a charge under the section but contains no decision by this court about it. opinion →
Trueblood v. State, the court decides plea withdrawal and death sentencing issues; it cites this section only to identify the murder charges. opinion →
Goodman v. State, the court decided a closing-argument issue, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Price v. State, the court decided whether the attempted murder instructions adequately conveyed intent to kill; it did not decide a rule of the murder section itself. opinion →
Jackson v. State, the opinion identifies the murder convictions and quotes the felony-murder provision, but does not show the court deciding this section's rules. opinion →
Schiro v. Richard Clark, Superintendent, and Indiana Attorney General, the citation reports the trial court’s conviction, rather than this court’s own decision about the murder statute. opinion →
Rouster v. State, the court mentions the murder section when reporting the convictions but does not decide that section's rules. opinion →
Thompson v. State, the court upheld the conviction based on the evidence but did not decide a rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1; the section appears only in a citation identifying the murder charge. opinion →
Harris v. State, the court decides whether identification evidence was admissible, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Weaver v. State, the court decided the voluntary intoxication defense to attempted murder; it cited the murder section only to identify the charged offense. opinion →
Burris v. Farley, the opinion recites the murder statute while describing a due process challenge to a jury instruction; it does not decide the statute’s own rules. opinion →
Vance v. State, the court affirms the murder conviction but decides juvenile waiver, conspiracy evidence, and discovery issues; it does not decide a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
State Ex Rel. Camden v. Gibson Circuit Court, the court decides juvenile-court jurisdiction over attempted robbery under Ind. Code § 31-6-2-1.1(d). It does not decide any rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Pierce v. State, the court assesses intoxication and intent in Pierce’s attempted-murder appeal, but does not decide a rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Horan v. State, the court decided a constitutional jury-instruction issue, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Wright v. State, the court decided whether the reckless-homicide conviction violated due process under the murder charge, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Griffin v. State, the court decided whether the evidence required a voluntary manslaughter instruction. It cited § 35-42-1-1(1) only to identify the murder conviction, without deciding that section’s rules. opinion →
Roark v. State, the court decided whether the evidence showed sudden heat under voluntary manslaughter, not a rule of the murder section. opinion →
Burris v. Robert A. Farley, Warden, the court left the scope of Indiana’s murder statute to Indiana courts and resolved the federal habeas challenge without deciding that statutory question. opinion →
Bradley v. State, the court reviewed witness credibility and general sufficiency of the evidence, but did not decide any rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Emerson v. State, the court decided an ineffective-assistance claim based on Fourth Amendment search law, not a rule of the murder statute. The statute appears only in a bare citation. opinion →
Wethington v. State, the court decides a rule of attempted murder and a double jeopardy claim, not a rule of the murder section itself. Section 35-42-1-1 appears only in a footnote identifying the offense underlying the attempt charge. opinion →
Johnson v. State, the court decided whether evidence of prior misconduct was admissible, not a rule of the murder statute. The section appears only in a citation identifying the charge. opinion →
Smith v. State, the court decides whether the evidence supports attempted murder; it quotes the murder statute but does not decide that statute's own rules. opinion →
Channell v. State, the court decided the intent required for attempted murder and the adequacy of its jury instructions, not a rule of the murder section itself. opinion →
Widener v. State, the court decides the appropriate sentence; it does not decide a rule of the murder statute, which appears only in a footnote identifying the offense. opinion →
Harris v. State, the court affirmed the felony murder conviction but did not decide any rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Sublett v. State, the court cites the murder section only to identify the charge and does not decide any rule of that section. opinion →
Swanson v. State, the court decides admissibility under the Indiana Rules of Evidence, not a rule of the murder statute. It summarily affirms the sufficiency ruling without construing the statute. opinion →
Sears v. State, the court decides the constitutional challenge to the sentence, not a rule of the murder statute. The section is cited only to identify the murder charges. opinion →
Mayberry v. State, the court decided evidentiary and sentencing issues under other law; it did not decide a rule of the murder statute, which appears only as a bare citation. opinion →
