Idaho Code § 12-120

Section 12-120(3) requires a reasonable attorney-fee award to the prevailing party in a civil action whose gravamen is a commercial transaction integral to and the basis of the claim.

Stafford L. Smith v. Woodruff D. Smith · filed 2016-09-09(3)

Here, Stafford’s complaint alleges: “The Bid Properties Purchase Agreement constitutes a valid and enforceable contract between Plaintiff and Defendant.” The complaint continues: “The Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement constitutes a valid and enforceable contract between Plaintiff and Defendant.” The claimed existence of a contract for a commercial transaction was clearly the basis of the complaint in this action; therefore, Idaho Code section 12-120(3) was applicable and Stafford was entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing party.

Section 12-120(3) permits attorney fees when a commercial transaction is integral to and forms the basis of a claim, including a tort claim arising from a timber sale entered into to earn income.

Eyer v. Idaho Forest Group · filed 2016-09-12(3)

Like the negligence claim in Bridge Tower Dental, P.A., a commercial transaction was integral to the Eyers’ assumed duty tort claim and constituted the basis of the Eyers’ theory of recovery on that claim. ... The district court did not err by determining that a commercial transaction was the gravamen of the Eyers’ cause of action.

Section 12-120(3) permits attorney fees only when the commercial transaction underlying the action was between the litigating parties, not parties merely indirectly related.

Sec. Investor Fund LLC v. Crumb · filed 2019-05-23(3)

Consequently, the rule from Great Plains still applies: " I.C. § 12-120(3) cannot be invoked if the commercial transaction is between parties only indirectly related, i.e. there was no transaction between the parties ...." See 136 Idaho at 472, 36 P.3d at 224 (italics in original). Although Crumb may be correct that Security's complaint nominally pleaded a commercial transaction in order to trigger the applicability of section 12-120(3), the underlying commercial transaction was between Crumb and the LLC. Security was not a party to any commercial transaction with Crumb. The LLC's involvement was as a successor in interest to the LLC. Consequently, the district court correctly denied attorney fees to Crumb under section 12-120(3).

Section 12-120(3) permits prevailing-party attorney fees only when a commercial transaction is integral to the claim and forms the basis for recovery; a contract claim qualifies, but an independent defamation claim does not.

Dickinson Frozen Foods, Inc. v. J.R. Simplot Co. · filed 2019-02-13(3)

This Court has said that "whether a party can recover attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3) depends on whether the gravamen of a claim is a commercial transaction." ... "To be the gravamen of a lawsuit, '(1) there must be a commercial transaction that is integral to the claim; and (2) the commercial transaction must be the basis upon which recovery is sought.'" ... In this case, a commercial transaction was not integral to DFF's defamation claim, and the claim was not based on a commercial transaction. ... Accordingly, the gravamen of DFF's defamation claim is not based on a commercial transaction, and therefore, the district court abused its discretion in awarding fees on the defamation claim. ... As to DFF's breach of contract claim, attorney fees were properly awarded pursuant to Section 12-120(3) as the gravamen of DFF's claim was the contract (NDA) between the parties.

Section 12-120(3) permits attorney fees only when a commercial transaction is integral to the claim and forms the basis for recovery, so an unrelated business relationship does not support fees for a defamation claim.

Dickinson Frozen Foods v. J.R. Simplot Co. (2nd Amnd) · filed 2019-05-03(3)

“Section 12-120(3) does not “prohibit[] a fee award for a commercial transaction that involves tortious conduct . . . .” ... However, “even though fees are available in cases involving a tort claim, a commercial transaction between the parties to the lawsuit must form the basis of the claim.” ... In this case, a commercial transaction was not integral to DFF’s defamation claim, and the claim was not based on a commercial transaction. ... Accordingly, the gravamen of DFF’s defamation claim is not based on a commercial transaction, and therefore, the district court abused its discretion in awarding fees on the defamation claim.

Section 12-120(3) allows prevailing-party attorney fees when a commercial transaction is integral to the claim and is between the parties to the lawsuit; a tort claim based on a transaction with nonparties does not qualify.

Brunobuilt v. Strata · filed 2020-02-05(3)

To recover attorney fees under section 12-120(3), “the commercial transaction must be between the parties to the lawsuit.” Clarke, 165 Idaho at 8, 437 P.3d at 8. Here, the commercial transaction was between the Strata Defendants and the Subdivision’s original developers. BrunoBuilt claimed it was a third-party beneficiary of that commercial transaction. However, the Strata Defendants’ services flowed from that contract between the Strata Defendants and the developers of the Subdivision, not BrunoBuilt. The gravamen of BrunoBuilt’s professional negligence claim is that the Strata Defendants had a duty to perform services in accordance with the applicable standard of care and breached that duty. The gravamen of BrunoBuilt’s claims sound in tort, not a commercial transaction. Even though the Strata Defendants have prevailed on appeal, attorney fees under section 12-120(3) are not appropriate.

Section 12-120(3) permits attorney fees only when a commercial transaction is integral to the claim and is the basis for the recovery sought.

A.C. & C.E. Investments, Inc. v. Eagle Creek Irrigation Company · filed 2023-12-19(3)

Eagle Creek asserts that “the commercial transactions that were integral to [AC&CE’s] claims against Eagle Creek were the Original Articles and Original Bylaws as well as the Amended Articles and Amended Bylaws.” Even if we assume arguendo that this were true, it does not establish that a commercial transaction was the basis upon which recovery was sought. See Breckenridge Prop. Fund 2016, LLC, 170 Idaho at 663, 516 P.3d at 87. Rather, the former trust and the fiduciary duties flowing from it were the basis upon which recovery was sought by AC&CE. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s conclusion there was no commercial transaction between the parties that gave rise to this litigation and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3) on that basis.

