Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3

Section 35-38-2-3(f) allows a court to enlarge probation conditions after a violation, but that power does not extend the probation period.

Slayton v. State · filed 1989-03-07(f)

However, the State argues the limited one year term of probation required by this section is subject to an extension for a period beyond one (1) year by IC 35-38-2-1(a)(1) (1986 Supp.) and IC 35-38-2-3(f) (1988). These provisions allow the trial court to modify the conditions of probation at any time and further, specifically allow the trial court to enlarge the conditions of probation if a violation occurs before the probation period ends. The conditions of probation, which the court has the power to modify or enlarge, refer to the undertakings required by a probationer and do not include the length of the probation period.

The State must prove an alleged probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Tachanavian Miles v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-10-22(f)

A probation revocation hearing is in the nature of a civil proceeding, and the State must prove an alleged violation only by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(f) (2015); Kincaid v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

Section 35-38-2-3(d) places the burden of proof in a probation revocation proceeding on the State, not the trial court.

Ratliff v. State · filed 1989-11-20(d)

The burden of proof in a revocation proceeding is on the State, not the trial court.

Section 35-38-2-3(e) places the burden on the State to prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence; the trial court cannot carry that burden for the State.

Isaac v. State · filed 1992-04-20(e)

Nonetheless, the State has the burden to prove probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence. I.C. 35-38-2-3(e). It cannot seriously be argued that the trial court may act on behalf of the State in performing this function.

Section 35-38-2-3 requires a probation violation to be proved by a preponderance of the evidence at a revocation hearing.

Wilson v. State · filed 1999-03-29

As set forth above, probation revocation is governed by IC 35-38-2-3. A revocation hearing is in the nature of a civil proceeding, and the alleged violation need be proven only by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 35-38-2-3 requires a probation violation to be proved by a preponderance of the evidence at a revocation hearing.

Plue v. State · filed 1999-12-28

Probation revocation is governed by Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3. A revocation hearing is in the nature of a civil proceeding, so the alleged violation need be proven by only a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 35-38-2-3(e) requires the State to prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Thornton v. State · filed 2003-07-29(e)

Accordingly, the State needs to prove a violation of probation by only a preponderance of the evidence. Ind.Code § 35-38-2-3(e).

Section 35-38-2-3(d) requires proof of a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence before revocation; its reference to the state does not require the prosecutor to present that evidence.

Isaac v. State · filed 1992-12-23(d)

The language of the statute (“The state must prove”) is consistent with the ordinary situation in which the prosecutor presents the evidence of the probation violation. We believe that the import of the statutory language, however, is to ensure the defendant that before his probation can be revoked, any violation must be found by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 35-38-2-3 permits revocation of probation upon proof of a single violation of a probation condition.

Hubbard v. State · filed 1997-07-16(a)

Proof of a single violation of the conditions of a defendant’s probation is sufficient to support a trial court’s decision to revoke probation.

A Kentucky conviction based on an Alford plea can support probation revocation under § 35-38-2-3.

Williams v. State · filed 1998-06-17

Since Kentucky law clearly treats Alford pleas as convictions, we see no reason for Indiana courts to treat them any differently for purposes of making determinations on probation revocations.

The State must prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Marsh v. State · filed 2004-11-24(e)

Therefore, the State is required to prove a violation by only a preponderance of the evidence. I.C. § 35-38-2-3(e); Thornton v. State, 792 N.E.2d 94.

The State must prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence; the burden cannot be shifted to the probationer.

Smith v. State · filed 2009-04-08(e)

The State must prove the violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind.Code § 35-38-2-3(e). ... Thus, the trial court shifted the burden from the State onto Smith.

Section 35-38-2-3(e) requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer committed a new offense.

Heaton v. State · filed 2011-12-28(e)

We note that today the correct legal standard in determining if a person on probation has committed another offense is a preponderance of the evidence, as is articulated in the current Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(e).

Section 35-38-2-3(e) requires the State to prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Schapker v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-01-31(e)

A revocation hearing is in the nature of a civil proceeding, and the State must prove an alleged violation only by a preponderance of the evidence.

A probation violation must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

Myers v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-03-30(e)

Probation revocation proceedings are civil in nature, and thus the State must prove a violation by only a preponderance of the evidence.

The State must prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence; an arrest alone is insufficient.

Hayes v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-04-04(e)

“To obtain a revocation of probation, „[t]he [S]tate must prove the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.‟ ” Id. at 615-16 (quoting Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(e)). ... The State did not meet that burden in this case. The State presented absolutely no evidence at the hearing regarding the reasonableness of the arrests or the facts underlying any of the three charges. A finding that Hayes had been arrested on other charges is by itself insufficient.

The State must prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Schmitt v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-05-07(e)

Probation revocation proceedings are civil in nature, and the State must prove a violation of the conditions of probation by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Code § 35- 38-2-3(e).

The State must prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Hamilton v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-07-16(e)

A probation revocation hearing is in the nature of a civil proceeding, and the State must prove a violation of the conditions of probation by a preponderance of the evidence.

A probation violation requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence, so an acquittal on a new criminal charge does not prevent revocation based on the same evidence.

Devon D. Dokes, Jr. v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-07-20(e)

Because of the difference between the burden of proof required to convict someone of a crime and the burden of proof required to revoke probation, the court could revoke probation after finding Dokes not guilty based on the same evidence.

