Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to revoke probation and order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence after finding a probation violation.

Pearson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-10-29(h)

Further, it was within the trial court’s discretion to revoke Pearson’s probation and order her to serve part of her previously suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence after revoking probation for a violation.

McCool v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-01-12(h)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced McCool to 180 days executed, after finding that he violated the terms of his probation by committing a new criminal offense.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court that finds a probation violation to order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence; repeated violations in less restrictive placements can support ordering the entire balance served.

Roberts v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-01-29(h)

Under the Indiana Code, once a trial court has found that a person has violated a condition of probation within the probationary period, the trial court shall: ... (3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. ... Further, as the trial court stated when it ordered Roberts to serve the remainder of his suspended sentence in the DOC, Roberts had previously been placed in less restrictive placements and had continued to violate the rules of those placements.

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to order execution of the entire suspended sentence after a probation violation; repeated violations can support that sanction.

Blankenship v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-03-11(h)(3)

Once the court has concluded that probation has been violated, it may continue the defendant on probation, extend the probationary period for not more than one year beyond the original period, or order all or part of the previously suspended sentence to be executed. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3). ... This was Blankenship’s second probation violation in this cause, and the trial court had ample basis for determining that imposition of the entire suspended sentence was proper since its prior attempt at a lesser sanction had proven wholly unsuccessful.

After finding a probation violation, a court may order execution of all or part of the sentence suspended at initial sentencing.

Jackson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-04-26(h)(3)

In light of the leniency the trial court afforded Jackson in the past and her criminal history, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered her to serve 730 days of her suspended sentence.

After a probation violation, subsection (h) permits the court to order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence, subject to abuse of discretion review.

Steusloff v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-07-28(h)

Once a trial court has determined that a condition of probation has been violated, the trial court may impose one of the following: ... (3) order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. ... There is ample basis for the trial court’s decision to order Steusloff to serve his previously suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence after a probation violation.

Haralson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-09-21(h)

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. ... Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Haralson to three years of his previously suspended sentence for violating his probation a second time in this case.

After finding a probation violation, a trial court may order the defendant to serve the entire sentence suspended at initial sentencing.

Kays v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-09-22(h)

The trial court, however, ordered Kays to serve his previously suspended sentence based on his violation of probation, and it did not add any extra time to that previously suspended sentence. The trial court’s action did not constitute an abuse of its discretion. See I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h) (providing that once a trial court has determined that a condition of probation has been violated, the trial court may order execution of all of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing).

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a trial court that finds a probation violation to order execution of the entire sentence originally suspended.

Martin v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-10-18(h)(3)

We first note that the trial court was statutorily authorized to require that Martin execute “all . . . of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h)(3).

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to order execution of a suspended sentence after a probation violation when the revocation petition is filed during the probationary period.

Kraig Von Reese Brown v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-11-14(h)

“If the court finds the defendant has violated a condition of his probation at any time before the termination of the probationary period, and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, then the court may order execution of the sentence that had been suspended.” Gosha, 873 N.E.2d at 664; see also Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). ... The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Brown to serve the entirety of his four-year suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3 permits a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence after revoking probation, but the order cannot exceed the number of days originally suspended.

Epperly v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-11-23

However, as Epperly and the State agree, Epperly’s original sentencing order suspended only 780 days to probation. Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to correct its order regarding the number of days that remained on Epperly’s sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3 permits a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence after revoking probation, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Vidal v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-12-09(h)(3)

Upon revocation of probation, a trial court may impose one or more of the following sanctions: ... (3) order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. ... Under these facts and circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court’s decision ordering Vidal to serve his previously suspended sentence was an abuse of the trial court’s considerable discretion in such matters.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) allows a trial court to order execution of part of a suspended sentence after revoking probation for repeated violations.

Payton v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-12-19(h)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing four years of the previously-suspended sentence as a result of these violations.

After a probation violation, Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence.

Starks v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-01-26(h)

On finding a defendant violated his probation, the trial court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h) (2016). ... The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Starks to serve 730 days of his suspended sentence following the revocation of his probation.

Subsection (h) permits a court to order execution of the remaining suspended sentence after a probation violation, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Schuler v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-02-27(h)

But Schuler does not demonstrate how that bears on the trial court’s discretion to sentence him under Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(h). ... We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Schuler to serve the remainder of his previously suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence after a probation violation.

Bradtmueller v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-05-05(h)

On finding a defendant violated her probation, the trial court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h) (2016). ... We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion when, after exhibiting patience and lenience with Bradtmueller for over one year of probation, it ordered her to serve eight years executed and two years suspended to probation.

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence after a probation violation.

Matherly v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-05-24(h)(3)

On finding a defendant violated his probation, the trial court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3). ... Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, Matherly could help his wife if he were not in the DOC, we cannot find an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s order for him to serve the remainder of his sentence in the DOC as Matherly had squandered opportunities given to him by the trial court.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence after a probation violation, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Greenwell v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-06-21(h)

Given the circumstances as set forth above and in the record, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in ordering Greenwell to serve eight years of his previously suspended ten-year sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to order execution of a suspended sentence after a probation violation when the revocation petition is filed during the probationary period.

Nesbit v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-07-03(h)

“If the court finds the defendant has violated a condition of his probation at any time before the termination of the probationary period, and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, then the court may order execution of the sentence that had been suspended.” Gosha v. State, 873 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); see also Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). ... We are unconvinced. We note, as did the trial court, that Nesbit has received extensive treatment for his substance abuse, but nevertheless continues to abuse drugs and commit new crimes.

Subsection (h) permits a court to order execution of a suspended sentence when it finds a probation violation and the petition to revoke was filed within the probationary period.

Maloney v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-07-03(h)

“If the court finds the defendant has violated a condition of his probation at any time before the termination of the probationary period, and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, then the court may order execution of the sentence that had been suspended.” Gosha v. State, 873 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); see also Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). ... The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to order execution of the entire suspended sentence when the defendant violates probation and the petition to revoke is filed during the probationary period.

