Statute Annotations › Idaho › Idaho Code § 18-8004

Idaho Code § 18-8004

Driving under the influence: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Idaho
Case notes
136
Cited in passing
684
Citing cases indexed
982
Case dates
1987–2026
Screened through
2026-06-03
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-22
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

820 citing cases reviewed of 982 in the citation index: 136 interpreted the section (annotated below), 684 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-03 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Idaho Code § 18-8004?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1987 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 122, § 2 allowed approved blood, breath or urine results to establish the alcohol concentration directly and added admission of approved test results and records without a reliability witness. State v. Elias-Cruz quotes the amendment. Source
  • 1988 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 47, § 4 transferred subsection (4)'s testing standards and laboratory authority from Health and Welfare to the Department of Law Enforcement. Source
  • 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 422, § 1 added a separate offense for drivers under 21 with an alcohol concentration of at least 0.02 but below 0.10, and excepted it from the below-limit prosecution bar. Source
  • 1997 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 158, § 1 reduced the per se alcohol concentration from 0.10 to 0.08 and conformed the commercial-vehicle, under-21 and below-limit provisions; State v. Severance (1999) confirms the change. Source
  • 1997 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 307, § 1 changed former subsection (5)'s non-narcotic drug standard from incapacity to drive safely to impaired ability to operate safely. Source
  • 1998-07-01 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 70, § 1 changed the commercial-vehicle range to 0.04 or higher but below 0.08. Source
  • 2000-07-01 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 469, § 28 transferred subsection (4)'s testing standards and laboratory authority from the Department of Law Enforcement to the Idaho State Police. Source
  • 2002-07-01 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 253, § 1 added combinations of intoxicants to the DUI provisions, deleted former subsection (5)'s separate drug categories, and added a prescription-use provision as subsection (7). The drug's effect on driving remains relevant. Source

Elements and proof of DUI

Law changed since 1987 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 122, § 2 allowed direct proof by approved breath or urine analysis without conversion to blood alcohol concentration; 1997 ch. 158, § 1 reduced the per se threshold from 0.10 to 0.08.

Section 18-8004 defines one DUI offense that may be proved either by a blood alcohol content of .10 percent or by other evidence that the driver was under the influence of alcohol.

State v. Hartwig · filed 1987-01-26

We previously have held that the Idaho DUI statute, (formerly I.C. § 49-1102 but now codified as I.C. § 18-8004), does not establish two separate crimes. State v. Knoll, 110 Idaho 678, 718 P.2d 589 (Ct.App. 1986); State v. Brown, 109 Idaho 981, 712 P.2d 682 (Ct.App. 1985). Rather, the statute provides for one crime with two alternative methods of proof. The state may establish the violation per se by proof of a blood alcohol content of .10 percent or, alternatively, by proving with other circumstantial evidence that the defendant was driving while under the influence of alcohol.
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Section 18-8004(2) permits proof of driving under the influence through other competent evidence when no alcohol concentration test was taken.

State v. Tupis · filed 1987-04-01(2)

Any person who does not take a test to determine alcohol concentration may be prosecuted for driving or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, or any other intoxicating substances, on other competent evidence. ... As worded by the trial court, the instruction is consistent with I.C. § 18-8004(2) and accurately reflects Idaho law.
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Section 18-8004 requires proof that alcohol impaired the defendant’s ability to drive, but does not require proof that the defendant could not drive safely or prudently or that impairment reached a specified degree.

State v. Andrus · filed 1990-03-21

It is not necessary to prove that the defendant could not drive safely or prudently; it is sufficient to prove only that his ability to drive was impaired by the influence of alcohol. Further, it is not necessary that the state prove impairment to any specified degree.
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Section 18-8004 can be violated by a moderate drinker if alcohol perceptibly impairs the person's ability to drive.

State v. Bailey · filed 1990-05-02

However, a defendant need not drink excessively to be convicted of driving under the influence. He need only be shown to have consumed alcohol, which perceptibly impaired his ability to drive.
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Law changed since 1997 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 158, § 1 reduced the per se alcohol concentration from 0.10 to 0.08; actual impairment remains unnecessary for that method.

Section 18-8004(1) permits a drunk driving prosecution based on an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more without proof of actual impairment.

State v. Nelson · filed 1991-03-19(1)

The state need not prove that the person was actually impaired by alcohol, but merely that the analysis of blood, urine, or breath had established an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more. By so structuring the drunk driving statute, the legislature was expressing its intent that prosecutions for drunk driving may be grounded in a per se 0.10 alcohol concentration test, rather than in complicated proof over the level of impairment of any particular individual.
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Law changed since 1997 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 158, § 1 reduced the per se alcohol concentration from 0.10 to 0.08; the HGN evidence rule was not changed by that amendment.

Section 18-8004 permits proof of DUI through a BAC of .10 percent or higher or circumstantial evidence of impairment, but a positive HGN test without chemical analysis cannot establish the BAC threshold.

State v. Garrett · filed 1991-05-09

The State may prove a violation of I.C. § 18-8004 two ways. State v. Knoll, 110 Idaho 678, 718 P.2d 589 (Ct.App. 1986) (DUI may be proved by establishing BAC of .10 percent or higher, or by circumstantial evidence of impaired driving ability or other readily observable symptoms of intoxication). A positive HGN test in the absence of some form of chemical analysis for the reasons stated above cannot be used at trial to establish blood alcohol content of .10 percent or above.
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Section 18-8004 requires driving or actual physical control of a car while under the influence of alcohol or another intoxicating substance.

State v. Zubizareta · filed 1992-09-14

As described in the statute and stated in the charges filed against Zubizareta, the elements of felony driving under the influence are limited to whether Zubizareta drove or was in actual physical control of his car, while under the influence of alcohol or other intoxicating substances, in Ada County, Idaho, and that he had pled or been found guilty of at least two violations of I.C. § 18-8004 within the previous five years.
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Section 18-8004 requires proof that alcohol affected the driver's ability to drive, without proof of a particular degree of intoxication.

State v. Gleason · filed 1992-12-22

The proper jury instruction for the crime of driving under the influence can be found in State v. Glanzman, 69 Idaho 46, 202 P.2d 407 (1949). In Glanzman, this Court held that the driver need not be shown to have been in any particular degree or state of intoxication, but only to have consumed intoxicating liquor to such extent as to influence or affect his ability to drive.
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Section 18-8004 does not require proof of a particular degree of intoxication; for driving under the influence, the State must show that alcohol or drugs affected the defendant’s driving.

State v. Lewis · filed 1994-09-22(1)(a)

To constitute the crime of operating or controlling a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or any other intoxicating substances, it is not necessary that any particular degree or state of intoxication be shown. The State need only show that the defendant had consumed sufficient intoxicating beverage, or ingested sufficient drugs, to influence or affect his driving. ... The instruction in this case is readily distinguishable from the improper instructions given in Andrus and adequately informs the jury on the meaning of the phrase driving under the influence. Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury.
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Section 18-8004 prohibits driving under the influence of drugs; an admission of driving under the influence of marijuana establishes a violation.

State v. Gardner · filed 1994-11-21

He acknowledged he was under the influence of marijuana at the time of the accident, and this admission is sufficient to establish that he violated I.C. § 18-8004 by driving under the influence of drugs, but that is not the offense with which he was charged or to which he pleaded guilty.
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Law changed since 1997 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 158, § 1 reduced the per se alcohol concentration from 0.10 to 0.08; the two alternative methods of proof remain.

Section 18-8004 permits the state to prove DUI by either impairment or an alcohol concentration of at least 0.10, without electing one method of proof.

State v. Barker · filed 1992-11-02(1)(a)

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the magistrate did not err when he denied Barker’s motion to elect which method of proof the state would use. Such an order would be contrary to the language of I.C. § 18-8004, which uses the disjunctive “or” in its description of the methods of proof allowed to establish the elements of the crime.
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Law changed since 1997 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 158, § 1 reduced the per se alcohol concentration from 0.10 to 0.08; the impairment method remains.

When no chemical test is performed, § 18-8004(1)(a) requires evidence of alcohol consumption and discernible impairment related to the ability to drive.

State v. Bronnenberg · filed 1993-07-08(1)(a)

Thus, where as here, the .10% per se rule is inapplicable because no chemical testing has been performed, "driving under the influence" must be established by evidence showing consumption of alcohol and some discernible impairment related to the motorist's ability to drive.
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Law changed since 1997 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 158, § 1 reduced the per se alcohol concentration from 0.10 to 0.08; the evidence rule applies to the amended threshold.

For a DUI charge based on an alcohol concentration of .10 or more, outward signs of sobriety cannot challenge a chemical test without a foundation linking those signs to the measured alcohol level.

State v. Edmondson · filed 1994-01-12(1)(a)

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the driver had an alcohol concentration of .10 or more is deemed a per se violation of the statute, and is conclusive, not presumptive, of guilt. ... Where, as in Edmondson’s case, such foundation is entirely lacking, the evidence of his outward symptoms was not relevant, and therefore inadmissible.
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Law changed since 1997 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 158, § 1 reduced the per se alcohol concentration from 0.10 to 0.08; the two methods of proof remain.

Section 18-8004 defines one DUI offense that the state may prove either by a blood alcohol concentration of at least .10 while driving or by evidence that the defendant drove under the influence of alcohol.

State v. Thomas · filed 1996-07-19

We begin by noting that I.C. § 18-8004 provides one crime with two methods of proof. The state may establish a violation of this provision by proving that, while driving, the defendant’s blood alcohol concentration was at least .10 or may, instead, prove through direct and circumstantial evidence that the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 18-8004 provides one DUI offense that the state may prove through a blood alcohol concentration of .10 or above while driving or through evidence that the defendant drove under the influence of alcohol.

State v. Winson · filed 1996-07-25

Idaho Code Section 18-8004 provides one crime with two methods of proof. The state may establish a violation of that provision by proving that, while driving, the defendant had a blood alcohol concentration of .10 or above, or the state may instead prove through direct and circumstantial evidence that the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol.
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Law changed since The accident preceded 1997 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 158, § 1, which reduced the per se alcohol concentration from 0.10 to 0.08.

At the time of the accident, § 18-8004 set a 0.10 alcohol concentration threshold for being legally under the influence of alcohol.

Dabestani v. Bellus · filed 1998-06-24(1)(a)

At the time of this accident, a person was considered to be unlawfully “under the influence of alcohol” if that person had “an alcohol concentration of 0.10.” I.C. § 18-8004(l)(a) (1994). Therefore, at the time of his accident, Dabestani was not considered to be legally “under the influence of alcohol.”
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Section 18-8004 makes a breath alcohol concentration above .08 percent a per se violation regardless of blood alcohol content, so evidence that the standard partition ratio varies among individuals is irrelevant.

State v. Hardesty · filed 2002-01-10(1)(a)

Under I.C. § 18-8004, Hardesty’s proffered evidence of the variability of the standard 2100:1 partition ratio is irrelevant because a breath alcohol concentration above the prescribed limit of .08 percent is a per se violation of the statute regardless of blood alcohol content. Therefore, we hold that the magistrate erred by granting Hardesty’s motion to introduce evidence regarding the variability of the standard partition ratio because such evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible.
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Law changed since 1997 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 158, § 1 reduced the statutory alcohol concentration from 0.10 to 0.08; the note describes the rule for the earlier offense.

Section 18-8004(2), as it applied at the time, barred prosecution when an officer-requested blood, urine, or breath test showed a BAC below .10, even if extrapolation might show a higher BAC at the time of driving.

State v. Daniel · filed 1999-02-22(2)

The language of I.C. § 18-8004(2) is plain and unambiguous. It states that where a blood, urine, or breath test, administered at the request of a police officer shows that the suspect’s BAC is less than .10, that person shall not be prosecuted. Contrary to the State’s position, the statute does not prohibit prosecution only where the test, in conjunction with expert testimony extrapolating the test results back to the time of driving or the accident, shows that the suspect’s BAC level was below .10.
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Section 18-8004 defines one DUI offense that may be proved by impairment or by an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more.

State v. Ferreira · filed 1999-11-15(1)(a)

Thus, I.C. § 18-8004 provides for one crime, with two alternative methods of proof.
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Section 18-8004(1)(a) permits proof of driving under the influence through alcohol testing or direct or circumstantial evidence that alcohol impaired the driver’s ability to drive.

United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Pair (In Re Pair) · filed 2001-07-13(1)(a)

These two theories of proof are: (1) forensic testing of the driver’s breath, blood or urine to show the blood alcohol content (BAC); or (2) direct or circumstantial evidence of impairment of ability to drive due to the influence of alcohol.
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Section 18-8004(1)(a) permits a DUI conviction based on proof that a person with a blood alcohol concentration of at least 0.08 drove or actually controlled a motor vehicle on a road or property open to the public.

State v. Roth · filed 2003-05-05(1)(a)

To establish a DUI offense, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Roth had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more, and drove or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within Blaine County upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property open to the public.
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Section 18-8004 requires proof that the person was driving or in physical control of a vehicle in a DUI prosecution.

State v. Ambro · filed 2005-10-28

When prosecuting crimes such as leaving the scene of an accident or DUI, the state must prove that the person was driving or in physical control of a vehicle.
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Section 18-8004 allows a driving-under-the-influence violation to be proved either by evidence of impaired driving or by test results exceeding the statutory alcohol limit.

