Idaho Code § 5-219

For pre-March 24, 1971 malpractice claims, the two-year limitations period begins when the patient discovers, or with reasonable care should discover, the condition resulting from the alleged malpractice.

Johnson v. Stoddard · filed 1974-03-28(4)

Returning to the instant case, we note that the gravamen of Johnson’s complaint is that he informed Dr. Brunt of the missing Penrose drains and that Dr. Brunt, after examining Johnson and operating on him, did not determine that the drains were responsible for Johnson’s discomfort. We conclude that at trial the evidence could establish that a proper diagnosis would have disclosed the missing drams. Therefore we conclude that the instant case comes within the ambit of Renner v. Edwards, and we hold that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the missing drains were discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have been discovered.

Section 5-219(4) imposes a two-year limit on personal-injury actions, and its discovery exception is limited to foreign objects left in a patient without the patient's knowledge; it does not apply when the patient knew the object was embedded and knew the wound was not healing properly.

Cook v. Soltman · filed 1974-07-18(4)

The record establishes that this action is not sufficiently similar to the Billings case to make the discovery exception applicable. The Billings case is limited on its facts to a situation in which a doctor places a foreign object in a patient’s body without the patient’s knowledge and fails to remove it. In the case at bar, Cook came to Dr. Soltman for treatment with the limb and shirt already embedded in his back, and Cook knew that the limb and shirt had penetrated into his back. ... Cook had notice that the tree limb and shirt were in his back. Moreover Cook alleges in his complaint that the wound never healed properly and continuously caused him pain. This allegation reveals that he had notice that the wound had not fully responded to the treatment. ... Since Cook’s action does not fall within the discovery exception, it is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 5-219 bars a medical-malpractice action when the injury and its alleged cause were known no later than 1966 and the action was not filed until 1970.

Patterson v. Twin Falls County · filed 1971-11-04

It is obvious that the action instituted in 1970, when the injury had been discovered along with its alleged cause no later than 1966, is barred by the statute of limitations. I.C. § 5-219.

For professional-malpractice claims, the two-year limitations period begins when some damage is objectively ascertainable, not when the plaintiff discovers the injury; § 5-219(4) does not adopt a discovery rule.

Wyman v. John J. Eck, M.D. · filed 2017-02-28(4)

Although Idaho Code section 5-219(4) is interpreted “flexibly to avoid absurd results,” a discovery rule—which begins to run once the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury—has been “consistently rejected.”

For professional-malpractice claims involving an inadvertently left foreign object, the cause of action accrues when the injured party knows or reasonably should be put on inquiry, and the applicable limitation is one year from accrual or two years from the occurrence, whichever is later.

Stoner v. Carr · filed 1976-05-03(4)

Thus, after 1964, when Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, supra, was decided, knowledge (actual or constructive) of a foreign object left in the body is required before the cause of action can be deemed to accrue in such cases. The statute of limitation in effect when the right of action is deemed to accrue defines that statutory period unless the legislature provides otherwise. The plaintiffs’ cause of action here is deemed to have accrued July 31, 1973, when the surgical needle was discovered in Mrs. Stoner’s abdomen. Thus, the statute of limitations began to run at this time. The statute, I.C. § 5-219(4), as amended, provided a one year limitation in cases involving foreign objects. The plaintiffs’ complaint was filed December 24, 1974, almost seventeen months after discovery of the needle; thus, the action is barred by the statute of limitations, I.C. § 5-219(4).

Under § 5-219(4), the “condition or matter complained of” in a foreign-object malpractice action is the alleged malpractice itself—leaving the foreign object—not merely symptoms or knowledge of an undissolved suture.

Reis v. Cox · filed 1982-12-27(4)

We construe the statutory language, “condition or matter complained of,” to mean the condition which ultimately is alleged to constitute the malpractice or negligence of the doctor, i.e., in this instance the leaving of a foreign object in her body.

For a malpractice claim involving a foreign object negligently left in a patient’s body, the two-year period begins when the patient discovers, or with reasonable care should discover, the object.

Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho · filed 1964-01-24(4)

We will, therefore, adhere to the following rule: where a foreign object is negligently left in a patient’s body by a surgeon and the patient is in ignorance *498of the fact, and consequently of his right of action for malpractice, the cause of action does not accrue until the patient learns of, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have learned of the presence of such foreign object in his body.

Section 5-219 sets a two-year limitations period for official-capacity claims against sheriffs and for listed personal-injury torts, and can cover other personal-injury claims such as abuse of process.

Gowin v. Altmiller · filed 1978-05-31(1), (5)

The statute of limitations applicable to the abuse of process claim is Idaho Code § 5-219. That statute provides a two-year limitation for “an action to recover damages ... for an injury to the person,” and for “an action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment or seduction.” Generally, Idaho Code § 5-219 includes all injuries to the person and is of the sort which should be applied to an abuse of process claim. Inclusion of such actions as libel, slander, false imprisonment or seduction indicates that the legislature in Idaho intended Idaho Code § 5-219 to include all injuries to the person, of any sort. ... The Court finds that either provision of Idaho Code § 5-219(5) or § 5-219(1) is applicable to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleged by plaintiffs and such action being brought more than two years from its accrual on July 16, 1974, is barred.

Section 5-219's two-year limitations periods for personal-injury and specifically listed tort actions do not apply to an abuse-of-process claim; the claim is governed by the four-year period in § 5-224.

Paul W. Gowin and Louise A. Gowin v. Leroy Altmiller, Harry Capaul, Carl Finke, Gerald Finke and Finke Lumber Company, I · filed 1981-03-23

The district court ruled that Gowins’ abuse of process claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The court held that the applicable statute of limitations was Idaho Code § 5-219. That section provides for a two-year limitations period for “an action to recover damages . . . for an injury to the person,” and for “an action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment or seduction.” We think the proper statute is Idaho Code § 5-224, which sets a four-year limitations period for actions not specifically covered by other statutes.

Section 5-219(4) is a substantive two-year products-liability limitations period with a very narrow discovery rule.

Kearns v. American Honda Motor Co. · filed 1986-07-31(4)

The statute of limitations under Idaho Code § 5-219(4) (1979) has been ruled to be substantive law, is a two-year limitations period, and has a very narrow discovery rule not applicable to this case.

Section 5-219(4)'s two-year professional-malpractice limitation applies only when the defendant is licensed to perform the type of professional service at issue.

Owyhee County v. Rife · filed 1979-04-23(4)

The term “professional malpractice” as used in I.C. § 5 — 219(4) “refers to wrongful acts or omissions in the performance of professional services by any person, firm, association, entity or corporation licensed to perform such services under the law of the state of Idaho.” ... We hold, however, that there exists at a minimum under I.C. § 5-219(4) a threshold requirement that the person, firm, association, entity or corporation be licensed to perform such services and if the particular defendant is not so licensed to perform the type of service rendered, then the provision of I.C. § 5-219(4), creating a two year statute of limitations for professional malpractice, is not applicable.

Section 5-219(4)'s professional-malpractice limitations period applies only when the defendant is licensed to perform the professional service at issue.

Hibbler v. Fisher · filed 1985-12-23(4)

Also, I.C. § 5-219(4) does not apply since neither Mr. Fisher, nor the contractor hired to install the water system, were licensed plumbers.

Section 5-219 provides a two-year wrongful-death limitations period, and minors receive an additional six years under § 5-230; expiration of the period for one claimant does not bar a statutorily protected minor claimant.

COX v. McDONNELL-DOUGLAS CORP. · filed 1982-01-11

Idaho has a two-year wrongful death statute of limitations, Idaho Code § 5-219, and by virtue of Idaho Code § 5-230, Idaho allows minors an additional six years beyond the two-year period of § 5-219 to file their action. Thus, minors have a total of eight years in which to file an action, and the minor plaintiffs in this case filed this suit prior to the expiration of the eight year limitations period. ... The authorities in states with wrongful death statutes similar to Idaho's are unanimous in concluding that expiration of the limitations period with respect to one possible plaintiff does not bar an action by statutorily-protected minor plaintiffs.

Section 5-219 gives a wrongful-death action a two-year statute of limitations running from the decedent’s death.

Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corp. · filed 2001-09-28

Under I.C. § 5-219, the statute of limitations in a wrongful death action is two years following the date of the decedent’s death; in this case, Delbert died on February 16, 1995.

Section 5-219(4) does not eliminate equitable estoppel in professional-malpractice actions, and such an action generally must be brought within two years of discovery, subject to the applicable outside limit.

Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital Building Corp. v. Hamill · filed 1982-04-27(4)

We find no intent, either explicit or implicit, in the language of I.C. § 5-219 to eliminate the doctrine of equitable estoppel in professional malpractice actions. ... Estoppel does not depend solely upon the existence of a continuing relationship and estoppel does not “extend” a statute of limitations, but rather prevents a party from pleading and utilizing the statute of limitations as a bar, although the time limit of the statute of limitations may have run. ... Hence we arrive at the following conclusions. ... A cause of action founded in professional malpractice arising out of the design or construction of improvements to real property must be brought within two years of the discovery of the alleged malpractice and in no event later than eight years following the completion of the construction.