Dupree M. Steward v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-02-16(h)

The trial court’s decision to impose the entirety of Steward’s previously suspended sentence as a sanction for his probation violations was amply supported by the record.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to order execution of the entire suspended sentence after a probation violation, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Craylon D. Bell v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-05-23(h)

Given Bell’s extensive criminal history and numerous probation violations, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Bell to serve his entire suspended sentence in the DOC for violating his probation merely four months after being released from the DOC.

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to order execution of the full suspended sentence after a probation violation, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Collier v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-08-10(h)(3)

Given these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Collier to serve his previously-suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to revoke probation and order all or part of a previously suspended sentence to be executed.

Johnson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-08-16(h)(3)

The court may also revoke the defendant’s probation and order all or part of the previously suspended sentence to be executed. I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h)(3). ... The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Johnson to serve his entire thirty-month sentence, including the previously suspended term, in the DOC.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to order execution of a suspended sentence after a probation violation; repeated violations can justify ordering the defendant to serve the remainder.

Moore v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-12-04(h)

Given Moore’s near-constant violation of the conditions of Drug Treatment Court, we find this argument unconvincing. The trial court’s decision to order Moore to serve the remainder of his previously suspended sentences was far from an abuse of discretion.

Section 35-38-2-3 permits a court to revoke an entire suspended sentence after a probation violation when the probationer’s conduct and history show that compliance is unlikely.

Barlow v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-12-05

Moreover, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked the entirety of Barlow’s previously suspended sentence. Barlow was out on probation for just six days before he refused to submit to an oral drug screen. That fact, along with Barlow’s history of probation violations in other causes, demonstrated that Barlow was unlikely to comply with the terms and conditions of his probation.

After a probation violation, subsection (h) permits execution of the entire suspended sentence, including when the violation is a prolonged failure to report.

Jerome Harris a/k/a Lawrence Brown v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-12-21(h)

After finding a defendant violated his probation, the trial court may continue the probation, extend the term of probation, or “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). ... We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to give Brown a second opportunity to flee the jurisdiction rather than serve the sentence imposed.

Upon finding a probation violation, a court may order execution of all or part of the sentence suspended at initial sentencing.

Newbern v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-01-17(h)(3)

Having found that Newbern violated his probation, the trial court was within its discretion to revoke probation and impose the balance of Newbern’s previously suspended sentence. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3) (providing that a trial court may order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing upon finding that a defendant has violated his probation).

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to order execution of a suspended sentence after a probation violation, even when other sanctions are available.

Gregg v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-01-24(h)

Notwithstanding the fact that the trial court had other options besides ordering full execution of Gregg’s sentences, we cannot say that the trial court acted outside its discretion when it ordered him to serve the remainder of his previously suspended sentences in the DOC.

After a probation violation is found, the trial court may order the defendant to serve all or part of the suspended sentence.

Novak v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-01-24(h)(3)

A trial court may revoke a defendant’s probation for violation of a single condition of his probation, e.g., Pierce v. State, 44 N.E.3d 752, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), and, once a violation is found, the trial court may execute all or part of a suspended sentence, I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h)(3).

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits a court to order all of a previously suspended sentence to be served after a probation violation.

Nowak v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-03-27(g)

A trial court may (1) continue the defendant on probation; (2) extend the probationary period for not more than one year beyond the original period; or (3) order all or part of a previously-suspended sentence to be executed. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g). ... The trial court’s decision was not clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Nowak’s probation and imposing the entire previously-suspended two-sentence.

After a probation violation, the trial court may order execution of all or part of the sentence suspended at initial sentencing.

Cliver v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-05-30(h)(3)

Upon finding that a defendant has violated a condition of her probation, the trial court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3) (2017).

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to order execution of the full suspended sentence after a probation violation.

James W. Geary, II v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-05-30(h)

Because Geary overtly failed to abide by three probation conditions he agreed to follow, and because of his prior criminal history, the trial court was well within its discretion to order him to serve the 1,095-day balance of his previously suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a previously suspended sentence as modified.

Harpring v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-05-30(h)

In its clarified order, the trial court has the discretion to order all or part of the previously suspended modified sentence to be executed.

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to order execution of the entire suspended sentence after a probation violation, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Joseph Harold Driver, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-06-27(h)(3)

Given the circumstances as set forth above, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in ordering Driver to serve the remainder of his previously suspended sentence.

Upon finding a probation violation, the court may order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence.

Rose Mary Boling v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-06-29(h)(3)

Upon finding that a defendant has violated a condition of her probation, the trial court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3) (2017).

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a previously suspended sentence after a probation violation.

Bice v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-07-18(h)

If a defendant is found to have violated his or her probation, a trial court may impose one or more of the following: (1) continue the defendant on probation; (2) extend the probationary period for not more than one year beyond the original period; (3) order all or part of a previously suspended sentence to be executed. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). ... Because Bice displayed a history of repeatedly rescheduling his appointments with Marketplace Treatment and failed to complete the program as required by the terms of his probation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering him to serve the remainder of his previously-suspended five-year sentence at the DOC.

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to execute the remainder of a suspended sentence after multiple probation violations when the court acts within its discretion.

Inman v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-07-31(h)(3)

Given Inman’s multiple probation violations, criminal history, and unwillingness to comply with the conditions of her probation, the trial court acted within its discretion when it executed the remainder of her previously suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to order execution of the entire suspended sentence after finding a probation violation.

Taylor v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-11-08(h)(3)

It was well within its discretion to order him to serve the previously suspended sentences. If a trial court finds that a person has violated a term of probation, it may “order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h)(3) (emphasis added); see also Castillo v. State, 67 N.E.3d 661, 665 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to order execution of a suspended sentence after a probation violation; a single violation can support revocation.

Colley v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-01-10(h)(3)

That single violation is sufficient to support the revocation of her probation. And while Colley’s efforts to overcome her substance abuse are laudable, the court’s order that she serve 730 days of her suspended sentence is supported by the record and well within the trial court’s discretion.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to order execution of part of a suspended sentence after finding a probation violation.

McClellan v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-02-28(h)

In light of the trial court’s comments and the evidence before the court, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that McClellan serve a portion of her previously-suspended sentence.