Thompson v. State · filed 2003-03-05

A violation of I.C. § 18-8004, which prohibits driving under the influence, may be proved in either of two ways — by direct and circumstantial evidence that use of alcohol has impaired the vehicle operator’s ability to drive or, alternatively, by test results showing that the alcohol concentration in the operator’s blood, breath or urine exceeded the statutory limit.
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Section 18-8004(1) permits a DUI charge based either on an alcohol concentration above .08 or on alcohol causing actual impairment of the ability to drive; when breath test results are excluded, the State is limited to the impairment form.

State v. Davis · filed 2003-12-05(1)

With the breath test results having been excluded, the State was precluded from trying Davis for per se DUI for driving with an alcohol concentration in excess of .08, and was limited to proving the alternative form of DUI, driving while under the influence of alcohol to a degree that there was actual impairment of the ability to drive.
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In an impairment prosecution under § 18-8004(1)(a), numerical blood alcohol test results require evidence connecting the results to the time of driving and to the driver's impairment.

State v. Robinett · filed 2005-01-28(1)(a)

We hold today that a numerical BAC test result is relevant to a prosecution for driving under the influence (as opposed to a per se violation) only if a proper foundation is laid to assure the validity of the test result, including evidence extrapolating the result back to the time of the alleged offense. ... This requires there be evidence connecting the test result to the time of the alleged offense and evidence showing how the numerical result relates to the issue of impairment.
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Section 18-8004(1)(a) is violated when alcohol or drugs influence or affect a person’s driving.

State v. Oliver · filed 2007-10-17(1)(a)

Thus, the issue is whether the jury was presented with substantial, competent evidence showing that Oliver had consumed sufficient alcohol and/or drugs to influence or affect his driving of his motor vehicle. It clearly was.
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Under section 18-8004, a person is under the influence of alcohol when driving ability is noticeably impaired to the slightest degree.

State v. Schmoll · filed 2007-11-07(1)(a)

Proving that a person is under the influence absent a BAC test requires a greater degree of impairment in Montana than in Idaho, since in Idaho, the ability to drive need only be impaired “to the slightest degree,” while in Montana, the ability to drive “safely” is the quality that must be diminished.
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Section 18-8004 requires proof, under an alcohol intoxication theory, that the driver consumed enough alcohol to influence or affect driving.

State v. Gross · filed 2008-07-15

The state charged Gross with DUI in violation of I.C. § 18-8004 and proceeded on a theory of alcohol intoxication. The state was required to prove that Gross had consumed sufficient alcohol to influence or affect his driving of the motor vehicle.
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Section 18-8004 does not require proof of the quantity or concentration of drugs in a driver’s system to establish drug impairment.

Feasel v. Idaho Transportation Department · filed 2009-10-15

Contrary to the district court’s interpretation, neither I.C. § 18-8002A(4) nor I.C. § 18-8004 requires that the state show the quantity or concentration of drugs in a driver’s system and that such a quantity would cause impairment.
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Without chemical test results, § 18-8004 requires evidence of physical impairment; proof of drinking alone is insufficient.

Wood v. Loader (In Re Loader) · filed 2009-09-28(2)

Absent chemical test results to show Loader exceeded the statutory blood alcohol limits, Wood must show that Loader was physically impaired. While this is a close call, and although she has clearly shown that Loader consumed several drinks on the day of the accident, the evidence is insufficient to persuade the Court that, more probably than not, Loader was discernibly impaired due to his alcoholic consumption.
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Section 18-8004 permits proof of intoxication through a blood alcohol concentration above the statutory limit or through evidence that alcohol impaired the person’s ability to drive; the latter requires both alcohol consumption and discernible driving impairment.

Wood v. Loader (In Re Loader) · filed 2009-12-10

Plaintiff may prove intoxication under Idaho Code § 18-8004 in either of two ways. The first option is through forensic evidence that Defendant’s blood alcohol concentration exceeded the statutory percentage. ... Alternatively, Plaintiff may show, through either direct or circumstantial evidence, the impairment of ability to drive due to the influence of alcohol. ... Under this method, Plaintiff must show both evidence of consumption of alcohol and “some dis-eernable impairment related to the motorist’s ability to drive.”
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Section 18-8004(2) does not bar DUI prosecution when a test result below 0.08 is demonstrably inaccurate or unreliable.

State v. Turbyfill · filed 2012-09-28(2)

In our view, Section 18-8004(2) does not prohibit prosecution where the test result of less than .08 was demonstrably inaccurate or unreliable.
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Section 18-8004 requires alcohol or drugs to affect a person’s ability to drive and is sufficiently similar to Montana’s DUI statute to support felony enhancement there.

State v. Young · filed 2012-11-07(1)(a)

Both require more than just drinking and driving; they require the consumption of alcohol or drugs to affect a person’s ability to drive.
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Section 18-8004(1)(a) requires evidence that alcohol, drugs, or another intoxicating substance caused the driver’s impairment; impairment alone is insufficient.

State v. Geirrod Detloph Stark · filed 2013-04-04(1)(a)

The State must also present evidence, besides the impairment itself, to prove that the impairment was caused by alcohol, drugs, or intoxicating substances.
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For a per se DUI violation, section 18-8004(1)(a) looks to alcohol concentration at the time of testing after driving or actual physical control.

State v. Juarez · filed 2013-11-12(1)(a)

In this sense, Idaho’s statute largely mirrors the substantive essence of Nevada Revised Statutes § 484.379(1)(c); Idaho’s statute also provides that it is the person’s alcohol concentration at the time of the test, taken after driving or being in actual physical control, that comprises a prima facie violation.
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Section 18-8004(1)(a) establishes an alcohol concentration violation even when a driver shows little observable impairment.

State v. Hunter · filed 2014-05-06(1)(a)

This is especially true because I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a) establishes a per se alcohol concentration violation. An individual who has become more tolerant to alcohol may not exhibit the same observable functional impairment at the per se legal limit as others.
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Law changed since State v. Austin (2018) limited this rule to the State’s initial proof and held that a defendant may offer contrary evidence about alcohol concentration while driving.

For a per se violation of § 18-8004(1)(a), the relevant alcohol concentration is the level when the sample was taken, rather than when the defendant was driving.

State v. Tomlinson · filed 2015-04-07(1)(a)

Indeed, where the prosecution elects to proceed under a per se theory of liability, the question is what the alcohol level was at the time the sample was taken.
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Section 18-8004(1)(a) makes general attacks on the validity of blood testing irrelevant to a per se DUI charge when the blood test yields a result above the statutory limit.

State v. Nichols · filed 2015-11-10(1)(a)

This information does not relate to whether an individual violated the per se DUI offense, which simply requires that the blood test yielded a result above the per se limit. Therefore, evidence generally attacking the validity of blood testing is irrelevant and inadmissible.
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Section 18-8004(2) requires expert testimony linking the administration of a breath test to the unreliability of a below-limit result for the State to avoid dismissal.

State v. Luna · filed 2016-07-18(2)

Where the results involve both the reliability and unreliability of the same BAC testing procedure on the same device, the State must produce an expert witness to explain the circumstances under which specific results are reliable while others are not.
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Breath-test results may be admitted despite noncompliance with administrative procedures if expert testimony establishes that the results reliably show alcohol concentration above the legal limit.

State v. Longhofer · filed 2017-06-29(4)

Second, even without fulfilling the administrative procedures, the State may still make the test results admissible if it calls an expert witness to establish the reliability of the test.
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Section 18-8004’s driving-under-the-influence element is adequately explained by the pattern instruction on degree of intoxication; the instruction need not include the words “noticeable” or “perceptible.”

State v. Jeske · filed 2018-03-06

In State v. Lewis, 126 Idaho 282, 285, 882 P.2d 449, 452 (Ct. App. 1994), this Court held that the pattern instruction on degree of intoxication (ICJI 1006) adequately informs the jury on the meaning of the phrase driving under the influence, and the words “noticeable” or “perceptible” are not required to be included in the instruction. The district court did not err when it refused to give Jeske’s modified pattern jury instruction.
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Under Section 18-8004(1)(a), a qualifying alcohol test can establish a per se DUI violation, but a defendant may present contrary evidence about their alcohol concentration while driving.

State v. Austin · filed 2018-03-06(1)(a)

The test result, however, does not act to remove the violation’s nexus to driving, nor does it mandate an unassailable conclusion not open to defense. The Tomlinson decision erroneously extended the irrelevancy of a driver’s actual alcohol concentration while driving—not required in the State’s case-in-chief and not admissible as it relates to a machine’s margin of error—to deny a defendant’s right to present contrary evidence in his defense.
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Submitting to or refusing a BAC test is not an element of DUI under section 18-8004.

Reagan v. Idaho Transportation Department · filed 2021-03-23

However, under Idaho Code section 18-8004, the act of submitting (or not) to a BAC test is not an element of the crime of driving under the influence; rather, it is the act of driving with a BAC in excess of the legal limit.
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A defendant charged with a per se DUI violation may present rising BAC evidence by questioning the State’s disclosed expert without disclosing an expert of his own.

State v. Hollon · filed 2019-12-23(1)(a)

The State contends this is so because Hollon did not disclose an expert who could present exculpatory testimony regarding rising BAC. However, this argument overlooks that Hollon was not required to disclose his own expert in order to present such a defense. Rather, Hollon was entitled to inquire of the State’s previously disclosed expert on this point.
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Circumstantial evidence can establish that a defendant drove while under the influence of alcohol even without direct testimony of intoxication at the time of driving.

State v. Scott · filed 2021-07-21

However, there is substantial circumstantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the State met its burden of proving Scott drove while under the influence of alcohol.
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Section 18-8004 prohibits driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle in Idaho on a road or property open to the public while having an alcohol concentration of .08 or more.

State v. Nez · filed 2025-06-10

The Idaho DUI statute makes it unlawful to: (1) drive or be in actual physical control of the vehicle; (2) in the state; (3) upon a highway, street or bridge or upon public or private property open to the public; and (4) while having an alcohol concentration of .08 or more. I.C. § 18-8004.
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Section 18-8004(1)(a) allows impairment related to driving ability to be proved through circumstantial evidence or observable symptoms of intoxication.

State v. Messman · filed 2025-04-30(1)(a)

The impairment could be established either by circumstantial evidence of impaired driving ability or other observable symptoms of intoxication.
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Section 18-8004(1)(a) requires proof that alcohol, drugs, or another intoxicating substance caused the person’s driving impairment; officer testimony and surrounding evidence can establish that cause.

State v. Keefe · filed 2026-02-18(1)(a)

In addition to impairment, the State must present evidence to prove that the impairment was caused by alcohol, drugs, or an intoxicating substance. ... The evidence, including Officer Merz’s testimony and the presence of methamphetamine and paraphernalia, was sufficient for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Keefe was guilty of DUI.
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When DUI is charged under both per se and impairment theories, a BAC test result is relevant to the per se theory without extrapolation to the time of driving.

State v. Clapp · filed 2025-11-21

In this case, the State charged Clapp under both the per se and impairment theories, making the BAC test result relevant to the per se theory even without extrapolation.
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Section 18-8004(2) does not bar prosecution when a later breath test shows a lower alcohol concentration than an earlier valid sample.

State v. Black · filed 2025-12-17(2)

Idaho Code § 18-8004(2) was not intended to preclude prosecution of an individual where testing conducted at a later time showed a lower BAC than a previous, valid sample.
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Actual physical control and covered vehicles

Section 18-8004 includes motorcycles within “motor vehicle” and gives sufficient notice that being in physical control of a running motorcycle while intoxicated is prohibited.

State v. Carpenter · filed 1988-02-01

We hold that the term “motor vehicle” as used in I.C. § 18-8004 encompasses that means of transportation called a motorcycle. We also hold that I.C. § 18-8004 is not constitutionally defective for failure to precisely define the term “motor vehicle.” Carpenter was provided with sufficient warning that being in physical control of a running motorcycle is subject to the penalty of the law.
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Section 18-8004(1) creates one DUI offense that may be committed by driving or exercising actual physical control of a motor vehicle while intoxicated.

State v. Cheney · filed 1989-06-29(1)

The language of the DUI statute states that it is unlawful to drive or to exercise actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances. The statute does not, as Cheney suggests, list these conditions separately, as if each were an offense distinct from the other. We believe that “driving” and being in “actual physical control” of a motor vehicle are alternative “circumstances” under which the crime of driving under the influence may be charged.
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Section 18-8004(6) does not require proof that a person intended to drive to establish actual physical control of a vehicle.

State v. Woolf · filed 1991-05-17(6)

Such a position, however, would not be logical with respect to prosecutions under I.C. § 18-8004(6) in light of the identical definitions of "actual physical control" contained in I.C. § 18-8002(7) and I.C. § 18-8004(6). ... Consequently, applying the Court's observation in Vogt to the instant case, we hold that Woolf's intent whether to drive his vehicle is immaterial.
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Section 18-8004(1) is violated when a person under the influence enters a vehicle, starts its motor, and drives away; the DUI offense is complete at that point.

State v. Castaneda · filed 1994-01-27(1)

When Castañeda entered his automobile, started the motor, and drove away he was "in actual physical control of a motor vehicle" while under the influence of alcohol in violation of I.C. § 18-8004(1). At that point, before the officer activated his vehicle's overhead lights, all of the acts necessary for a charge of driving under the influence were completed, while the offense of fleeing a police vehicle had not yet begun.
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Section 18-8004(1)(a) covers intoxicated operation of a snowmobile on a public roadway, and the State may charge under it even though the snowmobile statute also applies.