Section 12-120(3) allows the prevailing party to recover attorney fees for a quasi-contract claim pleaded as an alternative to a breach of contract claim when both rest on the same facts and the alleged transaction is commercial.

Erickson v. Flynn · filed 2002-12-19(3)

We hold only that when the quasi-contract claim is presented in the alternative to a breach of contract cause of action as a fallback position in the event that the contract claim fails, and where the quasi-contract claim is based upon the same facts and circumstances as the breach of contract claim, and the alleged transaction is commercial in nature, the prevailing party is entitled to ... recover attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3).

Under § 12-120, a prevailing party's attorney-fee award must be reasonable overall, the amount is committed to the trial court's discretion, and fees need not be excised for every unsuccessful litigation skirmish.

Record Steel & Construction, Inc. v. Martel Construction, Inc. · filed 1996-07-17(1), (3), and (8)

The attorney fees awarded must be reasonable overall, but the trial court is not required to excise fees relating to each skirmish that may have been lost during the litigation by the party who ultimately prevailed in the case. ... The amount of attorney fees to be awarded under I.C. § 12-120 is committed to the trial court’s discretion. ... Martel is awarded its costs and attorney fees on appeal in accordance with I.C. § 12-120(1) and (8) in an amount to be determined pursuant to I.A.R. 40 and 41.

Subsection (3) permits a court to award attorney fees in a commercial case and leaves the amount of the award to the court’s discretion.

Sarria v. JA, LLC · filed 2020-10-27(3)

The amount of attorney fees to be awarded under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) is committed to a court’s discretion.

Section 12-120(3) does not permit recovery of attorney fees when the claimant fails to isolate fees attributable to the covered contract claim from fees for another claim.

Weaver v. Searle Bros. · filed 1996-11-27(3)

Recently, we have upheld a trial court’s denial of attorney fees under this statute where the party claiming entitlement to the fees had not isolated or separated the fees attributable to the contract claim from those attributable to another claim not covered by I.C. § 12-120(3). ... From our review of the documentation submitted in support of Rosalia’s request for attorney fees in the present case, we find the same to be true here.

Section 12-120 cannot be used to recover attorney fees when an employee properly brings a wage claim seeking treble damages under §§ 45-614 and 45-617; § 45-615 is the exclusive attorney-fee provision.

Hutchison v. Anderson · filed 1997-12-17

Therefore, we hold that I.C. § 45-615 is the exclusive code section under which an employee can recover attorney fees when the employee properly brings a claim for wages and treble damages under I.C. §§ 45-614, -617. Thus, the district court erred when it awarded the Hutchisons attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120 as pled in count one of the complaints. We vacate the district court’s award of attorney fees to the Hutchisons.

Section 12-120(3) treats reasonable attorney fees as a neutral litigation cost in covered commercial disputes, not as a punitive penalty.

Sanders v. Lankford · filed 2000-05-08(3)

However, an attorney fee award based upon I.C. § 12-120(3) should not be characterized as a penalty. ... The statute [I.C. § 12-120(3) ] exhibits no punitive purpose. Rather, it treats reasonable attorney fees as a cost of using the court system to resolve disputes in specified types of commercial transactions; and it allocates this cost between the parties. Because this allocation turns solely upon a determination of the prevailing party, the statute is facially neutral. It identifies no favored category of litigant to be rewarded, nor disfavored category to be penalized.

A bare assertion of entitlement, without citing authority and presenting argument, is insufficient to recover attorney fees under § 12-120.

Appel v. LePage · filed 2000-12-27

This general assertion without the citation of authority and argument is insufficient to allow the LePages to recover attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120.

Section 12-120(3) does not provide an attorney-fee basis for an employer in an appeal arising from an employee’s Wage Claim Act action because the Act’s fee provisions are exclusive.

Stiffler v. Hydroblend, Inc. · filed 2023-09-08(3)

Both parties seek attorney fees on appeal. Stiffler seeks an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code section 45-615(2) of the Wage Claim Act, while Hydroblend seeks fees under Idaho Code sections 12-120(3) and 12-121. This Court has previously determined that section 12-121 is not an appropriate source for awarding attorney fees in wage claim disputes, even where other claims were involved. See Bilow v. Preco, Inc., 132 Idaho 23, 33, 966 P.2d 23, 33 (1998) (denying attorney fees where an employee sought an award under I.C. § 12-120(3), alleging unpaid wages and breach of contract). “The [Wage Claim] Act provides any judgment awarded to a plaintiff under the Act ‘may include all costs and attorney’s fees reasonably incurred in connection with the proceedings.’ ” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 873, 421 P.3d 187, 204 (2018) (quoting I.C. § 45-615). In short, “Idaho Code [sections] 45-615 and 45-617 are the exclusive code sections under which an employee may recover attorney fees whenever the underlying cause of action is a wage claim pursuant to I.C. § 45–617(4).” Bilow, 132 Idaho at 33, 966 P.2d at 33. See also Hawes v. W. Pac. Timber, LLC, 167 Idaho 896, 917, 477 P.3d 950, 971 (2020). Likewise, Idaho Code section 45-612(2) is the “exclusive remedy for attorney fees available to an employer when an employee has brought a claim for wages.” Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 315, 17 P.3d 247, 259 (2000). Stiffler has raised multiple issues before this Court, but his underlying cause of action is a wage claim dispute brought under Idaho’s Wage Claim Act. He is the only party who has claimed attorney fees under the correct section of the Idaho Code. However, Stiffler failed to establish that he is “entitled to recover from the defendant either the unpaid wages plus the penalties . . . or damages in the amount of three (3) times the unpaid wages found due and owing, whichever is greater.” I.C. § 45-615(2). Thus, we will not make an award of attorney fees to either party in this appeal.