After a probation violation, the court may order execution of all or part of the sentence suspended at initial sentencing.

Reith v. State of Indiana (mem.dec.) · filed 2019-03-11(h)(3)

Upon determining that a probationer has violated a condition of probation, the trial court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h)(3).

Subsection (h) permits a court to order execution of part of a suspended sentence after a probation violation.

Hamer v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-07-22(h)

If the trial court finds that a violation of probation has occurred, it may impose one or more of the following sanctions: ... (3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. ... Here, as authorized by statute, the trial court ordered that Hamer execute 505 days of his previously suspended sentence of 1,010 days.

Subsection (h)(3) permits a court that finds a probation violation to order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence.

Turner v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-10-17(h)(3)

Upon determining that a probationer has violated a condition of probation, the trial court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” ... Based on the foregoing, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

Section 35-38-2-3 permits a court to order execution of a suspended sentence after a probation violation; repeated drug use and failure to pursue treatment can support that sanction.

McAllister v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-11-12(h)(3)

Given the circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking McAllister’s probation and ordering that he serve the remainder of his previously-suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a trial court to order execution of an entire suspended sentence after a probation violation.

Johnson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-11-13(h)(3)

Thus, the trial court acted within its discretion when it ordered Johnson to serve his entire suspended sentence as explicitly authorized by statute.

After a probation violation is proved, subsection (h)(3) permits the court to order execution of all or part of the previously suspended sentence.

Murray v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-11-15(h)(3)

And consequently, the trial court had the statutory authority to order Murray to serve part—six years—of his previously-suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court that finds a probation violation to order execution of all or part of the previously suspended sentence.

Jerry L. Berkley, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-12-09(h)

Here, the trial court was well within its statutory authority to order execution of all six years of Berkley’s previously suspended sentence.

After a probation violation, subsection (h)(3) permits the court to order execution of all or part of the previously suspended sentence; that sanction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Evol v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-01-24(h)(3)

Upon determining that a probationer has violated a condition of probation, the trial court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” ... Evol has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the remainder of her sentence to be served at the DOC after Evol violated her probation.

After a probation violation, subsection (h)(3) permits the court to order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence; repeated violations can support ordering the remaining term served.

Lowder v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-03-06(h)(3)

Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Lowder to serve the remainder of his three-year sentence in the DOC because, among other reasons, Lowder’s criminal history, including multiple probation violations, shows that he cannot or will not take advantage of the opportunities afforded by probation.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court that finds a probation violation to order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence.

Hughes v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-04-20(h)

Where the court finds a person has violated a condition of probation, the court may: ... (3) order the execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. See I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h). ... To the contrary, the trial court acted well within its discretion to order Hughes to serve the remainder of his previously suspended sentence.

Subsection (h) permits a court to order execution of the entire suspended sentence after finding a probation violation.

Marshall v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-05-06(h)

Based upon the foregoing, and pursuant to the clear language of Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h), the trial court acted within its discretion in ordering execution of the entirety of Marshall’s suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to order execution of the entire suspended sentence after multiple probation violations that are not merely technical.

Spray v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-06-05(h)

Given Spray’s multiple probation violations, which were not merely technical violations, we conclude the trial court was well within its discretion in ordering Spray to serve her entire previously suspended sentence.

After a probation violation, subsection (h)(3) permits the trial court to order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence.

Lopilato v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-06-25(h)(3)

Upon finding that a defendant has violated a condition of his probation, the trial court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3) (2019).

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to order execution of the entire suspended sentence after a probation violation; that sanction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Hornsby v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-06-29(h)(3)

Given the circumstances and in light of the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking Hornsby’s probation and ordering that he serve the remainder of his previously- suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to order execution of a suspended sentence when probation violations warrant that sanction.

Walker v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-10-23(h)(3)

Notwithstanding the impact of his violations on his familial and professional responsibilities, Walker’s probation violations are severe enough to warrant the imposition of his previously-suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to order execution of part of a suspended sentence after finding a probation violation.

Pratchard v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-11-13(h)(3)

Having exercised its discretion in finding such a violation of the terms of probation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking a portion of Pratchard’s previously-suspended sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to order execution of a suspended sentence when a probation violation occurs during the probationary period and the revocation petition is filed within that period.

Robert James Plato, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-11-16(h)

“If the court finds the defendant has violated a condition of his probation at any time before the termination of the probationary period, and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, then the court may order execution of the sentence that had been suspended.” Gosha v. State, 873 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); see also Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). ... We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking Plato’s four-year suspended sentence.

When ordering execution of a suspended sentence after a probation violation, the court must account for time served for earlier violations and cannot order more than the remaining sentence.

Debriel Scales v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-12-07(h)

Although the trial court was within its discretion to revoke the balance of Scales’s sentence, the trial court mistakenly found the balance of Scales’s previously suspended sentence to be 2,800 days. ... The trial court’s sentence of 2,800 days also fails to account for the time Scales served for his previous violations of in-home detention and probation.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence after a probation violation without balancing aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

James Shead, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2021-01-13(h)

Because Shead violated a condition of his probation by committing a criminal offense, Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(h) authorized the trial court to “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” The court was authorized to do so without regard for any alleged aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence after a probation violation warrants revocation.

Davis v. State of Indiana · filed 2026-03-23(h)(3)

The court may impose one or more of the following sanctions: ... (3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. ... For this reason, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered him to serve 2,502 days of his previously suspended sentence.

After revoking probation, a court may order execution of all or part of the sentence suspended at initial sentencing.

Hoak v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-10-04(h)(3)

Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) plainly states that a court may reimpose all or part of a sentence that was suspended at the time of initial ... sentencing.

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to order a defendant to serve the remaining suspended sentence after a probation violation.

Hagerty v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-07-10(h)(3)

Ordering that Hagerty serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence in the DOC is an appropriate sanction for Hagerty’s violation of the terms of his community corrections placement.

A revocation petition is timely when filed during a probationary period that has not run while the person serves a mandatory consecutive prison sentence.

