Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5

The statute is liberally construed to protect consumers and promote fair sales practices, codifies common-law fraud, and can reach a participant in a fraudulent scheme even without the participant making the misrepresentation.

Schmidt Enterprises, Inc. v. State · filed 1976-09-15(a)(5)

The act enforced in this case “shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its purposes and policies” which include protecting consumers from those who commit deceptive sales acts and encouraging the development of fair consumer sales practices. IC 1971, 24-5-0.5-1 (Burns Code Ed.). This statute codifies the elements of common law fraud. Compare IC 1971, 24-5-0.5-3 (a) (5), supra (trial court’s judgment), and IC 1971, 24-5-0.5-4(a), supra n.4, with Grissom v. Moran (1972), 154 Ind. App. 419, 290 N.E.2d 119. Therefore we may turn to decisions interpreting common law fraud as aids in construing this statute. All who knowingly enter a fraudulent scheme become liable for the harm caused by the scheme — even if their part of the scheme does not entail making fraudulent representations.

The deceptive-practices provisions encompass forward-looking representations, but an incurable deceptive act requires an intentional effort by the supplier to defraud or mislead; accurate supply and timing disclosures did not constitute an incurable deceptive act.

Lesher v. Baltimore Football Club · filed 1986-08-26(a)(4), (a)(10), and 2(7)

Under the deceptive practices act, however, the focus is on the "intent to defraud or mislead." IC 24-5-0.5-2(7) (Emphasis added.) To mislead means to lead astray or into error or to guide wrongly. McCormick Piano & Organ Co., Inc. v. Geiger (1980), Ind.App., 412 N.E.2d 842, 849. Therefore, the deceptive practices act would seem to encompass forward-looking representations.

The IDCSA bars representations that a consumer transaction’s subject is a particular model or quality when it is not, and a deceptive act is actionable as uncured when the supplier does not make a written offer to cure within 30 days after notice; the federal-law exception applies only when the challenged practice is expressly permitted by federal law.

Anderson v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc. · filed 2011-11-03(a)(2)

As to Gulf Stream’s first contention, the statement on the website that 2009 Tourmasters came with a 425 horsepower engine, which, according to the Andersons, induced them to purchase the Tourmaster, was inaccurate, at least with respect to the Andersons’ 2009 Tourmaster. Nor, for the reasons explained above, are we convinced that federal regulations permitted Gulf Stream to designate the Tourmaster as a 2009 model. The reservation of rights also does not help Gulf Stream. It would not be reasonable to construe the statement that Gulf Stream “reserves the right to make changes in prices, colors, materials, components and specifications and discontinue models” to mean that Gulf Stream could, without apprising the consumer, change the size of something so fundamental to the vehicle as the engine, especially in light of the fact that a 425 horsepower engine was the only option listed for 2009 models.

A breach of warranty is not itself a deceptive act under the Act, although a misrepresentation about a warranty may qualify; the court therefore rejected the warranty-based deceptive-act theory.

Castagna v. Newmar Corp. · filed 2018-09-11(3)(a)(8)

The warranty here obligates Newmar to repair any manufacturing defects, but it does not make any representations about the performance or quality of the vehicle.

Section 24-5-0.5-3(a)(1) can cover an implied representation, provided it is made orally, in writing, or by electronic communication, and the Act must be liberally construed to promote its purposes.

Kesling v. Hubler Nissan, Inc. · filed 2012-09-04(a)(1)

There is nothing in the statute, however, to indicate that a representation cannot be implied, so long as it is made orally, in writing, or by electronic communication, and to exclude implied representations would not be consistent with the requirement that the Act be liberally construed and applied to promote its purposes. See Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-1(a). For this reason, we cannot agree with Hubler that Kesling’s claim is viable only if the advertisement explicitly stated that the Eclipse was safe to operate.

The DCSA treats a supplier's representation that a product has characteristics or benefits it lacks, when the supplier knows or should reasonably know that, as a deceptive act, but mere opinion or puffery is not a representation of fact and is not deceptive.

Kesling v. Hubler Nissan, Inc. · filed 2013-10-29(a)(1)

It is a “deceptive act” for a “supplier” like Hubler to make certain “representations as to the subject matter of a consumer transaction”—including, so far as relevant here, that it “has . . . performance, characteristics, . . . uses, or benefits it does not have which the supplier knows or should reasonably know it does not have.” ... Here, each part of “Sporty Car at a Great Value Price” can reasonably be taken only as puffing, akin to “top quality” in Rispens, and not as a representation of any fact. ... Since puffing is merely a statement of opinion, Rispens, 621 N.E.2d at 1082–83, it cannot be a representation of fact—and thus, cannot be “deceptive” under the DCSA.

Section 24-5-0.5-3(a)(14) permits a consumer claim for an unauthorized vehicle repair when the supplier knew or should reasonably have known that the repair was unauthorized, and the claim is not barred merely because the vehicle was sold through a mechanic’s-lien foreclosure before the consumer challenged the lien.

Terry Banks v. Denny Jamison, d/b/a, Automotive Hammerart · filed 2014-07-14(a)(14)

Although we conclude that issue preclusion does not bar Banks’s suit under the DCSA, we do conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Jamison with regard to Banks’s civil claims for theft and criminal conversion. ... However, Banks may proceed on his claims under the DCSA.

The DCSA covers deceptive representations that a service has sponsorship, approval, performance, characteristics, uses, benefits, or a particular standard or quality that it does not have and the supplier knows or should know it lacks.

Consumer Attorney Services, P.A. v. State of Indiana · filed 2016-05-23(b)(1), (2)

However, as noted by the Attorney General, there is a freestanding claim for a violation of the DCSA that is not dependent upon violation of the CSOA. ... Such representations may constitute a “deceptive act” related to a “consumer transaction” as defined by statute if they were intended to convey that the services to be provided had “sponsorship, approval, performance, characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits it does not have which the supplier knows or should reasonably know it does not have” or if the services were “of a particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model, if it is not and if the supplier knows or should reasonably know that it is not.” I.C. § 24-5-0.5-3(b)(1), (2).

Section 24-5-0.5-3(a) broadly prohibits unfair, abusive, or deceptive acts, omissions, or practices in connection with a consumer transaction, and subsection (b)'s listed deceptive acts do not limit that catch-all scope.

Gasbi, LLC d/b/a Michiana Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram Fiat v. Tatiyana Sanders · filed 2019-03-06(3)(a)

Effective July 1, 2014, the Indiana Legislature amended the Consumer Act to add a “catch-all” provision such as that referred to in Lawson. It is now found in subsection (a) of Indiana Code Section 24-5-0.5-3. After the amendment, deceptive acts are broadly defined to include non-disclosures or omissions. Explicitly, subsection (b) provides that, “without limiting the scope of subsection (a),” thirty-seven deceptive acts are described.

For a purchase-price deception, the injury required for a § 24-5-0.5-4 action arises at or after completion of the consumer transaction, not from pre-contract inducement alone.

Domer v. Menard, Inc. · filed 2024-09-03(a)

As shown in the emphasized language above, each of these claims require an injury to Domer: (1) “damage actually suffered,” (2) “suffered pecuniary loss,” or (3) “benefit conferred on [Menards].” IND. CODE § 24-5-0.5-4; WIS. STAT. § 100.18; Sands, 904 N.W.2d at 798. Whether Domer was misled to “patronize” Menards before the contract was formed does not matter. Domer did not suffer an injury necessary to bring a claim until the contract was formed. In other words, Domer did not suffer real damages, a pecuniary loss, or confer a benefit until the completion of the contract, not prior to it. Without the contract there would be no claims; the contract is an indispensable element of each.

The IDCSA provides remedies for deceptive consumer transactions, distinguishes uncured and incurable deceptive acts, and treats intent to defraud or mislead as an element of an incurable act under subsection 2(a)(8).

REINKRAUT v. FCA US LLC · filed 2024-09-05(a)(8)

The IDCSA provides for two kinds of actionable deceptive acts: “uncured” and “incurable” acts.

The IDCSA prohibits a supplier from misrepresenting a product’s characteristics, uses, benefits, or quality when the supplier knows or should reasonably know the representation is false; a breach of warranty alone is not enough.

Smith v. Nexus RVs, LLC · filed 2020-06-19(3)(b)(1)-(2)

The statute prohibits a supplier from representing that a product has performance, characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits it doesn’t have, which the supplier knows or should reasonably know it doesn’t have.

Section 24-5-0.5-6(2) excludes acts or practices expressly permitted by state law from the DCSA.

Michael and Mary Poore, Individually and on Behalf of J.P. v. Indianapolis Public Schools and its Board of Education · filed 2020-09-09(6)(2)

As IPS’s action of providing these specific educational opportunities tailored to J.P.’s abilities are expressly permitted by the statute, the DCSA does not apply.

An Indiana consumer-protection claim requires a false or misleading statement, deceptive advertising, or other unfair or deceptive conduct.

Dzielak v. Whirlpool Corp · filed 2023-09-29(4)

And without any deception associated with the logo’s use on the three Maytag model clothes washers, the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment on those claims.

