Statute Annotations › Idaho › Idaho Code § 12-120

Idaho Code § 12-120

Attorney fees in civil actions: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Idaho
Case notes
683
Cited in passing
233
Citing cases indexed
1,067
Case dates
1978–2026
Screened through
2026-04-27
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-03
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

916 citing cases reviewed of 1,067 in the citation index: 683 interpreted the section (annotated below), 233 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-04-27 may not have been reviewed yet.

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Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1975 Chapter 65 raised the subsection (1) amount limit from the original $1,500 to $2,500. source source Source
  • 1986-07-01 Chapter 205 expanded mandatory fees beyond the former listed accounts, instruments, and goods contracts to contracts for services and commercial transactions. The expanded entitlement applies to actions filed after the amendment. source source Source
  • 1987 Chapter 204 added the definition of “party,” including the state and political subdivisions, to subsection (3). source Source
  • 1988 Chapter 343 raised the subsection (1) amount limit from $2,500 to $25,000. source source Source
  • 1994 Chapter 353 amended § 12-120. source Source
  • 1996 Chapter 383 added the special subsection (4) fee procedure for personal injury claims, including a 60-day statement of claim and a 90-percent pre-suit tender rule. source Source
  • 1996-03-20 The amendment to § 41-1839(4) made that provision the exclusive statutory fee remedy for insured-insurer policy disputes, displacing § 12-120 in those actions. Source
  • 2001 Chapter 161 added subsection (6), allowing postjudgment collection fees and costs in qualifying small claims cases. source Source
  • 2001-10-31 Great Plains Equipment v. Northwest Pipeline clarified that the commercial-transaction fee provision does not require a contract; a transaction integral to the claim and the basis for recovery may support fees. Source
  • 2007-01-29 Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC overruled decisions categorically denying § 12-120(3) fees because a commercial-transaction claim sounds in tort or lacks a contract; it awarded fees on a fraud claim integral to a jeans sale. Source
  • 2009-01-21 Gonzalez v. Thacker held that subsection (4) alone governs qualifying personal injury claims and allows fees only to plaintiffs, rejecting the contrary 2004 Gillihan plurality. Source
  • 2011-06-30 Soignier v. Fletcher applied the commercial-transaction test to a legal-malpractice claim and confirmed that a tort claim may qualify when the transaction between the parties was commercial and integral to the claim. Source
  • 2012-07-01 Senate Bill 1324, chapter 94, raised subsection (1)'s amount-pleaded limit from $25,000 to $35,000; subsection (4)'s personal injury limit remained $25,000. source Source
  • 2018-07-01 Senate Bill 1277, chapter 244, raised subsection (4)'s personal injury claim limit from $25,000 to $35,000. source Source

Attorney fees and prevailing-party requirement

Section 12-120(3) awards attorneys' fees only to a prevailing party, and a party is not automatically prevailing merely because its offer of judgment exceeded the opposing party's recovery.

Champion Produce, Incorporated v. Ruby Robinson Co., Inc. · filed 2003-09-08(3)

We therefore hold that the district court properly denied post-offer attorneys' fees to Champion. ... Champion is not a prevailing party under Idaho Code § 12-120(3).
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Section 12-120(2) does not authorize attorney fees for an action based on the late return of an item under I.C. § 28-4-302 because that action is not one to recover on the negotiable instrument itself.

Idah-Best, Inc. v. First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A. · filed 1978-10-04(2)

For the guidance of the district court on remand, however, the court now advises that an action based on I.C. § 28 — 4-302 for late return of an item is not an, action “on a negotiable instrument” within the meaning of I.C. § 12-120(2). ... Accordingly, I.C. § 12-120 cannot form the basis of an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in this case.
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Section 12-120 requires a party seeking attorney fees to ultimately prevail before an award can be made.

Paloukos v. Intermountain Chevrolet Co. · filed 1978-12-29(2)

Paloukos has requested attorney fees for this appeal citing I.C. § 12-120. A prerequisite to an award of attorney fees under that section is that the party prevail. Although Paloukos was successful, in part at least, on this appeal, it nonetheless remains to be determined whether he will ultimately prevail on his cause of action for breach of contract. Should Paloukos ultimately prevail and satisfy the other requirements of I.C. § 12-120 for an award of attorney fees, the district court, in fixing the award, should of course consider the fees incurred in bringing this appeal.
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Section 12-120(2) requires a reasonable attorney-fee award to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a note, even when the note is unrelated to the purchase or sale of goods.

Camp v. Jiminez · filed 1984-12-26(2)

An obligation on a promissory note, like an obligation on an open account, is one of the enumerated causes of action under I.C. § 12-120(2) which need not relate to the purchase or sale of goods in order to invoke an attorney fee award. Accordingly, we uphold the award in this case, albeit upon a theory different from that employed by the district court.
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Section 12-120 applies to civil actions and does not apply to criminal actions.

Application of Robison · filed 1985-02-05

As to Robison’s claim for attorney fees based on I.C. sections 12-120 and 12-121, and I.R.C.P. Rule 54(e)(1), I.C. § 12-120 and § 12-121 apply to civil actions. Robison’s case was a criminal action, to which those statutes do not apply.
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Section 12-120(2) authorizes attorney fees to the prevailing party in a suit on a negotiable instrument, and fees incurred on appeal may be considered once the prevailing party is ultimately determined.

Kulczyk v. Kehle · filed 1985-05-22(2)

Both parties seek an award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(2). That section provides for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in a suit brought on a negotiable instrument. Because neither party has yet prevailed, we decline to make a fee award. When the prevailing party is ultimately determined, and assuming the other requirements of I.C. § 12-120 are satisfied, the district court should consider the fees incurred in bringing the appeal when making an award. See Paloukos v. Intermountain Chev. Co., 99 Idaho 740, 588 P.2d 939 (1978).
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Section 12-120(2) requires a reasonable attorney-fee award to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a note, including on appeal.

Farber v. Howell · filed 1986-06-25(2)

Idaho Code § 12-120(2) provides that the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a note shall be allowed a reasonable attorney fee to be set by the court. This statute has been held to apply to appeals as well as to trial court litigation.
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Section 12-120(2) requires a reasonable attorney fee for the prevailing party in an action to recover on a note.

McCray v. Twitchell · filed 1987-04-10(2)

Idaho Code § 12-120(2) provides that in an action to recover on a note the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney fee.
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Section 12-120 authorizes an award of attorney fees in an action to recover on accounts stated, including on appeal.

M.T. Deaton & Co. v. Leibroce · filed 1988-03-11

The trial court awarded attorney fees to Deaton on both accounts pursuant to I.C. §§ 12-120 and 12-121. Because this was an action to recover on accounts stated, we hold that attorney fees were award-able under I.C. § 12-120. The same applies as to attorney fees on this appeal. We award attorney fees, together with costs, to Deaton.
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Section 12-120(2) requires a reasonable attorney-fee award to the prevailing party in an action on an open account, including an account for cattle-feeding services.

Torix v. Allred · filed 1980-02-20(2)

The respondent’s counterclaim was an action on an open account for sums Torix owed Burley Butte for feeding and caring for his cattle. As prevailing parties on that counterclaim the respondent was entitled to attorney fees as a matter of statutory right under I.C. § 12-120(2) and not merely in the court’s discretion.
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Section 12-120(2) authorizes a reasonable attorney-fee award to the prevailing party in an action on an open account, without requiring the account to concern only the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise.

Boise Truck & Equipment, Inc. v. Hafer Logging, Inc. · filed 1984-12-18(2)

We believe the construction Boise Truck places on the statute is erroneous. We take a “plain meaning” view of the statute. The words “relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise” plainly modify only the words “or contract” which immediately precede that phrase and which are separated from the remainder of the sentence by a comma not otherwise required by modern English usage. Consequently, the phrase does not modify the other types of action identified by the statute — actions on open account, account stated, note, bill or negotiable instrument.
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Section 12-120(2) entitles the prevailing party in an action for collection of an open account to an award of attorney fees by the trial court.

Western Seeds, Inc. v. Bartu · filed 1985-08-05(2)

Further, because this suit is for collection of an open account, the prevailing party is entitled to an award by the trial court of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(2).
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Section 12-120(3) authorizes attorney fees for a prevailing party in an action based on an open account, but fees are not awarded when the record does not establish that the claim was based on an open account.

Jahnke v. Moore · filed 1987-05-06(3)

The Jahnkes have requested attorney fees on appeal, asserting that they are a prevailing party bringing a claim based on an open account. See I.C. § 12-120(3). On the present state of the record, this Court cannot determine whether the claim was, in faet, based on an open account. We therefore decline to award fees under that statute.
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Former § 12-120(2) authorizes attorney fees to a prevailing party in an action to recover on an open account, but not in a contract action for benefits that is not based on an open account.

Howard v. Blue Cross of Idaho Health Service, Inc. · filed 1988-06-13(2)

Section 12-120 allows a prevailing party to recover attorney fees in an action brought for recovery on an open account. We have defined “open account” as “an account with a balance which has been ascertained ... [and which] is kept open in anticipation of future transactions.” Kugler v. Northwest Aviation, Inc., 108 Idaho 884, 702 P.2d 922 (Ct.App.1985). The Ho-wards would have us hold that the open account relative to this case consists of the billings submitted to Blue Cross by the various health care facilities for services rendered to Stephen. We decline to so hold. No “open account” was maintained by the Howards. Nor was any open account maintained by Blue Cross for the Howards. This was simply an action brought on a contract to recover certain contract benefits. We hold that former I.C. § 12-120 does not provide a basis for awarding fees to the Howards.
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Section 12-120(2) authorizes attorney fees to a prevailing party but does not apply when there is no prevailing party.

International Engineering Co. v. Daum Industries, Inc. · filed 1981-06-15(2)

I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(A), which authorizes costs to the prevailing party, and I.C. § 12-120(2), which authorizes attorney fees to a prevailing party, are not applicable where, as here, there is no prevailing party.
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Section 12-120(2) permits an attorney-fee award only to a party who prevails.

Wing v. Hulet · filed 1984-05-31(2)

Finally, the lessee asserts that he should have been awarded attorney fees at trial pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(2). However, the district court specifically determined that neither party had prevailed. In order to recover attorney fees under § 12-120(2), a party must prevail. Due to the various number of claims asserted, and the various dispositions of those issues, it was within the district court’s sound discretion to find that no party had prevailed.
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Law changed since The 1988 amendment replaced the $2,500 ceiling; subsection (1) now reaches amounts pleaded up to $35,000 after the 2012 amendment.

Section 12-120(1) mandates attorney fees only when the amount pleaded is $2,500 or less and the claimant prevailed in the action.

Santillanes v. Property Management Services, Inc. · filed 1986-03-27(1)

To be entitled to the mandatory award of fees under I.C. § 12-120(1), San-tillanes must show that the “amount pleaded” is $2,500 or less and that he prevailed in the action. ... On the basis of his pleading alone, Santillanes has not shown entitlement to a separate award of fees on the particular claim for $1,592.
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Section 12-120(2) entitles the prevailing party to a reasonable attorney fee in an action on a promissory note.

Evans v. Sawtooth Partners · filed 1986-07-31(2)

We direct the judge on remand to determine, in the sound exercise of its discretion under Chadderdon, whether the partnership prevailed in the district court. If so, the partnership will be entitled to a reasonable attorney fee under I.C. § 12-120(2).
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Section 12-120(2) requires an award of reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a note, including a defendant who successfully defends the action.

Spidell v. Jenkins · filed 1986-10-31(2)

Section 12-120(2) mandates an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action “to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill [or] negotiable instrument____” ... We hold that the instrument in this case is a “note.” ... As stated above, I.C. § 12-120(2) mandates an award of reasonable attorney fees, set by the court, to the prevailing party in a civil action brought to recover on a note. Because Jenkins successfully defended against the action for recovery on the note, he is entitled to reasonable attorney fees.
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Section 12-120(2) does not authorize attorney fees when a multiple-claim action has no prevailing party.

Jones v. Whiteley · filed 1987-04-01(2)

I.C. § 12-120(2), which authorizes attorney fees to a prevailing party, are not applicable where, as here, there is no prevailing party. ... We acknowledge that some incentive to split claims may exist where one carries a mandatory fee award under I.C. § 12-120 and the other carries a discretionary award under I.C. § 12-121. ... We affirm the trial court’s finding of no “prevailing party” under the rule in this case.
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When a party only partially prevails in an action covered by § 12-120, whether to award attorney fees and the amount of the award are left to the trial court’s discretion.

Davidson v. Beco Corp. · filed 1987-04-30(2) (now codified as (3))

Finally, we turn to the question of attorney fees. The district judge made an award to Davidson under I.C. § 12-120(2), now codified as I.C. § 12-120(3). Beck and Beco have not challenged the applicability of the statute. ... However, our reversal of the judgment with respect to personal liability reopens the underlying question whether Davidson is a prevailing party. He has prevailed against the corporations but not against the Becks. He is a partially prevailing party. In such situations, the decision to award costs and attorney fees — like the determination of an amount — rests in the judge’s sound discretion. ... If the judge again decides to award fees, he is at liberty to adjust the amount.
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Section 12-120 authorizes a dominantly prevailing party on appeal to recover costs and attorney fees.

Meldco, Inc. v. Hollytex Carpet Mills, Inc. · filed 1990-07-17

Although our decision gives Hollytex some relief on prejudgment interest, we nevertheless conclude that Meldco and Mason are the dominantly prevailing parties on appeal. ... Accordingly, those parties are entitled to further awards of costs and attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120, and I.C. § 6-1307(2), respectively.
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Section 12-120(3) leaves identification of the prevailing party for attorney-fee purposes to the trial court's discretion, guided by the result and each party's success on the claims and issues.

Weaver v. Millard · filed 1991-09-27(3)

The identification of a prevailing party for the purpose of awarding attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120 rests in the discretion of the trial court. ... The district court then proceeded to discuss and apply each of the proper factors to identify the prevailing party: the result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties; whether there were multiple claims, multiple issues, counterclaims, third-party claims, cross-claims, etc.; and the extent to which each party prevailed upon each of those issues or claims. ... The district court reached these conclusions through an exercise of reason, and the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that neither Weaver nor the partnership prevailed against the other.
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Section 12-120(3) entitles the prevailing party in an action on an open account to reasonable attorney fees as a matter of statutory right, rather than merely in the court’s discretion.

Inland Title Co. v. Comstock · filed 1989-09-07(3)

The respondent’s counterclaim was an action on an open account for sums Torix owed Burley Butte for feeding and caring for his cattle. As prevailing parties on that counterclaim the respondent was entitled to attorney fees as a matter of statutory right under I.C. § 12-120(2) [now § 12-120(3) ] and not merely in the court’s discretion. ... Accordingly, on remand the trial court will fix attorney fees both for the trial and appeal.
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Section 12-120(3) provides reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in a qualifying civil action.

Irwin Rogers Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Murphy · filed 1992-05-28(3)

We find no error in the district court’s determination that the insurance agency was the sole prevailing party. Accordingly we find no basis for awarding the insurance agency less than the full amount of its costs and its reasonable attorney fees. ... As the prevailing party in this appeal, the insurance agency is entitled to recover its costs and reasonable attorney fees as provided by the express terms of the note, and also as provided in I.C. § 12-120(3).
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Section 12-120(3) entitles the prevailing party to reasonable attorney fees in a civil action to recover on a negotiable instrument.

Basterrechea Distributing, Inc. v. Idaho State Bank · filed 1992-06-17(3)

We also conclude that ISB is the prevailing party on appeal and is entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3).
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Section 12-120(3) entitles a party prevailing on a contract-related civil cross-appeal to an award of costs and attorney fees.

Toews v. Funk · filed 1994-06-07(3)

However, they did prevail on the Toews’ cross-appeal and they are entitled under I.C. § 12-120(3) to an award of their costs and attorney fees for the defense of the cross-appeal.
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Section 12-120(3) mandates a reasonable attorney-fee award to the prevailing party in a civil action on a contract for services, and its coverage is not narrowed by the separate reference to commercial transactions.