Section 12-120(4) does not waive attorney fees merely because the plaintiff presents a greater amount of damages at trial than in the statement of claim, though a lack of good faith may still preclude fees.

Johnson v. Sanchez · filed 2004-10-04(4)

Idaho Code Section 12-120(4) presumes that the amount of damages may change from the time the statement of claim is drafted to the date of trial.

A plaintiff does not waive attorney fees under § 12-120(4) by omitting a medical bill from the statement of claim when the defendant already knew of it and the omission is de minimis rather than a significant new item of damage.

Harris v. Alessi · filed 2005-05-20(4), (4)(a)

In the case at hand, Long, unlike Johnson, presented evidence of a new item of damage by failing to include one of her medical bills in her demand letter and then offering evidence of the bill at trial. However, because Alessi and her insurance company already knew about the bill during the settlement negotiations and because the bill was of a de minimis amount, we cannot conclude that the “new” item of damage was “significant.” Long, therefore, substantially complied with I.C. § 12-120(4). Accordingly, the district court did not err in awarding attorney fees to Long.

In a personal-injury action where the damages claim does not exceed $25,000, subsection (4) alone governs attorney fees and permits an award only to the plaintiff.

Gonzalez v. Thacker · filed 2009-01-21(4)

We hold that I.C. § 12-120(4) alone governs attorney fees in personal injury actions where the amount of plaintiffs claim does not exceed $25,000 and allows for an award of attorney fees only to plaintiffs in such cases.

Section 12-120(1) mandates attorney fees to the prevailing party in a personal-injury action only when the pleadings formally and clearly state damages of $35,000 or less.

Angelos v. Schatzel · filed 2024-08-16(1)

This statute requires a mandatory award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in personal injury actions “where the amount pleaded is thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) or less . . . .” I.C. § 12-120(1). ... “The pleadings must precisely comply with the statutory mandate and formally plead an amount of [$35,000] or less.” ... We have “narrowly construed the application of I.C. § 12-120(1) to cases where it is clear that the amount pleaded does not exceed [$35,000].” ... Here, the pleadings specified that the amount of damages would be “determined at trial but in excess of $25,000.” (Emphasis added). Although Angelos sought damages exceeding $25,000 in the underlying action, his pleadings did not foreclose the possibility of a judgment in excess of $35,000. Thus, while Schatzel has prevailed in this appeal, it is not clear that the amount pleaded in the original action was less than $35,000. Id.; I.C. § 12-120(1). Accordingly, Schatzel is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal under section 12-120(1).

Sections 12-120(1) and (3) award attorney fees to a prevailing party when their statutory conditions are met, but no party is entitled to fees when neither side prevails.

Fellowship Tabernacle, Inc. v. Baker · filed 1994-02-22(1), (3)

In light of the final result of the trial, we cannot say that the district court erred in finding that Baker did not prevail for the purposes of either I.C. §§ 12-120(1) or 12-120(3).

Section 12-120(3) requires a party seeking attorney fees to be the prevailing party before fees may be awarded.

Christiansen v. Potlatch 1 FCU · filed 2021-11-16(3)

Both Idaho Code sections 12-120(3) and 12-121 require a prevailing party for an award of fees. ... Neither P1FCU nor Moser prevailed on any issues on appeal; therefore, they are not prevailing parties and we decline to award them attorney fees or costs.

Section 12-120(3) requires reasonable attorney fees for the prevailing party in an open-account action; a defendant who obtains dismissal with prejudice of the sole claim is the prevailing party.

Daisy Manufacturing Co. v. Paintball Sports, Inc. · filed 2000-03-29(3)

Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides that an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party is mandatory in various types of civil actions including, inter alia, actions to recover on an open account, actions to recover on contracts for the sale of goods, and actions arising out of any commercial transaction. ... This is such a case, for application of the Rule 54(d)(1)(B) factors can lead only to a conclusion that Paintball was the prevailing party.

Section 12-120(3) does not award attorney fees on appeal when each party prevails only in part.

Mannos v. Moss · filed 2007-02-22(3)

Since each party only prevailed in part on appeal, their requests for attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) are denied.

Section 12-120(3) generally does not allow appellate attorney fees when the court remands for a finding of material fact, because no party has prevailed.

Melaleuca, Inc. v. Foeller · filed 2014-02-07(3)

Nonetheless, this Court generally does not award attorney fees when it remands an action ... for a finding of material fact because it does not consider any of the parties to the appeal as having “prevailed.” See Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 122 Idaho 471, 481, 835 P.2d 1282, 1292 (1992). Accordingly, the Court will not award the Foellers their attorney fees because the action will be vacated and remanded to the district court for a finding on the issue of damages.

Section 12-120(3) permits the prevailing party in an action for breach of an employment contract to recover attorney fees because an employment contract is a contract for the purchase or sale of services.

Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp. · filed 2005-02-23(3)

First, we have already determined that the prevailing party in an action brought for breach of an employment contract is entitled to an award of fees under § 12-120(3), on the basis that an employment contract constitutes a contract for the purchase or sale of services under that statute.

Section 12-120(3) does not authorize attorney fees when the action is based on an illegal contract, even if a party is allowed some recovery.

Farrell v. Whiteman · filed 2009-01-22(3)

Even when a party is permitted some recovery on an illegal transaction, the court may not award attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3).

Section 12-120(3) treats an action for breach of an employment contract as a commercial transaction subject to its attorney-fee provision, and a prevailing party may receive attorney fees.

Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co. · filed 2011-07-28(3)

“Actions brought for breach of an employment contract are considered commercial transactions and are subject to the attorney fee provision of I.C. § 12-120(3).” ... Mackay has prevailed as to all matters on appeal and is therefore entitled to an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3).

Section 12-120 requires a party seeking attorney fees to identify the specific subsection supporting the request.

MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. McGoldrick · filed 2008-07-01(3)

Because Idaho Code § 12-120 has differing subsections, merely citing the statute without specifying the portion of the statute upon which the claim for attorney fees is based is not sufficient.

Section 12-120(3) mandates attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover in a commercial transaction, but it does not authorize fees in an insured-insurer policy dispute when Idaho Code § 41-1839(4) provides the exclusive remedy.

Villa Highlands, LLC v. Western Community Insurance · filed 2010-02-09(3)

Idaho Code § 12-120(3) mandates the award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in a “civil action to recover ... in any commercial transaction.” However, I.C. § 41-1839(4) provides that “this section and section 12-123, Idaho Code, shall provide the exclusive remedy for the award of statutory attorney‟s fees in all actions between insureds and insurers involving disputes arising under policies of insurance.” Villa Highlands did not prevail on any issue and is therefore not entitled to an award of attorney fees. Although Western Community has prevailed in this appeal, I.C. § 41-1839(4) precludes an award of attorney fees under either I.C. 12-120(3) or I.C. § 12-121. Therefore, we do not award attorney fees.

A party is not entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) without making an appropriate fee request under that statute in the district court.

Stephen v. Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd. · filed 2011-03-17(3)

We hold that neither party is entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) because neither party made an appropriate fee request under that statute in the district court.

Section 12-120 permits the court to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.

Hernandez v. Hernandez · filed 2011-11-02

Charles seeks fees on appeal under I.C. §§ 12-120 and 12-121. Under both sections, this Court may award the prevailing party reasonable fees. Here, Charles has not prevailed and therefore is not entitled to a fee award.

Section 12-120(1) permits attorney fees when the amount pleaded is $25,000 or less, and § 12-120(3) permits fees to the prevailing party on a contract relating to the sale of goods.

GMAC v. Bach · filed 2011-11-17(1), (3)

Next, GMAC seeks the award under Idaho Code § 12-120(1), which allows for an award of attorney fees where the amount pleaded is $25,000 or less. ... GMAC also requests the award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), which provides for an award of fees to the prevailing party on a contract relating to the sale of goods. ... Because we uphold the judgment of the district court in this case, GMAC is the prevailing party. Therefore, we will award attorney fees to GMAC under the financing contract, and under the statutory grounds claimed by GMAC.

A party seeking attorney fees under § 12-120(3) must make an appropriate fee request identifying the statutory basis; deficient requests do not support an award.

Stephen v. Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd. · filed 2011-03-17(3)

We hold that neither party is entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) because neither party made an appropriate fee request under that statute.

Section 12-120(1) allows attorney fees when the amount pleaded is $25,000 or less, and § 12-120(3) allows fees to the prevailing party on a contract relating to the sale of goods.

GMAC v. Bach · filed 2011-11-17(1) and (3)

Next, GMAC seeks the award under Idaho Code § 12-120(1), which allows for an award of attorney fees where the amount pleaded is $25,000 or less. (The complaint in this case alleged that the indebtedness owing on the vehicle was the sum of $17,059.18 plus prejudgment interest at the rate of $4.16 per day from and after March 30, 2009.) GMAC also requests the award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), which provides for an award of fees to the prevailing party on a contract relating to the sale of goods. Finally, GMAC asks for the award under Idaho Code § 12-121, which allows for an award to the prevailing party in the court’s discretion. Because we uphold the judgment of the district court in this case, GMAC is the prevailing party. Therefore, we will award attorney fees to GMAC under the financing contract, and under the statutory grounds claimed by GMAC.

Section 12-120 requires attorney-fee awards to be made after all claims in the action have been adjudicated.

Madison Real Property v. Thomason · filed 2013-08-12

Idaho Code § 12-120, regarding awards of attorneys’ fees and costs in certain cases, also uses the phrases “in any action,” “in any civil action,” and “of the action;” and Idaho Code § 12-121 allows attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party “in any civil action.” As interpreted by the Bagley court, awards made under either authority should be made after all claims have been adjudicated.

Section 12-120 permits an award of attorneys’ fees and costs only after all claims in the action have been adjudicated.

Madison Real Property v. Thomason · filed 2013-08-12

As interpreted by the Bagley court, awards made under either authority should be made after all claims have been adjudicated.

Section 12-120(1) requires a pleading alleging no more than $35,000 and, for a plaintiff to recover attorney fees, written demand for payment at least ten days before the action begins.

Keybank National Ass'n v. Pal I, LLC · filed 2013-10-03(1)

For I.C. § 12-120(1) to apply, the pleading must specifically allege that the amount pleaded does not exceed $35,000. See Mickelsen v. Broadway Ford, Inc., 153 Idaho 149, 156, 280 P.3d 176, 183 (2012). Furthermore, I.C. § 12-120(1) “requires the defendant to be notified of the plaintiff’s claim against defendant for at least ten days before a complaint can even be filed.” Cox v. Mueller, 125 Idaho 734, 737, 874 P.2d 545, 548 (1994). “This Court has held that I.C. § 12-120 mandates an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial.” Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 225, 192 P.3d 1036, 1049 (2008).

Section 12-120(3) grants the prevailing party a reasonable attorney-fee award in a civil action to recover money in a commercial transaction.

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP · filed 2014-08-04(3)

Idaho Code § 12-120(3) “grants the prevailing party the right to an award of a reasonable attorney’s fee in ‘any civil action to recover ... in any commercial transaction.’ ”

Section 12-120(1) requires a plaintiff seeking prevailing-party attorney fees to show a written demand at least 10 days before suit, while section 12-120(3) permits fees to the prevailing party in an action on a contract for services.

