Statute Annotations › Idaho › Idaho Code § 28-22-104

Idaho Code § 28-22-104

Exempt property: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Idaho
Case notes
99
Cited in passing
29
Citing cases indexed
169
Case dates
1968–2026
Screened through
2026-03-04
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

128 citing cases reviewed of 169 in the citation index: 99 interpreted the section (annotated below), 29 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-03-04 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Idaho Code § 28-22-104?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Interest on money due under contracts

Section 28-22-104(1) allows interest on money due by express contract beginning when each payment becomes due; timely payment means no interest accrues.

Linford v. Hunsaker · filed 1968-11-011

I.C. § 28-22-104 provides that in the absence of a contract fixing a different rate, interest at the rate of 6% per annum will be allowed, not on money owing, but on money due, by express contract. Under this contract, the money became “due” on the date it was to be paid, i. e., December 1 of each year. The money was paid as due; hence interest never commenced to run on money due, or after the same became due.
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Section 28-22-104 requires money due by express contract or after it becomes due to bear 6% interest unless a written contract sets a different rate.

Mitchell v. Flandro · filed 1972-12-22

It is the rule by statute in Idaho that money due “by express contract” or “after the same becomes due” draws interest at 6%, in the absence of express written contract fixing the interest at a different amount. I.C. 28-22-104.
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Section 28-22-104 provides 6% interest on money due under an express contract, with interest accruing when the money becomes due if the contract does not specify a different accrual time.

DeAtley Corporation v. Otto · filed 1973-08-24(1)

I.C. § 28-22-104(1), (2) provides for interest at the rate of 6% per annum upon money due by express contract or money after the same becomes due. When Otto sold the rock which had been crushed, payment for it was then due under the terms of their express contract. ... The trial court should have allowed interest from the dates that the rock was sold.
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Section 28-22-104(1) authorizes, but does not require, interest on money due under an express contract when no different written interest rate applies.

Rosecrans v. Intermountain Soap & Chemical Co. · filed 1980-01-29(1)

It should be noted that interest in this case is authorized, though not required, by I.C. § 28-22-104, which provides in pertinent part: “Legal Rate of Interest. — When there is no express contract in writing fixing a different rate of interest, interest is allowed at the rate of eight cents (8c) on the hundred by the year on: 1. Money due by express contract.”
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Section 28-22-104 permits prejudgment interest on a sum due, with accrual beginning when the contractual payment obligation matures.

Olmstead v. Heidelberg Inn, Inc. · filed 1983-11-22

Allowance of prejudgment interest on the net sum found due, after deducting any sums the Olmsteads may owe under the counterclaim, is appropriate under I.C. § 28-22-104. The contract of employment specifically gave the corporation six months to complete payment of the redemption price for the stock. The money owed to the Olmsteads, therefore, became due six months after they resigned. Interest would begin to accrue at that point, as the district judge correctly concluded.
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Section 28-22-104(2) permits prejudgment interest on the Neibaurs’ recovery from the bank, accruing from the date the bank improperly charged their account.

Valley Bank v. Monarch Investment Co. · filed 1990-10-02(2)

Valley Bank was not entitled to charge the Neibaurs’ account for the check that Palmer indorsed as agent of Monarch Investment of Colorado. The Neibaurs are entitled to judgment against Valley Bank for $6,500.00, plus interest from the date Valley Bank charged their account. I.C. § 28-22-104(2).
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Section 28-22-104(1) permits prejudgment interest on money due by express contract, including general damages owed under an underinsured-motorist insurance contract, from the date the insurer’s contractual duties accrue.

Emery v. United Pacific Insurance · filed 1991-07-30(1)

Because Aid contracted to insure Brinkman for up to $300,000 for all injuries and losses suffered at the hands of an underinsured tortfeasor, Aid is liable for prejudgment interest on the entire amount awarded by the jury. Prejudgment interest accrues on the general damages from the date of the accident, because that is the date Aid’s contractual duties accrued. ... The facts presented in the instant case are strikingly similar to those in Brink-man. We therefore hold it was not error for the trial court to award prejudgment interest upon the entire award commencing from the date of the accident.
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Section 28-22-104(1) allows prejudgment interest on money due by express contract when no written contract fixes a different rate.

Brinkman v. Aid Insurance Co. · filed 1988-12-22(1)

In fixing the amount of prejudgment interest, the court looked to I.C. § 28-22-104(1) which provides for prejudgment interest on “money due by express contract.”
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Section 28-22-104(1) allows prejudgment interest on money due under an express contract; for underinsured-motorist coverage, interest begins accruing on the date of the accident.

Walton v. Hartford Insurance · filed 1991-09-25(1)

We also conclude that in underinsured motorist coverage the interest begins to accrue on the date of the accident.
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Section 28-22-104(1)(1) allows interest on money due by express contract when no written contract fixes a different rate.

Seubert Excavators, Inc. v. Eucon Corp. · filed 1994-03-18(1)(1)

Even if the subcontract formed a mutual account, however, the district court was correct in establishing prejudgment interest from August 27, 1984, for at least two reasons. First, Seubert’s attorney asserted at oral argument that Seubert’s letter of August 27, 1984 did not refer to the items included in the subcontract. Thus, we find that the sums which were withheld from Steelman-Duff as of August 27, 1984 constituted “money due by express contract,” prejudgment interest on which is due pursuant to I.C. § 28-22-104.1. Even if the items enumerated in the August 27 letter did relate to the items specified in the subcontract, substantial and competent evidence still supports the conclusion of the district judge that the balance of the accounts was ascertained as of that date, since the withheld sum has not been subsequently amended.
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Section 28-22-104(1) requires interest on money due by express contract; for an underinsured-motorist policy, prejudgment interest accrues on the general damages from the date of the accident.

Schilling v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1999-05-19(1)

In this case, the arbitration panel failed to award prejudgment interest on the arbitration award. However, under I.C. §§ 7-910, 28-22-104(1), and the prior decisions of this Court, prejudgment (pre-award) interest is due on the entire arbitration award from the date of the injury. Thus, the arbitration panel erroneously failed to award prejudgment interest to respondents.
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Section 28-22-104(2) permits prejudgment interest on money after it becomes due; for member assessments, the money does not become due until the assessment is actually levied.

Kidd Island Bay Water Users Cooperative Ass'n v. Miller · filed 2001-12-26(2)

Prejudgment interest awards are appropriate where the amount of liability is liquidated or capable of ascertainment by a mere mathematical calculation in order to fully compensate the injured party. ... No levy was actually made on the members until the time of trial, and until such levy was made, the money had not “become[ ] due.” Therefore, the award of prejudgment interest to Kidd Island is reversed.
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Section 28-22-104(1) allows prejudgment interest on money due under an express contract only when the principal liability is liquidated or ascertainable by mere mathematical calculation.

Champion Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co. · filed 2003-09-08(1)

Under Idaho Code § 28-22-104(1), a party is entitled to prejudgment interest on money due under an express contract only when the principal amount of liability is liquidated or ascertainable by a mere mathematical calculation.
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Section 28-22-104(1) permits prejudgment interest on money due under an express contract when the amount is capable of mathematical computation.

American & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Reichert · filed 2004-07-08(1)

Prejudgment interest is allowed on money due by an express contract, I.C. § 28-22-104, and should be awarded when it is capable of mathematical computation.
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Section 28-22-104(1) allows prejudgment interest on money due by express contract, accruing when the insurance contract makes the benefits due.

Jones v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance (In Re Jones) · filed 2009-02-10(1)

In this instance, Plaintiff is entitled to recover prejudgment interest from Defendant, calculated from the date Defendant became obligated to pay benefits to Plaintiff.
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Section 28-22-104(1) allows 12% annual interest on money due by express contract when no written contract sets a different rate, but prejudgment interest requires damages that are liquidated or readily ascertainable by mathematical calculation.