Section 35-38-2-3(e) requires the State to prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Willey-Rumback v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-07-27(e)

Probation revocation proceedings are civil in nature, and the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence a violation of the conditions of probation.

Section 35-38-2-3(e) requires the State to prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Patterson v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-09-04(e)

Probation revocation proceedings are civil in nature, and the State needs to prove a violation of probation only by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 35-38-2-3 requires the State to prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence at a revocation hearing.

Powell v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-10-04

In a probation revocation hearing, the State must prove a violation of probation by a preponderance of the evidence. I.C. § 35-38-2-3.

The State must prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Alexander v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-11-26(e)

The State must prove a violation of probation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 35-38-2-3(e) requires the State to prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence, including when the alleged violation is a new criminal offense.

Heaton v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-03-05(e)

This cause is remanded for a new determination of whether the defendant violated the conditions of her probation by a pre- ponderance of the evidence pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(e) (2008) and, if so, the appropriate sanction for such violation.

The State must prove an alleged probation violation, including commission of a new criminal offense, by a preponderance of the evidence.

Andrew J.P. Cox v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-03-22(e)

The State’s burden of proof regarding alleged probation violations is proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

The State must prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Daniel Rodgers-Conwell, Jr. v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-05-31(f)

In order to obtain a revocation of probation, “the state must prove the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(f). ... Based upon the record, including the evidence that Rodgers-Conwell punched McWilliams in the face, choked her, pulled her back into the vehicle, threw her to the ground, and punched her further, we conclude that the State presented substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court’s conclusion that Rodgers-Conwell violated his probation by not maintaining good behavior.

Section 35-38-2-3 requires the State to prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Pinkston v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-07-08

The State must prove evidence of a violation of probation by a preponderance of the evidence.

An alleged probation violation must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

Akeem Turner v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-08-20(f)

A probation revocation hearing is civil in nature, and therefore an alleged violation need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

The State must prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence to obtain revocation.

Dominique Brisker v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-02-17(f)

In order to obtain a revocation of probation, “the state must prove the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(f). ... Based upon the record, we conclude that the court as the finder of fact could reasonably conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that while on probation Brisker committed the new offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon as a class B felony.

Section 35-38-2-3(e) requires proof of a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Bott v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-06-18(e)

There was sufficient evidence to prove Bott violated the terms of his probation by committing intimidation. Probation revocation proceedings are civil in nature and the violation need be proved by only a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 35-38-2-3(e) requires the State to prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Gall v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-06-25(e)

Probation revocation proceedings are civil in nature and the State needs to prove a violation by only a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 35-38-2-3(f) requires the State to prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Murdock v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-06-27(f)

A probation hearing is civil in nature, and the State must prove an alleged probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Braxton v. State, 651 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 1995); see Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(f) (2012).

Section 35-38-2-3(f) requires proof of a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence, so dismissal of related criminal charges does not bar revocation.

McCullough v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-12-21(f)

The State must prove a violation of probation by a preponderance of the evidence. ... Thus, the mere fact that the criminal charges against McCullough for possession of marijuana were dismissed does not mean his probation could not be revoked for the same.

Section 35-38-2-3 permits revocation when a person violates a probation condition during the probationary period, if the State proves the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Luke v. State of Indiana · filed 2016-02-24(a), (f)

Based upon the record, we conclude that the court as the finder of fact could reasonably conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that while on probation Luke committed the new offense of invasion of privacy. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in revoking his probation.

The State must prove a new crime alleged as a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Guajardo v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-05-24(f)

Rather, because revocation proceedings are civil in nature, the State need only prove the commission of a new crime by a preponderance of the evidence. Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 616; Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(f) (2015).

The State must prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Stollings v. State · filed 2016-07-21(f)

Under Indiana law, the State must prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

The State must prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Jones v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-08-05(f)

Under Indiana law, the State must prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(f).

Section 35-38-2-3(f) requires the State to prove an alleged probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Jordan v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-09-11(f)

A revocation proceeding is civil in nature, and the State must prove its allegations by only a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(f).

Section 35-38-2-3(e) requires proof of a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence; a separate reference to probable cause does not establish that the court used the wrong burden when it expressly applied that standard.

Allen v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-10-20(e)

Thus, although the trial court’s statement included a reference to probable cause, this reference was immediately followed by an explicit finding that the State had proven that Allen committed a new offense by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, we reject Allen’s claim that the trial court failed to apply the proper burden of proof when it made its decision to revoke her probation.

The State must prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Tyra Shante Sanders v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-12-19(f)

The State must prove the probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(f).

The State must prove an alleged probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Reed v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-04-23(f)

A probation revocation hearing is in the nature of a civil proceeding, and the State must prove an alleged violation only by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 35-38-2-3(f) requires the State to prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence, including when seeking to revoke a community corrections placement.

Brockington v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-05-24(f)

However, the State only had to prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(f).

The State must prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Swain v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-08-25(f)

Swain ignores the lower bar here—the State need only have proved his possession by a preponderance of the evidence.

The State must prove an alleged probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Trejo v. State of Indiana · filed 2023-06-02(f)

The State must prove an alleged probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(f).

Section 35-38-2-3(e) requires proof of a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Steele v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-09-25(e)

The current statute contains a specific provision stating that probation violations must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

The State must prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence; a positive polygraph result may be used in a revocation proceeding but cannot automatically establish a violation.