Section 5-219(4) generally starts the two-year period for a professional-malpractice claim when the occurrence, act, or omission happens; a continuing professional relationship does not extend the period, and discovery exceptions are limited to foreign objects and fraudulent concealment.

Holmes v. Iwasa · filed 1983-01-13(4)

By amending I.C. § 5-219(4), the legislature narrowed the scope of Renner and, in large part, defined when a cause of action accrues for the purposes of applying the statutory period of limitations in professional malpractice actions. Under amended I.C. § 5-219(4), the discovery exception first recognized by this Court in Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964), is limited to cases involving foreign objects and fraudulent concealment. In all other professional malpractice actions, “the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of.... ” The action must be brought within two years of that time.

Section 5-219(4) generally starts the two-year period for professional-malpractice claims when the occurrence, act, or omission happens, without extension for continuing consequences or a continuing professional relationship, subject to specified exceptions.

Pichon v. Benjamin · filed 1985-06-28(4)

We believe that, by amendment of I.C.-§ 5-219, our legislature has expressly rejected the theory of continuing negligence advocated by Pichón. The cause of action accrued for each event of alleged malpractice on the day the event occurred and Pichon had two years in which to file a claim. ... We hold that Pichon’s claim based on negligence was barred by I.C. § 5-219(4) when she waited until July, 1976, to file suit.

Section 5-219(4) gives professional-malpractice claims a two-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff suffers damage, rather than when the professional act or omission occurs.

MacK Financial Corp. v. Smith · filed 1986-05-29(4)

According to Streib, then, the validity of Mack Financial’s suit depends upon the date when Mack Financial suffered “some damage.” Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 254, 678 P.2d 41, 46 (1984). Viewing the facts most favorably to Mack Financial, we hold that that date was the “spring of 1983” when the United States Bankruptcy Court in Idaho resolved Mack Financial's claim against the bankruptcy trustees of Shoemaker;1 it was not until then that it then became apparent that Mack Financial would not be able to fully recompense from the bankruptcy estate the amount which it had loaned Shoemaker.

For professional malpractice, the limitations period does not accrue until the plaintiff suffers damage; here, the two-year period began when the bankruptcy plan was confirmed and the bank lost its opportunity to obtain post-confirmation interest.

Treasure Valley Bank v. Killen & Pittenger, P.A. · filed 1987-02-05(4)

These cases point out that while I.C. § 5-219(4) provides that “the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of ...,” nevertheless until some damage occurs no cause of action accrues for professional malpractice, even though the “occurrence, act or omission complained of,” which ultimately causes the damages, has occurred earlier. ... Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting the summary judgment. The two-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice set forth in I.C. § 5-219(4) ran from the August 24, 1982, date that the bankruptcy plan was adopted and the date upon which TVB suffered some damage which commenced the running of the statute of limitations.

Section 5-219(4) generally starts the limitations period at the occurrence, act, or omission, but for negligent radiation treatment accrual waits until the fact of injury is objectively ascertainable.

Davis v. Moran · filed 1987-04-06(4)

It is clear that I.C. § 5-219(4) deems that a cause of action shall have accrued as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of. ... However, just as in Streib v. Veigel, supra, where we held that a flexible reading of I.C. § 5-219(4) was necessary to avoid an absurd result in that case, by the same token in cases involving alleged negligent radiation treatment a cause of action does not accrue until the fact of injury becomes objectively ascertainable.

Section 5-219(4) generally starts the two-year malpractice limitations period when the negligent occurrence, act, or omission causes damage, and it has no broad discovery exception.

Zumwalt v. Stephan, Balleisen & Slavin · filed 1987-12-30(4)

Idaho Code § 5-219(4) establishes a statute of limitation which generally runs for two years from the time of the occurrence, act or omission constituting malpractice.

The two-year limitations period for professional malpractice begins when the claimant suffers some damage from the alleged malpractice, including attorney fees incurred to address the resulting dispute.

Elliott v. Parsons · filed 1996-06-17(4)

The two-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice in I.C. § 5-219(4) does not begin running until the party claiming malpractice suffers “some damage” as a consequence of the alleged malpractice.

Section 5-219(4) starts the two-year limitations period for professional-malpractice claims only when objective proof supports actual damage; where the alleged negligence concerns litigation strategy, that proof may arise only when the underlying litigation ends adversely.

City of McCall v. Buxton · filed 2009-01-22(4)

[A]n action for professional malpractice shall be deemed to have accrued for the purposes of I.C. § 5-219(4) only when there is objective proof that would support the existence of some actual damage.” ... Under the circumstances of this case, the existence or effect of any alleged negligence on the part of the City’s Attorneys regarding their legal advice and strategy depended upon the outcome of the litigation against the City by Wausau and St. Clair. There would not be objective proof of actual damage until that occurred.

Under § 5-219(4), the two-year limitations period for a criminal legal-malpractice action begins only when the plaintiff is exonerated of the underlying criminal conviction.

Molen v. Christian · filed 2017-01-24(4)

While the plain language of Idaho Code section 5-219(4) provides that the cause of action accrues “as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of,” this Court has applied the completed tort theory to delay the accrual of statutes of limitations to “avoid absurd results.” ... We hold that Molen’s malpractice cause of action did not accrue until he was exonerated, which occurred on July 10, 2014.

Section 5-219(4) requires professional-malpractice actions to be filed within two years after accrual, which occurs at the complained-of act or omission and is not extended by continuing consequences or an ongoing professional relationship.

Evans v. Wright · filed 2024-08-19(4)

To begin, Idaho Code section 5-219(4) requires that “[a]n action to recover damages for ‘professional malpractice’ must be commenced within two years after the cause of action has accrued.” ... The cause of action accrues “as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of” and “shall not be extended by reason of any continuing consequences or damages resulting therefrom or any continuing professional or commercial relationship between the injured party and the alleged wrongdoer . . . .” ... In most cases, the act or omission complained of and the injury to the plaintiff occur simultaneously, particularly in the medical context.

Subsection (4) starts the two-year limitations period for a wrongful-death claim when the death occurs, because the death is the occurrence that accrues the heirs’ cause of action.

Chapman v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. · filed 1983-09-22(4)

We hold that the “occurrence, act or omission” which I.C. § 5-219 defines as the accrual of a cause of action refers to the death of the person, caused by the wrongful acts of another, and the running of the statute of limitation on the wrongful death cause of action begins from the date of death.

For a wrongful-death action, the two-year limitation period under § 5-219 begins when the decedent dies because the claim is a new and independent cause of action.

Castorena v. General Electric · filed 2010-08-18

The applicable statute of limitations for personal injuries and wrongful death actions is two years, as provided in Idaho Code § 5-219. ... The statute of limitations applies to each actionable wrong individually. As the actionable wrong for a wrongful death action is not complete until the death of the decedent, the statute of limitations does not begin running until that time. Therefore, we hold that the condition precedent does not apply to the statute of limitations, and the Appellants here filed their wrongful death actions in a timely fashion.

Section 5-219(4)'s professional-malpractice limitation does not apply to actions for fraudulent misrepresentation, even when brought against real estate agents or brokers.

Umphrey v. Sprinkel · filed 1983-12-27(4)

Assuming, without deciding, that real estate agents and brokers are professionals for the purpose of I.C. § 5-219(4), nevertheless we hold that an action for fraudulent misrepresentation does not fall within the protective embrace of the professional malpractice statute.

Section 5-219 starts the limitation period when the complained-of occurrence, act, or omission happens, and continuing consequences, damages, or a continuing professional relationship do not extend it.

Masi v. Seale · filed 1984-05-30

“[T]he cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of, and the limitation period shall not be extended by reason of any continuing consequences or damages resulting therefrom or any continuing professional or com ... mercial relationship between the injured party and the alleged wrongdoer____” ... The trial court’s decision correctly interpreted the statute.

Section 5-219(4) requires an action for damages from professional malpractice to be commenced within two years.

Griggs v. Nash · filed 1989-05-24(4)

Because this is an action for professional malpractice, I.C. § 5-219(4) is the applicable statute of limitations. This statute provides that an action to recover damages for professional malpractice must be commenced within two years.

The professional-malpractice limitations period in § 5-219(4) does not apply to a fiduciary-duty claim against a lawyer who was not the plaintiff’s attorney.

Jones v. Runft, Leroy, Coffin & Matthews · filed 1994-04-20(4)

In this case, the parties agree that Runft was not Jones’s attorney. Therefore, there is no basis for applying I.C. § 5-219(4).

For professional malpractice claims, the two-year limitations period bars an action filed more than two years after the plaintiff initially suffers damage caused by the malpractice.

B & K Fabricators, Inc. ex rel. Brown v. Sutton · filed 1995-04-06(4)

Because B & K’s complaint in this action was filed more than two years after B & K initially suffered damage, the action is barred by I.C. § 5-219(4).