Section 24-5-0.5-4(c) authorizes the Attorney General to seek injunctive relief and consumer restitution, including enhanced restitution for a knowing violation against a senior consumer, but not parens patriae damages; the broad catch-all in § 3(a) can encompass anticompetitive conduct.

Connecticut v. Sandoz, Inc. · filed 2024-11-12(1)(a), (1)(b), (3)(a), (4)(c)(2)-(3)

By its terms, the IDCPA does not authorize the Attorney General to bring a parens patriae action for damages on behalf of consumers. ... According to the statute, the court may order restitution in cases brought by the Attorney General. Indiana courts have held that restitution is an equitable remedy that differs from damages. ... Given the breadth of the “catch-all provision” of section 3(a), the statute’s remedial purpose, and the requirement that it be “liberally construed,” Indiana’s allegations that the Defendants colluded to restrain competition in violation of the Indiana Antitrust Act do not clearly fall outside section 3(a)’s ambit of an “unfair, abusive, or deceptive act, omission, or practice.”

Section 3(a)’s catch-all provision can encompass anticompetitive conduct when the IDCSA is liberally construed.

Connecticut v. Aurobindo Pharma USA, Inc. · filed 2025-04-25(3)(a)

In the absence of clear authority from Indiana’s highest court demonstrating that Indiana’s consumer protection claim is foreclosed by the statute, I decline to dismiss Indiana’s consumer protection claims.

Section 24-5-0.5-5(b) imposes a two-year limitations period, but fraudulent concealment may toll that period when concealment, misleading conduct, and the plaintiff’s diligence present factual questions.

Cwiakala v. Economy Autos, Ltd. · filed 1984-06-07(b)

While fraudulent concealment does toll the statute of limitations, Indiana law narrowly defines concealment. ... Whether the written odometer statement transferred by Economy Autos to plaintiff is a trick or artifice is a question of fact to be determined by a jury. Similarly, whether the use of the odometer statement did indeed mislead, hinder and prevent inquiry on the part of plaintiff and his attorneys and investigators is also a factual determination. ... Clearly the questions discussed above are not those which can be dealt with properly within the context of summary judgment and this Court will not attempt such a task.

Section 5(b) imposes a two-year limitations period for claims under the Act, but an adequately pleaded ongoing scheme to defraud can toll that period.

HASH v. FIRST FINANCIAL BANCORP · filed 2021-03-08(b)

Mr. Hash’s other argument supporting that his claims aren’t time-barred is more availing: First Financial’s violations of the Act are ongoing and continue to occur into the present because the improper overdraft fees are part of an ongoing scheme to defraud. ... This is enough to plead an ongoing scheme that would toll the two-year statute of limitations.

Under the IDCSA, a claim based on a contract signed more than two years earlier appears time-barred, although later contract changes within two years may support a timely claim.

MARTIN v. AMERIGAS PROPANE, L.P. · filed 2025-01-14(5)(a), (5)(b)

Plaintiffs’ bare-bones allegations are insufficient to plead that AmeriGas engaged in an unconscionable act within the meaning of the IDCSA. ... Plaintiffs’ allegations also face significant statute of limitations issues.

The Act prohibits supplier misrepresentations about a consumer transaction, is liberally construed to protect consumers, requires notice stating the deceptive act and actual damage, and permits actual damages and reasonable attorney fees for a prevailing consumer.

Captain & Co., Inc. v. Stenberg · filed 1987-03-18§§ 24-5-0.5-1, -4(b), -5, -8(a)(1)

This section is to be liberally construed to protect the consumer.

A statement of law is not an actionable deceptive act absent knowledge that it is false, and a real-property transaction is excluded from the Act's damages remedy; the court reversed the award under the Act.

Rainbow Realty Group, Inc. v. Katrina Carter and Quentin Lintner · filed 2019-09-13(3)(a)(8), (4)(a)

We still find their claim to be without merit, and thus reverse the trial court on this claim.

The Act treats deceptive statements inducing a contract as creating a cause of action, with contract invalidation as a remedy, rather than automatically making the contract void or supplying only a defense.

Johnson v. Anderson · filed 1992-05-07(3)(a), (4)(d), (5)(b)

AOK’s statements inducing the contract violated I.C. § 24-5-O.5-3(a), but that statute does not render contracts resulting from such statements void; rather, it creates a cause of action for which one of the remedies is to have a court declare the contract void. I.C. § 24-5-0.5-4(d).

Section 24-5-0.5-4(a) allows a consumer relying on an uncured deceptive act to recover actual damages and reasonable attorney fees, and multiple contract noncompliance violations may collectively establish an uncured deceptive act even when individual omissions caused no prejudice.

Mullis v. Brennan · filed 1999-09-10(a)

Specifically, the lack of detail in the contract was a factor in Mullis’s failure to cure the deficiencies in the room addition. We agree with Mullis that some of the incidents of non-compliance, standing alone, are not sufficient to support a finding of a deceptive act because no prejudice resulted therefrom. However, we find that the combined acts of non-compliance support both the trial court’s findings and its conclusion that Mullis committed a deceptive and uncured act.

The Act makes an uncured or incurable deceptive act actionable and permits, but does not require, a court to void or limit a resulting contract and order restitution.

Imperial Insurance Restoration & Remodeling, Inc. v. Costello · filed 2012-03-30§ 4(a), (d)

Under the DCSA, however, a contract that violates the statute and is a deceptive act is not necessarily void; rather, it creates a cause of action for which one of the remedies is to declare the contract void.

Section 24-5-0.5-4(d) allows the court to void or limit a contract or clause resulting from a deceptive act, leaving that remedy to the trial court rather than making voiding automatic or consumer-controlled.

Paul v. Stone Artisans, Ltd. · filed 2014-11-14(d)

HICA also provides that “the court may void or limit the application of contracts or clauses resulting from deceptive acts . . . .” I.C. § 24-5-0.5-4(d) (emphasis added). ... Thus, the statute leaves it to the trial court to determine whether voiding the contract is an appropriate remedy.

Section 24-5-0.5 treats an intentional deceptive act as incurable and permits a court to void or limit contracts resulting from deceptive acts and order restitution, but does not automatically void every noncompliant contract.

Faye E. Warfield and Keyotta Warfield a/k/a Nicole Warfield v. Jim Dorey d/b/a JRD Construction Services and JRD Enterprises, LLC · filed 2016-05-31(a)(8), (4)(a), (4)(d)

HICA does not include a provision mandating that contracts violating HICA’s requirements be declared void. ... Rather, HICA creates a cause of action for which voiding the contract is one possible remedy. Id. at 729; I.C. § 24-5-0.5-4(d) (“[T]he court may void or limit the application of contracts or clauses resulting from deceptive acts and order restitution to be paid to aggrieved customers.”) (emphasis added). ... Thus, the statute leaves it to the trial court to determine whether voiding the contract is an appropriate remedy. ... Because Dorey was yet to be licensed at the time he solicited the roofing work and failed to apply for the required permit, we conclude that he committed an incurable deceptive act as he intended to mislead Faye that he was a licensed contractor providing work in compliance with the statutory requirements and local ordinances. See I.C. § 24-5-0.5-2(a)(8). ... Therefore, we declare the Contract between Dorey and Faye void.

Section 3(b)(20) makes an FDCPA-violating deceptive act an IDCSA deceptive act, but the IDCSA's private damages remedy does not apply to that category and only the Indiana attorney general may seek an injunction for it.

POOLE v. MED-1 SOLUTIONS, LLC · filed 2020-03-20(b)(20)

However, “[t]his subsection does not apply with respect to a deceptive act described in section 3(b)(20) of this chapter.” Id. Section 3(b)(20) describes acts that violate the FDCPA. Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-3(b)(20). Only the Indiana attorney general can bring an action to enjoin deceptive acts that allegedly violate the FDCPA. Id. § 24-5-0.5-4(c).

For pyramid-scheme cases, the statute’s definition of “supplier” includes a person who contrives, prepares, sets up, operates, publicizes, or promotes a pyramid scheme, even without regular engagement in that business.

Watkins v. Alvey · filed 1990-01-30(3)

In light of the above, we hold that when the circumstances of this case occurred and throughout the trial, the definition of “supplier” under IC 24-5-0.5-2 included a person who contrived, prepared, set up, operated, publicized or promoted a pyramid scheme.

The Act’s definition of “supplier” does not cover a private individual making a one-time sale of a personal automobile, and its two-year limitations period begins when the deceptive act occurs rather than when it is discovered.

A.J.'s Automotive Sales, Inc. v. Freet · filed 2000-03-29(a)(3), (b)

The Freets offer no argument on appeal that Newman is a “supplier” within the meaning of the Deceptive Sales Act. For our part, we cannot conceive of a reasonable interpretation of the statute that would define “supplier” as including a private individual completing a one-time sale of his or her private automobile. We conclude that Newman is not subject to liability under the Deceptive Sales Act and therefore is entitled to summary judgment on claims arising under that Act. ... IC § 24-5-0.5-5(b) of the Deceptive Sales Act provides: “Any action brought under this chapter may not be brought more than two (2) years after the occurrence of the deceptive act.” Because the Deceptive Sales Act has an occurrence statute of limitation, rather than a discovery statute of limitation, the statutory period commences to run at the occurrence of the deceptive act.