Smith v. State · filed 2010-06-30(e)

While the court may order Smith to take those examinations, the stated uses of those test results are improper. ... See Ind.Code § 35-38-2-3(e) (providing that the State must prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence). ... We accordingly direct the sentencing court on remand to amend Smith's conditions of probation to the same effect.

Issuing a summons or warrant on a probation violation petition tolls the probation period until the charge is finally determined.

Alley v. State · filed 1990-07-05(b)

By the plain and unambiguous language of I.C. 35-88-2-3(b), the issuance of a summons or warrant tolls the period of probation until the final determination of the charge. ... The period of probation was tolled from March 28, 1981 until the final determination on April 24, 1989.

Section 35-38-2-3(c) tolls probation when a violation petition is filed and a warrant or summons is issued, until the charge is finally determined.

Tunstill v. State · filed 1991-03-21(c)

Under I.C. 85-88-2-8(b), the relevant statute in effect in 1987, upon the filing of such a petition and the issuance of a warrant or summons, the period of probation is tolled until the final determination of the charge. ... Appellant's probation period was tolled until the time that a final determination on the violation petition was made, which occurred well after the commission of the charged crime.

Section 35-38-2-3(c) tolls probation from the issuance of a summons or warrant for an alleged probation violation until that violation charge is finally resolved, even if the charge is dismissed.

Hayes v. State · filed 1992-04-28(c)

However, he urges us to find that the statute does not apply to his case because the probation department ultimately dismissed the charges against him. We cannot so find. ... By the plain and unambiguous language of I.C. § 35-38-2-3(c), the issuance of a summons or warrant tolls the period of probation until the final determination of the charge.

Section 35-38-2-3(c) tolls the probation period when a probationer disappears and fails to maintain contact with the probation department, delaying revocation proceedings.

Mumford v. State · filed 1995-06-15(c)

IC 35-38-2-3(c) "precludes a probationer from violating the terms of his probation and fleeing the jurisdiction until the term of the suspended sentence elapses, thereby thwart, ing the State's efforts to revoke his probation." Alley v. State (1990), Ind.App., 556 N.E.2d 15, 16, trans. denied. Mumford's disappearance and resultant failure to maintain contact with the probation department was responsible for the delays in the proceedings against him. Therefore, the probation period was tolled after the filing of the August 8, 1989 notice of probation violation due to Mumford's failure to maintain contact with the probation department.

Section 35-38-2-3(c) tolls the probation period when a summons issues, so time between a violation and the summons counts toward probation.

Kincaid v. State · filed 2001-11-06(c)

Kincaid should also be credited for the 42 days of probation he served from the time of his violation to the time the summons was issued. See Ind.Code § 35-38-2-3(c) (providing for tolling upon issuance of the summons, not upon the commission of the probation violation).

Section 35-38-2-3(c) cannot toll or continue a probation period after it has ended.

Davis v. State of Indiana · filed 2015-05-11(c)

The State’s notice of violation was filed on the day Davis’ probation ended such that there was no period of probation to be tolled, which means the trial court could not continue her terms of probation pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(c).

Section 35-38-2-3(c) tolls the probationary period while a timely revocation proceeding remains pending.

Long v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-02-06(c)

In addition, because the State timely filed the first petition to revoke Long’s probation based on the positive test result, his probation was tolled pursuant to statute.

Section 35-38-2-3 requires an evidentiary hearing before probation may be revoked.

Dalton v. State · filed 1990-10-11(c) (now (d))

An evidentiary proceeding must be conducted prior to the revocation of probation.

Section 35-38-2-3 requires an evidentiary hearing before a court determines that a probationer violated probation.

Eckes v. State · filed 1990-11-14(c)

It was only then that a hearing ensued and that hearing concerned only the proper punishment for the violation. The court's failure to hold a proper evidentiary hearing constitutes fundamental error requiring us to reverse the trial court's judgment.

Section 35-38-2-3 requires an evidentiary probation revocation hearing; an informal conversation does not satisfy its requirements.

Weatherly v. State · filed 1990-12-31(d), (e)

An informal conversation between the judge and the parties present is insufficient under both the statute and due process concepts.

Section 35-38-2-3 entitles a probationer to an evidentiary hearing with confrontation and cross-examination before revocation; a trial on the new charges can provide that opportunity.

Fields v. State · filed 1997-01-17

Prior to the revocation of his probation, Fields was entitled to an evidentiary hearing including confrontation and cross-examination. I.C. § 35-38-2-3. Here, Fields had numerous opportunities during trial to contest the charges against him. Once Fields was convicted for the additional crimes, it was within the discretion of the trial court whether to revoke his probation. We find no error.

Section 35-38-2-3 entitles a probationer to counsel at a revocation hearing, and the record must show a voluntary waiver before the probationer proceeds without counsel.

Bell v. State · filed 1998-06-08

Additionally, the defendant is entitled to representation by counsel. Ind.Code § 35-38-2-3. ... Here, in contrast, thé record does not establish that Bell was either advised of his right to counsel at the initial probation revocation hearing or that he voluntarily waived such right. Accordingly, we must conclude that Bell’s right to due process was violated.

Section 35-38-2-3(e) protects the rights to confrontation, cross-examination, and counsel at revocation hearings, and the court applied those protections to a community corrections placement revocation.

Cox v. State · filed 1999-03-03(e)

After a careful review of the record, we find that the trial court accorded Defendant his rights under the Due Process Clause and the Indiana statute at each stage of the revocation proceedings.

