Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3

Section 35-38-2-3(h) gives a trial court discretion to impose a probation revocation sanction without giving weight to mitigating factors.

Manvilla v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-03-16(h)

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to give weight to the mitigating factors Manvilla raised.

Section 35-38-2-3 does not require a trial court to consider mitigating factors when imposing sanctions after revoking probation.

Villegas-Solache v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-06-11

A trial court is not required to consider mitigating factors when imposing sanctions for probation revocations.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) does not require a trial court to explain its reasons for the sentence it imposes after a probation violation.

Jones v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-07-14(h)

Second, the trial court is not obligated to explain its reasons for imposing sentence pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(h).

Section 35-38-2-3 does not authorize a trial court to impose concurrent sentences when revoking probation.

Marvel v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-10-08(h)

First, we do not agree with Marvel’s assertion that INDIANA CODE § 35-38-2-3 should be read to include authority for a trial court to impose concurrent sentencing. Such a reading is incompatible with the plain language of this statute, and we will not interpret it beyond its plain language.

Section 35-38-2-3 does not specify how or whether to award credit time while a probation revocation petition is pending.

Jenkins v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-08-22

The statute governing probation revocation actions is silent regarding how or whether to award credit time for time a defendant spends in confinement or otherwise while awaiting final resolution of a revocation petition.

Section 35-38-2-3 does not require the court to choose the least restrictive sanction when a probationer violates a condition before probation ends.

Camplin v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-12-07

However, while the statute controlling dispositions of juvenile delinquents requires the court to place an offender in “the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available,” Ind. Code § 31-37-18-6, the statute controlling probation revocations includes no such restriction. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3 (containing no restriction on the court’s authority if probationer violates condition of probation prior to termination of probation).

Section 35-38-2-3(h) leaves revocation to the trial court’s discretion even when a probation violation is proven.

May v. State of Indiana · filed 2016-07-29(h)

Even in the face of a probation violation, the trial court may nonetheless exercise its discretion in deciding whether to revoke probation.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) authorizes a trial court to revoke probation and order an executed sentence for a violation committed at any time during the probationary period.

Dixon v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-12-23(h)

A trial court has statutory authority to revoke a defendant’s probation and order an executed sentence if a defendant violates the conditions of his probation at any time during the probationary period. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h).

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to continue probation after a violation and toll it during incarceration.

Woodard v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-04-09(h)

And although there is no express statutory authority permitting the tolling of a sentence, by its very nature, a person is not on probation while they are incarcerated and the trial court still possessed the authority to continue Woodard on probation under Cause 242 following his release from incarceration.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) does not treat transportation costs for required counseling as a financial obligation imposed by a probation condition.

Martin v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-08-27(g)

The condition that Martin attend those sessions does not impose a “financial obligation” as contemplated by the statute. Transportation is an ancillary expense commonly assumed by probationers.

Subsection (a)(1) requires the alleged probation violation to have occurred during the probationary period.

Murphy v. State of Indiana · filed 2018-10-31(a)(1)

This second petition did not comply with the requirements of subsection (a)(1) because it alleged that Murphy had violated a condition of probation on June 28, 2017, which was after Murphy’s probationary period had already ended.

Section 35-38-2-3(a)(1) permits revocation for a violation committed during the probationary period; executing part of a suspended sentence after an earlier revocation does not end probation when the remaining suspended sentence continues on probation.

Goble v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-11-13(a)(1)

A person’s probation may be revoked if “the person has violated a condition of probation during the probationary period.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(a)(1). ... As a practical matter, because his original sentence was never modified, the balance of his suspended sentence would certainly remain upon completion of his executed sentence. Having examined both sentencing statements and the totality of the circumstances presented, we believe that the clear intent was that Goble remain on probation with regard to the balance of his suspended sentence, and thus the January 2018 alleged violations occurred during a probationary period.1 Accordingly, the trial court had statutory authority to revoke Goble’s probation.

A new offense supports probation revocation under this subsection only if it occurred during the probationary period; an arrest date alone does not establish when the offense occurred.

Anderson v. State of Indiana · filed 2020-01-30(a)(1)

Here, the dates of alleged offenses control, and a date of arrest, without more, is not sufficient to show that the new offenses were committed during the probationary period.

Section 35-38-2-3(a) does not limit who may file a petition to revoke probation.

Smith v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-11-25(a)

The revocation statute imposes no limitation on who has authority to file the petition.

Subsection (f) gives a probationer the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; a court may consider hearsay at a revocation hearing if it is substantially trustworthy.

Morissette v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-12-21(f)

Therefore, the trial court may consider hearsay evidence at a probation revocation hearing only if the court finds the hearsay to be substantially trustworthy. ... Accordingly, we conclude that Officer Parkinson’s additional testimony regarding Morissette’s confinement of Martinez was substantially trustworthy, and the admission of any hearsay statements contained therein did not constitute error, fundamental or otherwise.

Section 35-38-2-3(d) entitles a probationer held more than fifteen days without a violation hearing to bail or release on recognizance, not dismissal of the alleged violation.

Hammann v. State of Indiana · filed 2023-05-11(d)

Similarly, under Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(d), a probationer is not entitled to dismissal of the alleged probation violation if he is held longer than fifteen days without a fact-finding hearing, admittance to bail, or release on recognizance. The probationer would merely be entitled to admittance to bail or release on his own recognizance.

Subsection (e) requires both an admission to a probation violation and a request to waive the violation hearing before the progressive sanctions schedule applies.

Depalma v. State of Indiana · filed 2025-04-17(e)

This subsection unambiguously requires two conditions to be met before a trial court must follow the schedule of progressive probation violation sanctions. First, the defendant must “admit to a violation.” Id. Second, the petitioner must “request[] to waive the right to a probation violation hearing.” Id.