Idaho Code § 67-5279

Section 67-5279’s review standards do not apply when the agency made its initial decision before the 1993 amendment took effect.

Viveros v. State Department of Health & Welfare · filed 1995-02-16

The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act was amended in 1993, I.C. § 67-5201 to 5218, including the provisions setting forth the standards of review. I.C. § 67-5215, as repealed by H.B. No. 712, 1992 Idaho Sess.Laws, ch. 263, § 41; I.C. § 67-5279, as added by H.B. No. 712, 1992 Idaho Sess.Laws, ch. 263, § 51. However, the initial decision of the Department was made pri- or to the effective date of the 1993 amendment. This case falls under the prior enactments of the Act, thus the 1992 version will be used.

Section 67-5279(3) permits a court to overturn a zoning decision for specified defects, including lack of substantial evidence; the challenger must also show prejudice to a substantial right.

Castaneda v. Brighton Corp. · filed 1998-01-09(3)

A city council’s zoning decision may only be overturned where its findings: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency’s statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3). The party attacking a zoning board’s action under I.C. § 67-5279 must first illustrate that the zoning board erred in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3), and then that a substantial right of the party has been prejudiced.

Section 67-5279(3) permits a court to set aside a zoning decision that lacks substantial evidence or is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

Lamar Corp. v. City of Twin Falls · filed 1999-06-11(3)(d), (3)(e)

This Court may set aside the decision of a zoning agency if the Court concludes that its findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3)(d),(e). ... We affirm the district court’s holding that the City Council’s action was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unsupported by substantial evidence.

A party challenging a zoning board’s action must show both an error specified in subsection (3) and prejudice to a substantial right.

Rural Kootenai Organization, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners · filed 1999-12-09(3)

The party attacking a zoning board’s action under I.C. § 67-5279(3) must first illustrate that the zoning board erred in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3) and must then show that a substantial right of the party has been prejudiced.

Section 67-5279 requires a party challenging a zoning board decision to show both a specified error and prejudice to a substantial right.

Angstman v. City of Boise · filed 1996-05-20

Hence, review of a zoning board decision under I.C. § 67-5279 is a two-tiered process. The party attacking the zoning board’s action must illustrate that the zoning board erred in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-6279(3), and that a substantial right of that party has been prejudiced.

Section 67-5279 governs judicial review of decisions by the State Board of Land Commissioners because the Board is an agency.

Idaho Watersheds Project, Inc. v. State Board of Land Commissioners · filed 1996-06-20

Idaho Code § 67-5279 applies when the Court is reviewing a decision of an “agency.” ... The Board is an “agency” as defined by I.C. § 67-5201(2) and the Rules of Practice and Procedure Before the State Board of Land Commissioners.

Section 67-5279(3) requires a court to affirm agency action unless it finds a listed defect; its standard applies to review of land use decisions under the LLUPA.

Blaha v. Board of Ada County Commissioners · filed 2000-09-06(3)

The court shall affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the agency’s findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (e) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3). ... These two standards are not in conflict; but because we deem the latter statute to be less specific, we apply the well-established APA standard to the review requested herein.

Section 67-5279(1) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence when agency findings are supported by substantial competent evidence, even if the record contains conflicting evidence.

Barron v. Idaho Department of Water Resources · filed 2001-02-06(1)

In other words, the agency’s factual determinations are binding on the Court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence in the record.

Section 67-5279(3)(c) permits a court to set aside an agency decision made upon unlawful procedure when the error prejudices a substantial right.

Price v. PAYETTE CTY. BD. OF CTY. COM'RS · filed 1998-05-08(3)(c)

For the above reasons, we find that the Board's amendment of the Comprehensive Plan was made upon unlawful procedure, in violation of I.C. § 67-5279(3)(c). The Board's actions result in a lack of orderly growth within the county, thereby diminishing Price's property value and hampering his use and enjoyment of his land. Thus, we vacate the Board's decision as to the Comprehensive Plan amendment and the zoning change, and remand the case for further proceedings.

Section 67-5279(3)(c) permits a court to vacate an agency decision made upon unlawful procedure when the error prejudices a substantial right.

Price v. Payette County Board of County Commissioners · filed 1998-05-08(3)(c)

For the above reasons, we find that the Board’s amendment of the Comprehensive Plan was made upon unlawful procedure, in violation of I.C. § 67-5279(3)(c). The Board’s actions result in a lack of orderly growth within the county, thereby diminishing Price’s property value and hampering his use and enjoyment of his land. Thus, we vacate the Board’s decision as to the Comprehensive Plan amendment and the zoning change, and remand the case for further proceedings.

A violation of a local land use ordinance does not, by itself, provide grounds for reversal as a violation of a statutory provision.

Evans v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF CASSIA COUNTY · filed 2002-05-31(3)(a)

However, a local land use ordinance is not a “statutory provision” enacted by the legislature, the violation of which provides grounds for reversal under I.C. § 67-5279(3)(a).