Section 24-5-0.5-4(a) allows a consumer to recover damages actually suffered from a home-improvement supplier's deceptive act.

Homer v. Burman · filed 2001-02-09(a)

As a result, Burman Electric committed a deceptive act, and the Homers were entitled to bring an "action for the damages actually suffered...." Inp.Cop® § 24-5-0.5-4(a).

Section 24-5-0.5 permits a senior consumer relying on an uncured or incurable deceptive act to recover treble damages, and an uncured act does not require proof of intent to defraud.

John DeWeese, Sr. and John DeWeese, Jr., Individually and d/b/a John & John Associates, Inc. v. Pribyla · filed 2018-11-14(a)(7), (a)(8), (a)(9), and (i)

The DCSA permits treble damages in some circumstances when the deceptive act is not incurable but, rather, simply uncured. See, e.g., I.C. 24-5-0.5-4(i). An “[u]ncured deceptive act” is an act “with respect to which a consumer who has been damaged by such act has given notice to the supplier” under the DCSA and either “(i) no offer to cure has been made to such consumer within thirty (30) days after such notice; or (ii) the act has not been cured as to such consumer within a reasonable time after the consumer’s acceptance of the offer to cure.” I.C. § 24-5-0.5-2(a)(7). Thus, while “a consumer must show intent to defraud on the part of the supplier of services” in order to show an incurable deceptive act, “[t]he same showing is not required to establish the existence of an uncured act.” ... The DCSA expressly provides that “[a] senior consumer relying upon an uncured or incurable deceptive act . . . may bring an action to recover treble damages . . . .” I.C. § 24-5-0.5-4(i) (emphasis added).

Under the DCSA, both a solicitation and a resulting sale can be consumer transactions, and a deceptive act occurring in each transaction starts a separate two-year limitations period.

State v. Classic Pool & Patio, Inc. · filed 2002-11-06(2), (5)(b)

But a consumer transaction can also occur at the time of a solicitation, and Classic Pool is correct that a consumer transaction occurred when it submitted the allegedly non-conforming contract to the DeMarcos on December 16,1999. See I.C. § 24-5-0.5-2. As a result, claims related to the consumer transaction created by the solicitation are time-barred, but claims related to the consumer transaction created by the sale are not time-barred.

A consumer transaction includes a sale or solicitation to an individual, corporation, school corporation, or other legal entity for primarily charitable purposes.

Liberty Publishing, Inc. v. Carter · filed 2007-06-25(1), (2)

Since then, the legislature has revised the statute replacing “individual” with “person” as defined in subsection (2) above. See ■ IC 24-5-0.5-2(1) (1997). Now, the amended statute states that an entity doing business with either an “individual, corporation, the state of Indiana or its subdivisions or agencies, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, nonprofit corporation, or cooperative or any other legal entity” constitutes a consumer transaction. ... Under the current reading of the statute, a “person” — school corporations and individual businesses — complained that Liberty violated the IDCSA. These complaints empowered the AG to investigate whether Liberty had relevant evidence. Further, we hold that Liberty subjected itself to the AG’s authority to represent and protect the people of Indiana, i.e., beneficiaries of the charitable cause, because the investigation pertained to whether Liberty was falsely representing that its business would use its proceeds for charitable purposes located within Indiana. See IC 24-5-0.5-2(l) (“for purposes that are primarily personal, familial, charitable, agricultural, or household, or a solicitation to supply any of these things-”).

The current Act permits a corporation to qualify as a person and consumer-transaction participant, so Indiana third-party payors may assert claims when they allege consumer damages from deceptive acts.

In Re Bextra & Celebrex Marketing Sales Practices & Product Liability Litigation · filed 2007-07-05(2), (4)

As defendants have not demonstrated that their sale of Celebrex and Bextra to the TPPs for the patients’ personal use does not qualify as a consumer transaction as a matter of law, the Court must give plaintiffs leave to assert claims under the Indiana Act.

Under the IDCSA, a third-party payor may qualify as a consumer even when it pays for products used by members or beneficiaries, and alleged misleading pricing may constitute a deceptive act involving a specific price advantage.

Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 20 Welfare & Benefit Fund v. CVS Health Corp. · filed 2016-11-01

The Court finds that TPPs can qualify as consumers under the IDCSA. ... The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that CVS’s alleged conduct could fall under the “specific price advantage” category.

The DCSA excludes policies or contracts of insurance from the definition of a consumer transaction.

Pickens v. New York Life Insurance Company · filed 2019-09-27(a)(1)

The DCSA, however, defines a “consumer transaction” as a “sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or other disposition of an item of personal property, real property, or an intangible, except securities and policies or contracts of insurance issued by corporations authorized to transact an insurance business under the laws of the state of Indiana . . . .” Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). The facts alleged in the Complaint relate exclusively to the Defendants’ conduct under the Certificate of Insurance, an insurance policy. Consequently, as “policies or contracts of insurance” are explicitly excluded from the DCSA, the Plaintiff cannot hold the Defendants liable under the DCSA.

The DCSA does not treat a contractor as a supplier for an alleged deceptive act in a business-to-business arrangement when the homeowner was not a party, because that arrangement is not a consumer transaction.

Castle Construction Corp. v. Leibengood-Chavez · filed 2026-05-29(2)(a)(3)(A), (2)(1)

A “consumer transaction” is “a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or other disposition of an item of personal property, real property, a service, or an intangible . . . to a person for purposes that are primarily personal, familial, charitable, agricultural, or household.” I.C. § 24-5-0.5-2(1). The alleged deceptive act—Castle misrepresenting itself as the contractor on the permit—was part of a commercial arrangement between two contractors. Homeowner was not a party to that arrangement. That the arrangement ultimately affected Homeowner’s residence does not transform a business-to-business transaction into a consumer transaction. Under the DCSA, the pertinent inquiry is the character of the transaction, not simply that a consumer may suffer harm as a result of the transaction.

A consumer transaction under the DCSA can exchange app access for personal data; it need not involve money.

State of Indiana v. TikTok Inc. · filed 2024-09-30(2)(a)(1), (3)(a)

the statutory language does not require such an exchange.

The Deceptive Consumer Sales Act can cover health care providers and their services, but a claim alleging that medical care was below the required standard remains subject to the Medical Malpractice Act's prerequisites even when pleaded as a deceptive act.

Bremer v. Community Hospitals of Indianapolis, Inc. · filed 1991-12-30

Upon doing so, it is apparent that the Estate's claim, on its face, satisfies the statutory requirements for proceeding under either the Deceptive Sales Act or the Malpractice Act: Community Hospital is a "supplier" of consumer services as provided by IC 24-5-0.5-2 and a "health care provider" as defined by IC 16-9.5-1-1. Paul was a "consumer" of Community Hospital's services as provided by the Deceptive Sales Act and also a "patient" as defined by IC 16-9.5-1-1. The alleged conduct of Community Hospital met the requirement of a "deceptive act" under IC 24-5-0.5-3 and the definition of "malpractice" as provided by the Malpractice Act. ... As such, the trial court quite correctly concluded that the Estate's claim was subject to the Malpractice Act because it was "based on the nature and standard of health care provided by the defendant and ... therefore derivative of a medical malpractice claim." Record at 28(a). The trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint.

The Act requires a consumer alleging an uncured deceptive act to give the supplier timely written notice fully describing the deceptive act and actual damage before suing, and a general price guess is not the repair-cost estimate contemplated by the Act.

Lehman v. Shroyer · filed 1999-12-30(5)(a); (3)(a)(12)

Failing to properly notify Shroyer of the alleged deceptive act under the requirements of I.C. 24-5-0.5-5(a) precludes Lehman from bringing a successful claim under the Deceptive Consumer Sales Act. ... The notice requirement of the act gives the supplier a reasonable opportunity to remedy the consequences of an alleged deceptive act about which the consumer complains. To fulfill this purpose, “a literal application of the notice provisions” is required. ... However, these circumstances do not represent an “estimate” as contemplated by the Deceptive Consumer Sales Act. ... Shroyer’s. husband was only making a general guess about the price of the work, and Lehman requested more expensive items later.

The Act treats a deceptive act as uncured when, after notice, the supplier fails to offer or complete a timely cure, and it covers representations about a product's characteristics or benefits that the supplier knows or should reasonably know are false.

Perry v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc. · filed 2004-08-312(6), 2(7), 5(a), 8(a)

Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 24-5-0.5-8(a), a deceptive act occurs when a supplier, ie., Mark's RV in this case, represents either orally or in writing that the subject matter of a consumer transaction, e.; the Motor Home, "has sponsorship, approval, performance; characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits it does not have which the supplier knows or should reasonably know it does not have." See also Ind.Code § 24-5-0.5-2(a)(8)(A) ("Supplier means ... a seller, lessor, assignor, or other person who regularly engages in or solicits consumer transactions, including a manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer, whether or not he deals directly with the consumer"). This section is to be liberally construed to protect the consumer. See Ind.Code § +24-5-0.5-1. ... This evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Mark's RV engaged in an uncured deceptive act by adopting the representations made in the Brochure. Moreover, this evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Mark's RV knew or should have known that the representations made in the Brochure were false.