Pedroza v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-08-14(a)(2)

Thus, because the sentences are to be served consecutively, Pedroza’s executed sentence and probation sentence cannot be served concurrently. Accordingly, it cannot be that probation for one offense, which runs consecutively to the sentence in another offense, could be served at the same time. ... Accordingly, the State’s petition to revoke was timely filed, and the trial court had the discretion to revoke Pedroza’s probation.

Section 35-38-2-3 allows a petition to revoke probation to be filed at any time during the probationary term; the forty-five day filing limit applies after that term ends.

Sutton v. State · filed 1997-12-04(2)

According to the plain language of the statute, a petition to revoke a defendant’s probation may be filed at any time during the defendant’s probationary term. ... As such, the forty-five day filing requirement applies only if a defendant’s probation has ended and the State has notice that the defendant violated his probation.

Section 35-38-2-3 treats the probationary period for filing a revocation petition as beginning immediately after sentencing and ending when the probationary phase of the sentence concludes.

Ashley v. State · filed 1999-10-19(a)

It follows from these cases that the term “probationary period,” as used in both subsections (a) and (g) of Ind.Code § 35-38-2-3, means that period of time beginning immediately after sentencing and ending at the conclusion of the “probationary phases” of the defendant’s sentence.

The 45-day filing limit applies only after probation ends; it does not bar an amendment filed during the probationary period.

Crump v. State · filed 2000-12-15(a)(2)(B)

We find that Crump's reliance on Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(a)(2)(B) is misplaced. ... Crump was in his probationary period when he violated a condition of his probation and when the State filed its Addendum. Thus, Crump's reliance on Ind. Code § 35-838-2-8(a)(2)(B) is not applicable to this case.

Section 35-38-2-3(a) permits revocation of unsupervised probation for a violation committed during the probationary period, subject to its petition-filing deadlines.

United States v. Davis · filed 1992-06-24(a)

Applying Lee, the court finds that even though the defendant was on unsupervised probation at the time of the instant offense, pursuant to I.C. 35-38-2-3(a), the State of Indiana maintained the jurisdiction to revoke the defendant’s unsupervised probation at that time because the instant offense was committed during the defendant’s probationary period.

Section 35-38-2-3(a)(2) does not permit revocation after probation expires unless the defendant was advised of that possibility when placed on probation.

Taylor v. State · filed 1997-01-14(a)(2)

Where a defendant is not advised of this possibility and the State seeks to revoke probation after the probationary period has expired, any subsequent revocation under IC 35-38-2-3(a)(2) is error.

Section 35-38-2-3 permits a probation officer to file a petition to revoke probation.

Noethtich v. State · filed 1997-02-11(a)(2)

The trial court committed no error when it proceeded to consider the matters filed by the probation officer.

Section 35-38-2-3(a)(2)(B) requires a petition to revoke probation to be filed within forty-five days after the State receives notice of a violation when that notice arrives less than forty-five days before probation ends or after it ends.

Machi v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-10-11(a)(2)(B)

The forty-five-day deadline is only triggered in cases where the State received notice of the violation less than forty-five days before the defendant’s probationary term expired or after the term expired.

A petition to revoke probation is timely if filed during the probationary period, even if the court rules after that period ends.

Kern v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-08-30(a)

We note that the petition to revoke was filed in 1997 and therefore was timely filed. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(a) (2001) (probation may be revoked if petition is filed during the probationary period).

A probation department may petition to revoke probation up to one year after the probationary period ends; release from another state’s custody does not start that period when the person never reports for probation supervision.

Reed v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-06-27(a)(2)

Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(a)(2) allows a probation department to file a petition to revoke probation up to one year after the end of the probationary period. ... Under these facts and circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court erred when it rejected Reed’s claim that his two-year probationary term began in 2003 and ended two years later in 2005.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) requires the State to prove both a probation violation and reckless, knowing, or intentional failure to pay child support before probation may be revoked for nonpayment.

Jones v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-12-09(g)

Before the trial court may revoke probation due to a defendant’s failure to pay child support, the State must prove both a violation of the terms of probation occurred and that the violation was due to the defendant reckless, knowing, or intentional failure to pay child support.

Subsection (f) bars probation revocation for failure to pay court costs and fines unless the State proves the failure was reckless, knowing, or intentional.

Johnson v. State · filed 1998-03-02(f)

The State failed to offer any evidence which would support that Johnson “recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally fail[ed] to pay.” I.C. § 35-38-2-3(f). Because the State failed to meet its burden of proof, the evidence is insufficient to support the alleged probation violation of failure to pay court costs and fines.

Section 35-38-2-3(f) permits revocation for failure to pay restitution when a probationer willfully refuses to pay or fails to make sufficient bona fide efforts to do so.

Barnes v. State · filed 1997-02-12(f)

Before incarcerating a probationer for failure to make restitution, the court must inquire into the reasons for the failure to make the required payments. If the court finds that a probationer has willfully refused to make restitution or has failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts to pay, his probation can be revoked.

Section 35-38-2-3(f) bars revocation for failure to pay in-home detention fees unless the State proves the failure was reckless, knowing, or intentional.

Baxter v. State · filed 2002-09-19(f)

As for the trial court’s revocation of Baxter’s probation for failure to pay in-home detention fees, Indiana Code Section 35 — 38—2—3(f) provides that “[pjrobation may not be revoked for failure to comply with conditions of a sentence that imposes financial obligations on the person unless the person recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally fails to pay.” Here, the State failed to offer any evidence that Baxter recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally failed to pay in-home detention fees.

Section 35-38-2-3(f) bars revocation for failure to pay a probation obligation without evidence that the person could have paid but chose not to.

Smith v. State · filed 2010-01-26(f)

In the absence of evidence that Smith could have paid the fees but chose not to, we cannot say that Smith "recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally fail[ed] to pay" for the fees associated with the terms and conditions of his probation.

For revocation based on failure to meet a financial condition, the State must prove both the violation and that the failure to pay was reckless, knowing, or intentional.