State v. Barnes · filed 1999-08-24(1)(a)

Based on the doctrine of in pari materia, we hold that driving a snowmobile on a public roadway while intoxicated is covered by both I.C. § 18-8004 and I.C. § 67-7110(2), that there is no conflict and that the State had the discretion to prosecute Barnes under either statute.
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Section 18-8004’s actual physical control prohibition does not apply when a vehicle is neither moving nor capable of easily being put in motion.

State v. Adams · filed 2005-01-26(1)

If a vehicle cannot be moved it is not a motor vehicle capable of being “controlled,” and the reason for the statutory prohibition does not exist. Consequently, the statute is not violated when the vehicle is not in motion or susceptible of easily being placed in motion.
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An intoxicated passenger who engages four-wheel drive while acting in concert with the driver can exercise actual physical control of a vehicle under § 18-8004.

In Re Loader · filed 2009-06-04(1)(a), (5)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that because Debtor’s actions, when combined with those of Ojeda, caused the truck to move as it did, Debtor was exercising sufficient actual, physical control of the motor vehicle. Because he was intoxicated, Debtor’s conduct violated Idaho Code § 18—8004(1)(a) and was unlawful.
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A person sitting in the driver’s position is not in actual physical control of a vehicle when its engine is off and it is not moving.

State v. Rocha · filed 2014-10-02(5)

Also of importance, Rocha could not be found to have been in “actual physical control” of the vehicle when the officer conversed with him on the roadside because the vehicle’s engine was not then running and the vehicle was not moving.
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A self-propelled utility type vehicle is a motor vehicle under § 18-8004, and the State may prosecute intoxicated operation of one under that section even though § 67-7114 also applies.

State v. Trusdall · filed 2014-02-10(1)(a)

A UTV is a motor vehicle for purposes of I.C. § 18-8004, and because the general DUI statute is in harmony with the UTV-specific DUI statute, the State properly charged Trusdall under I.C. § 18-8004.
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Law changed since The Idaho Supreme Court held in State v. Eversole (2016) that § 18-8004(5) does not require the vehicle to be operable.

A vehicle’s operability under the actual physical control provision is for the factfinder when evidence supports a sensible conclusion that it could be made operable in a short time.

State v. Eversole · filed 2015-04-08(5)

The district court correctly determined that the fact-finder could “sensibly conclude” that Eversole and his companions were capable of rendering the vehicle operational in a short period of time. A finder of fact could have credited the officer’s testimony that the jack strategy could have worked if the jack was positioned “a little bit differently.” Therefore, the issue should be decided by the trier of fact and the order denying dismissal was proper.
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A person in the driver’s position with the motor running is in actual physical control of the vehicle; the vehicle need not be operable.

State v. Eversole · filed 2016-04-04(5)

However, the plain language of the statute only requires that the defendant be in the driver’s position of the motor vehicle with the motor running to show that the defendant was in “actual physical control” of the vehicle. We decline to read additional requirements into the statute, particularly where the language is clear and unambiguous.
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Section 18-8004 covers driving a moped under the influence because a moped is a motor vehicle.

State v. McKie · filed 2018-04-12

Therefore, a moped is a motor vehicle for purposes of the DUI statute.
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Section 18-8004(1)(a) requires proof that the defendant drove or had actual physical control of a motor vehicle; proximity to a wrecked vehicle alone does not establish control.

State v. Vazquez-Torres · filed 2020-11-04(1)(a)

We hold that the State failed to present substantial evidence that Vazquez-Torres actually physically controlled the wrecked vehicle necessary to establish a conviction for excessive DUI. See I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a) (requiring proof of “actual physical control”).
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Section 18-8004(5) requires a vehicle to be moving or its motor running for a person in the driver’s position to have actual physical control.

State v. Borek · filed 2022-09-19(5)

Detective Steele unequivocally testified that Borek’s vehicle was neither moving nor running when Detective Steele arrived on the scene. Regardless, the district court found that Borek “was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in a highway,” contrary to I.C. § 18-8004(5).
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Alcohol test procedures and admissibility

Section 18-8004(4) permits admission of a breath test when the State establishes compliance with procedures that ensure the test’s reliability; the applicable mouthpiece procedure required a new mouthpiece for each series of tests, not each blow.

State v. Asselin · filed 2020-09-02(4)

Here, the magistrate court correctly identified the legal standards for admitting a breath test at trial, requiring that the State “establish that the administrative procedures, which ensure the reliability of the test, have been met.” State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 734, 736, 264 P.3d 75, 77 (Ct. App. 2011). The magistrate court considered Asselin’s argument that the Idaho State Police Standard Operating Procedures manual required that the mouthpiece be changed between each blow and found, based on the plain language, that a new mouthpiece was only required for each series of tests. ... The magistrate court applied correct legal standards and acted consistently with the applicable law and facts presented to it.
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Section 18-8004(4) requires compliance with applicable testing standards to be established as a foundation for admitting a blood-alcohol test result.

State v. Bell · filed 1988-11-01(4)

We conclude that the district court erred in stating that compliance with the testing standards went to the weight of, rather than to the foundation for, the evidence.
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Law changed since 1988 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 47, § 4 transferred the testing standards authority from Health and Welfare to the Department of Law Enforcement; 2000 ch. 469, § 28 transferred it to the Idaho State Police.

Section 18-8004(4) provides an expedited way to admit BAC test results when testing meets agency standards; reliability and accuracy may also be established through expert testimony.

State v. Phillips · filed 1990-04-06(4)

In reaching our conclusion, we noted that I.C. § 18-8004(4) provides for an expedient method for admitting BAC test results into evidence when the analysis is conducted pursuant to Health and Welfare standards. ... However, we also recognized that establishing the reliability and accuracy of such test results can be accomplished alternatively through expert testimony at trial. ... In the present case, we conclude that the reliability and accuracy of Phillips' BAC test results were established through expert testimony at trial.
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Law changed since 1988 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 47, § 4 transferred the testing authority from Health and Welfare to the Department of Law Enforcement; 2000 ch. 469, § 28 transferred it to the Idaho State Police.

Section 18-8004(4) provides a method for admitting approved alcohol test results and related records without a witness to establish the reliability of the testing procedure.

State v. Van Sickle · filed 1991-06-27(4)

The statutory method followed by the state in this case is set forth at I.C. § 18-8004(4), which provides, in relevant part, “the results of any test for alcohol concentration and records relating to calibration, approval, certification or quality control ... approved by [the Idaho department of] health and welfare shall be admissible in any proceeding in this state without the necessity of producing a witness to establish the reliability of the testing procedure for examination.” The state presented proof that the Intoximeter 3000 was a test for alcohol concentration approved by the Idaho Department of Health, administered in accordance with its required procedures, thus meeting the authentication condition of I.R.E. 901.
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Section 18-8004(4) permits blood serum testing if the result can be expressed in whole-blood terms.

State v. Koch · filed 1988-12-02(4)

Thus, although the blood alcohol test must yield a result that can be expressed in terms of whole blood, nothing in the statute or regulation prohibits testing the blood serum. Here, the serum was tested and the numerical result (.195 percent) was set forth with a conversion factor for whole blood, allowing the trier of fact to determine that the whole blood figure was approximately .16 percent. We hold that this methodology was permissible.
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Section 18-8004(1) does not give a licensee the choice of which BAC test will be administered.

Matter of McNeely · filed 1990-07-24(1)

Idaho Code § 18-8004(1) indicates that it is not the licensee who can chose the BAC test to be given.
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Section 18-8004(4) allows intoximeter results to be admitted without a witness establishing the testing procedure’s reliability, but admission alone does not establish guilt.

State v. Pressnall · filed 1991-01-03(4)

Thus, by legislative enactment, the intoximeter ... has been deemed reliable for the limited foundational purpose of having its test results admitted into evidence. ... We note, however, that the admissibility of the results of certain evidentiary testing does not equate to the sufficiency of such evidence to sustain a conviction.
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Section 18-8004(4)’s breath-test procedures allow an uncertified officer to perform the required fifteen-minute observation before the test.

State v. Bradley · filed 1991-09-03(4)

It is plain from the language of the manual that a fifteen-minute observation is part of the “operating procedure” for conducting a breath test with the Intoximeter. However, the state urges that where, as here, the certified operator fails to make the preliminary observation of the test subject, an uncertified officer’s observations may serve as a substitute. We agree.
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Law changed since 2000 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 469, § 28 transferred the testing standards and approval authority from the Department of Law Enforcement to the Idaho State Police.

Section 18-8004(4) authorizes admission of an intoximeter’s calibration check and certification and resolves authentication objections to the test results and calibration check.

State v. Howell · filed 1992-06-02(4)

Furthermore, the statute authorizes the admission of the calibration check and certification indicating that the machine was approved by the department of law enforcement and that the machine was properly calibrated at the time of Howell’s tests. The question of authentication of the test results and the calibration check raised by Howell is answered by the statute.
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A driver who refuses an evidentiary alcohol test cannot offer an expert’s estimated BAC when the state proceeds on proof of impaired driving.

State v. Tate · filed 1992-04-07(4)

As a matter of policy, where a defendant by his own choice has denied access to the scientifically more reliable evidence, recognized by statute and case law, he should not be allowed to introduce less reliable secondary evidence consisting of nothing more than an imputed BAC. Accordingly, we adhere to our Andrus decision and will apply it here. We conclude that the trial judge committed no error in rejecting the expert’s opinion evidence offered in this case.
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Law changed since 1997 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 158, § 1 reduced the per se threshold from 0.10 to 0.08; 2000 ch. 469, § 28 transferred testing authority to the Idaho State Police.

Section 18-8004(4) permits admission of blood-alcohol test results when the state establishes a sufficient foundation for the testing procedure.

State v. Uhlry · filed 1992-04-24(4)

To show that a blood test revealed a BAC of .10 or higher, the state may rely on I.C. § 18-8004(4), which provides an expedient method for admitting BAC test results into evidence when the analysis is conducted pursuant to Department of Law Enforcement methods. ... In view of the foregoing, we agree with the magistrate that sufficient evidence of reliability of the testing procedure was presented to establish a proper foundation for admission of the BAC test.
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Breath test results in a DUI prosecution are inadmissible unless the state establishes compliance with the required fifteen-minute observation period.

State v. Utz · filed 1993-12-29(4)

Thus, there was no showing that the fifteen-minute waiting period had been complied with. Absent such a showing, the results of the breath test were inadmissible, and the magistrate’s conclusion to the contrary therefore was in error.
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Law changed since 1997 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 158, § 1 reduced the relevant alcohol concentration from 0.10 to 0.08; the sample rule must be read using the amended threshold.

Section 18-8004(2) treats each valid breath sample as a test; a sample below 0.10 bars DUI prosecution even if another sample is higher.

State v. Mills · filed 1996-04-01(2)

We hold that one sample constitutes “a test,” as that term is used in I.C. § 18-8004(2), and if that sample shows a BAC level below 0.10, the accused cannot be prosecuted for DUI under this statute. Furthermore, if more than one sample is taken, each valid sample constitutes a test. If any of those samples falls below 0.10 then, again, the accused cannot be prosecuted for DUI under I.C. § 18-8004.
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Section 18-8004(4) excuses the State from presenting certain foundational evidence for approved alcohol concentration tests unless those elements are disputed.

State v. Smith · filed 1997-10-23(4)

Under I.C. § 18-8004, certain foundational elements for alcohol concentration tests approved by the Department need not be presented by the State at trial unless such elements are disputed.
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Law changed since 2000 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 469, § 28 transferred the testing standards and approval authority from the Department of Law Enforcement to the Idaho State Police.

Section 18-8004(4) permits admission of an alcohol concentration test result when the State shows that the equipment was approved and the test was administered in conformity with the Department of Law Enforcement’s standards.

State v. Nickerson · filed 1999-01-15(4)

If the State elects to proceed under § 18-8004(4), it must not only show that the test equipment was approved by the Department but also that the equipment was operated and the test administered in conformity with the Department’s standards.
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Section 18-8004(4) permits admission of a breath test when expert testimony establishes a sufficient foundation for its reliability, even if compliance with approved testing procedures is not shown.

State v. Charan · filed 1998-12-03(4)

We agree with the district court that this expert testimony regarding the reliability of the test presented an adequate foundation for its admission into evidence.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 18-8004(4) permits admission of breath-test results without separate proof of the testing procedure’s reliability when the test uses a Department-approved method; inadequate observation before the test fails that foundation.

State v. Carson · filed 1999-09-20(4)

Pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(4), the Idaho Department of Law Enforcement is charged with promulgating standards for administering tests for breath alcohol content. The statute provides that when it is shown that the test was administered by a method approved by the Department, the results are admissible without the necessity of further evidence of the reliability of the testing procedure. ... Because the foundational requirements for admission of the breath test were not established in this case, the evidence should have been excluded.
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Section 18-8004(4) requires breath test procedures to be followed to establish the foundation for admitting test results; that admissibility standard is not a jury instruction on the results’ weight.

State v. Ward · filed 2001-01-16(4)

Both of Ward’s proposed jury instructions dealt with procedures which, pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(4), must be followed prior to the administration of the breathalyzer test in order to meet the foundational requirements necessary to have the test results admitted at trial.
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Section 18-8004(4) permits admission of breath test results from deficient samples when the state lays an adequate foundation for the test's reliability.

State v. Mazzuca · filed 1999-06-10(4)

The admissibility of a breath test result pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(4) requires "adequate foundation evidence consisting either of expert testimony or a showing that the test was administered in conformity with the applicable test procedure." Bell, 115 Idaho at 39-40, 764 P.2d at 116-17. ... Thus, for the purposes of this issue, Mazzuca's case is indistinguishable from DeMarasse, Conrad, Harris and Wilkinson, where the courts held that the state laid sufficient foundation when it established that the test was properly administered, even though the results indicated that the breath samples were "deficient."
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Section 18-8004(4) requires alcohol concentration tests to comply with Idaho State Police standards; a documented sixteen-minute observation period begun after transport satisfied the breath-test observation requirement.