Dawn A. Maciosek v. Dow · filed 2026-02-27(1)

In relevant part, Idaho Code § 28-22-104(1) provides that an annual rate of twelve percent interest is allowed on money due by express contract when there is no express written contract fixing a different interest rate. ... Prejudgment interest is available where the damages are liquidated or readily ascertainable by mathematical process. ... Here, Maciosek argued that Dow lacked any ownership interest in the property. Pursuant to the three-step analysis in Demoney-Hendrickson, the district court was required to determine the parties’ respective interest in the property before the court could calculate Maciosek’s damages for Dow’s unpaid share of the mortgage. Thus, Maciosek’s damages were unascertainable until the district court rendered its decision regarding the parties’ property interest and calculated Maciosek’s damages. Prejudgment interest could not be assessed until that calculation was complete.
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Prejudgment interest

Section 28-22-104 permits prejudgment interest when the amount of liability is liquidated or can be ascertained by mathematical calculation, even before the claim is reduced to judgment.

United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Clover Creek Cattle Co. · filed 1969-03-21

The district court allowed interest from the former date at the rate of six per cent per annum under I.C § 27-1904, now compiled as I.C. § 28-22-104. The interest was allowed on “money due on the judgment of any competent court or tribunal.” ... However, where the amount of liability is liquidated or capable of ascertainment by mere mathematical processes as it is here, this Court has allowed interest from a time prior to judgment, for in that event the interest in fully compensating the injured party predominates over other equitable considerations. On that basis, we find no error in the district court’s allowance of interest.
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Section 28-22-104 allows prejudgment interest on liquidated sums.

Mitchell v. Flandro · filed 1974-07-02

The interest from the date of the breach of the contract to the date of the modified judgment arises out of I.C. § 28-22-104 which provides that pre-judgment interest shall be allowed on liquidated sums.
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Section 28-22-104(1) supplies the statutory rate for prejudgment interest on leasehold damages calculated by discounting a projected income stream to present value at termination.

Bergkamp v. Carrico · filed 1985-04-29(1)

Accordingly, we hold that where a tenant has been dispossessed through wrongful termination of a lease, and where the damage award includes a projected income stream discounted to present value on the date of termination, the tenant is entitled to prejudgment interest on the value of the leasehold from that date. The interest should be computed at the rate provided by I.C. § 28-22-104(1).
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Section 28-22-104(1) sets the prejudgment interest rate applicable to a written contract amount, here 8% for the earlier period and 12% for the later period.

HOMES BY BELL-HI, INC. v. Wood · filed 1986-03-04(1)

I.C. § 28-22-104(1) (1977-81) entitles Bell-Hi to 8% annual interest on the $26,720 written contract amount from May 10, 1977 to June 30, 1981. I.C.. § 28-22-104(1) (1981-85) entitles Bell-Hi to 12% annual interest from July 1, 1981 to the date of the original trial judgment, January 13, 1984.
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Section 28-22-104 supports an award of prejudgment interest when the contested liability is liquidated, compensating for the loss of use of the money.

Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp. · filed 1988-10-06

Also in this cross-appeal Agri-Lines asserts that the trial court erred in denying prejudgment interest pursuant to I.C. § 28-22-104. A majority of this Court agrees. ... We agree with the assertion that here the amount of the contested liability is liquidated, and hence an award of prejudgment interest is appropriate to compensate Agri-Lines for the loss of their money from 1980 to 1986. ... Hence, that part of the judgment in the district court denying prejudgment interest to Agri-Lines is reversed and remanded with directions that the trial court amend the judgment to award Agri-Lines prejudgment interest.
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Section 28-22-104(1) supports prejudgment interest on unpaid wages due under an express employment contract, but not on a treble-damage penalty that becomes due only upon judgment.

De Witt v. Medley · filed 1990-04-11(1)

Under I.C. § 28-22-104(1), the appellants should have been awarded prejudgment interest on the unpaid wages, but not on the treble damage penalty.
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Section 28-22-104(2) authorizes 12% annual interest on money after it becomes due and does not categorically exclude tort claims.

Schenk v. Smith · filed 1990-05-03(2)

Prejudgment interest is authorized by statute. Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2) provides that interest of twelve percent per year “is allowed ... on ... [mjoney after the same becomes due.” The statute does not expressly exclude tort actions from its scope. ... Accordingly, we hold that prejudgment interest is not precluded in this case merely because it involves a tort.
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Section 28-22-104 does not expressly exclude tort actions, but in a tort case whether money is due awaits an eventual judgment before prejudgment interest can be awarded.

Van Brunt v. Stoddard · filed 2001-12-28

The application of the statute, which does not expressly exclude tort actions from its scope, is tempered by the limitation that in tort cases, the question of whether money is due awaits an eventual judgment.
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Section 28-22-104's general interest provision does not waive the state's sovereign immunity from prejudgment-interest awards.

Sanchez v. State · filed 2006-08-08

The University of Utah Court specifically held I.C. § 28-22-104 does not overcome the presumption of the state’s sovereign immunity.
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Subsection (1) supplies a 12% annual rate for prejudgment interest.

Murrietta v. Fehrs (In Re Fehrs) · filed 2008-07-18(1)

Judgment will be entered under § 550(a)(2) against Debtor in the amount of $44,997.43 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum, Idaho Code § 28-22-104(1), from and after March 10, 2006, to the date of entry of judgment.
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Section 28-22-104(1) permits interest on money after it becomes due and on money due on an open account, but an isolated transaction shown by a unique bill is not an open account and interest requires an amount that became due.

Med. Recovery Servs., LLC v. Neumeier · filed 2018-04-05(1)

In reverse order, the second provision has no application in this case, because the contract and payment at issue do not fit the definition of an open account as it is used under section 28-22-104. Namely, “[a]n open account refers to a continuing series of transactions between the parties, where the balance is unascertained and future transactions between the parties are expected.” Seubert Excavators, Inc. v. Eucon Corp., 125 Idaho 409, 415, 871 P.2d 826, 832 (1993) (citing 1 Am. Jur. 2d Accounts and Accounting § 4 (1962)). “A defining characteristic of an open account is that services are recurrently granted over a period of time. Thus, an open account is similar to a line of credit.” 1 Am. Jur. 2d Accounts and Accounting § 4. Here, even if Neumeier received medical services from Dr. Baird on multiple occasions, each instance was a particular, closed transaction—as evidenced by the creation of a unique bill—as opposed to an ongoing line of credit. The other statutory provision calculates interest from the date on which the principal amount becomes due. Linford v. Hunsaker, 92 Idaho 505, 506, 446 P.2d 627, 628 (1968). Thus, interest is predicated on there being an amount that becomes due. Because we conclude that there was never an amount due and owing against Neumeier, it follows that this provision cannot apply.
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Section 28-22-104(1) allows interest on money after it becomes due and on money due on an open account after three months, but separate closed medical-service transactions are not open accounts and interest cannot accrue without an amount due.

Medical Recovery Svc v. Neumeier · filed 2018-04-05(1)

These provisions are applicable here in so far as there was no express, written contract fixing an interest rate. Yet, neither supplies the crucial element missing from MRS’s argument—an amount due and owing—and therefore neither provides MRS with the interest it seeks. In reverse order, the second provision has no application in this case, because the contract and payment at issue do not fit the definition of an open account as it is used under section 28-22-104. Namely, “[a]n open account refers to a continuing series of transactions between the parties, where the balance is unascertained and future transactions between the parties are expected.” ... Here, even if Neumeier received medical services from Dr. Baird on multiple occasions, each instance was a particular, closed transaction—as evidenced by the creation of a unique bill—as opposed to an ongoing line of credit. The other statutory provision calculates interest from the date on which the principal amount becomes due. ... Thus, interest is predicated on there being an amount that becomes due. Because we conclude that there was never an amount due and owing against Neumeier, it follows that this provision cannot apply.
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Section 28-22-104 does not support prejudgment interest when the underlying judgment and the amounts associated with it were not affected by the transfers.