Bailey v. State, the court decided the procedure for instructing a deadlocked jury, not any rule of the murder statute. The section appears only in a footnote identifying the charge. opinion →
Williams v. State, the court decides issues under the death penalty statute, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9. Its references to § 35-42-1-1 are bare footnote citations and do not decide that section’s rules. opinion →
Terry v. State, the court reviewed attempted-murder instructions under the attempt statute; it did not decide a rule of the murder section. opinion →
Barnett v. State, the court reviewed intent for attempted murder and a battery instruction; it did not decide a rule of the murder section. opinion →
Greer v. State, the court decided the specific intent required by the attempt statute; the murder section supplies only the target offense. opinion →
McLean v. State, the court resolved a factual identity and ballistics sufficiency question; it did not define or apply a disputed rule of the murder section. opinion →
Owens v. State, the court assessed the evidence of intoxication and the defendant’s conduct; it did not decide a rule of the murder section. opinion →
PG v. State, the court decided the juvenile waiver rule in Ind.Code § 31-6-2-4(d), not the rules of the murder statute. opinion →
Howse v. State, the court decides whether the guilty plea showed an understanding of attempted murder, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Johnson v. State, the court decides evidence and self-defense issues, but does not decide any rule of the murder statute. Section 35-42-1-1 appears only in a footnote citation. opinion →
Anderson v. State, the court decides a double jeopardy issue, not a rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Pigg v. Hanks, the court decides whether the guilty plea was voluntary, not a rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
State v. Van Cleave, the court used the murder statute to assess prejudice in a post-conviction ineffective-assistance claim; that claim was the issue it decided. opinion →
Hunter v. State, the court decided sentencing and guilty-plea issues, not the rules of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. The section appears only in a footnote identifying the murder charge. opinion →
Jones v. State, the section is cited only to identify the murder charge; the court decides sentencing and plea issues under other law. opinion →
Cadiz v. State, the court decides evidentiary issues and waiver, not any rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. The section appears only in a bare footnote citation. opinion →
Woods v. State, the court decides a double-jeopardy challenge based on two gunshots, not a rule of the murder statute. The section appears only in citations identifying the charges. opinion →
Carter v. State, the court decided evidentiary issues; it cited the murder statute only to identify the conviction. opinion →
Daniels v. State, the court decided search and evidence issues, not any rule of the murder statute. The section appears only in a footnote identifying the conviction. opinion →
Mauricio v. State, the court decides whether an involuntary-manslaughter instruction was warranted and whether the evidence supported the conviction. It cites § 35-42-1-1 only to identify the murder conviction. opinion →
Waters v. State, the court decides whether the evidence supports the conviction, but states no rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1; the section appears only in a bare citation. opinion →
Greer v. State, the court decides the consecutive-sentence limitation in § 35-50-1-2, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Whatley v. State, the section appears only in a footnote identifying the murder conviction; the court decides no rule under it. opinion →
Mitchem v. State, the court decided an attempted-murder charging and instruction issue, not a rule of the murder section itself. opinion →
Allen v. State, the opinion identifies the murder counts but does not decide any rule of this section. opinion →
Bacher v. State, the court identifies the murder charge but does not decide a rule of this section. opinion →
Grafe v. State, the court decides a double jeopardy issue, not the rules of the murder statute. opinion →
Carter v. State, the court uses the murder provision in a double-jeopardy comparison but does not decide its own rules. opinion →
Broome v. State, the court does not decide a rule of the murder statute; it cites the section only in a comparison with the voluntary manslaughter statute. opinion →
Borders v. State, the court cites the section to identify the murder conviction but decides evidentiary and constitutional issues, not the section’s rules. opinion →
Battles v. State, the court decided whether the evidence supported an accident instruction, but did not decide a rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1; that section appears only as a citation identifying the murder charge. opinion →
Thompson v. State, the court cites the section to identify the convictions but decides evidentiary error and retrial, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Games v. State, the court uses the murder statute’s elements to decide prejudice on an ineffective-assistance claim, rather than deciding a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Roche v. State, the court cites the murder statute in a footnote but does not decide any rule of that section. opinion →