Section 67-5279 allows a court to set aside agency action that abuses discretion and prejudices an appellant’s substantial rights.

University of Utah Hospital v. Ada County Board of Commissioners · filed 2007-01-26(2), (4)

We hold that Ada County failed to carry out its investigative duties, thereby violating I.C. § 31-3505A and abusing its discretion as to how to carry out a proper investigation. I.C. § 67-5279(2). ... In this case, Ada County’s failure to conduct a proper investigation prejudiced the providers’ right to prompt notice “of any material information missing from the application which, if omitted, may cause the application to be denied for incompleteness.” I.C. § 31-3505A(1). Thus, pursuant to I.C. § 67-5279, we set aside Ada County’s action in whole and remand this matter for further proceedings.

Section 67-5279(2) requires affirmance unless agency action has a listed defect; abuse-of-discretion review does not apply to a nondiscretionary factual determination.

American Lung Ass'n v. State, Department of Agriculture · filed 2006-02-22(2)

We are required to affirm the Director’s determination unless we find that his action was: (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions, (b) in excess of his statutory authority, (c) made upon unlawful procedure, or (d) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Purco Fleet Services, Inc. v. Idaho State Dept. of Fin., 140 Idaho 121, 90 P.3d 346 (2004); I.C. § 67-5279(2). In this case, Petitioners have challenged the Director’s determination solely on the ground that it was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. The abuse-of-discretion standard of review does not apply in this case. The Director is not given discretion to deeide whether or not to permit field burning.

Section 67-5279(3)(e) requires courts to review an agency hearing officer’s discretionary decisions for abuse of discretion.

State of Idaho, Department of Transportation v. Gibbar · filed 2006-11-14(3)(e)

Courts review discretionary decisions of hearing officers for an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3)(e).

Section 67-5279(3)(e) provides for abuse-of-discretion review of an agency hearing officer's discretionary decisions, including discovery rulings in administrative license suspension hearings.

In Re Suspension of Driver's License · filed 2006-11-14(3)(e)

Courts review discretionary decisions of hearing officers for an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3)(e). ... Accordingly, the multi-tiered inquiry of Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. also applies to a court's review of the discretionary decisions of an ALS hearing officer.

An unreasonable city interpretation of its ordinance is an abuse of discretion under § 67-5279(3)(e).

Lane Ranch Partnership v. City of Sun Valley · filed 2007-12-27(3)(e)

The City’s interpretation of their code is unreasonable and therefore an abuse of discretion under I.C. § 67-5279(3)(e).

Section 67-5279(3) limits reversal of an agency decision to specified legal, procedural, evidentiary, or discretionary errors.

Terrazas v. BLAINE COUNTY EX REL. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS · filed 2009-04-15(3)

This Court will only overturn the Board’s decision if we find that the Board’s decision: (a) violated statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceeded the Board’s statutory authority; (c) was made upon unlawful procedure; (d) was not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3); Price, 131 Idaho at 429, 958 P.2d at 586. ... Applicants have failed to persuade us that the Board erred in a fashion governed by I.C. § 67-5279(3).

Section 67-5279 requires a party challenging a zoning board decision to show both a specified error and prejudice to substantial rights before the decision may be overturned.

Dry Creek Partners, LLC v. Ada County Commissioners Ex Rel. State · filed 2009-10-02(3), (4)

First, it must demonstrate that the board erred in a manner specified in Idaho Code section 67-5279(3). Id. Second, it must show that the board‘s action prejudiced its substantial rights. I.C. § 67-5279(4); Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork, 145 Idaho at 126, 176 P.3d at 131.

Section 67-5279(3) allows a court to overturn a board decision when the challenger shows that it was arbitrary or capricious.

Gardiner v. Boundary County Board of Commissioners · filed 2010-03-18(3)

In order to overturn the ruling of the Board, the party attacking the decision of the Board must demonstrate that it was arbitrary or capricious. I.C. § 67-5279(3); Id. ... Accordingly, the finding of the Board that operation of a gravel pit fits within Chapter 7, Section (1)(D(1), while disregarding the definition of ―commercial,‖ amounted to an arbitrary decision.

Section 67-5279(3)(e) permits review for abuse of discretion by asking whether the agency recognized its discretion, stayed within its legal limits, and reached a reasoned decision.

Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman · filed 2011-03-17(3)(e)

In determining whether an agency abused its discretion under that statute, we “must determine whether the agency perceived the issue in question as discretionary, acted within the outer limits of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the available choices, and reached its own decision through an exercise of reason.”

Section 67-5279(1) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for an agency’s on the weight of factual evidence.

Ravenscroft v. Boise County · filed 2013-05-13(1)

Rather, the scope of review is limited by I.C. § 67-5279, which prohibits the court from “substitute[ing] its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.”