Eriksen v. Blue Cross of Idaho Health Services, Inc. · filed 1989-08-03(3)

By parity of construction, we believe that “services” and the other enumerated elements of I.C. § 12-120(3) are not limited by the words “commercial transaction.” ... We deem it clear that the Legislature put the term “commercial transaction” in this statute, not to narrow its scope, but to extend its coverage to litigation arising from commercial disputes as well as from certain non-commercial disputes. ... Because all service contracts are encompassed by I.C. § 12-120(3), the statute was correctly applied to this case.
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Section 12-120(3) awards reasonable attorney fees in a qualifying civil action to the prevailing party, so when there is no overall prevailing party, each side bears its own fees.

Stb Systems, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Micron Technology, Inc., Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant · filed 1993-04-20(3)

Since we have reversed the district court's grant of JNOV but affirmed its grant of a new trial on damages, there is no "overall prevailing party" and each party is ordered to pay its own costs and attorneys fees. Idaho Code § 12-120(3) (1990); International Eng'g Co. v. Daum Indus., Inc., 630 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Idaho 1981).
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To obtain attorney fees under § 12-120(1), a complaint must plead that the damages claim is within the statute’s limit and that attorney fees will be sought; later notice or closing argument is insufficient.

Cox v. Mueller · filed 1994-05-20(1)

To invoke the entitlement to attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(1), the complaint should also allege that the plaintiffs claim for damages does not exceed the limit established by I.C. § 12-120(1) and that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to this statute. ... We therefore conclude that a plaintiff must comply with the literal mandate of I.C. § 12-120(1) to be awarded attorney fees upon prevailing.
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Section 12-120(3) generally mandates an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party at trial and on appeal.

Baker v. Boren · filed 1997-03-21(3)

Idaho Code § 12-120(3) generally mandates an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial. ... We agree with the district court that neither party prevailed at trial. We also believe that neither party prevailed on appeal. Hence, we will not award attorney fees under this statute.
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Under § 12-120(1) or (3), attorney fees are available only to a prevailing party; a party that wins some claims but loses others may not qualify.

Fellowship Tabernacle, Inc. v. Baker · filed 1994-02-22(1) and (3)

In light of the final result of the trial, we cannot say that the district court erred in finding that Baker did not prevail for the purposes of either I.C. §§ 12-120(1) or 12-120(3).
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Section 12-120(3) permits an award of attorney fees on appeal to the prevailing party in a foreclosure action brought on a commercial-farming financing transaction.

Eastern Idaho Agricultural Credit Ass'n v. Neibaur · filed 1997-08-27(3)

Respondents are entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3).
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Section 12-120(3) permits attorney fees to a prevailing party in qualifying civil actions, but no fees are awarded when the appeal has no prevailing party because of mixed results.

Jeremiah v. Yanke MacHine Shop, Inc. · filed 1998-03-24(3)

The Machine Shop also seeks an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Because of the mixed result on this appeal we find no prevailing party and therefore do not award fees under I.C. § 12-120(3).
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In a contract action, § 12-120(3) generally requires an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party at trial and on appeal.

Freeman & Co. v. Bolt · filed 1998-08-11(3)

As the prevailing party on appeal, the Kulms are entitled to costs and attorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). In an action on a contract, I.C. § 12-120(3) generally mandates an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial.
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Section 12-120(3) requires a party to be prevailing to receive an award of attorney fees.

Great Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp. · filed 1999-03-29(3)

Thus there can be no award under Utah Code § 14-2-2(3), and, under I.C. § 12-120(3), one must be a prevailing party in order to receive an award of fees.
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Section 12-120(3) requires reasonable attorney fees for the prevailing party in an action arising out of a contract for services, and the mandate applies both at trial and on appeal.

Hummer v. Evans · filed 1999-06-02(3)

Section 12-120(3) of the Idaho Code requires that the court hearing any action arising out of a contract for services award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party. This Court has interpreted I.C. § 12-120(3) to mandate the award of attorney fees on appeal as well as at trial.
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Section 12-120(3) does not support an attorney-fee award when vacating the dismissal means the claimed prevailing party is no longer the prevailing party.

Klaue v. Hern · filed 1999-09-22(3)

Klaue contends that the Herns are not entitled to the attorney fees awarded by the trial court under I.C. § 12-120(3). Since we vacate the district court’s dismissal order, the Herns are not the prevailing party and the order granting them attorney fees and costs is also vacated.
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Section 12-120(1) does not support attorney fees when no amount is pleaded in a complaint seeking only an accounting, and section 12-120(3) does not apply because a Uniform Partnership Law accounting is not a commercial transaction.

D.A.R., Inc. v. Sheffer · filed 2000-03-23(1) and (3)

I.C. § 12-120(1) provides that in any action where the amount pleaded is twenty-five thousand dollars or less, there shall be taxed and allowed to the prevailing party, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorney fees. As argued by Dale, it is obvious that no amount was pleaded in the complaint which sought only an accounting in order that Dale might determine what amounts he as a partner was entitled to from the partnership. In Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho 624, 903 P.2d 1321 (1995), this Court held that a suit for an accounting brought pursuant to the Uniform Partnership Laws was not based on a “commercial transaction,” as required for prevailing parties to be entitled to an award of fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court in this case erred in awarding fees under I.C. § 12-120(1) and (3) where the action was one to obtain an accounting of the partnership.
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Section 12-120(3) does not entitle a party that is not the prevailing party on appeal to attorney fees.

U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Kuenzli · filed 2000-04-25(3)

Since Dennett is the overall prevailing party on appeal, the Kuenzlis are not the prevailing party and therefore are not entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3).
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Under § 12-120(3), attorney-fee entitlement is evaluated by identifying the overall prevailing party, even when one side wins particular motions.

Dennett v. Kuenzli · filed 2000-04-25(3)

The Kuenzlis argue that they are entitled to attorney fees in Dennett I, at trial and on appeal, pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3). ... The trial court’s determination of the prevailing party in the context of claims for attorney fees is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. ... Considering the mixed result in Dennett I, in which Dennett was granted specific performance but was denied the relief sought in each of his post-appeal motions, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Dennett was the overall prevailing party.
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Section 12-120(3) authorizes attorney fees on appeal to the prevailing party in a qualifying civil action.

Belk v. Martin · filed 2001-12-28(3)

The Respondents are the prevailing party and fees on appeal are therefore awarded on appeal in accordance with Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and I.A.R. 41.
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Section 12-120(3) provides attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a contract.

Electrical Wholesale Supply Co. v. Nielson · filed 2001-12-31(3)

Section 12-120(3) provides for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a contract.
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Law changed since The 2012 amendment raised subsection (1)'s pleading ceiling to $35,000; the separate statutory-claim rule under subsection (3) remains.

Section 12-120(1) allows prevailing-party attorney fees only when the pleadings formally seek $25,000 or less, and subsection (3) does not allow fees when the gravamen of the action is enforcement of a statutory claim rather than a commercial transaction.

L & W SUPPLY CORP. v. Chartrand Family Trust · filed 2002-01-17(1) (3)

This Court construes I.C. § 12-120 narrowly. ... The pleadings must precisely comply with the statutory mandate and formally plead an amount of $25,000 or less. ... Although Gem State’s pleadings reference the proper monetary amount, the prayer for relief, excepting for the quantum meruit claim voluntarily dropped by Gem State, does not truly seek monetary damages, but instead seeks enforcement of a statutory right to sell the property. Therefore, attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(1) were properly denied. ... The transactions related to the steel materials did not comprise the gravamen of this action. The gravamen was the in rem enforcement of a statutory claim, and, as this Court has held, “[ajttorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) are not available when the claim is based on a statutory provision, even when the underlying action depends on contract.” ... Consequently, attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) were properly denied.
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Section 12-120(3) mandates attorney fees to the prevailing party in qualifying cases; when the ultimate prevailing party remains undetermined, appellate fees are not awarded yet.

Gillingham Construction Inc. v. Newby-Wiggins Construction Inc. · filed 2002-02-22(3)

Newby-Wiggins has requested attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3), which mandates the award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in certain types of cases. Although Newby-Wiggins prevailed in part on this appeal, it remains to be determined which party will ultimately prevail in this lawsuit. Therefore, we do not award any attorney fees on this appeal. If the district court ultimately makes an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party, when fixing the amount of that award it may consider attorney fees incurred by the prevailing party in bringing or defending this appeal.
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Section 12-120(3) requires a reasonable attorney’s fee for the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a note.

Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc. · filed 2002-06-05(3)

As the prevailing party on a note, the Estate is entitled to attorney’s fees under this provision.
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Section 12-120(3) authorizes an award of attorney fees on appeal to the prevailing party.

Dillon v. Montgomery · filed 2003-04-03(3)

Therefore, this Court awards Dillon attorney fees on appeal pursuant to the contract and I.C. § 12-120(3).
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Section 12-120(3) requires a prevailing party before attorney fees may be awarded, and appellate fees may be considered when the prevailing party is determined on remand.

Land O'Lakes, Inc. v. Bray · filed 2003-05-02(3)

Both parties have requested an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3). A prerequisite to an award of attorney fees under that section is that there be a prevailing party in the litigation. Although the Brays were successful on this appeal, it remains to be determined which party will ultimately prevail on remand to the district court. If the prevailing party on remand satisfies the other requirements of I.C. § 12-120 for an award of attorney fees, the district court, in fixing the award, should consider the fees incurred during this appeal.
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Section 12-120(3) mandates a reasonable attorney fee to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods.

Keller v. Inland Metals All Weather Conditioning, Inc. · filed 2003-08-29(3)

Both parties claim attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3), which mandates the award of a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party in any civil action to recover on a contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods. Because both parties have prevailed in part on appeal, we will not award attorney fees on appeal.
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Section 12-120(3) requires a reasonable attorney-fee award to the prevailing party in a civil action on a contract for the sale of goods, including on appeal.

Haight v. Dales Used Cars, Inc. · filed 2003-10-24(3)

Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) provides that in any civil action to recover on a contract relating to the sale of goods the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. In this case, Haight sought relief in the form of an order canceling the sale contract for the Jeep and a return of the purchase price. This, relief was denied, making Dale’s and the Zooks the prevailing parties. Haight has failed to show that Dale’s and the Zooks were not entitled to attorney fees. Under I.C. § 12-120(3), Dale’s and the Zooks claim entitlement to attorney fees on appeal. It is well established that this statute mandates an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal as well as in the trial court.
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Section 12-120(3) does not authorize attorney’s fees when neither party is the prevailing party because the result is mixed.

Short v. Singer Asset Finance Co. · filed 2004-08-04(3)

In light of this determination, we reverse the award of attorney’s fees made pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Because neither party has achieved the result sought, our ruling constitutes a mixed outcome. Therefore, there is no “prevailing party” and no award of attorney’s fees is appropriate.
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Section 12-120(3) authorizes attorney’s fees in qualifying commercial actions only for the party that prevails, and a Rule 68 offer exceeding the opposing party’s recovery does not automatically make the offeror the prevailing party.

Champion Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co. · filed 2003-09-08(3)

Where the substantive statute permits a “prevailing party” to recover attorneys’ fees as costs, a defendant who has not “prevailed” may not recover attorneys’ fees pursuant to Rule 68. Such costs are not “properly awardable” under the relevant statute. ... In this case, the district court expressly held that Ruby did not prevail under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and that attorneys’ fees were therefore not “properly awardable under the relevant substantive statute or other authority.”
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Section 12-120(3) permits an attorney-fee award only to a prevailing party.

Howard v. Perry · filed 2005-02-07(3)

The statutes only provide for the awarding of attorney fees to a prevailing party. Because we vacate the judgment, there is at present no prevailing party. Therefore, we will not address the issue of whether attorney fees were awardable in this case under either statute.
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Section 12-120(3) authorizes attorney fees only for a prevailing party.

Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc. · filed 2005-03-04(3)

The Blahds seek attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). Because they are not the prevailing party, the Blahds are not entitled to fees.
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Section 12-120(3) authorizes a reasonable attorney-fee award to the prevailing party in a civil action or appeal involving a contract for services.

Gillingham Construction, Inc. v. Newby-Wiggins Construction, Inc. · filed 2005-07-22(3)

Idaho Code § 12-120(3) allows for the reasonable award of attorney fees to the prevailing party of a civil appeal involving a contract for services. I.C. § 12-120(3)(2004). Gillingham is the prevailing party on appeal and was the prevailing party below. The gravaman of its claim involved breach of a contract for services, namely demolition, excavation and grading services. Pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3) and its subcontract, Gillingham is entitled to a reasonable award of its attorney fees at trial. Costs and attorney fees on appeal are awarded to Gillingham.
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Section 12-120 permits an award of attorney’s fees only to the prevailing party.

Fenn v. Noah · filed 2006-04-11

Fenn requests attorney’s fees pursuant to the terms of the contract, I.C. §§ 12-120 and 12-121, and I.C. § 48-608(4). The contract and statutory provisions cited by Fenn all allow the award of attorney’s fees only to the prevailing party. Since we affirm the court below, Fenn is not the prevailing party and, therefore, not entitled to attorney’s fees.
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Section 12-120(3) entitles the prevailing party in a commercial transaction to an award of attorney fees, including on appeal.

P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust · filed 2007-05-01(3)

As the prevailing party in a commercial transaction, POV is entitled to attorney fees on appeal under I.C. § 12-120(3), together with its costs.
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Section 12-120(3) requires an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover in a commercial transaction.

Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. & Lynn Lea Family Trust · filed 2008-01-07(3)

Commercial, Wilde, and the Lea Respondents seek attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Idaho Code § 12-120(3) compels an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover in any commercial transaction. Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 729, 152 P.3d 594, 600 (2007). Commercial is not the prevailing party and is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. However, Lynn, Lea Electric and the Trust are prevailing parties here and are entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3). Since Wilde did not have a contract with Commercial, he cannot recover attorney fees pursuant to this section.
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Section 12-120(3) permits reasonable attorney’s fees for the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a contract relating to the purchase or sale of services.

Partout v. Harper · filed 2008-04-25(3)

§ 12-120(3) allows an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on any contract relating to the purchase or sale of services.
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Section 12-120(3) permits attorney-fee awards only to the prevailing party, including on appeal.

Harger v. Teton Springs Golf & Casting, LLC · filed 2008-05-02(3)

Attorney fees under that statute are awardable only to the prevailing party. Because the Hargers are not the prevailing parties on this appeal, they are not entitled to an award of attorney fees.
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Section 12-120(3) requires a reasonable attorney-fee award to the prevailing party in covered civil actions, while leaving the determination of the prevailing party to the trial court's discretion.

Nguyen v. Bui · filed 2008-07-21(3)

In considering a request for attorney fees under section 12-120(3), the trial court must first determine whether any litigant is the “prevailing party,” a decision that is committed to the discretion of the trial court.
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Section 12-120(3) requires a party to prevail before attorney fees may be awarded.

Rhino Metals, Inc. v. Craft · filed 2008-09-24(3)

Both statutes require that the party prevail in order to be awarded attorney fees.
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Section 12-120(3) entitles the prevailing party to an award of attorney fees in a qualifying commercial transaction.

Ray v. Frasure · filed 2009-01-30(3)

Because Frasure is the prevailing party in this appeal, he is entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to this statute.
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Section 12-120(3) permits an award of attorney fees only to the prevailing party.

Banner Life Insurance v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust · filed 2009-04-03(3)

An award of fees under both Idaho Code section 12-120(3) and section 12-121 may only be made to the prevailing party. I.C. §§ 12-120(3) & 12-121; Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(1). Because we conclude that the district court erred in granting the Trust’s motion for summary judgment, the Trust is not the prevailing party on appeal. Therefore, the Trust is not entitled to fees under sections 12-120 and 12-121.
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Section 12-120(3) permits an award of attorney fees only to a party who ultimately prevails.

Gray v. Tri-Way Construction Services, Inc. · filed 2009-04-27(3)

However, both statutes require that the party prevail in order to be awarded attorney fees. Because Gray‘s quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims must still be litigated, it remains to be determined whether Gray or Tri-Way will ultimately be the prevailing party in this litigation.
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Section 12-120(3) allows the prevailing party to recover attorney fees in a commercial transaction.