Section 5(a) bars an action for a deceptive act unless the act is incurable or the consumer timely gives the supplier written notice describing the act and actual damages.

Tennant v. Peaks & Valleys, Inc., and Toni Staples (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-07-06(5)(a)

Indiana Code section 24-5-0.5-5(a) states clearly that an action cannot be brought under HICA unless the deceptive act is incurable (meaning that it was done by the real property improvement supplier as part of a scheme, artifice, or device with intent to defraud or mislead) or unless the consumer bringing the action gives written notice to the real property improvement supplier within a certain timeframe that states the nature of the alleged deceptive act and the actual damage suffered from it.

A consumer must provide the supplier timely written notice describing the alleged deceptive act and actual damages before pursuing a claim under the Act; Lee failed to satisfy that notice requirement.

Lee v. Countryside Auto Sales, LLC (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-08-20(5)(a)

Here, Lee failed to provide such notice in a timely fashion.

An incurable deceptive-act claim under the IDCSA requires intent to defraud or mislead; without pre-suit notice of an uncured act, a claimant may proceed only on an incurable-act theory.

GIBSON v. EAGLE FAMILY FOODS GROUP LLC · filed 2023-08-29(2)(a)(8)

all require a showing of an intent to defraud or mislead. ... Gibson has not alleged that she provided pre-suit notice of uncured deceptive acts, so she may only assert a claim for incurable deceptive acts.

A home improvement supplier's violation is actionable by the consumer under § 24-5-0.5-4, and an attorney-fee award under that provision includes appellate attorney fees.

Benge v. Miller · filed 2006-10-244

Finally, a home improvement supplier who violates the Act commits a deceptive act that is both actionable by a consumer under Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-4 and subject to the remedies and penalties under Ind.Code § 24-5-0.5. ... As a final matter, Miller argues that she is entitled to appellate attorney fees pursuant to IC § 34-24-3-1 and IC § 24-5-0.5-4, the same statutes that entitled her to attorney fees at trial. ... Under both statutes, an award of attorney fees includes appellate attorney fees. Brown, 776 N.E.2d at 398 (attorney fees pursuant to IC § 34-24-3-1) and Mullis, 716 N.E.2d at 67 (attorney fees pursuant to IC § 24-5-0.5-4). We therefore remand this case to the trial court for a determination of appellate attorney fees generated in Miller's defense of the award of damages and attorney fees under the Home Improvement Fraud Act and the Home Improvement Contracts Act.

Section 24-5-0.5-4(a) makes a prevailing party’s attorney-fee award discretionary and excludes certain real-property consumer transactions, including construction-defect claims.

Thunanber v. Uponor, Inc. · filed 2012-08-14(a)

It is not clear whether this provision is applicable to the facts of this case, as the statute expressly does not permit attorney’s fees for cases involving consumer transactions in real property, including a claim or action involving a construction defect. In any event, without determining whether this case involves a “consumer transaction in real property” or the sale of goods or services, or some combination, the award of attorney’s fees is discretionary.

The DCSA broadly prohibits unfair, abusive, or deceptive acts connected with consumer transactions, includes CSOA and MRPFA violations within its definition of deceptive acts, and provides no attorney or law-firm exemption to extend to those claims.

Consumer Attorney Services, P.A., The McCann Law Group LLP, and Brenda L. McCann, Individually and as Owner and/or Offic · filed 2017-03-21(a), (b)(28), (b)(35)

The DCSA is broader in scope, barring an “unfair, abusive, or deceptive act, omission, or practice in connection with a consumer transaction,” Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-3(a); however, “deceptive act” is further defined to specifically include CSOA and MRPFA violations, Ind. Code §§ 24-5-0.5-3(b)(28), (35). Neither the HLPA nor the DCSA contains an express attorney exemption of any kind, but CAS still sought exemption, on the grounds that the underlying alleged violation of the HLPA and the DCSA falls within the scope of the MRPFA and the CSOA. However, since we find no available law firm exemption under either of the principal statutes, there is no exemption to extend to these ancillary claims.

Section 24-5-0.5-4 permits an award of reasonable attorney fees as a remedy for a deceptive act under the Home Improvement Contracts Act.

Correct Roofing Inc. v. Vasquez · filed 2024-10-184

One of those remedies is an award of reasonable attorney fees. Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-4. Correct Roofing admitted that it was a real property improvement supplier, and its contract with Vasquez did not list an email address. That failure made it more difficult for Vasquez to contact Correct Roofing about the faulty repairs. Vasquez’s attorney submitted an affidavit attesting that his firm had charged Vasquez $6,240.00 in fees related to the prosecution of his case, and Correct Roofing did not designate any evidence challenging that amount. Therefore, Vasquez was also entitled to summary judgment on his claim under the Indiana Home Improvement Contract Act and an award of attorney fees in the unchallenged amount designated.

A HICA violation is a deceptive act under the DCSA, but it does not automatically void the contract; a consumer seeking DCSA remedies must show the violation was uncured or incurable.

Bermes v. G.K. Cambray & Company, Inc., Gregory K. Cambray d/b/a Cambray & Associates, Inc., and Lauri Massoth · filed 2014-03-31(4)(a)

If a home improvement supplier fails to provide a contract, or provides a non-conforming contract, it is considered “to be a deceptive act and affords the aggrieved consumer the remedies available to victims . . . under the DCSA.” ... A violation of the HICA, although considered a deceptive act, does not automatically render the contract void; “rather, it creates a cause of action for which one of the remedies is to declare the contract void.” ... “[T]o establish entitlement to those remedies, the consumer must show that the deceptive act was either uncured—meaning that notice was given and the deceptive act was not cured—or incurable—meaning that the supplier acted with an intent to defraud or mislead the consumer.” ... Therefore, we conclude that G.K. Cambray is not liable for a deceptive act resulting from a HICA violation.

A home-improvement supplier’s failure to provide a compliant written contract is a deceptive act actionable under § 24-5-0.5-4, but the consumer must show that the act was uncured or incurable to obtain the chapter’s remedies and penalties.

Walsh v. Chris Sweeney Construction, Inc. · filed 2012-01-25(4), (5)

Thus, HICA provides that a supplier’s failure to give the consumer a written contract is a deceptive act, and brings that deceptive act under the purview of the remedies and penalties of Indiana Code chapter 24-5-0.5.

A claim under the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act based on alleged misrepresentations must satisfy Rule 9(b), and inadequate allegations of the advertisements and their content warrant dismissal with leave to amend.

In re Nexus 6P Prods. Liab. Litig. · filed 2018-03-05(4)(a)

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Google's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Beheler's IDCSA claim with leave to amend to specify the advertisements and the content of the advertisements that Plaintiff Beheler relied upon in purchasing his Nexus 6P.

The Act bars specified supplier misrepresentations about goods and requires a deceptive act for a claim; the court held that the alleged radiator omissions did not plausibly state an IDCSA claim.

Krautkramer v. Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A., Inc. · filed 2020-09-213

Under the IDSCA, a supplier of goods may not represent, among other things, that its goods have certain “performance, characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits” that the goods do not have, and which the supplier “knows or should reasonably know” that the goods do not possess. Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-3. Similarly, a supplier may not represent that its goods have “a particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model” when the supplier “knows or should reasonably know” otherwise. Id. ... A claim under the IDSCA must allege that a defendant engaged in one or more deceptive acts. Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-4(a). ... Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ claim for violation of the IDCSA. Because the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to allow the Court to infer a material omission occurred, the Court does not address whether Yamaha had a duty to disclose to Plaintiffs or whether Plaintiffs satisfied the IDSCA’s notice requirement.

The Act covers an entity’s purchase of goods for its own primarily personal use, prohibits unfair, abusive, or deceptive conduct connected to a consumer transaction, permits an action by a person relying on an uncured or incurable deceptive act, and applies a two-year limitations period measured from each occurrence of deceptive conduct.

IUE-CWA Local 901 v. Spark Energy, LLC · filed 2020-02-182(a)(1), 2(a)(2), 3(a), 4, 5(b)

“Any action brought under [the IDCSA] may not be brought more than two (2) years after the occurrence of the deceptive act.” Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-5(b). Under the occurrence rule, the IDCSA’s two-year statute of limitations is “triggered by the date of each occurrence” of a deceptive act. State v. Classic Pool & Patio, Inc., 777 N.E.2d 1162, 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). ... Given the breadth of the language in subsection (a) of Indiana Code Section 24-5-0.5-3, which includes “an unfair, abusive, or deceptive act, omission, or practice in connection with a consumer transaction” the Court finds that the Complaint alleges that Defendant engaged in such conduct within two years of the filing of the Complaint. ... The Act defines a consumer transaction as “a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or other disposition of an item of personal property, real property, a service, or an intangible, except securities and policies or contracts of insurance . . . with or without an extension of credit, to a person for purposes that are primarily personal, familial, charitable, agricultural, or household, or a solicitation to supply any of these things.” Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-2(a)(1). “’Person’ means an individual, corporation, the state of Indiana or its subdivisions or agencies, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, nonprofit corporation or organization, or cooperative or any other legal entity.” Id. § 24-5-0.5-2(a)(2). ... It stands to reason that if Plaintiff, a corporation, is considered a “person” under the Act, it can make purchases of items and services that are primarily for that corporation’s personal use. Here, the clear implication of the Complaint is that the purchase of natural gas was for that corporation’s personal use. Plaintiff did not sell the natural gas to other consumers. Rather, it was using the natural gas as a source of energy like any other consumer would. Accordingly, the Court does not dismiss the IDSCA claim on grounds that it does not involve a consumer transaction. ... “A person relying upon an uncured or incurable deceptive act may bring an action” under the IDSCA. Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-4. ... For purposes of pleading, Plaintiff has sufficiently provided the time, manner, and content of the purported misrepresentation that it relied upon. Whether Plaintiff will be able to prove such reliance is not a question to be answered at this stage of the litigation.