Runyon v. State · filed 2010-12-08(f)

Where the claimed violation is that the probationer failed to comply with financial conditions of probation, the trial court must be convinced both that the condition was violated and that the failure to pay was reckless, knowing, or intentional. Because proof of both of these components is required before a trial court may revoke probation, we hold that it is the State's burden to prove both the violation and the requisite state of mind in order to obtain a probation revocation.

For a financial obligation imposed as a probation condition, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence both less than full payment and a reckless, knowing, or intentional failure to pay; proving a knowing failure requires proof of ability to pay.

Smith v. State · filed 2011-03-23(f)

Therefore, we hold that a trial court may revoke probation for failure to satisfy a financial obligation only if the State satisfies its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence: 1) less than full payment; and 2) the probationer submitted less than full payment recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally. To prove “knowingly” the State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the probationer was able to pay.

Probation may not be revoked for unpaid restitution without proof that the probationer recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally failed to pay.

Szpunar v. State · filed 2009-09-17(f)

"Probation may not be revoked for failure to comply with conditions of a sentence that imposes financial obligations on the person unless the person recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally fails to pay." Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(f). ... The State had the burden of proof, but presented no evidence regarding Szpu-nar's ability to pay. ... The trial court abused its discretion in revoking Szpunar's probation.

When probation revocation is based on failure to pay child support, the defendant bears the burden of proving inability to pay.

Runyon v. State · filed 2010-03-11(f)

We hold that when revoking a defendant's probation for failing to support his or her dependents, the defendant bears the burden of proving that he or she was unable to provide support pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(f).

Probation may not be revoked for failure to meet a financial obligation unless the person recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally fails to pay.

Snowberger v. State · filed 2010-12-10(f)

Ind.Code § 35-38-2-3(f) provides: "Probation may not be revoked for failure to comply with conditions of a sentence that impose [] financial obligations on the person unless the person recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally fails to pay." ... Based upon our review of the testimony and other evidence presented at the probation revocation hearing as set forth in the record, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to revoke Snow-berger's probation.

For a financial-condition violation, the probationer bears the burden of showing inability to pay and sufficient bona fide efforts to pay to avoid further imprisonment.

Smith v. State · filed 2012-03-23(f)

It is the probationer’s burden “to show facts related to the inability to pay and indicating sufficient bona fide efforts to pay so as to persuade the trial court that further imprisonment should not be ordered.” Runyon, 939 N.E.2d at 617. Here Smith failed to carry his burden. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Smith’s probation.

Section 35-38-2-3(f) permits revocation for unpaid probation fees and court costs when circumstantial evidence shows the probationer could pay but knowingly or intentionally chose not to.

Swain v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-01-22(f)

From this circumstantial evidence that Swain was buying crack cocaine, the trial court could infer that Swain had an ability to pay for probation fees and court costs but knowingly or intentionally chose not to apply those funds toward those financial obligations, as well as child support.

For revocation based on a knowing failure to pay child support, the evidence must show that the probationer was aware of a high probability that he was not paying the current obligation.

Cameron v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-05-09(g)

Thus, in order to sustain the probation revocation in this case, the evidence must show that Cameron was aware of a high probability that he was not paying his current support obligation.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits revocation for failure to pay a probation-imposed financial obligation when the State proves the probationer knowingly failed to pay.

Perry v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-08-21(g)

Further, “[p]robation may not be revoked for failure to comply with conditions of a sentence that impose[] financial obligations on the person unless the person recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally fails to pay.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g). ... The State demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Perry was aware of a high probability that he was not making required child support payments.

Probation may be revoked for failure to pay a financial obligation when the State proves that the failure was reckless, knowing, or intentional.

Hayes v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-09-11(g)

The State demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Hayes was aware of a high probability that he was not making required child support payments.

Probation may be revoked for failure to pay financial obligations only if the probationer recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally fails to pay.

Fiers v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-12-17(g)

Additionally, Indiana’s revocation statute provides that “[p]robation may not be revoked for failure to comply with conditions of a sentence that imposes financial obligations on the person unless the person recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally fails to pay.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g). ... Therefore, the trial court did not err by finding Fiers knowingly violated conditions of his probation.

Probation may be revoked for failure to pay a financial obligation only if the failure was reckless, knowing, or intentional.

Dozier v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-04-28(g)

It is further provided that “[p]robation may not be revoked for failure to comply with conditions of a sentence that imposes [sic] financial obligations on the person unless the person recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally fails to pay.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g). ... We conclude that the trial court could reasonably determine by a preponderance of the evidence that Dozier knowingly failed to pay his current child support obligation which was a violation of his probation.

A probationer facing revocation for unpaid child support bears the burden of showing inability to pay.

Leonard Abshier, III v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-08-21(f)

Based on the record and the court’s comments we conclude that Abshier has not met his burden regarding his inability to pay and that the evidence was sufficient to support his probation revocation.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits revocation for unpaid restitution only if the State proves the failure to pay was reckless, knowing, or intentional.

Burkhart v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-04-18(g)

Thus, when attempting to revoke a defendant’s probation based on the failure to pay restitution, the State must prove both that a violation occurred and that the defendant’s violation was reckless, knowing, or intentional.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits revocation for failure to pay a financial probation condition when the State proves knowing nonpayment and the probationer fails to show inability to pay despite bona fide efforts.

Bryan P. Meek v. State of Indiana · filed 2014-12-31(g)

“Probation may not be revoked for failure to comply with conditions of a sentence that imposes financial obligations on the person unless the person recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally fails to pay.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g). ... In sum, the State met its burden of demonstrating Meek’s knowing nonpayment of child support, and Meek failed to present evidence demonstrating that he made a bona fide effort but was simply unable to pay. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in revoking Meek’s probation.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) requires consideration of an offender’s ability to pay before imprisonment for failure to meet a financial condition; the offender must present facts showing inability to pay and bona fide efforts to pay.

Riggle v. State of Indiana · filed 2015-01-22(g)

We strike a balance among these concerns by requiring that an offender’s ‘ability to pay’ be considered before imposing imprisonment as a sanction for failure to comply with financial conditions associated with a sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) bars revocation for an unpaid financial obligation when the probationer shows an inability to pay and bona fide efforts to pay.