Spencer v. Jameson · filed 2009-06-16(3)

First, Jameson requests attorney fees under I.C. §§ 12-120(3), 12-121, and 12-123. “[Idaho Code] § 12-120(3) ... allows recovery of attorney fees by the prevailing party in any commercial transaction.” Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 415, 179 P.3d 1064, 1071 (2008). Idaho Code § 12-121 allows recovery of attorney fees by the prevailing party only if the Court determines that the appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Thus, both statutes require that the party requesting attorney fees be a prevailing party. Here, Jameson is not a prevailing party and, therefore, is not entitled to attorney fees under I.C. §§ 12-120(3) or 12-121.
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Section 12-120(3) allows attorney fees to the prevailing party in a commercial transaction.

Hurtado v. LAND O'LAKES, INC. · filed 2009-08-25(3)

“[Idaho Code § 12-120(3)] ... allows recovery of attorney fees by the prevailing party in any commercial transaction.”
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Section 12-120(3) authorizes attorney fees on appeal to the prevailing party in a commercial transaction.

Gold v. Lockwood Engineering · filed 2009-10-19(3)

Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in a commercial transaction.
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Section 12-120(3) permits a prevailing party to recover attorney fees in an action involving a commercial transaction or to recover on a guaranty.

Triad Leasing & Financial, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Rogues, Inc. · filed 2009-12-30(3)

Lessor seeks an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to the terms of the Agreement and pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3), which provides for the awarding of attorney fees in an action to recover on a guaranty and in a commercial transaction. ... Lessor has prevailed in this appeal and is entitled to an award of attorney fees under the Agreement and under section 12-120(3). ... Because Seller is the prevailing party, he is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal under section 12-120(3).
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Section 12-120(3) permits an award of attorney fees only to the prevailing party.

Storey Construction Inc. v. Hanks · filed 2009-12-31(3)

That statute only permits the awarding of attorney fees to the prevailing party, and the Contractor was not the prevailing party on appeal.
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Section 12-120(1) does not entitle a party that did not prevail on appeal to an award of attorney fees.

Lopez v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho · filed 2010-01-11(1)

The Lopezes seek attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(1). Because they have not prevailed on this appeal, they are not entitled to an award of attorney fees.
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Section 12-120(3) allows a reasonable attorney-fee award to the prevailing party in certain civil actions, and appellate fees depend on ultimately prevailing in the action.

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP · filed 2010-01-12(3)

That statute provides that the prevailing party in certain types of civil actions is entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney’s fee. A prerequisite to an award of attorney fees under that statute is that the party prevail in the “civil action.” ... Thus, in the instant case, we held: “Both St. Alphonsus and MRIA request an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Because we are vacating the judgment and remanding this case, there is not yet a prevailing party.”
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Section 12-120(3) authorizes a reasonable attorney-fee award to the prevailing party in covered civil actions, but when the prevailing party is not yet known, the fee determination is premature and may be made on remand if Builder prevails.

Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Investment, LLC · filed 2010-01-28(3)

That statute provides for the awarding of a reasonable attorney‟s fee to the prevailing party in various types of civil actions. Because we do not yet know who will prevail in this action, any determination of the prevailing party is premature. ... If the district court on remand determines that Builder is the prevailing party in this action, it may award Builder attorney fees for this appeal.
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Section 12-120(3) authorizes a reasonable attorney-fee award to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a commercial transaction, but no fee award is made when each party prevails in part.

HIGH VALLEY CONCRETE, LLC v. Sargent · filed 2010-07-08(3)

Appellants contend that, as they should prevail on appeal, this Court should award them their attorney fees and costs pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3) and I.A.R. 40. Sargent also contends he is entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3) and I.A.R. 40. Under I.C. § 12-120(3), “In any civil action to recover on . . . any commercial transaction . . . the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney‟s fee. . . .” Because each party prevailed, in part, we decline to award attorney fees.
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Section 12-120(3) requires attorney fees for the prevailing party in a civil action involving a commercial transaction, but fees are not awardable until the case is resolved and a party has prevailed.

Climax, LLC v. Snake River Oncology · filed 2010-10-06(3)

Idaho Code § 12-120(3) mandates that the courts award attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action involving a “commercial transaction.” Since the Court reverses the summary judgment in favor of SRO and Dr. Shull and remands the case for more proceedings, neither party has yet prevailed. No attorney fees are appropriate under § 12-120(3) until the case is resolved.
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Section 12-120(3) permits the prevailing party to recover attorney fees in a civil action arising from a commercial transaction.

Vreeken v. Lockwood Engineering, B.V. · filed 2009-10-19(3)

This appeal arises from a dispute over the parties’ respective rights upon termination of a joint venture, which falls under the definition of a “commercial transaction.” Furthermore, we find that the respondents are the prevailing party on appeal. ... Therefore, the respondents, as the prevailing parties in this matter, are entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal under I.C. § 12-120(3).
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Section 12-120(3) applies to prevailing parties in a civil action.

Bishop v. Owens · filed 2012-01-12(3)

Idaho Code section 12-120(3) and Idaho Code section 12-121 apply to prevailing parties in a civil action. Bishop is not the prevailing party in this action. Therefore, this Court denies Bishop’s attorney’s fees claims under I.C. § 12-120(3) and I.C. § 12-121.
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Section 12-120(3) requires a reasonable attorney fee for the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a commercial transaction.

Schroeder v. Partin · filed 2011-08-04(3)

The prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a commercial transaction “shall be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.” I.C. § 12-120(3). Both parties acknowledge that this action flows from a commercial transaction. Schroeder is the prevailing party on appeal and therefore entitled to attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3). Partin did not prevail in this appeal and is therefore not entitled to an award of attorney fees.
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Section 12-120(3) allows reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a commercial transaction, but not when the transaction is illegal.

Pines Grazing Ass'n v. Flying Joseph Ranch, LLC · filed 2011-11-23(3)

Because we hold that the oral agreement not to bid is illegal and unenforceable, neither party is entitled to attorney fees with respect to the issues related to the oral agreement not to bid. See Trees, 138 Idaho at 12–13, 56 P.3d at 774–75 (attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) are not appropriate when the commercial transaction is found to be illegal. ... Pines Grazing prevailed on the grazing lease issue both below and on appeal and is, thus, entitled to such attorney fees below pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3).
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Section 12-120(3) permits attorney fees in a qualifying civil action only for the prevailing party; legal-malpractice tort actions may qualify as commercial transactions.

Bishop v. Owens · filed 2012-01-12(3)

Idaho Code section 12-120(3) and Idaho Code section 12-121 apply to prevailing parties in a civil action. Bishop is not the prevailing party in this action. Therefore, this Court denies Bishop’s attorney’s fees claims under I.C. § 12-120(3) and I.C. § 12-121.
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Section 12-120(3) allows the prevailing party to recover attorney fees in a commercial transaction.

Dorion v. Keane · filed 2012-06-27(3)

Both parties seek attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3), which allows recovery of attorney fees by the prevailing party in any commercial transaction.
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Section 12-120(3) requires a reasonable attorney’s fee for the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a commercial transaction, including claims arising from an employment contract, with fees apportioned to the claims on which each party prevailed.

Hardenbrook v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2012-07-24(3)

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3), the prevailing party in any civil action to recover on a commercial transaction “shall be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be set by the court.” Idaho Code Ann. § 12-120(3) (emphasis added). The statute applies in actions brought pursuant to an employment contract and for claims related to the employment relationship. See Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 108 P.3d 380, 391 (Idaho 2005). ... Thus, Hardenbrook is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees because he is the prevailing party in his case against UPS, and UPS is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees because it is the prevailing party in its case against Orloff. The district court abused its discretion by finding otherwise.
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Section 12-120(3) entitles only the prevailing party to an award of attorney fees.

Poole v. Davis · filed 2012-11-14(3)

Under that statute, only the prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorney fees.
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Section 12-120(3) gives the prevailing party a right to reasonable attorney fees in a civil action to recover in a commercial transaction, but a party that prevails only in part on an appeal and cross-appeal is not entitled to fees.

St. Al's v. MRI Associates · filed 2014-06-17(3)

Both sides seek an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3). Idaho Code § 12-120(3) “grants the prevailing party the right to an award of a reasonable attorney’s fee in ‘any civil action to recover . . . in any commercial transaction.’ ” Apple’s Mobile Catering, LLC v. O’Dell, 149 Idaho 211, 216, 233 P.3d 142, 147 (2010). The MRI Entities prevailed on the appeal, but they did not prevail on their cross-appeal. Since they prevailed in part and Saint Alphonsus prevailed in part, they are not entitled to an award of attorney fees. KEB Enterprises, L.P. v. Smedley, 140 Idaho 746, 755, 101 P.3d 690, 699 (2004).
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Section 12-120(3) provides attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on any commercial transaction.

April Beguesse, Inc. v. Rammell · filed 2014-06-18(3)

Both parties seek attorney’s fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3), which “provides for attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on ‘any commercial transaction.’”
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Section 12-120(3) permits attorney-fee recovery for the prevailing party in a commercial transaction, but fees cannot be awarded before the prevailing party is determined.

Dorion v. Keane · filed 2012-06-27(3)

Both parties seek attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3), which allows recovery of attorney fees by the prevailing party in any commercial transaction. The parties do not dispute that this case involves a commercial transaction. However, “it remains to be seen [who] will be the prevailing party in the action, and, therefore, entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3).” Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 415, 179 P.3d 1064, 1071 (2008). Therefore, we decline to award attorney fees.
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Section 12-120(3) requires a reasonable attorney’s fee for the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a commercial transaction, including employment-contract and related employment claims.

Hardenbrook v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2012-07-24(3)

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3), the prevailing party in any civil action to recover on a commercial transaction “shall be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be set by the court.”
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Section 12-120(3) permits an award of attorney fees on appeal only to the prevailing party.

Poole v. Davis · filed 2012-11-14(3)

Under that statute, only the prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorney fees. I.C. § 12-120(3).
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Section 12-120(3) permits a prevailing party to recover a reasonable attorney fee in a civil action to recover in a commercial transaction, but a party that prevails only in part is not entitled to fees on appeal.

St. Al's v. MRI Associates · filed 2014-06-17(3)

Idaho Code § 12-120(3) “grants the prevailing party the right to an award of a reasonable attorney’s fee in ‘any civil action to recover . . . in any commercial transaction.’ ” ... Since they prevailed in part and Saint Alphonsus prevailed in part, they are not entitled to an award of attorney fees.
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Section 12-120(3) awards attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a commercial transaction, meaning a transaction other than one for personal or household purposes.

Wandering Trails, LLC v. Big Bite Excavation, Inc. · filed 2014-06-18(3)

Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) provides for attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on “any commercial transaction.” Commercial transactions are all transactions except for personal or household purposes. I.C. § 12-120(3). There is no dispute that this appeal and cross-appeal involve a commercial transaction. The Defendants prevailed on both the appeal and cross-appeal. Defendants are therefore entitled to attorney fees and costs.
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Section 12-120(1) mandates a reasonable attorney-fee award to the prevailing party in an action within the statutory amount limit, and the award extends to appeals when the provision’s requirements are met.

Medical Recovery Services, LLC v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc. · filed 2014-08-21(1)

“For I.C. § 12-120(1) to apply, the pleading must specifically allege that the amount pleaded does not exceed $35,000.” Keybank Nat’l Ass’n v. PAL I, LLC, 155 Idaho 287, 297, 311 P.3d 299, 309 (2013) (citing Mickelsen v. Broadway Ford, Inc., 153 Idaho 149, 156, 280 P.3d 176, 183 (2012)). ... In this case, BBC was the prevailing party at the magistrate court level, making it eligible for attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(1). The amount pleaded in this case was very clearly $1,083.21, the sum of the three checks mistakenly sent to BBC by WSEC. We note that the notification requirement of Idaho Code section 12-120(1) is not at issue as to BBC in this case because BBC is the defendant. Thus, because BBC was the prevailing party, and the amount pleaded was less than the statutory cap, the district court erred by vacating the magistrate court’s award of attorney fees and by ordering the magistrate court to calculate a reasonable pre-appeal attorney fee award for MRS.
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Section 12-120(3) permits an award of attorney fees on appeal to the prevailing party.

EGP Investments v. Skinner · filed 2014-12-23(3)

EGP requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3), 12-121. Both statutes require that the party prevail in order to be awarded attorney fees. Because EGP is the prevailing party on appeal, we conclude that an award of attorney fees is appropriate pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3).
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Section 12-120(3) permits the prevailing party in a commercial transaction to recover attorney fees, and the court may award those fees when the party prevails.

Secured Investment Corp. v. Myers Executive Bldg. · filed 2016-06-15(3)

Idaho Code § 12-120(3) allows recovery of attorney fees by the prevailing party in any commercial transaction. The awarding of attorney fees and costs is within the discretion of the trial court and subject to review for an abuse of discretion. ... Because Secured was the prevailing party, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Secured attorney fees and costs.
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Section 12-120(3) authorizes attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action to recover in a commercial transaction.

Cummings v. No Title Co of Idaho · filed 2016-09-12(3)

Cummings requests attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code section 12-120(3). We deny this request because Cummings has not prevailed in this appeal. Northern Title has prevailed in this appeal. It requests attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code sections 12-120(3) and 12-123. ... In Cummings I, this Court awarded attorney fees to Northern Title pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3) because Cummings’ lawsuit “was an action to recover in a commercial transaction.” Cummings I, 157 Idaho 348, 367, 336 P.3d 281, 300 (2014). For the same reason, we award Northern Title attorney fees in this appeal.
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Subsection (5) does not apply to a deficiency proceeding because the proceeding recalculates the debt rather than attempts to collect on a judgment; under subsection (3), the prevailing party must be determined from the entire action because a deficiency proceeding is not a separate civil action.

AgStar Financial Services, ACA v. Northwest Sand & Gravel, Inc. · filed 2017-02-24(5), (3)

Idaho Code Section 12-120(5) provides: “In all instances where a party is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under subsection (1), (2), (3) or (4) of this section, such party shall also be entitled to reasonable postjudgment attorney’s fees and costs incurred in attempting to collect on the judgment" I.C. § 12-120(5) (emphasis added). ... Because a deficiency proceeding is not an attempt to collect on the judgment, Idaho Code section 12-120(5) is not applicable. ... We conclude that the district court erred by applying an erroneous legal standard when it determined that the deficiency proceeding was a separate civil action under Idaho Code section 12-120(3) and awarded Gordon Paving attorney fees as the prevailing party solely based on the deficiency proceeding and without considering the entirety of the action.
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Section 12-120(3) permits the prevailing party in a commercial-transaction case to recover attorney fees and costs, including on appeal.

Green River Ranches, LLC v. Silva Land Co. · filed 2017-05-26(3)

Idaho Code section 12-120(3) permits the prevailing party in a case involving a commercial transaction to recover attorney fees and costs. I.C. § 12-120(3). Neither party disputes that this is a commercial transaction and the prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorney fees. The issue is whether Silva was a prevailing party below. ... Because we affirm the judgment of the district court, McCall is the prevailing party and is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal.
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Section 12-120(3) requires an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party when the gravamen of the lawsuit is a commercial transaction, which excludes transactions for personal or household purposes.

Green River Ranches, LLC v. Silva Land Co. · filed 2017-06-29(3)

Idaho Code section 12-120(3) mandates that when “the gravamen of a lawsuit” is a commercial transaction, the prevailing party is entitled to attorney’s fees. Kugler v. Nelson, 160 Idaho 408, 413, 374 P.3d 571, 579 (2016). Under the statute, a “commercial transaction” is any “transaction[] except transactions for personal or household purposes.” I.C. §12-120(3).
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Section 12-120(1) permits reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party; when remand leaves no present prevailing party, fees are not awarded yet.