Unifund CCR, LLC v. Lowe · filed 2016-02-11(1) and (3)

Both statutes only provide for the awarding of attorney fees to the prevailing party. ... However, absent a showing of the required written demand pri- or to filing this lawsuit, Unifund is not entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(1). ... Therefore, we will award Uni-fund attorney fees under section 12-120(3) because it is the prevailing party on appeal.

Section 12-120(3) entitles a prevailing party in a covered civil action to a reasonable attorney-fee award that is not limited to the amount actually billed or incurred.

Inclusion, Inc. v. Idaho Department of Health & Welfare · filed 2016-11-23(3)

Idaho Code section 12-120(3) entitles the prevailing party to a “reasonable” attorney fee. ... Thus, Idaho law simply does not equate reasonable attorney fees to actual attorney fees.

Section 12-120(1) requires a reasonable attorney-fee award to the prevailing party when the amount pleaded is $35,000 or less, including on appeal when the statute's terms are satisfied.

Blaser v. Cutler · filed 2020-06-25(1)

The applicable statute is Idaho Code § 12-120(1) which provides: “In any action where the amount pleaded is thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) or less, there shall be taxed and allowed to the prevailing party, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorney’s fees.” Where the terms of a statute governing prevailing party attorney fees in civil action have been satisfied it mandates an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial.

Section 12-120(3) does not authorize attorney’s fees when the gravamen of a wrongful-termination claim is violation of statutory rights rather than a commercial transaction or contract.

Kreb v. Life Flight Network, LLC · filed 2021-12-29(3)

These statutory predicates created the rights Plaintiff sought to enforce within his Complaint and Amended Complaint via a wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim – even if the claim itself arises out of an employment relationship. As a result, the gravamen of the cause of action is the violation of these statutes respectively. Idaho Code § 12-120(3) does not apply in this setting.

Section 12-120(3) requires a party seeking attorney fees to establish the statute’s requirements; a contract alone does not automatically establish entitlement, and the court will not infer a qualifying commercial transaction without supporting argument.

Rowett v. Infinity Pools, LLC · filed 2024-05-03(3)

Rowett does not present any substantive argument in support of his request for attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3). This Court will not consider issues on appeal, including a request for attorney fees, which are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument. Bingham v. Montane Resource Assocs., 133 Idaho 420, 427, 987 P.2d 1035, 1042 (1999). Therefore, this Court cannot hold the statutory requirements of I.C. § 12-120(3) have been met to award attorney fees pursuant to the statute. Simply having a contractual agreement, without providing the Court with information regarding the transaction, will not automatically provide relief to the prevailing party under this statute. The facts may indicate this is a commercial transaction; however, we cannot infer that the statutory requirements have been met without additional argument presented on appeal.

Section 12-120(5) permits reasonable postjudgment fees and costs for collecting a judgment when fees are available under subsections (1) through (4), and the request must be made within a reasonable time; subsection (3) permits a prevailing party to recover reasonable attorney fees in a commercial transaction.

Agriculture Services Inc. v. Freeland · filed 2025-04-09(5), (3)

In all instances where a party is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under subsection (1), (2), (3) or (4) of this section, such party shall also be entitled to reasonable postjudgment attorney’s fees and costs incurred in attempting to collect on the judgment. ... The Supreme Court held that, “in order to collect post-judgment attorney fees, a party must request such fees within a reasonable time of incurring them. Because the district court erred in concluding the fourteen-day deadline applied to Bronco Elite’s request for post-judgment attorney fees, it abused its discretion in denying the request.” ... Thus, Freeland’s argument that the fourteen-day-time limit applies to AGI’s request for post-judgment costs and attorney fees fails. ... As noted by the district court, the subject matter of this litigation is a commercial transaction. As the prevailing party on appeal, AGI is entitled to costs and to attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3).

Section 12-120 makes attorney fees part of costs that may be awarded against a county to the prevailing party in a qualifying civil action.

St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Ltd. v. Killeen · filed 1993-07-19

Hence, I.C. § 12-120 includes attorney fees as costs, which I.C. § 12-119 permits the court to assess against counties. When the two statutes are read together, it is apparent that there is statutory authority for awarding attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120.

A request for attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120 must identify the subsection on which it relies.

James v. MERCEA · filed 2012-04-26

She does not identify the subsection of section 12-120 upon which she relies. “Because Idaho Code § 12-120 has differing subsections, merely citing the statute without specifying the portion of the statute upon which the claim for attorney fees is based is not sufficient.”

Section 12-120(3) permits attorney fees in commercial transactions, but a home-loan refinancing for personal or household purposes is not a commercial transaction and does not qualify for fees under the statute.

Bajrektarevic v. Lighthouse Home Loans, Inc. · filed 2007-01-26(3)

The Bajrektarevics seek attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), which provides for an award of reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in any commercial transaction. Commercial transaction has been defined as “all transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes.” I.C. § 12-120(3). The transaction involved in this case — the refinancing of the Bajrektarevics’ home loan — was clearly made “for personal or household purposes,” and does not constitute a commercial transaction as contemplated by Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Therefore, the Bajrektarevics’ request for attorney fees is denied.

Section 12-120(3) does not authorize attorney fees for a transaction to modify a home loan because it is for personal or household purposes, not a commercial transaction.

Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Hafer · filed 2015-06-22(3)

The transaction at issue here was to modify the Hafers’ home loan and is likewise for “personal or household purposes.” It was therefore not a commercial transaction under Idaho Code section 12-120(3) and that statute does not authorize fees on appeal.