Clarke v. Latimer · filed 2018-06-26(1)(2)

The Clarkes argument through section 28-22-104 is equally unavailing. The Clarkes identify the “money due” under the statute as the funds that were subject to Zach’s fraudulent activities. The judgment against Zach and the amounts associated with that judgment are not at issue here, nor were they affected by the transfers to Holly. Thus, the district court also did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion in the face of section 28-22-104.
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Section 28-22-104(2) provides for 12% simple prejudgment interest on money after it becomes due when the liability is liquidated or ascertainable by mathematical calculation.

Edmark Auto, Inc. v. Zurich, Inc. · filed 2020-01-09(2)

Idaho law guides the Court’s hand in calculating pre-judgment interest. Idaho Code § 28-22-104 “provides for the award of pre-judgment interest on “‘[m]oney after the same becomes due.’” Doolittle By and Through Doolittle v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 919 P.2d 334, 343 (Idaho 1996) (citing Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2)). The applicable interest rate is 12%, not compounded. Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2); Doolittle, 919 P.2d at 343 (holding compounding of interest erroneous). And pre-judgment interest should be awarded if the amount of liability is liquidated or was capable of ascertainment by a mere mathematical calculation. Doolittle, 919 P.2d at 343.
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Section 28-22-104(1) allows 12% prejudgment interest on money after it becomes due, but accrual requires a claim whose amount is mathematically calculable.

Agstar Financial Services v. Northwest Sand & Gravel · filed 2021-03-22(1)

Prejudgment interest began to accrue on October 19, 2018, the date Gordon Paving’s claim became ascertainable, and ran until the district court entered its judgment on May 10, 2019.
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Section 28-22-104(1) sets Idaho statutory prejudgment interest at 12% per year, which the court applied to ascertainable damages.

Ivanov v. Fitness Elite Training Center, Inc. · filed 2023-10-06(1)

The applicable Idaho statutory prejudgment interest is 12% per year. I.C. § 28-22-104(1). This conclusion is supported by the fact that the Agreement is silent as to the prejudgment interest rate and the fact that the amount due is capable of mathematical computation: $120,000 annual salary = $10,000 per month x 66 months remaining on the Agreement at the time of Plaintiff’s termination = $660,000, plus; half of the annual insurance payment ($1,369.56 / 12 = $114.13 per month x 4 months (January-April 2020) = $456.52).
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Prejudgment interest—exceptions and statutory limits

Section 28-22-104(1) addresses prejudgment interest on money after it becomes due, but it does not authorize adding prejudgment interest to a statutory penalty.

Stueve v. Northern Lights, Inc. · filed 1992-09-24(1)

To hold that prejudgment interest can be assessed to augment an award under a penalty statute would be to define the punishment differently than did the legislature.
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Section 28-22-104 provides prejudgment interest on money due by express contract only when the principal liability is liquidated or ascertainable by mathematical calculation.

Ervin Construction Co. v. Van Orden · filed 1993-08-25

Prejudgment interest is warranted only when the principal amount of liability is liquidated or ascertainable by mere mathematical process.
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Section 28-22-104(1) allows prejudgment interest on money due under an express contract only when the principal liability is liquidated or ascertainable by a mere mathematical calculation.

Lickley v. Max Herbold, Inc. · filed 1999-07-21(1)

Consequently the trial court properly denied Lickley’s claim for prejudgment interest.
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Section 28-22-104 allows prejudgment interest for money due by express contract or when it becomes due, when the amount is mathematically ascertainable.

Sainsbury Const. Co., Inc. v. Quinn · filed 2002-04-08

In a breach of contract action, interest may be awarded from the date of the breach when the amount upon which the interest is to be based is mathematically and definitely ascertainable.
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Section 28-22-104 provides simple prejudgment interest rather than compound interest on qualifying money after it becomes due.

Holladay v. Lindsay · filed 2006-11-01(1) (2)

Therefore, the district court did not err when it held that Holladay was entitled to simple prejudgment interest, but not compound interest, under I.C. § 28-22-104.
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Section 28-22-104 permits prejudgment interest only when damages are liquidated or readily ascertainable by mathematical process.

Ross v. Ross · filed 2007-10-24

Under either the statute or the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment, however, prejudgment interest is allowed only where the damages are liquidated or readily ascertainable by mathematical process.
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Section 28-22-104(1) provides interest on money due by express contract, and prejudgment interest requires damages that are liquidated or capable of mathematical computation.

Cranney v. Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance · filed 2007-12-24(1)

In applying Idaho Code § 28-22-104, this Court has also held that damages must be liquidated or capable of mathematical computation for prejudgment interest to be awarded.
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Section 28-22-104(1) identifies the categories of money eligible for prejudgment interest, and the court may deny interest when none applies.

Taylor v. Maile · filed 2009-01-30(1)

Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of prejudgment interest.
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Section 28-22-104(1)(4) permits prejudgment interest on money received for another and retained beyond a reasonable time without the owner’s consent, even outside a commercial transaction, and interest stops when the money is deposited with the court.

Vouk v. Chapman · filed 2022-12-07(1)(4)

We hold that while the district court did not err in awarding prejudgment interest to Siblings under Idaho Code section 28-22-104(4), the accrual of interest started on December 26, 2018, and ended on August 8, 2019, when Wade deposited the money with the district court.
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Section 28-22-104 provides a 12 percent statutory rate for prejudgment interest, which the court applied from May 14, 2024, to January 9, 2026.

Jeske · filed 2026-03-04

Plaintiff seeks prejudgment interest under Idaho Code § 28-22-104 (Dkt. 14 at ¶ 13(b)). Stoddard calculates prejudgment interest at the 12 percent statutory rate from May 14, 2024, to January 9, 2026, in the amount of $15,582.96 (Dkt. 14 at ¶ 13(b), n.1). The Court awards prejudgment interest in the amount of $15,582.96.
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Section 28-22-104 is not limited to commercial transactions, and subsection (1)(4) permits prejudgment interest on money received for another and unreasonably retained until the recipient deposits it with the court.

Vouk v. Chapman · filed 2022-12-07(1)(4)

However, nothing in the plain language of the statute confines its operation to commercial transactions.
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Post-judgment interest

Section 28-22-104 provides a six-percent legal interest rate on money due under a judgment when no written contract fixes a different rate.

State Ex Rel. Symms v. Collier · filed 1969-05-094

“Legal rate of interest. — When there is no express contract in writing fixing a different rate of interest, interest is allowed at the rate of six cents (6‡) on the hundred by the year on: 4. Money due on the judgment of any competent court or tribunal. * * *.” I.C. § 28-22-104.
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Section 28-22-104 governs interest on the judgment, with interest at 6% per annum until July 1, 1974, and 8% per annum thereafter under the 1974 amendment.

Ramsey v. Ramsey · filed 1975-04-10

From the date of entry bf the decree of divorce until July 1, 1974, the balance due on the judgment shall bear interest at the rate of 6% per annum and after that date, the balance due on the judgment shall bear interest at the rate of 8% per annum. I.C. § 28-22-104, and S. L.1974, Ch. 229, p. 1586, amending § 28-22-104 as of July 1, 1974.
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Section 28-22-104(1) entitles a prevailing party to statutory interest on the judgment.