For an incurable deceptive-act claim under the IDCSA, the plaintiff must plead an intentional deceptive act and reliance on it to the plaintiff’s detriment; a bare warranty breach is insufficient.

Shea v. General Motors LLC · filed 2021-10-14(2)(a)(8), (3)(a), and (4)(a)

The IDCSA prohibits the use of deceptive acts in connection with a consumer transaction. Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-3(a). The owners allege that GM committed incurable deceptive acts [ECF 1 ¶ 222]. An “[i]ncurable deceptive act means a deceptive act done by a supplier as part of a scheme, artifice, or device with intent to defraud or mislead.” Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-2(a)(8). A mine-run breach of warranty claim isn’t enough. See Smith, 468 F. Supp.3d at 1026 (citing Kesling v. Hubler Nissan, Inc., 997 N.E.2d 327, 332-33 (Ind. 2013)). An intent to defraud or mislead is a required element of an incurable deceptive act. See McKinney v. State, 693 N.E.2d 65, 68 (Ind. 1998). The heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) applies to these claims. See Young v. Harbor Motor Works, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111909, 17 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 18, 2008). ... The IDCSA only confers a cause of action on persons “relying upon an . . . incurable deceptive act[.]” Ind. Code. § 24-5-0.5-4(a) (emphasis added); see also Young, 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 111909 at 19 (“Because [the plaintiff] has not identified any deceptive act engaged in specifically by [the defendant], he has failed to met [sic] the factual particularity requirement of Rule 9(b).”); Jones v. Bridgeport Educ., Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86204, 10 (N.D. Ind. June 5, 2017) (dismissing IDCSA claim because the plaintiff didn’t state any facts to show that “she expressly relied, to her detriment, on any statements or representations made by [the defendant’s] phone solicitors”); Lyons v. Leatt Corp., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152015, 10 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 10, 2015) (dismissing IDCSA claim because the complaint only provided generalized statements about where representations were made and how the plaintiff relied upon them). Though argued by the parties, whether GM had knowledge of the alleged oil consumption defect at the time of sale is then beside the point. GM must have intended to deceive these owners and done so based on representations that these owners in fact relied on to their detriment. This complaint insufficiently advances such a claim.

The IDCSA prohibits suppliers from unfair, abusive, or deceptive acts in consumer transactions, covers debt collectors and debt collection, and expressly includes FDCPA violations among its prohibited acts.

Odneal v. Midwest Recovery Systems LLC · filed 2020-04-242, 3(a), 3(b)(20)

As noted above, Mr. Odneal has also brought a state law claim under the IDCSA which prohibits a “supplier” from committing an “unfair, abusive, or deceptive act, omission, or practice in connection with a consumer transaction.” Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-3(a). “Supplier” and “consumer transaction” are defined to include debt collectors and debt collection. Id. at § 24-5-0.5-2. The statutory list of prohibited acts expressly includes violations of the FDCPA. Id. at § 24-5-0.5-3(b)(20). Therefore, because Odneal has stated a claim for violation of the FDCPA, he has also stated a claim for violation of the IDCSA.

The IDCSA includes a debt collector within its definition of supplier and defines debt collector coterminously with the FDCPA, so a claimant who cannot establish that status under the FDCPA likewise cannot establish it under the IDCSA.

Wagoner v. NPAS Inc · filed 2020-04-27(a)(3)(B), (a)(13)

The IDCSA includes a “debt collector” as such a supplier and defines “debt collector” coterminously with the FDCPA. Ind. Code §§ 24-5-0.5-2(a)(3)(B), (a)(13); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Having not established NPAS a debt collector under the FDCPA, she likewise cannot do so under the IDCSA.

A transaction to purchase a rental property for the purpose of generating investment income is primarily commercial, not a consumer transaction, and is therefore not covered by the IDCSA.

MCLESKEY v. MORRIS INVEST, LLC · filed 2020-06-18(a)(1)

The IDCSA prohibits specified deceptive acts "in connection with a consumer transaction." Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-3. To be a "consumer transaction," the transaction must be for "purposes that are primarily personal, familial, charitable, agricultural, or household, or a solicitation to supply any of these things." Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-2(a)(1). ... Here, Plaintiffs allege that they wanted "to invest in 'turnkey' rental properties generating immediate income," dkt. 36 ¶¶ 25, 34, 39, so they bought the Rental Property to make money. That is primarily a commercial transaction, not a consumer transaction, and therefore is not covered by the IDCSA.

The IDCSA requires consumer notice and an unprovided cure for an uncured deceptive act, while an incurable deceptive act is one done as part of a supplier's scheme, artifice, or device intended to defraud or mislead.

Pansiera v. The Home City Ice Company · filed 2020-06-29(2)(6), (2)(7), and (5)(a)

The IDCSA “provides for two kinds of actionable deceptive acts: ‘uncured’ deceptive acts and ‘incurable’ deceptive acts.” ... Therefore, in order to adequately state a claim under the IDCSA “there must either be compliance with the notice requirements coupled with proof that the act is ‘uncured’ or proof that the act is ‘incurable.’” ... An “uncured” deceptive act is a deceptive act to which a consumer has given notice to the supplier (pursuant to I. C. § 24-5-0.5-5(a)) and either the supplier does not make an offer to cure within thirty days or the deceptive act has not been cured within a reasonable time after the acceptance of the offer to cure. ... A deceptive act is “incurable” if it is “done by a supplier as part of a scheme, artifice, or device with intent to defraud or mislead.” ... In order to plead an uncured deceptive act, the Plaintiff was required to give notice to Defendant that states “fully the nature of the alleged deceptive act and the actual damage suffered therefrom.” ... Because Pansiera did not comply with the IDCSA’s mandated notice provision, his claim for an “uncured” deceptive act fails as a matter of law. ... Instead, all that is required is that Plaintiff must allege is that Home City Ice sold the ice bags as “part of a scheme, artifice, or device with intent to defraud or mislead.” ... The Court finds that the allegations in the Complaint sufficiently capture the “who, what, where, when, and how” of the alleged fraud perpetrated by Home City Ice, meeting Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard. Thus, Plaintiff adequately pleads an incurable deceptive act by Defendant in violation of the IDCSA.

Under § 24-5-0.5, an uncured deceptive-act claim requires consumer notice and an opportunity to cure, while an incurable deceptive-act claim requires a scheme, artifice, or device intended to defraud or mislead.

IN RE METFORMIN MARKETING AND SALES PRACTICES LITIGATION · filed 2022-03-30(a)(7)(A)-(B), (a)

The IDCSA is intended to be liberally construed and applied to promote its purposes of (1) simplifying and modernizing the law governing deceptive and unconscionable sales practices; (2) protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive and unconscionable sales acts; and (3) encourage the development of fair consumer sales practices. ... Claims under this law can arise under (1) uncured deceptive acts, which do not require a showing of an intent to defraud or mislead; and (2) incurable deceptive acts, which require such a showing. ... To succeed on a claim for an “uncured deceptive act,” the consumer must allege that they gave notice to the supplier and either no offer to cure was made within thirty days after notice or the act was not cured within a reasonable time after the consumer’s acceptance of an offer to cure. ... As this Court has already determined that the Consumer Plaintiffs lack standing under the FAC, and there are no allegations that the TPPs sent any IDSCA demand letters to Defendants, the Court finds that MSPRC cannot sustain an “uncured deceptive acts” claim under the IDSCA. ... As for MSPRC’s claim for an “incurable deceptive act” under the IDSCA, the Court finds that MSPRC has not alleged any “scheme, artifice, or device with intent to defraud or mislead.” ... the Court has already determined that such allegations are insufficient to constitute knowledge of the NDMA contamination, let alone an intent to defraud. The Court therefore dismisses MSPRC’s IDSCA claim.

An uncured deceptive act requires notice to the supplier but no intent to defraud, while an incurable deceptive act requires intent to defraud or mislead but no notice.

O'Flynn v. PHH Mortage Corporation · filed 2023-09-28(a)(7), (a)(8)

A claim based on an “uncured” deceptive act does not include an intent to defraud element but requires notice to the supplier, whereas an “incurable” deceptive act has no notice prerequisite but requires the showing of an intent to defraud or mislead.

The IDCSA prohibits suppliers from unfair, abusive, or deceptive acts in consumer transactions and requires a consumer seeking relief to allege an uncured or incurable deception; an incurable act includes a scheme intended to defraud or mislead.