Section 5-219(4) gives professional-malpractice claims a two-year limitations period and starts accrual when objective proof shows some actual damage; fraudulent or knowing concealment may toll it, but continuing consequences or the professional relationship do not extend it.

Rice v. Litster · filed 1999-05-25(4)

Under section 5-219(4), “the statute of limitations ... expirefs] two years following the occurrence, act or omission complained of, barring fraudulent or knowing concealment of the injury, and will not be extended due to any continuing consequences, resulting damages, or continuing professional relationship.” ... Although not expressly stated in the statute, “ ‘this Court has interpreted the law to require ‘some damage’ before the action accrues and the limitation period begins to run.’ ”

Section 5-219(4) covers wrongful acts or omissions occurring in the course of providing professional services, without requiring a separate license for each individual act.

Lapham v. Stewart · filed 2002-07-12(4)

There is nothing in the statute indicating that each action taken in performing professional services should be examined to determine whether a license is required to perform that particular action. Rather, the focus is whether the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred in the course of performing professional services.

Section 5-219(4) sets the time for bringing professional-malpractice claims but does not immunize an unlicensed person or entity from being sued for malpractice.

Stephen v. Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd. · filed 2011-03-17(4)

The Court determined that the statute did not apply to the accountants because they were unlicensed. Id. That did not mean, however, that they were not subject to a malpractice suit. It only meant that the longer four-year statute of limitations in either I.C. § 5-217 or I.C. § 5-224 applied. Id. Nothing in I.C. § 5-219 or in Rife immunizes a person or entity carrying on a profession from being sued for malpractice, just because the applicable professional standards do not require the particular person or entity to have a license. Statutes of limitation do not have a bearing on professional malpractice claims, other than to establish the time in which they must be brought.

Section 5-219(4) requires an action for professional malpractice to be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Cole v. Posey · filed 2011-11-02(4)

The applicable statute of limitations for professional malpractice is two years. I.C. § 5-219(4). An action to recover damages for professional malpractice must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Section 5-219(4) starts the two-year professional-malpractice limitations period when some damage occurs, and later continuing damage does not restart the period.

Brunobuilt, Inc. v. Briggs Engineering, Inc. · filed 2023-03-07(4)

The district court correctly determined that this is when “some damage” to the property occurred, making April 2016 the accrual date for purposes of the statute of limitations.

Section 5-219(4) sets a two-year limitations period for professional malpractice claims, but a factual dispute over whether the alleged settlement was binding precluded summary judgment on that defense.

Thompson v. Pike · filed 1992-08-17(4)

In our view, these statements raise a genuine issue of material fact whether the parties intended the oral settlement of July 31, 1987, to be a binding contract or whether they intended that the written release would be the binding contract. Therefore, ... the trial court should not have granted summary judgment on the basis of I.C. § 5-219(4).

Subsection (4) generally imposes a two-year limitations period for professional malpractice, running from the occurrence, act, or omission complained of; in this injury case, the period ran from the date of injury.

Stephens v. Stearns · filed 1984-01-12(4)

I.C. § 5-219(4) sets out a two-year period as the statute of limitations for professional malpractice in general. The two-year period begins to run “as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of.”

When fraudulent concealment applies, the one-year limitations period begins when the injured party knows or reasonably should have been put on inquiry about the alleged malpractice, rather than merely about the resulting damage.

Bliss Valley Foods, Inc. v. Walker · filed 1995-06-02(4)

We conclude that the one-year limitation contained in the concealment exception begins to run when “the injured party knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been put on inquiry” of the alleged malpractice, not when the injured party knows or was put on inquiry of “the fact of damage.”

Under Idaho Code § 5-219(4), objectively ascertainable damage occurs when sexual abuse takes place because the abuse is a battery that entitles the victim to at least nominal damages, so the statute of limitations begins then even if emotional harm is recognized later.

Bonner v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Boise · filed 1996-02-16(4)

Unlike some states which have tolled the statute of limitations for repressed memories, Idaho is not a discovery jurisdiction. Thus, the question under Chicoine is when was there some objectively ascertainable damage sufficient to start the running of the statute of limitations. Even though the emotional damage the Bonners say they suffered may not have occurred until they remembered the events, there was also immediate damage at the time of any abuse. An act of sexual abuse is a battery and entitles the victim to at least nominal damages in a suit filed immediately following the act. Cf. Pierson v. Brooks, 115 Idaho 529, 537, 768 P.2d 792, 800 (Ct.App.1989). Therefore, some objectively ascertainable damage occurred at the time of any abuse of the Bon-ners by the priest, and the statute of limitations bars the Bonners’ claims.

Section 5-219(4) imposes a two-year professional-malpractice limitations period, but the period does not begin until some damage occurs and is not extended by continuing consequences, resulting damages, or a continuing professional relationship.

McColm-Traska v. Baker · filed 2004-04-05(4)

Although not stated in I.C. § 5-219(4), some damage must occur before the statute of limitations begins to run.

For professional-malpractice claims, the two-year limitations period begins when some actual damage occurs; losing a cause of action against another party when that party’s limitations period expires is sufficient damage to start the period.

Figueroa v. Merrick · filed 1996-06-06(4)

We hold that the district court did not err in concluding that “some damage” occurred in December 1988, when the limitation period for bringing an action against H & H expired, and that the two-year statute of limitation for a malpractice action against his attorney therefore commenced at that point.

Section 5-219(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on professional-malpractice claims, including qualifying contract-based claims, unless a written agreement specifies an elevated standard of care.

Greenfield v. Smith · filed 2017-06-06(4)

“Professional malpractice” as used in Idaho Code § 5-219(4) is not limited to claims that are alleged as a negligence action. ... The statute provides that an action for professional malpractice also includes “any such action arising from breach of an implied warranty or implied covenant,” both of which are actions for breach of contract. ... The label attached to a cause of action will not necessarily take it out of the professional malpractice statute of limitations. ... The only time the Court has recognized a contract basis for a malpractice action is where the attorney has failed to perform an elevated standard of care expressly specified in a written agreement. ... We have reviewed the contract, and there are no provisions which guarantee the outcome of the representation or specify an elevated standard of care because we are unable to find a particular contractual provision that has been breached, we hold that the district court correctly treated all claims as being subject to the professional malpractice two-year statute of limitations.

Section 5-219(4)'s professional-malpractice limitations period applies to an employee who does not hold themselves out as licensed but performs the work under the supervision and control of a licensed professional to whom the malpractice claim is attributable.

BrunoBuilt, Inc. v. Erstad Architects, PA · filed 2023-03-21(4)

Therefore, we hold that Rife does not apply to a professional malpractice claim to one who (1) does not hold themselves out as a licensed individual and (2) who operates under the supervision and control of a licensed individual to whom a claim of malpractice would be attributable.

Section 5-219 makes a cause of action accrue when the wrongdoing occurs, rather than when the wrongful act is discovered.

Wing v. Martin · filed 1984-09-25

Under I.C. § 5-219, a cause of action accrues at the time of the wrongdoing, rather than at the time of discovery of the wrongful act.

For asbestos-related injuries, the two-year limitations period begins on the date of the plaintiff’s last exposure to asbestos; knowledge or discovery of the injury is irrelevant.

Hise v. John Does, Inc. · filed 1986-06-26(4)

To reiterate, the Court holds that the statute of limitations began to run in this action in May of 1981 because that was the date of last exposure, not because plaintiff was coincidentally diagnosed at that same time.

For professional malpractice claims, the two-year period under § 5-219(4) begins when actual damage occurs; for negligent tax-return preparation, damage occurs when the IRS assesses penalties and interest.

Streib v. Veigel · filed 1985-06-18(4)

Similarly, in the instant case, no damage was suffered until the tax return was challenged and an assessment made by the Internal Revenue Service.

A cause of action under § 5-219(4) accrues when the fact of injury becomes objectively ascertainable, not when a latent process is merely suspected to have begun and might eventually cause damage.

Werner v. American-Edwards Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1987-10-29(4)

We expressly reject the trial court’s analysis. For the trial court, or any court, to rule that damage has occurred as of the date on which a latent, continuing process is suspected to have begun — which might eventually result in damage (here, a stroke) is pure medical speculation. It ignores the tenuous nature of predicting medical results and is particularly inappropriate speculation when viewed in the context of a motion for summary judgment. This Court has held both that “a cause of action does not accrue until the fact of injury becomes objectively ascertainable,” and we will not require a plaintiff to maintain suit absent such “objectively ascertainable” damage.

Section 5-219(4) generally measures accrual from the occurrence, act, or omission, but for negligence the limitations period begins when some damage occurs; it has no discovery exception apart from foreign objects left in the body.