Eimco Corp. v. Sims · filed 1979-08-03(1)

Under I.C. § 28-22-104(1) Eimco is entitled to statutory interest on the judgment of $4,506.48. Eimco’s counsel specifically provided for such interest in the judgment and it should be added to the judgment.
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Section 28-22-104(4) requires interest on money due under a judgment of a competent court or tribunal and applies to the state and its political subdivisions absent an express statutory exemption.

County of Ada v. Red Steer Drive-Ins of Nevada, Inc. · filed 1980-04-03(4)

Examination of our statutes on this matter reveals there is no statute expressly exempting the state or any of its political subdivisions from paying interest on amounts due as a result of a judgment rendered against those entities. Therefore, there is no reason to distinguish the state or any of its political subdivisions, e. g., Ada County, from private parties who are required to pay interest on “[m]oney due on the judgment of any competent court or tribunal.” I.C. § 28-22-104(4).
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Section 28-22-104(2) sets an 18% annual interest rate for judgments, and statutory judgment interest continues to accrue during an appeal unless the judgment is actually paid through an unconditional, non-prejudicial tender.

Packard v. Joint School District No. 171 · filed 1983-04-05(2)

Indeed, in the present case, the school district has argued that judgment interest at 18% per annum, as currently provided by I.C. § 28-22-104(2), exceeds the internal rate of return realized by the district’s insurance company upon funds which ultimately would be used to pay the judgment. However, we have been furnished no factual record upon which to test this assertion. In any event, the problem created by an imprecise relationship between statutory interest on judgments and rates of interest prevalent in money markets is for the Legislature, not for the courts, to resolve. Accordingly, we hold that a conditional offer of settlement during pendency of an appeal, which results in no actual transfer of funds from the judgment debtor to the judgment creditor, does not terminate the running of statutory interest upon the judgment.
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Section 28-22-104 governs the interest rate on a judgment, and the applicable rate must reflect statutory amendments taking effect during the appeal.

Brown v. Jerry's Welding & Construction Co. · filed 1983-06-10

The final judgment from the district court reflects that the judgment will bear interest at 8% per annum based on I.C. § 28-22-104. We note the evolution of I.C. § 28-22-104 during the time of this appeal. Interest on the judgment should reflect the various amendments.
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Subsection (4) sets the statutory interest rate at eight percent per annum for the applicable period after the foreclosure decree and before the sale.

Thompson v. Kirsch · filed 1984-02-14(4)

Interest will accrue on the total amount of the mortgage indebtedness, including foreclosure costs and attorney fees as determined by the decree of foreclosure, from March 11, 1981 to the date of the sale, April 1, 1981, at the statutory rate of eight percent per annum in accordance with former I.C. § 28-22-104(4).
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Subsection (2) provides the interest rate applicable to money due on a judgment of a competent tribunal.

Krebs v. Krebs · filed 1988-07-07(2)

Money due on the judgment of any competent tribunal would bear interest at a rate provided in I.C. § 28-22-104(2). We see no cogent reason why interest on this sum should not be awarded.
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Prejudgment interest—liquidated or ascertainable amounts

Section 28-22-104 permits six-percent interest on money due under an express contract when no different written rate is fixed, but prejudgment interest requires an amount that is mathematically ascertainable.

Farm Development Corporation v. Hernandez · filed 1970-12-21

In order for interest to be computed from the date of the contract, the amount upon which the interest is to be based must have been mathematically and definitely ascertainable.
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Section 28-22-104 permits prejudgment interest on liquidated sums whose amount is ascertainable by mathematical process, including undisputed expenditures.

Child v. Blaser · filed 1986-09-08

We believe that plaintiffs are entitled to interest on these liquidated sums from the dates when paid to February 25, 1985, the date of judgment, at the prevailing statutory rate(s) in existence during this interim.
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Section 28-22-104 requires interest on money due by express contract or after it becomes due, at 6% absent a different written rate.

Ridley v. VanderBoegh · filed 1973-06-22

By statute in Idaho, money due “by express contract” or “after the same becomes due” draws interest at 6% in the absence of an express written contract fixing the interest rate at a different amount. I.C. 28-22-104. ... Therefore, it is our view that three months after the date of Mr. Ridley’s death, or March 12, 1970, would have been the earliest time that the purchase price “became due” under the agreement. I.C. 28-22-104.
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Section 28-22-104 makes prejudgment interest run from when damages become fixed or ascertainable; when damages are measured by replacement cost, that is when product failure requires replacement.

Meldco, Inc. v. Hollytex Carpet Mills, Inc. · filed 1990-07-17

Rather, an award of prejudgment interest, in order to fulfill its compensatory purpose, should run from the date the damages amount first becomes “fixed” or “ascertainable.” I.C. § 28-22-104; ... In the present case, the district court awarded damages measured as the cost of replacing the failed carpet rather than using the difference-in-value formula. That award reflects Meldco’s damages as “fixed” from the time of the carpet’s failure, not from the time of breach, and prejudgment interest should properly begin to run from that date. We conclude, therefore, that in a breach of warranty case where damages are a measure of cost of replacement, prejudgment interest should accrue from the date that the product’s failure required that the product be replaced.
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Section 28-22-104 supplies the applicable interest rate for money due under contracts and open accounts: 8% for amounts due before July 1, 1981, and 12% for amounts remaining due after that date.

Idaho Falls Bonded Produce & Supply Co. v. General Mills Restaurant Group, Inc. · filed 1983-06-28

The judgment is affirmed except as to that portion relating to interest, and the cause is remanded with instructions that the trial court allow interest at the rate of eight per cent for the amounts due prior to July 1, 1981 and at the rate of twelve per cent for the amounts remaining due thereafter.
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Section 28-22-104 supplies the legal interest rate for money after it becomes due unless a written contract fixes a different rate.

International Business MacHines Corp. v. Lawhorn · filed 1984-02-29

Such expiration occurs upon the due date of the note or loan agreement. Idaho Code § 28-22-104 prescribes the legal rate of interest on “[m]oney after the same becomes due,” absent an express written contract fixing a different rate. Here, the IBM loan agreement provided that the money would become due upon any one of several alternative contingencies, including termination of employment. As noted earlier, Lawhorn was terminated. The circumstances surrounding that event are not at issue in this appeal. We hold that interest at the legal rate accrued upon the loan after Lawhorn was terminated. Judgment allowing such interest was correctly entered.
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Section 28-22-104 sets a 12% rate for money after it becomes due and an 18% rate for money due on a judgment.

Camp v. Jiminez · filed 1984-12-26

Accordingly, we uphold the district court’s award of interest under I.C. § 28-22-104 on the fourth and fifth installments after they became due. However, we note that the district court specified an interest rate of 18%. In this respect, we believe the court erred. The statute distinguishes between interest on “[mjoney after the same becomes due” and “money due on the judgment of any competent court or tribunal ----” Interest on “money after the same becomes due” accrues at the rate of 12% while “interest on money due on [aj judgment” accrues at 18%. We hold that 12% is the rate applicable to the unpaid installments from the time they became due until they were reduced to judgment.
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Section 28-22-104(2) allows interest before judgment on money that is due when the amount owed is liquidated or readily ascertainable.