Barnett v. The Kroger Company · filed 2024-05-083(a), 4(a), 2(a)(8)

The IDCSA prohibits any “supplier” from committing an “unfair, abusive, or deceptive act, omission, or practice in connection with a consumer transaction.” Id. § 24-5-0.5-3(a). But to bring an action under the IDCSA, a consumer must allege that the deception is “uncured or incurable.” Id. § 24-5-0.5-4(a). A deceptive act is incurable (the only basis by which Plaintiff Hoffman seeks to proceed with this claim, (see Doc. 34, #475–78)) if it is undertaken by a supplier “as part of a scheme, artifice, or device with intent to defraud or mislead.” Id. § 24-5-0.5-2(a)(8). ... The Court finds that the Plaintiff Hoffman has plausibly alleged (both under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and the IDCSA) that the Grocery Stores fraudulently misrepresented the nature of their product. ... But for present purposes the allegations are specific enough to meet Rule 9’s heightened pleading standard and support the plausibility of the IDCSA claim. Plaintiff Hoffman’s IDCSA claim can proceed.

Section 24-5-0.5 prohibits deceptive acts or practices in consumer transactions and requires an uncured-deceptive-act claimant to describe the actual damage and deceptive act so the supplier has an opportunity to correct the problem.

Williams v. Thor Motor Coach Inc · filed 2024-10-175(a)

Plaintiff seeks to add a claim for violation of Indiana’s Deceptive Consumer Sales Act (IDCSA), Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5, which prohibits deceptive acts or practices in connections with consumer transactions. ... “To bring a claim for an uncured deceptive act under the IDCSA, a plaintiff must provide ‘not only a complete description of the actual damage suffered, but also a description of the alleged deceptive act . . . so that the supplier has an opportunity to correct the problem.’” ... Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under the IDCSA in their proposed amended complaint.

The IDCSA distinguishes uncured and incurable deceptive acts; an incurable deceptive act requires intent to defraud or mislead.

REINKRAUT v. FCA US LLC · filed 2025-06-29(2)(a)(8)

The IDCSA provides for two kinds of actionable deceptive acts: “uncured” and “incurable” acts. ... An incurable act is done “as part of a scheme, artifice, or device with intent to defraud or mislead.” Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-2(a)(8). “Intent to defraud or mislead is thus clearly an element of an incurable deceptive act.” ... In the TAC, while Linda and John Kotos point to promotional materials they viewed that they allege are deceptive, they have failed to sufficiently plead that FCA acted with intent to defraud in promulgating these materials.

A consumer transaction requires the buyer's purpose to be primarily personal, familial, charitable, agricultural, or household, so purchasing rental property for investment income does not qualify.

LEJ MANAGEMENT, LLC v. MORRIS INVEST, LLC · filed 2020-08-28(2)(a)(1)

Neither party has presented any caselaw directly bearing on that question, and thus the Court resorts to looking at the plain language of the statute to answer it. The Deceptive Consumer Sales Act plainly states that for a transaction to qualify as a "consumer transaction," the buyer's purpose must be personal, familial, charitable, agricultural, or household. Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-2(a)(1). LEJ Management's motivation for purchasing the property, as pleaded in his own complaint, was to rent the property and collect the rent as investment income. (Filing No. | at 1.) Because investment is not one of the categories enumerated in the Deceptive Consumer Sales Act, the transaction at issue here does not qualify as a "consumer transaction.” LEJ Management has not stated a claim under the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act, and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss this claim is granted. This claim is dismissed with prejudice.

The IDCSA applies only to transactions primarily for personal, familial, charitable, agricultural, or household purposes, so purchases of investment property to generate rental income are not consumer transactions under the Act.

DL3 PROPERTIES, LLC IN1801 v. MORRIS INVEST, LLC · filed 2020-09-28(a)(1)

The IDCSA prohibits unfair, abusive, or deceptive acts, omissions, or practices "in connection with a consumer transaction." Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-3. The act defines a "consumer transaction" as "a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or other disposition of an item of personal property, real property, a service, or an intangible . . . to a person for purposes that are primarily personal, familial, charitable, agricultural, or household." Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-2(a)(1). ... The sales of investment property at issue here do not constitute consumer transactions, because the purchases were for primarily commercial purposes—not "purposes that are primarily personal, familial, charitable, agricultural, or household." Id. ... In short, the purchases here are simply not consumer transactions under the IDCSA; therefore, the Act does not apply to these transactions.

The statute covers deceptive acts connected with consumer transactions, but a purchase made primarily for commercial investment purposes is not a consumer transaction.

GALVESTON, LLC v. MORRIS INVEST, LLC · filed 2020-09-29(2)(a)(1), (3)

The IDCSA prohibits unfair, abusive, or deceptive acts, omissions, or practices "in connection with a consumer transaction." Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-3. The act defines a "consumer transaction" as "a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or other disposition of an item of personal property, real property, a service, or an intangible . . . to a person for purposes that are primarily personal, familial, charitable, agricultural, or household." Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-2(a)(1). The sales of investment property at issue here do not constitute consumer transactions, because the purchases were for primarily commercial purposes—not "purposes that are primarily personal, familial, charitable, agricultural, or household." Id. ... In short, the purchases here are simply not consumer transactions under the IDCSA; therefore, the Act does not apply to these transactions.

Section 3(a) applies to both implicit and explicit misrepresentations, including representations that are unfair, abusive, or deceptive when material to a consumer's decision to pay.

OUTZEN v. KAPSCH TRAFFICCOM USA, INC. · filed 2021-03-10(a)

And as for any deficiency in the IDCSA claim relying on an "implication" that a 1st Toll Notice was sent, Indiana Code section 24-5-0.5-3(a) clearly applies to "both implicit and explicit misrepresentations." (Emphasis added). And these representations—whether implicit or explicit—were unfair, abusive, and deceptive when Outzen's reasonable interpretation of the Notice was material to her decision to pay the additional fee.

The IDCSA requires more than a mine-run warranty breach to establish a deceptive act, and its written-notice requirement is liberally construed so the notice need not state the alleged act with absolute precision.

Smith v. Nexus RVs, LLC · filed 2021-03-313(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 5

A breach of warranty alone isn’t enough to constitute a deceptive act. ... Nothing within the statute’s plain language or the gloss of cases suggests that a warranty breach alone suffices, and such a view would extend the Indiana General Assembly’s declaration of what is “unfair, abusive, or deceptive” beyond its intent. ... A prohibited act may include “both implicit and explicit misrepresentations,” ... The statute requires more. ... A misrepresentation about a warranty may prove deceptive, ... but not a mine-run breach of warranty. ... The IDCSA, based on such an act, permits suit when the consumer gives notice in writing to the supplier that “state[s] fully the nature of the alleged deceptive act and the actual damage suffered therefrom.” ... The statute “demands liberal construction,” and this liberality has been adopted in assessing a notice’s sufficiency. ... Though the statute requires a full statement of the alleged deceptive act, the notice doesn’t need to provide that statement with “absolute precision.”

Section 24-5-0.5-3 does not treat a bare warranty breach as an unfair, abusive, or deceptive act; deceptive liability requires additional conduct such as a qualifying misrepresentation.

Litsinger v. Forest River Inc · filed 2021-04-30(3)(a)-(b)

A breach of warranty alone isn’t enough to constitute a deceptive act. See McKinney v. State, 693 N.E.2d 65, 73 (Ind. 1998); Castagna v. Newmar Corp., 340 F. Supp.3d 728, 741 (N.D. Ind. 2018). Nothing within the statute’s plain language or the gloss of cases suggests that a warranty breach alone suffices, and such a view would extend the Indiana General Assembly’s declaration of what is “unfair, abusive, or deceptive” beyond its intent. Ind. Code §§ 24-5-0.5-3(a), (b).

Section 4(a) permits damages only for a person who relied on an uncured or incurable deceptive act.

CRUM v. SN SERVICING CORPORATION · filed 2021-08-104(a)

Only a "person relying upon an uncured or incurable deceptive act may bring an action for the damages" under the IDCSA. Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-4(a) (emphasis added). Accordingly, an IDCSA claimant must show that he relied on the alleged deception. ... In other words, although SN Servicing's collecting conduct could be considered "deceptive" in the sense that its representations tended to mislead, Crum was not deceived. He never believed the representations or acted upon a belief in the truth of the representations. Thus, there is insufficient evidence that Crum relied on SN Servicing's deceptive acts. SN Servicing is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the IDCSA claim.

Section 24-5-0.5-4(a) requires a consumer to rely on a deceptive act and suffer actual damages to establish an actionable injury.

Union Savings Bank v. Spencer · filed 2024-10-07(a)

The Indiana Supreme Court has interpreted Indiana Code section 24-5-0.5-4(a) to require both reliance on the deception and actual damages. ... Thus, in order to have suffered an injury sufficient to grant standing to sue, the claimant must have suffered actual damages.

The Act broadly prohibits unfair, abusive, or deceptive consumer-transaction acts, includes a non-exclusive list of violations, and reaches a seller's knowing or reasonably knowable deceptive representations about a product's characteristics or quality.

