Statute Annotations › Indiana › Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4

Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4

Limitation of actions for injuries to person or character: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Indiana
Case notes
179
Cited in passing
48
Citing cases indexed
187
Case dates
1998–2026
Screened through
2026-05-20
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-03
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

227 citing cases reviewed: 179 interpreted the section (annotated below), 48 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-05-20 may not have been reviewed yet.

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Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 2013-07-01 P.L.44-2013 added subsection (b), giving personal-injury claims resulting from sexual abuse of a child the later of seven years after accrual or four years after dependence on the alleged abuser ends. The general two-year rule no longer covers those claims without this exception. Source
  • 2024-03-12 P.L.79-2024 added subsections (c) and (d), allowing a narrow group of previously time-barred child-sexual-abuse claims against a congressionally chartered organization involved in a specified bankruptcy to be filed before July 1, 2025. That filing window has expired. Source

Two-year limitation period for personal injury actions

Section 34-11-2-4 requires an action for injury to a person or character to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Richards-Wilcox v. Cummins · filed 1998-10-15

Unlike the knowledge of the appellants in Wehling , here the Cummins knew on April 25, 1994, that their injury was the "result of the tortious act of another." Id. That they did not determine until over two years later the actual identity of the party causing the injury did not suspend the running of the statute of limitations.
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Law changed since P.L.44-2013 (effective July 1, 2013) added subsection (b), so the former general two-year period is now limited for personal-injury claims resulting from sexual abuse of a child.

Section 34-11-2-4 requires actions for injuries to the person or character to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Doe, Jane R. v. Howe Military School · filed 2000-09-21

Indiana law requires that any action for injuries to the person or character must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues. IC 34-11-2-4 (formerly Ind. Code sec. 34-1-2-2(1)). ... The Indiana Supreme Court’s analysis of Jane F.’s claims controls in this case: both Jane R. and Jane C. remembered the events of abuse, and therefore nothing prevented them from asserting their claims during the two years after they reached majority.
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Section 34-11-2-4 provides a two-year limitation period for tort actions for injury to the person.

Burkett v. American Family Insurance Group · filed 2000-10-31

Further, we conclude that the tort statute of limitations, Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4, is applicable to actions against a signator under the financial responsibility statute, Ind.Code § 9-24-9-4(a).
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Section 34-11-2-4 sets a two-year limitation period for personal injury claims.

Holly v. Anton · filed 2004-01-22

In Indiana, the limitations period for personal injury, and thus § 1983 claims, is two years. King v. One Unknown Fed. Corr. Officer, 201 F.3d 910, 913 (7th Cir.2000); see Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 (2004).
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Section 34-11-2-4 sets a two-year limitation period for personal injury claims used for Indiana-based § 1983 and § 1985 claims.

Hoagland, Daniel v. Clear Lake Indiana · filed 2005-07-18

For §§ 1983 and 1985 claims, the statute of limitations is determined by the law of the state in which the violation took place. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985). Indiana’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims is 2 years. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4; Coopwood v. Lake County Cmty. Dev. Dep’t, 932 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1991). Section 1986 contains its own one-year statute of limitations. All of the claims here are outside these limitations periods.
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Section 34-11-2-4 requires actions for injuries to the person or character to be commenced within two years after accrual.

Perkins v. Johnston · filed 2006-05-11

“Indiana law requires that any action for injuries to the person or character must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues. I.C. 34-11-2-4 (formerly Ind.Code § 34-1-2-2(1)).” ... Because all of the events in which Defendant Johnson was involved occurred more than two years before Mr. Perkins submitted his complaint to the court, the claim against him is barred by the statute of limitations.
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Section 34-11-2-4(1) provides a two-year limitation period for personal-injury claims sounding in tort.

Schuman v. Kobets · filed 1999-09-15(1)

Claims for personal injury sound in tort and are therefore governed by Ind.Code § 34-1-2-2(1), a two-year statute of limitation that had long since tolled when Schuman filed her complaint. ... This section was recently recodified at Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(1).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 34-11-2-4 sets a two-year limitation period for actions for injuries to the person or character, running from accrual.

Jane R. Doe and Jane C. Doe v. Howe Military School · filed 2000-09-21

Indiana law requires that any action for injuries to the person or character must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues. IC 34-11-2-4 (formerly Ind.Code § 34-1-2-2(1)). ... Both Does filed their actions more than two years after reaching majority: Jane R. turned 18 on October 5, 1992, and filed suit March 21, 1995; Jane C. turned 18 on February 11, 1993, and filed suit August 30, 1995. Thus, the general tolling period provided by IC 34-11-6-1 cannot save their actions.
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For a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim involving injury to personal property, Section 34-11-2-4(2) provides a two-year statute of limitations.

Waterfield v. Trust Co. of Oxford · filed 2011-12-30(2)

Where, as here, the alleged injury is to personal property, the statute of limitations for a claim of breach of fiduciary duty is two years. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(2). ... Thus, their claim for breach of fiduciary duty expired on January 8, 2005, and their claim for breach of trust expired on January 8, 2006.
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Section 34-11-2-4 requires actions for injury to a person or character, including defamation, to be filed within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Ted L. Cecil, Cecil Septic LLC, and Max Haas Company, LLC v. Fisk Excavating, Plumbing and Septic Services, Inc., et al. · filed 2012-10-15

An action for injury to person or character must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. Defamation is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish esteem, respect, good will, or confidence in the plaintiff, or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. Davidson v. Perron, 716 N.E.2d 29, 37 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. Therefore, the statute of limitations for defamation is two years.
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Subsection (a) imposes a two-year limitations period for Brown’s claims, running from accrual; the court held that period expired before he amended his complaint to name the proper defendants.

Brown v. Vanderburgh County Sheriff's Department and Vanderburgh County, Indiana · filed 2017-10-13(a)

It is undisputed that Brown’s claims against VCSD and the County are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a). The undisputed facts similarly show that Brown’s cause of action accrued, at the latest, on July 30, 2014, the date Brown was released from the detention center. Therefore, the statute of limitations ran on July 30, 2016. Brown’s amended complaint naming VCSD and the County as defendants was not filed until August 8, 2016.
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Section 34-11-2-4 gives tort claimants two years from accrual to file suit.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Sellers · filed 2012-03-30

The statute of limitations for tort claims is two years from the date the cause of action accrues. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4.
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Section 34-11-2-4(a) requires an action for injury to personal property to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Holland v. Indiana Farm Bureau Insurance · filed 2018-08-28(a)

We agree with Holland that a two-year statute of limitations is appropriate because breach of fiduciary duty is a tort claim for injury to personal property, and an action for injury to personal property must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues. I.C. § 34-11-2-4(a).
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Section 34-11-2-4(a) requires actions for injury to a person or character to be filed within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Day v. Harris · filed 2019-06-27(a)

The Indiana statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions is the two-year period found in Indiana Code § 34-11-2-4. Campbell v. Chappelow, 95 F.3d 576, 580 (7th Cir. 1996). Section 34-11-2-4 requires an action for “injury to person or character . . . be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of the action accrues.” Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a).
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Section 34-11-2-4 requires lawsuits for injury to a person or character, including legal-malpractice claims, to be filed within two years after the cause of action accrues.

White v. Macey & Swanson LLP (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-09-23

A lawsuit for an “injury to person or character,” including legal malpractice, must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 (2013); see also Estate of Spry v. Batey, 804 N.E.2d 250, 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.
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Section 34-11-2-4 requires actions for injury to person or character to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Stone v. Doyle T. Wright and The City of Clinton, Indiana · filed 2019-09-30

Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 provides that “[a]n action for . . . injury to person or character . . . must be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues.” ... Because she did not file her complaint until October 2016, her claims of false arrest and false imprisonment are barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
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Section 34-11-2-4 requires Indiana personal injury claims to be brought within two years.

MANN v. DANIELS · filed 2019-12-20

In Indiana, personal injury claims must be brought within two years. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4; see also Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). ... Mr. Mann’s failure to protect claim accrued on April 21, 2016, when he alleges that the defendants failed to intervene during an attack from his cellmate. His retaliation claims accrued, at the latest, in December 2016. He did not move for leave to file the proposed second amended complaint until July 17, 2019, outside the limitations period for these claims.
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Section 34-11-2-4(a)(1) requires a personal-injury action to be commenced within two years after the claim accrues.

Jones v. Ramos · filed 2020-02-03(a)(1)

The Indiana statute of limitations for personal injury claims requires that an action be commenced within two years of the date on which the action accrued. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a)(1) (2016). ... The requirement of tendering the summons to commence an action is an integral part of the policies served by the statute of limitations in Indiana. ... In short, Indiana law governs the prerequisites for commencement of this action for purposes of Indiana’s statute of limitations and requires a proper summons to do so.
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Section 34-11-2-4 supplies a two-year limitations period for Indiana personal-injury claims, including claims under § 1983.

Justice v. Justice · filed 2018-03-28

In Indiana, personal injury claims must be commenced within two years after the action accrues.
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Section 34-11-2-4 provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury-based claims in Indiana.

BOWLING v. CANTRELL · filed 2020-07-14

Actions brought under § 1983 use the statute of limitations and tolling rules that states employ for personal-injury claims. In Indiana, the applicable statute of limitations period is two years. See Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012); Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. Mr. Bowling first named Mr. Combs, Mr. Oliver, and Mr. Hornsby as defendants in the second amended complaint, which was filed April 28, 2020, and concerns events that occurred in March 2017. Dkt. 63. Thus, all claims against Mr. Combs, Mr. Oliver, and Mr. Hornsby are barred by the statute of limitations.
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Section 34-11-2-4 supplies a two-year limitations period for Indiana personal-injury claims, including the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.

SCRUGGS v. ALDEN · filed 2020-07-27

As noted in Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 2013), federal courts addressing a § 1983 action apply not only the host state's applicable limitations period, which in Indiana is two years, see Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4, but the host state's tolling provisions as well.
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Section 34-11-2-4 requires an action for injury to a person to be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues; the court applied that two-year period to the malicious prosecution claim.

MCCLAIN v. DICKERSON · filed 2020-08-25

But Mr. McClain's malicious prosecution claim is time barred. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Ensley, 264 N.E.2d 80, 85 (Ind. Ct. App. 1970) ("there is a two-year statute of limitations which applies to actions for malicious prosecution in Indiana"); see also Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 (providing that an action for injury to a person must be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues). ... Because Mr. McClain was acquitted of those charges on July 18, 1977 and filed this complaint on February 21, 2020, Mr. McClain's malicious prosecution claim is time barred.
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Section 34-11-2-4(a)(1) requires a personal-injury action to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues, and supplies the limitations period for Bivens claims through the applicable state personal-injury limitations period.

SWEENEY v. SWEENEY · filed 2020-09-02(a)(1)

The statute of limitations for both § 1983 and Bivens actions is determined by the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state where the incident forming the basis of the claim occurred); Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a)(1) (a personal injury action must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues).
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Subsection (a) sets a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, including § 1983 claims when Indiana supplies the limitations period.