Mahurin v. State · filed 2004-06-18(4)

Idaho Code § 18-8004(4) provides that tests to determine alcohol concentration of blood, urine or breath must be performed in facilities or by methods approved by the Idaho State Police and in compliance with standards set by the State Police. ... The hearing officer’s finding that an adequate observation period was conducted is supported by Officer Campbell’s police report, which was placed in evidence. It indicates that a sixteen-minute observation period was conducted and began after the arrival of Campbell and Mahurin at the sheriffs annex.
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Breath test results require compliance with the approved testing method, including fifteen minutes of monitoring before the test; an officer who cannot adequately monitor the subject during that period does not establish the foundation for admission.

State v. DeFranco · filed 2006-09-05(4)

The statute provides that when it is shown that the breath test was administered by a method approved by the I.S.P., the results are admissible without the necessity of further evidence to establish the reliability of the testing procedure. ... Therefore, we hold that DeFranco was not “monitored” in such a manner as to accomplish the purpose of pre-test monitoring, as described in the training manual. Because only six minutes elapsed between the trooper’s return to DeFranco’s side and the administration of the breathalyzer test, the foundational requirements for the admission of the breath test were not met in this case.
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Section 18-8004(4) requires compliance with the fifteen-minute observation period for breath tests, which an officer may time with a wristwatch.

In Re Suspension of Driver's License · filed 2006-11-14(4)

In the absence of a validly conducted fifteen-minute wait required by the manual, the hearing officer should vacate the license suspension because the breath test was not conducted in accordance with the requirements of I.C. § 18-8004(4). ... However, the manual and the standard operating procedures do not indicate that use of a wristwatch is impermissible. Therefore, the hearing officer properly found that the officer could time the fifteen-minute wait with his wristwatch.
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Section 18-8004(4) requires a valid fifteen-minute observation period before a breath test; the officer may time it with a wristwatch when the testing procedures do not prohibit that method.

State of Idaho, Department of Transportation v. Gibbar · filed 2006-11-14(4)

In the absence of a validly conducted fifteen-minute wait required by the manual, the hearing officer should vacate the license suspension because the breath test was not conducted in accordance with the requirements of I.C. § 18-8004(4). ... However, the manual and the standard operating procedures do not indicate that use of a wristwatch is impermissible. Therefore, the hearing officer properly found that the officer could time the fifteen-minute wait with his wristwatch.
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Section 18-8004(4) requires breath alcohol tests to follow prescribed monitoring procedures; an officer who leaves the room during the observation period does not comply.

Bennett v. State, Department of Transportation · filed 2009-04-02(4)

This testimony, then, would demonstrate that proper monitoring procedures were not followed, and that the test for alcohol concentration was, therefore, not conducted in accordance with the requirements of I.C. § 18-8004(4).
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Section 18-8004(4) requires the prosecution to establish that a breath testing method was approved by the Idaho State Police before its results may be admitted.

State of Idaho v. Anderson · filed 2007-04-27(4)

To establish foundation for the admission of alcohol concentration test results, as relevant to this appeal, the prosecution was required to show that the Intoxilyzer 5000 was a method of analysis approved by the Idaho State Police.
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Section 18-8004(4) requires the State to show that a breath test method was approved by the Idaho State Police when the test was conducted to establish a foundation for admitting the results.

State v. Anderson · filed 2008-01-09(4)

The State was required to show that the Intoxilyzer 5000 (breathalyzer test) was a method of analysis approved by the Idaho State Police at the time that the tests were conducted. ... Therefore, the State laid a sufficient foundation for the admission of the test results and it was within the discretion of the trial court to allow the admission of the evidence.
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Section 18-8004(4) makes breath test results admissible without further proof of the testing procedure’s reliability when the test used a method approved by the Idaho State Police.

State v. Stump · filed 2009-01-22(4)

Pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(4), the Idaho State Police (I.S.P.) are charged with promulgating standards for administering tests for breath alcohol content. The statute provides that when it is shown that the breath test was administered by a method approved by the I.S.P., the results are admissible without the necessity of further evidence to establish the reliability of the testing procedure.
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Section 18-8004(4)'s breath-testing requirement concerns how the test is conducted; failure to attach a calibration record afterward does not show that the test was invalid.

Archer v. State, Department of Transportation · filed 2008-03-27(4)

Attaching a calibration record to a test record is an act performed after the test itself is complete. It could not have changed the validity of the test itself. ... Archer has failed to demonstrate that the test for alcohol concentration conducted in his case was not done in accordance with the requirements of I.C. § 18-8004(4).
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Section 18-8004(4) requires breath alcohol testing to follow the prescribed procedures, including monitoring the subject for fifteen minutes; an officer who leaves the room and cannot use his senses to monitor the subject does not comply.

Stacie Dawn Bennett v. Idaho Dept. of Transportation · filed 2009-04-02(4)

Pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(4), the Idaho State Police (ISP) are charged with promulgating standards for administering tests for breath alcohol content. ... Therefore, to the extent the evidence demonstrates that the officer left the monitoring room and, as such, could not employ his senses to monitor Bennett, proper procedures were not followed.
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Section 18-8004(4) gives force of law to ISP breath test standards in its operating procedures and training manuals.

Schroeder v. State, Department of Transportation · filed 2009-04-30(4)

The standards for administration of breath tests in the SOP and training manuals have thus been given the force of law in this state and we treat their interpretation, accordingly, as a question of law.
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Section 18-8004(4) does not make a breath test result inadmissible solely because a testing procedure phrased as “should” was not followed; the driver may present evidence that the violation made the result unreliable.

Wheeler v. Idaho Transportation Department · filed 2009-10-15(4)

In order to give due credit to the promulgating party‟s intent in repeatedly choosing to use the word “should” instead of “must” or “shall,” and vice versa, we conclude that the violation of a regulation requiring that a procedure “should” be followed does not render a test result inadmissible per se. Rather, in such case, the violation opens the door for the driver to attack the evidentiary test result through expert testimony or other evidence tending to prove that the violation rendered the result unreliable.
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Section 18-8004(4) permits breath test results despite departures from testing procedures if expert testimony explains why the departures did not affect their reliability.

State v. Healy · filed 2011-09-12(4)

If the State cannot show conformity with the applicable test procedures, it does not automatically require the exclusion of the test results governed by I.C. § 18-8004(4). ... Thus, in order to meet the standard in Charan and allow breath test results into evidence when there is not strict compliance with the administrative procedures, the State needs to not only present an expert to testify, but that expert must also testify as to why procedural defects did not affect the reliability of test results in the particular case at issue.
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Section 18-8004(4) requires breath tests to follow State Police approved methods and standards; the fifteen-minute observation requirement is met when the officer can use his senses to detect belching, burping, or vomiting.

Wilkinson v. State, Department of Transportation · filed 2011-11-17(4)

Idaho Code § 18-8004(4) provides that tests to determine alcohol concentration of blood, urine, or breath must be performed in facilities or by methods approved by the Idaho State Police and in compliance with standards set by the State Police. ... As long as Officer Davis was in a position to use his senses to determine that Wilkinson did not belch, burp, or vomit for the requisite time period, his observation was in compliance with State Police procedure.
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Section 18-8004(4) requires breath tests to comply with State Police approved methods and standards; an officer satisfies the monitoring requirement when positioned to use his senses to detect belching, burping, or vomiting.

License suspension · filed 2011-11-17(4)

Idaho Code § 18-8004(4) provides that tests to determine alcohol concentration of blood, urine, or breath must be performed in facilities or by methods approved by the Idaho State Police and in compliance with standards set by the State Police. ... As long as Officer Davis was in a position to use his senses to determine that Wilkinson did not belch, burp, or vomit for the requisite time period, his observation was in compliance with State Police procedure.
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Section 18-8004(4) permits admission of breath test certificates but does not require them to prove an element of driving under the influence.

State v. Kramer · filed 2012-04-25(4)

While the section provides how the certificates may be admitted into evidence, it does not require that the certificates be admitted in order to establish an element of proof of the crime charged.
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Section 18-8004 permits a per se violation to be established by a test that meets the statutory requirements; the testing equipment’s margin of error is irrelevant.

Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Department of Transportation · filed 2012-06-29(4)

After the 1987 amendment, a violation can be shown simply by the results of a test for alcohol concentration that complies with the statutory requirements. With that change, the margin of error in the testing equipment is irrelevant. The equipment need not precisely measure the alcohol concentration in the person’s blood. The test need only be based upon the correct formula, and the equipment must be properly approved and certified.
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Section 18-8004(4) requires alcohol concentration tests to comply with Idaho State Police standards; the fifteen-minute breath test monitoring requirement can be satisfied when the officer remains able to observe the driver using senses other than sight.

Broadfoot v. Idaho Transportation · filed 2012-10-25(4)

Idaho Code § 18-8004(4) provides that tests to determine alcohol concentration of blood, urine, or breath must be performed in facilities or by methods approved by the Idaho State Police (ISP) and in compliance with standards set by the ISP. ... Having reviewed the video recording in this case, we conclude the hearing officer did not lack substantial evidence in the record from which to conclude Deputy Dahlinger’s surveillance complied with the observation requirement of the fifteen-minute monitoring period.
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Section 18-8004(4) requires breath alcohol testing to comply with ISP standards; an officer’s observation satisfies the applicable monitoring procedure when the officer has a reasonable opportunity to see and hear the subject throughout the period.

State v. Donndelinger · filed 2013-05-15(4)

Idaho Code § 18-8004(4) provides that tests to determine alcohol concentration of blood, urine, or breath must be performed in facilities or by methods approved by the ISP and in compliance with standards set by the ISP. ... Based on the record, there was substantial evidence to support the magistrate’s finding of fact that despite the road noise and other distractions, Trooper Murakami had a “reasonable opportunity” to see and hear Donndelinger throughout the observation period. And, given the facts as found by the magistrate, and evidence on the video recording, the magistrate and district court did not err in concluding the trooper observed Donndelinger to the degree required by the applicable SOP.
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Section 18-8004(4) gives the Idaho State Police authority to set breath alcohol testing standards, including the fifteen-minute monitoring procedure applied here.

Kimbley v. State, Transportation Department · filed 2013-06-04(4)

Pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(4), the Idaho State Police are charged with promulgating standards for administering tests for breath alcohol content. ... The hearing officer’s determination that the second monitoring period complied with applicable standards is supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record and the findings have not been demonstrated to be clearly erroneous.
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Section 18-8004(4) gives the Idaho State Police authority to set breath alcohol testing standards; fifteen-minute monitoring complies when the officer remains able to use senses beyond sight to detect belching, burping, or vomiting.

Beyer v. Transportation Dept · filed 2013-06-04(4)

Pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(4), the Idaho State Police (ISP) is charged with promulgating standards for administering tests for breath alcohol content. ... Therefore, so long as the officer is continually in a position to use his or her senses, not just sight, to determine that the defendant did not belch, burp or vomit during the monitoring period, the observation complies with the training manual instructions.
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Section 18-8004(4) assigns the Idaho State Police authority to set standards for administering breath alcohol tests.

Platz v. State, Transportation Department · filed 2013-06-06(4)

Pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(4), the Idaho State Police (ISP) are charged with promulgating standards for administering tests for breath alcohol content.
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Section 18-8004(4) assigns the Idaho State Police responsibility for prescribing approved breath testing equipment and standards for administering breath tests.

State v. George Joseph Besaw, Jr. · filed 2013-06-21(4)

Pursuant to I.C. §§ 18-8004(4) and 18-8002A(3), the Idaho State Police agency is charged with prescribing by rule approved equipment for testing breath alcohol content and standards for administration of such tests.
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Section 18-8004(4) makes compliance with Idaho State Police breath testing standards a foundation for admitting test results, unless expert testimony establishes that noncompliance did not affect their reliability and accuracy; the judge may consider hearsay when deciding whether that foundation exists.

State v. Swenson · filed 2014-07-03(4)

Absent expert testimony explaining why any noncompliance with one or more of the requisite ISP administrative standards and methods for administration of the test did not affect the reliability and accuracy of the test results, compliance with those standards is a foundational prerequisite to having the test results admitted into evidence. ... By terms of this rule, the magistrate court possessed discretion to consider Johnston’s hearsay testimony in determining that foundation for admission of the breath test results had been shown, and Swenson has not shown an abuse of that discretion.
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Section 18-8004(1)(a) permits a per se DUI violation based on the alcohol concentration measured in a person's breath; it does not require a sample of air from the deep lung area.

State v. Roach · filed 2014-11-06(1)(a)

However, I.C. § 18-8004 does not require measurement of air from the deep lung area, or air in the alveoli, but simply requires measurement of the “breath.”
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Section 18-8004 permits one valid breath sample above .08 to establish a violation for an administrative license suspension when the failure to obtain a second sample is not the fault of the officer or testing equipment.

Wernecke v. Idaho Transportation Department · filed 2015-03-30(4)

The SOP clearly contemplates a situation in which only one breath sample can be obtained from the subject without invalidating the test result. Thus, one evidentiary test sample indicating breath alcohol content in excess of .08 may be sufficient evidence of a violation of I.C. § 18-8004 for purposes of an ALS pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A(7).
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Section 18-8004(4) requires ISP-approved breath-testing methods to be adopted in compliance with IDAPA.