Section 12-120(3) requires a reasonable attorney-fee award to the prevailing party in a commercial transaction, but does not apply to transactions for personal or household purposes; merely invoking the statute without alleging a commercial transaction is insufficient to trigger estoppel.

Terrell v. Paradis de Golf Holding, LLC · filed 2023-03-24(3)

Our caselaw is clear that transactions for personal or household purposes do not constitute a commercial transaction for purposes of section 12-120(3).

Section 12-120(4) makes attorney-fee entitlement depend on whether the defendant tendered at least 90% of the amount ultimately recovered before suit, not on the percentage of the plaintiff's written demand that was recovered.

Lake v. Purnell · filed 2007-02-21(4)

Their complaint is really with the provisions of Idaho Code § 12-120(4). To avoid liability for attorney fees under that statute, they had to tender to the Lakes prior to the commencement of this action an amount equal to at least ninety percent of the amount ultimately awarded. The Purnells did not do so. With respect to Justin, their offer was $27.40 too low, and with respect to Allison their offer was $312.40 too low. As a result, Justin and Allison were entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney fee under Idaho Code § 12-120(4). That statute does not base entitlement to an award of attorney fees upon whether the plaintiff recovers a certain percentage of the written demand for payment. It bases the award upon the comparison between the defendant’s tender prior to the filing of the lawsuit and the plaintiffs ultimate recovery.

Section 12-120(4) makes a new item of damage significant only when it causes the plaintiff's damages to exceed a prelitigation tender enough to qualify for attorney fees.

Contreras v. Rubley · filed 2006-02-23(4)

A new item of damage (one not included in the written claim) is significant only if it causes the plaintiffs damages to exceed the tender in an amount sufficient to qualify for an award of attorney fees.

Section 12-120(4) does not waive attorney fees merely because a plaintiff seeks a greater amount for an item of damage listed in the statement of claim; waiver requires a different injury or a significant new item of damage.

Bennett v. Patrick · filed 2012-04-27(4)

An increase in the amounts asked for items of damage included in the statement of claim is not seeking to recover for a new item of damage.

Section 12-120(4) does not waive attorney fees merely because a plaintiff seeks a significantly increased amount for an item of damage listed in the statement of claim.

Bennett v. Patrick · filed 2012-04-27(4)

An increase in the amounts asked for items of damage included in the statement of claim is not seeking to recover for a new item of damage.

Section 12-120(3) permits attorney-fee recovery for a commercial transaction, but an employer-employee relationship alone does not make stock-option enforcement claims commercial transactions; the statute applies to an action to recover on a promissory note.

Paolini v. Albertson's Inc. · filed 2008-01-31(3)

The district court erred; § 12-120(3) is not applicable to these claims. First, contrary to the district court’s stated basis for awarding fees, the stock option plan and agreements were not employment contracts—each of those agreements expressly disclaimed any right to employment. Second, although Paolini and Albertson’s were engaged in a commercial relationship as employer-employee, this relationship does not automatically render Paolini’s attempt to enforce option rights into claims based on a “commercial transaction.”

Subsection (3) requires attorney fees for the prevailing party in an action to recover in a commercial transaction, defined as all transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes.

Vanderwal v. Albar, Inc. · filed 2013-06-20(3)

JLZ Enterprises requests an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to the real estate contract and to Idaho Code section 12-120(3), which provides that attorney fees shall be awarded to the prevailing party in an action to recover in a commercial transaction. A commercial transaction is defined as “all transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes.” I.C. § 12-120(3). Because this was an action to recover in a commercial transaction, we award JLZ Enterprises reasonable attorney fees on appeal.

Section 12-120(3) allows a prevailing party to recover reasonable fees for defending a counterclaim that seeks recovery on a commercial transaction, including an employment contract.

Carbajal v. Hayes Management Services, Inc. · filed 2024-08-30(3)

In other words, the defendant’s answer and counterclaim becomes the relevant pleading for purposes of Section 12-120(3). The key, then, is whether the counterclaim was brought to recover on a “commercial transaction,” such as an employment contract.

Idaho Code § 12-120’s statutory attorney-fee entitlement does not override a valid contractual agreement governing fees and costs.

Zenner v. Holcomb · filed 2009-06-16

In Farm Credit Bank, we stated that I.C. § 12-120 “does not override a valid agreement. . . .” 122 Idaho at 569, 836 P.2d at 515 (citing Chittenden & Eastman Co. v. Leasure, 116 Idaho 981, 982, 783 P.2d 320, 321 (Ct. App. 1989)). Likewise, we hold that the general entitlement to costs under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1) does not override a valid agreement.

Section 12-120(3) does not apply to actions between insureds and insurers involving disputes arising under an insurance policy.

Woodworth v. Stonebridge Life Ins. · filed 2009-07-08(3)

However, Idaho Code § 41-1839, entitled “Allowance of attorney fees in suits against insurers,” expressly states that “Section 12-120, Idaho Code, shall not apply to any actions between insureds and insurers involving disputes arising under any policy of insurance.”

Section 12-120(3) requires reasonable attorney fees for the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a contract for services, and subsection (5) extends that entitlement to reasonable postjudgment fees and costs incurred to collect the judgment.

MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES, LLC v. Carnes · filed 2010-03-25(3) and (5)

Idaho Code § 12-120(3) mandates an award of reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in any civil action to recover on a contract for services. Section 12-120(5) states that “[i]n all instances where a party is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under subsection (1), (2), (3) or (4) of this section, such party shall also be entitled to reasonable postjudgment attorney’s fees and costs incurred in attempting to collect on the judgment.” Here, MRS is the prevailing party in an action to collect on a contract for provision of medical services, so it was entitled to an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). By terms of I.C. § 12-120(5), that entitlement includes a right to attorney fees incurred in a reasonable attempt to collect on the judgment.