Ben-Yisrayl v. State, the court decides sentencing and evidentiary issues, not the rules of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. Its citation to that section is bare. opinion →
Wrinkles v. State, the court identifies the applicable murder statute but does not decide any rule of that section. opinion →
Beason v. State, the court cites the murder section only to identify the offense; it decides sentencing and jurisdiction issues, not this section’s rules. opinion →
Sipe v. State, the court decided speedy-trial and post-conviction issues under other law; it did not decide any rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Jones v. State of Indiana, the court decided the sentence, not the rules of § 35-42-1-1. That section appears only in a footnote identifying the murder charge. opinion →
Griffin v. State, the discussion of the murder statute is in a dissent, not this court's decision. opinion →
Rouster v. State, the court cites the murder statute while deciding prejudice on a post-conviction ineffective-assistance claim; it does not decide the statute's own rules. opinion →
Brown v. State, the court decided whether an intent instruction violated due process, not a rule of the murder statute. The statute appears only in a footnote identifying the conviction. opinion →
Ajabu v. State, the court uses the murder conviction as background while deciding what the separate capital sentencing aggravator requires. opinion →
Johnson v. State, the opinion identifies the murder statute in a footnote but does not decide any of its rules. opinion →
Wisehart v. State, the court cites the murder section but does not decide any rule of that section. opinion →
Gant v. State, the court decides evidentiary sufficiency and jury instruction issues, but does not decide a rule of the murder statute; the section appears only in footnote citations identifying the offenses. opinion →
Haynes v. State, the court decided the post-conviction challenge, not the rules of the murder statute. The statute appears only in a footnote identifying the conviction. opinion →
Taylor v. State, the court decided sentencing issues under other statutes; it cited § 35-42-1-1 only to identify the murder offense. opinion →
Cook v. State, the footnote merely identifies intent as relevant to a discovery dispute about a witness; the court did not decide the murder section’s rules. opinion →
Johansen v. State, this post-conviction opinion reviews a claim of instructional error and reports the instructions given; it does not decide a new rule of the murder section. opinion →
Barnes v. State, the court resolved a factual sufficiency challenge about intoxication rather than deciding a rule of the murder section. opinion →
Haak v. State, the court decides a federal double jeopardy claim, without construing the murder statute’s own rules. opinion →
Sylvester v. State, the court decides the effect of sudden heat under the voluntary manslaughter provision, not a rule of the murder section. opinion →
Taylor v. State, the court decided whether the victim’s statements were admissible under the excited utterance rule, not any rule of the murder statute. The statute appears only in a footnote citation. opinion →
Brown v. State, the court decides post-conviction and death-penalty issues, not a rule of the murder statute. Section 35-42-1-1 appears only as a footnote citation. opinion →
Jackson v. State, the court decided the limits of the consecutive-sentencing statute, not the rules of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
State v. Klinger, the court decides a double jeopardy issue, not a rule of the murder statute. The section appears only in a footnote identifying the attempted murder charge. opinion →
Hurst v. State, the court decides how to review the jury’s rejection of a guilty but mentally ill verdict, not a rule of the murder statute. Section 35-42-1-1 appears only in a footnote identifying the charge. opinion →
Rhodes v. State, the court decides sentencing rules under Ind. Code §§ 35-50-2-9 and 35-50-2-3, not the murder section’s own rules. Section 35-42-1-1 appears only in a footnote identifying the charge. opinion →
Webster v. State, the court recites the murder statute but decides whether the eyewitness testimony sufficiently identified Webster; it does not decide a rule of the section. opinion →
Greer v. State of Indiana, the court decided the consecutive-sentence limit under Ind.Code § 35-50-1-2, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Whatley v. State of Indiana, the court mentions the murder conviction but does not decide any rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Mitchem v. State of Indiana, the court decides a rule about attempted murder charges, not a rule of the murder section. opinion →
Foster v. State, the court decided whether the trial court had to answer a jury question under Ind. Code § 34-36-1-6. Section 35-42-1-1(2) appears only in a footnote identifying the felony-murder conviction. opinion →
Rogers v. State, the court cites this section to identify the murder charge but decides the rules of the mental retardation statutes, not this section. opinion →