Watkins v. Watkins · filed 2017-09-07(1)

Son requests an award of attorney’s fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(1), which allows reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. Because the case is not yet resolved, there is no prevailing party. Where there is no present prevailing party because a case has been remanded after an appeal, this Court has refused to award attorney’s fees.
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Section 12-120 permits a prevailing party to recover attorney fees under subsection (1) and/or (3) without satisfying the criteria of all three subsections; subsection (2) applies subsection (1)'s award provision to qualifying counterclaims, cross-claims, or third-party claims.

Credit Bureau of E. Idaho v. Acedo · filed 2018-11-26(1), (2), (3)

Section 12-120(1) authorizes attorney fees to the prevailing party in any action where the amount pleaded is $35,000 or less. Section 12-120(2) applies the award provision from Section 12-120(1) to counterclaims, cross-claims, or third-party claims filed after the initiation of the original action. Section 12-120(3) authorizes attorney fees to the prevailing party in any civil action to recover on certain accounts and transactions. In its appellate opinion, the district court concluded Acedo “is entitled to reasonable attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120 as the prevailing third-party claimant in an appeal pertaining to a civil case in which the amount in controversy is under $35,000.00.” In its subsequent memorandum decision addressing the specific attorney fee amount requested, the district court referenced subsections (1)-(3) of I.C. § 12-120, but did not cite a particular provision in concluding Acedo was entitled to attorney fees. CBEI contends that Acedo was not entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(2) because he was not a third-party claimant as contemplated by that subsection. We need not address this argument because Acedo was entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(1) and/or I.C. § 12-120(3) since he prevailed on the cause of action CBEI pursued against him. Nothing in the plain language of I.C. § 12-120 required Acedo to meet the criteria of subsections (1), (2), and (3) before he was entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing party.
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Section 12-120(3) permits attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action arising from a commercial transaction, but a party is not entitled to fees on appeal while the case remains unresolved.

La Bella Vita v. Shuler · filed 2018-12-31(3)

This Court awarded attorney fees to La Bella Vita pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3), which allows for the recovery of attorney fees by the prevailing party in a civil action on any commercial transaction. ... Based on these holdings, it is improper to award attorney fees at this time. While La Bella Vita was successful in this Court’s ruling to reverse the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Respondents, the case has not been resolved. However, if Bella Vita ultimately prevails on remand the district court may properly award attorney fees in connection with this appeal.
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Subsections (1) and (3) authorize a prevailing party to recover reasonable attorney fees in the civil actions they cover, and the fee award must rest on a reasoned application of the governing fee factors.

Action Collection Service Inc. v. Black · filed 2019-05-31(1) and (3)

Idaho Code Section 12-120(1) authorizes the award of reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action where the amount pleaded is less than $35,000. Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) also authorizes the award of reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in certain delineated civil actions. To properly exercise its discretion on a request for attorney fees, a trial court must, at a minimum, consider the twelve factors outlined in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3).
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Section 12-120(1) mandates attorney fees to the prevailing party when its requirements are satisfied, but its ten-day written-demand requirement does not apply when the prevailing party is the defendant.

Medical Recovery Services v. Gepford · filed 2020-06-23(1)

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, when the requirements of I.C. § 12-120(1) are satisfied, that provision mandates an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal. Medical Recovery Servs., LLC v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc., 157 Idaho 395, 401-02, 336 P.3d 802, 808-09 (2014). In addition to being the prevailing party, one requirement for an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(1) is the complaint must have alleged the amount at issue is $35,000 or less. Another requirement is the plaintiff must have provided the defendant with a written demand for payment of the claim not less than ten days before the plaintiff commenced its action. I.C. § 12-120(1). This latter requirement, however, is inapplicable where the prevailing party is the defendant, as in this case. See Medical Recovery Servs., 157 Idaho at 402, 336 P.3d at 809 (noting notice requirement of I.C. § 12-120(1) not an issue where prevailing party is defendant).
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Section 12-120(3) authorizes an award of attorney fees on appeal to the prevailing party.

Brand Makers v. Archibald · filed 2018-10-18(3)

Both parties also assert mandatory attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120 on appeal as well and that this matter falls within I.C. 12-120(3), which authorizes an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party. We conclude that Brand Makers is the prevailing party and is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
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Subsection (1) mandates a reasonable attorney-fee award to the prevailing party in an action where the amount pleaded is $35,000 or less, including on appeal when the statutory conditions are satisfied.

Blaser v. Cutler · filed 2020-06-25(1)

The applicable statute is Idaho Code § 12-120(1) which provides: “In any action where the amount pleaded is thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) or less, there shall be taxed and allowed to the prevailing party, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorney’s fees.” Where the terms of a statute governing prevailing party attorney fees in civil action have been satisfied it mandates an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial.
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Section 12-120(3) authorizes attorney fees on appeal to the prevailing party, but when both parties prevail in part, neither party receives attorney fees.

Agstar Financial Services v. Northwest Sand & Gravel · filed 2021-03-22(3)

Idaho Appellate Rule 40 and Idaho Code section 12-120(3) authorize an award attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal. ... Because we reverse in part, vacate in part, and affirm in part the district court’s decision below, both Compeer and Gordon Paving are prevailing parties. ... Because both parties have prevailed, we decline to award attorney fees.
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Section 12-120(3) permits attorney fees only for the prevailing party.

Gem State Roofing, Incorp. v. United Components, Incorp. · filed 2021-06-07(3)

Idaho Code section 12-120(3) still requires that the party seeking attorney fees under this provision be the prevailing party.
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Section 12-120(1) and (3) require the court to award reasonable attorney fees on appeal to a prevailing party.

Tullett v. Pearce · filed 2021-08-27(1) and (3)

Under I.C. § 12-120(1) and I.C. § 12-120(3), this Court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party. The LLC is not a prevailing party and therefore, is not entitled to attorney fees. Brian, Susan, Porter, and Aurora Pearce are prevailing parties on appeal against the LLC and pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(1) and (3), shall be awarded attorney fees on appeal.
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Section 12-120(3) requires attorney fees for the prevailing party in an action to recover on a commercial transaction, but does not define “prevailing party”; that determination is made under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(B).

Self Storage Advisors, LLC v. SE Boise Boat & RV Storage LLC · filed 2021-09-04(3)

Plaintiff also claims entitlement to attorneys’ fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), which mandates an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action to recover on a commercial transaction. I.C. § 12-120(3); Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903 (2009). ... Neither the management agreement nor Idaho Code § 12-120(3) defines “prevailing party.” Therefore, the Court, in deciding which party prevailed under Idaho law, must turn to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(B), which provides that: ... The determination of the prevailing party in an action is up to the sound discretion of the trial court. Shore, 146 Idaho at 914. ... Thus, the Court finds that each party prevailed on one count contained in the Amended Complaint. Since both parties were partially successful, the Court will not award fees or costs to either side, and instead order that each of the parties must bear their respective attorney fees and costs. See Israel v. Leachman, 139 Idaho 24, 27 (2003).
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Under § 12-120(3), the prevailing-party determination considers the overall result and multiple claims or issues rather than analyzing each claim alone, so an attorney-fee award may be premature while claims remain unresolved.

Allen v. Campbell · filed 2022-08-16(3)

“In order to determine who is the ‘prevailing party’ under § 12-120(3), the trial court must consider: (1) the result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2) whether there were multiple claims or issues; and (3) the extent to which either party prevailed on each issue or claim.” ... “[T]he prevailing party question is examined and determined from an overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis.” ... “Because the Court must determine the prevailing party from an overall view, the Court finds it is still too early to determine whether to award Plaintiffs attorney fees.”
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Section 12-120(3) permits reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in a qualifying commercial transaction, but a party that prevails only on appeal while the case is remanded is not yet the ultimate prevailing party.

Blaskiewicz v. Spine Institute of Idaho · filed 2022-10-31(3)

Both parties agree that the dispute over the PSA is a “commercial transaction” within the meaning of section 12-120(3). However, although the Spine Institute prevailed in challenging the district court’s grant of summary judgment before this Court, neither party is the ultimate “prevailing party” at this juncture. See Christiansen, 169 Idaho at 544, 498 P.3d at 724. Therefore, we decline to award the Spine Institute attorney fees either on appeal or for the proceedings below.
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Section 12-120(3) allows a reasonable attorney fee only to the prevailing party.

Eagle Rock Timber, Inc. v. Teton County · filed 2023-06-13(3)

Idaho Code section 12-120(3) only applies to a prevailing party. See I.C. § 12-120(3) (“[T]he prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.”). Given the result on appeal, Teton County should not have prevailed below. Accordingly, we vacate the award of attorney fees to Teton County. On remand, the district court may reconsider whether attorney fees should be assessed once the matter is fully adjudicated.
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Section 12-120(3) awards reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party, not the party’s lawyer, even when the party did not actually incur attorney fees.

Puckett v. Evans · filed 2023-10-04(3)

Further, the Idaho Supreme Court held the identical language in I.C. § 12-120(3) was clear that it entitles the “prevailing party” to the award and not the “prevailing party’s lawyer.” Inclusion, Inc. v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 161 Idaho 239, 241, 385 P.3d 1, 3 (2016). The Court has “held that a prevailing party may recover a reasonable attorney fee award even if that party never actually incurred any attorney fees.” Id.
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Section 12-120(3) allows reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a commercial transaction, but no fees were awarded here because both parties partially prevailed on appeal.

Cannon v. Teel · filed 2023-11-01(3)

Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) provides for an award of reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on any commercial transaction. ... Both Cannon and Teel Auto Body have partially prevailed on appeal. Accordingly, we decline to award attorney fees to either party on appeal.
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Section 12-120(3) generally requires a reasonable attorney-fee award to the prevailing party in a qualifying action, including an action involving a note, but appellate fees are premature until the prevailing party is determined.

Montierth v. Dorssers · filed 2023-11-29(3)

The language of section 12-120(3) (“shall be allowed”) makes it clear that the award of attorney fees to the prevailing parties is not discretionary. ... Accordingly, we hold that because Idaho Code section 12-120(3) applies to Dorssers, they would be eligible for attorney fees on appeal.
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Section 12-120(3) requires a reasonable attorney-fee award to the prevailing party in a civil action involving recovery on a commercial transaction.

Zubillaga v. Bransford · filed 2024-03-14(3)

Under Idaho law, the prevailing party in a civil action involving recovery on a commercial transaction “shall be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be set by the court.” I.C. § 12-120(3). ... Accordingly, the Court will analyze Zubillaga’s motion under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). ... On the whole, Zubillaga is a prevailing party. ... As the prevailing party, Zubillaga is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees.
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Section 12-120 allows attorney fees on appeal only for a party who qualifies as the prevailing party.

Crane v. Godfrey · filed 2024-07-12(1), (2)

Godfrey requests an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(2) and § 12-207. Because Godfrey did not prevail on appeal, he is not entitled to attorney fees. ... All the authority Crane cites for attorney fees on appeal, or cross-appeal, require her to be a prevailing party. ... Where a party loses on its cross-appeal, it is not a prevailing party. ... Accordingly, Crane is not a prevailing party, so she is not entitled to attorney fees or costs on appeal or cross-appeal.
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A prevailing party may seek fees under section 12-120(1) or (3), but the fee question is not ripe until the case is resolved and a prevailing party exists.

Cave Bay Community Services v. Lohman · filed 2026-02-09(1), (3)

Lohman also claims that he is entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(1), which allows a prevailing party to recover attorney fees when a party has pleaded relief of less than $35,000 in its complaint. I.C. § 12-120(1). And he argues that he should receive attorney fees under section 12-120(3), which mandates that a prevailing party recover attorney fees “[i]n any civil action” that centers on a “commercial transaction.” I.C. § 12-120(3). ... While Lohman has prevailed on this appeal, we are remanding the case for further proceedings. We have held that when a “case is not yet resolved, there is no prevailing party” as to an award of attorney fees. Portfolio Recovery Assoc., LLC v. MacDonald, 162 Idaho 228, 236, 395 P.3d 1261, 1269 (2017). Because we are remanding the case at the summary judgment stage, this case is not yet resolved, and the question of attorney fees is not yet ripe.
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Section 12-120(1) permits an award of reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party, but a fee request must be supported by legal authority or argument.

Crystal Homestead Estates v. That Piece of Property · filed 2026-04-01(1)

Idaho Code sections 12-120 and 12-121 both permit the award of reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party. I.C. §§ 12-120(1), -121. CHE is not the prevailing party on appeal; therefore, CHE is not entitled to attorney fees or costs. ... Although the Schiffmans prevailed on appeal, we decline to consider their request for attorney fees. ... The Schiffmans’ “general request is insufficient to merit an award of attorney fees” under Idaho Code sections 12-120, 12-121, or 6-202.
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Section 12-120(3) mandates attorney fees for the prevailing party in a contract for services or commercial transaction, and its amended version applies when the suit is filed after the amendments even if the contract predates them.

Bott v. Idaho State Building Authority · filed 1992-08-07(3)

That statute clearly applies to the present suit because it involves a “contract for services” as well as a “commercial transaction,” and the parties fall within the statute’s definition of “party.” ... In the present case, suit was brought on July 28, 1987, subsequent to both the 1986 and 1987 amendments; therefore, application of the current version of I.C. § 12-120(3) would not be unconstitutionally retroactive. ... Accordingly, an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) to the prevailing party below is appropriate regardless of the fact that the Agreement was formed prior to the amendments.
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Section 12-120(3) permits an award of attorney fees on appeal only to the prevailing party.

Storey Construction, Inc. v. Tom Hanks / Rita Wilson · filed 2009-09-30(3)

The Contractor seeks an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3). That statute only permits the awarding of attorney fees to the prevailing party, and the Contractor was not the prevailing party on appeal.
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Section 12-120(3) requires reasonable attorney fees for a prevailing party when a commercial transaction is integral to the claim and is the basis for the recovery sought.

Ivanov v. Fitness Elite Training Center, Inc. · filed 2025-03-03(3)

Under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3), the prevailing party shall be allowed reasonable attorney fees in actions on contracts or “commercial transactions.” Idaho Code § 12-120(3). “[A]ll transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes” are commercial transactions. Id. “There are ‘two stages of analysis to determine whether a prevailing party could avail itself of [Idaho Code Section] 12-120(3): (1) there must be a commercial transaction that is integral to the claim; and (2) the commercial transaction must be the basis upon which recovery is sought.’” Genho v. Riverdale Hot Springs, LLC, 560 P.3d 1041, 1054 (Idaho 2024) (quoting Breckenridge Prop. Fund 2016, LLC v. Wally Enters., Inc., 516 P.3d 73, 87 (Idaho 2022)). ... Applying the foregoing here, the Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees on the breach of contract claim under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). The Agreement between the parties was a commercial transaction. ... Because the Agreement is a commercial transaction integral to the breach of contract claim and constitutes the sole basis upon which attorney fees are sought, Plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3).
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Qualifying actions and statutory limits

Law changed since The 1988 amendment removed the $2,500 ceiling. A $4,000 pleading no longer fails subsection (1) for that reason alone; later commercial-transaction doctrine also rejects a categorical tort exclusion.

Section 12-120 does not mandate attorney fees where the action is grounded in negligence rather than contract, and a complaint with counts pleading $2,000 and $4,000 does not qualify under the $2,500 limit even if the judgment is $2,100.

T-Craft Aero Club, Inc. v. Blough · filed 1982-03-09(1), (2)

We deem subsection (2) of the statute to be inapplicable on its face. Although there was a bailment between the Club and Blough, the Club’s underlying cause of action was grounded in negligence, not in contract. We deem subsection (1) to be inapplicable on the pleadings. The Club received a principal judgment of $2,100— within the $2,500 limit prescribed in subsection (1). However, the Club’s complaint contained two counts, pleading damages of $2,000 and $4,000, respectively. Therefore, we conclude that the Club is not entitled to a mandatory award under I.C. § 12-120.
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Law changed since The 1986 commercial-transaction expansion means a business lease may qualify under subsection (3), depending on the claim and the parties' purposes.

Section 12-120(2) does not authorize attorney fees for a lease of real property.