Hern v. Idaho Transportation Department · filed 2015-12-30(4)

However, the Haynes Court interpreted I.C. § 18-8004(4) to require that ISP’s approved method for breath testing be adopted in compliance with IDAPA. Thus, Hern’s breath test could not be conducted in accordance with the requirements of I.C. § 18-8004(4) because the method approved by ISP and used for Hern’s test (the 2013 SOPs) was not adopted in compliance with IDAPA.
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Section 18-8004(4) requires breath testing to use an Idaho State Police approved method adopted in compliance with IDAPA; testing under the unadopted 2013 procedures does not satisfy that requirement.

Ewing v. Dept of Transportation · filed 2015-12-31(4)

However, the Haynes Court interpreted I.C. § 18-8004(4) to require that ISP’s approved method for breath testing be adopted in compliance with IDAPA. Thus, Ewing’s breath test could not be conducted in accordance with the requirements of I.C. § 18-8004(4) because the method approved by ISP and used for Ewing’s test (the 2013 SOPs) was not adopted in compliance with IDAPA.
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Section 18-8004(4) requires an ISP-approved breath-testing method to be adopted in compliance with IDAPA; a test using the unpromulgated 2013 SOPs does not comply.

State v. Peterson v. Transportation Dept · filed 2016-02-25(4)

However, the Haynes Court interpreted I.C. § 18-8004(4) to require that ISP’s approved method for breath testing be adopted in compliance with IDAPA. Thus, Peterson’s breath test could not be conducted in accordance with the requirements of I.C. § 18-8004(4) because the method approved by ISP and used for Peterson’s test (the 2013 SOPs) was not adopted in compliance with IDAPA.
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Section 18-8004(4) allows breath test results into evidence when the State shows that the machine was approved and operated under approved standards; admission does not establish that the results are accurate.

State v. Cruz-Romero · filed 2016-03-31(4)

By legislative enactment, breathalyzer machines are deemed reliable for the limited foundational purpose of having test results admitted into evidence, as long as the State introduces evidence that the designated state agency approved the machine and an officer operated the machine in compliance with approved standards.
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Section 18-8004(4) requires breath alcohol testing to follow applicable standards adopted by the Idaho State Police; a test does not satisfy the section when the record fails to establish that those standards were properly adopted.

Hamilton v. Dept of Transportation · filed 2016-05-23(4)

The examiner’s conclusion that the ISP had adopted a temporary rule relating to the breath alcohol testing standards in accordance with the requirements of the IDAPA was not supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, Hamilton’s breath test was not conducted in accordance with the requirements of I.C. § 18-8004(4).
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Section 18-8004(4) does not require testing a whole blood sample; a blood serum result may be converted to a whole blood result.

State v. Nelson · filed 2016-09-06(4)

The district court applied the correct legal standard in finding that it was not disqualifying for the BAC test to be performed on blood serum. ... There is no other statutory provision or administrative provision requiring the blood sample be comprised of whole blood.
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In a criminal prosecution under § 18-8004, general challenges to the reliability and accuracy of approved intoxication testing methods are irrelevant.

State v. Sciandra · filed 2016-11-21

However, the holding in Elias-Cruz--that general challenges to the reliability and accuracy of approved intoxication testing methods are irrelevant--does not vary with the burden of proof.
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Section 18-8004(4) removes the need to prove the reliability of an approved blood alcohol testing procedure in each case, but other foundational requirements still apply.

State v. Clapp · filed 2022-02-04(4)

As discussed above, Idaho Code section 18-8004(4) eliminates the need for the State to independently establish an accepted BAC test procedure’s reliability in every case it tries but does not provide “the only foundational requirement” for BAC test results to be admitted at trial.
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Section 18-8004(4) removes the need to establish the reliability of an accepted BAC test procedure in each case, but other foundational requirements still apply.

State v. Clapp · filed 2022-05-20(4)

As discussed above, Idaho Code section 18-8004(4) eliminates the need for the State to independently establish an accepted BAC test procedure’s reliability in every case it tries but does not provide “the only foundational requirement” for BAC test results to be admitted at trial.
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Lesser included offenses

Inattentive driving is not a lesser included offense of driving under the influence under the pleading theory when the charge does not allege inattentive conduct as the means of violating § 18-8004.

State v. Curtis · filed 1997-07-21

While the police officer who arrested Curtis testified that the vehicle Curtis was operating was weaving on the roadway, the charge against Curtis does not contain any language indicating that the weaving manner in which Curtis was allegedly driving was the manner and means by which Curtis violated I.C. § 18-8004. ... We hold that under the pleading theory inattentive driving is not a lesser included offense of driving under the influence, I.C. § 18-8004, in this case.
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Locations covered by DUI

Section 18-8004 permits DUI prosecution for conduct in a parking lot.

State v. Anderson · filed 1997-11-13

Until the cross-examination of deputy Schueller, the prosecutor may have failed to appreciate that the location of Anderson’s pickup in a parking lot permitted prosecution under the statute defining the DUI offense but not under the statute defining DWP.
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Section 18-8004 applies to driving under the influence in a business parking lot open to members of the public, including prospective customers.

State v. Gibson · filed 1994-07-15(1)(a)

Without an express provision to do so, we decline to en-graft the definition of I.C. § 49-117(14) onto our interpretation of “private property open to the public” as used in I.C. § 18-8004. ... We conclude, as did the magistrate, that the parking lot of the Pasttime Bar was maintained for the use of any members of the public who wanted to patronize the business or for members of the public who did not want to patronize the bar but, for example, wanted to turn their vehicles around.
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Section 18-8004 does not cover driving on a residential driveway merely because social guests and people with business at the residence may use it.

State v. Knott · filed 1999-04-05(1)(a)

The fact that social guests and persons with business at the residence are permitted to use the driveway does not make it property available to' the general public for vehicular traffic or parking. The residential driveway was not “private property open to the public” within the meaning of section 18-8004.
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When a DUI charge alleges driving on a highway, the State must prove the offense occurred on an Idaho highway but need not prove the highway’s name.

State v. Hanson · filed 1997-11-26(1)(a)

The name of the highway upon which Hanson drove is not an essential element of the crime and need not be proven by the prosecution. All that need be demonstrated by the prosecution with regard to this element is that the offense occurred upon a highway of this state.
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Section 18-8004(1) includes commercial business parking lots as private property open to the public.

State v. Bulkley · filed 2010-12-13(1)

The law has long recognized that the parking lots of restaurants, shopping centers, bars, grocery stores, gas stations, and other commercial businesses are included in the definition of private property open to the public.
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Drug impairment and prescription drugs

Section 18-8004(5) does not make a prescription for lithium a defense to a charge of driving under the influence of intoxicants.

State v. Goerig · filed 1991-12-03(5)

Moreover, under I.C. § 18-8004(5), the fact that Goerig was legally entitled to take lithium because it had been prescribed to him is not a defense to a charge of driving under the influence of intoxicants.
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Section 18-8004(5) does not require proof of a particular quantity of drugs in a driver's system; guilt turns on their effect on the driver's ability to drive safely.

State v. Lesley · filed 1999-03-01(5)

Idaho Code § 18-8004 does not require that a driver have a certain quantity of drugs in his or her system in order to be guilty of driving under the influence.
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Section 18-8004(1)(a) permits a DUI conviction when the evidence shows that alcohol impaired the driver's ability to drive.

State v. MacE · filed 2000-01-27(1)(a)

This was sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that Mace's ability to drive was impaired by the influence of alcohol.
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Law changed since 2002 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 253, § 1 deleted former subsection (5) and its separate narcotic versus other-drug framework; drug impairment remains relevant under the amended section.

Section 18-8004(5) requires impairment of driving ability when the alleged influence is from a non-narcotic drug such as marijuana; use alone does not establish impairment.

United States v. Patzer · filed 2002-01-14(5)

Given the distinction drawn by the statute, there is no basis to conclude that impairment may be presumed upon admission of use of a non-narcotic drug.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Marijuana is outside the category of narcotic drugs under § 18-8004(5), so suspected marijuana use alone does not support an arrest under the subsection’s narcotic-drug provision.

United States v. Patzer · filed 2002-03-21(5)

We resolved this argument adversely to the Government, finding that Idaho law consistently defines marijuana as outside the category of narcotic drugs. ... To the extent that our prior opinion suggested that Patterson lacked probable cause to arrest Patzer under any other subsection of I.C. § 18-8004 or other provision of Idaho law, we now clarify our intent to limit the holding to I.C. § 18-8004(5).
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Section 18-8004 does not require proof of a particular quantity of drugs; a drug-related violation turns on their effect on the driver’s ability to operate a vehicle safely.

State v. Smelser · filed 2011-12-12

In regard to the first approach, Idaho Code § 18-8004 does not require that a driver have a certain quantity of drugs in his or her system in order to be guilty of driving under the influence; rather, a violation of the statute turns upon the effect the drugs, or combination of drugs and alcohol, have on the individual’s ability to safely operate a vehicle, not upon any quantification of the amount of a drug in the bloodstream.
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Section 18-8004(1)(a) allows carboxy-THC evidence to support a driving-under-the-influence charge when the State also presents evidence of present marijuana impairment.

State v. Morin · filed 2015-02-25(1)(a)

In a prosecution under that statute, carboxy-THC evidence is relevant when the State also presents evidence of present marijuana impairment.
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A medication capable of impairing driving may be evidence of a violation of § 18-8004(a) regardless of whether the driver has a prescription.

State v. Roy Roland Araiza, Sr. · filed 2015-03-31(a)

Additionally, given the crime for which Araiza was being investigated, the pill need not have even been a prescription medication and whether Araiza had a prescription was irrelevant; the presence of any type of medication capable of decreasing a person’s ability to drive would have been possible evidence of the crime of driving under the influence.
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Section 18-8004(1)(a) covers driving under the influence of substances other than alcohol.

State v. Clark · filed 2024-08-12(1)(a)

Driving under the influence does not just include alcohol; rather, a person could drive under the influence of other substances. See I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a).
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Substantially conforming foreign DUI statutes

Section 18-8004’s DUI offense is substantially matched by an Arizona DUI statute despite differences in its timing and alcohol-consumption requirements.

State v. George Albert Shuck, Jr. · filed 2016-10-20

The only difference between the Idaho and Arizona statutes is that the Arizona statute has a two-hour time limit and a requirement that the accused must have consumed the alcohol prior to driving. These distinctions are the same distinctions this Court analyzed between the Idaho and North Dakota statutes in Moore, where we determined the foreign statute was substantially conforming. Thus, the Arizona statute prohibiting driving under the influence is substantially conforming to I.C. § 18-8004.
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Underage DUI

Under the 1997 version of section 18-8004(1)(a), a person under twenty-one could be charged with adult DUI if their blood alcohol concentration exceeded 0.08.

State v. Roberts · filed 2024-12-19(1)(a)

At the time of Roberts’ arrest in April of 1998, Idaho law permitted a person under twenty-one years of age to be charged with an adult DUI offense if that person’s BAC was over 0.08.
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Section 18-8004(1)(d) can be violated by a driver under twenty-one whose alcohol concentration is at least 0.02 but less than 0.08, even without impairment.

State v. Connery · filed 2022-09-16(1)(d)

A plain reading of the statute demonstrates that a driver under the age of twenty-one may be in violation of I.C. § 18-8004(1)(d) even if the driver is not impaired or under the influence.
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684 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