Cosgrove v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 1990-03-29(4)

Under I.C. § 5-219(4), a cause of action is deemed to “accrue” at the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of. However, in interpreting that statute, this Court held in Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 254, 678 P.2d 41, 46 (1984), and Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 260, 698 P.2d 315, 322 (1985), that “the statute of limitations does not begin to run against a negligence action until some damage has occurred.” In Blake v. Cruz, this Court held, in another birth defect case, that the fact of damage in a wrongful birth/defective birth arises when the defective child is born. In this case, Cosgrove was born on December 17,1975, with the defective hand and arm. Her mother, plaintiff Winfree, began to incur medical expenses shortly thereafter in 1976. As held in Blake, “some damage has occurred” at the time of the defective birth and immediately thereafter as Winfree began to incur medical expenses. However, Winfree did not file her action until 1983, almost seven years after the birth of Sally Cosgrove with the defective hand and arm. The two-year statute of limitations in I.C. § 5-219(4) had long since run. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff Winfree’s complaint.

Under subsection (4), a professional-malpractice claim accrues when the plaintiff first suffers some damage, including when an improperly drawn trust is created and control of property is surrendered.

Anderson v. Glenn · filed 2003-11-03(4)

Damage occurred when the trust was created and control of the property surrendered to that trust. The action is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 5-219(4) starts the two-year limitations period for professional malpractice when the completed tort produces the first objectively ascertainable "some damage," and the claim does not accrue before the alleged malpractice is raised as the source of damage.

Minnick v. Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP and Geoffrey M. Wardle · filed 2015-01-09(4)

“The cause of action accrues “as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of, and the limitation period shall not be extended by reason of any continuing consequences or damages resulting therefrom or any continuing professional or commercial relationship between the injured party and the alleged wrongdoer.” ... This Court has held that a cause of action for professional negligence cannot accrue, however, until “some damage” has occurred. ... The statute’s accrual standard operates under a completed tort theory in that the cause of action accrues when the tort is completed, an event that corresponds with the first objectively ascertainable occurrence of some damage. ... Here, the Minnicks’ claim against Hawley Troxell based on the firm’s failure to subordinate the deed of trust could not have begun accruing until the IRS raised subordination in the underlying tax court proceedings. ... “Some damage” related to subordination could not have been incurred until the issue was formally raised. ... For these reasons, the district court erred in finding on summary judgment that the Minnicks’ legal malpractice action against Hawley Troxell was time-barred under Idaho Code section 5-219.”

Section 5-219(4) generally accrues an action at the time of the occurrence, act, or omission complained of and provides no discovery rule for latent asbestos diseases.

Adams v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. · filed 1984-11-01(4)

The Court finds that § 5-219(4) contains no discovery rule for latent diseases such as asbestosis. This finding is mandated by the decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and by the clear expression of intent from the Idaho legislature.

Section 5-219(4) generally excludes a discovery rule for personal-injury claims, except for injuries involving a foreign object left in the body or fraudulent concealment of damage.

Stevens · filed 2025-12-22(4)

However, the cases cited by Defendants are inapposite because Idaho law determines when Mr. Pedersen’s cause of action accrued. And, unlike the state law applied in those cases, Idaho Code section 5-219(4) applies the discovery rule only to an action resulting from a foreign object unintentionally left in the body or when the fact of damage has been fraudulently concealed. Under these narrow circumstances, the cause of action “shall be deemed to accrue when the injured party knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been put on inquiry regarding the condition or matter complained of.” Idaho Code § 5-219(4). In all other cases, the discovery rule does not apply.

Section 5-219(4) treats an I.U.D. as a foreign object when, after the patient elects removal and the surgeon represents it was removed, it is negligently left in the body, triggering the foreign-object discovery rule.

Ogle v. De Sano · filed 1984-12-19(4)

Under these circumstances, we hold that the I.U.D. then becomes a foreign object within I.C. § 5-219(4).

Under § 5-219(4), a medical-malpractice claim accrues when some damage is objectively ascertainable, and the foreign-object exception does not apply to medical hardware intentionally left in the body for treatment.

Stuard v. Jorgenson · filed 2011-04-01(4)

Stuard’s malpractice action accrued at the time of the surgery because some damage was objectively ascertainable at that time. Further, the “foreign object” exception does not apply because the locking plate and other hardware were intentionally left within the body for the purpose of medical treatment.

Subsection (4)'s fraudulent-concealment discovery exception applies when the defendant fraudulently and knowingly conceals the fact of damage, and the action accrues when the injured party knows or should reasonably have been put on inquiry about the condition or matter complained of.

Jack Ray Allen and Sandy Lynn Allen, Husband and Wife v. A.H. Robins Company, Inc., a Virginia Corporation · filed 1985-01-29(4)

Under the Idaho statute, the fraudulent concealment exception is limited to situations where the “fact of damage” has been fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff.

For battery claims, the two-year limitations period accrues when the wrongdoing occurs rather than when it is discovered, and the fraudulent-concealment exception applies only to professional-malpractice claims and concealment practiced on the injured party.

Glaze v. Deffenbaugh · filed 2007-11-27(4), (5)

I.C. § 5-219 provides a two-year statute of limitations for actions seeking compensation for battery. ... A cause of action for a battery accrues when the wrongdoing occurs, not when it is discovered. I.C. § 5-219(5); ... I.C. § 5-219(4) applies to professional malpractice claims, not claims of the nature alleged in this case. Even then, the fraudulent concealment must be concealment practiced upon the injured party, not upon a third party.

The fraudulent-concealment exception applies when the fact of damage was fraudulently and knowingly concealed from the injured party, and the action must be filed by the later of one year after accrual under the exception or two years after the complained-of act, occurrence, or omission.

Baker v. RMC · filed 2015-07-20(4)

One of the exceptions to the general statute of limitations rule for medical malpractice cases--the fraudulent concealment exception--is asserted by Baker. This exception applies “when the fact of damage has, for the purpose of escaping responsibility therefor, been fraudulently and knowingly concealed from the injured party by an alleged wrongdoer standing at the time of the wrongful act, neglect or breach in a professional or commercial relationship with the injured party.” I.C. § 5-219(4). Under the exception, the cause of action accrues “when the injured party knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been put on inquiry regarding the condition or matter complained of.” Id. The “condition or matter complained of” refers to “the condition which ultimately is alleged to constitute the malpractice or negligence of the doctor.” Reis v. Cox, 104 Idaho 434, 438, 660 P.2d 46, 50 (1982). If the exception applies, the statute of limitations requires that the action be commenced by the later of (a) one year from when the cause of action accrues under the exception or (b) two years after the act, occurrence, or omission complained of (disregarding the exception). I.C. § 5-219(4).

Subsection (4) provides exceptions to the accrual rule for a foreign object left in a patient's body and for fraudulent concealment of the fact of damage, with a one-year period after accrual for an action under the concealment exception.

Rowlette v. Mortimer · filed 2018-10-25(4)

Idaho Code section 5-219(4) provides two exceptions related to when a cause of action begins to accrue: when a foreign object is left in a patient's body and when the fact of damage is fraudulently and knowingly concealed from the patient. An action brought under the fraudulent concealment exception must be commenced within one (1) year following the date of accrual.

Section 5-219(4) generally accrues personal-injury claims at the occurrence, act, or omission and permits discovery-based accrual only for foreign objects or fraudulent concealment; courts may not add further discovery exceptions.

Theriault v. AH Robins Co., Inc. · filed 1985-04-05(4)

Finally, Theriault asks this Court to engraft a discovery exception to the statute of limitations contained in I.C. § 5-219(4). She urges us to hold that a cause of action does not accrue under I.C. § 5-219(4) until the injured party discovers or should have discovered the facts giving rise to the cause of action. This we decline to do. ... Since the 1971 amendment, in deference to the legislative policy expressed therein, this Court has consistently refused to create additional discovery exceptions. We are not persuaded that the facts of this case mandate an abandonment of this judicial deference.

Section 5-219(4) requires personal-injury and wrongful-death actions to accrue at the occurrence, act, or omission and be filed within two years, without a discovery exception for latent asbestosis, and this limitation is constitutional.

Adams v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. · filed 1987-03-12(4)

Idaho Code § 5-219(4) is Idaho’s personal injury and wrongful death statute of limitations. It provides that in all cases except medical malpractice actions involving foreign objects left in the body or the fraudulent concealment of professional malpractice, an action accrues “as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of” and that the action must be brought within two years of the date on which it accrues. ... And as noted above, this Court has held, and the Ninth Circuit has affirmed, that there is no discovery rule in Idaho Code § 5-219(4) for latent diseases such as asbestosis. ... Hence, this Court holds that Idaho Code § 5-219(4) is constitutional and accordingly will grant summary judgment to the defendants.

Under § 5-219(4), the limitations period begins when the plaintiff first sustains damage; the court also held that this claim was not barred because the plaintiffs did not know they had been damaged before the prior litigation was adjudicated.