Dorian Lee v. State of Indiana, the court affirms the sentences but does not decide any rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1; the section appears only in footnotes identifying the charges. opinion →
Roche v. State, the court addressed intent for attempted murder and the admissibility of prior acts, but did not decide a rule of the murder section itself. opinion →
Allen v. State of Indiana, the opinion identifies the murder convictions but does not decide a rule of this section. opinion →
Malone v. State, the court identifies the murder conviction but decides evidentiary and trial procedure issues, not this section’s rules. opinion →
Carter v. State of Indiana, the court decided a double jeopardy claim using the offenses’ elements; it did not decide a rule of the murder statute itself. opinion →
Borders v. State of Indiana, the court decided evidentiary and constitutional issues, not the rules of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1; the section appears only in a footnote identifying the offense. opinion →
LaMonte M. Battles v. State, the court cites the murder statute to identify the conviction but decides jury-instruction and sentencing issues without deciding any rule of that section. opinion →
Gibson v. State, the court uses the offense elements to decide a federal double jeopardy claim; it does not decide a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Miller v. State, the court decides post-conviction ineffective-assistance claims, not the rules of the murder statute. The section appears only in a bare footnote citation. opinion →
State v. Klein, the court decided whether the attempted murder charge was filed too late; it did not decide any rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Richeson v. State, the court cited the murder section to explain why its attempted-murder rule is exceptional, while deciding how the attempt statute applies to attempted battery. opinion →
Sweeney v. State, the court decides evidentiary issues, not the murder statute’s rules; the section appears only in a bare footnote citation. opinion →
Thompson v. State of Indiana, the court cites the section to identify the convictions but decides evidentiary and double jeopardy issues, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Ben-Yisrayl f/k/a Peterson v. State, the discussion concerns the death penalty statute; § 35-42-1-1 appears only as a footnote citation, with no decision about its rules. opinion →
Rowe v. State, the court decides whether suppressed impeachment evidence warrants a new trial; it does not decide any rule of the murder statute. The section appears only in a footnote identifying the conviction. opinion →
Ford v. State, the court cites the murder statute to identify the conviction but decides procedural and evidentiary issues, not the statute’s rules. opinion →
White v. State, the court applies an evidentiary rule to the murder conviction but does not decide any rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1; the section appears only in a citation. opinion →
Herrera v. State, the court decides evidentiary issues in a conspiracy prosecution, not the rules of the murder statute. Its only citation to this section is a bare citation in a footnote. opinion →
McQueen v. State, the court cites the murder section to identify the conviction, but decides issues under other rules and the accessory liability statute. opinion →
Rondon v. State, the court decides an ineffective-assistance claim, not a rule of the murder statute; the section appears only in a bare citation. opinion →
Thornton v. State, the court applies general rules for sufficiency of evidence and witness examination; it does not decide a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Bunch v. State, the court addressed a waived general motive instruction covering both murder and arson; the proposed quote does not establish a distinct rule of the murder section. opinion →
Olive v. State, the court reviewed factual sufficiency and ballistics evidence rather than deciding a disputed rule of the murder section. opinion →
Powers v. State, the court reviewed the facts of an infant’s death for sufficiency, without deciding a disputed rule of the murder section. opinion →
Richardson v. State, the court decided accomplice liability under Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4, not a rule created by the murder section. opinion →
Ogle v. State, the court reviewed factual sufficiency of the robbery and murder convictions, without deciding a rule of the murder section. opinion →
Smoote v. State, the court reviewed circumstantial evidence of identity and motive; it did not decide a rule of the murder section. opinion →
Cuto v. State, the court compared offenses for double jeopardy; its statement that felony murder requires a knowing or intentional killing is not a reliable rule of this section. opinion →
Jackson v. State, the court reviewed evidence of sudden heat under voluntary manslaughter rather than deciding a rule of the murder section. opinion →
Angleton v. State, the court decides whether the circumstances support a sentencing aggravator, rather than a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Porter v. State, the court affirmed the murder conviction and sentence but did not decide any rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Ballard v. State, the court decides the meaning of Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2’s sentencing rule. It lists the murder section but does not decide any rule of that section. opinion →