State v. Brown, the court interprets former § 49-1102; it mentions § 18-8004 only as its replacement and does not decide that section’s rules. opinion →
People v. Bowers, the court cites Idaho Code § 18-8004(4) as a comparison while deciding Colorado law; it does not decide the Idaho section's rules. opinion →
State v. Albright, the court decides whether destruction of the blood samples violated due process, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Nichols, the court decides issues under earlier statutes; it mentions § 18-8004 only as a later recodification. opinion →
State v. Knoll, the court construed the 1983 statute codified at § 49-1102. It identified § 18-8004 as a later version with changes, but did not decide that section’s rules. opinion →
Bronson v. Swinney, the Idaho citation appears in a list of authorities discussed by another court; this court makes no decision about Idaho Code § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Simpson, the court decides whether the stop was permissible under the Fourth Amendment; it mentions § 18-8004 only to describe the blood-alcohol result. opinion →
Matter of Griffiths, the court cites § 18-8004(1) to describe methods of proving DUI, but decides who chooses the evidentiary test under § 18-8002. opinion →
State v. Wheeler, the court decided whether Wheeler waived his right to a jury trial, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Fanning, the court decides jurisdiction and the right to lay counsel, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
Matter of Nowoj, the court reports the arrest under § 18-8004; it does not decide anything under that section. opinion →
State v. Denton, the court decided whether the charging instrument was sufficient, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
Matter of Smith, the court decides the refusal rule under § 18-8002(4); § 18-8004 only identifies the arrest charge. opinion →
State v. Woolery, the court decides the implied-consent and suppression rules of § 18-8002. It refers to § 18-8004 only to identify what the test measures. opinion →
State v. Wilson, the citation appears in a party’s argument within a dissent, not in this court’s own decision. opinion →
State v. Thomas, the court decides when Thomas was arrested and whether the officer had probable cause; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Armbruster, the court decides probable cause for arrest and testing; it cites § 18-8004 only to identify the charged offense and does not decide the section’s rules. opinion →
State v. Langdon, the court decides appellate dismissal and rehearing procedure, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. McCormack, the court only reports a charge under this section; it does not decide a rule under it. opinion →
State v. Bacon, the court decided the validity of the amended complaint and the prosecutor's authority, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Bever, the court construes § 18-8005(3)'s felony enhancement requirements; § 18-8004 identifies the underlying DUI violations. opinion →
State v. Johnson, the court cites § 18-8004 as background to the conviction but decides whether the sentence imposed after probation revocation was an abuse of discretion, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Magill, the citation appears in Magill’s argument, which the court declined to address. The court made no decision about § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Paramore, the citation appears in a report of the district court’s probation ruling, not in this court’s decision about § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Cooper, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the charged offense, but decides probable cause and breath-test authority under other law. opinion →
State v. Crea, the court decides the admissibility of breath-test evidence under evidentiary rules, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Snyder, the court decides Idaho's jurisdiction to prosecute a non-Indian on a reservation, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Emory, the court decides whether the stop satisfied the Fourth Amendment, not what § 18-8004 means or requires. opinion →
State v. Swenson, the court decided the deputy’s authority and competence to testify, not any rule of § 18-8004. The section identifies the charge. opinion →
State v. Greathouse, the court identifies § 18-8004 as the charge but does not decide any rule of that section. opinion →
State v. Beach, the court decides the repeat-offender sentencing rule under § 18-8005(2). It cites § 18-8004 only to identify the DUI offense. opinion →
State v. Hoak, the opinion reports that the district court dismissed the § 18-8004 charge; this court decides only the challenge to the separate felony sentence. opinion →
State v. Hildreth, the court reviews the sentence but does not decide any rule of § 18-8004; it cites the section to identify the DUI charge. opinion →
State v. Fry, the court describes the statute in a footnote but decides whether the police seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Jimenez, the court decides whether denying a Rule 35 sentence reduction was an abuse of discretion; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Zamarripa, the court identifies § 18-8004 as the offense of conviction but decides the timeliness of a sentence-reduction motion under Rule 35. opinion →
State v. Deitz, the court decides the repeat-offender penalty rule in § 18-8005(4), not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Smith, the court decided whether successive prosecutions were barred by § 18-301; it did not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
Matter of Goerig, the court decides whether conditional consent was a refusal under § 18-8002; § 18-8004 only identifies the offense for which Goerig was arrested. opinion →
State v. Osborne, the court decides whether the police seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Smith, the court decided whether the sentence was reasonable under the sentence review criteria; it did not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Elliot, the court reviews the sentence but does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Nickerson, the court decides the written-notice and enhanced-penalty rules of § 18-8005, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Eastman, the court decided whether jury instructions on justification and necessity were required, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Smith, the court mentions § 18-8004 only as a charge that was dismissed; it does not decide any rule of that section. opinion →
State v. Litz, the court decided whether Litz could withdraw his guilty plea, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Martin, the court decides whether revoking probation and reinstating the sentence was an abuse of discretion; it cites § 18-8004 only to identify the underlying offense. opinion →
State v. Denny, the court decides whether Denny was entitled to a hearing before relinquishment of retained jurisdiction; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Jordan, the court decided a Fourth Amendment suppression issue, not a rule of § 18-8004. The section identifies the charge. opinion →
State v. Hadley, the court decides Rule 35 issues concerning the sentence; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Cardona, the court decided whether the sentence was excessive under Rule 35; it did not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Beloit, the court decides whether prior convictions support felony enhancement, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
Ex Parte State, Idaho Code § 18-8004 appears only in a string cite of other states’ statutes; the court decides Alabama law. opinion →
Gifford v. State, the court decides whether the officer had grounds to request an alcohol test under § 18-8002; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Wildcat, the court decided whether the sentence was an abuse of discretion; it did not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Maxey, the court decides whether prior convictions can enhance the DUI charge under other law; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Nickerson, the court decides Rule 35 jurisdiction and sentencing discretion; § 18-8004 only identifies the underlying DUI conviction. opinion →
State v. Smith, the reference to § 18-8004 reports the jury’s conviction and the charge; this court decides whether the sentence was reasonable. opinion →
State v. Gusman, the court mentions § 18-8004 as background, but decides whether a license suspension hearing under § 18-8002 precludes a later DUI prosecution; it does not decide § 18-8004’s own rules. opinion →
State v. Garcia, the court decides whether revoking probation was an abuse of discretion; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Tucker, the court decided whether an unpreserved pleading objection could be raised on appeal, not a rule of Idaho Code § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Halford, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the charged offense, but decides whether the sentence could be enhanced under § 18-8005 without an amended charge. opinion →
Matter of MacKey, the court decided the Fourth Amendment seizure issue and the license suspension under § 18-8002; it did not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Lafferty, the court cites § 18-8004 only to identify the offense; it decides whether probation was properly revoked, not a rule of this section. opinion →
State v. Burris, the court decides issues under § 18-8002 and the Idaho Constitution; it mentions § 18-8004 only as the charged offense. opinion →
State v. Wersland, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense, but decides who may provide impact statements for the presentence report under other law. opinion →
Claiborne v. State, the court decides the license suspension requirements of I.C. § 18-8002; § 18-8004 identifies only the charge underlying the arrest. opinion →
State v. Hunnel, the court decides whether Hunnel validly waived counsel and whether his sentence was excessive; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Gusman, the court decided whether findings from the license suspension hearing precluded the DUI prosecution; it did not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Naccarato, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the charge, but decides the traffic stop and a speedy trial claim under § 19-3501, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. McConnell, the court decides whether McConnell validly waived counsel and entered his earlier plea; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Schoonover, the court mentions § 18-8004 only to identify a charge; it decides whether the State preserved an evidentiary ruling for appeal, not any rule of the DUI statute. opinion →
State v. Remsburg, the court decides the breath-test observation requirement in the operator’s manual, not a rule of § 18-8004. The section is cited only to identify the charge. opinion →
State v. Lynch, the court decides whether § 18-301 bars the DUI prosecution; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Coby, the court decides whether prior convictions can support felony enhancement under § 18-8005(5), not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Waldie, the court decides whether the officer’s conduct was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Stevens, the court cites § 18-8004 for the legal limit while deciding evidentiary and double jeopardy issues; it does not decide a rule of the section. opinion →
State v. Johnson, the court decides the elements of aggravated DUI under § 18-8006, not the rules of § 18-8004. opinion →
Sosa v. State, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the underlying conviction, but decides claims about post-conviction relief and the jurisdictional review process, not this section’s rules. opinion →
State v. Warden, the court decides whether Idaho retains jurisdiction under § 67-5101 to prosecute the DUI offense; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004 itself. opinion →
State v. Flynn, the court decides a statutory double-jeopardy issue under former I.C. § 18-301, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Carr, the section identifies the charge; the court decides a due process issue, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Coby, the court decides what proof is needed to use prior convictions for felony enhancement; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004 itself. opinion →
Moir v. State of Idaho, the court mentions § 18-8004 only to identify the conviction; it decides federal habeas claims, not the section’s rules. opinion →
State v. Atkinson, the court decides whether the traffic stop satisfied the Fourth Amendment, not what § 18-8004 requires or covers. opinion →
State v. Pusey, the court decides the enhancement computation under § 18-8005, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Pilik, the court decides suppression and admission of prior-conviction evidence, not a rule of § 18-8004 itself. opinion →
State v. Rountree, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense but decides the rules for additional BAC testing under § 18-8002. opinion →
State v. Knight, the court decided the validity of the stop and evidentiary issues, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Schorzman, the court decides whether a contempt order enforcing an unpaid fine is time-barred and properly entered; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Reed, the court decides whether the continued traffic stop complied with the Fourth Amendment; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Etherington, the court decided whether the investigatory stop was constitutional, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Curtis, the court expressly declined to decide whether inattentive driving is a lesser included offense of DUI. Its holding concerns harmless error under I.C. § 19-2132(c), not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Shelton, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the charge but decides issues under other statutes and due process, not this section’s rules. opinion →
State v. Kelchner, the court decides dismissal and appeal issues under other provisions; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Rosencrantz, the court recites § 18-8004 as the underlying DUI provision while deciding whether other offenses are included in aggravated DUI under § 18-8006; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Gleason, the court resolved the evidentiary challenge on preservation grounds without deciding a rule under § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Peck, the court mentions § 18-8004 only as a charge against Peck; it decides issues concerning counsel and self-representation, not the section’s rules. opinion →
State v. Hills, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense but decides sentencing and a Rule 35 motion, not the section’s rules. opinion →
State v. Nez, the court decides probation revocation issues; § 18-8004 only identifies the underlying DUI conviction. opinion →
State v. Harmon, the court decides constitutional claims and issues under § 18-8002; it cites § 18-8004 only to identify the charge. opinion →
State v. Flowers, the court decides whether the traffic stop satisfied the Fourth Amendment. It does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Pressley, the court reports the arrest charge but makes no decision about § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Barros, the court decided the officer's arrest authority under Idaho Code § 67-5101(G), not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
Kramer v. Colorado Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division, the court decides whether Colorado law permits consideration of the Idaho convictions; it does not decide a rule of Idaho Code § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Severance, the court gives the statute’s BAC limit as background but decides a voir dire issue, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Johnson, the court decides whether disclosing the felony enhancement to the jury was harmless; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. McCarthy, the court decides whether the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Miller, the court decides discovery and continuance issues, not the rules of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Albaugh, the court decided whether the officer’s questioning was permissible under the Fourth Amendment; it did not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Mireles, the court decided whether the officer's detention was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment; it did not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Keetch, the court decides the requirements of Idaho Criminal Rule 48(b), not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Nelson, the court decided whether the Fourth Amendment permitted field sobriety tests; it did not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Anderson, the court decides whether the traffic stop was lawful; § 18-8004 appears only as the charge against Anderson. opinion →
State v. Evans, the court decided whether the broken headlight justified the traffic stop; it did not decide a rule under § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Hankey, the court decides whether the investigatory stop was justified, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Larson, the court decided whether the stop satisfied constitutional reasonable-suspicion requirements, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
Garcia v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, the court decided how the federal crime-of-violence definition applies to a DUI conviction, not a rule of Idaho Code § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Scott, the court decides the felony enhancement rule in § 18-8005(5), not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
Bowman v. Idaho Transportation Department, the court decides when evidentiary testing fails under § 18-8002A(4)(a); § 18-8004 supplies the alcohol limit but its own rules are not decided. opinion →
State v. Shearer, the court decides issues concerning the vehicle-noise statute and a Fourth Amendment search, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Slater, the court decides whether the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, not the rules of § 18-8004. opinion →
Druffel v. State, Department of Transportation, the court mentions § 18-8004 as the underlying DUI violation but decides the rules for restricted driving privileges under § 18-8002A(9), not the rules of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Worthington, the court decided whether the blood draw violated the Fourth Amendment, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
Hansen v. State, the court decides whether Rule 60(b)(1) can remedy an untimely hearing request under § 18-8002 and M.C.R. 9.2; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
Fenimore v. State, the court decides Oklahoma law and cites Idaho Code § 18-8004 only as a comparison. opinion →
State v. Cantrell, the court mentions § 18-8004(1)(a) only as the charge; it decides the right to obtain independent testing and whether the BAC results should be suppressed under § 18-8002(4)(d). opinion →
State v. Lovelace, the court decides issues concerning capital sentencing; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004, which concerns driving under the influence. opinion →
State v. Weber, the court decides whether prior convictions may be challenged in a felony DUI proceeding under § 18-8005(5), not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Patterson, this sentence reports the charges, not this court’s decision about § 18-8004. The court decides the taillight and traffic stop issues under other laws. opinion →
State v. McDonald, the court decided hearsay and confrontation issues, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Kimball, the court decided whether the traffic stop was lawful under headlight laws and the Fourth Amendment, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Thornley, the court decides whether the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, not a disputed rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Davis, the court addresses speedy trial rights; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Ortiz, the court decided whether the Idaho provision was a statutory counterpart under Oregon law; it did not decide a rule of Idaho Code § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Irwin, the court decides a Fourth Amendment suppression issue and a license suspension issue under § 18-8002; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Hedges, the court mentions § 18-8004 only to identify the DUI charge; its decision addresses the right to independent testing under § 18-8002. opinion →