Bastian v. Albertson's, Inc. · filed 1982-04-06(2)

The lessors urge an award under I.C. § 12-120(2) and § 12-121. We deem § 12-120(2) to be inapplicable on its face to a lease of real property.
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Section 12-120(3) permits the prevailing party in a qualifying commercial action to recover attorney fees on appeal when the party makes a timely request.

Christensen v. Rice · filed 1988-10-05(3)

Because Christensen has prevailed, he is also entitled to attorney fees on appeal, based on his timely request pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3).
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Law changed since The 1986 amendment added contracts for services and commercial transactions; an employment contract is no longer excluded merely because it does not concern goods.

Section 12-120(2) does not apply to an action on a real estate broker’s employment contract because that contract is not related to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise.

Barnes v. Hinton · filed 1982-09-13(2)

In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable instrument, or contract related to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise, unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. ... The trial court concluded that Barnes’ claim against Hinton was an action brought on a contract of employment and could not be “stretched” to fit under I.C. § 12-120(2). Common sense compels us to agree.
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Law changed since The 2001 Great Plains rule allows fees for a claim whose gravamen is a commercial transaction even without a contract; a tort label alone no longer bars fees.

Section 12-120(2) permits attorney fees only when the action itself seeks recovery on a contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise; a tort action arising from a goods-related transaction does not qualify.

Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp. · filed 1984-05-15(2)

For attorney fees to be recoverable under I.C. § 12-120(2) the action must be one “to recover on ... [a] contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares or merchandise.” It is not enough that the transaction between the parties relate to the purchase or sale of goods. The action itself must be one “to recover ... on [the] contract.”
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Law changed since The 1986 amendment expanded subsection (3) to contracts for services and commercial transactions beyond the former listed categories.

Section 12-120(2) authorizes attorney fees only for an action to recover on an open account, account stated, or a contract for the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise.

Argonaut Insurance Companies v. Tri-West Construction Co. · filed 1984-11-21(2)

However, because we cannot uphold the court’s ruling that there was an account stated, or an open account, we are constrained to hold that the award of attorney fees to Argonaut under I.C. § 12-120(2) must be vacated. This statute does not authorize an award of fees because Argonaut’s cause of action was not one “to recover on an open account, account stated ... or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise.”
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Section 12-120(2) requires a reasonable attorney fee for the prevailing party in an action to recover on a contract for the purchase or sale of goods.

D.R. Curtis, Co. v. Mathews · filed 1982-11-16(2)

Finally, Curtis Company requests that it be allowed recovery of a reasonable attorney fee for defense of this appeal. The request is made pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(2), which provides that in any action to recover on a contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. Curtis Company is the prevailing party both at trial and on this appeal. The action involves recovery for breach of a contract for the sale of goods. The request is therefore proper and is granted, subject to I.A.R. 41.
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Section 12-120(2) authorizes attorney fees for the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on an open account or a contract relating to the purchase and sale of goods, but does not cover an action against a law firm founded solely on an assignment of lawsuit proceeds.

Bonanza Motors, Inc. v. Webb · filed 1983-02-03(2)

Section 12-120(2) provides, in part, for the award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action brought to recover on an open account or contract relating to the purchase and sale of goods. The creditor’s cause of action against the client in this case may have related to a purchase and sale of goods; but the cause of action against the law firm did not. That cause of action was founded solely upon assignment of proceeds from a lawsuit. Such an action is not covered by § 12-120(2). Accordingly, we decline to award attorney fees under this section.
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Section 12-120(2) authorizes attorney fees as a matter of right for recovery on a contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares or merchandise, but not for water-system maintenance charges where water could not be sold.

Yellowpine Water User's Ass'n v. Imel · filed 1983-09-23(2)

Second, we note that the magistrate awarded attorney fees as a matter of right under I.C. § 12-120(2) as a recovery on a “contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares or merchandise ...” By the terms of its water permit, Yellow Pine was not allowed to sell water and it charged only for maintenance of the water system. Hence, no sale of goods, wares or merchandise was involved.
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Section 12-120(2) authorizes attorney fees to a prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, including a counterclaim based on such a contract.

McKinney v. Kirkness · filed 1984-11-30(2)

However, defendant Kirkness prevailed on his counterclaim, and the attorney fees were awarded for that. This counterclaim asserted a right under the contract of sale existing between Kirkness and McKinney’s agent, National Auto Finders, Inc. As such the counterclaim was a “civil action to recover on ... [a] contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods .....” Therefore, Kirkness was entitled to recover attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(2).
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Section 12-120(2) requires a reasonable attorney-fee award in a dealer's action to recover the value of parts returned under a dealership agreement because the action is on a contract relating to the sale of goods.

MH & H IMPLEMENT, INC. v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc. · filed 1985-07-05(2)

The statute provides in pertinent part that “[i]n any civil action to recover on ... [a] contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise, unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney fee to be set by the court to be taxed and collected as costs.” (Emphasis added.) This case unquestionably involves a sale of goods. However, the question is whether the suit is one to recover on a “contract” relating to the sale of goods. The manufacturer would characterize the suit not as one to recover on a contract but to recover on a statute, I.C. § 28-23-102. But we believe the statute cannot be disembodied from the contractual relationship between the parties. The statute is predicated entirely upon the existence of a contract between the dealer and the manufacturer. The statute is triggered by termination of the contract. In our view, the statute represents a legislatively imposed supplement to the contract, intended to protect the dealer in the event of termination for any reason. Accordingly, we hold that a dealer’s suit to recover the value of parts returned, upon termination of the dealership agreement, is an action to recover on a “contract” relating to the sale of goods within the meaning of I.C. § 12-120(2). The dealer in the present case is entitled to an attorney fee award.
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Section 12-120(2) permits an appellate attorney-fee award to the prevailing party in a suit on a contract for the alleged sale of goods even when no contractual liability is established.

Konic International Corp. v. Spokane Computer Services, Inc. · filed 1985-11-04(2)

Because this was a suit on a contract for the alleged sale of goods, Spokane Computer is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal as the prevailing party, even though no liability under a contract was established. I.C. § 12-120(2).
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Section 12-120(2) requires a reasonable attorney-fee award to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods.

United States v. City of Twin Falls · filed 1986-12-15(2)

Envirotech argues that the district court erred in awarding the City attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(2) (1979) (§ 12-120(3) as amended), because that section applies only to contract actions “relating to purchase or sale of goods.” Our holding that the contract was for the sale of goods as defined by the Idaho UCC disposes of that contention. We affirm the award of attorney fees. ... Because we have concluded that the contract at issue is for the sale of goods, and as the City has substantially prevailed on these appeals, we hold that the City is entitled to its reasonable attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-120(2).
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Section 12-120(2) requires a reasonable attorney-fee award to the prevailing party in an action to recover on a contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, including a claim-and-delivery action used to remedy the buyer’s breach of that contract.

Building Concepts, Ltd. v. Pickering · filed 1988-07-26(2)

We conclude that the district court’s award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(2) was proper.
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Subsection (2) requires a reasonable attorney-fee award to the prevailing party in a qualifying civil action, and subsection (1)'s $2,500 pleading limit does not apply to subsection (2).

Steiner v. Amalgamated Sugar Co. · filed 1984-01-24(1), (2)

The growers cross-appeal, arguing that the district court should have awarded attorney fees to them pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(2). The trial court declined to award such fees because it believed that the limitation of awards of attorney fees contained in I.C. § 12-120(1) also applied to subsection (2). Subsection (1) limits awards of attorney fees to eases where the amount pleaded in the complaint or counterclaim does not exceed $2,500. We hold that the limitation of subsection (1) does not apply to subsection (2) and reverse the district court’s decision in that regard. We also award attorney fees on appeal, to the growers.
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Commercial actions, appeals, and retroactivity

Section 12-120(2) mandates a reasonable attorney fee for the prevailing party in qualifying commercial actions, but it does not mandate fees for an appeal limited to the amount of the trial-level fee award.

DeWils Interiors, Inc. v. Dines · filed 1984-02-24(2)

Idaho Code § 12-120(1) relates only to civil actions where the amount pleaded is $2,500 or less. It is not applicable here. In contrast, § 12-120(2) contains no limit upon the amount in controversy. Rather, it contains a subject matter limitation. It is restricted to a “civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable instrument, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise....” Because this case falls within one or more of the enumerated categories, § 12-120(2) is applicable here. It provides that “the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney fee to be set by the court.” ... We conclude that § 12-120(2) should not be extended by judicial construction to mandate an attorney fee award on appeal where the sole issue is the reasonableness of an amount awarded below.
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Section 12-120 makes attorney-fee awards mandatory for prevailing parties in commercial litigation, and an amendment expanding that entitlement is substantive and does not apply retroactively.

Myers v. Vermaas · filed 1988-04-06(2), (3)

However, we think a different analysis is required for I.C. § 12-120. Unlike I.C. §§ 12-121 and 61-617A, I.C. § 12-120 provides for a mandatory, not discretionary, award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in commercial litigation. The automatic nature of an award under I.C. § 12-120 makes it, in effect, an adjunct to the underlying commercial agreement between the parties. It establishes an entitlement. ... Accordingly, we think that the 1986 amendment to I.C. § 12-120, which enlarged the scope of entitlement to mandatory attorney fee awards, is more accurately classified as substantive than as merely remedial or procedural. Consequently, the 1986 amendment should not be given retroactive effect.
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Specific statutes control

Section 12-120 is not an appropriate source for awarding attorney fees in wage-claim disputes.

Zattiero v. Homedale School District No. 370 · filed 2002-04-24(3)

The School District requests an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3). However, this Court has previously determined that I.C. § 12-120 is not an appropriate source for awarding attorney fees in wage claim disputes.
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Section 12-120 broadly authorizes attorney fees in commercial litigation, but a more specific attorney-fee provision governing dissenting-shareholder suits takes precedence.

Waters v. Double L, Inc. · filed 1988-06-03

Idaho Code § 12-120 applies to a broad field of commercial litigation. In our view, it yields to the greater particularity of I.C. § 30—1—81(i), which deals specifically with suits by dissenting shareholders. No award will be made under I.C. § 12-120.
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The statute's definition of a commercial transaction covers transactions that are not personal or household and are commercial in the ordinary sense.

Clement v. Franklin Investment Group, Ltd. · filed 1988-07-20(3)

As defined by Idaho Code § 12-120(3), the term “commercial transaction” is broad enough to cover the transaction in this case because the transaction, as contemplated, was not personal or household and was commercial in the ordinary sense of the word.
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Section 12-120(3) does not control attorney-fee awards in antitrust cases when the more specific § 48-114 applies.

K. Hefner, Inc. v. Caremark, Inc. · filed 1996-06-19(3)

Because we have concluded that BCI should not have prevailed below, we set aside the district court’s award of attorney fees. For guidance to that court on remand, we will also address the question of which statute is applicable in this case. Where two statutes appear to apply to the same case, the specific should control over the general. ... Because § 48-114 specifically addresses the subject of attorney fees in cases brought under the Antitrust Law, it is more specific than I.C. § 12-120(3), and is controlling in this ease. Therefore, § 48-114 should be applied by the district court on remand.
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Section 12-120(3) does not authorize attorney fees when the underlying action is a wage claim under Idaho's treble-damages wage statute; the exclusive fee provisions are Idaho Code §§ 45-615 and 45-617.

Bilow v. Preco, Inc. · filed 1998-09-08(3)

Idaho Code §§ 45-615 and 45-617 are the exclusive code sections under which an employee can recover attorney fees whenever the underlying cause of action is a wage claim pursuant to I.C. § 45-617(4). Dhow’s claim for attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3) is denied.
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Section 12-120(3) does not apply when the gravamen of an employee’s wage suit is violation of the wage statute rather than violation of an employment contract.

Shay v. Cesler · filed 1999-03-17(3)

Since the gravamen of Shay’s suit was not violation of an employment contract but violation of the statute, Section 12-120(3) does not apply.
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Attorney fees — contract actions involving sale of goods

Section 12-120(2) awards attorney fees in qualifying contract actions involving the purchase or sale of goods, but not when the action is merely related to that transaction and is not an action to recover on a contract.

Day v. CIBA Geigy Corp. · filed 1989-04-17(2)

Our Court of Appeals has held that to recover attorney fees under the statute, the action must be one to recover on the contract, not merely an action arising from a transaction relating to the purchase or sale of goods. Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687, 690, 682 P.2d 640, 643 (1984); cf., Idah-Best, Inc. v. First Security Bank of Idaho, 99 Idaho 517, 584 P.2d 1242 (1978) (attorney fees under the statute not awarded when action is not one to recover on a negotiable instrument). ... At the time of dismissal, the Days retained causes of action against CIBA Geigy for negligent labeling and breach of express warranty, but no action to recover on a contract. Thus the trial court did not *1019err by denying CIBA Geigy attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(2) (1979).
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Section 12-120(2) entitles the prevailing party to reasonable attorney fees in an action involving a contract for the sale of goods or an alleged guaranty, even when no liability under the contract or guaranty is established.

Twin Falls Livestock Commission Co. v. Mid-Century Insurance · filed 1989-11-01(2)

Because this was a suit based upon an alleged contract for the sale of goods (TFLC’s claim against Triple H), and one involving an alleged guaranty (TFLC’s claim against Mid-Century), Triple H and Mid-Century are both entitled to awards of attorney fees as prevailing parties, pursuant to I.C. § 12-120,2 even though no liability under the contract or guaranty was established.
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Section 12-120 permits an award of attorney fees to the successful party in an action on a promissory note.

Pocatello Railroad Employees Federal Credit Union v. Galloway · filed 1990-04-04

The credit union seeks attorney fees on appeal under both I.C. § 12-120 and § 12-121. Because this is an action on a promissory note, we deem I.C. § 12-120 to be applicable. Thus, the credit union, as the successful party in this appeal, is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal under I.C. § 12-120.
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Subsection (3) requires an award of reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a contract for the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services.

Shurtliff v. Northwest Pools, Inc. · filed 1991-05-02(3)

A court is required to award attorney fees to a prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a “contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services____.” I.C. § 12-120(3).
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Section 12-120(3) requires a reasonable attorney-fee award to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods.

Berning v. Drumwright · filed 1992-06-01(3)

The relevant statute in deciding this issue is I.C. § 12-120(3) which states in pertinent part: ... In any civil action to recover on [a] ... contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, ... unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. ... The Bernings’ claim was an action to recover on a contract for the sale of goods. Because they prevailed on their claim below, and because we affirm the judgment of the magistrate, we conclude that they are the prevailing party. The Bernings are thus entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal.
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Section 12-120(3) authorizes a reasonable attorney-fee award to the prevailing party when the gravamen of the action is a commercial contract claim for the purchase or sale of goods, even if the alleged contract is not proven.

Hilt v. Draper · filed 1992-08-19(3)

The present case fits the language of I.C. § 12-120(3) precisely. The “gravamen” of Hilt’s action was contractual. ... Because Draper has prevailed in an action brought to recover damages for the breach of a contract for the sale of hay, he is entitled to a reasonable award for attorney fees incurred in bringing this appeal.
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Notes 1–150 of 683, oldest cases first.