Section 35-38-2-3 requires an evidentiary hearing for probation revocation, but an admission of the violation through counsel makes the hearing unnecessary.

Parker v. State · filed 1997-02-12

Indiana has codified the due process requirements of Morrissey in IC 35-38-2-3 by requiring that an evidentiary hearing be held on the revocation and providing for confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses by the probationer. When a probationer admits to the violations, the procedural safeguards of Mor-rissey and the evidentiary hearing are not necessary. ... Therefore, the admission of a violation by Parker’s attorney is binding on him.

Section 35-38-2-3(e) entitles a probationer to representation by counsel at a revocation hearing.

Johnson v. State · filed 1994-09-29(e)

I.C. 35-38-2-3(e) (1993 Supp.) provides that “[t]he [S]tate must prove the violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The evidence shall be presented in open court. The person is entitled to confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel.” ... The court made the foregoing comments yet failed to accommodate Johnson’s right to be represented by counsel.

Section 35-38-2-3(e) entitles a probationer to counsel at a revocation hearing; the record must establish a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver before the hearing proceeds without counsel.

Bumbalough v. State · filed 2007-09-25(e)

Additionally, the defendant is entitled to representation by counsel. ... The law is well settled that whenever a defendant proceeds without the benefit of counsel, the record must reflect that the right to counsel was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived. ... However, the record is silent as to whether the trial court determined that Bumbalough’s waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Accordingly, Bumbalough’s right to due process was violated.

Section 35-38-2-3 requires an evidentiary hearing before probation may be revoked, with the State proving a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Tillberry v. State · filed 2008-10-31

We noted Indiana Code § 35-38-2-3 requires the court to “conduct a hearing,” requires the State to “prove the violation by a preponderance of the evidence,” and requires “evidence ... be presented in open court” to allow “confrontation [and] cross-examination.” ... The informal conversation between the judge and parties at a hearing on the State’s Notice of Probation Violation not only failed to comport with Tillberry’s right to due process at a probation revocation, it also failed to elicit evidence to support by a preponderance of evidence the finding there had been two violations. Therefore, we reverse the revocation of Tillberry’s probation.

Section 35-38-2-3(e) requires an evidentiary revocation hearing with confrontation, cross-examination, and counsel; an admission insufficient to support revocation does not eliminate those safeguards.

Davis v. State · filed 2009-11-17(e)

Indiana has codified the due process requirements in Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3, which requires that an evidentiary hearing be held on the revocation, during which the probationer is "entitled to confrontation, eross-examination, and representation by counsel." Ind.Code § 35-38-2-3(e). ... Where, however, the admission itself is insufficient to support a probation revocation, we cannot agree it renders the procedural due process safeguards and evidentiary hearing unnecessary.

For revocation hearings before Hopper, a probationer who admits a violation may waive the right to counsel under Section 35-38-2-3(e) without a warning about the dangers of self-representation.

Butler v. State · filed 2011-06-27(e)

In line with Greer, because Butler admitted that he violated his probation, the trial court was not required to warn him of the dangers of self-representation in order to establish a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel.

Subsection (g) permits a court that finds a probation violation to impose any one or combination of the listed sanctions, including execution of all or part of the suspended sentence.

Ellis v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-08-15(g)

At the time of Ellis’s violations and the probation revocation hearing, Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g) set forth the trial court’s sentencing options upon a finding of a probation violation, providing: ... This provision permits judges to sentence offenders using any one of or any combination of the enumerated options.

Section 35-38-2-3(d)'s hearing requirement is satisfied when a probationer attends with counsel and has an opportunity to present evidence, even if the probationer presents none.

Eddie Rogers v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-02-05(d)

Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(d) requires the court to conduct a hearing concerning the alleged probation violation unless the probationer admits to the violation, waives the right to a hearing, and is advised of the resulting forfeiture of certain due process rights. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(e). ... But in light of our finding above that the proceeding on May 1, 2012, was indeed a probation revocation hearing, we decline Rogers’s invitation to view his silence as an unknowing or involuntary waiver. The hearing was held, Rogers was present and represented by counsel, and he was given the opportunity to defend himself.

An admission ordinarily removes the need for an evidentiary hearing, but a suspect admission following the court’s sentencing comment did not excuse the lack of a hearing.

Sparks v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-02-26(e)

Thus, while an evidentiary hearing is not required if the defendant admits to the probation violation, the lack of an evidentiary hearing in this case in light of the trial court’s comment and the suspect quality of Sparks’s admission constitutes fundamental error.

A probationer may admit a probation violation and waive the probation violation hearing.

Sparks v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-04-23(e)

Our decision did not change established Indiana law that a probationer may admit to a probation violation and waive the right to a probation violation hearing. See Ind. Code § 35- 38-2-3(e).

When a probationer admits a violation and knowingly waives hearing rights, the State need not prove the violation at a hearing.

Johnson v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-04-29(f)

Johnson argues the State was required to prove he violated his community corrections placement, as set forth in Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(f). We disagree. ... As Johnson admitted to the violations alleged, and indicated he understood the waiver of rights in doing so as explained by the trial court, we find no error.

Section 35-38-2-3 does not require a probation revocation hearing to wait until new criminal charges are resolved.

Sidelinger v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-06-10

Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3, wherein due process requirements for probation revocation hearings are codified, see Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 640, contains no requirement that the hearing be held only after resolution of new criminal charges.

A probationer who admits a violation may waive the evidentiary hearing required for probation revocation.