State v. Diaz, the court decides constitutional and § 18-8002 blood-testing rules; it cites § 18-8004 only to identify the charge. opinion →
State v. Williamson, the citation appears in a concurrence’s footnote as an analogy; the court does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Gomez, the court decided a Fourth Amendment suppression issue; it did not decide any rule of § 18-8004. The section appears only as the charge for driving under the influence. opinion →
State v. Buell, the court decided whether the field sobriety tests violated the Fourth Amendment; it did not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. DeWitt, the court decides the blood draw’s legality under the Fourth Amendment and Idaho Code § 18-8002; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
Reisenauer v. State, Department of Transportation, the court decides the license-suspension requirements of § 18-8002A, not a rule of § 18-8004. The discussion of § 18-8004’s methods of proof appears in a concurrence quoting an earlier decision. opinion →
State v. Card, the court decides restitution under Idaho Code § 19-5304; it cites § 18-8004 only to identify the offense. opinion →
State v. Leslie, the court decides how §§ 18-8004C and 18-8005(5) apply to enhanced DUI convictions; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004 itself. opinion →
State v. Beasley, the court decided arrest and jurisdiction issues, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Finnicum, the court decides whether the deputies’ entry violated the Fourth Amendment, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Turney, the court decides the rules of § 18-8006; § 18-8004 appears only as its predicate DUI violation. opinion →
State v. Madden, the citation appears in a report of the proceedings below, not in this court’s decision about § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Eldred, the court decides a prosecutorial misconduct claim, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Jim Howard, III, the court decides double jeopardy and mootness, not the rules of Idaho Code § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Wheeler, the court cites § 18-8004(1)(a) to identify the conviction but decides prosecutorial misconduct and suppression issues, not that section’s rules. opinion →
State v. Ashworth, the court decided a Fourth Amendment privacy issue; it did not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Ashworth, the citation appears in a report of Ashworth’s arrest, not in this court’s decision about § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. TWO JINN, INC., the court mentions § 18-8004 only to report Harris’s guilty plea; its decision concerns bond forfeiture. opinion →
State v. Wheeler, the court identifies § 18-8004 as the offense of conviction but decides suppression and prosecutorial misconduct issues, not this section’s rules. opinion →
State v. Moore, the court decides whether the prior conviction qualifies for enhancement under § 18-8005; it uses § 18-8004 as the comparison statute without deciding a rule of § 18-8004 itself. opinion →
State v. Vann, the court decides only the sentence for possession of cocaine; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Eschief, the court cites § 18-8004(1) to identify the offense of conviction, but decides the sentencing appeal under general abuse-of-discretion standards. opinion →
State v. Jose L. Martinez, Jr., the court decides the blood draw issue under the Fourth Amendment and Idaho Code § 18-8002; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Johnson, the court decides how §§ 18-8005(7) and 19-2514 apply; § 18-8004 only identifies the underlying offense. opinion →
State v. Gerhardt, the court decides whether the Rule 35 motion was properly denied, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Hale, the court decides a Rule 35 sentence reduction motion; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Misty M. Canada, the court decides whether denying a Rule 35 sentence reduction was an abuse of discretion; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Green, the court decided a due process claim and the rules of § 18-8002, not the rules of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Flores, the court decides whether expanding the traffic stop was permissible, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Feltman, the court decides whether the sentence was an abuse of discretion; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Nelson, the court decides only whether the sentence was an abuse of discretion; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Blackmon, the court decided the right to additional testing under § 18-8002; it cited § 18-8004 only to identify the DUI charge. opinion →
State v. Locke, the court decides the felony enhancement rule in § 18-8005(5), not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. William A. Barrett, Jr., the court identifies § 18-8004 as a charge but decides issues of plea withdrawal and sentencing, not the section’s rules. opinion →
State v. Reusser, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the conviction, but decides whether relinquishing jurisdiction and executing the sentence was an abuse of discretion. opinion →
State v. Hamilton, the court decides whether the sentence was excessive, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
McDaniel v. State, Department of Transportation, the court decides whether § 18-8002A requires consideration of a breath test’s margin of error in an administrative suspension; it uses § 18-8004 to identify the alcohol limit. opinion →
State v. Kevin Vernon McNabb, Jr., the court decides the stop and blood draw issues, but does not decide any rule of § 18-8004; it cites the section only to identify the charge. opinion →
State v. James, the court decides whether the officer’s actions violated the Fourth Amendment; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. David C. Ralston, III, the court decided the license suspension rule under § 18-8005(5)(d), not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
Burton v. State, Department of Idaho, the court decides whether § 49-808(1) is vague as applied to Burton. It cites § 18-8004 only to describe the breath test result. opinion →
State v. Linn, the court reviewed the sentence for abuse of discretion but did not decide any rule of Idaho Code § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Twiss, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense, but decides probation revocation and sentencing issues without deciding any rule of that section. opinion →
State v. Daniels, the court reviews sentencing discretion and a Rule 35 motion without deciding any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Reed, the court decided whether a dismissed DUI conviction counts for enhancement under Idaho Code § 18-8005(6), not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Raymond, the court decided whether the sentence was excessive; it did not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. LeCLERCQ, the court decides the implied-consent and suppression issues under Idaho Code § 18-8002, not a rule of § 18-8004. Section 18-8004 identifies the DUI offense underlying the plea. opinion →
State v. Two Jinn, Inc. /Brett Robert Bardsley, the court decides bond forfeiture; § 18-8004 only identifies the underlying charge. opinion →
State v. Scott, the court decides whether the officer was in fresh pursuit under other statutes. Section 18-8004 identifies a charge but its rules are not decided. opinion →
State v. Lanham, the court cited § 18-8004 to identify the offense of conviction, but decided only whether the sentence was an abuse of discretion. opinion →
State v. Baker, the court reviews the sentence for abuse of discretion but decides no rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. TWO JINN, INC., the citation reports a charge; the court decides bond forfeiture, not § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Heda, section 18-8004 identifies the offense, but the court decides sentencing and Rule 35 issues without deciding any rule of the section. opinion →
Masterson v. Idaho Department of Transportation, the court decided whether the administrative suspension was supported by properly noticed, substantial evidence under other provisions; it did not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Jacobson, the court decided a constitutional due process claim and a motion under the criminal rules, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
Wanner v. State, Department of Transportation, the court cites § 18-8004 only to describe Wanner’s breath test results; it decides hearing and review issues under other statutes. opinion →
Wanner v. Idaho Dept of Transportation, the court cites § 18-8004(1)(a) for the legal limit but decides the hearing deadline and administrative remedies under other statutes. opinion →
State v. Georgia, the court reviews the sentence and Rule 35 ruling but decides no rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Warren, the court reviewed the sentence for abuse of discretion but did not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Ingle, the court reviewed the sentence for abuse of discretion but did not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Harris, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense, but decides the sentencing and Rule 35 issues without deciding any rule of that section. opinion →
State v. Wheeler, the court reviewed the sentence for abuse of discretion but did not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
Cunningham v. State, the court decides the advisory requirements of § 18-8002(3); § 18-8004 only identifies the suspected offense. opinion →
Livingston Papse, Jr. v. State, the court cites § 18-8004 only to identify the underlying charge; it decides whether counsel should have been appointed for the post-conviction proceeding. opinion →
State v. Wilkins, the court decides issues about the hearing record and disclosure of evidence, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Cunningham, the court decides whether the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Gough, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense, but decides the reasonableness of the sentence and probation terms under general standards rather than a rule of this section. opinion →
Buell v. Idaho Department of Transportation, the court mentions § 18-8004 only while deciding whether a license disqualification under § 49-335 is criminal punishment; it does not decide § 18-8004’s rules. opinion →
Buell v. Department of Transportation, the court mentions § 18-8004 while deciding whether a CDL disqualification under § 49-335 is criminal punishment; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
Idaho Transportation v. Van Comp, the court decides the requirements for an administrative license suspension under § 18-8002A, not a rule of § 18-8004 itself. opinion →
State v. Crockett, the court decides constitutional speedy-trial and due-process claims, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Foster, the court decided a Batson jury-selection issue, not any rule of § 18-8004. The section appears only in the description of the charge. opinion →
State v. Betancourt, the citation appears only in the court's account of the charges, not in its own decision about § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Miller-Reizenstein, the court decides whether revoking probation was an abuse of discretion; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. TOYNE, the court cites § 18-8004 to describe the charge, but decides evidentiary and sentencing issues under other provisions. opinion →
State v. Decker, the court decides suppression under §§ 18-8002 and 18-8002A; § 18-8004 appears only as a citation for the legal limit. opinion →
Graves v. State Dept of Transportation, the court decided whether the officer had legal cause under the administrative license suspension statute, § 18-8002A; it did not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Collins, the court decides whether revoking probation was an abuse of discretion, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Olson, the court decides probation revocation and sentence reduction issues; it cites § 18-8004 only to identify Olson’s offense. opinion →
State v. Roy Thompson Gwin, Jr., the court decided the Fourth Amendment basis for the traffic stop and whether the sentence was excessive; it did not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Bybee, the court reviewed the sentence for abuse of discretion; it did not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, the court decides probable cause for a warrantless arrest; the opinion does not show it deciding the meaning or scope of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Penkunis, the court decides probation revocation and sentencing issues, not the rules of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Adams, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense but decides only whether the sentence and denial of the Rule 35 motion were an abuse of discretion. opinion →
State v. Reyna, the court reviewed the sentence for abuse of discretion; it did not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Radcliff, the court decides whether the length of probation was an abuse of discretion; § 18-8004 only identifies the offense. opinion →
State v. Wilske, the court decided whether Wilske was in custody for Miranda purposes, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Anderson, the court cites § 18-8004(1)(a) to identify the conviction but decides sentencing and probation issues, not the section’s rules. opinion →
State v. Margaret Lea Lewis, the court decides whether the traffic stop was lawful; it does not decide any rule of Idaho Code § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Randle, the citation reports the charge against Randle, not this court’s decision about § 18-8004. The court decided a Fourth Amendment seizure issue. opinion →
State v. Beltran, the court reviewed the sentence for excessiveness and did not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Robinson, the court decides whether relinquishing jurisdiction and executing the sentence were abuses of discretion; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Woodley, the court mentions § 18-8004 only to identify the underlying charge; it decides post-conviction issues, not this section’s rules. opinion →
State v. Warnell Trent Turner, the court decides whether the sentence and denial of the Rule 35 motion were abuses of discretion; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Fortuno-Garcia, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the conviction, but decides probation revocation and sentencing issues rather than the section’s rules. opinion →
State v. Hansen, the court mentions § 18-8004 as the offense of conviction but decides only whether the district court abused its sentencing discretion. opinion →
State v. Johnnie, the court decides whether revoking probation and executing the sentence was an abuse of discretion; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Hernandez, the court reviews sentencing discretion and does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. David Jared Arthur, Jr., the court decides appeal waiver and probation revocation, not any rule of § 18-8004. The section identifies the offense underlying the conviction. opinion →
Mecham v. Dept of Transportation, the court decides whether the evidence supports the license suspension under § 18-8002A; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004(4). opinion →
State v. Kelley, the court reviewed the sentence for abuse of discretion but did not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
Ewell v. State, the court cites § 18-8004 only while describing a prior DUI case; it decides a sex offender enhancement and an ineffective assistance claim. opinion →
Hubbard v. Dept of Transportation, the court decides whether the breath test complied with ISP procedures and whether the license suspension could be vacated under § 18-8002A(7)(d). It cites § 18-8004(4) as the source of ISP authority but does not decide that section’s own rules. opinion →
State v. Kesey, the court decides whether revoking probation and relinquishing jurisdiction was an abuse of discretion; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
Hubbard v. State, the court decides whether the breath test complied with ISP procedures and whether the equipment malfunctioned under § 18-8002A(7)(d); it cites § 18-8004(4) as the source of ISP authority. opinion →
Fisher v. State, the citation reports the jury’s verdict; this court decides ineffective-assistance claims, not a rule under § 18-8004. opinion →
Peck v. State, Department of Transportation, the court addresses the license suspension under § 18-8002A; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
Peck v. Dept of Transportation, the court mentions § 18-8004 as the basis for the reported test violation but does not decide that section’s rules. opinion →
State v. Matt, the court reviews the probation and sentencing decisions but decides no rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. North, the court decides whether the sentence was excessive, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
Johnson v. Dept of Transportation, the court expressly declined to decide whether the breath test complied with § 18-8004(4). opinion →
Lawyer v. State, the court mentions § 18-8004(1)(a) only to identify the conviction. It decides an ineffective-assistance claim and jurisdiction under § 67-5101, without deciding a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Fisher, the court decides whether the sentences and probation revocations were an abuse of discretion; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Conrad, the court decided the sentencing and Rule 35 issues, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Burnet, the court decides whether the consecutive sentence was an abuse of discretion, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
Williams v. Dept of Transportation, the court mentions § 18-8004 only to assess whether the separate CDL disqualification under § 49-335 is criminal punishment; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Sherman R. Maxwell Withdrawn 10-31-12 (See Substitute), the court cites an earlier decision about § 18-8004 as an analogy while deciding whether amendments to charges under § 49-1418 alleged different offenses; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Gendron, the court decided whether Gendron could withdraw his guilty plea, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Reece, the court decides whether the sentence was excessive; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Vann, the opinion only reports the guilty plea under § 18-8004; this court decides a Rule 35 sentencing motion. opinion →
State v. Corwin, the court decided a prosecutorial-misconduct claim, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Alcala, the court identifies § 18-8004 as the charged offense but decides the appeal under general probation and sentencing standards, without deciding a rule of this section. opinion →
State v. Rian Kristopher Hill, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense but decides sentencing discretion and a Rule 35 motion, not a rule of this section. opinion →
State v. Pope, the court decides a Rule 35 sentence-reduction appeal; it cites § 18-8004 only to identify the offense. opinion →
State v. Jack Cahill Steelsmith, Jr., the court decides sentencing rules under § 18-8005(6), not the rules of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Sherman R. Maxwell SUBSTITUTE, the court decides whether amendment of charges under Idaho Code § 49-1418 was permissible. Its references to § 18-8004 are string cites describing earlier decisions, not a decision about that section’s rules. opinion →
State v. Racehorse, the citation reports the conviction below; the court’s own decision addresses probation revocation and sentencing, not § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Halbert, the court decides the Rule 35 sentence-reduction appeal. Section 18-8004 appears only as background identifying the offense. opinion →