Mauch v. State of Indiana · filed 2015-06-10(g)

We find that Mauch has made a sufficient showing of his inability to pay and bona fide efforts to pay. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in revoking Mauch’s probation.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits revocation for failure to pay a probation obligation when the probationer recklessly chooses not to pay.

Kish v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-01-20(g)

This evidence shows that Kish recklessly failed to pay for his anger management courses by making the conscious choice not to do so.

Section 35-38-2-3 permits revocation for failure to pay required fines and costs when the failure is reckless, knowing, or intentional and is not the sole basis for revocation.

Alayo v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-05-17(g), (m)

With regard to Alayo’s failure to pay fines and costs (including fees) required as a condition of probation, such is a proper basis for revocation of probation if it is shown that the person recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally failed to pay and so long as it is not the sole basis for revocation. See I.C. § 35-38-2-3(g), (m).

When revocation is based on failure to meet a financial obligation, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the failure to pay was reckless, knowing, or intentional.

Cervantes v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-05-16(g)

Where the ... State alleges a failure to meet a financial obligation, it must prove that the defendant recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally failed to pay by a preponderance of the evidence.

A probationer who violates a financial condition may have probation revoked only if the failure to pay was reckless, knowing, or intentional.

Moore v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-09-26(g)

“[I]f the condition violated involves a financial obligation, then the probationer must be shown to have recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally failed to pay.” ... This evidence, which supports the trial court’s determination that Moore recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally failed to pay child support, is sufficient to support ... the revocation of Moore’s probation.

Section 35-38-2-3(m) bars commitment to the Department of Correction when failure to pay probation fines or costs is the sole basis for the sanction.

Goodwin v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-08-24(m)

However, Runyon applies only when a court revokes conditional release due merely to the offender’s inability to pay fines. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(m) (“Failure to pay fines or costs (including fees) required as a condition of probation may not be the sole basis for commitment to the department of correction.”). ... This is not why the trial court sent Goodwin to the DOC Purposeful Incarceration program.

When a violation occurs and the revocation petition is filed during probation, subsection (h)(2) permits the court to extend probation by up to one year beyond the original term, even if the defendant’s suspended sentence was the maximum allowed.

Lill v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-04-17(h)(2)

As noted above, “[i]f the court finds that the person has violated a condition at any time before termination of the period, and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, the court may . . . [e]xtend the person’s probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(2). At the time Lill violated his probation, he had a little over one year remaining in his original probationary period. Thus, the trial court was well within its discretion to extend Lill’s probationary period by one year.

Section 35-38-2-3(g)(2) allows a court to extend probation for up to one year after a violation, even when the extension exceeds the limit on the initial probation term.

Bailey v. State · filed 2000-06-20(g)(2)

The fact that the additional year extended the term of Bailey’s probation beyond that provided for in Indiana Code section 35-50-2-2 is of no consequence, because that statute applies only to the initial suspension of a sentence and placement on probation. If a probationer is found to violate probation, Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(g)(2) allows the trial court to order an extension of up to one year.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits an extension of probation only when a petition to revoke is filed during the probationary period and the court finds a probation violation.

Gilreath v. State · filed 2001-05-04(g)

Finally, the provision of I.C. § 85-38-2-3 authorizing the extension of a probationary period contains two specific prerequisites: (1) that "the petition to revoke" be filed within the probationary period; and (2) a finding by the court "that the person has violated a condition." I.C. § 35-38-2-3(g).

Section 35-38-2-3(g) allows a court that finds a probation violation to continue or extend probation, or order execution of the suspended sentence.

Brabandt v. State · filed 2003-10-27(g)

Therefore, upon finding that a probationer has violated a condition of probation, a court may either continue probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions, extend probation for not more than one year beyond the original probationary period, or order execution of the initial sentence that was suspended. IC 35-38-2-3(g).

Section 35-38-2-3 does not require an evidentiary hearing when a probationer admits a violation, but the probationer must have an opportunity to present evidence explaining or mitigating it before revocation.

Sanders v. State · filed 2005-04-22

Indiana has codified the due process requirements at Ind.Code § 35-38-2-3 by requiring that an evidentiary hearing be held on the revocation and providing for confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses and representation by counsel. Id.; see also Ind.Code § 35-88-2-3(d), (e). When a probationer admits to the violations, the procedural due process safeguards and an evidentiary hearing are not necessary. Id. Instead, the court can proceed to the second step of the inquiry and determine whether the violation warrants revocation. Id. In making the determination of whether the violation warrants revocation, the probationer must be given an opportunity to present evidence that explains and mitigates her violation. Id. at 1086, n. 4.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits a judge to use any one or any combination of its listed sentencing options after a probation violation.

Prewitt v. State · filed 2007-12-18(g)

Accordingly, we hold that Indiana Code § 35-38-2-3(g) permits judges to sentence offenders using any one of or any combination of the enumerated options.

Subsection (g) permits a court that finds a probation violation to continue probation, extend it, or order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence.

Peterson v. State · filed 2009-07-14(g)

When a trial court finds a person has violated a condition of probation, the trial court may continue the person on probation, extend the probationary period, or order execution of all or part of the sentence that was originally suspended. Ind.Code § 35-38-2-3(g). ... In light of Peterson's frequent viewing of pornography in violation of his treatment contract and the conditions of his probation, the trial court was well within its discretion to order Peterson to serve the remainder of his sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits a court to use one or a combination of its listed sanctions after finding a probation violation, including execution of the entire suspended sentence.

Wilkerson v. State · filed 2009-12-23(g)

Ind.Code § 35-38-2-3(g) permits judges to sentence offenders using any one of or any combination of the enumerated options.

An admission to a probation violation makes the section's evidentiary hearing and confrontation and cross-examination requirements unnecessary.

Beeler v. State · filed 2011-04-27

When the probationer admits to the violation, the due process requirements codified in Indiana Code § 35-38-2-3, which requires an evidentiary hearing, and confrontation and cross-examination of the witnesses, are unnecessary.

After finding a probation violation, a court may continue probation, extend it, or order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence.