Montanez v. Town of Highland · filed 2020-11-13(a)

When determining the statute of limitations for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for constitutional and personal injury claims. Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). In Indiana, the applicable statute of limitations period is two years. Id.; Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a).
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Section 34-11-2-4(a)(1) requires a personal-injury action to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Hamilton v. C T Corporation · filed 2022-07-05(a)(1)

The parties do not dispute the legal standard governing the timeliness of Hamilton’s negligence action. Under Indiana law, applicable here, an action for personal injury must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a)(1); see Cordova v. Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac, 936 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1011–12 (N.D. Ind. 2013).
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For personal injury claims, Section 34-11-2-4(a) provides a two-year statute of limitations.

HILL v. COUNTER TERRORISM UNIT · filed 2022-09-16(a)

Mr. Hill's alleged injury occurred in Indiana, which has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a); Julian v. Hanna, 732 F.3d 842, 844–45 (7th Cir. 2013). ... Mr. Hill’s excessive force claim accrued on September 21, 2018. Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 554-55 (application of excessive force in violation of the constitution was "immediately actionable"), but he did not bring an excessive force claim or name the officers allegedly involved as defendants until March 29, 2021, more than six months after the expiration of Indiana’s two-year statute of limitations. Dkt. 21.
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Section 34-11-2-4 requires personal-injury claims to be filed within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Mojsoski v. Indiana Wesleyan University · filed 2022-11-30

In Indiana, this time period is two years after the cause of action accrues. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. Therefore, any claim that accrued before January 14, 2020, is time-barred.
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Section 34-11-2-4 supplies a two-year statute of limitations for this § 1983 action.

MCMILLAN v. GARRISON · filed 2023-04-24

The statute of limitations for this § 1983 case is two years. Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4).
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Section 34-11-2-4(a) provides a two-year statute of limitations for constitutional and personal-injury claims, including § 1983 claims in Indiana.

Lattimore v. Kosciusko County Sheriff · filed 2024-05-15(a)

When determining the statute of limitations for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for constitutional and personal injury claims. ... In Indiana, the applicable statute of limitations period is two years. Id.; Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a).
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Section 34-11-2-4(a)(1) requires a personal-injury action to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

WATERMAN v. KEEN · filed 2024-05-21(a)(1)

There is no dispute that the applicable statute of limitations for the remaining claims in this case is Indiana's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. ... The statute provides that an action for personal injury "must be commenced withing two (2) years after the cause of action accrues." Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a)(1). ... To the extent that those actions constituted constitutional violations, they were complete and Waterman was aware of them when they occurred on October 26, 2020.
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Subsection (a) sets a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which the court applied as the borrowed limitations period for Abel's § 1983 claims.

ABEL JR. v. MODESTO · filed 2024-07-10(a)

Abel's injury occurred in Indiana, which has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a); Julian v. Hanna, 732 F.3d 842, 844–45 (7th Cir. 2013).
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Section 34-11-2-4 imposes a two-year limitations period on Indiana personal-injury claims and applies to defamation claims.

Marshall v. Lake County · filed 2025-06-17

Indiana’s personal injury statute of limitations is two years. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4; see also Hall v. Shaw, 147 N.E.3d 394, 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“Section 34-11-2-4 applies to claims of defamation.”) ... This means that any claim for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and any personal injury claim must be brought within two years of the date that the conduct occurred or the date when Plaintiff learned of the conduct.
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Section 34-11-2-4(a) requires personal-injury actions in Indiana to be filed within two years after accrual.

Jones v. Barnes · filed 2025-10-01(a)

In Indiana, a personal injury action must be brought within two years of the action accruing. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4-(a).
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Section 34-11-2-4(a)(1) requires a personal-injury action to be initiated within two years of the injury; under Indiana commencement rules, filing a complaint without timely tendering a required summons does not satisfy that period.

Hatzitheodorou · filed 2026-03-30(a)(1)

Indiana law required Plaintiff to initiate this case within two years of the date of his injury on November 5, 2022. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a)(1). To commence an action in Indiana, a party must do three things: (1) file a complaint, (2), pay the filing fee, and (3), where service of process is required, tender a summons to the clerk.
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Section 34-11-2-4(a) gives personal-injury plaintiffs two years after accrual to commence an action.

Gray v. Benham · filed 2026-04-10(a)

Gray had to commence his civil action based on the tortious conduct alleged in his complaint on or before September 18, 2023. It is undisputed that on September 18, 2023, Gray filed his complaint in this case and paid the appropriate filing fee. Gray completed the complaint and filing fee requirements within the statutory period. It is also undisputed that on September 26, 2023, Gray tendered the summonses to the clerk. Gray did not complete the summonses requirement within the statutory period. Consequently, Gray failed to commence this civil action within the applicable two-year statute of limitations. The trial court therefore did not err by granting the Motion and dismissing Gray’s claims with prejudice, and we affirm that decision.
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Section 34-11-2-4(a)(1) requires an action for personal injury to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Estate of Judah Morgan v. Morgan · filed 2025-05-30(a)(1)

A claim under the Survival Statute is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 (a)(1) (“An action for . . . injury to person . . . must be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues.”).
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Section 34-11-2-4(a) gives personal-injury claimants two years to file suit, but equitable estoppel may prevent a defendant from asserting the limitations defense when its conduct reasonably induced delay.

Weist v. Kristen Dawn and State Farm Insurance Companies · filed 2014-01-21(a)

Weist argues that Dawn is equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a bar to his claim. There is no dispute that Weist filed his complaint beyond the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. See Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a) (1998). ... Accepting Weist’s version of events, as we must under our standard of review, he has established disputes of material fact as to both elements of the equitable estoppel test set forth in Davis. It is thus necessary to reverse and remand the case for a trier of fact to resolve whether Dawn is equitably estopped from asserting the defense.
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Section 34-11-2-4(2) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on tort claims for injury to personal property, including a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim.

Bacompt Systems, Inc. v. Ashworth · filed 2001-07-20(2)

In Indiana, the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty asserted by Ba-compt is considered a tort claim for injury to personal property. Mack v. American Fletcher Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 510 N.E.2d 725, 738-39 (Ind.Ct.App.1987). Accordingly, the applicable statute of limitations is two years. Id.; Ind.Code § 34-11-2-4(2)(1998). Bacompt's counterclaims accrued in December of 1994, when Ash-worth resigned his position. However, Ashworth's claim did not accrue until after December 31, 1996, the due date of the promissory note. Bacompt filed its counterclaims in May of 1997, approximately two and a half years after Ashworth resigned from Bacompt to begin working with CopyRite. Thus, because the two-year limitation had run on Bacompt's claim against Ashworth by the time Ashworth's claim accrued, Bacompt never had a viable counterclaim to assert against Ashworth's claim.
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Section 34-11-2-4(2) provides a two-year limitations period for injury-to-personal-property claims, including contract-related claims based on a duty imposed by law rather than on a contractual term.

Lewis v. Methodist Hospital, Inc. · filed 2002-02-07(2)

This passage is the key to making the consistent sense of Schuman, Pokraka and Whitehouse: when a plaintiff seeks damages resulting from breach of an express or implied term, of a contract, the action sounds in contract and a contractual statute of limitations applies. When the plaintiff seeks damages resulting from the breach of a duty implied by law, i.e., the defendant did not meet the standard of care required by law in performing the contract, the action sounds in tort and the two-year statute of limitations applies. ... The statute discussed in Whitehouse was Ind.Code § 34-1-2-2(1), which subsequently was recodified as § 34-11-2-4(2).
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Section 34-11-2-4 provides a two-year statute of limitations for claims seeking recovery for injury to personal property.

Shriner v. Sheehan · filed 2002-08-06

We now join the fray and conclude that the two-year statute of limitations espoused in Bacompt is the appropriate statute of limitations. ... Based on our supreme 'court’s agreement with the outcome and the legal reasoning applied in Mack, we find that the Bacompt panel was correct in concluding that breach of fiduciary duty is a tort claim for injury to personal property with a two-year statute of limitations. Therefore, we find that the trial court was correct in applying a two-year statute of limitations to Shriner’s claim for excessive compensation. However, Shriner filed suit on December 13, 1996; therefore, a portion of Shriner’s claim was made within the appropriate time.
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Section 34-11-2-4 requires actions for injury to a person or character to be commenced within two years after accrual.

ServiceMaster Diversified Health Services, L.P. v. Wiley · filed 2003-07-02

The statute of limitations on negligence actions reads as follows: "An action for ... injury to person or character must be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues.”
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Section 34-11-2-4 provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, including § 1983 claims in Indiana.

Lovett v. Seniff · filed 2003-07-16

The Indiana statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions is the two-year period found in Ind.Code § 34-11-2-4. ... The statute of limitations on this claim expired at the latest in May 2003, but this complaint was not signed and filed until June 2003. Therefore these claims are barred and must be dismissed with prejudice.
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Section 34-11-2-4 imposes a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, barring recovery for injuries occurring more than two years before suit, although earlier conduct may remain relevant evidence.

Woodruff v. Wilson · filed 2007-04-27

The Court agrees with the parties that a two-year statute of limitations applies to Legacy’s § 1983 claims. The statute of limitations for civil rights claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is determined by the personal injury law of the state in which the violation took place. Hoagland v. Town of Clear Lake, 415 F.3d 693, 699-700 (7th Cir.2005) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985)). Indiana’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years. Ind.Code § 34-11-2-4; Hoagland, 415 F.3d at 700. Applying this statute to the case at bar, Legacy may not recover for injury that occurred prior to February 18, 1998, because such injury is outside the two-year statute of limitations. However, evidence of conduct or interactions between the parties, or between Defendants, prior to that date may be relevant to show motive, agreement or knowledge.
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Section 34-11-2-4 provides a two-year limitations period for an action involving injury to a person.

Sinks v. Caughey · filed 2008-07-16

The applicable statute of limitations is determined by identifying the nature or substance of the cause of action. Schuman v. Kobets, 716 N.E.2d 355, 356 (Ind.1999). Because Caughey’s cause of action involves injury to person, the applicable statute of limitations is two years. Ind.Code § 34-11-2-4. Caughey’s petition to amend her complaint to name Sinks as a defendant comes after the two-year statute of limitations expired.
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Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 supplies a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which governs § 1983 and § 1985 claims arising in Indiana.

Hoagland v. Town Of Clear Lake · filed 2005-07-18

For §§ 1983 and 1985 claims, the statute of limitations is determined by the law of the state in which the violation took place. ... Indiana's statute of limitations for personal injury claims is 2 years. Ind.Code § 34-11-2-4; Coopwood v. Lake County Cmty. Dev. Dep't, 932 F.2d 677 (7th Cir.1991). ... All of the claims here are outside these limitations periods.
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Section 34-11-2-4 imposes a two-year limitation period on actions for injury to personal property.