Hanf v. Syringa Realty, Inc. · filed 1991-08-06(2)

In the partial judgment entered by the trial court, and certified under Rule 54(b), the damage items were computed on the basis that because of Kaniksu’s negligence the Hanfs were not able to withdraw from the contract with the Millers and obtain the return of their $10,000 down payment, their $9,447.60 in escrow payments, together with interest on that amount. See I.C. § 28-22-104(2) (“money after the same becomes due”). The trial court apparently concluded that, absent Kaniksu’s negligence, the Hanfs would have been able to recover from the Millers the amount of money which they paid on the contract, together with interest, and therefore that interest was includable within the damages suffered by the Hanfs as the result of Kaniksu’s negligence. As we said in Davis v. Professional Business Services, Inc., 109 Idaho 810, 712 P.2d 511 (1985), relied upon by the trial court, “All things considered, we view the trial court’s characterization of plaintiff’s claim [for prejudgment interest] as one sounding in contract,” because it is based upon the contract type damages which the Hanfs were seeking to recover from the Millers, for which the defendant Kaniksu became liable because of its negligence. See I.C. § 28-22-104(2). Cf Stoor’s, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Parks & Recreation, 119 Idaho 83, 803 P.2d 989 (1990). Our cases make clear that “where the amount of liability is liquidated or capable of ascertainment by mere mathematical process ... this Court has allowed interest from a time prior to judgment, for in that event the interest in fully compensating the injured party predominates over other equitable considerations.”
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Section 28-22-104(2) supplies the lawful 12% annual interest rate applicable to the condemnation compensation from the date the interest accrued.

Eagle Sewer District v. Hormaechea · filed 1985-09-26(2)

Under the eminent domain statutes in the State of Idaho, I.C. § 7-701 et seq., it is clear that a defendant is entitled to interest running from the date of the summons. The lawful rate of interest is 12 percent per annum. The district court was correct in deciding the interest rate should begin to run on August 13, 1982, the date of the summons, at 12 percent.
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Section 28-22-104 requires eighteen cents per hundred dollars per year as the legal interest rate on money due under a court judgment, making postjudgment interest mandatory.

Dursteler v. Dursteler · filed 1987-02-26

In I.C. § 28-22-104 the Legislature has declared: “The legal rate of interest on money due on the judgment of any competent court or tribunal shall be eighteen cents (18c) on the hundred by the year.” ... We believe the allowance of post-judgment interest is mandatory, not discretionary with the trial court.
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Subsection (2) sets the post-judgment interest rate at eighteen percent and does not permit a different contract rate after the debt is reduced to judgment.

Gro-Mor, Inc. v. Butts · filed 1985-12-24(2)

Section 28-22-104 consists of two independently operating parts. Subsection (1) specifies the legal rate of prejudgment interest where “there is no expressed contract in writing.” Subsection (2) fixes the interest rate on judgments at eighteen percent. Thus, as is the case here, the court may award pre-judgment interest at a higher contract rate, but the statute will control the assigned interest rate once the debt is reduced to a judgment. See Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878, 885, 693 P.2d 1080, 1088 (Ct.App.1984). Subsection (2) contains no language which would allow a rate other than the denominated interest rate.
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The 1987 amendment’s formula-based post-judgment interest rate applies only to causes of action accruing on or after July 1, 1987.

George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger · filed 1990-09-24(2)

The cause of action in the present case accrued prior to July 1, 1987 and the lower post-judgment interest rate provided in the 1987 amendment to I.C. § 28-22-104 is not applicable to the judgment.
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When a cause of action accrued before July 1, 1987, the lower post-judgment interest rate in the 1987 amendment to § 28-22-104 does not apply to the judgment.

Desfosses v. Desfosses · filed 1991-08-30

The Court held that, where the cause of action accrued prior to July 1,1987, the lower post-judgment interest rate provided in the 1987 amendment to I.C. § 28-22-104 was not applicable to the judgment. ... Because the cause of action in the case at hand accrued well before the effective date of the amendment to the statute, the eighteen percent interest rate, not the lower post-judgment rate, was the proper rate. We hold that the magistrate’s award of post-judgment interest at eighteen percent per annum was correct.
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Section 28-22-104's 1987 interest-rate amendment applies only to causes of action accruing on or after July 1, 1987, with accrual generally occurring when damages are experienced.

Westfall v. Caterpillar, Inc. · filed 1991-11-26

Caterpillar argues that the court erred by awarding post-judgment interest at eighteen percent under I.C. § 28-22-104. As this presents a question of law, we exercise free review. That statute was amended in 1987 to provide for a five percent interest rate plus a statutorily defined base rate in place of the eighteen percent interest rate. The question presented is determining the time at which this new interest rate comes into effect. ... The section of the act amending I.C. § 28-22-104 is Section 7. Therefore, according to Section 18, the new interest rate will apply here only if the plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued on or after July 1, 1987. ... In general,1 in Idaho a cause of action is said to accrue when damages have been experienced. ... Because the event causing Westfall’s death, and his heirs’ resultant losses, occurred on a date certain, September 17, 1984, that is the date when this cause of action accrued. Plaintiffs’ cause of action thus accrued before the statutorily defined effective date of the new rate of interest, and the district court did not err in awarding post-judgment interest at the correct rate under I.C. § 28-22-104.
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Section 28-22-104 permits prejudgment interest once the claimed damages become readily ascertainable; for unliquidated damages, the ascertainability date depends on the circumstances.

Reynolds v. American Hardware Mutual Insurance · filed 1988-12-30

The appellant next asserts that the order granting prejudgment interest was in error and correctly cites I.C. § 28-22-104 for the proposition that prejudgment interest does not become due until the claimed amount can be readily ascertained. ... After a review of the pertinent facts, we hold that the trial court erred when it calculated prejudgment interest effective from the day that the insurer’s claim settlement was rendered rather than from the day that the jury rendered its verdict. ... With claims involving unliquidated damages, the underlying principle of calculating prejudgment interest from the point at which the damage claim first became readily ascertainable remains unchanged. ... However, it becomes necessary where damages are not liquidated to look to the individual circumstances in making the determination. On the present facts, the date on which the jury rendered its verdict becomes the earliest date upon which the damage claim would begin to accrue prejudgment interest.
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Subsection (2) supplies the judgment interest rate for money due under a competent court's judgment, including delinquent child-support installments, with interest accruing from each installment's due date.

Hunsaker v. Hunsaker · filed 1990-01-29(2)

We have determined that I.C. § 28-22-104 is appropriate for assessing the accrual of interest at the judgment rate on the unpaid balance of delinquent child support payments. ... Here, we conclude the district court committed no error in holding that interest accrues at the judgment rate from the due date on delinquent child support installments.
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Section 28-22-104(2), as amended in 1987, applies the new variable post-judgment interest formula only to causes of action accruing on or after July 1, 1987; earlier-accruing causes retain the 18% rate.

Magic Valley Radiology Associates v. Professional Business Services, Inc. · filed 1991-04-08(2)

A reading of the entire act before us clearly demonstrates that it was the legislature’s express intention that the amendment to I.C. § 28-22-104 applied only to causes of action accruing on and after July 1, 1987. The fact that the legislature specifically included section seven which contained the new post-judgment interest formula within the first eleven sections of the act, clearly demonstrates its intent that the annual adjustment to post-judgment interest rates applied only to those causes of action accruing on and after July 1, 1987.
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Subsection (2) applies the statutory judgment-interest rate to money due on a judgment, including cash payment of interest on property awarded in a decree.

Swope v. Swope · filed 1992-05-27(2)

We do conclude, however, that Isabel is entitled to receive post-judgment interest under I.C. § 28-22-104 on the interest earned by the bonds she was awarded in the original divorce decree.
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Section 28-22-104(2) applies its statutory post-judgment interest rate to all judgments in a case, while subsection (1) permits prejudgment interest on money after it becomes due.

Hepworth v. Hepworth · filed 2021-11-23(1) and (2)

The plain language of I.C. § 28-22-104(2) does not limit “the judgment” to the final judgment in a case. Instead, it applies to all judgments entered in a case. In this case, the relevant judgments were the 2017 and 2018 money judgments because these judgments contained readily ascertainable monetary values for the assets at issue. Because James acquired the money prior to the entry of the 2017 and 2018 money judgments, Amy’s share was “[m]oney when such becomes due” pursuant to I.C. § 28-22-104(1).
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Subsection (2) requires all judgments to accrue interest at the statutory post-judgment rate, while subsection (1) governs only pre-judgment interest.