Cottingham v. State · filed 2011-07-19(g)

After finding a probation violation, the trial court may continue the probation, extend it, or order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence.

Upon finding a probation violation, a trial court may order execution of all or part of the previously suspended sentence.

Aynes v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-02-14(g)

Upon finding a probation violation, a trial court may keep the probationer on probation, extend the terms of probation, or order execution of all or part of the previously suspended sentence. I.C. § 35-38-2-3(g). ... Therefore, we find that the trial court acted within its discretion to order Aynes to serve his remaining sentence.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits a court that finds a probation violation to continue probation, extend it, or order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence.

Ramsey v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-02-14(g)

When a trial court finds a person has violated a condition of probation, the trial court may continue the person on probation, extend the probationary period, or order execution of all or part of the sentence that was originally suspended.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) allows a court that finds a probation violation to impose any one or combination of its listed sanctions, including execution of the suspended sentence.

West v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-05-24(g)

Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g) permits judges to sentence offenders using any one of or any combination of the enumerated options.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits a court that finds a probation violation to order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence.

Lawrence v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-05-25(g)

On finding the defendant violated probation, the trial court may “[o]rder the execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g). ... In light of the fact Lawrence had not even bothered to register with probation when he was released from incarceration, which resulted in a warrant for his arrest for violating probation, we cannot find an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to allow Lawrence to return to probation.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits a sanction for a probation violation even when the probationer may also be sentenced for the new offenses.

Saunders v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-05-29(g)

However, Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(g) provides for the imposition of a sanction once probation is violated, separate and apart from the sentences that a defendant may serve on new offenses.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) permits a trial court that finds a probation violation to use any one or a combination of its listed sanctions.

Boring v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-08-14(g)

Under this provision, the trial court may sentence offenders using any one of or any combination of the enumerated options.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court that finds a probation violation to order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence.

Crabtree v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-10-11(h)

Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h), after finding that a person has violated a condition of his probation, the trial court may: ... (3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. ... For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion when it ordered Crabtree to serve two years and 180 days of his previously suspended sentence in the Department of Correction and extended his probation by an additional two years upon release from incarceration.

Subsection (g) permits a court that finds a probation violation to order execution of the entire suspended sentence, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Grigsby v. State of Indiana · filed 2012-12-26(g)

This provision permits judges to sentence offenders using any one of or any combination of the enumerated options. ... Given the circumstances as set forth above and in the record, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in ordering Grigsby to serve his previously suspended sentences totaling seven years.

Section 35-38-2-3(g) gives a trial court broad discretion to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence after a probation violation.

Cashdollar v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-07-03(g)

Upon finding that Cashdollar violated the terms of his probation, the trial court properly looked to Indiana’s probation revocation statute to determine the range of consequences that would follow. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g). This statute gives the trial court broad discretion to order execution of all or part of Cashdollar’s suspended sentence.

After a probation violation, the court may order execution of all or part of the sentence suspended at initial sentencing.

Thomas Rayford, Jr. v. State of Indiana · filed 2013-09-16(h)(3)

Upon determining that a probationer has violated a condition of probation, the trial court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.”

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence after a probation violation.

Reese v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-01-29(h)(3)

Again, he admitted to the allegations, and this time, the trial court imposed a different option within the statutory framework – execution of most but not all of his suspended term. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3).

After finding a probation violation, a court may order execution of all or part of the previously suspended sentence.

Pettis v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-04-10(h)

Although a trial court has several alternative sanctions it may impose where it has found that a defendant has violated his probation, one of those sanctions is to order execution of the sentence that was previously suspended.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) gives the trial court discretion to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence after a probation violation.

Bass v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-09-23(h)

Thus, under this statute, the trial court has discretion in deciding which option is appropriate under the circumstances of each case.

After a probation violation, § 35-38-2-3 permits the court to continue probation, extend it by up to one year, or order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence.

Spicer v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2015-11-13

Once a trial court has concluded that probation has been violated, it may continue the defendant on probation, extend the probationary period for not more than one year beyond the original period, or order all or part of the previously-suspended sentence to be executed. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3 (2014).

Section 35-38-2-3 allows a court that finds a probation violation to continue probation, extend it by up to one year, or order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence.

Winners v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-02-02

Once a trial court has concluded that probation has been violated, it may continue the defendant on probation, extend the probationary period for not more than one year beyond the original period, or order all or part of the previously-suspended sentence to be executed. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3 (2014).

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court that finds a probation violation to order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

McCool v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-02-03(h)

At the time of McCool’s violation, Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h) (2012) provided that if the court finds a violation of a condition of probation, it may: (1) continue the person on probation, with or without modifying the conditions, (2) extend the person’s probationary period for not more than one year; and/or (3) order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. ... For the reasons stated, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in ordering McCool to serve the remaining eleven and a half years of his previously suspended sentence upon the revocation of his probation in this matter.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to order execution of the full suspended sentence after a probation violation, even when the probationer offers mitigating evidence.

Mattingly v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-02-16(h)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Mattingly to serve the balance of her previously suspended sentence.

After a probation violation, the court may continue probation, extend it by up to one year, or order all or part of the suspended sentence executed.

Perez v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-02-17(h)

Once a trial court has determined that probation has been violated, it may continue the defendant on probation, extend the probationary period for not more than one year beyond the original period, or order all or part of the previously suspended sentence to be executed. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h).

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court that finds a probation violation to order execution of all or part of the sentence suspended at initial sentencing.

Raber v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-08-17(h)(3)

Although the court has several alternative sanctions it may impose where it has found that a defendant has violated probation, one of those sanctions is to order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. Id.; see also Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3-(h)(3).

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court that finds a probation violation to order execution of all or part of the previously suspended sentence.

Kent R. Blair, Sr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2016-10-26(h)

Having concluded that Blair committed a probation violation, the trial court could impose one or more of the following sanctions: (1) continue Blair’s probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions; (2) extend his probationary period for not more than one year beyond the original probationary period; or (3) order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). ... Based on the foregoing, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s choice of sanction.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) allows a court that finds a probation violation to continue probation, extend it by no more than one year, or order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence.