City of East Chicago v. East Chicago Second Century, Inc. · filed 2009-06-30

Our Court of Appeals has determined that a breach of fiduciary duty is a tort claim for injury to personal property and therefore the applicable statute of limitation is two years. Del Vecchio v. Conseco, Inc, 788 N.E.2d 446, 451 (Ind.Ct.App.2003); Ind.Code. § 34-11-2-4 (2008) (statute of limitation for injury to personal property). We have previously declared that a cause of action for a personal injury claim accrues and the statute of limitation begins to run when the plaintiff knew, or in the exercise of ordinary diligence could have discovered, that an injury had been sustained as a result of the tortious act of another.
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Section 34-11-2-4 imposes a two-year limitation period for personal-injury claims, and the discovery rule does not delay its start merely because the plaintiff has not identified every potentially liable defendant.

RIETH-RILEY CONST. CO., INC. v. Gibson · filed 2010-03-25

At the outset, the parties agree that the two-year statute of limitation applies to Gibson's claim for personal injury. See Ind.Code § 34-11-2-4. The resolution of this case turns on when the two-year limitation began to run, as applied to Gibson's claim against Rieth-Riley. ... Therefore, we decline to extend the discovery rule to apply to cases like this one where the indeterminate fact is not the existence of an injury, but rather the identity of a tortfeasor.
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Section 34-11-2-4 requires an action for injury to personal property, including tortious breach of fiduciary duty, to be filed within two years after the cause of action accrues.

FARMERS ELEV. CO. OF OAKVILLE v. Hamilton · filed 2010-04-23

Breach of fiduciary duty is a tort claim for injury to personal property, and "[a]n action for . . . injury to personal property. . . must be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues." Ind.Code § 34-11-2-4; City of East Chicago v. E. Chi. Second Century, Inc., 908 N.E.2d 611, 618 (Ind.2009).
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Section 34-11-2-4 requires an action for injury to personal property, including breach of fiduciary duty treated as such a tort, to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Farmers Elevator Co. of Oakville, Inc. v. Hamilton · filed 2010-04-23

Breach of fiduciary duty is a tort claim for injury to personal property, and "(aln action for ... injury to personal property . must be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action acerues." Ind.Code § 34-11-2-4; City of East Chicago v. E. Chi. Second Century, Inc., 908 N.E.2d 611, 618 (Ind.2009). In this case, the events relevant to Hamilton's breach of fiduciary duty claim all occurred on or before January 31, 2004, which is the date FECO finally sold the cooperative. Hamilton did not file his complaint until May 22, 2006. According ly, Hamilton filed his complaint outside the two-year limitations period.
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Section 34-11-2-4 imposes a two-year statute of limitations on actions for injury to person or character, including defamation and intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.

Taleyarkhan v. Purdue University · filed 2011-08-23

Under Indiana law, any actions for “injury to person or character” are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Ind.Code § 34-11-2-4. Plaintiffs claims of defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress are all governed by this statute.
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Section 34-11-2-4 requires personal injury actions in Indiana to be brought within two years.

SHAFFER v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS · filed 2021-05-11

"[I]n § 1983 actions, federal courts apply the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the injury took place. In Indiana, such claims must be brought within two years."
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Discovery rule and accrual of injury claims

Section 34-11-2-4 uses a two-year discovery rule, beginning when the plaintiff knew or should have discovered the injury caused by the tortious act.

Kroger Co. v. Estate of Hinders · filed 2002-08-13

We also conclude that the applicable statute of limitations, Indiana Code section 34-11-2-4, allowed Hinders’ Estate to file its complaint within two years of discovering that Hinders’ injury was the result of Kroger and/or Simacek’s alleged negligence, which it did when it filed its claim on December 21, 2000.
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Section 34-11-2-4 provides a two-year limitation period for conversion claims, measured under Indiana’s discovery rule from when the injury was known or reasonably discoverable.

Estate of Verdak Ex Rel. Dindonis v. Butler University · filed 2006-11-06

The Estate's replevin claim is governed by a six-year statute of limitations, Ind.Code § 34-11-2-7, and its conversion claim is governed by a two-year statute of limitations, I.C. § 34-11-2-4.
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Section 34-11-2-4(2) starts the two-year tort limitation period when the plaintiff knew or, through ordinary diligence, could have discovered an injury caused by the tortious act; some ascertainable damage is enough.

First Farmers Bank & Trust Co. v. Whorley · filed 2008-08-05(2)

Pursuant to Indiana code section 34-11-2-4(2), a cause of action in a tort claim accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, could have discovered that an injury had been sustained as a result of the tortious act of another.
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Section 34-11-2-4 supplies a two-year limitations period for §1983 personal-injury claims, subject to Indiana’s tolling rule for physical incapacity.

Richards v. Mitcheff · filed 2012-08-09

Suits under §1983 use the statute of limitations and tolling rules that states employ for personal-injury claims. ... Indiana allows two years. ... Indiana recognizes this as a tolling condition; indeed, the state’s constitution requires the judiciary to toll time limits for incapacitated persons. ... Indiana allows tolling because of physical incapacity—and, far from pleading that he was capable of suing throughout the two years after his first surgery, Richards pleaded incapacity, again plausibly.
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Section 34-11-2-4's two-year limitations period applies to these legal-malpractice claims and begins when the claimant knew or should have known of the injury.

Grandview Memorial Gardens, LLC, et al. v. John C. Eckert, et al. · filed 2012-10-10

Here, the Grandview clients acknowledged before the trial court that all of their claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitation. Appellants’ App. p. 174 (citing Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 (1998)). The key issue is determining when the two-year period began to run. ... Under Indiana’s discovery rule, a cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitation begins to run, when a claimant knows or in the exercise of ordinary diligence should have known of the injury. ... For a cause of action to accrue, it is not necessary that the full extent of damage be known or even ascertainable, but only that some ascertainable damage has occurred.
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Section 34-11-2-4 bars a negligence claim accruing more than two years before the complaint is filed, with accrual when the plaintiff knew of the injury caused by the tortious act.

Rangel v. Schmidt · filed 2012-07-24

A tort claim accrues under Indiana law “when the plaintiff knew ... that an injury had been sustained as a result of the tortious act of another.”
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Section 34-11-2-4(a) applies a two-year limitations period to tort claims when that period governs, with accrual under Indiana’s discovery rule.

Kissinger v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch. · filed 2018-02-26(a)

Tort claims accrue and the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of ordinary diligence, could discover, that he has sustained an injury caused by another person's tortious act.
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Section 34-11-2-4(a) imposes a two-year limitations period on attorney-malpractice and fiduciary-duty claims, with accrual governed by the discovery rule and fact questions about when the injury was discoverable.

Krieg DeVault LLP v. WGT V, LLC · filed 2023-03-24(a)

“Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of ordinary diligence could have discovered, that it has been injured from tortious conduct.” ... “The trial court properly denied summary judgment on Krieg’s summary judgment based on the statute of limitations because genuine issues of material fact exist about “when the plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, could have discovered that an injury had been sustained[.]””
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Section 34-11-2-4 applies to personal-injury negligence actions and, under the discovery rule, the limitations period begins when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury and that it was caused by another’s product or act.

Johnson v. Centrome Inc · filed 2023-08-23

See Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 (applicable to personal injury negligence actions). In Barnes v. A.H. Robins Co., 476 N.E.2d 84, 87 (Ind. 1985) the Indiana Supreme Court set out the applicable standard for analyzing the statute of limitations in a toxic tort case. It held that where “an injury to a plaintiff caused by a disease which may have been contracted as a result of protracted exposure to a foreign substance, . . . a discovery type rule should be applied, and the statute of limitations in such causes commences to run from the date the plaintiff knew or should have discovered that she suffered an injury or impingement, and that it was caused by the product or act of another.” Id. Accordingly, even if I were to adopt Johnson’s view—that he avoids application of the IPLA statute of repose because his tort claims are based on “protracted exposure” to toxic chemicals—the result would be no different: the claims are untimely.
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Section 34-11-2-4(a) gives tort claims a two-year statute of limitations, beginning when the plaintiff knew or, through ordinary diligence, could have discovered the injury caused by the tortious act.

Aegean LLC d/b/a Public Agency Training Council v. Taggart Insurance Center Inc. · filed 2025-05-30(a)

Indiana imposes a two-year statute of limitations on tort claims.
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Section 34-11-2-4 requires a personal-injury action to be commenced within two years after accrual, and the period is not suspended merely because the plaintiff later identifies the party who caused the injury.

Richards-Wilcox, Inc. v. Cummins · filed 1998-10-15

Wilcox complains the trial court erred in denying its motion for judgment on the pleadings because the Cummins’ complaint was filed outside the two year limitation period applicable to personal injury actions. ... Unlike the knowledge of the appellants in Wehling, here the Cummins knew on April 25, 1994, that their injury was the “result of the tortious act of another.” ... That they did not determine until over two years later the actual identity of the party causing the injury did not suspend the running of the statute of limitations.
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An action for injury to personal property must be filed within two years after accrual, and under the discovery rule accrual occurs when the claimant knows or, through ordinary diligence, should have known of the injury.

Runkle v. Runkle · filed 2009-10-28(2)

Here, the trial court applied Ind.Code § 34-11-2-4, which provides that "[a)n action for ... (2) must be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action acerues." ... "Under Indiana's discovery rule, a cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitation begins to run, when a claimant knows or in exercise of ordinary diligence should have known of the injury." ... We conclude that Fifth Third Bank established as a matter of law that Susan (or her attorney) knew or in the exercise of ordinary diligence should have known more than two years before she filed her complaint that Fifth Third Bank had wrongfully issued a second mortgage on the marital residence. ... we conclude as a matter of law that she (or her attorney) knew or should have known prior to June 3, 2003, that she had suffered some sort of injury as a result of Fifth Third Bank's allegedly wrongful actions.
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Legal malpractice — statute of limitations — continuous representation

Section 34-11-2-4 imposes a two-year limitations period on legal-malpractice claims, which begins when the plaintiff knows or should have discovered an injury; knowledge of the full extent of damages is unnecessary.

Morgan v. Benner · filed 1999-04-30

The statute of limitation for a claim of legal malpractice is two years. Ind.Code § 34-1-2-2 [recodified at Ind.Code § 34-11-2-4]; Lambert v. Stark, 484 N.E.2d 630 (Ind.Ct.App.1985). Further, legal malpractice actions are subject to the “discovery rule,” which provides that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until such time as the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of ordinary diligence could have discovered, that he had sustained an injury as the result of the tortious act of another. Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind.1992). For a cause of action to accrue, it is not necessary that the full extent of damage be known or even ascertainable, but only that some ascertainable damage has occurred. Doe v. United Methodist Church, 673 N.E.2d 839, 842 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). ... In this case, the Morgans were aware after the July 22, 1992 court order that all their claims had been dismissed. At that time, the Morgans were aware that they had possibly sustained an injury by pursuing a preliminary injunction rather than a declaratory judgment. Therefore, the statute of limitations began to run at the time that the Morgans’ claims were dismissed and they became aware that their claims were dismissed. However, the Morgans did not bring their claim against Benner until May 30, 1996, approximately four years after they could have discovered they had a claim against Benner. Although the Morgans argue that they were not aware of the full extent of damages after these interlocutory orders, it is not necessary that the full extent of damage be known or even ascertainable, but only that some ascertainable damage has occurred. Id. We find that summary judgment was proper because the Morgans failed to bring their claim within the two year statute of limitation for legal malpractice claims.
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Section 34-11-2-4 requires a legal-malpractice action to be commenced within two years after accrual, with accrual delayed until termination of the attorney’s representation in the same matter under the continuous representation doctrine.