Roesch v. Klemann · filed 2013-08-16(2)

decisions interpreting it demonstrate that once an amount owed on a debt is reduced to a judgment, the post-judgment statutory rate is the only applicable interest rate. We therefore hold that judgments accrue interest only at the rate defined in subsection (2) and that the rate applies to all judgments.
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Interest on arbitration awards

Section 28-22-104 treats interest on money due under subsection (1) differently from judgment interest under subsection (2); an arbitration award is not a judgment for subsection (2) until a court enters judgment.

Bingham County Commission v. Interstate Electric Co. · filed 1985-03-22(1) and (2)

The award becomes enforceable when a court enters judgment on the award. It follows that the arbitrator’s award is not a judgment of a tribunal for the purpose of applying the interest rate applicable to judgments.
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Section 28-22-104(1) does not overcome sovereign immunity or authorize prejudgment interest against a governmental entity absent a more specific legislative mandate.

University of Utah Hospital & Medical Center v. Twin Falls County · filed 1992-11-30(1)

Neither does the existence of a general statute regarding the rate of interest and the allowance of interest between parties to actions automatically include the state within its purview. American Oil, 90 Idaho at 337, 414 P.2d at 209 (citing Engebretson v. City of San Diego, 185 Cal. 475, 197 P. 651 (1921); and Savings & Loan Soc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 131 Cal. 356, 63 P. 665 (1901)); Richland County v. State, 180 N.W.2d 649 (N.D.1970); East Orange v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 84 N.J.Super. 242, 201 A.2d 586 (1964); Bond v. State. In order to overcome the presumption of sovereign immunity, there must be a more specific assertion by the legislature. Therefore, the County cannot rely upon the Idaho general statute on recovery of interest, I.C. § 28-22-104(1), in this case. Because it is clear that nothing in Idaho’s medical indigency statutes authorizes us to impose prejudgment interest against the County, we decline to do so.
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Section 28-22-104(2) automatically allows interest on money due under a judgment at the statutory legal rate, leaving the court without discretion to set a different rate.

Chenoweth v. Sanger · filed 1993-01-29(2)

While this Court has not been called upon to rule specifically on this issue, it seems clear that this statutory provision is quite definite in its allowance of interest on judgments in Idaho. We have in the past concluded that because post-judgment interest is a statutory creation in Idaho, the court does not have discretion to determine the rate of interest to be awarded on a judgment. ... Implicit in that decision, however, is a recognition that interest is automatically allowed on judgments and is allowed at the statutory rate then provided.
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Before its 1987 amendment, subsection (2) prescribed 18% annual interest; after the amendment, it prescribed interest at 5% plus the base rate.

Conley v. Whittlesey · filed 1999-08-12(2)

The district court assessed separate damage awards: (a) $17,874.86 for the cutting of the mature cedar tree which took place on October 10, 1986, and (b) $1,095.75 for the cutting of the immature trees on a date set by the district court, December 31, 1988, because the exact date, except for the year, was unknown. In the judgment, the district court applied a rate of interest of eighteen (18%) percent per year to the damages related to the trespass that occurred prior to 1987. That amount reflects the statutory rate prescribed in I.C. § 28-22-104(2). The statute was amended in 1987, chapter 278 of the sessions laws, section 7, pp. 571, 579, to provide for interest at the rate of five (5%) percent plus the base rate. The second rate of interest of 10.875% per annum was applied to the damages that occurred in 1988, according to the statutorily-prescribed formula. We conclude that the district court correctly applied the law to determine the amount of interest that would be added to the judgment.
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Subsection (2) sets annual interest on an offer-of-settlement judgment at five percent plus the base rate at judgment entry, with interest and principal calculated on a 365-day year.

Dyet v. McKinley · filed 2003-12-04(2)

The legal rate of interest on money due on the judgment of any competent court or tribunal shall be the rate of five percent (5%) plus the base rate at the time of entry of the judgment ... The payment of interest and principal on each judgment shall be calculated according to a three hundred sixty-five (365) day year.
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Subsection (2) requires interest on money due under any court judgment to accrue at the statutory legal rate.

St. Al's v. MRI Associates · filed 2014-06-17(2)

Idaho Code section 28-22-104(2) sets forth “[t]he legal rate of interest on money due on the judgment of any competent court.” “The plain language of Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2) indicates that interest on a judgment must accrue at the statutory rate and that the provision applies to all judgments.”
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Subsection (2) sets the legal interest rate for money due on any court judgment, requiring interest to accrue at the statutory rate on all judgments.

St. Als v. MRI Associates · filed 2014-08-04(2)

Idaho Code section 28-22-104(2) sets forth “[t]he legal rate of interest on money due on the judgment of any competent court.” “The plain language of Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2) indicates that interest on a judgment must accrue at the statutory rate and that the provision applies to all judgments.” Roesch v. Klemann, 155 Idaho 175, 178, 307 P.3d 192, 195 (2013). Therefore, the district court did not err in including accrued interest on Saint Alphonsus’s judgment when calculating the sum it was entitled to have offset against the award to MRI Associates.
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Section 28-22-104(2) sets the legal rate of interest on money due on a judgment and requires interest on all judgments to accrue at the statutory rate.

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP · filed 2014-08-04(2)

Idaho Code section 28-22-104(2) sets forth “[t]he legal rate of interest on money due on the judgment of any competent court.” “The plain language of Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2) indicates that interest on a judgment must accrue at the statutory rate and that the. provision applies to all judgments.”
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Section 28-22-104 supplies a 12% statutory interest rate for a creditor’s secured claim, subject to a contrary rate controlling under a confirmed bankruptcy plan.

Best View Construction & Development, LLC · filed 2021-08-24

It is undisputed by the parties that, pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-22-104, the Creditors are entitled to interest on their secured claims. While the statutory interest rate is 12%, and the PSAs and proofs of claim all include a 12% interest rate, the confirmed plan provides, for each of the Creditor’s claims, ... As such, the Court presumes the six percent interest rate therein will take precedence over any interest rate specified in the PSAs, Idaho statute, or the proofs of claim. If any party disputes that rate of interest, he or she may so indicate and set the matter for hearing.
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Section 28-22-104(2) requires interest on the entire integrated state-court judgment, including accrued child-support interest, rather than only on the underlying unpaid installments.

In Re Messinger · filed 1999-10-22(2)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that interest accrues under state law on the entire amount of the judgment of the state court, and not just on those amounts representing unpaid support installments.
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Prejudgment interest—special applications

Subsection (2) allows prejudgment interest on liquidated or mathematically ascertainable money from when it becomes due; subsection (1)(5) applies to money due on settlement of mutual accounts from when the balance is ascertained.

Seubert Excavators, Inc. v. Eucon Corp. · filed 1993-05-12(2), (1)(5)

Where the amount claimed is liquidated or capable of ascertainment by mere mathematical process, interest is allowed from the time the amount became due. ... Generally, a dispute over a claim, in whole or in part, does not change the character of a liquidated claim to an unliquidated claim. ... Nor is a liquidated claim rendered unliquidated by the existence of a counterclaim, whether liquidated or unliquidated. ... The claims do not arise from reciprocal charges or allowances between the parties, nor did the parties agree, explicitly or implicitly, to extend each other credit. ... For these reasons, I.C. § 28-22-104(l)(5) does not apply. Instead, prejudgment interest was properly awarded under subsection (2) of the statute, which provides for interest on money “after the same becomes due.”
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Section 28-22-104 permits prejudgment interest on contract money due only when the principal liability is liquidated or ascertainable by a simple mathematical calculation.