Section 67-5279(3)(c) allows a court to set aside an agency order made upon unlawful procedure.

Erickson v. Idaho Board of Licensure of Professional Engineers and Professional Land Surveyors · filed 2019-10-04(3)(c)

Accordingly, the district court’s Substituted Judicial Review Opinion is reversed and the Board’s Order is vacated because it was made upon unlawful procedure. I.C. § 67-5279(3)(c).

Section 67-5279(3)(a) requires courts to hold agency action to constitutional standards when reviewing it.

Reagan v. Idaho Transportation Department · filed 2021-03-23(3)(a)

Idaho Code section 67-5279(3)(a) clearly holds executive agencies to the same constitutional standards as our trial courts. Thus, we hold that because the breath test on which IDT based Reagan’s license suspension violated constitutional standards, the district court correctly vacated her license suspension.

Section 67-5279(3)(e) allows a court to overturn an agency decision that is arbitrary and capricious, including a permit decision that refuses to consider relevant zoning requirements.

Citizens Against Linscott v. Bonner County Board of Commissioners · filed 2021-05-12(3)(e)

IDAPA provides that an agency decision may be overturned where that decision is “in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions” or “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” I.C. § 67-5279(3)(a), (d). ... In any event, we conclude that the County acted in a manner that was arbitrary and capricious in refusing to address the gravel pit’s nonconforming status when considering the CUP application. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in affirming the County’s decision to grant the CUP because that decision was arbitrary and capricious.

Section 67-5279(3)(e) permits a court to set aside agency action that is arbitrary or capricious.

Skehan v. ISP · filed 2024-01-03(3)(e)

An agency action may be vacated when the agency’s findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are arbitrary or capricious. ... “An action is capricious if it was done without a rational basis” and “is arbitrary if it was done in disregard of the facts and circumstances presented or without adequate determining principles.”

Section 67-5279(3) governs judicial review of county board medical indigency decisions without deference to the board’s statutory interpretation.

St. Luke's Health System v. Board of Commissioners of Gem County · filed 2021-05-19(3)

As a result, we reject the district court’s deference to the Board’s interpretation of the statute. Instead, we review these decisions under the statutory framework set out in Idaho Code section 67-5279(3).

Section 67-5279 allows a court to overturn an agency’s factual determination if it is clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion.

Johnson v. Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center · filed 1994-10-26(3)(d), (3)(e)

Factual determinations by administrative agencies should be overturned only upon a showing of a clearly erroneous decision or an abuse of discretion. Id. See also I.C. § 67-5279(3)(d), (e).

Section 67-5279(3)(d) requires a reviewing court to defer to the Board’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.

Suits v. Idaho Board of Professional Discipline · filed 2003-02-10(3)(d)

This Court is required to defer to the Board’s findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous. See I.C. § 67-5279(3)(d). Dr. Suits has not demonstrated that the Board’s findings are clearly erroneous.

Section 67-5279(3) requires a court to uphold an agency finding unless it lacks substantial evidence in the record.

Willig v. State, Department of Health & Welfare · filed 1995-07-10(3)

We must uphold this finding unless it is not ... supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Section 67-5279(3)(d) allows a court to overturn an agency finding that is unsupported by substantial evidence.

Woodfield v. Board of Professional Discipline of the Idaho State Board of Medicine · filed 1995-11-01(3)(d)

We also conclude—as did the district court—that the Board’s finding, that Dr. Woodfield was lying with regard to the length of the ultrasound, was not supported by substantial evidence. I.C. § 67-5279(3)(d). We uphold and adopt the district court’s ruling overturning the Board’s conclusion that Dr. Woodfield breached the standard of care by conducting an excessively long vaginal ultrasound on patient 12.

Section 67-5279(3) requires a reviewing court to uphold an agency finding supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Capital Care Center v. Idaho Department of Health & Welfare · filed 1997-02-25(3)

This finding must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. I.C. § 67-5279(3). There is substantial evidence to support this finding.

Section 67-5279(3)(d) requires agency findings to be supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.

Paul v. Board of Professional Discipline · filed 2000-09-08(3)(d)

The agency’s findings must be affirmed unless the findings are not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole or the findings are arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3)(d)(e).

Section 67-5279 does not permit reversal of an agency finding merely because the record contains conflicting evidence.

Pearl v. BPD OF IDAHO STATE BD. OF MEDICINE · filed 2002-03-26(3)(d)

The existence of conflicting evidence is not a basis to reverse the Board’s determination.

Section 67-5279(3)(d) permits reversal when an agency’s findings or decisions lack substantial evidence in the record as a whole; a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment on supported factual findings.

Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center v. Ada County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2004-03-02(3)(d)

Whether or not Mr. Hamlet was a resident of Idaho must now be analyzed in the context of I.C. § 67-5279, which provides the scope of review and the grounds required before reversing Ada County. EIRMC centers its argument around I.C. § 67-5279(3)(d), which mandates-reversal when an .agency’s findings and decisions are “not supported by substantial evidences on the record as a whole.” ... Therefore, we hold that substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the conclusion that Mr. Hamlet was not a resident of Idaho at the time of receiving medical services because he did not possess the intent to remain in Idaho.

Section 67-5279(3)(d) permits a court to set aside an administrative hearing officer’s findings when they lack substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

Mahurin v. State · filed 2004-06-18(3)(d)

Upon judicial review of an administrative hearing officer’s order, a court may not set aside findings unless those findings are “not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” I.C. § 67-5279(3)(d). ... This credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record and will not be disturbed by this Court.

Section 67-5279(1) bars courts reviewing an agency decision from substituting their judgment for the agency’s on the weight of the evidence.

Levin v. Idaho State Board of Medicine · filed 1999-08-24(1)

In the appellate process, neither the district court nor this Court may substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented in the record. I.C. § 67-5279(1); Woodfield v. Board of Professional Discipline, 127 Idaho 738, 905 P.2d 1047 (Ct.App.1995).

Section 67-5279(3) requires an agency’s findings to be supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.

Cooper v. Board of Professional Discipline · filed 2000-06-28(3)

Therefore, we hold that the finding that Cooper had a sexual encounter with J.H. is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole as required by I.C. § 67-5279(3).

Section 67-5279(3)(d) does not treat a licensing board’s expertise as substantial evidence when the board uses it in place of a clearly defined standard.

Ater v. Idaho Bureau of Occupational Licenses · filed 2007-05-23(3)(d)

If a licensing board chooses to insert its own knowledge and expertise for that of a clearly defined standard, as happened here, we cannot find that the Board considered substantial evidence to support its order, contravening Idaho Code § 67-5279(3)(d).

Section 67-5279(3) allows a court to set aside an agency decision unsupported by substantial evidence when the challenger shows prejudice to a substantial right.

Stacie Dawn Bennett v. Idaho Dept. of Transportation · filed 2009-04-02(3)

The party challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3) and that a substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. ... Thus, the hearing officer’s finding that the breath test was conducted in compliance with procedural standards is not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

Section 67-5279(3) permits a court to set aside an agency decision when its findings lack substantial evidence in the record.

Bennett v. State, Department of Transportation · filed 2009-04-02(3)

A court may overturn an agency’s decision where its findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency’s statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3). ... Thus, the hearing officer’s finding that the breath test was conducted in compliance with procedural standards is not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

Section 67-5279(3)(d) permits reversal of an agency order that is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.

Peckham v. Idaho State Board of Dentistry · filed 2013-06-21(3)(d)

We reverse the district court’s decision upholding the Board’s Final Order as to both the Malby and the advertising matters because there was insufficient evidence to support the Board’s conclusions.

Section 67-5279(1) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence the agency considered.

Kern v. ITD · filed 2018-12-21(1)

However, the hearing officer considered all of this evidence and we will not substitute our judgment for the agency as to the weight of evidence presented. See I.C. § 67-5279(1).

Section 67-5279(3) requires a court that does not affirm agency action to set it aside and remand as necessary; it does not authorize the court to reverse the agency’s decision.

Rouwenhorst v. Gem County · filed 2021-04-16(3)

At the outset, we note the review statute does not authorize the district court to do what it did and reverse the Board’s decision. Under Idaho Code section 67-5279(3), “[i]f the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.”

Section 67-5279(3) requires a court that does not affirm agency action to set it aside and remand as necessary, rather than reverse it.

St. Alphonsus Regional Medical v. Ada County · filed 2021-05-19(3)

We note here that the judicial review statute does not authorize a district court to “reverse” a Board’s decision. Rather, Idaho Code section 67-5279(3) states: “[i]f the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.” (Italics added.) If the district court found the Board’s decision was in error, the proper disposition would have been to set it aside and remand the case.

Section 67-5279(1) bars a reviewing court from reweighing an agency’s factual findings; a dispute over which facts govern the legal analysis remains a question of law.

Whittaker v. Idaho Department of Water Resources · filed 2024-06-27(1)

This Court will “not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” ... The difference involves a question of law, not one of factual findings.

Section 67-5279(4) permits a court to overturn an incorrect agency decision only if the appellant's substantial rights have been prejudiced.

Dupont v. IDAHO STATE BD. OF LAND COM'RS · filed 2000-07-28(4)

Under I.C. § 67-5279(4), a court can overturn an incorrect decision of an administrative agency only if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced. In this case, the City's rights have not been prejudiced.

Section 67-5279(4) allows a court to overturn an incorrect agency decision only if the appellant’s substantial rights were prejudiced.