Barnard v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-07-21(e)

When a probationer admits to the violations, the procedural due process safeguards and an evidentiary hearing are not necessary.

Section 35-38-2-3(f) permits hearsay at a probation revocation hearing when the trial court finds it substantially trustworthy.

Andrius Brooks v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-07-29(f)

Therefore, the general rule against hearsay is inapplicable in a probation revocation proceeding and hearsay may be admitted without violating the probationer’s right to confrontation if the trial court finds the hearsay is “substantially trustworthy.”

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits the court to order execution of a suspended sentence after a probation violation without a separate evidentiary hearing on the sanction.

Lemock v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-02-29(h)(3)

The court was not required to hold a separate evidentiary hearing on Lemock’s statutorily-authorized sanction.

Section 35-38-2-3(e) makes a fact-finding hearing unnecessary when a probationer admits the alleged violations in open court after being advised of his rights.

Ellison v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-09-06(e)

After being advised of his rights, Ellison admitted to the alleged violations in open court, which rendered a fact-finding hearing unnecessary. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(e) (2017).

Section 35-38-2-3(d) requires a court hearing when a revocation petition is filed; that requirement also applies to community corrections revocations.

Morgan v. State of Indiana · filed 2017-11-01(d)

As community corrections revocations are analogous to probation revocations, see Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 549, when a petition for revocation is filed, “the court shall conduct a hearing concerning the alleged violation.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(d) (2015).

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to impose a previously suspended sentence after a probation violation, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Ukpong v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-03-23(h)

Indiana Code § 35-38-2-3(h) governs the sanctions the trial court may impose when probation is violated. ... Ukpong has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing his previously suspended sentence on work release.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) gives the court discretion to choose a probation revocation sanction, including execution of all or part of a suspended sentence.

Holsapple v. State of Indiana · filed 2020-05-06(h)

Rather, as in any probation revocation proceeding, the trial court may impose one or more sanctions, including ordering execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

Section 35-38-2-3(f) permits a court to revoke probation for a violation committed before the defendant begins the probationary portion of a sentence.

Ashba v. State · filed 1991-04-29(f)

In the above statues we construe the language “at any time” as permitting the trial court to terminate probation before a defendant has completed serving his sentence or to revoke probation before the defendant enters the probationary phases of his sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3 permits revocation for a violation committed after sentencing, even before the probationary period begins.

Gardner v. State · filed 1997-04-02(g)

In conclusion, Gardner’s probation may be revoked — either because probation may be revoked prospectively or because he was already on probation.

The probationary period begins immediately after sentencing, allowing revocation for a violation committed while the defendant serves the executed portion of the sentence.

Baker v. State · filed 2008-10-15(a)(1)

Baker was initially sentenced on January 3, 2008. That same day he was provided a copy of the written terms and conditions of his probation, which he signed. Six days later he committed criminal battery. This was a violation of the terms and conditions of his probation, and the trial court was well within its discretion and did not err when it revoked Baker’s probation and ordered that he serve the two-year suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits revocation for a violation committed after sentencing, even before the defendant begins actively serving probation.

Ruffin v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-11-13(h)

Thus, Ruffin’s probation was subject to prospective revocation for any violation committed between July 30, 2012, and the expiration of his probation term.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits revocation for a violation committed before the person begins serving probation.

Hardy v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-09-28(h)

Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h) provides that a trial court may revoke probation “[i]f the court finds that the person has violated a condition at any time before termination of the period . . . .” (Emphasis added.) This has been interpreted to mean that probation may be revoked even before it begins.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits a court to execute a suspended sentence after proper revocation procedures and proof of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence; it does not require the court to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

Mitchell v. State · filed 1993-09-07(g)

According to I.C. 35-38-2-3(g), so long as the proper procedures have been followed in conducting the hearing, upon a finding of violation by a preponderance of the evidence, the trial court may order execution of a suspended sentence. ... We therefore decline Mitchell's invitation to insert into the statute a requirement that trial courts consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances when imposing sentence in a probation revocation proceeding, such as is required at the sentencing phase of a criminal prosecution.

Subsection (g)(3) permits a court to order execution of a suspended sentence after a probation violation.

Oswalt v. State · filed 2001-06-04(g)(3)

The trial court properly ordered execution of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. See I.C. § 35-38-2-3(g)(3).

Subsection (g) permits a court to order execution of a suspended sentence after finding a probation violation.

McKnight v. State · filed 2003-04-25(g)

Consequently, we find that the trial court properly ordered McKnight to serve seven years of his previously suspended sentence with five days credit time. See Goonen, 705 N.E.2d at 212; I.C. § 35-38-2-3(g).

Section 35-38-2-3(g)(8) permits a court to order execution of a suspended sentence after a probation violation, but does not permit it to add new terms to the sentence.

Balding v. State · filed 2004-07-22(g)(8)

When a court finds that a person has violated probation, the court may "order execution of the sentence that was suspended at the time of the initial sentencing." Ind.Code § 35-38-2-3(g)(8) (emphasis added). The trial court cannot add new terms to the sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits a court to order execution of a suspended sentence after a probation violation; alternatives to incarceration are discretionary.

Monday v. State · filed 1996-10-04(g)

Under IC 35-88-2-3, the trial court has the discretion to revoke any conditional liberty granted through probation upon a showing of a probation violation, and order incarceration. Consideration and imposition of any alternatives to incarceration is a "matter of grace" left to the discretion of the trial court.