Subsection (5) permits reasonable postjudgment attorney fees when the party was entitled to fees under subsection (1), (2), (3), or (4), and does not require the underlying judgment to identify the specific statutory basis.

Magleby v. Kevin · filed 2013-02-26(5)

The statute does not require that the judgment recite the specific code section under which attorney fees were originally awarded, nor has this Court ever imposed such a requirement.

Section 12-120(5) makes postjudgment attorney fees mandatory when the party is otherwise entitled to fees under subsection (1), (2), (3), or (4), although the amount remains within the trial court’s discretion.

Medical Recovery Svcs v. Penny R. Siler · filed 2017-04-28(5)

However, under section 12-120(5), attorney fees are mandatory.

Section 12-120(5) mandates reasonable postjudgment attorney fees and costs for attempts to collect on a judgment when the party is otherwise entitled under subsections (1) through (4), but it does not authorize fees for attempting to collect attorney fees.

Med. Recovery Servs., LLC v. Lopez · filed 2018-02-14(5)

We find that the district court properly reversed the magistrate court’s judgment, determining that postjudgment attorney fees were mandatory under Idaho Code section 12-120(5). However, after the district court’s decision, MRS was no longer trying to collect on a judgment. Instead, similar to the situation in Siler, MRS was attempting to collect attorney fees related to its previous attempt to collect attorney fees. According to Lecheminant, Idaho Code section 12-120(1) and (3) do not apply to such an attempt. Further, according to Siler, Idaho Code section 12-120(5) does not support such an award. Therefore, we find that the district court properly denied MRS’s request for attorney fees on appeal.

Subsection (5) makes postjudgment attorney fees and costs mandatory for a party otherwise entitled under subsection (1), (2), (3), or (4), but it does not authorize fees for an appeal seeking fees incurred in an earlier collection effort; subsections (1) and (3) do not apply to that appeal.

Med. Recovery Servs., LLC v. Merritt · filed 2018-05-07(5); (1) and (3)

Similarly, we are not persuaded by MRS’s argument that it was entitled to attorney fees on appeal under I.C. § 12-120(1) and (3). The Court makes clear in Lopez that I.C. § 12-120(1) and (3) are not applicable to MRS’s claim. The district court properly reversed the magistrate court’s judgment, determining that some post-judgment attorney fees were mandatory under I.C. § 12-120(5). However, after the district court’s decision, MRS was no longer trying to collect on a judgment. Rather, MRS was attempting to collect attorney fees related to its previous attempt to collect attorney fees. According to Lecheminant, I.C. § 12-120(1) and (3) do not apply to such an attempt. Further, according to Siler, I.C. § 12-120(5) does not support such an award. Therefore, the district court properly denied MRS’s request for attorney fees on appeal.

Section 12-120(3) permits a reasonable award of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in an action to recover on a contract, and applies to disputes over obligations inherent in a franchise contract.

Transport Truck & Trailer, Inc. v. Freightliner, LLC · filed 2010-03-01(3)

Because this case arises out of a dispute over the obligations inherent in the franchise contract between Transport Truck and Freightliner, Idaho Code §12-120(3) applies and fees may be awarded to the prevailing party.

Section 12-120(3) allows a prevailing party to recover attorney fees when the civil action is based on a qualifying contract, including enforceable CC&Rs.

Marquette v. Falck · filed 2024-08-16(3)

Idaho Code § 12-120(3) allows a prevailing party to recover attorney fees pursuant to a contract. CC&Rs are a valid, enforceable contract. Eagle Springs, 165 Idaho at 868, 454 P.3d at 510. As the prevailing party, pursuant to the CC&Rs, the Marquettes were entitled to recover their attorney fees.

Under the pre-1986 version of § 12-120(2), attorney fees for a goods contract require an action to recover on a contract; a suit against a party with whom the plaintiff had no contract does not qualify.

Management Catalysts v. Turbo West Corpac, Inc. · filed 1991-03-05(2)

Based upon the interpretation of the statute in Day, the trial court’s grant of attorney fees against appellants must be reversed; there being no contract between appellants *631and Piper Aircraft, the suit was not one “to recover on a contract.”

Section 12-120(3) permits a prevailing party to recover reasonable attorney fees incurred in determining and securing the amount of its fee award.

BECO Construction Co. v. J-U-B Engineers Inc. · filed 2010-05-28(3)

Rather, we hold today that courts may award reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection with the effort to secure a reasonable amount of attorney fees. ... We can discern no principled basis for treating claims for attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120 in a different fashion.

Section 12-120(3) does not provide an independent basis for attorney fees against a county when § 12-117 governs the fee award.

Smith v. Washington County · filed 2010-10-06(3)

As noted above, I.C. § 12-117 specifically provides for attorney fees in actions against the counties, so it governs this case exclusively. See I.C. § 12-117(4)(b). Smith therefore cannot receive attorney fees under I.C. §§ 12-120(3) or 12-121.

Section 12-120(3) does not provide an avenue for attorney-fee recovery against a county when Idaho Code § 12-117 exclusively governs the action.