Dupont v. Idaho State Board of Land Commissioners · filed 2000-07-28(4)

Under I.C. § 67-5279(4), a court can overturn an incorrect decision of an administrative agency only if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced. In this case, the City’s rights have not been prejudiced.

Section 67-5279(4) requires a zoning decision to be upheld unless the appellant’s substantial rights were prejudiced; dismissal of an appeal that denied the appellant a required public hearing satisfied that requirement.

County Residents Against Pollution From Septage Sludge v. Bonner County · filed 2003-04-02(4)

In addition, the Board’s zoning decision must be upheld if substantial rights of the appellant have not been prejudiced. ... The summary dismissal of their appeal clearly prejudiced the Plaintiffs’ substantial rights.

Section 67-5279(4) requires a showing that an agency’s unlawful procedure prejudiced a substantial right before a court may reverse its action.

Spencer v. Kootenai County · filed 2008-03-06(4)

In addition, Spencer points to nothing in the record which indicates his substantial rights were prejudiced by virtue of the improper handling of the initial appeal, particularly since he received the minimum 20-foot roadway that is available for a residence. See I.C. § 67-5279(4) (agency action to be affirmed despite employment of unlawful procedure, unless substantial rights of appellant have been prejudiced). Thus, although the initial hearing was held upon unlawful procedure, we affirm the order of the district court upholding the Board’s decision.

Section 67-5279(4) requires a court to affirm agency action despite unlawful procedure unless the error prejudiced the appellant’s substantial rights.

Kuna Boxing Club, Inc. v. Idaho Lottery Commission · filed 2009-01-21(4)

Although the Commission’s decision was “made upon unlawful procedure,” I.C. § 67-5279(2)(c), we are required to affirm the agency’s action “unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced.” I.C. § 67-5279(4). We conclude that Kuna Boxing was not prejudiced by the Commission’s failure to comply with the statutory requirement to conduct a postdeprivation evidentiary hearing.

Section 67-5279(4) requires affirmance of agency action unless it prejudiced the appellant’s substantial rights; denial of a discretionary variance does not itself establish that prejudice.

Wohrle v. Kootenai County · filed 2009-04-14(4)

Finally, even if the Board’s decision had not been based on substantial evidence or was otherwise invalid under I.C. § 67-5279(3), I.C. § 67-5279(4) states that “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section, agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced.” ... Denial of Respondents’ variance requests in this case does not deprive them of any substantial right.

Section 67-5279(4) requires affirmance despite a procedural violation unless it prejudiced the appellant’s substantial rights.

Thompson Creek Mining Co. v. Idaho Department of Water Resources · filed 2009-10-27(4)

However, under IDAPA, notwithstanding procedural violations, “[the] agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced.” I.C. § 67-5279(4). Thompson Creek has failed to demonstrate that its substantial rights have been prejudiced by this procedural defect in not recording the entire hearing.

Section 67-5279(4) requires a court to affirm agency action despite a procedural violation unless the violation prejudiced the appellant’s substantial rights.

In Re Wd170 · filed 2009-10-27(4)

However, under IDAPA, notwithstanding procedural violations, “[the] agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced.” I.C. § 67- 5279(4). Thompson Creek has failed to demonstrate that its substantial rights have been prejudiced by this procedural defect in not recording the entire hearing.

Section 67-5279(4) requires a party challenging agency action to show prejudice to its substantial rights in addition to an error under subsection (3).

Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC v. Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2010-06-02(4)

The party challenging the decision of the Board must not only demonstrate that the Board erred in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3) but must also show that its substantial rights have been prejudiced.

Section 67-5279(4) requires prejudice to a substantial right, which a due process violation establishes.

Eddins v. City of Lewiston · filed 2010-11-26(4)

Thus, because Eddins has demonstrated that his due process rights have been violated by the City’s actions, he has similarly demonstrated that a substantial right has been prejudiced for the purposes of Idaho Code section 67-5279(3).

Section 67-5279(4) places the burden of showing agency error on the appellant.

Chisholm v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources · filed 2005-11-25(4)

The Appellants bear the burden of showing error on appeal. I.C. § 67-5279(4); Barron, 135 Idaho at 417, 18 P.3d at 222. Here, Appellants have failed to meet that burden.

Section 67-5279(4) requires a petitioner opposing a development permit to prove real or potential prejudice to a substantial right.

Hawkins v. Bonneville County Board of Commissioners · filed 2011-06-28(4)

On the other hand, when a petitioner opposes a governing board’s decision to grant a permit authorizing development, as Hawkins has, the petitioner must still show, not merely allege, real or potential prejudice to his or her substantial rights. I.C. § 67-5279(4).

Section 67-5279(4) requires a person opposing a development permit to show real or potential prejudice to a substantial right.

Hawkins v. BONNEVILLE COUNTY BD. OF COM'RS · filed 2011-06-28(4)

On the other hand, when a petitioner opposes a governing board’s decision to grant a permit authorizing development, as Hawkins has, the petitioner must still show, not merely allege, real or potential prejudice to his or her substantial rights. I.C. § 67-5279(4).