Harris v. State, the court decides whether consecutive sentences were justified, but does not decide any rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
James v. State, the court decided procedural challenges to the conviction, not any rule of the murder statute. Section 35-42-1-1 appears only in a footnote identifying the offense. opinion →
Hernandez v. State, the court decides witness-separation and habitual-offender issues, while citing the murder statute only to identify the unchallenged attempted-murder conviction. opinion →
Ellison v. State, the court decided prosecutorial misconduct and sentencing issues, but no rule of the murder statute. The section appears only in footnotes identifying the offenses. opinion →
Smith v. State, the court decides evidentiary and neglect issues. The citation to § 35-42-1-1(1) identifies the murder charge but does not address that section’s rules. opinion →
Johnson v. State, the court decided an ineffective-assistance claim, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Kelly v. State, the court decides whether the evidence supports the murder verdicts, including an accomplice-liability theory, but does not decide a rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Garland v. State, the court recites the murder statute’s elements, but its decision turns on whether the defendant aided, induced, or caused the killing under the separate accomplice liability statute. opinion →
Hubbard v. State, the court decided a general sufficiency-of-evidence challenge but did not decide any rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Garland v. State, the court decides an ineffective-assistance claim based on the admission of a co-defendant’s statement, not a rule of the murder statute. The section appears only in a citation. opinion →
Garland v. State, the court decided whether the evidence established accomplice liability. It cited the murder section to identify the underlying offense, without deciding a rule of that section. opinion →
Coy v. State, the court decides jury selection and evidence issues, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Spry v. State, the court decides a state double jeopardy issue involving attempted murder; it does not decide a rule of the murder statute, which appears only in a footnote identifying the charge. opinion →
Dobbins v. State, the court decided whether the evidence supported the conviction, but did not decide any rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. The section appears only in a footnote identifying the charge. opinion →
Newson v. State, the court decided whether the evidence identified Defendant as the killer, without deciding a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Monegan v. State, the court cites the murder statute to explain why evidence of intent was relevant, but decides admissibility under Evidence Rule 404(b), not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Bacher v. State, the court decides sentencing issues, not any rule of the murder statute; the section appears only in a footnote identifying the offense. opinion →
Moore v. State, the court decides whether the evidence supports attempted murder under the attempt statute. Section 35-42-1-1 appears only in footnotes identifying and defining the target crime; the court does not decide a rule of the murder section. opinion →
Dunlop v. State, the court decides the voluntary intoxication defense and sentencing issues, but does not decide any rule of the murder statute, which appears only in a footnote identifying the conviction. opinion →
Carter v. State, the court decides the rules for accepting a guilty plea; the murder section identifies a dismissed charge and its rules are not decided. opinion →
Emerson v. State, the court resolves identification, sentencing, and double jeopardy issues without deciding a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Dixie v. State, the court decides whether the defendant waived his right to a jury trial, not any rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Sanquenetti v. State, the court decides accomplice liability and consecutive sentencing, while this section appears only as a citation identifying the murder convictions. opinion →
Hardiman v. State, the court cites the section to identify the conviction but decides evidentiary issues and sufficiency without construing the murder statute. opinion →
Lane v. State, the court decides a resentencing issue under Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3. Section 35-42-1-1 appears only in a footnote identifying the murder conviction. opinion →
Walter v. State, the court decides sentencing issues, not the rules of § 35-42-1-1. The section appears only in a footnote identifying the murder counts. opinion →
Troutman v. State, the court decides whether the evidence identifies Defendant as the killer, but does not decide any rule of the murder statute. The section is cited only to identify the conviction. opinion →
State v. Holmes, the court decides post-conviction claims, not any rule of the murder statute; the section appears only in footnotes identifying the charges. opinion →