Osborn v. Ahrens · filed 1989-05-08(4)

The district court was correct in recognizing that either under I.C. § 5-218 or I.C. § 5-219(4) the statute of limitations [commenced] running when the plaintiff first sustains damage. ... We agree. ... However, we view the instant case as presenting no facts indicating that the Osborns possessed any knowledge that they had been damaged by the negligent acts of Ahrens prior to the adjudication of the Osborn v. Alexander litigation. ... We hold that the trial court was eminently correct in its ruling that the Osborn claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, and that ruling of the trial court is affirmed.

Subsection (4) preserves discovery exceptions for negligently placed foreign objects and fraudulent concealment, but otherwise accrual occurs at the underlying act and continuing consequences do not extend the limitation period.

Knudsen v. Agee · filed 1996-07-02(4)

In 1971, the Idaho Legislature amended the statute of limitations applicable to professional malpractice. Idaho Code § 5-219(4) allows a discovery exception in the case of negligently placed foreign objects in the body and in the case of fraudulent concealment, ... but in all other actions, whether arising from professional malpractice or otherwise, the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued as of the time of occurrence, act, or omission complained of, and the limitation period shall not be extended by reason of any continuing consequences or damages resulting therefrom.... I.C. § 5-219(4).

Under § 5-219(4), the professional-malpractice limitations period begins when damage is objectively ascertainable, even if the plaintiff has not yet discovered it.

Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc. · filed 2005-03-04(4)

Although damage must be objectively ascertainable, I.C. § 5-219(4) does not require the plaintiff to have discovered the damage before the statute of limitations begins to run.

Section 5-219(4) does not begin running before the injured party suffers actual damages; a personal-injury claim cannot be barred before the injury occurs.

Corbridge v. Clark Equipment Co. · filed 1986-12-19(4)

Or, we might add, to bring the instant case out of the realm of the hypothetical, the sale of an allegedly mislabeled product which causes a personal injury more than two years after the sale takes place. It is clear that language in Wing should not have been used to bar a claim in the circumstances here present. The interpretation of I.C. § 5-219(4) has caused this Court some difficulties over the years. The cases are too numerous to cite. However, we have never held that a statute of limitations may run before an aggrieved party suffers damages. The authority to do so is highly doubtful, since it is axiomatic that a party has no right to sue for damages until actual injury occurs.

Section 5-219(4) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on personal-injury claims.

Adamson v. Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies Co. · filed 2001-10-09(4)

Idaho Code section 5-219(4) provides that the statute of limitations in such actions is two years.

Section 5-219 provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims, which the court applied to the plaintiff’s § 1983, Title VI, and Title IX claims.

Joseph v. Boise State University · filed 2014-02-21

The state’s personal injury statute of limitations applies to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). The same statute of limitations applies to Title VI claims. See Taylor v. Regents of University of California, 993 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir.1993). It likewise applies to claims under Title IX. See Stanley v. Trustees of California State University, 433 F.3d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting decisions of other circuits and the close similarity between Title VI and Title IX). Accrual of a cause of action is generally at the time of the discriminatory acts and “not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful.” Id. at 1136 (citation omitted). The Idaho statute of limitations for personal injury is two years. See I.C. § 5-219.

Under § 5-219(4), a personal-injury cause of action accrues when objective medical proof supports the existence of an actual injury; later confirmation does not extend the limitations period.

Brennan v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. · filed 2000-09-06(4)

We conclude that the accrual of Brennan’s cause of action commenced at the time Dr. King rendered his report, for the purpose of the limitation expressed in I.C. § 5-219(4). It follows that the limitation period was not extended until the existence of an asbestos-related medical condition demonstrating actual injury was later confirmed by Dr. Welch.

Section 5-219 gives personal injury claims a two-year statute of limitations.

Gallagher v. Best Western Cottontree Inn · filed 2017-01-19

The statute of limitations for personal injury claims is 2 years. I.C. § 5-219. As Gallagher was injured on July 10, 2012, the statute of limitations expired on July 10, 2014.

Section 5-219(4) accrual begins when some damage is objectively ascertainable, rather than when the plaintiff subjectively discovers or should discover the injury.

Green v. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. · filed 2020-04-03(4)

According to Davis and its progeny, despite the plain language of the statute, Idaho’s statute of limitations under section 5-219 does not begin to run until there is “some damage” to the plaintiff which is “objectively ascertainable.” Stuard, 249 P.3d at 1160.

Idaho Code § 5-219 provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which applies to § 1983 claims when no federal limitations period exists.

Castrejon v. Twin Falls County · filed 2024-05-03

Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations. In the absence of a federal limitations period, federal courts generally apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Butler v. Nat’l Cmty. Renaissance of Cal., 766 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2014). Idaho’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years. I.C. § 5-219; see Joseph v. Boise State Univ., 998 F. Supp. 2d 928, 948 (D. Idaho 2014), aff’d, 667 F. App’x 241 (9th Cir. 2016).

Under § 5-219(4), a personal-injury claim accrues only when some damages exist and the injury is objectively ascertainable through objective medical proof.

In re Bolton · filed 2018-01-22(4)

The court also requires that, for a claim to accrue, such damages must be "objectively ascertainable", meaning that "objective medical proof would support the existence of an actual injury."

Section 5-219(4)’s limitations period for asbestos injuries is determined under Idaho’s objectively ascertainable injury test and does not necessarily begin on the date of exposure.

Adams v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. · filed 1988-05-26(4)

In the instant matter, after our determination of the statute of limitations issue, the Supreme Court of Idaho interpreted section 5-219(4) in such a manner that the limitations period does not commence on the date of the tortfeasor’s conduct under certain circumstances. Our prior ruling on the statute of limitations issue is inconsistent with the Idaho Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 5-219(4) in Davis v. Moran. Accordingly, we must vacate our prior ruling in this case.

Section 5-219(4) bars malpractice claims brought more than two years after the claim accrues.

Anderton v. Herrington · filed 1987-07-15(4)

Therefore, we affirm the district court order as to any claim for malpractice being barred by the statute of limitation for malpractice, but we reverse as to the claim for attorney fees received by Harward, which may be pursued as a contract action.

Section 5-219(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on negligence and other tort claims, so claims arising from acts more than two years before filing are time-barred.

Rincover v. State, Department of Finance, Securities Bureau · filed 1996-06-04(4)

Since these orders were both entered more than two years before the original complaint was filed, we hold that the district court was correct in concluding that these claims are time barred pursuant to I.C. §§ 5-219(4), (5). It is not clear whether the Rincovers intended to assert claims for negligence against Vincent and Totorica. To the extent that they did intend to assert such claims, for the reasons stated above we also hold that the claims are time barred pursuant to I.C. § 5-219(4).

Section 5-219(5) imposes a two-year statute of limitations for libel claims.

Caldwell v. Judicial Administration of Idaho · filed 2023-03-13(5)

Caldwell’s claims of libel against East Idaho News and Local News 8 were filed outside the two-year statute of limitations for a libel claim.

Section 5-219 provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, including federal civil-rights actions arising in Idaho.

Burress · filed 2025-10-20

Idaho Code § 5-219, providing for a two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries, governs federal civil rights actions arising in Idaho.

Section 5-219 provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, and that period governs § 1983 civil-rights actions arising in Idaho.

May · filed 2026-05-06

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985) (later overruled only as to claims brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, not applicable here); Idaho Code § 5-219 (providing for a two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries, which governs federal civil rights actions arising in Idaho). May thus has two years from the incidents she complains of to file a Section 1983 claim.

Section 5-219(4) supplies a two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, measured from accrual of the claim.

Gibson v. Ada County · filed 2006-02-09(4)

In Idaho there is a two-year statute of limitations on all § 1983 claims similar to personal injury actions.

Subsection (4) imposes a two-year limitation period on federal civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including Fifth Amendment takings claims.

Hansen v. Boise School Dist 1 · filed 2025-08-15(4)

For federal civil rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including Fifth Amendment takings claims, the applicable limitation period under Idaho law is two years.

The amended section 5-219(4) does not apply retroactively to a cause of action accruing before the amendment's effective date.

Martin v. Clements · filed 1978-03-08(4)

Idaho Code § 5-219(4), as amended, is not to be retroactively applied to a cause of action accruing before the effective date of the amendment.

For a wrongful-birth medical-malpractice action, § 5-219(4)'s two-year limitations period begins when the child is born, because no actionable injury exists before then.

Blake v. Cruz · filed 1985-04-04(4)

Under § 5-219(4) an action must be brought within two years of the “occurrence, act or omission complained of.” ... Such an interpretation is incorrect however. ... Since under the cause of action for wrongful birth, there is no defective child until and unless the birth occurs, logic dictates that the statute of limitations cannot begin to run until the date of birth, which was July 3, 1975.

Under § 5-219(4), a professional-malpractice claim accrues when objective proof shows some actual damage, even if the exact amount of damage is established later.

Webster v. Hoopes · filed 1994-04-05(4)

We hold there is objective proof that the Websters suffered some damage upon.the summary judgment order of June 7,1989.

For professional-malpractice claims, the limitation period generally accrues when the complained-of act occurs, but some resulting damage must also exist; continuing consequences do not extend the period.