Section 67-5279(4) permits remand for agency error only when the error prejudices an appellant’s substantial rights, including the right to due process.

Jasso v. CAMAS COUNTY · filed 2011-11-02(4)

Remand is only appropriate if an error prejudiced the appellant’s substantial rights. I.C. § 67-5279(4); Vickers v. Lowe, 150 Idaho 439, ___, 247 P.3d 666, 669 (2011). ... We hold that the Board’s failure to provide a reasoned statement for its decision prejudiced Jasso’s and the Gorringes’ substantial right to due process.

Section 67-5279(4) requires an appellant to show prejudice to a substantial right before an agency action may be reversed.

Peck v. State, Department of Transportation · filed 2012-04-30(4)

However, section 67-5279(4) states the “agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced.” Peck, and his attorney, participated in the hearing held on December 29, 2009, and had the opportunity to present Peck’s challenges. Having participated in the hearing, Peck does not articulate how any substantial right was prejudiced.

Section 67-5279(4) requires affirmance of agency action unless the appellant shows prejudice to a substantial right.

Peck v. Dept of Transportation · filed 2012-04-30(4)

However, section 67-5279(4) states the “agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced.” ... Having participated in the hearing, Peck does not articulate how any substantial right was prejudiced.

Section 67-5279(4) requires a case-by-case determination of whether agency action prejudices a petitioner’s substantial rights; restricting the ability to enter lawful contracts can establish prejudice.

Two Jinn, Inc. v. Idaho Department of Insurance · filed 2013-01-11(4)

Instead, this determination is made on a case-by-case basis. Here, the Director has forbidden Two Jinn from negotiating all of the aspects of a bail bond agreement during a single transaction. The ability to enter freely into contracts that are neither illegal nor violate important public policies is a substantial right. ... Therefore, Two Jinn’s substantial rights were prejudiced.

A party seeking to overturn an agency decision must show an error listed in subsection (3) and prejudice to a substantial right.

Dabrowski v. Dept of Transportation · filed 2013-09-04(3)

The party challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3) and that a substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. ... Assuming arguendo that this constituted error, Dabrowski has failed to demonstrate he has been prejudiced in any way.

Section 67-5279(4) requires prejudice to a substantial right, which the ITD establishes as a matter of law when it challenges an erroneous decision vacating a license suspension.

Idaho Transportation v. Kalani-Keegan · filed 2013-09-10(4)

Idaho Code Section 67-5279(4) has dual components of the materiality of the effect of the decision--prejudice and standing. ... Thus, the district court erred in affirming the vacation of the suspension on the ground that the ITD did not allege or demonstrate prejudice to a substantial right. The substantial interest and the prejudicial effect of an erroneous decision of the hearing officer exist and are demonstrated as a matter of law. The ITD need not have done more.

Section 67-5279(4) requires prejudice to an appellant’s substantial rights, an issue the court may defer when the underlying property right has not been determined.

Shinn v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2014-06-17(4)

Arguably, granting approval of a subdivision without having determined the adequacy of the access road could prejudice the substantial rights of the servient estate owner upon which the road is located, but it would appear premature to make any such determination until such time as the scope of the easement has been definitively determined in a declaratory judgment action. Because of our decision to reverse and remand, any consideration of the issue of prejudice to substantial rights is clearly unripe for determination.

Section 67-5279(4) requires a petitioner challenging a land-use permit to show real or potential prejudice to substantial rights, such as economic harm to its property.

917 LUSK, LLC v. City of Boise · filed 2015-02-10(4)

Our determination that the Commission abused its discretion requires us to consider whether Lusk identified prejudice to its substantial rights, as required by Idaho Code section 67- 5279(4). ... We conclude that there is sufficient evidence that Lusk is in jeopardy of economic harm from the project to satisfy the requirements set forth in Hawkins.

Section 67-5279(4) requires prejudice to an appellant’s substantial rights before agency action may be set aside.

Robert Mena, M.D. v. State Bd. of Medicine · filed 2016-03-23(4)

Subsection (4) of Idaho Code section 67-5279 states, “Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section, agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced.” Dr. Mena’s substantial rights have been prejudiced.

Section 67-5279(4) requires a petitioner seeking judicial review to show that the agency decision prejudiced its substantial rights.

North Snake Ground Water District v. Idaho Department of Water Resources · filed 2016-05-27(4)

As stated in the standard of review section, an agency decision will not be set aside unless one of the exceptions in Idaho Code section 67-5279(3) applies and the petitioner shows that its substantial rights have been prejudiced. I.C. § 67-5279(4). Here, the Districts petitioned for judicial review after the Director denied their permit in a final order. Accordingly, the Districts were required to show that their substantial rights had been prejudiced by the final order.