Bott v. Idaho State Building Authority · filed 1996-05-17(1)

Pre-judgment interest may be awarded only when the principal amount of liability under the contract is liquidated or ascertainable by a mere mathematical calculation. Ervin Constr. Co. v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695, 704, 874 P.2d 506, 515 (1993). Based on the terms of the Agreement between the parties and based on our earlier decisions in this case, we conclude that the principal amount of liability under the Agreement was not liquidated or readily ascertainable in a fashion to award pre-judgment interest to Bott. The district court’s award of pre-judgment interest is reversed.
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Section 28-22-104(2) permits prejudgment interest on money after it becomes due, including when the amount owed is liquidated or readily ascertainable by mathematical calculation.

Doolittle ex rel. Doolittle v. Meridian Joint School District No. 2 · filed 1996-06-21(2)

Section 28-22-104 of the Idaho Code provides for the award of prejudgment interest on “[m]oney after the same becomes due.” I.C. § 28-22-104(2) (Supp.1995). Prejudgment interest may be awarded where the amount of liability is liquidated or capable of ascertainment by a mere mathematical calculation in order to fully compensate the injured party.
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Section 28-22-104 permits prejudgment interest on money due by express contract or after it becomes due when the damages are liquidated or mathematically ascertainable.

Bouten Construction Co. v. H.F. Magnuson Co. · filed 1999-11-15(1), (2)

Whether damages are sought through contract or statute, a grant of prejudgment interest requires a showing that the damages were liquidated or ascertainable. Idaho Code § 28-22-104 allows for an award of prejudgment interest for money due by express contract or when it becomes due.
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Section 28-22-104 permits prejudgment interest on money due under an express contract only when the amount is liquidated or capable of mathematical computation.

Opportunity, L.L.C. v. Ossewarde · filed 2002-01-04

Idaho Code § 28-22-104 allows for prejudgment interest at a rate of twelve percent per year in eases of money due on an express contract. Prejudgment “[ijnterest should be allowed as a matter of law from the date the sum became due in eases where the amount claimed, even though not liquidated, is capable of mathematical computation.” ... The damages in the present dispute, however, were not liquidated or subject to a mere mathematical calculation, and thus the district judge erred in awarding prejudgment interest. ... In the present ease, the district judge awarded prejudgment interest, to be paid from May 27, 1997, the date of the foreclosure sale, for the difference between the market value of the property and the amount due under the amended promissory note. Because the market value of the property was subject to dispute, the amount of damages was not liquidated or subject to mathematical calculation until judgment was entered. Thus, the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest under Idaho Code § 28-22-104, and that part of its order is reversed.
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Section 28-22-104(1) permits interest on money due by express contract when no written contract fixes a different rate, but prejudgment interest requires damages that are liquidated or ascertainable by a mathematical process.

Boel v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. · filed 2002-02-28(1)

“It is settled law in Idaho that pre-judgment interest is available only when damages are liquidated or are ascertainable by mere mathematical process.” Bouten Const. Co., 133 Idaho at 762, 992 P.2d at 757. The title insurance policy did not specify a liquidated amount or a mechanism for mathematically determining the amount of damages the Boels would suffer as the result of any particular title defect. Contrary to Stewart Title’s argument, the Boels clearly suffered some amount of damages prior to the time they brought suit; however, the actual amount of damage was not ascertainable until the jury returned its verdict. Consequently, the district court’s decision to deny the Boels’ claim for prejudgment interest is affirmed.
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Section 28-22-104(2) makes interest on past-due child-support installments a statutory entitlement at the legislatively established rate, attaching automatically rather than requiring a separate adjudication.

Worthington v. Thomas · filed 2000-04-27(2)

It is clear that the right to interest on past-due child support installments arises not as a matter of adjudication from the courts, but rather as a matter of statutory right and is set at the rate established by the legislature, I.C. § 28-22-104(2). It is an automatic result of the judgment as a matter of policy set by statute, not of judicial grace.
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Under subsection (2), prejudgment interest begins only after money becomes due; reimbursement funds become due when the court determines the claimant is entitled to them.

Swanson v. Swanson · filed 2000-06-30(2)

Section 28-22-104 of the Idaho Code provides for the award of prejudgment interest on “[mjoney after the same becomes due.” I.C. 28-22-104(2). Prejudgment interest awards are appropriate where the amount of liability is liquidated or capable of ascertainment by a mere mathematical calculation in order to fully compensate the injured party. ... The money for which Jeane claims prejudgment interest is a liquidated amount, ascertainable by common mathematical processes. Therefore, the focal point of the Court’s analysis in this case should be the language of I.C. 28-10-104, which provides that interest begins to accrue “after the [money] becomes due.” ... We hold that the reimbursed funds did not become due until the court determined that Jeane was entitled to those funds.
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Section 28-22-104(1) allows prejudgment interest on money only after it becomes due, and an assessment is not due until the levy is actually made.

KIDD ISLAND BAY WATER USERS CO-OP. ASS'N, INC. v. Miller · filed 2001-12-26(1)

Section 28-22-104 of the Idaho Code provides for the award of prejudgment interest. Idaho Code § 28-22-104 provides in relevant part: Legal rate of interest. (1) When there is no express contract in writing fixing a different rate of interest, interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents (12¢) on the hundred by the year on: . . . 2. Money after the same becomes due. . . . . ... No levy was actually made on the members until the time of trial, and until such levy was made, the money had not "become[] due." Therefore, the award of prejudgment interest to Kidd Island is reversed.
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Section 28-22-104(1) permits prejudgment interest on money due under an express contract, with interest beginning when the amount becomes due under the contract's terms.

Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho · filed 2006-02-27(1)

Idaho Code Section 28-22-104 allows for prejudgment interest at the rate of twelve percent per annum in cases where money is due on an express contract. ... Application of the statute to the contract provision would result in the inescapable conclusion that payment under the contract was due 60 days after the proof of loss was furnished and that interest would begin to accrue on the amount owing under the policy on that date. ... In insurance cases money becomes due as provided under the express terms of the insurance contract. Therefore, the insured is not entitled to prejudgment interest until he or she complies with the applicable contract provisions.
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Section 28-22-104 authorizes 12% prejudgment interest for money due by express contract.

Kelly v. Wagner · filed 2017-03-02

I.C. § 28-22-104 provides for the award of prejudgment interest of 12% for “money due by express contract.” A trial court may award prejudgment interest from the date of the breach of contract when the amount upon which the interest is to be based is mathematically and definitely ascertainable.
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Section 28-22-104 supplies the statutory interest rate on money due by express contract when the written agreement does not fix a different rate.

Dillon v. Montgomery · filed 2003-04-03

Where the parties fail to specify the interest rate that applies by agreement, then the statutory rate of interest will apply. Therefore, the statutory rate of I.C. § 28-22-104 applies in this case.
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Under subsection (1), interest accrues on an obligation from the time the money becomes due.

Bahnmiller v. Bahnmiller · filed 2008-03-27(1)

Interest begins to accrue on money when it becomes due. Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 519, 5 P.3d 973, 980 (2000); I.C. § 28-22-104(1). Fred is entitled to interest on the contributions owed him by Raleen and Jerry from the time they became due.
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Section 28-22-104 provides a general 12% interest rate in specified circumstances, but it does not govern PERSI benefit underpayments when the more specific PERSI statute supplies the applicable interest provision.

Elgee v. Retirement Brd. of the Public Employee (PERSI) · filed 2021-06-24

On the other hand, Idaho Code section 28-22-104 (contained within the Idaho Code title pertaining to commercial transactions) provides that interest accrues at a default rate of 12 percent in certain circumstances: ... Because section 59-1305 is PERSI-specific and section 28-22-104 is generally applicable, the district court held the PERSI Board correctly determined section 59-1305 applies in this case. We hold that the district court was correct in this determination. ... Accordingly, the district court correctly held that Idaho Code section 59-1305(6) applied as the more specifically applicable interest provision.
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Section 28-22-104(1) supplies the statutory interest categories and does not permit an agency to substitute a different interest rate under its general authority.