Section 35-38-2-3(g)(3) permits a court that revokes probation to order less than the full suspended sentence to be served, provided the total sentence remains at or above the statutory minimum.

Stephens v. State · filed 2004-12-10(g)(3)

We hold that a trial court has the statutory authority to order executed time following revocation of probation that is less than the length of the sentence originally suspended, so long as, when combined with the executed time previously ordered, the total sentence is not less than the statutory minimum.

Section 35-38-2-3(g)(3) permits a court to order execution of a suspended sentence after revoking probation, but does not require the court to impose the entire suspended term.

Podlusky v. State · filed 2005-12-16(g)(3)

But we in no way construe our Supreme Court's decision in Stephens to mean that the trial court was required to impose the entire suspended sentence.

Upon finding a probation violation, subsection (g)(3) authorizes the court to order execution of all or part of the sentence suspended at initial sentencing.

Cox v. State · filed 2006-07-13(g)(3)

Indiana Code § 35-38-2-3(g)(3) gave the trial court au-. thority to order execution of all or part of Cox's sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing upon finding that Cox had violated a condition of his probation. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Cox to serve his six-year suspended sentence.

After a probation violation, the trial court may order execution of all or part of the previously suspended sentence, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

BEALMEAR v. State · filed 2006-12-15(g)

Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(g), after finding that a person has violated a condition of his probation, the trial court may: (1) continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions; (2) extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period; or (3) order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. ... Under these facts and circumstances, we conclude the trial court acted well within its discretion when it ordered Bealmear to serve his previously suspended four-year sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3 allows a court revoking probation to order execution of all or part of the previously suspended sentence.

Carneal v. State · filed 2007-01-17(g)(3)

Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3 was amended, effective July 1, 2005, to explicitly allow a trial court to order execution of "all or part of" a probationer's suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(g)(3) permits a court to order execution of the entire sentence suspended at initial sentencing after a probation violation.

Milliner v. State · filed 2008-07-29(g)(3)

First, we note that the court had discretion to order execution of the entire sentence suspended at the time of initial sentencing. See Ind.Code § 35-38-2-3(g)(3).

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence after a home detention violation.

Ravonte L. Love v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-02-08(g)

If the court finds a violation of a condition of home detention, it may modify conditions of probation, extend probation for up to one year, or “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g). ... The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Love to serve the remainder of his previously suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits a court that finds a probation violation to order execution of all or part of the previously suspended sentence.

Bishop v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-02-22(g)

If the trial court finds that the person violated a condition of probation, it may order the execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits a court to order execution of the entire suspended sentence after a probation violation, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Skinner v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-02-24(g)

Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the court ordering Skinner to serve the rest of his suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence after a probation violation; that decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Newlin v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-02-27(g)

If a trial court finds that a person has violated his probation before termination of the period, the court may order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g). Here, we find that Newlin’s criminal history and likelihood of reoffending sufficiently support the trial court’s decision to order execution of all 385 days that were suspended at the time of his original sentencing.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits a trial court to order execution of a suspended sentence after finding a probation violation.

Shocke v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-03-06(g)

A trial court may order execution of a suspended sentence upon a finding of a probation violation.

After a probation violation, the court may order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence; multiple violations can support execution of the entire suspended term.

Cottrill v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-03-27(g)

If a trial court finds that a person has violated her probation before termination of the period, the court may order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g). Here, we find that Cottrill’s numerous probation violations and history of doing poorly on probation sufficiently support the trial court’s decision to order execution of all four years that were suspended at the time of her initial sentencing.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits a court to order execution of the entire suspended sentence after a probation violation, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Huskey v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-04-02(g)

Given Huskey‟s criminal history and probation violation, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in ordering him to serve the entire portion or balance of his previously-suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits a court to order execution of a suspended sentence after a probation violation despite a plea agreement’s cap on the initially executed sentence.

Abernathy v. State · filed 2006-08-23(g)

The mere fact that Abernathy had a plea agreement which controlled at the time of initial sentencing in no way modified the trial court's statutory authority under Ind.Code § 85-38-2-3(g)(8) to order execution of a suspended sentence following a probation violation.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) does not require a detailed sentencing statement when a court reinstates part of a suspended sentence after revoking probation.

Berry v. State · filed 2009-04-17(g)

A trial court is not required to issue a detailed sentencing statement when reinstating a portion of an already imposed sentence.

After revoking probation, a court may order execution of all or part of the sentence suspended at initial sentencing.

Williams v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-05-07(g)

Once a trial court decides to revoke probation, it may impose one or more of the following sanctions: (1) continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions; (2) extend the person’s probationary period for not more than one year beyond the original probationary period; (3) order execution or all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g). ... Given Williams’ criminal history and prior violations of probation, the warning he received at sentencing, in addition to Williams’ commission of a new crime, violation of a no contact order, use of alcohol, and curfew violation, we decline to find an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s revocation of his entire suspended sentence.

If a probation violation occurs before probation ends and the revocation petition is filed during the probationary period, the court may order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence.

Wallace v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-05-09(g)(3)

If the court finds that the probationer has violated a condition of her probation at any time before the termination of the probationary period and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, then the court may order execution of the sentence that was suspended.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence when a person violates probation before the probation period ends.

Canfield v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-06-28(g)

If a trial court finds that a person has violated his probation before termination of the period, the court may order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

Section 35-38-2-3 permits a court to execute all or part of a suspended sentence when probation is violated and the revocation petition is filed during the probationary period.