233 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., the court did not decide whether § 12-120(2) applied or award fees under it; it merely directed the trial court to consider the statute on retrial if the facts warranted. opinion →
McKee Bros., Ltd. v. Mesa Equipment, Inc., the court cited § 12-120(2) only in the final costs disposition and did not interpret the statute, explain its requirements, identify its coverage, or otherwise decide an issue about its application. opinion →
Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, section 12-120 is mentioned only in a general list of statutes authorizing attorney-fee awards; the court does not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Decker v. Homeguard Systems, the statute appears only in the procedural history as the basis for the trial court's unchallenged fee award on an account-collection counterclaim; the appellate court decides issues under I.C. § 48-608(3) and does not interpret or apply § 12-120(2). opinion →
Robinson v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 331 Minidoka, the court merely cited § 12-120(1) as authority for awarding attorney fees on appeal; it did not interpret or decide what the statute means, requires, or covers. opinion →
William v. Cenarrusa, section 12-120 is mentioned only in a quotation from Idaho Power Company v. Idaho Public Util. Comm’n; this court neither interprets nor applies § 12-120. The court's actual ruling on attorney fees relies on § 12-121 and the Private Attorney General Doctrine. opinion →
Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, the court merely mentions I.C. § 12-120 as a possible basis for an attorney-fee award on remand; it does not interpret the statute or decide how it applies. opinion →
Craft Wall of Idaho, Inc. v. Stonebraker, the statute is mentioned as the basis for Craft Wall’s fee request, but the entitlement to fees was not challenged. The court decided only whether the amount of the fee award was reasonable, applying I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A), and did not construe or otherwise decide an issue about § 12-120(2). opinion →
Lawrance v. Elmore Bean Warehouse, Inc., the court mentions § 12-120(2) only as the basis for awarding attorney fees; it does not construe the statute or decide its meaning, requirements, or coverage. opinion →
Gro-Mor, Inc. v. Butts, the court cites § 12-120 only as authority for awarding costs and attorney fees; it does not interpret or explain the statute's meaning, requirements, or scope. opinion →
Airstream, Inc. v. CIT Financial Services, Inc., the opinion only notes that the district court did not address § 12-120(2) and expressly declines to comment on its applicability; it does not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Nalen v. Jenkins, the opinion cites § 12-120(2), recodified as (3), only to describe the prior DeWils holding; this case construes Idaho Code § 48-608(3), not § 12-120. opinion →
Department of Health & Welfare v. Sandoval, the court mentions § 12-120 only in a footnote explaining that 1987 attorney-fee amendments were not applicable to this case; it does not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
J.M.F. Trucking, Inc. v. Carburetor & Electric of Lewiston, Inc., the opinion reports J.M.F.’s argument under § 12-120(3) but expressly does not reach its merits; no rule about the statute is decided. opinion →
Vanoski v. Thomson, the court cites § 12-120 only as one basis for awarding reasonable attorney fees on appeal; it does not construe the statute or decide what it requires or who it covers. opinion →
Lowery v. Board of County Commissioners for Ada County, the opinion merely reports that the Lowerys invoked Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and -121 in seeking fees. The court discusses and applies § 12-121, while making no determination about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 12-120. opinion →
United States of America, Ex Rel., Thomas G. Leno, Dorothy Leno Dba T & D Construction v. Summit Construction Company, the court did not construe or apply § 12-120(3); it mentioned the statute only conditionally while deciding that the claims arose under the Miller Act and that federal law governed the fee request. opinion →
Priceco, Inc. v. Youngstrom, the court only mentions Idaho Code § 12-120 in reserving possible attorney-fee claims for consideration on remand; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under the statute. opinion →
Frazier v. Neilsen & Co., the court cites Idaho Code § 12-120(3) only as authority for awarding attorney fees on appeal; it does not interpret the statute or explain its requirements, scope, or application. opinion →
Needs v. Hebener, the statute is cited only as authority for awarding appellate attorney fees; the court does not construe, explain, or otherwise analyze Idaho Code § 12-120. opinion →
Quintana v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service (In re Quintana), Idaho Code § 12-120 appears only in the creditor’s stated intention to seek attorney’s fees; the court did not decide whether the statute authorizes fees, interpret it, or otherwise apply it. opinion →
Quintana v. Commissioner, the statute appears only in the opinion's summary of Creditor's stated intent to seek attorney's fees; the court does not interpret, apply, or rule on Idaho Code § 12-120. opinion →
Valley Bank v. Monarch Investment Co., the court cited § 12-120(3) as authority for awarding attorney fees but did not interpret the statute, identify its requirements, or otherwise analyze how it applies. opinion →
First SEC. Bank of Idaho v. Webster, the statute appears only in the procedural history as one basis for the trial court's fee award. The appellate court does not construe or independently apply § 12-120(3); its own fee award is based on the guaranty. opinion →
Callenders, Inc. v. Beckman, the court did not construe or apply § 12-120(3); it stated that the trial court may have relied on the statute erroneously and upheld the attorney-fee award under the partnership and dissolution agreements instead. opinion →
Federal Land Bank of Spokane v. Wright, the court cited Idaho Code § 12-120 only in its disposition to award attorney fees; it did not interpret the statute, state its requirements, or explain why it applied. opinion →
USA Fertilizer, Inc. v. Idaho First National Bank, the statute appears only in the concluding attorney-fee award, with no discussion of what § 12-120(3) means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Emery v. United Pacific Insurance, the opinion only reports the trial court’s conclusion that Idaho Code § 12-120(3) did not apply; the appellate court affirms attorney fees under I.C. § 41-1839 and does not construe or decide anything about § 12-120(3). opinion →
Willis v. Realty Country, Inc., the court cited Idaho Code § 12-120 only as authority for awarding attorney fees on appeal; it did not discuss, construe, or decide the statute’s requirements or scope. opinion →
Hoff Companies, Inc. v. Danner, the statute is cited only in the conclusion as authority for the appellate award of costs and attorney fees. The opinion does not explain, construe, or analyze the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of Idaho Code § 12-120. opinion →
Erb v. Kohnke, the statute is mentioned as part of the trial court’s attorney-fee request, but the opinion does not construe or apply § 12-120(3)’s requirements. The court’s stated basis for denying fees is the absence of a frivolous, unreasonable, or unfounded action under § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1). opinion →
Phillips Industries, Inc. v. Firkins, the court merely notes an undisputed entitlement to attorney fees and awards them; it does not construe or decide what Idaho Code § 12-120(3) means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Chen v. Conway, the statute appears only in the Chens' attorney's objection describing their argument below; the Supreme Court did not construe or apply Idaho Code § 12-120 and merely awarded costs without attorney-fee analysis. opinion →
Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Wissel, the court declined to address the statutory fee claims because plaintiffs had not asserted them in the district court; its discussion of § 12-120(3) was incidental to the decision on the contractual fee provision and did not construe or apply the statute in deciding the appeal. opinion →
Edwards v. Edwards, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote reporting the district court’s separate denial of attorney fees; this opinion does not decide what § 12-120(3) means or how it applies. opinion →
McCandless v. Carpenter, the opinion merely reports that the district court awarded attorney fees under § 12-120(3) and expressly declines to review whether that ruling was correct because the appellate record is incomplete; it does not construe or decide the statute’s requirements. opinion →
Frontier Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Douglass, the court merely noted Frontier's request for appellate attorney fees under the statute and awarded fees based on the note's contractual provision; it did not interpret or apply Idaho Code § 12-120(3). opinion →
Idaho Power Co. v. Benj. Houseman Co., the court merely cites § 12-120(3) as the basis for awarding attorney fees and does not explain, interpret, or analyze the statute or its requirements. opinion →
Jackson v. Wood, the court merely cites § 12-120(3) as a basis for awarding attorney fees; it does not interpret the statute or explain its requirements or application. opinion →
Hoopes v. Hoopes, the court mentioned § 12-120(3) only in discussing the rule from Phillips. It did not construe or apply the statute, and resolved the attorney-fee issue under the promissory note. opinion →
Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, the court mentions § 12-120(3) only in a footnote as a comparison to the attorney-fee rule it applies under I.C. § 6-202; it does not decide what § 12-120(3) means or how it applies. opinion →
Jordan v. Hunter, the court did not construe or apply Idaho Code § 12-120(1); it expressly deferred any fee determination because the trial court had not yet determined whether the statute's predicates were met. opinion →
Intermountain Gas Co. v. Industrial Indemnity Co., the court merely cited § 12-120(3) as the basis for the parties' fee requests and awarded fees to the prevailing party; it did not interpret the statute or analyze its requirements or application. opinion →
Ujdur v. Thompson, the court merely cited Idaho Code § 12-120(3) as authority for awarding reasonable attorney fees after affirming on the contract-performance issue; it did not interpret or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Christensen v. Nelson, the opinion merely reports the trial court's fee award under § 12-120(3) and affirms it based on the appellant's concession after affirming the underlying judgment; it does not interpret or apply the statute's requirements. The appeal also mentions § 12-120 among fee authorities, but the appellate award rests on the parties' agreement. opinion →
Van Velson Corp. v. Westwood Mall Associates, the court did not construe or apply Idaho Code § 12-120(3); it held only that the attorney-fee issue was not preserved for appeal and declined to consider it for the first time. opinion →
J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics International, Inc., the statute is mentioned only as one basis for Simplot’s attorney-fee request. The court did not construe § 12-120(3) or decide its applicability; it reviewed the fee award under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and abuse-of-discretion principles. opinion →
Graham Capital Corp. v. Simpson, the opinion only reports that the trial court awarded attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3); the appellate court does not interpret or apply the statute and instead awards appellate fees under the agreement. opinion →
Bell Rapids Mutual Irrigation Co. v. Hausner, the statute is mentioned only to report the trial court’s attorney-fee award in the prior proceedings; the appellate court does not interpret or apply Idaho Code § 12-120. opinion →
City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, the opinion only reports that the district court awarded fees under § 12-120(3), then vacates the award because Pocatello was not the prevailing party; it does not interpret or apply the statute's requirements. opinion →
Durrant v. Quality First Marketing, Inc., the court merely cites Idaho Code § 12-120(3) as authority for awarding appellate attorney fees; it does not construe the statute or decide what it means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Idaho Potato Commission v. Russet Valley Produce, Inc., section 12-120 appears only in the Commission’s list of asserted bases for recovering administrative costs and attorney fees. The court did not construe or decide anything about that statute; its analysis instead addressed other authorities, including §§ 12-117 and 12-121. opinion →
Whitehouse v. Lange, the court merely cited § 12-120(3) as authority for awarding appellate attorney fees; it did not construe the statute or decide what it requires or how it applies. opinion →
Griffith v. Latham Motors, Inc., the court mentions § 12-120(3) only to explain that the trial court’s attorney-fee award to Latham falls with the reversed judgment; it does not construe or apply the statute’s prevailing-party standard. opinion →
City of Wheat Ridge v. Cerveny, the Colorado dissent cites Idaho Code § 12-120(1) only as a comparative example in a survey of other jurisdictions’ attorney-fee statutes. The court does not decide what the Idaho statute means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Roe Ex Rel. Roe v. Harris, the opinion's holding concerns Idaho Code § 12-117 and the private attorney general doctrine. Section 12-120 is mentioned only in discussing the prior Bott case and the court's characterization of dicta; this case does not decide what § 12-120 means or how it applies. opinion →
GME, INC. v. Carter, the opinion merely reports the trial court's award of attorney fees under § 12-120(3); the appellate court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about that statute. opinion →
Zanotti v. Cook, the court merely noted that the plaintiffs did not seek fees under § 12-120(1); it awarded fees under § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54 and did not interpret or apply § 12-120. opinion →
Pocatello Railroad Federal Credit Union v. Dairyland Insurance, the opinion mentions § 12-120(1) only to report the district judge's attorney-fee award below. The Supreme Court does not construe or apply that statute; its own attorney-fee ruling relies on I.C. § 41-1839. opinion →
Beco Construction Co. v. Harper Contracting, Inc., the statute is mentioned only as the trial court's stated basis for awarding attorney fees. The appellate court reviewed the amount of the award for abuse of discretion and did not interpret or apply the meaning, requirements, or scope of Idaho Code § 12-120. opinion →
Star Phoenix Mining Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., the court cited § 12-120(3) only as authority for directing an attorney-fee award after reversing the judgment; it did not interpret or apply the statute's requirements or scope. opinion →
Curtis v. Becker, the court merely reports the district court's ruling on the attorney-fee statute and expressly declines to address the issue; it therefore does not construe or apply Idaho Code § 12-120. opinion →
Kimbrough v. Reed, the statute is mentioned only as the basis for Kimbrough's request for attorney fees; the opinion does not construe or apply § 12-120, and it vacates the fee award without analyzing the statute. opinion →
Holder v. Elg, the opinion mentions § 12-120(4) only in a footnote reporting the 1994 Idaho legislative amendment; the court decides the attorney-fee issue under Oregon law and does not construe or apply this statute. opinion →
LeaseFirst v. Burns, the opinion only mentions Idaho Code § 12-120(3) in LeaseFirst's request for attorney fees. The court awarded fees under the lease's contractual fee provision and did not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 12-120(3). opinion →
Inland Group of Companies, Inc. v. Obendorff, the concurrence expressly says that a ruling on § 12-120(3)'s applicability to contempt proceedings is unnecessary; the statute is discussed but not construed or applied by the court. opinion →
Weaver v. Searle Bros., the court merely noted that Rosalia requested attorney fees under § 12-120(3), then declined to address either party's fee request because neither brief argued the issue. It did not construe or apply § 12-120(3). opinion →
First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. Murphy, the statute is mentioned only as the basis for the district court’s fee award in the procedural history; the appellate court does not interpret or apply § 12-120(3), and later simply sets aside the fee award after vacating summary judgment. opinion →
Watts v. Krebs, the statute is discussed only in the opinion’s report of the Court of Appeals’ reasoning in Jahnke. This Court did not decide whether § 12-120(3) applied; it declined to disturb the fee award because the appellant had not challenged entitlement to the award under that statute. opinion →
Butterfield v. MacKenzie, the court mentions Idaho Code § 12-120(3) only when affirming the district court’s award of attorney fees and costs; it does not interpret or analyze the statute, and the fee ruling is not this court’s holding about the statute. opinion →
Empire Lumber Co. v. Thermal-Dynamic Towers, Inc., the opinion lists Idaho Code § 12-120(3) as a basis argued for appellate attorney fees, but the court awarded fees under paragraph 20 of the lease and I.A.R. 41 and did not interpret or apply § 12-120(3). opinion →
Graefe v. Vaughn, the court merely reported Brawley’s request for attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(2) and declined to address the issue because it was unsupported by argument; it did not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Interlode Constructors, Inc. v. Bryant, the court only noted the request for attorney fees under § 12-120(3) and declined to address it because the issue was not properly argued; it did not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Montane Resource Associates v. Greene, the statute appears only in the complaint's quoted attorney-fee allegation. The court did not construe or apply Idaho Code § 12-120; it decided whether to set aside the default judgment under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) and addressed personal liability on the loggers' lien. opinion →
Ramerth v. Hart, the court merely reported and declined to consider Hart’s unsupported request for attorney fees; it did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about Idaho Code § 12-120(3). opinion →
Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, the court merely noted that the parties requested attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120, then declined to address the request because they presented no supporting argument; it did not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Trimble v. Engelking, the court mentions § 12-120(3) only while describing a prior case; it does not interpret or apply the statute in Trimble. opinion →
Town of St. John v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, Idaho Code §§ 12-120 & -121 are mentioned only as statutory authority for adoption of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) in the opinion's discussion of Hellar; the court does not construe or apply § 12-120. opinion →
Farner v. Idaho Falls School District No. 91, the opinion mentions § 12-120(3) only as one basis requested by the Teachers, but the court awards fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and does not interpret or apply Idaho Code § 12-120(3). opinion →
Ahles v. Tabor, the court did not construe or apply § 12-120(1); it merely directed the district court on remand to determine whether the statutory conditions for attorney fees were satisfied. opinion →
Utter v. Gibbins, the opinion only reports Utter's request for attorney fees under § 12-120; the court awarded fees under § 12-121 and did not construe or apply § 12-120. opinion →
Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., Idaho Code § 12-120(1) is mentioned only as a basis for the Ditch Company’s fee request. The court decided the timeliness of the memorandum of costs under Rule 54(d)(5) and expressly declined to decide whether the party was entitled to attorney fees under any authority. opinion →
In Re Wiersma, the court discusses Idaho Code § 12-120(3) only to use Idaho fee-law distinctions by analogy when characterizing the debtors’ claim under Revised Article 9; it does not decide an attorney-fee issue under § 12-120(3). opinion →
Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, L.L.C., the court merely reports the trial judge’s fee award under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and vacates and remands that award; it does not construe or decide what the statute means, requires, or covers. opinion →
McKay v. Ireland Bank, the court merely reported the bank's request for attorney fees under I.C. 12-120 and declined to address it because the bank provided no supporting argument; it did not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Elliott v. Darwin Neibaur Farms, the opinion mentions § 12-120(3) only to note that the Elliotts did not base their fee request on it; the court decided the request under § 12-121 and did not construe or apply § 12-120(3). opinion →
Stefano v. Micron Technology, Inc., the court mentions § 12-120(3) only as the basis for the parties’ attorney-fee requests and affirms the fee ruling without construing what the statute means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Lamprecht v. JORDAN, LLC, the court stated the commercial-transaction attorney-fee issue would not be considered because Jordan offered only a citation and no supporting argument; it therefore did not decide anything about § 12-120(3). opinion →
Cox v. City of Sandpoint, the court merely cited § 12-120(3) in reserving whether Cox would ultimately be entitled to attorney fees; it did not interpret or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Driver v. SI CORP., the court discussed whether § 12-120(3) applies to an arbitration-confirmation proceeding but expressly declined to decide that issue, resolving attorney-fee authority under I.C. § 7-914 instead. opinion →
Pacific Alaska Seafoods, Inc. v. Vic Hoskins Trucking, Inc., the opinion mentions Idaho Code § 12-120(3) only in Pacific's cross-appeal argument and does not decide the statute's meaning or application; the court held the attorney-fee issue was not preserved for appeal. opinion →
Roark v. Bentley, the opinion merely reports the trial court’s denial of fees under § 12-120(1) as procedural history; the appellate court does not construe or apply § 12-120 and addresses attorney fees under § 12-121 instead. opinion →
Ackerman v. Bonneville County, the court merely reports Bonneville County’s request for appellate fees citing § 12-120; it does not interpret or apply § 12-120, and the appellate fee award is analyzed and granted under § 12-121 and § 12-123. opinion →
Quinto v. Millwood Forest Products, Inc., the court only described § 12-120(3) while declining to award appellate attorney fees pending determination of the ultimate prevailing party; it did not decide what the statute means or how it applies beyond this procedural ruling. opinion →
Reding v. Reding, the court mentions § 12-120(3) only in connection with the parties' request for appellate attorney fees and disposes of the request because Raymond and Arlene were not the prevailing party; it does not interpret or substantively analyze the statute. opinion →
Vanvooren v. Astin, section 12-120 appears only in the procedural history as one basis cited in Dr. Smith’s fee request. The court’s analysis and ruling concerned attorney fees under § 12-121, so it made no holding about § 12-120. opinion →
Watson v. Weick, the statute is mentioned only as the basis for the district court's attorney-fee award. This court vacated that award and did not construe or decide how § 12-120 applies. opinion →
Certain Underwriters at Lloyds v. Wolleson, the opinion mentions Idaho Code § 12-120 only as one statutory basis Wolleson asserted for attorney fees in its counterclaims. The court decided the appeal under I.C. § 41-1839 and did not interpret, apply, or rule on § 12-120. opinion →
Oldcastle Precast, Inc. v. Parktowne Construction, Inc., the court merely mentioned § 12-120(3) as an alternative fee statute that Oldcastle did not invoke; it did not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Hogg v. Wolske, the court did not interpret or apply Idaho Code § 12-120; it declined to review the fee award under that statute because the appellants had not properly raised the issue, and merely noted that the award duplicated other grounds. opinion →
Craig Johnson Construction, L.L.C. v. Floyd Town Architects, P.A., the court mentions § 12-120(3) only as one of the authorities invoked in the parties’ requests for appellate attorney fees. It did not construe or apply the statute; it denied fees because neither party presented arguments justifying an award. opinion →
Independence Lead Mines Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., the court did not interpret or decide the scope or requirements of Idaho Code § 12-120(3). It mentioned the statute in denying appellate attorney fees based on the parties’ prevailing-party status and failure to adequately brief the fee issue, and referred to a prior case’s statement about commercial transactions. opinion →
State v. District Court, the court mentions § 12-120 only as one of several possible statutory bases for attorney fees, then expressly declines to address that basis because no argument was presented. It does not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., the court merely affirmed the district court’s fee award and awarded appellate fees to the prevailing party; it did not interpret, analyze, or decide any requirement or scope of Idaho Code § 12-120(3). opinion →
Stout v. Key Training Corp., the opinion is Chief Justice Schroeder's dissent, which advocates a broader interpretation of Idaho Code § 12-120(3); it does not state the majority court's holding. opinion →
Berry v. Ostrom, the court only mentioned Idaho Code § 12-120(3) in declining to award attorney fees because Berry was not yet the prevailing party; it did not interpret or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Nelson v. Nelson, the court noted that Darline cited § 12-120 but made no argument under it; the attorney-fee analysis and award were under § 12-121. opinion →
Trilogy Network Systems, Inc. v. Johnson, the court merely noted I.C. § 12-120 as the basis for Trilogy's fee request and denied fees because Trilogy was not the prevailing party; it did not interpret or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Crowley v. Critchfield, the court only mentions § 12-120 as a basis Crowley claimed for attorney’s fees and states that he failed to show entitlement; it does not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Jorgensen v. Coppedge, the court merely applied the prevailing-party requirement to deny attorney fees; it did not interpret or otherwise decide what Idaho Code § 12-120(3) means or requires. opinion →
Losser v. Bradstreet, the opinion mentions § 12-120(1) as the basis for the magistrate’s fee award and says the challenge to that award was waived; it does not interpret or decide what the statute means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Deelstra v. Hagler, the court mentions Idaho Code § 12-120(3) as the basis for the district court's fee award and for the parties' requests for fees on appeal, but it decides the appeal under Idaho's arbitration statutes and does not interpret or apply § 12-120(3). opinion →
Cuevas v. Barraza, the court merely noted that the parties requested attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120 and declined to address the requests because neither party provided supporting argument; it did not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Deluna v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., the court merely recounts Deluna's citation of Idaho Code § 12-120 as a basis for her request for attorney fees and denies the request because she did not prevail; it does not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Cantwell v. City of Boise, the statute appears only in a footnote addressing Cantwell's request for attorney fees; the court did not interpret or apply any substantive requirement of § 12-120(3), but merely observed that he did not prevail on his claims. opinion →
Taylor v. Maile, the opinion merely reports the district court’s denial of attorney fees under § 12-120(3) and affirms it; the appellate court does not interpret or apply the statute itself. opinion →
Canada Life Assurance v. Lapeter, the court mentioned Idaho Code § 12-120(3) as an alternative basis for attorneys' fees but expressly declined to decide entitlement under the statute because fees were awarded under the Deed of Trust. opinion →
Canada Life Assurance Co. v. LaPeter, the court only mentions Idaho Code § 12-120(3) as an alternative basis for attorneys’ fees and expressly declines to decide entitlement under the statute, resolving the issue under the Deed of Trust instead. opinion →
Canada Life Assuranc v. Lapeter, the court noted the claim for fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) but expressly declined to reach entitlement under the statute because fees were available under the Deed of Trust. opinion →
Justad v. Ward, the court merely denied attorney fees because Justad was not the prevailing party; it did not interpret or decide anything substantive about Idaho Code § 12-120(1). opinion →
Ruyle v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America, the court merely identifies § 12-120(3) as one of the statutory claims alleged in the complaint when evaluating the amount in controversy; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Chandler v. Hayden, the court merely mentions I.C. § 12-120(3) as one basis First American invoked for appellate attorney fees; it does not interpret or apply the statute, and denies fees because First American was not the prevailing party on appeal. opinion →
Crump v. Bromley, the statute is mentioned only as the basis cited for the parties' motions for fees; the Supreme Court's decision addressed prevailing-party status under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54 and 68, without construing or applying Idaho Code § 12-120. opinion →
Carroll v. MBNA America Bank, the court mentioned § 12-120(3) as one of the statutes MBNA cited for attorney fees, but declined fees because MBNA provided no supporting argument; it did not interpret or apply the statute's substantive requirements. opinion →
STATE, EX REL. WASDEN v. Maybee, the opinion mentions Idaho Code § 12-120(4) only to cite and describe the holding of Gonzalez v. Thacker while deciding whether attorney fees were available under Idaho Code § 39-8407(5); it does not independently construe or apply § 12-120(4). opinion →
State v. Maybee, the opinion merely reports the interpretation of § 12-120(4) from another case while addressing attorney fees under Idaho Code § 39-8407(5); it does not decide anything about § 12-120. opinion →
Henderson v. Henderson Investment Properties, L.L.C., the opinion merely reports the district court's ruling that fees were unavailable under I.C. § 12-120(3); the appellate court decided the fee issue under the Operating Agreement and did not construe or apply this statute. opinion →
Bedke v. CITY OF OAKLEY, the statute is mentioned only as one of several provisions cited in the City's request for attorney fees during the procedural history. The court did not construe or apply Idaho Code § 12-120; its fee rulings and award were under I.C. § 12-121. opinion →
In Re SRBA, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as one of several statutes cited in the City's request for attorney fees. The court did not construe or apply § 12-120; its fee award was made pursuant to § 12-121. opinion →
Bruce Byron Bedke and Jared K. Bedke v. City of Oakley, the statute was mentioned as one of several statutes cited in the City's initial request for attorney fees, but the court's analysis and award rested on I.C. § 12-121; it did not construe or apply § 12-120. opinion →
Financial Federal Credit Inc. v. Walter B. Scott & Sons, Inc. (In Re Walter B. Scott & Sons, Inc.), the statute appears only in a footnote reporting the debtor’s pleading request for attorney’s fees. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide entitlement under Idaho Code § 12-120; its fee ruling concerned the Security Agreement and Guaranties. opinion →
Bagley v. Thomason, the court merely noted that the respondents cited § 12-120(3) without explaining its application; it did not interpret or decide what the statute requires or authorizes. opinion →
LC v. Erickson Ex Rel. Erickson, Idaho Code section 12-120(3) is mentioned in the parties' arguments, but the court does not interpret or apply it; instead, it awards Sirius attorney fees on appeal under the note and mortgage. opinion →
Doe v. Doe, the court merely reported the Guardians' unsupported request for fees under Idaho Code § 12-120 and expressly declined to award fees under that section; it did not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
RE: Guardianship of minor children, the court merely noted that the Guardians requested fees under I.C. § 12-120 but provided no supporting argument, so it declined to award fees; it did not interpret or apply the statute's substantive requirements. opinion →
VANDERFORD CO., INC. v. Knudson, the court merely declined to consider Knudson’s unsupported request for attorney fees under § 12-120(3); it did not interpret or decide anything about the statute’s meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance v. Schrock, the statute is mentioned only in the appellants' request for attorney fees; the court did not construe or decide the scope or application of Idaho Code § 12-120(3), and denied fees because appellants were not the prevailing parties. opinion →
Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, the statute is cited only as a basis for Respondents' request for appellate attorney fees. The court did not interpret or apply Idaho Code § 12-120(3); it denied fees because Respondents were not the prevailing party. opinion →
Moffett v. Moffett, the statute is mentioned only as one of the legal bases Bartschi asserted in a prior case; this opinion relies on Garner's general preservation rule and does not construe or apply § 12-120(3). opinion →
Fuller v. CALLISTER, the court did not interpret or apply Idaho Code § 12-120(3); it only held that the attorney-fee issue was moot because Respondents were no longer the prevailing party below. opinion →
Caldwell v. COMETTO, the court did not decide whether § 12-120(3) applied or whether the appeal involved a commercial transaction; it held that issue unnecessary because no party prevailed on appeal. opinion →
Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. County of Kootenai, the statute is mentioned only as a basis Allied requested for appellate attorney fees; the court awarded fees under I.C. § 12-117 and did not decide what Idaho Code § 12-120(3) means or how it applies. opinion →
NIGHTENGALE v. Timmel, the court only mentioned Idaho Code § 12-120 as one basis for Nightengale's unsupported request for attorney fees and declined to consider the request; it did not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Idaho Development, LLC v. Teton View Golf Estates, LLC, the court mentioned § 12-120(3) only while declining to decide whether the appeal involved a commercial transaction; it did not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Belstler v. Sheler, the statute is mentioned only because the Belstlers cited it in seeking attorney fees; the court states that the denial of fees under § 12-120 was not appealed and therefore does not address it. opinion →
Kerr v. Bank of America, Idaho, N.A., the court mentioned § 12-120(3) only as an alternative basis requested for appellate attorney fees, but expressly declined to address entitlement under that provision and awarded fees under § 12-121 instead. opinion →
Idaho Development, LLC v. Teton View Golf Estates, LLC, the court did not decide what § 12-120(3) requires or whether it applied; it merely noted that the commercial-transaction issue was unnecessary to reach because the respondents were not prevailing parties on appeal. opinion →
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, the opinion mentions § 12-120(3) only while describing the prior Champion decision and using it by analogy to interpret Rule 68 in this Copyright Act case; it does not decide what § 12-120(3) means or how it applies. opinion →
Asbury Park, LLC v. Greenbriar Estate Homeowners' Ass'n, the statute is mentioned only as one of the parties' attorney-fee requests; the court remanded the fee issue based on the CC&Rs and did not interpret or apply Idaho Code § 12-120(3). opinion →
Steel Farms, Inc. v. Croft & Reed, Inc., the court did not interpret or apply Idaho Code § 12-120(3); it merely identified the statute as an authority for the trial court to consider later when determining the prevailing party’s entitlement to attorney fees after all claims were resolved. opinion →
Federal National Mortgage v. Allen, the opinion mentions Idaho Code § 12-120 only as one of the authorities cited in Fannie Mae's request for appellate attorney fees; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply the statute. opinion →
Stevenson v. Windermere Real Estate/Capital Group, Inc., the court mentions § 12-120(1) only in describing the district court’s fee ruling and the now-moot cross-appeal; it expressly declines to address the issue and does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Morrison v. Northwest Nazarene University, the court merely reports the University's request for attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and declines to address the issue because it was not argued in the brief; it does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Blue Dog RV, Inc. v. Treaty Rock, Inc., the court mentioned § 12-120(3) only as a basis Blue Dog asserted for fees on appeal; it awarded fees under the clear terms of the lease and did not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Doe v. Doe, the court only reported the Guardians' request for fees under § 12-120 and declined to award fees because they provided no supporting argument; it did not interpret or apply the statute's substantive requirements. opinion →
RE: Guardianship of minor children, the court merely noted the respondents' request for attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120 and declined to award fees because they provided no supporting argument; it did not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
VANDERFORD CO., INC. v. Knudson, the court merely noted Knudson’s unsupported request for attorney fees under § 12-120(3) and declined to consider it; it did not construe or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance v. Schrock, the court merely reported the appellants' fee argument and denied fees because they were not the prevailing parties; it did not construe or independently analyze Idaho Code § 12-120(3). opinion →
Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, the court only mentions Idaho Code § 12-120(3) as one of the provisions cited in Respondents' request for appellate attorney fees; it does not interpret or apply the statute's meaning or requirements. opinion →
Moffett v. Moffett, the statute is mentioned only as one asserted basis for attorney fees in the prior Garner case; this opinion does not construe or apply Idaho Code § 12-120. opinion →
Fuller v. CALLISTER, the statute is mentioned only to say that the respondents' attorney-fee issue became moot because they were no longer the prevailing party; the opinion does not interpret or apply Idaho Code § 12-120(3). opinion →
Caldwell v. COMETTO, the court cited § 12-120(3) as a possible basis for appellate attorney fees but expressly declined to decide whether the appeal involved a commercial transaction because there was no prevailing party. opinion →
Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. County of Kootenai, the statute is mentioned only as a statutory basis requested for attorney fees on appeal; the court awarded fees under I.C. § 12-117 and did not interpret or apply § 12-120(3). opinion →