Conway v. Sonntag · filed 2005-02-07(4)

Except for actions based upon leaving a foreign object in a person’s body or where the fact of damage has been fraudulently and knowingly concealed, the cause of action for professional malpractice accrues “as of the time of the occurrence, act or o'mission complained of,” I.C. § 5-219 (1998), although there must also be “some damage” for the cause of action to accrue.

Section 5-219(4) gives professional-malpractice claims a two-year limitations period, but in negligence cases the period cannot begin until some actual damage has occurred; objective ascertainability is an analytical tool for identifying that point.

Conner v. Bryan F. Hodges, M.D. · filed 2014-08-22(4)

Pursuant to Idaho Code section 5-219(4), “[a]n action to recover damages for ‘professional malpractice’ must be commenced within two years after the cause of action has accrued.” ... Nevertheless, in a negligence action, because the plaintiff must prove actual damage, the statute of limitations cannot begin to run until some damage has occurred as a result of the alleged malpractice. ... The concept of an “‘objectively ascertainable injury’ is simply an analytical tool to be used in determining when ‘some damage’ has occurred.” Conway, 141 Idaho at 146–47, 106 P.3d at 472–73.

Section 5-219(4) starts the two-year period for professional-malpractice claims only after actual damage occurs and is objectively ascertainable; risky, medically unnecessary tests do not make an injury objectively ascertainable.

Conner v. Hodges · filed 2014-08-22(4)

Under the statute, the cause of action accrues “as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of’ and “shall not be extended by reason of any continuing consequences or damages resulting therefrom or any continuing professional or commercial relationship between the injured party and the alleged wrongdoer.” ... Nevertheless, in a negligence action, because the plaintiff must prove actual damage, the statute of limitations cannot begin to run until some damage has occurred as a result of the alleged malpractice. ... The concept of an “‘objectively ascertainable injury’ is simply an analytical tool to be used in determining when ‘some damage’ has occurred.” ... For this reason, we conclude that the district court erred in its determination that the cause of action for malpractice accrued on the date of the 2007 surgery. Therefore, we vacate that portion of the judgment dismissing the malpractice action.

For professional malpractice, the cause of action generally accrues when the complained-of occurrence, act, or omission happens, but accrual also requires some damage.

English v. James Taylor, D.O. · filed 2016-07-12(4)

Except for actions based upon leaving a foreign object in a person’s body or where the fact of damage has been fraudulently and knowingly concealed, the cause of action for professional malpractice accrues “as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of,” I.C. § 5-219(4), although there must also be “some damage” for the cause of action to accrue.

Section 5-219(4) gives medical malpractice claims a two-year limitations period that generally begins at the occurrence, act, or omission, with foreign-object and fraudulent-concealment claims accruing when the injured party knows or should reasonably have been put on inquiry.

Rolon v. Migliori · filed 2019-12-09(4)

Medical malpractice claims in Idaho are also subject to a two-year statute of limitation. Idaho Code § 5-219(4). Under Idaho law, a malpractice claim generally accrues “as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission” of which the plaintiff complains. Id. An exception exists for claims based upon leaving a foreign object in a person’s body or where the fact of damage has been fraudulently and knowingly concealed; such claims accrue “when the injured party knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been put on inquiry regarding” the problem. Id.

Section 5-219(4)’s medical malpractice limitation period does not begin until some damage occurs; tumor growth alone does not establish damage without supporting evidence.

Hawley v. Green · filed 1993-07-20(4)

We cannot affirm the summary judgment absent a showing of some damage, or undisputed evidence that growth or progression amounts to damage.

Section 5-219(4)'s limitations period is substantive, not merely procedural, and controls personal-injury and wrongful-death actions in the circumstances discussed.

Jenkins v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. · filed 1985-05-21(4)

In conclusion, the Court finds that § 5-219(4) is substantive as to both Meyers’ personal injury action and Jenkins’ wrongful death action.

Section 5-219(4) imposes a two-year limitations period for personal-injury damages actions, and that period applies to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions in Idaho.

Henderson v. State · filed 1986-02-27(4)

In view of the holding in Wilson, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions in Idaho must now meet the two-year Idaho statute of limitations for personal injury actions, I.C. § 5-219(4).

Section 5-219(4) provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims in Idaho.

Susan Hallstrom Robert Hallstrom v. City of Garden City Randy W. Snapp Sgt. Thurston Vaughn Killeen, Sheriff Mike Robert · filed 1993-04-12(4)

In Idaho, the applicable statute is Idaho Code § 5-219(4) (1990), which provides for a limitations period of two years from the date the cause of action accrues.

Section 5-219(4) requires a personal-injury action to be brought within two years after the injury.

Barab v. Plumleigh · filed 1993-06-02(4)

Thus, under these two statutes, a personal injury action founded upon the negligent design or construction of an improvement to real property must be brought within two years of the injuries, and in no event later than eight years following the completion of construction.

Section 5-219(4)'s two-year personal-injury limitation applies to claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

Mason v. Tucker and Associates · filed 1994-03-24(4)

We agree with the rationale of those decisions and conclude that I.C. § 5-219(4) is also applicable to Mason’s cause of action for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

Section 5-219(4) provides a two-year statute of limitation for actions based on personal injury.

Samuel v. Michaud · filed 1996-03-07(4)

Thus the court finds that the pertinent Idaho statute is Idaho Code § 5-219(4), which provides a two-year statute of limitation for actions based on personal injury.

Section 5-219(4) gives § 1983 actions brought in Idaho a two-year limitations period running from accrual of the cause of action.

Roell v. City of Boise · filed 2002-05-13(4)

We have previously held that the applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 actions brought in Idaho is governed by Idaho Code § 5-219(4), which provides for a limitations period of two years from the date the cause of action accrues.

Subsection (4) gives a two-year limitations period for personal-injury tort claims.

Stoltz v. Fry Foods, Inc. · filed 2014-10-13(4)

Under I.C. § 5-219(4), Stoltz had to file his tort claims against Fry Foods on or before November 15, 2013.

Section 5-219(4) gives section 1983 personal-injury claims a two-year limitations period running from the occurrence, act, or omission complained of.

Yu v. ID State University · filed 2019-07-10(4)

This Court applies the two-year statute of limitation set forth in Idaho Code section 5-219(4) to section 1983 actions. McCabe v. Craven, 145 Idaho 954, 957, 188 P.3d 896, 899 (2008). Under this statute, an action to recover damages for personal injury must commence within two years of “the occurrence, act or omission complained of.” I.C. § 5-219(4).

Section 5-219 supplies a two-year statute of limitations for federal civil-rights actions arising in Idaho.

Martinez v. Morgan · filed 2019-08-07

Federal civil rights actions arising in Idaho are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.

Section 5-219(4) imposes a two-year limitations period on personal-injury actions, including the plaintiff’s Title IX claims.

Jameson v. University of Idaho · filed 2019-10-30(4)

Idaho law applies a two-year statute of limitations to personal injury actions. Idaho Code § 5-219(4). Both parties agree that Jameson’s Title IX claims are subject to Idaho’s two-year statute of limitations. ... Jameson’s post-reporting claim (her first cause of action) is time-barred. ... In order for the claim to accrue, Jameson must have enough critical facts to be put on notice that she should look into UI’s knowledge of Level’s history. ... After reviewing the Complaint and briefings, as well as listening to oral arguments at the motion hearing, it is plausible that Jameson had no reason to further investigate her heightened-risk claim until after the release of the Independent Report and the subsequent media coverage in 2018. Liberally construed, Jameson’s heightened-risk claim survives a motion to dismiss.

Section 5-219 provides a two-year statute of limitations for federal civil-rights actions arising in Idaho.

Helburn v. Ramirez · filed 2020-03-02

Federal civil rights actions arising in Idaho are governed by a two-year statute of limitations. Idaho Code § 5-219; see also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985) (holding that state statute of limitation for personal injury actions governs § 1983 actions), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004).

Section 5-219 sets a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury and false-imprisonment claims, including Idaho federal civil-rights actions governed by that limitations period.

Cavallero v. State of Idaho · filed 2020-05-01

Idaho Code § 5-219 provides for a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury and false imprisonment. Federal civil rights actions arising in Idaho are governed by this two-year statute of limitations.

Section 5-219 sets a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, which governs federal civil-rights actions arising in Idaho.

Cavallero v. State of Idaho · filed 2020-08-03

Idaho Code § 5-219 provides for a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury. Federal civil rights actions arising in Idaho are governed by this two-year statute of limitations.

Section 5-219 imposes a two-year limitations period for personal-injury and false-imprisonment claims, and Idaho federal civil-rights actions are governed by that period.

Cavallero v. State of Idaho · filed 2020-10-07

Idaho Code § 5-219 provides for a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury and false imprisonment. Federal civil rights actions arising in Idaho are governed by this two-year statute of limitations.

Section 5-219 provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims, and Idaho federal civil-rights actions are governed by that period.