Lundberg v. State, the court decides a double jeopardy issue, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Hicks v. State, the court decided a resentencing issue under the sentencing statute and Post-Conviction Rule 1(10)(b), not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Maxey v. State, the court decides procedural and evidentiary issues, not the murder statute’s rules. opinion →
Azania v. State, the only references to the murder section are bare footnote citations; the opinion states no rule about it. opinion →
Herron v. State, No. The court cites the murder statute as a comparison while deciding the meaning of the neglect statute; it does not decide a rule under the murder statute. opinion →
Robinson v. State, the court decides whether the evidence supports attempted-murder convictions; it does not decide a rule of the murder section itself. opinion →
Smith v. State, the court decides jury instruction and evidentiary issues, not any rule of the murder statute. Section 35-42-1-1 appears only in a footnote identifying the conviction. opinion →
Rubalcada v. State, the court decided disclosure and evidentiary issues, not the rules of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1; the section appears only as a citation for the felony-murder conviction. opinion →
Gill v. State, the court decided evidentiary and mistrial issues, not any rule of the murder statute; the section appears only in a citation identifying the conviction. opinion →
Grace v. State, the court decided sufficiency of the evidence and double jeopardy issues, but did not decide a rule of the murder statute. The section appears in a footnote identifying a charge. opinion →
Maul v. State, the court decides whether the evidence supports the murder conviction, but does not decide any rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1; the section appears only in a footnote identifying the offense. opinion →
Houston v. State, the court decided whether the evidence supported the murder conviction, but did not decide a rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Cohen v. State, the court reviewed an attempted-murder conviction under the attempt statute; it did not decide the murder section’s own rules. opinion →
Vehorn v. State, the court stated a general circumstantial-evidence rule and resolved factual sufficiency, not a rule of the murder section. opinion →
Childers v. State, the court reviewed factual sufficiency of injuries and knowledge, without deciding a disputed rule of the murder section. opinion →
Ellis v. State, the court assessed eyewitness credibility and factual sufficiency, not a rule of the murder section. opinion →
Maxwell v. State, the court assessed attempted-murder intent under the attempt statute, not a rule of the murder section. opinion →
Richardson v. State, the court uses felony murder as a hypothetical example while deciding Indiana double jeopardy law; it does not decide a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Dickenson v. State, the court decided juror misconduct, not any rule of the murder statute; the section appears only in a citation. opinion →
Williams v. State, the court cites this section only to identify the murder conviction; its decisions concern evidence, counsel, and a different sentencing statute. opinion →
Majors v. State, the court decides the required instruction for attempted murder. Its reference to § 35-42-1-1 appears in a quoted trial instruction, and the court does not decide a rule of the murder section itself. opinion →
Godby v. State, the court identifies the murder conviction but decides evidentiary and trial issues, not a rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Wieland v. State, the court applied accomplice liability and constitutional double jeopardy rules; it did not decide a rule of the murder statute itself. opinion →
Boyce v. State, the court applies accomplice liability and addresses double jeopardy; it does not decide a rule specific to the murder statute. opinion →
Ellis v. State, the court decides whether an involuntary intoxication defense supports a lesser-offense instruction, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Small v. State, the court decides evidentiary issues, not the murder statute’s rules; the section appears only as a citation for the charge. opinion →
Martin v. State, the court decided evidentiary issues, not any rule of the murder statute; the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the charge. opinion →
Rastafari v. Anderson, this court decides an ineffective-assistance claim about severance, not a rule of the murder statute. The statutory citation appears in its quotation of the Indiana Supreme Court. opinion →
Hoskins v. State, the court decides jury instruction and juror misconduct issues, but does not decide any rule of the murder statute; the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the conviction. opinion →
Williams v. State, the court decides the intent and jury-instruction requirements for aiding an attempted murder, not a rule of the cited murder section itself. opinion →
Ben-Yisrayl v. State, the court decides whether the charging instrument was valid and whether appellate counsel was ineffective; it does not decide a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Brown v. State, the court decides self-defense and jury-instruction issues; it does not decide any rule of the murder section, which appears only in charging footnotes. opinion →