NIGHTENGALE v. Timmel, the court merely reported Nightengale's unsupported request for attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120 and declined to consider it; it did not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Hernandez v. Hernandez, the court only mentioned Idaho Code § 12-120 in denying attorney fees because Charles was not the prevailing party; it did not construe or independently analyze the statute. opinion →
Idaho Development, LLC v. Teton View Golf Estates, LLC, the court expressly declined to decide whether the appeal involved a commercial transaction under § 12-120(3), because the respondents were not prevailing parties; the statute was only mentioned in the context of attorney-fee requests. opinion →
Belstler v. Sheler, the court mentions § 12-120 only in a footnote explaining that the denial of fees under that statute was not appealed, so it does not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Kerr v. Bank of America, Idaho, N.A., the court awarded attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41, and expressly declined to address whether Bank of America was entitled to fees under § 12-120(3). Thus, § 12-120(3) was not construed or applied. opinion →
Idaho Development, LLC v. Teton View Golf Estates, LLC, the court did not decide whether Idaho Code § 12-120(3) applied; it expressly found it unnecessary to discuss that issue because the requesting parties were not prevailing parties on appeal. opinion →
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, the court mentions Idaho Code § 12-120(3) only while describing the prior Champion decision and using it to analyze whether Rule 68 expands an underlying statute's fee entitlement; it does not construe or apply § 12-120(3) in this case. opinion →
Asbury Park, LLC v. Greenbriar Estate Homeowners' Ass'n, the court mentioned § 12-120(3) only as one of the provisions under which the parties requested attorney fees. It did not interpret or apply the statute; it resolved the fee issue under the CC&Rs and held that fees could not yet be awarded because the appeal involved a partial judgment. opinion →
Steel Farms, Inc. v. Croft & Reed, Inc., the court merely directed the district court to determine attorney-fee entitlement after all claims were resolved; it did not interpret or apply Idaho Code § 12-120. opinion →
Federal National Mortgage v. Allen, the court merely notes Fannie Mae's request for fees under § 12-120 and then awards fees without interpreting, explaining, or applying any requirement of that statute; the fee ruling is supported by the appeal's untimeliness and the impermissibility of the motion. opinion →
Stevenson v. Windermere Real Estate/Capital Group, Inc., the court did not construe or apply Idaho Code § 12-120(1); it only held that Windermere’s cross-appeal concerning the trial court’s denial of fees under that provision was moot and declined to address it. opinion →
Morrison v. Northwest Nazarene University, Idaho Code § 12-120(3) appears only in the University’s request for attorney fees on appeal. The court did not interpret or apply the statute; it declined to address attorney fees because the issue was not presented in the argument section of the brief and therefore did not comply with Idaho Appellate Rule 35. opinion →
Blue Dog RV, Inc. v. Treaty Rock, Inc., the court mentioned Idaho Code § 12-120(3) as a basis asserted by Blue Dog for appellate fees, but awarded fees under the lease agreement and did not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
The Estate of Benjamin Holland v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance, section 12-120 appears only in the complaint’s allegation seeking attorney fees; the court does not construe or apply that statute and decides the attorney-fee issues under Idaho Code § 41-1839. opinion →
Kugler v. Nelson, the court merely stated the general availability of fees under § 12-120(3) while denying fees because Nelson was not the prevailing party; it did not decide an issue about the statute. opinion →
Peterson v. Laura Knight Peterson, the statute appears only in Russell’s and Laura’s requests for attorney fees. The court did not interpret or apply Idaho Code § 12-120; it denied fees because neither party provided argument or case law supporting the requests. opinion →
Terry-Lee v. Young, the court merely reports Young's request for fees under § 12-120(3); it does not interpret or apply that subsection, and its stated basis for awarding fees is § 12-121. opinion →
Quemada v. Arizmendez & Acosta, the court mentioned I.C. § 12-120(3) only in a footnote describing a prior attorney-fee award in Garner v. Povey. The court did not construe or apply § 12-120(3); it awarded fees under TEDRA's I.C. § 15-8-208. opinion →
Brannon v. City of Coeur D'Alene, Idaho, the court only recounts the City’s argument invoking Idaho Code § 12-120; it does not interpret or apply that statute. The court analyzes attorney fees under § 12-121 instead and declines to award fees because the appeal presented a legitimate issue of law. opinion →
Hobson Fabricating Corp. v. SE/Z Construction, LLC, the court mentions § 12-120 only to describe the Contractors’ arguments and distinguish prior fee-award cases; it decides the request under § 12-117(2), not § 12-120. opinion →
Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., the court mentions Idaho Code § 12-120(3) as one basis for Boise Mode's request for appellate attorney fees, but awards fees under the lease and personal guarantee without interpreting or applying the statute. opinion →
Peterson v. Gentillon, the statute appears only in the Gentillons' argument for attorney fees; the court did not interpret or apply Idaho Code § 12-120(3), and denied fees because the Partnership failed to request them in its first appellate brief. opinion →
Medical Recovery Services, LLC v. Strawn, the court merely noted MRS's request for appellate attorney fees under Idaho Code §§ 12-120(1) and 12-120(3) and denied fees because MRS did not prevail; it did not interpret or decide what § 12-120 means or requires. opinion →
The Estate of Benjamin Holland v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance, section 12-120 appears only in the complaint’s allegation seeking attorney fees; the court did not interpret, apply, or adopt any rule about that statute. opinion →
Peterson v. Laura Knight Peterson, the opinion mentions Idaho Code § 12-120 only as one of the statutes cited in the parties’ requests for appellate attorney fees. The court did not interpret or apply the statute; it denied fees because neither party provided supporting argument or case law. opinion →
Terry-Lee v. Young, the court merely reported the request for fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3); its fee discussion and ruling relied on § 12-121 and did not interpret or apply § 12-120(3). opinion →
Quemada v. Arizmendez & Acosta, the statute appears only in a footnote as an analogy to prior attorney-fee awards. The court decided the fee award under TEDRA’s attorney-fee provision, I.C. § 15-8-208, and did not construe or apply I.C. § 12-120(3). opinion →
Brannon v. City of Coeur D'Alene, Idaho, the statute is mentioned only as one basis asserted by the City for attorney fees on appeal. The court does not construe or decide the applicability or requirements of § 12-120; it discusses § 12-121 and declines fees because the UOCAVA issue was legitimate and triable. opinion →
Hobson Fabricating Corp. v. SE/Z Construction, LLC, the court mentions Idaho Code § 12-120 only while discussing other cases as analogies for whether a fee request adequately identified its statutory basis; it decides the appeal under § 12-117 and does not construe or apply § 12-120. opinion →
Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., the statute is mentioned only as one basis for Boise Mode's request for attorney fees on appeal. The court awarded fees under the lease and personal guarantee and did not decide what § 12-120(3) means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Peterson v. Gentillon, the opinion merely reports the Gentillons' argument invoking I.C. § 12-120(3); it does not interpret or apply the statute, and denies attorney fees because the Partnership failed to request them in its first appellate brief. opinion →
Medical Recovery Services, LLC v. Strawn, the court merely noted MRS's reliance on Idaho Code §§ 12-120(1) and 12-120(3) and denied appellate fees because MRS did not prevail; it did not construe or decide what either subsection requires. opinion →
Idaho Property Management Services, Inc. v. MacDonald, the opinion only reports that the district court awarded attorney fees and costs under Idaho Code § 12-120; the appellate court does not interpret or apply that statute, and later vacates the award because IPMS was no longer the prevailing party. opinion →
Britanie Bell v. Eagy, the opinion mentions § 12-120(3) only in a footnote while reporting the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in another case; this court did not construe or apply § 12-120(3). Its attorney-fee ruling addressed I.C. §§ 7-610 and 12-121. opinion →
Nampa Education Association v. Nampa School District No. 131, the court merely noted that the Association requested fees under § 12-120, then declined to address attorney fees because the request was not argued in the brief; it did not interpret or apply § 12-120. opinion →
Lamont v. Lamont, the court cites § 12-120 in a string cite concerning attorney’s fees, but does not construe the statute or rely on it to decide the fee issue. The court instead explains and applies the standard under § 12-121. opinion →
Panagiotou v. Eliopulos, the court mentions § 12-120(3) in Panagiotou’s fee request and states its general rule, but it does not decide whether that statute applies or award fees under it; the fee award rests on § 12-121. opinion →
Sky Canyon Properties, LLC v. Golf Club at Black Rock, LLC, the opinion mentions § 12-120(3) only while recounting the district court’s reliance on Star Phoenix and quoting that earlier directive; the present court’s holding concerns remand jurisdiction and attorney fees under the parties’ CCRs, not the meaning or application of § 12-120(3). opinion →
Estate of John H. Cornell v. Johnson, the court cited this language from Rockefeller v. Grabow only to support its characterization of the Estate’s fiduciary-duty claims as tort claims in deciding whether they survived John’s death. It did not decide whether attorney fees were available under § 12-120(3) in this case or otherwise construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Garrison v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the opinion mentions § 12-120(3) only while comparing hourly rates from prior Idaho fee-shifting cases to rates used in Vaccine Program litigation. It does not construe, apply, or decide any issue under the Idaho statute. opinion →
Linell Bills v. Bills, the statute appears only in the respondent's request for appellate attorney fees. The court did not interpret or apply § 12-120(3); it denied fees because Linell was not the prevailing party and addressed the award under I.C. § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41. opinion →
Grant Lee v. Litster, the statute appears only in the plaintiffs’ fee request. The court rejected fees because the plaintiffs failed to comply with Idaho Appellate Rule 35(b)(6), without interpreting or applying Idaho Code § 12-120(3). opinion →
Budget Truck Sales, LLC v. Tilley, the court recited § 12-120(3) while describing the parties’ fee requests and noting that the claims arose from commercial transactions, but it declined appellate attorney fees in light of its disposition and did not decide the statute’s meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
Wozniak v. Puckett, the opinion mentions § 12-120 only as one of several authorities cited in Wozniak’s request for appellate attorney fees. The court decides the fee request under Idaho Appellate Rule 41 and the good-faith/frivolousness standard from Clearwater REI, without interpreting or applying § 12-120’s requirements. opinion →
Regdab, Inc. v. Graybill, the statute appears only in Regdab’s string citation in the prayer for relief; the court’s holding concerns Idaho Code section 45-513 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e), not the meaning or application of section 12-120. opinion →
Regdab, Inc. v. Graybill, the opinion quotes Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(4)(B), which mentions § 12-120, but the court does not construe or apply § 12-120. Its holding concerns the pleading requirement under the procedural rule for fees sought under Idaho Code § 45-513; § 12-120 is only a passing reference in the quoted rule and the complaint's prayer. opinion →
Gomez v. Crookham, the court cited § 12-120 only in resolving the request for appellate attorney fees, which it denied because both parties prevailed in part. It expressly said it was unnecessary to decide whether the plaintiffs would prevail under either statute; the footnote's subsection-citation observation was not necessary to the ruling. opinion →
Gietzen Solar, LLC v. Powerco Solar, Inc., the court mentions § 12-120(c) in a footnote as a possible basis for the plaintiff’s fee request, but decides only whether future attorneys’ fees count toward the amount-in-controversy calculation; it does not construe or decide the statute’s application. opinion →
Cover v. ID Board of Correction, the court cites § 12-120(3) only as one example of another statute under which appellate attorney fees had previously been awarded. It does not construe the subsection, determine its requirements, or apply it to the parties’ dispute. opinion →
Action Collection Service, Inc. v. Black, the court mentions subsections (1) and (3) only to identify potential statutory bases for the attorney-fee award. Its holding concerns whether the district court properly exercised discretion under the twelve factors in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of Idaho Code § 12-120. opinion →
Action Collection Service, Inc. v. Black, the court mentioned §§ 12-120(1) and (3) as statutory authorization for attorney fees, but it did not construe or decide any issue about the statute. The ruling addressed whether the district court reasonably applied the attorney-fee factors in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) when reducing the award. opinion →
LLLP v. Hoffman Construction Company of America, the opinion quotes § 12-120(3), but the defendant expressly did not dispute that the statute applied. The court did not construe the statute or decide a contested question about its meaning, requirements, coverage, or application; it instead determined the amount of fees under general lodestar and reasonableness principles. opinion →
United States of America for use and benefit of Mountain Utilities, Inc. v. Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, the statute appears only as an alternative argument by Mountain Utilities. The court expressly declined to address the merits of that argument and awarded fees on independent American Rule grounds based on bad faith and substantial benefit. opinion →
Schueler v. Four Squarebiz, LLC, the statute is mentioned only in the plaintiff’s complaint prayer for attorneys’ fees. The court does not construe § 12-120(3) or decide whether it independently authorizes fees; its fee discussion relies on the agreements and District of Idaho Local Civil Rule 54.2(b). opinion →
Staker & Parson Companies, Inc. v. Clow, the statute is cited in connection with the parties’ attorney-fee requests and the opinion reports the district court’s statutory basis, but the appellate court does not construe or independently apply § 12-120(3); its fee award is based on IMC’s prevailing-party status and the contractual fee provision. opinion →
Ivanov v. Fitness Elite Training Center, Inc., section 12-120(3) appears only in parenthetical authorities explaining other decisions; this court did not decide its meaning or applicability. The fee award was analyzed under Idaho Code § 45-615 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3). opinion →
Philip Dean Mannlein, the statute appears only in the opinion's report of the state-court order and the debtor's requested attorney-fee basis; this court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about Idaho Code § 12-120. opinion →
Angelos v. Schatzel, the court mentions § 12-120(1) only while rejecting Schatzel’s request for appellate attorney fees because he was not the prevailing party. It does not decide a disputed issue about the statute’s meaning, requirements, or coverage. opinion →
TLC Landscape v. Mallett, the opinion only reports that the district court relied on § 12-120(3) when awarding fees and then holds that Mallett waived any challenge to that award. The appellate court does not decide the meaning or application of § 12-120(3); its own fee award rests on § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41. opinion →
Gerard and Heather Ann Hart Living Trust v. Legends Development Company, the opinion merely identifies § 12-120(3) as one basis for a fee award previously determined, then addresses the reasonableness of the requested fees under Rule 54(e)(3); it does not interpret, define, or decide the statute’s requirements or scope. opinion →
Medical Recovery Services, LLC v. Baird, the court cited § 12-120(3) only in a parenthetical reference to another case; it did not interpret or apply the statute, instead deciding that the parties' stipulated attorney-fee amount controlled. opinion →
North Haven Business Park, Inc. v. Balance Regenerative Medicine, PLLC, the court merely reported BRM’s argument citing § 12-120(3); it did not interpret or apply that statute. The fee award was based on the lease, and the court expressly declined to address the alternative statutory and rule-based grounds. opinion →
CapEd FCU v. Lippa, the court mentioned § 12-120(3) only in CapEd's request for fees and expressly declined to decide whether the statute authorized an award because the contract independently supported fees and costs. opinion →
Garshelis v. Bennett, the statute is mentioned in Garshelis’s argument as a claimed fee-shifting limit. The court rejects using the complaint’s alleged amount to determine damages, but does not construe or apply Idaho Code § 12-120. opinion →
Ross nka Miller v. Ross, section 12-120 is listed only as one of several asserted bases for Miller’s fee request. The court denied fees because Miller was not the prevailing party and did not construe or otherwise independently apply § 12-120. opinion →
Holt, the statutes appear in P1FCU’s argument for attorney’s fees, but the court denied the fee motion solely because it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and did not interpret or apply Idaho Code § 12-120. opinion →
Millenkamp Cattle, Inc, the statute is mentioned only to describe the court’s treatment of computerized legal research in prior cases where state law governed. The present decision applies Bankruptcy Code § 330 and bankruptcy rules to the fee application and does not construe or apply Idaho Code § 12-120. opinion →
Doron Precision Systems, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co., the court merely vacated the trial court's attorney-fee award after reversing the judgment and stating that USF & G was no longer the prevailing party; it did not interpret or otherwise analyze the requirements or scope of Idaho Code § 12-120(3). opinion →
Bolognese v. Forte, the statute is mentioned only as one basis in the buyers’ request for appellate attorney fees. The court did not construe or apply Idaho Code § 12-120; it denied the buyers’ request because they were not prevailing parties and awarded the sellers fees under the real estate contract. opinion →
Carbajal v. Hayes Management Services, Inc., the court cited § 12-120(3) only in a footnote while rejecting the argument that a possible attorney-fee award arose from an action on a contract for purposes of Idaho Code § 8-501. The decision construed and applied § 8-501, not § 12-120. opinion →

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Describe your situation under Idaho Code § 12-120. Ezel checks it against the cases on this page and answers with citations.

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