Mituski v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-07-25(h)

In accordance with Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3, a trial court has three options if a defendant violates probation. It may: (1) continue the defendant’s probation; (2) extend the probationary period for not more than one year beyond the original probationary period; or (3) order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence.

After finding a probation violation, a court may order execution of all or part of the sentence suspended at initial sentencing.

Judd v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-08-17(h)

At the time of the alleged violations contained in Judd’s third notice of probation violation, Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h) provided that if the court finds a violation of a condition of probation, it may: (1) continue the person on probation, with or without modifying the conditions; (2) extend the person’s probationary period for not more than one year; and/or (3) order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

An admission to violating one condition of probation is sufficient to support revocation.

Parke v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-09-13(a)

We begin by noting that Parke’s admission to having violated one condition of her probation is sufficient, alone, to support probation revocation.

Section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a suspended sentence after a probation violation, including the full balance in community corrections.

Knecht v. State of Indiana · filed 2017-09-27(h)(3)

Here, minus credit for time served in pretrial detention, the trial court ordered execution of all of Knecht’s suspended sentence under subsection (h)(3). ... In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Knecht to serve the balance of his term in Community Corrections.

After a probation violation, subsection (h)(3) permits a court to order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence, including time suspended through a later sentence modification.

Tomlinson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-10-23(h)(3)

Although the court has several alternative sanctions it may impose where it has found that a defendant has violated his probation, one of those sanctions is to order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. Id.; see also Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3). ... This order for probation was in addition to the four years of the original sentence that was initially suspended to probation.

Upon finding a probation violation, subsection (h) permits a court to order execution of all or part of the sentence previously suspended.

McCall v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2017-11-21(h)

Upon a finding of a probation violation, a trial court may: (1) continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions; (2) extend the person’s probationary period for not more than one year beyond the original probationary period; and (3) order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h). ... Given these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering McCall to serve the entire two-year suspended sentence as a result of the revocation of his probation.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court that finds a probation violation to order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence.

Mitchell v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-06-29(h)

As such, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s order for Mitchell to serve two years of his suspended six-year sentence in the DOC.

After a probation violation, subsection (h)(2) permits the court to extend probation for up to one year beyond the original period.

Clayburn v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-04-12(h)(2)

As a result, the trial court extended her probation by six months, which was within its discretion pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(h)(2).

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court to order execution of all or part of a previously suspended sentence after a probation violation.

Fix v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2018-08-29(h)

When a probationer violates a term of probation, the court may: (1) continue the person on probation, with or without modifying the conditions; (2) extend the probationary period; or (3) order execution of all or part of the previously-suspended sentence. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h) (2015). ... Based on this record, the trial court acted well within its discretion in ordering Fix to serve the remainder of his previously-suspended sentence at the DOC.

Section 35-38-2-3(h) permits a court that finds a probation violation to revoke probation and order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence; repeated violations can support that sanction.

Cheesman v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-02-19(h)

Where, like here, the trial court finds that a defendant has violated a condition of his probation, it may: (1) continue the probation with or without modifying the probation conditions; (2) extend the probationary period for up to one year; or (3) revoke the probation and order the execution of all or part of the sentence suspended at the initial hearing. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). ... Given Cheesman’s repeated probation violations, we do not find the imposition of the suspended sentence to be an abuse of discretion.

After a probation violation is established, subsection (h) permits the trial court to order execution of all or part of the previously suspended sentence.

Thomas v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-04-23(h)

Under these facts and circumstances, the trial court was well within its discretion to order Thomas to serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence.

After a probation violation, Section 35-38-2-3(h) allows the court to continue or extend probation or order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence.

Beard v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2019-06-24(h)

Beard admitted she violated her probation. Therefore, the trial court had the option of imposing one of the following sanctions: (1) continue Beard on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions; (2) extend her probationary period for not more than one year beyond the original probationary period; or (3) order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h).

Section 35-38-2-3(h) allows a court that finds a probation violation to order execution of all or part of the sentence suspended at initial sentencing.

Bedtelyon v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · filed 2020-09-30(h)

As for probation, once a violation is established, the trial court may impose one or more of the following sanctions: (1) continue the defendant’s probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions; (2) extend the defendant’s probationary period for not more than one year beyond the original probationary period; or (3) order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). ... We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s chosen sanction.

Section 35-38-2-3 gives credit for time served on home detention as a condition of probation, and the amendments providing that credit apply retroactively.

Palmer v. State of Indiana · filed 2002-08-28(h)(2), (j)(2)

Effective July 1, 2001, the amendments provide that a person earns credit for time served on home detention as a condition of probation. Ind. Code §§ 35-38-2-3(h)(2), (j)(2), -2.5-5(e). Previously, the statutes were silent on this point. See I.C. §§ 35-38-2-3, -2.5-5 (1998). In accordance with our companion case also decided today, Martin v. State, No. 03S01-0108-PC-363 (Ind. Aug. 28, 2002), we hold that the amendments should be applied retroactively to Palmer.

Section 35-38-2-3 grants credit for time served on home detention as a condition of probation, and its 2001 amendments apply retroactively.

Martin v. State · filed 2002-08-28(h)(2), (j)(2)

We grant transfer and hold that the 2001 amendments to the Indiana Code providing credit for time served on home detention as a condition of probation should be applied retroactively to the defendant in this case. ... Effective July 1, 2001, the amendments provide that a person earns credit for time served on home detention as a condition of probation. Ind. Code §§ 35-38-2-3(h)(2), (j)(2), -2.5-5(e).

Section 35-38-2-3(g)(3) permits execution of a suspended sentence after a probation violation without applying credit time awarded at the initial sentencing a second time.

Blanton v. State · filed 2001-07-16(g)(3)

According to statute, once a defendant is found to have violated the conditions of his or her probation, the trial court may "order execution of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing." Ind.Code § 35-38-2-3(g)(3) (1998). Although there is no explicit mention of credit time, allowing the trial court to order execution of the entire "suspended" sentence necessarily implies that the credit time applied at sentencing is not to be applied again.