Biomet, Inc. v. Barnes & Thornburg · filed 2003-07-08

We adopt the continuous representation doctrine as an exception to our discovery rule. I.C. § 34-11-2-4 provides that an action for legal malpractice “must be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues.” In a situation where the attorney continues to represent the client in the same matter in which the alleged malpractice occurred, the date of accrual begins at the termination of an attorney’s representation of a client in the same matter in which the alleged malpractice occurred.
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Section 34-11-2-4’s two-year limitations period for an attorney-malpractice claim begins when the plaintiff knows or, through ordinary diligence, could have discovered the tortious conduct, and pleaded facts supporting equitable tolling can prevent dismissal when they create a factual dispute.

Chenore v. Plantz · filed 2016-06-28

The statute of limitations for attorney malpractice is two years. ... The two-year period begins to run when the plaintiff knows of, or in the exercise of ordinary diligence could have discovered, the tortious conduct. ... Chenore’s complaint asserted facts in avoidance of the statute of limitation. ... Accordingly, we agree with Chenore that her complaint was improperly dismissed pursuant to Trial Rule 12(B)(6).
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Section 34-11-2-4 imposes a two-year statute of limitations on legal-malpractice claims, and claims filed several years after that period are untimely.

Djuric v. Levy & Dubovich, and Judith A. Levy-Adler and Debra Lynch Dubovich (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-11-16

There is a two-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice claims, Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4, and it is undisputed that Djuric filed her legal malpractice claims several years outside of that window.
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Section 34-11-2-4 imposes a two-year limitations period for legal-malpractice claims, beginning when the plaintiff knew or reasonably could have discovered the injury.

Myers v. Thomas D. Maxson Amy L. Hutchison Bruce W. Graham and Trueblood & Graham (In their Official and Individual Capacities) · filed 2016-03-29

The statute of limitations for a claim of legal malpractice is two years. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4.
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Section 34-11-2-4 sets a two-year statute of limitations for legal-malpractice claims.

Saylor v. Reid · filed 2019-09-10

The statute of limitations for a claim of legal malpractice is two years. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. For a cause of action to accrue, it is not necessary that the full extent of damage be known or even ascertainable, but only that some ascertainable damage has occurred.
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Section 34-11-2-4(a) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on legal malpractice claims.

Bardonner v. Clendening, Johnson, & Bohrer, P.C. (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-02-14(a)

The limitations period governing a legal malpractice claim is two years. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a); Myers v. Maxson, 51 N.E.3d 1267, 1276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. “Legal malpractice actions are subject to the ‘discovery rule,’ which provides that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until such time as the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of ordinary diligence could have discovered, that he had sustained an injury as the result of the tortious act of another.” Biomet Inc. v. Barnes & Thornburg, 791 N.E.2d 760, 765 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. Here, Bardonner fired CJB Attorneys by email on August 3, 2015, alluding to “[t]he almost total loss of visitation” which caused “harm to him and his children.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 112). Therefore, the statute of limitations for his counterclaim expired on August 3, 2017. As Bardonner did not file his legal malpractice counterclaim until December 4, 2018—more than a year after the expiration of the statute of limitations—Bardonner’s claim should be barred.
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Section 34-11-2-4 gives legal-malpractice claims a two-year limitations period, with accrual governed by Indiana’s discovery rule.

French v. Jeffrey A. Lockwood (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-06-14

The statute of limitations for a claim of legal malpractice is two years.
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Section 34-11-2-4 imposes a two-year statute of limitations on legal-malpractice claims, subject to Indiana’s discovery and continuous-representation rules.

New City Auto Group, Inc v. O'Rourke & Moody LLP · filed 2024-07-22

In Indiana, the statute of limitations for a claim of legal malpractice is two years. See Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. Legal malpractice actions are subject to the “discovery rule,” which provides the statute of limitations does not begin to run until such time as the plaintiff knows, or could have discovered using ordinary diligence, that he had sustained an injury as the result of the tortuous act of another. ... “Under the continuous representation doctrine, the statute of limitations does not commence until the end of an attorney’s representation of a client in the same matter in which the alleged malpractice occurred.” ... This is just way too speculative for the Court to go along with and bar claims at this stage of the proceedings, on a motion to dismiss, based on the statute of limitations defense. ... Depending on how discovery shakes out, this might be something more appropriate for the summary judgment stage of the case, but it certainly is not a winning argument on a motion to dismiss.
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Section 34-11-2-4 gives legal-malpractice claims a two-year limitations period, which runs under the discovery rule when the plaintiff knows or reasonably could discover the injury, even if the full extent of damage is not yet known.

Estate of Spry v. Batey · filed 2004-03-04

The statute of limitations for a claim of legal malpractice is two years. See Ind.Code § 34-11-2-4 (1998); Silvers v. Brodeur, 682 N.E.2d 811, 813 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied. Generally, a cause of action accrues when a wrongfully inflicted injury causes damage. Keep v. Noble County Dept. of Public Welfare, 696 N.E.2d 422, 425 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied. Legal malpractice actions are "subject to the 'discovery rule, which provides that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until such time as the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of ordinary diligence could have discovered, that he had sustained an injury as the result of the tortious act of another." Id. "For a cause of action to acerue, it is not necessary that the full extent of damage be known or even ascertainable, but only that some ascertainable damage has occurred." Id. at 813-814.
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Section 34-11-2-4 requires a legal-malpractice action to be filed within two years after the injury accrues.

Godby v. Whitehead · filed 2005-10-26

And Godby had to file this action within two years of his injury to comply with the applicable statute of limitations. See Ind.Code § 34-11-2-4. ... In the present case, Godby's claim against Whitehead for legal malpractice accrued when Whitehead failed to present a post-conviction claim that Godby was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel. Thus, Godby had two years from that date to file his complaint for legal malpractice against Whitehead. To reiterate, a criminal defendant does not have to prove his innocence before he files a legal malpractice claim. Id. Likewise, Godby was not required to exhaust his post-conviction remedies before he commenced this action.
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Section 34-11-2-4 gives medical malpractice claims a two-year limitations period measured from the alleged injury.

Hazel M. Sendelweck v. Greene County General Hospital (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-12-06

The statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims is two years from the date of the alleged injury. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4; id. § 34-18-7-1(b).
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Two-year statute of limitations

Section 34-11-2-4 provides the two-year personal-injury limitation period that governs § 1983 claims arising in Indiana, subject to the Journey's Account statute.

Irwin Mortgage Corp. v. Marion County Treasurer · filed 2004-10-18

Irwin asserts that the two-year statute of limitations contained within I.C. § 34-11-2-4 does not bar its federal and state claims seeking refund of the alleged illegal tax penalty. ... While we agree that the typical application of the Journey's Account statute is to salvage time-barred actions filed in an incorrect state or federal court, based on the oft-noted purpose of the statute (i.e., to protect a diligent suitor and permit resolution on the merits of a claim filed in an incorrect forum) which our supreme court has warned not to narrowly construe, we conclude the Journey's Account applies to this unique factual seenar-io. Irwin's federal claims are not barred by the statute of limitations.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 34-11-2-4 requires actions for injury to person or character to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Tucker v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Lafayette-In-Indiana · filed 2005-11-23

To the extent these claims were based on Metzger's abuse of Tucker from 1966 through 1968, they were barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in IC 34-11-2-4.
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Section 34-11-2-4 provides a two-year statute of limitations that bars claims based on statements made more than two years before filing.

Collins v. Purdue University · filed 2010-03-24

The first of Federated’s series of motions for judgment on the pleadings asks that all claims based upon statements made before February 9, 2007, be barred because of the two year statute of limitations and the filing date of Collins’ original complaint in this matter, February 9, 2009. I.C. 34-11-2-4. The response filed by Collins concedes the point, stating no objection to the motion. Therefore, this motion to bar all claims based upon statements made before February 9, 2007, is GRANTED.
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Subsection (a)(2) imposes a two-year limitations period on conversion and breach-of-fiduciary-duty tort claims, running from when the plaintiff knew or should have discovered the injury.

Treadway v. Stewart & Irwin, P.C., et al. · filed 2015-12-10(a)(2)

An action for conversion is governed by a two-year statute of limitations. ... Similarly, breach of fiduciary duty is a tort claim subject to the two-year statute. ... Under Indiana’s discovery rule, a cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when the plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, could have discovered that an injury had been sustained as the result of the tortious act of another. ... The designated evidence shows that, by his own admission, Treadway was aware of the fees issue by August 2010, making his May 2013 complaint untimely. Thus, the trial court correctly determined that these claims are barred by the statute of limitations, and summary judgment for the Individual Defendants was proper on these issues.
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Section 34-11-2-4 gives a plaintiff two years from accrual to file a § 1983 claim, with accrual when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury and possible relief.

Lane v. Murrie · filed 2016-09-19

Lane had two years from the time his claim accrued to file his § 1983 claim, see Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4; Devbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 767-68 (7th Cir. 2013). Accrual occurs when a plaintiff knows or should know of the alleged injury and possibility for relief.
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Section 34-11-2-4 imposes a two-year limitations period on tortious-interference claims.

Gumwood HP Shopping Partners, L.P. v. Simon Property Group, Inc. (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-06-25

two-year statute of limitations. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4.
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Section 34-11-2-4 requires a personal-injury claim to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Webb v. City of Carmel, Carmel Clay Parks Building Corporation, and Carmel/Clay Board of Parks & Recreation · filed 2018-04-30

In Indiana, a claim for personal injury must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. Therefore, the statute of limitations expired on June 20, 2016.
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Section 34-11-2-4 imposes a two-year statute of limitations on legal-malpractice claims, including claims labeled breach of contract or negligent misrepresentation when their substance is legal malpractice.

Pearman v. Andrew Alexander Szakaly (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-05-24

The statute of limitations for a claim of legal malpractice is two years. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. ... Therefore, the substance of these claims is legal malpractice, notwithstanding Pearman’s characterizations of them as breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation. Accordingly, the two-year statute of limitations from Indiana Code section 34-11-2-4 applies.
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Subsection (a) imposes a two-year limitations period on an invasion-of-privacy claim, which begins when the plaintiff knew or, with ordinary diligence, could have discovered the injury caused by the tortious act.