Ryder v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission · filed 2005-09-06(1)

This provision is not broad enough to permit the Commission to create an interest rate or apply the IDAPA 31.41.01.106.01 rate.
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Section 28-22-104(2) sets the legal interest rate for Idaho judgments entered between July 1, 2020, and June 30, 2021, at 5.25% calculated on a 365-day year.

Marilynn Lynn Thomason · filed 2022-02-02(2)

In Idaho, the legal rate on judgments entered between July 1, 2020, and June 30, 2021, is 5.25% calculated on a 365-day year. See Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2) and Idaho State Treasurer published rates at https://sto.idaho.gov/Banking/Legal-Rate-of-Interest.
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Subsection (2) sets the interest rate on a judgment at five percent plus the Idaho state treasurer’s annual base rate determined on July 1.

Idaho Department of Labor v. Slonim · filed 2023-10-30(2)

Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2) provides that the interest rate on a judgment shall be five percent (5%) plus the base rate as determined on July 1 by the Idaho state treasurer each year.
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Section 28-22-104(1) provides a statutory interest rate of 12% per annum.

Woodbridge Pacific Group, LLC v. Red Butte, LLC · filed 2024-04-15(1)

The Court will award WPG interest at the statutory rate of 12% under I.C. § 28-22-104(1).
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29 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Barnes v. Huck, the opinion applies and construes the predecessor statute, I.C. § 27-1904, in deciding the usury dispute. Section 28-22-104 appears only in a footnote identifying the current codification of that predecessor; the court did not decide what § 28-22-104 means or requires. opinion →
Furness v. Park, the opinion cites I.C. § 28-22-104 only in a brief cf. citation while discussing whether prejudgment interest should be awarded on the facts; it does not construe, explain, or independently apply the statute. opinion →
Shill v. Shill, the opinion merely quotes Ramsey's prior directive and cites § 28-22-104 as authority for the interest rates; it does not construe or apply this statute in deciding Shill's pension and property-division issues. opinion →
Rangen, Inc. v. Valley Trout Farms, Inc., the opinion only reports that the district court allowed statutory interest under § 28-22-104; the appellate court does not interpret or decide the statute, instead addressing usury and contractual late charges. opinion →
Terrell, Inc. v. Robert DeShazo Builders, Inc., the court mentions § 28-22-104 to identify the default interest rate and recount the district court’s reasoning, but it resolves the appeal under the usury rule from § 28-22-107 and Rangen. It does not decide the meaning or application of subsection (7). opinion →
McGill v. Lester, the court cited Idaho Code § 28-22-104 only as authority for the applicable statutory prejudgment-interest rates; it did not interpret or decide anything about the statute itself. opinion →
Lee v. Peterson, the statute is mentioned only in describing the district court's award of prejudgment interest; the appellate court did not decide what Idaho Code § 28-22-104 means or how it applies. opinion →
Ward v. Lupinacci, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote identifying an issue the parties did not ask the court to decide; the court expressly says it is unnecessary to reach that question. opinion →
Jones v. Whiteley, the court merely reports Jones's appellate argument invoking the statute and declines to consider it because the issue was not presented below; it does not construe or apply § 28-22-104. opinion →
Campion v. Simpson, the statute is mentioned only in describing the Campions’ requested prejudgment-interest calculation. The court did not interpret or apply the statute; it held the prejudgment-interest issue moot after resolving the damages issue. opinion →
Culp v. Tri-County Tractor, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in a footnote as the source of a possible interest rate the district court may use on remand. The opinion does not construe or decide anything about § 28-22-104. opinion →
Modern Mills, Inc. v. Havens, the court merely noted that the prejudgment-interest rates were consistent with the statute while affirming the calculation; it did not interpret or decide what Idaho Code § 28-22-104 requires. opinion →
Knopp v. Nelson, the court cited Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2) only as authority for awarding interest from the date the money was due; it did not interpret or apply the statute's meaning, requirements, or coverage. opinion →
Platt v. Brown, the court cited § 28-22-104(1), paragraph 4, only to identify the legal interest rate applicable to funds being returned on remand. It did not construe the statute or decide what it requires or whom it covers. opinion →
Anderson-Blake, Inc. v. Los Caballeros, Ltd., Incidental: the statute appears only in the parties’ stipulated payment provision to specify 12% interest. The court resolved the appeal under invited-error principles and did not interpret or decide what Idaho Code § 28-22-104 means or requires. opinion →
Karen Svea Johnson and Robert Cooke, Jr., Wife and Husband v. Continental Airlines Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, the statute appears only in the procedural history as the basis for the plaintiffs’ motion to amend the judgment. The appellate court did not construe or apply § 28-22-104; its holding addressed which state’s law governs prejudgment interest in the choice-of-law analysis. opinion →
Bonaparte v. Neff, the court cites Idaho Code § 28-22-104 only as additional authority for allowing post-judgment interest; it does not construe the statute or decide what it requires or whom it covers. opinion →
McKay Construction Co. v. Ada County, the court cites Idaho Code § 28-22-104 while rejecting McKay’s prejudgment-interest argument because the County had no liability and there was no damage award. It does not interpret or otherwise decide what the statute means or requires. opinion →
Balivi Chemical Corp. v. Industrial Ventilation, Inc., the statute appears only in the quoted allegations of IVI’s counterclaim seeking statutory interest; the court’s decision construed and applied I.C. § 5-217, not I.C. § 28-22-104. opinion →
Hensley v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, the opinion mentions Idaho Code § 28-22-104 only in a string cite surveying how other jurisdictions treat prejudgment interest. The court does not analyze, interpret, or apply the Idaho statute. opinion →
Fairfax v. Ramirez, the statute is mentioned only to report the district court’s award of prejudgment interest; the appellate court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about Idaho Code § 28-22-104. opinion →
Belk v. Martin, the opinion mentions § 28-22-104(1) only to report the statutory basis for the district court's prejudgment-interest award. The appellate court reviewed the award for abuse of discretion and did not interpret or independently apply the statute. opinion →
Meyers v. Hansen, the court cited Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2) only in explaining that post-judgment interest is an effect of a statute rather than part of a prospective judgment; it did not construe or decide the statute's meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
Grease Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, the opinion mentions § 28-22-104 only while recounting the prior decisions in Emery and Greenough. The appeal itself concerned attorney fees in arbitration and did not decide the statute’s meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
Engineered Structures, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., the court merely mentioned § 28-22-104 as a possible basis for prejudgment interest in a later motion; it did not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
United States of America for use and benefit of Mountain Utilities, Inc. v. Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, the court cited the statute only as background for Idaho’s 12% prejudgment-interest rate. It did not interpret or decide what § 28-22-104 requires; the ruling concerned the date from which interest accrued. opinion →
Snap! Mobile v. Vertical Raise, the statute appears only in the trial court’s explanation for denying prejudgment interest. The appellate court did not construe or decide what Idaho Code § 28-22-104 means or requires; it reviewed the additur calculation and reported the trial court’s determination that the damages were not liquidated. opinion →
Ivanov v. Fitness Elite Training Center, Inc., the court cited Idaho Code § 28-22-104 only as one authority in a string cite supporting the general proposition that prejudgment interest is not compounded annually under Idaho law. It did not interpret the statute or decide its meaning, requirements, coverage, or application independently. opinion →
York v. Kemper Northwest, Inc., the opinion reports Medeiros’s request and quotes an earlier statement about the statute, but expressly declines to address post-judgment interest because the issue was not contested below. Thus, the court did not decide anything about the statute. opinion →

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