Thomas v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-07-20

Waiver notwithstanding, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Thomas to 546 days for violating his probation. If the trial court finds that a person has violated the terms of his probation before the termination of the period and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, the court may “order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” I.C. § 35-38-2-3. We find that the trial court was acting within its discretion.

When a revocation petition is filed during the probationary period, the court may order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence.

Hosea v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-10-05(g)(3)

When a defendant violates probation “and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period,” a trial court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.”

If a probation condition is violated before probation ends and the revocation petition is filed during the probationary period, the court may order execution of the suspended sentence.

Emry v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-11-16(g)(3)

If the court finds that the probationer has violated a condition of his probation at any time before the termination of the probationary period and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, then the court may order execution of the sentence that had been suspended.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a judge to order execution of up to the entire initial suspended sentence after a probation violation.

Kohues v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-01-04(h)

Indiana law allows judges to order execution of up to the entire initial suspended sentence upon a violation of a condition of probation, and it was not an abuse of the court’s discretion to do so here.

Former subsection (g) allowed a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence after finding a probation violation.

Henderson v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-01-22(g)

This provision permits judges to sentence offenders using any one or any combination of the enumerated options. ... Given the circumstances as set forth above and in the record, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in ordering Henderson to serve his previously suspended sentence of one year.

Upon a probation violation, subsection (g) permits the court to order execution of all or part of the sentence suspended at initial sentencing.

Anthony Paul Banks v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-02-07(g)

If a trial court finds that a person has violated his probation before termination of the period, the court may order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. ... The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Banks to serve his entire previously suspended four-year sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(g)(3) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence after a probation violation.

Burton v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-02-14(g)(3)

A trial court may order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence upon a violation of probation. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g)(3) (2010). ... The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering him to serve the balance of his suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to order execution of all remaining suspended time after a probation violation.

Pruitt v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-03-25(h)(3)

After revoking probation, the trial court may order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence.

When a person violates probation, the trial court may order execution of all or part of the sentence suspended at initial sentencing.

Messer v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-03-26(g)(3)

If a person is found to have violated the terms of his probation, the trial court can “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g)(3).

After a probation violation, the trial court may order execution of all or part of the sentence suspended at initial sentencing.

Chandler v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-05-09(g)(3)

Upon finding a probation violation, the trial court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.”

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to order execution of the entire suspended sentence after a probation violation is established.

Sheese v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-06-21(h)(3)

On such a showing, the trial court may order the execution of the entire sentence that was suspended at the time of the initial hearing. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3); Stephens v. State, 818 N.E.2d 936, 942 (Ind. 2004).

After revoking probation, a court may order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence.

Anderson v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-07-15(h)(3)

If the trial court decides to revoke a defendant’s probation, it may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of the initial sentencing.” I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h)(3). ... We decline Anderson’s invitation to reweigh these matters, and find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to impose as executed time the remainder of the sentence in Cause 6465 and four of the five years of the sentence in Cause 6466, with the terms of imprisonment run consecutively.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) allows a court that finds a probation violation to order execution of all or part of the sentence suspended at initial sentencing.

Horton v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-07-16(h)

If the trial court finds a violation of a condition of probation, the court may impose one of the following sanctions on the person: (1) continue probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions; (2) extend the probationary period for not more than one year beyond the original probationary period; or (3) order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). ... We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Horton to serve his six-year suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence after finding a probation violation before the probation period ends.

Mead v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-07-30(g)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Mead to serve his entire previously suspended five-year sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence when a person violates probation before the probation period ends.

Brandenburg v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-08-20(g)

If a trial court finds that a person has violated his probation before termination of the period, the court may order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g). ... The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Brandenburg to serve the balance of his sentence in the Department of Correction.

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to order execution of a suspended sentence after finding a probation violation.

Small v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-09-03(h)(3)

If the court finds that the probationer has violated a condition of his probation at any time before the termination of the probationary period, then the court may order execution of the sentence that had been suspended. Wilburn v. State, 671 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied; see also Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3). ... Based on the fact that this was his second violation and that he continued to violate probation, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the balance of Small’s four-year previously suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(g)(3) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence after a probation violation.

Couthen v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-09-17(g)(3)

A trial court may order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence upon a violation of probation.

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence when it finds a probation violation before probation ends.

Galvin v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-11-26(h)(3)

If a trial court finds that a person has violated his probation before termination of the period, the court may order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3).

Section 35-38-2-3 gives trial courts discretion to impose the full suspended sentence after a probation violation; that sanction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Kirkwood v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-01-21

Based on Kirkwood’s multiple felonies, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking the entirety of his previously suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court that finds a probation violation to order execution of all or part of the previously suspended sentence.

Johnson v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-01-22(h)(3)

However, Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) allows that, if the court finds that a person has violated a condition of probation, the court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” The court was well within bounds when it revoked five years of Johnson’s previously suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to order execution of the full suspended sentence after a probation violation.

Ramsey II v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-02-07(h)(3)

Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3 provides in relevant part: ... (3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. ... The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Ramsey to 1005 days executed.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a trial court to order a probationer to serve the entire suspended sentence after revoking probation.

Taylor v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-03-21(h)

As Taylor did not satisfy numerous conditions of probation and was arrested for the same crime for which he was on probation, imposition of his entire suspended sentence was not error. See Ind. Code § 35-38- 2-3(h) (the trial court has discretion to impose the entirety of a suspended sentence when probation is revoked).