Dotson v. Stryker Corporation, Brad Bolinger, Patrick Reagan, Jeffrey M. Sheedy, M.D., Rochester Orthopedics, P.C. · filed 2018-08-03(a)

The parties do not dispute that Dotson’s claim for invasion of privacy was controlled by a two-year statute of limitations. See Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a) (2017); Johnson v. Blackwell, 885 N.E.2d 25, 31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “In general, the cause of action of a tort claim accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, could have discovered that an injury had been sustained as a result of the tortious act of another.” Filip v. Block, 879 N.E.2d 1076, 1082 (Ind. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). ... Accordingly, the designated evidence establishes that the statute of limitations for Dotson’s claim for invasion of privacy began to run on February 25, 2014. However, Dotson did not file her complaint until more than two years later, on October 20, 2016. Thus, her complaint was barred by the statute of limitations.
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Section 34-11-2-4 provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims, including claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that borrow Indiana’s limitations period.

Watts v. Quality Correctional Care LLC · filed 2019-10-17

“The pertinent Indiana statute of limitations is two years.” Devbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4).
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Section 34-11-2-4 requires personal-injury and tort actions, including the claims addressed here, to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

BRINGLE v. BRINGLE · filed 2020-03-31

Moreover, the Court agrees that these claims are also time barred, as each of the alleged incidents giving rise to Plaintiffs’ IIED and NIED claims occurred more than two years prior to the filing of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint. ... The statute of limitations for invasion of privacy claims is two years from the date of accrual. ... Thus, Plaintiff Bringle’s invasion of privacy claim is also time barred.
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Section 34-11-2-4(a) imposes a two-year limitations period on negligence and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims, running under the discovery rule when the plaintiff knows or should know of an injury from tortious conduct.

City of Marion v. London Witte Group, LLC, Chad Seybold, Estate of Michael Y. An, Global Investment Consulting, Inc., an · filed 2020-04-28(a)

It is undisputed that a two-year statute of limitations governs the City’s claims against LWG for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. ... Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff actually knows, or in the exercise of ordinary diligence could have discovered, that it has sustained an injury from tortious conduct.
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Section 34-11-2-4 supplies a two-year limitations period for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

SCRUGGS v. ALDEN · filed 2020-06-12

As explained below, Mr. Scruggs was aware that the Indiana two-year statute of limitations barred his claim. See Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that suits brought pursuant to § 1983 use the statute of limitations and tolling rules of the host state, and citing Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4); Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012) (same). ... Accordingly, under Indiana law, the two-year statute of limitations was not tolled while Mr. Scruggs exhausted his administrative remedies, and this action was filed twenty days after the expiration of the limitations period.
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Section 34-11-2-4(a) establishes a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which the court applied to Dobbie’s § 1983 claim.

Dobbie v. Bremen Police Dep't · filed 2018-09-24(a)

Indiana has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.
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Section 34-11-2-4 provides a two-year statute of limitations period for applicable personal-injury claims in Indiana.

TONEY v. BROWN · filed 2020-09-29

In Indiana, the applicable statute of limitations period is two years. See Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012); Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4.
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Section 34-11-2-4 supplies Indiana's two-year limitations period for § 1983 personal-injury claims, running from accrual.

HUTCHISON v. CASTEEL · filed 2020-10-19

In Indiana, the applicable statute of limitations period is two years. See Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012); Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4.1 ... Under the two-year statute of limitations, the claims from December 17, 2017 to March 1, 2018 are barred, and, therefore, DISMISSED.
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Section 34-11-2-4 gives a two-year limitations period for breach-of-fiduciary-duty and conversion claims, running when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury; later consequences of the same old act do not restart the period.

DEIBEL v. HOEG · filed 2020-11-12

Under both theories he now forwards—breach of fiduciary duty and conversion—he would have had two years to file his claims. See Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4; Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945) (instructing that federal courts sitting in diversity must apply governing states' statutes of limitations). It is too late now, decades later, to litigate issues that commenced in 1992.
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Subsection (a) provides a two-year statute of limitations, and the claim was timely because it was filed within two years of the relevant conduct.

ACCIDENT FUND INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA v. CUSTOM MECHANICAL CONSTRUCTION, INC. · filed 2020-11-30(a)

Schultheis next argues Custom Mechanical's claim with respect to procuring coverage is barred by the statute of limitations. See Filip, 879 N.E.2d at 1082. Not so. Custom Mechanical's claim stems from Sublett's actions taken with respect to the Second Policy, which was effective on May 13, 2016. Custom Mechanical filed its Third-Party Complaint on February 24, 2017, well within the two-year statute of limitations. See Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a).
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Section 34-11-2-4 requires an emotional-distress claim to be filed within two years after the injury occurs, unless an applicable exception applies.

Marvin v. St. Joseph County Sheriff Department · filed 2020-12-07

Except in circumstances not applicable here, the law requires a person to file an emotional distress claim within two years after her injury. See Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. Ms. Marvin knew that she was emotionally injured by this incident immediately. Ms. Marvin acknowledges that she “could feel that something was wrong with me after the beating on my son” (ECF 30 at 3). The incident occurred on April 3, 2015. She had two years from that date to file her suit. Her claim now is untimely.
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Section 34-11-2-4 provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which applies to § 1983 suits in Indiana.

WARREN v. WELLPATH, LLC · filed 2020-12-15

Suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 use the statute of limitations and tolling rules that states employ for personal-injury claims. In Indiana, the applicable statute of limitations period is two years. See Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012); Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4.
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Section 34-11-2-4 supplies a two-year statute of limitations for the applicable personal-injury claims in Indiana.

ATWOOD v. THOMPSON · filed 2021-02-03

Suits under § 1983 use the statute of limitations and tolling rules that states employ for personal-injury claims. In Indiana, the applicable statute of limitations period is two years. See Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012); Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4.
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Subsection (a) imposes a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions, which the court applied to the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.

Seegers v. Jasper County Indiana · filed 2021-02-05(a)

In Indiana, the applicable statute of limitations period is two years. See Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012); Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a).
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Section 34-11-2-4 provides a two-year statute of limitations for Indiana personal-injury claims, which governs this § 1983 action.

WARREN v. WELLPATH, LLC · filed 2021-03-16

Suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 use the statute of limitations and tolling rules that states employ for personal-injury claims. In Indiana, the applicable statute of limitations period is two years. See Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012); Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4.
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Section 34-11-2-4 provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims in Indiana.

WEAVER v. CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES,INC. · filed 2021-03-23

Suits under § 1983 use the statute of limitations and tolling rules that states employ for personal-injury claims. In Indiana, the applicable statute of limitations period is two years. See Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012); Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4.
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Section 34-11-2-4 supplies a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims in Indiana.

BLEDSOE v. LAWRENCE · filed 2021-03-30

Suits under § 1983 use the statute of limitations and tolling rules that states employ for personal-injury claims. In Indiana, the applicable statute of limitations period is two years. See Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012); Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4.
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Section 34-11-2-4 supplies a two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Indiana.

EMBERTON v. WINKLE · filed 2021-04-29

Section 1983 claims in Indiana are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4). ... Because the two-year statute of limitations expired on May 22, 2020, see Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4, Mr. Emberton did not commence his suit within the statute of limitations period.
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Section 34-11-2-4 sets Indiana's personal-injury limitations period at two years.

Williams-Preston v. South Bend Community School Corporation · filed 2023-02-17

Claims under § 1983 are subject to the statute of limitations period for personal injury actions in the state in which the alleged injury occurred. Wilson v. Giesen, 956 F.2d 738, 740 (7th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff’s alleged injury occurred in the State of Indiana, and Indiana’s personal injury statute of limitations is two years. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. As Plaintiff filed her complaint on August 14, 2020, the statute of limitations excludes conduct which occurred before August 14, 2018. (See DE 4.)
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Section 34-11-2-4 gives tortious-interference claims a two-year limitations period, which begins when the claimant knew or reasonably could have discovered the injury.

LeSEA Inc v. LeSEA Broadcasting Corporation · filed 2023-08-22

The parties agree that a tortious interference claim has a two-year statute of limitations under Ind. Code §34-11-2-4. ... Instead, accrual of the claim occurred when Frank knew, or in the exercise of ordinary diligence, could have discovered that he had been injured by the tortious act of another. ... When a plaintiff eventually obtains information that would lead to the discovery of the cause of action through ordinary diligence, the statute of limitations begins to run at that time, regardless of any fraudulent concealment previously perpetrated by the defendant. ... Frank’s passivity in the face of his knowledge that he was being excluded from any inheritance from Dr. Sumrall supports the conclusion that the tortious interference claim was not timely brought within the two-year statute of limitations, and/or that it is barred by the doctrine of laches as previously discussed.
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Section 34-11-2-4 sets a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, and the period begins when the claimant knew or, exercising ordinary diligence, should have known of the injury.

Adams v. Atlantic Richfield Company · filed 2023-09-29

See generally Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions), § 34-11-2-7 (six-year statute of limitations for property claims). ... Under Indiana law, which governs here, the limitations period started when Plaintiffs knew or, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, should have known of their injuries. ... So for now, I accept as true plaintiffs’ allegations that they did not discover their alleged exposure to lead contamination caused by Defendants until July 25, 2016. Therefore, dismissal on statute of limitations grounds will be denied.
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Section 34-11-2-4 provides a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims based on personal injuries occurring in Indiana.

RICHEY v. MCGLONE · filed 2023-11-02

For claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "federal courts apply the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the injury took place." Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 2013). "In Indiana, such claims must be brought within two years." Id. (citing Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4). Under the continuing harm doctrine, the statute of limitation begins to run on the last occurrence of the harm.
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Section 34-11-2-4(a) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, which the court applied to bar the plaintiff's § 1983 claims as untimely.

Gill v. Hammond The City of · filed 2023-12-11(a)

When determining the statute of limitations for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for constitutional and personal injury claims. Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). In Indiana, the applicable statute of limitations period is two years. Id.; Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a).
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Section 34-11-2-4(a) provides a two-year statute of limitations for Indiana personal-injury claims, which the court applied to bar the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.

James v. Mace · filed 2023-12-12(a)

For claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims. ... In Indiana, the applicable statute of limitations period is two years. See Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012); Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a). ... Thus, the Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendants accrued in July 2020, and the statute of limitations provided him two years from then, until July 2022, to file his claims. ... Therefore, the Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Mace, City of Michigan City, Kennedy, and Pflughaupt are barred by the statute of limitations and must be dismissed.
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Section 34-11-2-4 provides a two-year limitations period for the relevant claims.

RODRIGUEZ v. ZATECKY · filed 2024-05-13

The relevant statute of limitations here is two years. Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012); Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. That means Mr. Rodriguez needed to file suit against Mr. Evans, Warden Reagle, and Officer Leohr by December 9, 2022.
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Section 34-11-2-4(a) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims arising in Indiana, which applies to § 1983 claims through the state’s borrowed limitations period.