Atwell v. State, the court decides evidence and sentencing examination issues, not any rule of the murder statute. The section appears only in a citation identifying the offense. opinion →
Swingley v. State, the court decided whether autopsy photographs were admissible and whether the error was harmless; it did not decide a rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Corcoran v. State, the citation identifies the murder convictions, while the court decides sentencing issues rather than this section’s rules. opinion →
Poling v. State, the court applies accomplice liability and post-conviction rules; it does not decide a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Hubbard v. State, the court identifies the murder charges but decides accomplice liability instructions and the admissibility of polygraph evidence, not a rule of § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Long v. State, the court affirmed the murder conviction but did not decide any rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Redman v. State, the court affirms the murder conviction but does not decide any rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Russell v. State, the court affirms the murder conviction but does not decide any rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1; the section appears only in footnotes identifying the offenses. opinion →
Chambliss v. State, the court decides the effect of the theft verdict on counsel’s failure to request defense instructions; it does not decide a rule of the murder statute, which appears only in charge footnotes. opinion →
Brasher v. State, the court decides whether the evidence supports the murder conviction under general sufficiency rules; it does not decide a rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Hopkins v. State, the court decides attempted murder and double jeopardy issues; it cites the murder section to identify the underlying crime without deciding that section's own rules. opinion →
Ingle v. State, the court decided the sudden-heat issue under the voluntary manslaughter statute; it did not decide a rule of § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Moody v. State, the court uses the murder statute while deciding whether appellate counsel’s argument would have changed the result; it does not decide a rule of § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Marley v. State, the court decides whether the effects of battery statute shifts the burden of proof; it cites the murder section only to identify the elements the State must prove. opinion →
Sherwood v. State, the court decides sentencing issues under other statutes; it does not decide any rule of the murder statute. Section 35-42-1-1 appears only as a citation identifying the conviction. opinion →
Lampkins v. State, the court decides whether a jury instruction at the voluntary manslaughter trial improperly presumed intent. It mentions the murder section only to identify the original charge and decides no rule of that section. opinion →
Saintignon v. State, the court decides how the sentencing suspension statutes apply to juvenile records; murder appears only in a list of offenses in a quoted sentencing statute. opinion →
Greer v. State, the references to this section identify the charges; the court's decision concerns sentencing under a different statute. opinion →
Williams v. State of Indiana, the court decided whether the evidence supported the murder conviction, but did not decide a rule of this section; its only citation to the section is a footnote. opinion →
Allen v. State, the court decides post-conviction claims, not any rule of the murder statute. The section appears only in footnote citations. opinion →
Vitek v. State, the court applied the separate accomplice-liability statute to the murder conviction but did not decide a rule of § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Coleman v. State, the court decided evidentiary and prosecutorial misconduct issues, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Brown v. State, the court decides whether the evidence warranted a voluntary manslaughter instruction, not a rule of the murder section. opinion →
Jackson v. State, the court decides sentencing issues, not the rules of § 35-42-1-1, which appears only as a citation for the murder conviction. opinion →
Tapia v. State, the court mentions the murder conviction as background but decides post-conviction procedure, not a rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Cotton v. State, the court decides whether a competency hearing was required under § 35-36-3-1; it cites the murder section only to identify the conviction. opinion →
Chinda v. State, the court decided whether neglect of a dependent was a lesser-included offense under the charging information; it did not decide a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Miller v. State, the court resolved whether the challenge was preserved for appeal without deciding a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Smith v. State, the court decided whether evidence was relevant and admissible; it did not decide any rule of the murder statute. The statute appears only in a footnote identifying the charge. opinion →