Housley v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc. · filed 2021-10-07(3)(a), (3)(b), (3)(b)(1), (3)(b)(2), and (1)

That leaves the IDCSA claim. The IDCSA prohibits “unfair, abusive, or deceptive” acts in a consumer transaction. Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-3(a). The IDCSA contains a non-exclusive list of some forty violative acts. Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-3(b); see Gasbi, LLC v. Sanders, 120 N.E.3d 614, 619-20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Though non-exclusive and liberally construed, see Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-1, the statute’s protections have been glossed only for acts that are “truly unfair, abusive, or deceptive.” Litsinger v. Forest River, Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83190, 40 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 30, 2021). ... The Housleys say Thor (and its dealer) represented the recreational vehicle was new when in fact it had excessive rust [ECF 1 ¶¶ 19, 29]. ... Demonstrable known rust reasonably supports an IDCSA claim when Thor otherwise said the vehicle was “new.” ... The key measure then is what the statute says—Thor’s prior or capable knowledge. See Ind. Code §§ 24-5-0.5-3(b)(1), (b)(2).

The IDCSA requires a consumer transaction involving a deceptive act, with an uncured act requiring notice and no timely cure and an incurable act requiring intent to defraud or mislead.

PROSSER v. CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA), N.A. · filed 2021-12-21

The IDCSA provides for two kinds of actionable deceptive acts: 'uncured' deceptive acts and 'incurable' deceptive acts." ... "Therefore, an IDCSA claim founded on an incurable deceptive act includes the element of "intent to defraud or mislead" while a claim based on an uncured deceptive act lacks such an intent-to-defraud element." ... "Prosser makes no allegations in his Amended Complaint regarding conduct by the Capital One Defendants in connection with a consumer transaction or deceptive act that would support his claims under the IDCSA. See Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-3(a). The Court rejects Prosser's unsupported allegations of misappropriation and does not find that he adequately described any "uncured deceptive acts" by the Capital One Defendants to support a violation of the IDCSA. Id.

The IDCSA prohibits unfair or deceptive acts, omissions, or practices connected to a consumer transaction, including implicit or explicit misrepresentations made before, during, or after it; Indiana courts apply Rule 9(b) to such claims.

Negron v. Ascension Health · filed 2025-09-23

The IDCSA prohibits unfair or deceptive acts, omissions, or practices in connection with a consumer transaction, including implicit and explicit misrepresentations that occur before, during, or after the transaction.Reger v. Arizona RV Centers, LLC, 515 F. Supp. 3d 915, 938 (N.D. Ind. 2021). ... Indiana courts apply Rule 9(b) pleading standards to IDCSA claims. Williams v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc., 2024 WL 4524292, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 17, 2024). Even so, the Court finds the pleadings sufficient to state an IDCSA claim. ... These allegations satisfy Rule 9(b) standards for an IDCSA claim. See e.g., Moore v. Soc. Coaching-Credit Repair, LLC, 2024 WL 1929431, at *3 (N.D. Ind. May 1, 2024) (finding IDCSA pleadings sufficient). The Court will deny Ascension’s motion on this Count XVIII.

The IDCSA permits a third-party payor to pursue a private claim without proving first-party reliance or a direct purchase from the supplier, if the claimed damages arise from the supplier’s provision of qualifying goods.

American Federation of State v. Cephalon, Inc. · filed 2011-03-23(a)

The Court finds that contrary to Defendant’s contention, the IDCSA does not require a direct transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant involving the sale of goods primarily for personal, family, charitable, agricultural, or household purposes. To the contrary, it requires only that the plaintiffs damages arise from defendant’s provision of such goods.

The statute's consumer-transaction definition does not require a direct sale between the plaintiff and defendant; a third-party payor or insurer can qualify as a consumer when its damages arise from the defendant's provision of goods for its members or insureds.

In re HIV Antitrust Litigation · filed 2022-03-08(2)(a)(1)

The Court finds that contrary to Defendant's contention, the IDCSA does not require a direct transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant involving the sale of goods primarily for personal, family, charitable, agricultural, or household purposes. To the contrary, it requires only that the plaintiff's damages arise from defendant's provision of such goods. Plainly stated, there is no mandate under the IDCSA that the plaintiff must be the consumer who purchased the goods primarily for personal purposes. Plaintiff is a valid consumer for purposes of the IDCSA, as its use of Actiq, through its payment for prescriptions of its members and beneficiaries, fits squarely within the ordinary meaning of the term "consume."

The Act treats certain omissions about a product’s performance as actionable deceptive practices and generally requires suit within two years, with possible tolling for active concealment.

Himan v. Thor Industries, Inc. · filed 2022-03-08(3), (5)(b)

The IDCSA requires that an individual bring an action for a deceptive act or practice within two years of the time that deceptive act or practice occurred. See Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-5(b). While that does not leave room for application of the discovery rule, Indiana recognizes that the IDCSA’s two-year limitations period can be tolled in instances where a defendant has engaged in active concealment, which the Plaintiffs argue occurred here but the Defendants dispute. ... There is no missing in Mr. Himan’s pleadings that the failure to disclose the axle defect to him either online, at local RV dealerships, or at RV trade shows, despite their knowledge of the defect, led him to bring his omission based IDCSA claim. (DE 1 ¶ 18); Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-3 (recognizing omissions about product’s performance to be actionable under IDCSA). ... The Court thus finds that Mr. Himan’s pleadings related to his omission-based IDCSA claim satisfy the heightened Rule 9(b) standard and that his IDSCA claim should not be dismissed.

Under the IDCSA, uncured deceptive acts do not require intent to defraud or mislead, while incurable deceptive acts do; advertising puffery is not actionable.

Tinnermon v. REV Recreation Group, Inc. · filed 2023-02-03(7) & (8)

Under the IDCSA, Plaintiffs’ claims can be categorized as (1) uncured deceptive acts (which do not require a showing of an intent to defraud or mislead); and (2) incurable deceptive acts (which require such a showing). Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-2(7) & (8). ... The Court agrees with REV on both arguments. Statements in sales brochures that constitute “mere puffery” are not actionable under the IDCSA. See Kesling v. Hubler Nissan Inc.,997 N.E.2d. 327, 333 (Ind. 2013). ... Here, the language that Plaintiffs complain of in the sales brochure is that the 2017 Holiday Rambler is suitable for a “rambling weekend” or a “cross-country holiday adventure.” This is nothing more than salesmanship or “meaningless sales patter” and not actionable under the IDCSA.

A claim under the IDCSA that is grounded in fraud must plead the alleged deceptive scheme with particularity, including the who, what, where, when, and how.

Gordon v. Finch · filed 2023-07-10

However, regardless of whether Plaintiff’s purchase from Defendants was for agricultural use within the meaning of the IDCSA, he must plead fraud with the requisite particularity as to this claim. ... Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to acknowledge or correct defects with the nucs, and that the deception was part of a scheme to defraud but does not explain how the alleged failure to correct rises to a scheme to defraud by identifying the who, what, where, when, and how of the alleged scheme.

A consumer may sue under the Act only after relying to the consumer’s detriment on a deceptive act and suffering actual injury; a class representative and each class member must satisfy that injury requirement, although statutory damages remain available when actual damages are small or difficult to ascertain.

Hoosier Contractors, LLC v. Gardner · filed 2023-07-19(a), (b)

For Gardner to show injury under the deceptive consumer sales act, he needed to show that he relied to his detriment on a deceptive act by Hoosier: “A person relying upon an uncured or incurable deceptive act may bring an action for the damages actually suffered as a consumer as a result of the deceptive act or five hundred dollars ($500), whichever is greater.” I.C. § 24-5-0.5-4(a) (emphasis added). ... Relevant here, subsection 4(b), which governs class actions, requires the named class representative—Gardner—to be “damaged” by the deceptive act: ... Thus, the Act requires that every class member must suffer damages derived from actual injuries.

The IDCSA requires a consumer to give the supplier written notice before suing unless the deceptive act is incurable, and defines an incurable act as one done as part of a scheme, artifice, or device with intent to defraud or mislead.

Barnett v. The Kroger Company · filed 2023-09-11§ 24-5-0.5-5; § 24-5-0.5-2(8)

But a plaintiff advancing an IDCSA claim must first show one of the following: (1) the (allegedly) deceptive act is “incurable”; or (2) certain notice requirements are met. ... The IDCSA requires “the consumer bringing the action” to provide that notice “in writing to the supplier.” Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-5. Hoffman did not give that notice. ... That lack of notice means that, to have a viable IDCSA claim, Hoffman must instead meet the second potential prerequisite: that the deceptive act is “incurable.” Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-2(8). Under the statute, a deceptive act is incurable when “done by a supplier as part of a scheme, artifice, or device with intent to defraud or mislead.” Id. ... Not only is the failure to plead such knowledge a pleading defect, it is also a substantive defect under Indiana law. The IDCSA requires that the deceptive act be done “with intent to defraud or mislead.” Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-2(8); McKinney, 693 N.E.2d at 67–68. When the fraud is an omission, showing intent to defraud would necessarily seem to entail knowledge.

Section 4(a) permits a consumer relying on an uncured or incurable deceptive act to recover actual damages suffered as a result of the act or $500, so the deceptive act must be causally connected to the consumer's harm through reliance.