State v. Ballard, the court decides probation revocation and execution of the sentence, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Clapp, the court decides how to review the sentence after probation revocation, not any rule of Idaho Code § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Navejar, the court decides the timeliness of a Rule 35 sentence modification motion and an appeal; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Locke, the citation appears in the court’s account of Locke’s guilty plea, not in its own decision about § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Storms, the court reviews probation, sentencing, and a Rule 35 motion; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Morgan, the court only reports the DUI conviction; its own decision addresses the Rule 35 motion. opinion →
State v. Gonzales, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense but decides probation revocation and sentencing issues, not this section’s rules. opinion →
State v. Tucker, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense but decides sentencing and a Rule 35 motion, not the section’s rules. opinion →
State v. Browning, the court decides whether the sentences are illegal under Rule 35; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Fifer, the court decides whether the stop was constitutional under the community caretaking doctrine, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Waters, the court mentions § 18-8004 only to identify a conviction; it decides no rule of that section. opinion →
State v. Tevebaugh, the citation identifies the offense of conviction; the court decides sentencing issues, not a rule under § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. LLoyd Preacher, Jr., the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense but decides a sentencing issue under the invited-error doctrine, not a rule of this section. opinion →
State v. Cloe, the court decided whether the sentences were excessive, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Chavez, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense, but decides probation revocation and sentencing issues without deciding any rule of that section. opinion →
State v. Tallman, the court decides whether Tallman's challenge to probation revocation is moot and whether revocation was an abuse of discretion; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Gillihan, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense, but decides only whether the district court abused its sentencing discretion. opinion →
State v. Tackett, the court decided whether the magistrate had discretion to reject a guilty plea, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Uhlry, the court mentions § 18-8004 as the offense of conviction but decides jurisdiction under Idaho Criminal Rule 35. opinion →
State v. Roderick, the court decides probation revocation and sentencing issues, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Jay, the court decides whether the sentences and denial of Rule 35 motions were an abuse of discretion; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Jensen, the court decides whether the probation-revocation appeals were timely; § 18-8004 identifies the underlying convictions. opinion →
State v. Liles, the court decides issues about appellate authority, probation revocation, and sentencing; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Lundahl, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense but decides no rule of that section. opinion →
State v. Ackerland, the section identifies the offense of conviction; the court decides probation revocation and sentence execution, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Allred, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense, but decides probation revocation and sentencing issues rather than the section’s rules. opinion →
State v. Casey, the court decides probation revocation and sentencing issues, not the rules of § 18-8004; the section identifies the underlying offense. opinion →
State v. Friedrich, the court decided a constitutional suppression issue and reviewed the sentences; it did not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Hunnicutt, the court reviewed sentencing decisions under general standards and did not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
Trottier v. Transportation Dept, the court cites § 18-8004(4) as background authority for the testing standards; the dispute concerns compliance with those standards, not the section’s own rules. opinion →
State v. Caverly, the court reviewed the sentence for abuse of discretion but did not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Spencer, the court decides whether the magistrate had to ask about a guilty plea under I.C.R. 11(a)(1), not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Norman Lake Dye, Jr., the court cites § 18-8004 only to identify a conviction; it decides probation revocation and execution of the battery sentence, not a rule of the DUI statute. opinion →
State v. Willard, the court reviewed the length of Willard’s sentence but did not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Dobbs, the court decided whether the prosecutor’s closing argument mischaracterized the evidence, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Martin, the court decided whether the evidence linked Martin to two prior convictions; it did not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Keane, the court decides whether Keane’s Rule 35 motion was timely and permissible, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Roderick, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense, but decides probation revocation and sentencing issues rather than any rule of that section. opinion →
State v. Rusco, the court reports the conviction below; its own decision addresses the timeliness of the appeal, not § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Ballard, the court decided whether the sentence was an abuse of discretion, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Schall, the court decided the burden of proving substantial conformity under § 18-8005(6), not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. McBride, the citation reports a guilty plea entered below; it is not this court’s decision about § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Marrone, the court decides sentencing and Rule 35 issues, but no rule of § 18-8004. The section appears only in the citation identifying the offense. opinion →
State v. Crisp, the court decided whether the stop satisfied the Fourth Amendment, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Treva Dawn Irving, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the DUI conviction but decides probation and sentencing issues, not this section’s rules. opinion →
State v. Michael D. Luttrell, Jr., the court decided whether the district court abused its discretion under Rule 35; it did not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
Fisher v. State, the court cites § 18-8004 only to identify the offense underlying the conviction; it decides no rule of that section. opinion →
State v. Carter, the court decides sentencing and Rule 35 issues, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Harvey Paul Guthrie, Jr., the court decides the suppression issue arising from the traffic stop, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Griffiths, the court decides probation revocation and execution of the sentence; § 18-8004 only identifies the underlying offense. opinion →
State v. Rodriguez, the court cites § 18-8004 as the basis for the DUI conviction but decides only whether the district court abused its discretion concerning probation and sentencing. opinion →
State v. Paez, the court decided whether the detention was supported by reasonable suspicion; it did not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Knott, the court identifies § 18-8004 as the charge but decides admissibility under other statutes and the rules of evidence, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Aguilar-Penaloza, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense, then decides whether the sentence was excessive. It does not decide a rule of this section. opinion →
State v. Cisneros, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense but decides the sentence and Rule 35 motion, not a rule of this section. opinion →
State v. Bauer, the court reviewed the sentences for abuse of discretion; it did not decide any rule of Idaho Code § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Dorman, the court decides sentencing and Rule 35 issues; it cites § 18-8004 only to identify the offense. opinion →
State v. Hernandez, the court decides whether the sentence was an abuse of discretion, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Hernandez, the court decides whether the clerk could accept a misdemeanor DUI plea under Idaho Misdemeanor Criminal Rules 6 and 14; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Eric Lawdahl Brown, Jr., the court cites § 18-8004 only to identify an offense Brown pleaded guilty to; it decides no rule of that section. opinion →
State v. Ash, the court decides whether the sentence was excessive and whether the Rule 35 motion was properly denied; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Penn, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense, but decides Penn’s Rule 35 motion rather than any rule of the section. opinion →
State v. Shay, the court decides whether the probation revocation was moot and whether the district court abused its discretion; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Largent, the court decided whether the sentence was an abuse of discretion, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
Peck v. Idaho Transportation Department, the reference to § 18-8004 appears in a quotation from an earlier opinion, not in this court’s decision about the section. opinion →
State v. Rhoads, the court decides whether an alleged evidentiary error was harmless; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Mercer, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense but decides probation revocation and sentence reduction under other rules. opinion →
State v. Marrone, the court decided whether to reduce Marrone’s sentence under Rule 35, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Heughins, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense, but decides only whether the sentence was excessive; it does not decide a rule of the section. opinion →
Daniels v. State, the court decided a search and ineffective-assistance claim under other law; it did not decide any rule of § 18-8004, which it cited only as a charge. opinion →
State v. Rathke, the court decides probation revocation and sentencing issues, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Murphy, the court decides whether probation was properly revoked and the sentence executed; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Nicolescu, the § 18-8004(4) point is Nicolescu’s argument, which the court did not decide. The court resolved the appeal under § 18-8002(1). opinion →
State v. Loman, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense but decides probation and sentence reduction issues, not a rule of this section. opinion →
State v. Peek, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense but decides only whether the district court abused its sentencing discretion. opinion →
State v. Fuerstinger, the court decides probation revocation and sentencing issues, not any rule of § 18-8004; the section appears only in the description of the conviction. opinion →
State v. Awantaye, the court cites § 18-8004 only to identify the conviction; it decides probation revocation and sentencing issues, not this section’s rules. opinion →
State v. Ash, the court decides probation revocation and sentence execution, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Arlyn v. Orr, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the DUI charge, but decides the appeal under § 18-705. opinion →
State v. Valera-Tema, the court resolved the appeal based on the preliminary-hearing waiver and expressly declined to decide what § 18-8004 means. opinion →
State v. Marsh, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the conviction but decides whether revoking probation was an abuse of discretion, not a rule of this section. opinion →
State v. Meredith, the court decides whether relinquishing jurisdiction was an abuse of discretion; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004, which appears only in the description of the guilty plea. opinion →
State v. Hergesheimer, the court decided Miranda and corpus delicti issues, but did not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Cornelison, the court reports the guilty plea but makes no decision about § 18-8004; it decides a Rule 35 sentencing motion. opinion →
State v. Trent, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense but decides only whether denial of a Rule 35 sentence reduction was an abuse of discretion. opinion →
Cynthia Dawn Salinas v. State, the citation appears in a quotation recounting Salinas’s earlier conviction, not in this court’s decision about § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. McSherry, the court decides probation revocation and sentencing issues, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Haugland, the court decides whether the crosswalk stop was lawful; § 18-8004 identifies the DUI charge but its rules are not decided. opinion →
State v. Big Dawg Bail Bonds, the court identifies § 18-8004 as the charge but decides bail-bond exoneration, not a rule of that section. opinion →
State v. Jared Charles Hergesheimer SUBSTITUTE, the court applied the general corpus delicti rule to a DUI charge, without deciding a rule of § 18-8004 itself. opinion →
State v. Parker, the court decides whether the sentence was an abuse of discretion; § 18-8004 only identifies the offense of conviction. opinion →
State v. Jerry Leonard Ellis, II, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the underlying conviction but decides probation revocation issues, not the section’s rules. opinion →
State v. Stephens, the court decided a sentencing appeal and a Rule 35 motion, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Warren, the court decides the Rule 35 sentencing challenge, but does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Neal, the court decided whether the traffic stop was justified under § 49-637(1); § 18-8004 only identifies the charge. opinion →
State v. Martinez, the court decides the Rule 35 sentence-reduction motion, not a rule of Idaho Code § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Schall, the court decides the enhancement rules of section 18-8005(6); section 18-8004 identifies the underlying DUI offense. opinion →
State v. Bias, the court decides the motion for substitute counsel; it mentions § 18-8004 only to identify the charge. opinion →
State v. Ernest Alexander Bercher, Jr., the court reviews the sentence for excessiveness and does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Mendoza, the court cited § 18-8004 to identify the offense but decided only whether the district court abused its sentencing discretion. opinion →
State v. Dean, the court decides whether relinquishing jurisdiction and imposing the sentence were abuses of discretion. It cites § 18-8004 only to identify the offense. opinion →
State v. Jaramillo, the court decided a constitutional prosecutorial-misconduct issue; § 18-8004 only identifies one of the charges. opinion →
State v. Jaramillo, the court decides whether prosecutorial misconduct affected the trial; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Welsh, the court cites § 18-8004 only to identify the conviction; it decides probation revocation and a Rule 35 motion, not a rule of this section. opinion →
State v. Ballard, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the conviction but decides only whether the district court abused its discretion in denying a Rule 35 sentence reduction. opinion →
State v. Carter, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify a charge but decides no rule of that section. opinion →
State v. Olguin, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense, then decides whether the sentence was an abuse of discretion under general sentencing standards. opinion →
State v. Fencl, the court decides sentencing discretion under the persistent violator statute, § 19-2514. It cites § 18-8004 only to identify the DUI charge. opinion →
State v. Yocom, the court reviewed the sentence for abuse of discretion but did not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Costa, the court decides whether the arrest had probable cause under the Fourth Amendment, not what Idaho Code § 18-8004 means or requires. opinion →
State v. Cory Brand Hincks, the court decides whether the sentence and denial of the Rule 35 motion were abuses of discretion; it does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Dixon, the court decides probation revocation and a Rule 35 motion, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Sams, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense but decides only whether the sentence and denial of the Rule 35 motion were abuses of discretion. opinion →
State v. Shelton, the court decided Fourth Amendment suppression issues, not the rules of § 18-8004; the section identifies only a charge. opinion →
State v. Boehm, the opinion reports Boehm’s argument about § 18-8004(4), but the court expressly declines to decide its merits. opinion →
State v. Brennan, the court decides whether the Rule 35(b) motion was timely; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Paz, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the conviction, but decides probation revocation and execution of the sentence, not a rule of this section. opinion →
State v. Lange, the court decides the sentencing and Rule 35 issues, not any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Vega, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense, but decides sentencing and Rule 35 issues without deciding any rule of that section. opinion →
State v. Tanner, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense, but decides the sentence and Rule 35 motion without deciding any rule of the section. opinion →
State v. Murphy, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the conviction but decides whether Murphy is entitled to credit for time served, without deciding a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Larsen, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense, but decides probation revocation and sentencing issues rather than a rule of this section. opinion →
State v. Smith, the court mentions the DUI conviction but does not decide any rule of Idaho Code § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Hernandez, the court decided whether the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion; it did not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
Tucker v. State, the court cites § 18-8004 only to identify the underlying conviction; it decides post-conviction claims, not this section’s rules. opinion →
State v. Beaman, the court reviewed the sentence for abuse of discretion; it did not decide any rule of Idaho Code § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Gonzalez, the court decides whether revoking probation was an abuse of discretion; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Danielle Mona Lisa Duff, the court identifies the DUI charge but decides evidentiary and new-trial issues, not a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Hof, the court decides whether the sentence was excessive; it cites § 18-8004 only to identify the offense. opinion →
State v. Taylor, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the conviction but decides only whether the sentence was excessive; it does not decide the section’s rules. opinion →
State v. Wilson, the court reviews the length of the sentence but does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Charles Edward Burch, II, the court decided sentencing and a Rule 35 motion; it did not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
Bezdicek, Jr. v. Transportation Dept, the court decided legal cause as a ground for contesting an administrative license suspension under § 18-8002A; it did not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Juli Rose Wells, the court cites § 18-8004 to identify the offense, but decides whether the district court considered information submitted with a Rule 35 motion. It does not decide a rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
State v. Jesus Angel Corella, Jr., the court decides whether the sentences and denial of the Rule 35 motions were an abuse of discretion; it does not decide any rule of § 18-8004. opinion →
…and 284 more.

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