Warren v. State, the court decided evidentiary and trial issues, not any rule of the murder statute. The section appears only in a citation identifying the conviction. opinion →
Vasquez v. State, the court cites the murder section to identify the conviction but decides sentencing issues under other law, without deciding this section’s rules. opinion →
Gray v. State, the court addressed evidence and sentencing issues; it cited §35-42-1-1 only to identify the murder conviction and did not decide the section’s rules. opinion →
Burgett v. State, the court decides witness credibility, jury instructions, and evidence issues; it does not decide a rule of the murder statute. The section appears only in the opening list of convictions. opinion →
Fight v. State, the court decides the requirements and sufficiency of evidence for attempted murder; it does not decide a rule of the murder section itself. opinion →
Scalissi v. State, the court decides confession, evidence, and jury-instruction issues, not a rule of the murder statute; the section appears only in a footnote identifying the charge. opinion →
Warren v. State, the court decided a Fourth Amendment suppression issue, not a rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. The section appears only in a footnote identifying the murder convictions. opinion →
Gamba M. Rastafari, A/K/A Gregory Rouster v. Anderson, the court cited the murder provision while deciding an ineffective-assistance claim under Strickland; it did not decide a rule of this section. opinion →
Swaynie v. State, the court decides an Indiana constitutional double jeopardy issue, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Lashbrook v. State, the court decides evidentiary and sentencing issues, not any rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. The section appears only in a footnote identifying the murder charge. opinion →
Ingle v. State, the court decides sentencing issues, while § 35-42-1-1 appears only in footnotes identifying the offenses. opinion →
Pickens v. State, the court decided whether evidence was admissible under the Indiana Evidence Rules, not any rule of the murder statute. The statute appears only in a footnote identifying the conviction. opinion →
Smock v. State, the court decides a Fourth Amendment evidentiary issue, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Saylor v. State, this statement appears in a concurring and dissenting opinion, not the court's own decision. opinion →
Clay v. State, the court decided whether an attempted murder jury instruction adequately stated the required intent; it did not decide a rule of the cited murder section. opinion →
Thompson v. State, the court decides whether the evidence supports the verdict under the incredible dubiosity doctrine, without deciding a rule of the murder statute. The section appears only in a footnote identifying the conviction. opinion →
Whedon v. State, the court decides whether the evidence supports the conviction under accomplice liability; it does not decide a rule of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1, which appears only in a footnote identifying the murder charge. opinion →
Pickens v. State, the court decided sentencing issues; § 35-42-1-1 appears only as a footnote identifying the murder charge. opinion →
Woodson v. State, the court decided the intent required for attempted murder as an accomplice and the adequacy of the jury instructions, not a rule of the murder section itself. opinion →
Henderson v. State, the court decides a double jeopardy issue involving felony murder, but does not decide a rule of the murder statute itself. opinion →
Gross v. State, the court recites the murder elements to decide a double jeopardy issue; it does not decide a rule of this section. opinion →
Bradley v. State, the court mentions murder only as the original charge and decides no rule under § 35-42-1-1. opinion →
Charles Roche, Jr. v. Cecil Davis, Warden, Indiana State Prison, Cross-Appellee, the court recites the murder statute as background but decides a federal ineffective-assistance claim, not this section’s rules. opinion →
Norton v. State, the court decided whether a co-defendant’s statement was properly admitted, not any rule of the murder statute. The section appears only in footnotes identifying the charge. opinion →
Edwards v. State, the court decides the intent required for attempted murder, not a rule of the cited murder section itself. opinion →
Kirby v. State, the court reviews Kirby’s sentence but does not decide any rule of the murder statute. Section 35-42-1-1 appears only in a footnote identifying the murder charge. opinion →
Smith v. State, the citation to this section identifies the murder conviction; the court decides self-defense jury instructions, not a rule of the murder statute. opinion →
Woodson v. State, the court decides whether the claim is available in post-conviction proceedings. It cites § 35-42-1-1 only in a footnote identifying the offense and does not decide the murder section’s rules. opinion →
Weida v. State, the court decided whether the evidence supported a conspiracy conviction. It cited § 35-42-1-1 only to define the proposed offense of murder. opinion →
…and 518 more.

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