Subsection (h) permits a court that finds a probation violation to order execution of all or part of the sentence suspended at initial sentencing.

Thomas H. Fuller, III v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-05-22(h)

If a trial court determines that a person has violated a term of probation before termination of the period, the court may order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h) (2012). ... All in all, the court’s decision that Fuller had been extended enough chances is not against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.

After a probation violation, subsection (h) permits a court to order execution of all or part of the previously suspended sentence.

Workman v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-05-30(h)

Once a trial court has concluded that probation has been violated, it may continue the defendant on probation, extend the probationary period for not more than one year beyond the original period, or order all or part of the previously-suspended sentence to be executed. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). ... Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err.

Section 35-38-2-3(g)(3) permits a court that finds a probation violation to order execution of all or part of the sentence originally suspended.

McGee v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-06-30(g)(3)

On finding a defendant violated his probation, the trial court may “order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g)(3).

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to order execution of a previously suspended sentence after finding a probation violation, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Marx v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-07-15(h)(3)

Given the circumstances as set forth above and in the record, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in ordering Marx to serve her previously suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a trial court to order execution of all or part of a previously suspended sentence after a probation violation.

Cash v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-08-22(h)(3)

Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) (2012) authorizes the trial court to order the execution of all or part of the initial sentence that was previously suspended.

Section 35-38-2-3(g)(3) permits a trial court to revoke an entire suspended sentence after finding a probation violation.

Johnson v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-05-25(g)(3)

The trial court acted within its discretion when it ordered Johnson to serve the remainder of his suspended sentences considering Johnson has a lengthy criminal past as both a juvenile and adult and had previously violated probation for another offense. Therefore, we cannot hold it abused that discretion. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g)(3) (trial court may revoke entire suspended sentence when it finds probationer violated probation).

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits a court to order execution of a suspended sentence after a probation violation, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Peak v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-09-30(g)

Given the circumstances as set forth above and in the record, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in ordering Peak to serve his previously suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to order execution of the entire suspended sentence after a probation violation.

Turner v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-10-10(h)(3)

Once a probation violation occurs, the trial court is vested with statutory authority to “[o]rder execution of all . . . of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3).

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court that finds a probation violation to order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence.

McGee v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-10-29(h)

Ind. Code § 35- 38-2-3(h) provides in part that if the court finds that a person has violated a condition of probation, the court may order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. ... Given the circumstances as set forth above and in the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering McGee to serve 365 days of his previously- suspended sentence at the DOC.

Subsection (h) permits a trial court to order execution of the entire suspended sentence after revoking probation.

Taylor v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-12-11(h)

For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Taylor to serve his previously suspended four-year sentence in the Department of Correction.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to order execution of a previously suspended sentence after finding a probation violation.

Haines v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-12-11(h)

Although the court has several alternative sanctions it may impose where it has found that a defendant has violated his probation, one of those sanctions is to order execution of the sentence that was previously suspended.

Upon revoking probation, a court may order execution of all or part of the sentence suspended at initial sentencing.

Vicars-Goings v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-12-18(g)

Upon the revocation of probation, the trial court may: (1) continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions; (2) extend the person’s probationary period for not more than one year beyond the original probationary period; and (3) order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g). ... Because Vicars-Goings was repeatedly allowed to participate in drug treatment programs before his probation was actually revoked, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in the DOC.

Subsection (h) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence after a probation violation, subject to abuse-of-discretion review.

McFadden v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-12-23(h)

Given the circumstances as set forth above and in the record, including that McFadden committed multiple violations, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in ordering McFadden to serve eight years of her previously suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence after a probation violation.

Kinsel v. State of Indiana · filed 2015-01-13(h)(3)

Among the sanctions at the trial court’s disposal is the power to “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3). ... The trial court is afforded a great deal of discretion in probation matters, and we do not believe the trial court abused its discretion here.

Subsection (h) permits a court that finds a probation violation to order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence.

Jones v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-03-05(h)

If the trial court finds that an individual has violated a condition of probation, the court is empowered to “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of the initial sentencing.”

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court that finds a probation violation before probation ends to order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence.

James M.A. Howard v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-03-12(h)(3)

If a trial court finds that a person has violated his probation before termination of the period, the court may order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3).

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court that finds a probation violation to order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence.

Brown v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-03-30(h)

Given the circumstances as set forth above and in the record, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in ordering Brown to serve his previously suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence after a probation violation, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Bailey v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-04-30(h)(3)

Given the circumstances, including that Bailey used methamphetamine within six months after the rules of probation were read and reviewed with him in October 2013, and that he was serving probation in connection with his conviction for possession of methamphetamine, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in ordering him to serve his previously suspended sentence.

Upon finding a probation violation, a court may order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended.

Powers v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-07-27(h)

The trial court had the authority to order Powers to serve the previously-suspended two years, 730 days, but it only required Powers to serve a portion of that sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(j) permits a court to order execution of the entire suspended sentence after finding a probation violation.

Huntington v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-07-27(j)

The imposition of an entire suspended sentence is within the trial court’s discretion.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence after a hearing when a defendant violates probation.

Rich v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-09-24(h)

Rich admitted that he violated his probation by committing new crimes. The trial court was authorized by statute to impose the sanction selected.

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence when a person violates probation before the probationary period ends.

Percifield v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-10-09(h)(3)

If a trial court finds that a person has violated probation before termination of the probationary period, the court may order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. Ind. Code § 35- 38-2-3(h)(3).