Smith v. Washington County Idaho · filed 2010-12-15(3)

Even if he had not, I.C. § 12-117 ―is the exclusive means for awarding attorney fees for the entities to which it applies.‖ Potlatch Educ. Ass’n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist., 148 Idaho 630, ---, 226 P.3d 1277, 1282 (2010); see also State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 718, 723, 947 P.2d 391, 396 (1997) (―I.C. § 12-117 provides the exclusive basis upon which to seek an award of attorney fees against a state agency.‖); Johnson v. Blaine Cnty., 146 Idaho 916, 929, 204 P.3d 1127, 1140 (2009) (holding that fees for a petition for judicial review of a county’s decision are not awardable under I.C. § 12-121). As noted above, I.C. § 12-117 specifically provides for attorney fees in actions against the counties, so it governs this case exclusively. See I.C. § 12-117(4)(b). Smith therefore cannot receive attorney fees under I.C. §§ 12-120(3) or 12-121.

Section 12-120(3) permits the prevailing party to recover reasonable attorney fees when a claim is based on a contract relating to services, even if contractual liability is not ultimately established.

John F. Noak, M.D. v. Dept of Corrections and Prison Health Services, Inc. · filed 2012-01-06(3)

In this case, Noak alleged a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which sounds in contract. The complaint asserted that the covenant was implied into the employment agreement between Noak and PHS and that by virtue of that agreement the covenant was binding upon IDOC. Noak thus sought to recover against IDOC based on a contract relating to services. Such allegations triggered application of the contract prong of I.C. § 12-120(3).

A claim alleging breach of a covenant implied in an employment agreement for services triggers the contract prong of Idaho Code § 12-120(3), allowing the prevailing party to recover attorney fees even when the claimant was not a party to that contract.

Noak v. Idaho Department of Correction · filed 2012-01-06(3)

Noak thus sought to recover against IDOC based on a contract relating to services. Such allegations triggered application of the contract prong of I.C. § 12-120(3). Noak misunderstands the essence of his claim, which he characterizes as something other than a contract claim, but that does not change the fact that Noak alleged a cause of action based upon a contract (even though he was not a party to that contract). Accordingly, IDOC, as the prevailing party, may recover fees.

The contract prong applies when a party alleges a contract-based claim relating to services, allowing the prevailing party to recover attorney fees even if no contractual liability is ultimately established.

John F. Noak, M.D. v. Dept of Corrections and Prison Health Services, Inc. · filed 2012-01-06(3)

In this case, Noak alleged a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which sounds in contract. ... Noak thus sought to recover against IDOC based on a contract relating to services. Such allegations triggered application of the contract prong of I.C. § 12-120(3). ... Accordingly, IDOC, as the prevailing party, may recover fees.

Section 12-120(3) does not treat disputes seeking a determination of property rights as commercial transactions eligible for its attorney-fee award.

Kayser v. McClary · filed 2012-06-22(3)

Generally speaking, disputes seeking a determination of property rights are not considered commercial transactions within Idaho Code section 12-120(3).

Section 12-120(3) does not apply unless each party entered the transaction for a commercial purpose.

Goodspeed v. Shippen · filed 2013-06-25(3)

As this transaction lacks the required symmetry of commercial purpose, I.C. § 12-120(3) does not apply.

Section 12-120(3) does not apply to mechanic’s-lien foreclosure actions or appeals from them.

Allied General F&S v. DeBest Fire · filed 2014-05-01(3)

However, I.C. § 12-120(3) does not apply to mechanic’s lien foreclosure actions or appeals therefrom.

Section 12-120(3) does not authorize attorney fees in mechanic’s lien foreclosure actions or appeals from those actions.

Allied General F&S v. DeBest Fire · filed 2014-05-01(3)

However, I.C. § 12-120(3) does not apply to mechanic’s lien foreclosure actions or appeals therefrom.

Section 12-120(5) permits reasonable postjudgment attorney fees and costs for collecting a judgment when the party was entitled to fees under subsection (1), (2), (3), or (4), and it does not require the original judgment to identify the specific fee subsection; here, the underlying fees were authorized under subsection (3) because the transaction was commercial.

Magleby v. Kevin · filed 2013-02-26(5), with (3) as the underlying entitlement provision

The statute does not require that the judgment recite the specific code section under which attorney fees were originally awarded, nor has this Court ever imposed such a requirement. ... Thus, the appropriate inquiry is whether the Maglebys were entitled to recover attorney fees under one of the enumerated subsections of I.C. § 12-120 at the time of the entry of judgment against ITP and Jenks. ... It is evident that the transaction between the Maglebys and ITP and Jenks, involving rendition of professional services in connection with construction of a cabin for sale to another, was a commercial transaction and that the original award of attorney fees under the default judgment was authorized by I.C. § 12-120(3).

Section 12-120 does not apply to cases involving termination of parental rights.

Doe v. Jane Doe (2014-12) · filed 2014-08-25

However, I.C. § 12-120 does not apply to cases involving termination of parental rights.

Section 12-120(3) permits attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a note or negotiable instrument.

Porcello v. Estates of Porcello · filed 2020-08-03(3)

Idaho Code section 12-120(3) allows for attorney fees to be awarded to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a note or negotiable instrument. I.C. § 12-120(3). ... Accordingly, under Idaho Code section 12-120(3), there is no prevailing party on appeal, and no party is entitled to attorney fees.

Section 12-120(2) allows the prevailing party attorney fees in an action on a promissory note even when the note does not relate to a sale of goods.

Cheney v. Smith · filed 1985-03-26(2)

We conclude that I.C. § 12-120(2) applies to the instant case.

Section 12-120(3) does not entitle a prevailing party representing itself to attorney fees, even when that party is a lawyer.

Swanson & Setzke, Chtd. v. Henning · filed 1989-04-27(3)

Accordingly, we conclude that the general rule against attorney fee awards to pro se litigants is the law in Idaho. It precludes any automatic award in this case under I.C. § 12-120. ... For this reason, and because the other rationales for the general rule against fee awards are applicable to lawyer and nonlawyer litigants alike, we decline to carve out a special exception for lawyers pro se.