HOOTEN v. BROWN · filed 2024-05-14(a)

Mr. Hooten's alleged injury occurred in Indiana, which has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.
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Section 34-11-2-4 gives personal-injury actions a two-year statute of limitations.

Hullett v. Dreessen · filed 2024-09-27

Under Indiana law, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. Therefore, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s § 1983 action for violation of J.M.’s constitutional rights is two years.
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Section 34-11-2-4 supplies a two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims.

BEY v. YOCHUM · filed 2025-03-27

For § 1983 claims, the statute of limitations is two years. Johnson v. City of South Bend, 680 F. App’x 475, 476 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4; Behavioral Inst. of Ind., LLC v. Hobart City of Common Council, 406 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2005)); Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 2013). ... The complaint was therefore filed beyond the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims.
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Section 34-11-2-4 provides a two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims.

ALLEN v. FAULK · filed 2025-05-27

As the Court stated in the Order to Show Cause, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is two years. Johnson v. City of South Bend, 680 F. App’x 475, 476 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4; Behavioral Inst. of Ind., LLC v. Hobart City of Common Council, 406 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2005)); Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 2013).
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Section 34-11-2-4 imposes a two-year limitations period for tort claims, measured from accrual, and also governs § 1983 Eighth Amendment claims in Indiana.

J.L.R. v. Elkhart County · filed 2025-07-23

Under Indiana law, the statute of limitations for tort claims such as negligence is two years after the action accrues. See Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. ... Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims are also governed by the statute of limitations in § 34-11-2-4—two years after the action accrues.
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Section 34-11-2-4 provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which the court applies to the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and state-law claims.

Layman v. Young · filed 2025-09-18

Under Indiana law, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. Therefore, the statute of limitations for Layman’s § 1983 action for violation of his constitutional rights is two years.
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Section 34-11-2-4(a) supplies a two-year Indiana statute-of-limitations period for § 1983 claims based on personal injury.

ROSE v. KNIGHT · filed 2025-09-29(a)

The applicable Indiana statute of limitations is two years. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a). ... Here, Mr. Rose alleges he was assaulted in January of 2021 and then not again until March of 2022. There is not enough of a connection between the January 2021 assault and the March 2022 assault to show that these incidents at least were not discreet and instead he was subjected to an ongoing wrong such that claims based on his 2021 assault would be timely. The defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment in this respect.
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Section 34-11-2-4 supplies a two-year limitations period that may serve as the analogous Indiana limitations period for Lanham Act claims, including as the baseline for laches.

Banjo Corporation v. Green Leaf, Inc. · filed 2026-01-09

As previously noted, "[b]ecause the Lanham Act does not contain a statute of limitations, federal courts have referred to analogous state statutes of limitations to determine whether a presumption of laches should apply." Id. at 821. In addition, as also noted above, both parties here recognize that Indiana law provides a two-year statute of limitations. Dkt. 111 at 27; dkt. 124-3 at 32–33 (citing Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4); see, e.g., Gema USA, Inc. v. First in Finishing Inc., No. 1:22-CV-02053-TWP-KMB, 2025 WL 3073875, at *22 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 27, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 26-1075 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 22, 2025) (collecting cases applying Indiana's two-year statute of limitations for injuries to personal property to Lanham Act claims). We thus shall apply this two-year limitations period "as [our] baseline" in determining whether the "presumption of laches exists." Hot Wax, 191 F.3d at 821.
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Section 34-11-2-4 provides a two-year limitations period applicable to the claims at issue.

MYERS · filed 2026-01-14

Fourth, Myers' claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Under Indiana law, the statute of limitations for claims under Section 1983, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act are all two years. See Logan v. Wilkins, 644 F.3d 577, 581 (7th Cir. 2011); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Ensley, 264 N.E.2d 80, 85 (Ind. Ct. App. 1970); Strominger v. Ind. Dep't of Corrections, No. 13-cv-291, 2014 WL 2452967, at *2 (S.D. Ind. June 2, 2014); Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. The 2017 and 2019 Criminal Cases, which form the basis of Myers' claims, were decided well over two years before he initiated this action. Myers' claims are therefore time-barred.
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Section 34-11-2-4 supplies a two-year limitations period for Indiana § 1983 claims because those claims borrow the period for personal-injury actions.

Shorter · filed 2026-05-20

“Claims under § 1983 borrow the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state in which the cause of action arose[.]” ... “The statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 suits in Indiana is two years. Behav. Inst. of Ind., LLC v. Hobart City of Common Council, 406 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4).”
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Section 34-11-2-4 provides a two-year limitations period for § 1983 personal-injury claims borrowing Indiana law.

Antwan Rush v. Rachelle Brower, John Mershon, and Martial Kneiser · filed 2026-03-30

The pertinent Indiana statute of limitations is two years.
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Section 34-11-2-4 sets a two-year limitations period for an action for injury to person or character or a forfeiture penalty given by statute.

Sanderson v. Spectrum Labs, Inc. · filed 2000-01-12

The Lanham Act does not have a specific statute of limitations. Rather, it incorporates the statute of limitations for the most analogous state law cause of action. Hot Wax, Inc. v. Warsaw Chem. Co., 45 F.Supp.2d 635, 647 (N.D.Ill.1999). The most analogous statute of limitations in Indiana is the two-year statute for injury to person or character or for a “forfeiture of penalty given by statute.” Ind.Code § 34-11-2-4; Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 656 F.Supp. 950 (N.D.Ind.1987). In Indiana, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, could have discovered that an injury had been sustained as a result of the tortious act of another.
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Section 34-11-2-4 supplies a two-year limitations period for Indiana § 1983 claims treated as personal-injury claims.

Boyd v. Anderson · filed 2003-05-09

Because there is no federal statute of limitation for § 1983 actions, courts apply the most appropriate state statute of limitations. Section 1983 claims are considered as personal injury claims for purposes of determining the applicable state statute of limitations. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). The Indiana statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions is the two-year period found in Ind.Code § 34-11-2-4. Campbell v. Chappelow, 95 F.3d 576, 580 (7th Cir.1996). The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, but if a plaintiff “pleads facts that show his suit is time-barred or otherwise without merit, he has pleaded himself out of court.” Tregenza v. Great American Communications Co., 12 F.3d 717, 718 (7th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1085, 114 S.Ct. 1837, 128 L.Ed.2d 465 (1994). The claims presented in paragraphs 92 and 93 are barred by the statute of limitations.
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Section 34-11-2-4 imposes a two-year statute of limitations on personal-injury claims, and claims filed after that period are untimely absent a valid relation-back amendment.

Roddy v. Canine Officer · filed 2003-11-18

Plaintiffs’ claims, therefore, are governed by Indiana’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. ... Ind.Code 34-11-2-4. Plaintiffs did not seek to add Officer Lewis and Deputy Taylor as Defendants until July 14, 2003. Because the statute of limitations expired on April 27, 2003, the claims against Lewis and Taylor will only survive if the proposed amendment relates back to Plaintiffs’ original complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(3).
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Section 34-11-2-4 imposes a two-year limitations period on claims including conversion and breach of fiduciary duty, and may apply to tortious-interference and civil-conspiracy claims when applicable.

KnowledgeAZ, Inc. v. JIM WALTERS RESOURCES, INC. · filed 2008-09-30

The two year limitations period set out in Indiana Code § 34-11-2-4 applies as well to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
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Indiana’s two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions applies to § 1983 claims brought in federal court in Indiana.

Bedree v. Bedree · filed 2010-10-01

The court ruled that his wrongful arrest and false imprisonment claims, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983, were barred by Indiana’s 2-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions, see Ind.Code § 34-11-2-4. James insists that the 5-year statute of limitations applicable to actions against law enforcement for acts in the course of their official duty applies to this case. See Ind. Code § 34-11-2-6. This argument comes too late as he did not make this argument in the court below. See, e.g., Everroad v. Scott Track Sys., Inc., 604 F.3d 471, 480 (7th Cir.2010). In any case, the statute of limitations for claims brought in federal court in Indiana under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the same as for personal-injury actions, which in Indiana, is two years. See, e.g., Hoagland v. Town of Clear Lake, Ind., 415 F.3d 693, 699-700 (7th Cir.2005); Behavioral Inst. of Ind., LLC v. Hobart City of Common Council, 406 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir.2005); Perez v. Sifel, 57 F.3d 503, 505 (7th Cir.1995).
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Section 34-11-2-4 imposes a two-year limitations period on legal-malpractice claims, and the court applied it after determining the plaintiffs knew or should have discovered their injury by the summer of 2006.

Dickes v. Felger · filed 2012-12-13

The statute of limitations for a claim of legal malpractice is two years. Ind.Code § 34-11-2-4. ... Plaintiffs filed their complaint against Attorneys on March 5, 2009. Thus, if Plaintiffs’ action accrued before March 5, 2007, the statute of limitations would bar their claim. ... We agree that Plaintiffs here were aware of or could have discovered Attorneys’ alleged malpractice by the summer of 2006. ... Consequently, we conclude that Plaintiffs’ claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
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Section 34-11-2-4 requires covered personal-injury and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress actions to be commenced within two years after accrual, with accrual governed by Indiana’s discovery rule.

Cordova v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac · filed 2013-03-29

... In Indiana, the timeliness of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is governed by Indiana Code 34-11-2-4, which requires that an action be commenced within two years of the date on which the action accrued. See Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 736 F.Supp. 1512, 1517 (S.D.Ind.1990). The standard discovery rule in Indiana is that the claim “accrues at the time the individual knew or should have known of the tort.” Parish, 614 F.3d at 683; see also Filip v. Block, 879 N.E.2d 1076, 1082 (Ind.2008) (statute begins to run when “plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, could have discovered that an injury had been sustained as a result of the tortious act of another”).
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Section 34-11-2-4 supplies the two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Indiana.

STONE v. FRANKLIN · filed 2022-10-21

"In Indiana, such claims must be brought within two years." Id. (citing Ind. Code § 34-11- 2-4).
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Limitations period for bodily injury actions

Section 34-11-2-4 requires a bodily injury action to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Smith v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co. · filed 2007-12-12

Under IC 34-11-2-4, an action for bodily injury must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues. Therefore, under the terms of their policy the Smiths were required to file any action against Auto-Owners within two years from the date that the cause of action accrued.
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Section 34-11-2-4 provides a two-year statute of limitations in Indiana for personal-injury actions, and that period governs § 1983 and Bivens claims arising from such injuries.

Coleman v. Unknown Persons of the United States Marshal Service · filed 2021-05-06

“The statute of limitations for both § 1983 and Bivens actions is determined by the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state where the incident forming the basis of the claim occurred.” ... In Indiana, the statute of limitations is two years. See Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4.
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Section 34-11-2-4(a) requires tort actions, including attorney-malpractice claims, to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues, measured here from discovery of the alleged misconduct.