Cavallero v. State of Idaho · filed 2020-10-09

Idaho Code § 5-219 provides for a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury. Federal civil rights actions arising in Idaho are governed by this two-year statute of limitations.

Section 5-219 sets a two-year limitations period for professional malpractice, personal injury, and wrongful-death actions and supplies the limitations period for Idaho federal civil-rights claims.

Byerly v. Bandit Task Force · filed 2020-10-13

Idaho Code § 5-219 provides for a two-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice, personal injury, and wrongful death actions. Federal civil rights actions arising in Idaho are governed by this two-year statute of limitations.

Section 5-219 provides a two-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice, personal injury, and wrongful death actions, and that period governs federal civil-rights actions arising in Idaho.

Scott v. Thompson · filed 2020-10-13

Idaho Code § 5-219 provides for a two-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice, personal injury, and wrongful death actions. Federal civil rights actions arising in Idaho are governed by this two-year statute of limitations.

Section 5-219(4) requires a medical malpractice action to begin within two years after an objectively ascertainable injury and applies to adults and minors alike.

Gomersall v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center · filed 2021-03-19(4)

Under Idaho Code section 5-219(4), a medical malpractice action must be commenced within two years after an objectively ascertainable injury. ... Section 5-219(4) does not make a distinction between actions belonging to adults or minors; the statute is applicable to all actions.

Subsection (4) imposes a two-year limitations period on personal injury actions.

Jenkins v. Little · filed 2021-03-25(4)

The district court properly dismissed Jenkins’s action because his claim was barred by the statute of limitations. See Idaho Code § 5-219(4) (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Soto v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 871-72 (9th Cir. 2018) (state tolling and statute of limitations for personal injury claims apply to § 1983 actions; federal law governs when a claim accrues, which is when a plaintiff knows or should know of the injury that forms the basis for his cause of action).

Section 5-219 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising from conduct in Idaho.

Smith v. Rawson · filed 2021-03-31

Federal civil rights actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and arising from conduct in Idaho are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.

Section 5-219(4) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Wolf v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr. · filed 2021-08-23(4)

The district court properly dismissed any claims arising before December 16, 2017 as time barred. See Idaho Code § 5-219(4) (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Soto v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 871-72 (9th Cir. 2018) (state statutes of limitations for personal injury claims apply to § 1983 actions; federal law governs when a claim accrues, which is when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury that forms the basis for his cause of action).

It provides a two-year statute of limitations period applicable to both § 1983 claims and state-law negligence claims.

Wolf v. Tewalt · filed 2021-11-03

Therefore, Idaho’s two-year statute of limitations period applies to both Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and his state-law negligence claims.

Subsection (4) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, governing the timeliness of both state and federal claims.

Strayer v. Idaho State Patrol · filed 2022-03-08(4)

Most of the plaintiffs’ remaining claims are time-barred. Idaho’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions governs the timeliness of all the plaintiffs’ claims, both state and federal. See Idaho Code § 5-219(4) (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); see also Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 344 F.3d 822, 828 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The applicable statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.”).

Section 5-219(4) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on personal-injury actions, including § 1983 claims.

St. John v. Kootenai County Idaho · filed 2022-12-01(4)

The remaining § 1983 claims are also subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiffs incorrectly argue that under Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250 (1989), the Court should apply Idaho’s four-year catchall statute of limitations. In Owens, the Supreme Court directed courts to “resort to residual [or ‘catchall’] statutes of limitations only where state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions and the residual one embraces, either explicitly or by judicial construction, unspecified personal injury actions.” Id. at n12. That is not the case here. Compare I.C. § 5-219(4) (setting a two-year statute of limitations for a personal injury action) with I.C. § 5-224 (setting a four-year statute of limitations for “action[s] for relief not hereinbefore provided for”).

Section 5-219 supplies a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims in Idaho, including § 1983 claims arising in Idaho.

Alvarado v. Blackhawk · filed 2022-12-02

The statute of limitation period for filing a civil rights suit under § 1983 is the statute of limitation period for personal injuries in the state where the claim arose. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004). In Idaho, that limitations period is two years. See Idaho Code § 5-219.

Section 5-219(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 actions filed in Idaho.

Citizens Allied for Integrity and Accountability, Inc. v. Miller · filed 2023-03-20(4)

The statute of limitations for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the forum state’s limit for personal injury suits. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275–76 (1985). In Idaho, that limit is two years. Idaho Code § 5-219(4). Here, it is undisputed that the 2016 integration order took place well outside that statutory period. The issue is whether the 2021 final order created a continuing violation such that the statute of limitations will not bar Plaintiffs’ claims. Because this is a question of law, it can be properly decided at summary judgment. ... With neither of the branches of the continuing violations doctrine applicable, the discovery rule governs: Plaintiffs’ claims accrued when they could have brought suit—in 2016—because the integration order was the “operative decision.” RK Ventures, 307 F.3d at 1059. The window for filing suit closed two years later, in 2018. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims are barred as a matter of law.

Section 5-219(4) supplies a two-year personal-injury limitations period for a § 1983 claim, with accrual governed by federal law; in a false-imprisonment action, the period begins when the confinement ends.

McCabe v. Craven · filed 2008-06-12(4)

Idaho Code § 5-219(4) states the statute of limitations for personal injury cases: ... In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case, the applicable statute of limitations is found in Idaho Code § 5-219(4) above. ... However, under controlling federal law regarding accrual of his cause of action, the statute of limitations did not begin to run against McCabe’s cause of action until the false imprisonment ended on March 7, 2003.

Section 5-219(4) gives plaintiffs two years to bring an action for injury to a person, with accrual timing governed by when the cause of action may be sued and, for continuous tortious activity, when that activity ends.

Stone v. Mehra-Pedersen · filed 2020-10-02(4)

Idaho Code § 5-219(4) sets a two-year statute of limitation for actions for injury to a person. In Idaho, generally, a cause of action accrues when one party may sue another. Galbraith v. Vangas, Inc., 103 Idaho 912, 916 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982). In cases where the injury results from a continuous chain of tortious activity, the limitation period does not begin to run until the tortious behavior has ended. Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 463 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009).

For personal injury actions, the limitations period is two years from the date the cause of action accrues.

Mendez v. City of Boise · filed 2023-07-31(4)

First, Mendez’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is subject to Idaho’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See Samuel v. Michaud, 980 F.Supp. 1381, 1410 (D. Idaho 1996). Idaho’s personal injury statute of limitations is two years from the date the cause of action accrues. Idaho Code § 5-219(4).

Subsection 5-219(4) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions, which the court applied to the federal civil-rights claims.

Coy v. ADA COUNTY · filed 2023-10-10(4)

Idaho’s personal injury statute of limitations is two years.

Section 5-219 gives federal civil-rights actions in Idaho a two-year statute of limitations.

Smith v. Bangs · filed 2024-01-26

In Idaho, federal civil rights actions are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.

Idaho Code § 5-219(4) imposes a two-year statute of limitations on personal injury actions.

Amaral v. Post Falls Highway District · filed 2024-12-03(4)

In Idaho, personal injury actions have a two-year statute of limitations. Idaho Code §§ 5-219(4); see Gibson v. Ada Cnty., 133 P.3d 1211, 1219 (Idaho 2006).

Section 5-219 provides a two-year limitations period for professional malpractice, personal injury, and wrongful death actions, and that period governs federal civil-rights actions arising in Idaho.

Marlor v. Goodin · filed 2025-03-24

Idaho Code § 5-219 provides for a two-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice, personal injury, and wrongful death actions. Federal civil rights actions arising in Idaho are governed by this two-year statute of limitations.

Section 5-219 imposes a two-year statute of limitations applicable here, so claims arising in September 2021 were untimely when filed in December 2024.

Byrd v. Doe · filed 2025-08-07

First, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations. ... The Amended Complaint does not establish that Plaintiff’s initial complaint, filed in December 2024, was timely or that Plaintiff’s claims are properly subject to tolling or equitable estoppel. See id.; Idaho Code § 5-219 (two-year statute of limitation); Idaho Code § 5-230 (tolling); J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics Int’l, Inc., 887 P.2d 1039, 1042 (Idaho 1994) (equitable estoppel), abrogated in part on other grounds by Day as Tr. of Tr. B of Donald M. Day & Marjorie D. Day Fam. Tr. v. Transp. Dep’t, 458 P.3d 162, 170 (Idaho 2020).

Section 5-219(4) requires a personal-injury action, including a § 1983 claim, to be filed within two years of the incident.

Wise v. Richardson · filed 2025-08-25(4)

And Idaho law requires the individual suing in a personal injury case to do so within two years of the incident that led to the lawsuit. ... Wise states that Detective Richardson assaulted him in 2018, so he had to bring his Section 1983 lawsuit in 2020 at the latest. ... But he did not do so. Instead, he filed his lawsuit in 2025, some seven years after the alleged assault and five years after the Section 1983 filing deadline.