Section 67-5279(4) requires a court to affirm agency action despite an error unless the error prejudiced the appellant’s substantial rights.

Sylte v. IDWR · filed 2019-06-14(4)

Thus, while there was an error by denying Sylte notice and an opportunity to rebut the use of these documents, we will affirm the agency action because it did not prejudice Sylte’s substantial rights. I.C. § 67-5279(4).

Section 67-5279(4) requires a challenger to show prejudice to a substantial right before a court may set aside agency action, even when the agency violated its own ordinance.

Hungate v. Bonner County · filed 2020-02-25(4)

Having established that the Board erred in granting the Variances, the Hungates must also show that their substantial rights have been prejudiced by the error. This is not easy; the legislature has restricted challenges against agency action by decreeing that “[n]otwithstanding the [grounds for legal error previously discussed], agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced.” I.C. § 67-5279(4). Thus, even when an agency blatantly contravenes its own ordinance, as the County did here, contestants like the Hungates must still establish prejudice to a substantial right to overcome that agency action.

A party seeking judicial review must show both an error listed in subsection (3) and prejudice to a substantial right; without an error, the court need not reach prejudice.

3G AG LLC v. IDWR · filed 2022-05-18(4)

Second, to prevail on judicial review of an agency action, a party must establish that the agency erred for one of the reasons provided under Idaho Code section 67-5279(3), and that such error(s) resulted in at least one of the complaining party’s “substantial rights” being prejudiced. See I.C. § 67-5279(4). The use of “and” in the statute means that this test is conjunctive.

Section 67-5279(4) requires no substantial-rights prejudice analysis when the court finds no violation of the asserted grounds for setting aside agency action under subsection (3).

Grace at Twin Falls, LLC v. Jeppesen · filed 2022-11-03(4)

Having determined that no violation of Idaho Code section 67-5279(3) (a) or (b) occurred, there is no need to analyze whether Grace’s substantial rights have been prejudiced.

Section 67-5279(4) requires both improper agency action and prejudice to the appellant’s substantial rights before a court may overturn the action.

Owens v. Ada County Board of Commissioners · filed 2023-03-15(4)

However, section 67-5279(4) requires a two-step process – identifying improper agency action and showing that the action prejudiced the individual’s substantial rights.

Section 67-5279(4) requires an objector challenging a land use approval to show real or potential prejudice to a substantial right; an agency’s legal error alone is insufficient.

Reese v. City of Blackfoot · filed 2023-06-13(4)

However, when it comes to an objector, like the Reeses, it is not enough to demonstrate that the agency made a legal error by granting an application. The objector must show, not merely allege, real or potential prejudice to his or her substantial rights if the project moves forward.

Section 67-5279(4) requires prejudice to an appellant’s substantial rights before a court may reverse an agency decision for procedural error.

NW Neighborhood Assoc v. City of Boise · filed 2023-09-07(4)

The Idaho APA expressly provides that even if a land use decision is made in violation of section 67-5279(3), the governing board’s decision must be affirmed unless “substantial rights” of the appellant have been prejudiced. I.C. § 67-5279(4). ... Because NWNA has not established prejudice to a substantial right caused by the alleged procedural defects in the handling of the PUD application, there are no other grounds for reversing the Council’s decision.

An applicant shows prejudice to a substantial right when an agency denies the application using an inapplicable legal standard.

Roy v. IDHW · filed 2024-09-03(4)

Thus, if Roy demonstrates that the Department applied an inapplicable legal standard when it denied her clearance, then she has ispo facto demonstrated prejudice to a substantial right.

Section 67-5279(4) requires a party challenging agency action to establish prejudice to substantial rights; without that showing, the court may affirm without deciding whether the agency erred.

Sullivan v. Blaine County · filed 2024-09-25(4)

However, notwithstanding these five factors, this Court will affirm the Board’s decision unless the appellant establishes prejudice to her substantial rights under Idaho Code section 67-5279(4).

Section 67-5279(4) does not require a court to address prejudice to substantial rights when the appellant has failed to show agency error.

Abbott v. Canyon County · filed 2024-12-12(4)

However, notwithstanding the violation of any requirements, the order will be affirmed “unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced.” I.C. § 67-5279(4). ... Because the Appellants failed to show an error by Canyon County, the district court did not err in declining to address the Appellants’ substantial rights.

Section 67-5279(4) requires prejudice to a party’s substantial rights before agency action may be set aside; an inadequate reasoned statement that prevents meaningful judicial review violates the substantial right to due process.

Veterans Park Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. City of Boise · filed 2025-01-22(4)

Having established that the City Council made an error by approving the CUP application, VPNA must also establish that this error harmed its substantial rights. I.C. § 67-5279(4). ... Here, we conclude that VPNA’s substantial right to due process was violated by the inadequate reasoned statement issued by the City Council in this case.