Davison v. Coffey · filed 2021-10-12(a)

Further, the state court docket reveals that Mr. Kraus moved to withdraw his appearance as counsel for Ms. Davison on May 7, 2010, which the court granted [ECF 1-1 at 10]. This date is important because Indiana requires that tort actions, including attorney malpractice claims, “be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues.” Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a); see also Ruckelshaus v. Cowan, 963 F.3d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 2020). Mr. Kraus was Ms. Davison’s attorney at the time the 2010 arrest warrant was issued [ECF 1-1 at 10]. Therefore, Ms. Davison had two years from the date that she discovered the alleged misconduct to file suit. She waited eleven years and did not provide an explanation for this delay.
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Section 34-11-2-4 sets a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Indiana.

WANG v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS · filed 2024-04-23

In Indiana, the personal injury statute of limitations is two years. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4.
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Indiana's two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims begins when the cause of action accrues.

Harris v. General Motors, LLC · filed 2025-07-03

In Indiana, that period is two years after the cause of action accrues. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4; See also Mojsoski v. Indiana Wesleyan Univ., 2022 WL 17338426, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 30, 2022). ... The statute of limitations started to run at the time of the alleged injury which was Harris’ termination on February 1, 2024. Harris brought his Title VI claim just seven months after and well before the (still ticking) statute of limitations on his claim ran. His claim is thus timely.
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Section 34-11-2-4 supplies Indiana’s general two-year limitations period for personal-injury suits.

Miles v. Vanderburgh County Jail · filed 2009-06-25

When the forum state has various statutes of limitations for different types of injury, a federal court must use the general period of limitation adopted by the state for personal-injury suits, which in Indiana is two years. See Ind.Code § 34-11-2-4 (1999); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985); Malone, 553 F.3d at 542; Behavioral Inst. of Ind., LLC v. Hobart City of Common Council, 406 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir.2005).
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Section 34-11-2-4 sets a two-year limitation period for personal-injury suits, and that period applies to § 1983 actions in Indiana.

Bebout v. Thomas · filed 2011-02-09

A court entertaining an action under § 1983, however, must apply the forum state’s general statute of limitations for personal-injury suits, Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989); Hoagland v. Town of Clear Lake, 415 F.3d 693, 699-700 (7th Cir.2005), not its statute of limitations for wrongs committed by a public officer, Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985).
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Breach of fiduciary duty — limitations period

Section 34-11-2-4 imposes a two-year limitation period on an action for breach of fiduciary duty, barring damages evidence from before the limitations period began.

Ferguson v. Candler · filed 2008-09-04

An action for breach of fiduciary duty is subject to a two-year statute of limitation. See Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4; Shriner, 773 N.E.2d at 846. As such, the Candlers are time-barred from presenting evidence of damages from Ferguson's breach before June 6, 2000, which is two years before the date they filed their counterclaim. The trial court is, however, free to consider evidence of damages after this date on remand.
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Section 34-11-2-4 requires an action for breach of fiduciary duty to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

DiMaggio III v. Elias Rosario Elias Rosario v. Victor J. DiMiaggio III · filed 2016-04-07

An action for breach of fiduciary duty must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 (2013). ... DiMaggio’s claims would be barred by the two-year statute of limitation because he did not file his complaint raising said claims until March 26, 2008, which is beyond the two-year statute of limitation.
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Section 34-11-2-4 requires an action for injury to personal property, including a breach-of-fiduciary-duty tort claim, to be filed within two years.

The Village Pines at the Pines of Greenwood Homeowners' Association, Inc. v. Pines of Greenwood, LLC, and Arbor Homes, L · filed 2019-04-11

We note initially that, to the extent the HOA argues that Pines and Arbor Homes owed it a fiduciary duty, a breach of fiduciary duty is a tort claim for injury to personal property and the applicable statute of limitation is two years. ... Based on our review of the record, we conclude that some ascertainable damage had occurred that, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, could have been discovered prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitation period.
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Section 34-11-2-4 gives Indiana breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims a two-year statute of limitations.

WILKINS v. GENZYME CORPORATION · filed 2022-09-14

Likewise, the statute of limitations is set at two years for breach of fiduciary duty under Indiana law. See Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4; Shriner v. Sheehan, 773 N.E. 2d 833, 846 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
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Subsection (a) gives negligence and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims a two-year limitations period, running from accrual.

Federal Deposit Insurance v. Kime · filed 2014-03-28(a)

In Indiana, a cause of action for negligence or breach of fiduciary duty expires two years from the date it accrues. See Ind.Code § 34-11-2-4(a). ... The Court is persuaded that an Indiana tribunal confronted with this inquiry likely would find that the Banks would not necessarily have been expected to discover (or even suffer) an ascertainable injury simultaneous to the Defendants’ approval of each loan and that the accrual date therefore is a question of fact not ripe for resolution at this stage. ... Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Defendants’ motion to the extent it asks the Court to dismiss any of the FDIC’s claims as time-barred.
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Limitation period for professional malpractice

Section 34-11-2-4 imposes a two-year limitation period on a professional-malpractice claim treated as an injury to personal property.

Shaum v. McClure · filed 2009-03-17

We hold that the two-year statute of limitations applies here as this is a claim for professional malpractice.
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Accrual and timeliness of claims

Section 34-11-2-4 provides the applicable two-year statute of limitations, but equitable estoppel can bar a defendant from asserting that limitations defense when the defendant's material misrepresentation caused the plaintiff to miss the deadline.

Binder v. Benchwarmers Sports Lounge · filed 2005-08-24

The parties agree that the instant lawsuit was filed outside the applicable two-year statute of limitations. See Ind.Code § 34-11-2-4. Benchwarmers properly pled and raised this defense. The trial court dismissed Binder's negligence claim on this basis, and also found that equitable estoppel did not work to rehabilitate the negligence claim. We disagree with the trial court in that regard, and hold that Benchwarmers is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense in this case.
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Section 34-11-2-4 requires an action to be brought within two years after the claim accrues, with accrual determined under applicable Indiana rules.

Christopher Parish v. City Elkhart IN · filed 2010-07-30

The parties agree that the timeliness of Parish’s claim is governed by Indiana Code 34-11-2-4, which requires that an action be brought within two years of the date on which the action accrued. ... If the claimed tort continued through, or beyond, the point of conviction, the court must ask whether the claims would directly implicate the validity of the conviction. If the claims would not directly implicate the validity of the conviction, the court should follow the standard discovery rule applied in Indiana: The claim accrues at the time the individual knew or should have known of the tort. ... If the claim would directly implicate the validity of the conviction, then Heck and Scruggs come into play and the claim does not accrue until the conviction has been disposed of in a manner favorable to the plaintiff. ... Therefore, under Indiana’s adoption of Heck, Parish could not have brought these claims until his conviction was disposed of in a manner favorable to him. Parish brought his claim within two years of when the claim accrued upon his exoneration, thereby making the claim timely.
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Section 34-11-2-4’s accrual rule is deferred until a conviction is favorably disposed of when the claim directly implicates the conviction’s validity.

Christopher Parish v. City Elkhart IN · filed 2010-07-30

Under the Heck framework, a claim that directly attacks the validity of a conviction cannot accrue until after the conviction has been termi- nated in a manner favorable to the plaintiff.
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Accrual of limitations period for negligent procurement of insurance coverage

Section 34-11-2-4 starts the two-year limitations period for negligent procurement of inadequate insurance coverage when the coverage begins if the coverage problem was reasonably ascertainable from the policy.

Christopher Groce and Tracey Groce v. American Family Insurance Company and Michael A. Meek · filed 2013-03-06

We hold that the alleged inadequacy of the replacement cost coverage in the Groces’ American Family policy was “readily ascertainable from the policy itself.” See Filip, 879 N.E.2d at 1084. Accordingly, the statute of limitations began to run at the time of coverage, in 2003, and bars the Groces’ negligence claims, which were first asserted in 2009. See id.
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Statute of limitations—Injury to personal property

Section 34-11-2-4 requires an action for injury to personal property to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Robert L. Johnson, et al. v. Peace Baptist Church, Inc. · filed 2013-04-24

Pursuant to Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4, an action for “injury to personal property” must be “commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues.”
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Section 34-11-2-4 requires actions for injury to person or character or injury to personal property to be commenced within two years after accrual, with accrual beginning when the claimant knows or should have known of the injury and some ascertainable damage has occurred.

Staton v. Dawn M. Dobyns-Gross, Indiana Family Social Services Administration, Tippecanoe County, Indiana and · filed 2013-09-30

Pursuant to Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4, an action for “injury to person or character” or “injury to personal property” must be “commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues.” ... “Under Indiana’s discovery rule, a cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitation begins to run, when a claimant knows or in exercise of ordinary diligence should have known of the injury.” ... “For an action to accrue, it is not necessary that the full extent of the damage be known or even ascertainable, but only that some ascertainable damage has occurred.” ... Because Staton filed this action against the Defendants more than two years after his cause of action accrued, Staton’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. ... The trial court properly dismissed Staton’s complaint.
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Section 34-11-2-4 provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Indiana.

PRUCHA v. WATSON · filed 2020-10-26

In an action bringing claims pursuant to Bivens and the RA, the Court applies the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the incident took place. King v. One Unknown Fed. Corr. Officer, 201 F.3d 910, 913 (7th Cir. 2000) (Bivens); Conley v. Village of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703, 710 n. 5 (7th Cir. 2000) (Rehabilitation Act). In Indiana, the statute of limitations is two years. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. That two years begins to run "when the plaintiff knows or should know that his or her constitutional rights have been violated." Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 2013) (federal law determines when limitations period begins to run). Mr. Prucha signed his complaint on April 8, 2020. ... The Court notes that the claims on the preceding list involve allegations that both began and ended before April 8, 2018.
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Section 34-11-2-4 requires personal-injury claims, including the limitations period borrowed for § 1983 claims, to be commenced within two years after accrual.

SEAY v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS · filed 2020-11-16

In Indiana, claims concerning personal injury "must be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues." Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4.
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Section 34-11-2-4 provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury-based constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Indiana.

SMITH v. BROWN · filed 2021-01-21

"[I]n § 1983 actions, federal courts apply the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the injury took place. In Indiana, such claims must be brought within two years." Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted); see also Indiana Code section 34-11-2-4. Thus, the applicable statute of limitations for the constitutional claims is two years.
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Section 34-11-2-4(a)(1) requires an action for injury to a person, including battery, to be brought within two years after the action accrues.

Felder v. United States Steel Corp. · filed 2021-03-24(a)(1)

Finally, regarding the allegation of battery with a door, an action in Indiana for “injury to person,” such as the alleged battery, must be brought within two years of the action accruing. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a)(1). Based on this limitations period, Felder’s claim against the union for being battered with a door by the union’s employee is time-barred.
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Notes 1–150 of 179, oldest cases first.