Hughes v. Apple, Inc. · filed 2024-03-15(a)

Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-4(a) (“A person relying upon an uncured or incurable deceptive act may bring an action for the damages actually suffered as a consumer as a result of the deceptive act or five hundred dollars.”). None of the plaintiffs allege that they saw the “stalker-proof” statements and relied on them.

The Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act requires a plaintiff seeking damages to allege facts sufficiently showing a loss, injury, or damages; merely alleging that personal information has value does not suffice to establish a loss.

Hubbard v. Google LLC · filed 2024-07-01

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the consumer-protection statutes of 14 states when they appropriated Plaintiffs’ information without parental consent. Under each statute in question, a plaintiff may recover damages only after experiencing a loss, injury or damages. ... In the absence of such facts, the Court must dismiss Plaintiffs’ consumer-protection claims for failure to sufficiently allege that Plaintiffs suffered a loss.

Section 4(a) requires a claimant relying on an uncured or incurable deceptive act to have suffered consumer injury, and for this claim the injury arose only when the purchase contract was completed.

Domer v. Menard, Inc. · filed 2024-09-03(a)

Domer did not suffer an injury necessary to bring a claim until the contract was formed.

Section 24-5-0.5-4(a) requires detrimental reliance on an uncured or incurable deceptive act for a DCSA damages claim.

MCAFEE v. DRAFTKINGS, INC. · filed 2025-02-07(a)

The DCSA allows a "person relying upon an uncured or incurable deceptive act" to bring an action for damages. ... In short, the DCSA "requires consumers to rely on the deceptive act and suffer injury as a result—known as detrimental reliance." ... This Court therefore applies the Indiana Supreme Court's holding that detrimental reliance is required for DCSA claims. ... Since Mr. McAfee admits that he has not pleaded detrimental reliance, his DCSA claims must be dismissed.

Section 4(a) permits recovery of actual damages or $500, whichever is greater, and for willful violations, three times actual damages or $1,000, whichever is greater, but does not authorize punitive damages.

O'FLYNN v. PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION · filed 2024-10-23(a)

In any event, punitive damages are not recoverable under the FDCPA or the IDCSA. See Saccameno v. U.S. Bank Nat'l. Ass'n, 943 F.3d 1071, 1081 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting that only plaintiff's claims under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act – and not her claims under the FDCPA or RESPA – could result in punitive damages); Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-4(a) (IDCSA allowing recovery of "damages actually suffered" or $500, whichever is greater, and three times the actual damages or $1,000, whichever is greater, for willful violations). The Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' punitive damages request and STRIKES paragraph H of the Prayer for Relief in the Second Amended Complaint.

The IDCSA prohibits suppliers from making specified deceptive statements, including knowingly or negligently false representations about a product’s characteristics or quality, and permits a relying consumer to recover actual or statutory damages.

Callantine v. 4E Brands North America LLC · filed 2024-11-273(a), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), and 4(a)

The IDCSA punishes certain deceptive statements from suppliers of consumer products, including statements describing a product’s characteristics or quality that the supplier knows or should know are false. See Ind. Code §§ 24-5-0.5-3(a), (b)(1), (b)(2). A consumer who relies on such a deceptive statement can sue for the greater of actual damages or $500 in statutory damages (if the deception was willful, the remedy is the greater of treble damages or $1,000). See Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-4(a).

Section 3(b)(1)(10) treats misrepresentations about a consumer transaction’s delivery date as deceptive business practices that can support liability under the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act.

Weiskopf v. Tiny Cocoons, Inc. · filed 2024-12-03(b)(1)(10)

Unlike with common law fraud, the misrepresentations as to delivery date are deceptive business practices and satisfy an element of the cause of action for a violation of the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act. Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-3(b)(1)(10). Accordingly, Plaintiffs have proved that Tiny Cocoons has violated the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act.

Section 24-5-0.5-3 prohibits suppliers from committing unfair, abusive, or deceptive acts in connection with a consumer transaction, and an IDCSA plaintiff must show that the alleged deceptive act was committed with intent to defraud or mislead.

Smith v. Santander Consumer USA Inc. d/b/a Chrysler Capital · filed 2025-11-04-3

The IDCSA prohibits suppliers from “commit[ting] an unfair, abusive, or deceptive act, omission, or practice in connection with a consumer transaction.” Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-3. “[I]n order to prevail on [a] IDCSA claim, [the plaintiff] must show that the alleged deceptive act was committed with intent to defraud or mislead.” James v. S. Univ., LLC, No. 3:16-CV-855 JD, 2018 WL 11448005, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 13, 2018); see also Perry v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 814 N.E.2d 634, 647 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). The Complaint alleges that Defendant failed to provide documentation in the form requested by Plaintiff, but does not identify any false statement about Defendant’s services. To the extent that Plaintiff is intending to bring a claim for violation of the IDCSA, his Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

The IDCSA permits a consumer to seek damages for an incurable deceptive act, which requires intent to defraud or mislead and reliance on the alleged deception.

Angus v. Flagstar Bank, FSB · filed 2025-03-27(2)(a)(8), (4)(a)

The IDCSA allows a consumer to seek damages where a “supplier” (here, Flagstar) commits an “incurable deceptive act.” Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-4(a). An “incurable deceptive act” is “a deceptive act done by a supplier as part of a scheme, artifice, or device with intent to defraud or mislead.” Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-2(a)(8). A claim under the IDCSA requires, among other things, (1) intent to defraud and (2) reliance on the alleged deception. See Shea v. Gen. Motors LLC, 567 F.Supp.3d 1011, 1024 (N.D. Ind. 2021) (“An intent to defraud or mislead is a required element of an incurable deceptive act.”); Crum v. SN Serv. Corp., No. 19-cv-02045, 2021 WL 3514153, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 10, 2021) (“[A]n IDCSA claimant must show that he relied on the alleged deception.”). Burdick does not plausibly allege either element.

The IDCSA prohibits unfair, abusive, or deceptive acts in consumer transactions, treats its enumerated deceptive acts as non-exhaustive, and distinguishes uncured acts requiring notice from incurable acts requiring intent to defraud or mislead.

Greene v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc. · filed 2025-03-28(2)(7), (2)(8), (3)(a), (3)(b), (3)(b)(1)-(2), (3)(10)

As to the IDCSA claim, Thor argues it must be dismissed because breaches of warranty or contract cannot support a IDCSA claim. Under IDCSA, a “supplier may not commit an unfair, abusive, or deceptive act, omission, or practice in connection with a consumer transaction.” Ind. Code 24-5-0.5-3(a). IDCSA then lists over forty acts that are deemed “deceptive,” however those enumerated acts are non-exhaustive. Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-3(b). There are two kinds of actionable deceptive acts. The first are uncured deceptive acts, which requires notice to the supplier but does not require a showing of an intent to defraud or mislead. Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-2(7). There are also incurable deceptive acts, which do not require notice but require a showing of an intent to defraud or mislead. Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-2(8). ... Deceptive acts under IDCSA include such representations that a subject of a consumer transaction “has sponsorship, approval, performance, characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits it does not have which the supplier knows or should reasonably know it does not have” or “is of a particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model, if it is not and if the supplier knows or should reasonably know that it is not.” Ind. Code §§ 24-5-0.5-3(b)(1)-(2). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Greene, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Thor committed an unfair or deceptive act by misrepresenting the inverter failure at the time of the sale through its authorized dealer, and knew or should have known that the inverter had issues before selling the RV to Greene, particularly when Greene has presented evidence that Thor informed Greene of the inverter issues immediately after Greene purchased the RV.

The Act prohibits suppliers from unfair, abusive, or deceptive acts in consumer transactions and requires a person to qualify as a supplier—such as by regularly engaging in or soliciting consumer transactions—for individual liability.

Weiskopf v. Tiny Cocoons, Inc. · filed 2025-08-28(a)(3)(A); 3(a)

The Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act provides that “a supplier may not commit an unfair, abusive, or deceptive act, omission, or practice in connection with a consumer transaction.” Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-3(a). Plaintiffs argue that Liu and Baer are liable as suppliers within the meaning of the Act. The Act defines a supplier as “a seller . . . or other person who regularly engages in or solicits consumer transactions.” Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-2(a)(3)(A). ... Although the Court has found that these statements were violations of the Act by Tiny Cocoons [DE 100], Plaintiffs have failed to show that Liu or Baer were suppliers within the meaning of the Act because they have not shown that Liu and Baer were acting individually. ... Summary Judgment on the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act claim is not granted against Baer or Liu individually.

Section 24-5-0.5-5 requires a consumer pursuing a curable deceptive-act claim to give the supplier written notice; constructive notice from other consumers is insufficient, so without actual written notice the consumer may proceed only on an incurable deceptive-act theory.

Jasper v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. · filed 2011-07-085

Claims under the DCSA may be brought for an incurable deceptive act or once the consumer bringing the action “give[s] notice in writing to the supplier.” Id. at § 24-5-0.5-5. Jasper does not allege that she gave written notice to Abbott about beetles in her formula, only that Abbott should have been put on notice when it received complaints several months before from other consumers. Constructive notice, however, is insufficient; the notice must come from the consumer bringing the action.