Section 5-219 provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims and governs federal civil-rights actions arising in Idaho.

Campbell · filed 2026-02-11

Idaho Code § 5-219, providing for a two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries, governs federal civil rights actions arising in Idaho.

Section 5-219(4) provides a two-year limitations period for Idaho personal-injury actions, which the court applies to § 1983 claims by borrowing state law.

Buchanan · filed 2026-02-20(4)

In Idaho, personal injury actions have a two-year statute of limitations.

Section 5-219(4) supplies a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, which governs § 1983 claims in Idaho under the forum state's borrowing rule.

Zeyen v. Boise District 1 · filed 2021-02-26(4)

Thus, the Court must apply Idaho’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, see Idaho Code § 5-219(4), instead of the limitations period urged by the plaintiffs set forth in Idaho’s inverse condemnation statute.

Section 5-219(4) provides a two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which the court applied as the borrowed state limitations period for the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.

Turner v. City of Coeur D' Alene, Idaho · filed 2021-12-03(4)

In Idaho, personal injury actions have a two-year statute of limitations. Idaho Code § 5-219(4). ... Because Turner’s federal claims accrued by the time of his termination, they are barred by the two-year statute of limitations.

Subsection 5-219(4) imposes a two-year limitations period for IIED and NIED claims, with accrual for a continuing tort when the tortious conduct ends.

Steingruber v. Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC · filed 2023-07-07(4)

The statute of limitations for NIED in Idaho is two years. Idaho Code § 5-219(4); see also Ridenour, No. 2:13-CV-00317-BLW, 2015 WL 1409402, at *6. NIED is generally characterized as a continuing tort. Ridenour, No. 2:13-CV-00317-BLW, 2015 WL 1409402, at *6 (citing Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 210 P.3d 563, 573 (Ct. App. 2009)). Therefore, the two-year statute of limitations begins to run only when such tortious conduct ends.

For a case filed before Chacon, the statutory limitation period does not bar amending a complaint to replace a Doe defendant with a nonfictitious defendant.

Hise v. Garlock Inc. · filed 1988-03-10

Thus, appellees’ statute of limitations argument fails as a matter of law.

Section 5-219(4) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, measured from the date the cause of action accrues.

Olsen v. Idaho State Board of Medicine · filed 2004-04-07(4)

In Idaho, the statute of limitations provides for a limitations period of two years from the date the cause of action accrues.

Section 5-219(4) imposes a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, and the continuing-tort doctrine does not preserve claims based on conduct that ended before a substantial interruption.

Johnson v. McPhee · filed 2009-04-08(4)

Idaho Code section 5-219(4) prescribes a two-year statute of limitation for actions for injury to a person. ... Because there was a distinct and substantial interruption of the alleged tortious activity for more than a year, the alleged misbehavior in 2005 cannot be said to have been part of an unceasing stream of tortious acts that began in 2003. Therefore, the continuing tort doctrine does not apply to save from the statute of limitation Johnson‟s claims that are predicated upon pre-December 7, 2003 conduct.

Section 5-219(4) does not preclude equitable estoppel from preventing reliance on its limitation period when representations allegedly induced reliance that delayed filing.

Williams v. Blakley · filed 1988-06-23(4)

The language of the statute demonstrates no clear intent to repeal or abolish the doctrine of equitable estoppel, nor do we view the language of the statute as containing a necessary implication that the doctrine of estoppel be repealed or abolished.

Section 5-219(4) does not start the limitations period until some damage has occurred, even though it refers to the occurrence, act, or omission.

Hawley v. Green · filed 1990-03-19(4)

Despite the language in 5-219(4) that a “cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of,” this Court has held that a cause of action does not accrue at the time of the act complained of unless some damage has occurred.

For professional-malpractice limitations purposes, an action does not accrue until the plaintiff suffers some damage; a cloud on title alone is insufficient, and here accrual occurred when the investor withdrew financial support.

Bonz v. Sudweeks · filed 1991-03-29(4)

The determination of what constitutes “damage” for purposes of accrual of an action must be decided on the circumstances presented in each individual case. In the instant case there is no dispute as to dates or events involved in the recording of the release of lis pendens or filing of plaintiffs’ action. Based on our review of the record we hold that plaintiffs had suffered no damage, as contemplated in I.C. § 5-219(4) and our case law, until the investor withdrew his financial support from the proposed development venture.

Section 5-219(4) starts the two-year professional-malpractice limitations period when the claimant suffers some actual, objectively provable damage, rather than when only potential harm exists.

Reynolds v. Trout, Jones, Gledhill, Fuhrman, P.A. · filed 2013-01-23(4)

We therefore hold that Reynolds’s cause of action for professional negligence is barred by Idaho Code § 5-219(4) because “some damage” occurred no later than September 25, 2007, more than two years prior to the commencement of the action on March 9, 2010.

For fraudulently concealed professional malpractice, the usual two-year limitation has an exception, and the one-year additional period runs from when the plaintiff knew or should have been put on inquiry about the malpractice.

McCoy v. Lyons · filed 1991-10-25(4)

Accordingly, with respect to alleged fraudulent concealment of professional malpractice under I.C. § 5-219(4), the exception to the usual two-year statute of limitations is applicable, and the one-year additional period begins to run from the date to be determined by the trier of fact, of when plaintiffs knew or should have been put on inquiry of Lyons’ alleged malpractice.

For professional malpractice, § 5-219(4) does not ordinarily require discovery of the damage before accrual, but fraudulent or intentional concealment tolls the period until the injured party knows or reasonably should be on inquiry, after which one year remains.

Tingley v. Harrison · filed 1994-01-06(4)

However, this Court has not interpreted I.C. § 5-219(4) to require that the plaintiff has discovered the damage as Tingley contends. ... However, the statute itself provides a discovery rule when a plaintiff alleges fraudulent concealment of the malpractice. The statute makes clear that when professional malpractice involves fraudulent or intentional concealment of the wrongdoing, even when the initial wrongdoing is merely negligent, the statute of limitation contained in I.C. § 5-219(4) is tolled until the injured party “knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been put on inquiry regarding the ... matter complained of.” After that date, the statute of limitation period is one year, after which an action for professional malpractice is barred.

Subsection (5) bars a defamation claim filed more than two years after the defamatory statements, and the limitations issue is a question of law when the relevant dates are undisputed.

Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc. · filed 1992-02-03(5)

Since the statute of limitations defense was raised in the answer to the amended counterclaim as provided in I.R.C.P. 9(h), and in the motion for j.n.o.v., and since there was no factual issue over whether or not more than two years had elapsed between the making of the statements and the filing of the amended counterclaim, the issue of the statute of limitations was one of law, and the trial court erred in failing to grant the bank’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the basis that the defamation claim asserted by Erkins was barred by the two-year statute of limitations proscribed in I.C. § 5-219(5).

Section 5-219(4) supplies the two-year personal-injury statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, including claims involving sexual abuse.

Osborn v. Salinas · filed 1998-05-19(4)

Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Wilson, Idaho courts have held that § 1983 actions must meet the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions set forth in I.C. § 5-219(4).

Section 5-219 sets a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, and that period governs federal civil-rights actions arising in Idaho.

Osborn v. Butler · filed 2010-05-11

Idaho Code § 5-219 provides for a two-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice, personal injury, and wrongful death actions. Federal civil rights actions arising in Idaho are governed by this two-year statute of limitations.

Section 5-219(4)'s two-year personal-injury limitations period does not govern a claim specifically pleaded as fraud; the specific fraud limitations period in § 5-218(4) applies instead.

Doe v. Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints · filed 2011-08-05(4)

For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that the specific statute of limitations applicable to fraud claims — Idaho Code § 5-218(4) — applies to Doe’s third and fourth claims for relief.

Section 5-219(4) supplies the applicable statute of limitations for Title IX and § 1983 claims.

Torres v. Sugar-Salem School District 322 · filed 2020-09-24(4)

It is correct that the appropriate statute of limitation for Title IX and section 1983 claims is indeed Idaho Code § 5-219(4).

Idaho Code § 5-219 provides a two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims.

Quinones v. Meskin · filed 2024-05-21

In Idaho, the statute of limitations period for § 1983 claims is two years.

Idaho Code § 5-219 supplies a two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising in Idaho.

Moore v. Tewalt · filed 2024-10-25

In Idaho, the statute of limitations period for § 1983 claims is two years.

Idaho Code § 5-219 supplies a two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising in Idaho.

Byrd v. Doe · filed 2025-03-12

In Idaho, the statute of limitations period for § 1983 claims is two years.

Idaho Code § 5-219 supplies a two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising in Idaho.

Escobedo v. Gonzales · filed 2025-09-24

In Idaho, the statute of limitations period for filing a § 1983 claim is two years. See Idaho Code § 5-219; Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279–80 (1985) (holding that the statute of limitations period for § 1983 claims is the statute of limitations period for personal injuries in the state where the claim arose), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004).