48 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Indiana Farmers Mutual Insurance v. Richie, the court cited Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 only to identify the two-year tort limitations period. Its holding construed and applied Ind. Code § 29-1-14-1(f), not § 34-11-2-4. opinion →
King v. One Unknown Federal Correctional Officer, the court cites Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 in a string citation as authority for the applicable two-year limitations period, but does not construe or otherwise decide anything about the statute itself. opinion →
Gill v. Pollert, the statute appears only in a footnote reporting the cross-defendants' limitations argument. The opinion expressly states that this limitations-period issue was not presented on appeal and decides the cross-claim's relation-back and other procedural issues instead. opinion →
Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v. United States Ex Rel. Wilson, the statute appears only in footnote 3 as one entry in a nationwide list of possible analogous state limitations statutes; the Court neither interprets § 34-11-2-4 nor decides that it applies. opinion →
Crossroads Service Center, Inc. v. Coley, the court merely identified the two-year limitations period as background to its analysis of whether the amended complaint related back under Indiana Trial Rule 15(C); it did not construe or decide an issue about Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. opinion →
Rudnick v. Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District, the statute appears only in a footnote identifying the current codification of a two-year personal-injury limitations provision cited in the District's argument. The court expressly declined to decide which statute of limitations applied and resolved the case on the Tort Claims Act notice requirement. opinion →
Blevins v. Brassart, the statute is cited only while reporting the trial court’s limitations ruling. The Court of Appeals expressly declined to address the limitations issue and decided the appeal on Statute of Frauds grounds. opinion →
Myers v. Stason L. Wiete, Unknown Party, and W. Lafayette Police Department, the statute appears only as a footnote citation supporting the statement that malicious prosecution has a two-year limitations period. The court construed and applied the Journey’s Account Statute, Ind. Code § 34-11-8-1, instead. opinion →
Torres v. Enders, the court merely recited the statute's two-year limitations period while discussing the procedural requirements for commencing a civil action. It decided that the motion to dismiss should have been converted to summary judgment and that the complaint should be reinstated based on the uncontroverted tolling-agreement evidence; it expressly stated that whether an insurer can toll a statute of limitations by agreement was not before the court. opinion →
Garcia v. Garau Germano Hanley & Pennington, P.C., the court mentioned the statute only to note that an unpleaded fiduciary-duty claim appeared time-barred; it ultimately disposed of that claim as waived because it was raised for the first time on appeal, without deciding the statute’s meaning or applying it as the basis for the judgment. opinion →
Allen v. Richard Hinchman, M.D. Richard Tanner, M.D. and Jeffery Smith, M.D., the court merely cited the statute to identify Indiana's two-year limitations period while deciding the timeliness of a proposed 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim; it did not interpret or otherwise decide an issue about the statute itself. opinion →
Adam Nagel and Emily Nagel v. Northern Indiana Public Service Company, the court merely cited the statute to identify the limitations deadline in discussing alleged discovery prejudice; it did not construe or decide the statute’s meaning, requirements, or scope. opinion →
Munoz v. Woroszylo, the court mentioned subsection (a) only in a footnote to identify the applicable two-year limitations period; it did not construe or apply that statute. The holding concerned Indiana’s Journey’s Account Statute, Ind. Code § 34-11-8-1. opinion →
Christa Allen State of Indiana, Indiana Department of Correction, the court cited § 34-11-2-4 to establish that the complaint was untimely, but the appeal actually concerned whether the Journey’s Account Statute could preserve the claim; the court did not construe or decide any disputed issue about § 34-11-2-4. opinion →
Devereux v. DiBenedetto, the court merely recited the statute's two-year limitations period as background while deciding that a contractual clause shortening the time to sue a law firm was void as against public policy; it did not construe or apply the statute itself. opinion →
Isby v. Brown, the statute is cited only as authority for the two-year limitations period applied to Isby's initial-placement claim, and the statement reports the district court's procedural ruling rather than deciding what the statute means or requires. opinion →
Christopher K. Kesling, DDS, MS, Adam Kesling and Emily Kesling v. Andrew C. Kesling, individually and as Trustee of the, the statute is mentioned only in footnote 13 of the dissent as background support for the dissent’s view that the limitations period reduced the risk of future suits under one Barth factor. The court did not decide a dispute about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. opinion →
Richardson v. Det. Arturo Azcona, Jr., Gary Police Department, and City of Gary, Indiana (mem. dec.), the court mentions § 34-11-2-4 as the general two-year limitations period for federal § 1983 claims, but it does not decide or apply that statute; it holds that § 34-11-2-6 supplies the applicable five-year period because the claim implicates a public officer. opinion →
Biedron v. Anonymous Physician 1, the statute appears only in a footnote explaining the alternative survival-action theory and its general two-year period. The court did not construe or decide any issue under § 34-11-2-4; its rulings concerned other statutes and fraudulent concealment. opinion →
June Russell and Betty Stevens v. Anh Bui (mem. dec.), the court merely cited the statute to identify the applicable limitations period; it did not interpret or decide any issue about what the statute means or requires. The decision turned on relation back under Indiana Trial Rule 15(C). opinion →
KEEYLEN v. RIGGS, the court cites Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 in a string citation as authority for the two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims. It does not interpret the statute or decide its scope; the citation is incidental to the court’s screening and timeliness determination. opinion →
Austin v. Auto Handling Corporation, the court cites § 34-11-2-4(a) only to support its procedural conclusion that the proposed defamation claim was timely and that there was no undue delay in allowing amendment. It does not interpret or apply the statute's requirements. opinion →
Pack v. Mast, the court cites Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a) only within a string cite supporting the parties' agreement that a two-year limitations period applies; it does not interpret or independently analyze the statute. opinion →
MCCLAIN v. DICKERSON, the opinion cites Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 in a string cite to support the statement that Indiana's two-year limitations period applies to § 1983 personal-injury claims. It does not interpret or independently analyze the statute; the limitations ruling concerns accrual of the plaintiff's federal claims. opinion →
Deibel v. Hoeg, the court cited the statute to identify the applicable two-year limitations period, but the holding addressed when the claim accrued and rejected the continuing-wrong theory; it did not construe or independently analyze § 34-11-2-4. opinion →
ATWOOD v. THOMPSON, the court merely cited the statute for Indiana's general two-year limitations period; its decision turned on federal accrual rules for the § 1983 claim, not on interpreting or applying this statute. opinion →
JOHNSON v. SOJKA, the court cited Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 as the source of Indiana's two-year personal-injury limitations period while resolving the timeliness of § 1983 claims; it did not interpret, define, or independently analyze this statute. opinion →
Sims v. City of Elkhart, the court merely reported the parties’ agreement about the applicable two-year limitations period and then decided when the § 1983 claim accrued; it did not construe or independently analyze Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. opinion →
HINES v. KOONS, the statute appears only as the basis for the defendant's limitations argument. The court resolved whether dismissal was proper at the pleading stage and whether the status-conference statement was a binding judicial admission; it did not construe or independently apply Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. opinion →
Shawa v. GILLETTE, the court merely recited the two-year limitations period for battery; it did not interpret or decide any disputed issue about Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. The parties did not contest when the limitations period began or that the complaint was filed within two years, and the ruling instead concerned whether the defendant was “unknown” under Trial Rule 17(F). opinion →
London Witte Group, LLC v. City of Marion, the statute is mentioned in the procedural history as part of the trial court’s summary-judgment ruling, and the opinion also recounts an earlier appeal. The present decision addresses the sufficiency of the evidence for adverse domination and directed-verdict motions; it does not itself construe or decide how Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a) applies. opinion →
JESSIE-BEY v. IN THE ESTATE OF ROY ALAN BRUBAKER, the court cites Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 in a string cite supporting the two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims; it does not interpret or independently apply the statute. opinion →
C&T Consulting Group, LLC v. Sterilumen, Inc., the court mentioned § 34-11-2-4 only to compare Indiana and Colorado statutes of limitations in deciding whether to transfer the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1631. It did not decide the conversion claim's timeliness or otherwise interpret or apply this statute. opinion →
Gill v. Hammond The City of, the court cites § 34-11-2-4(a) only as support for the previously decided two-year limitations period applicable to the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims; this reconsideration opinion does not construe or independently decide the statute. opinion →
Fadavi v. Ginn, the court cited § 34-11-2-4(a) only to state the undisputed baseline limitations period and accrual date. Its dispositive analysis concerned whether Indiana's Journey's Account Statute, § 34-11-8-1, saved the otherwise time-barred claim; it did not construe or decide an issue about § 34-11-2-4(a). opinion →
Analise Parsley v. Marasco, the statute is cited only in a footnote to record the parties' agreement that the limitations period is two years. The court does not interpret or apply Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4; its decision concerns the Journey's Account Statute and negligence in prosecution. opinion →
MCLEAN v. LEVINE, the opinion mentions Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 only in recounting that some claims had previously been dismissed on statute-of-limitations grounds. The court expressly bypassed the limitations issue and decided summary judgment on the deliberate-indifference merits, so it did not construe or apply this statute. opinion →
Harris v. Raymond, the court mentions § 34-11-2-4 only in a footnote as the general tort statute of limitations, while deciding the applicability and constitutionality of the separate medical-malpractice statute of limitations. opinion →
TIPTON COUNTY v. State Ex Rel. Nash, the statute is discussed and applied only in the dissent; the majority expressly declined to reach the statute-of-limitations issue on the merits, so the dissent's analysis is not the court's holding. opinion →
Strauser v. Westfield Insurance Co., the court cited Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 in a footnote as the two-year limitations period for tort actions, but expressly held that the claims were time-barred regardless of which statute of limitations applied. The statute was therefore mentioned in the course of resolving the case rather than construed or independently applied. opinion →
Lewis v. Rex Metal Craft, Inc., the statute appears only in a parenthetical comparison listing the language of other limitation provisions; the court did not construe or apply Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. opinion →
Foley v. Schwartz, the statute appears only in a footnote explaining the limitations period while discussing accrual and the continuous representation doctrine; the court's holding concerns personal jurisdiction, not the meaning, requirements, or application of Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. opinion →
Estate of Wilson v. Steward, the statute appears only in a quoted string citation listing other limitation statutes, used to contrast their wording with Indiana Code § 34-11-2-12. The court did not decide any issue about § 34-11-2-4. opinion →
Land v. International Business Machines Corp., the opinion recounts IBM’s statute-of-limitations argument and the two-year period, but the court does not construe or independently apply Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. It decides the remand issue under the Journey’s Account Statute and fraudulent-joinder standard. opinion →
In Re Urethane Antitrust Litigation, the statute is mentioned only in a parenthetical citation to Gibson as support for the two-year limitations period. The court’s own ruling concerned whether Indiana law permits cross-jurisdictional American Pipe tolling, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 itself. opinion →
Lewis, Anthony B. v. Methodist Hospital, the court only conditionally describes the statute's applicability while deciding that the claim is governed by the ten-year contract limitations period. opinion →
Carpenter Co. v. SE, the court does not construe or independently decide Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4; it reports the parties' undisputed position and cites another court's decision. opinion →
Hamilton National Title, LLC v. Jurus, the court did not decide this section’s own rules; it addressed the party’s argument and held that the ten-year statute for written contracts applied. opinion →

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