Section 67-5279 does not authorize a district court reviewing agency action to enter a money judgment.

University of Utah Hospital v. Board of Commissioners · filed 1996-02-02

The applicable language in I.C. § 67-5279 specifically limits the remedies available when a district court acts in its appellate capacity. The legislature deleted “modification” from the types of relief authorized by the statute, and thereby farther limited the possible remedies available in the district court. Therefore, we hold that the district court correctly determined that it lacked the statutory authority to enter a money judgment against the county.

Under § 67-5279, setting aside a hearing officer’s decision can effectively remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings.

Druffel v. State, Department of Transportation · filed 2002-01-18

Idaho Code § 67-5279 states “if the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside in whole or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.” The district court determined ITD had exceeded its statutory authority and set aside the hearing officer’s decision. It does not appear that Druffel’s suspension was reversed. By reversing the hearing officer’s decision, the district court effectively remanded the case back to ITD.

Section 67-5279(3) requires a court that does not affirm agency action to set it aside in whole or in part and remand for further proceedings.

Laurino v. Board of Professional Discipline · filed 2002-07-16(3)

Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) dictates that “[i]f the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded for further proceedings.” The proper procedure, therefore, is for the Court in this instance to set aside the decision of the Board revoking Dr. Laurino’s license and remand the matter to the Board with directions to determine a properly applicable sanction.

Section 67-5279(2) requires remand after agency action is set aside only when further proceedings are necessary; remand is unnecessary when further findings could not affect the outcome.

Bonner General Hospital v. Bonner County · filed 1999-05-28(2)

Idaho Code § 67-5279 states that “if the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside in whole or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.” The County contends that the district court should have remanded this case to the Commissioners to make further findings of fact. However, there is no indication in the record that further findings of fact could be made from the paucity of evidence that would affect the outcome of this case. Consequently, we hold that no remand by the district court was necessary.

Section 67-5279(3) requires a reviewing court that sets aside an agency decision to remand for further proceedings as necessary.

Urrutia v. Blaine County · filed 2000-04-03(3)

If the Board’s action is not affirmed, “it shall be set aside ... and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.” I.C. § 67-5279(3).

Section 67-5279 limits when a court may disturb an agency decision based on the grounds for review and prejudice to substantial rights.

Purco Fleet Services, Inc. v. Idaho State Department of Finance · filed 2004-04-29

The Court finds no substantial rights have been prejudiced by the Department’s decision nor are there grounds for disturbing the Department’s decision under the statute.

Section 67-5279(3) directs a court that does not affirm agency action to set it aside in whole or in part and remand for further proceedings as necessary.

Haw v. Idaho State Board of Medicine · filed 2006-05-30(3)

Idaho Code section 67-5279(3) directs, "[I]f the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary." Because we have vacated the fees and costs award, we remand the matter to the Board for further proceedings.

Section 67-5279 requires a reviewing court to remand when it sets aside agency action and the agency has not made necessary factual findings.

Mercy Medical Center v. Ada County · filed 2008-08-26

Idaho Code § 67-5279 states: “If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.” ... However, when a board fails to make a factual determination on a necessary issue, the district court must not make its own factual determination but must rather remand the case to the board to make that determination.

Section 67-5279 provides for setting aside and remanding agency action on judicial review; it does not permit a civil damages claim to be combined with a petition for judicial review.

Euclid Avenue Trust v. City of Boise · filed 2008-09-23

IDAPA provides the scope of review and the type of relief available in I.C. § 67-5279 — “If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.” By failing to mention any further remedial measures, it is reasonable to conclude that combining a claim for civil damages with a petition for judicial review is not a permissible course of action.

Section 67-5279 allows a reviewing court to affirm an agency action or set it aside and remand as necessary, but does not authorize the court to order the agency to issue a particular license.

Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Department of Water Resources · filed 2011-05-26

Pursuant to I.C. § 67-5279, upon reviewing an administrative appeal, the Court can either affirm the agency action, or set it aside, in whole or in part, and remand for further proceedings as necessary. Therefore, even if requiring the issuance of a license by operation of law was a viable remedy for Idaho Power, this Court would not be in the position to grant such a remedy in a judicial review proceeding.

Section 67-5279(1) bars a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for the agency’s on the weight of the evidence.

Hansen v. Dept of Transportation · filed 2012-03-30(1)

This Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented. I.C. § 67-5279(1); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. ... The inference drawn by the hearing officer in this case is reasonable, especially in light of the fact that Hansen never offered any evidence as to where the traffic infractions occurred.

Section 67-5279(1) prevents a reviewing court from reweighing evidence or substituting its judgment for the agency’s on the weight of evidence.

George Besaw, Jr. v. Transportation Dept. · filed 2013-06-21(1)

This Court will not reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the hearing officer. Substantial and competent evidence in the record supports the hearing officer’s finding that the trooper adequately monitored Besaw for the requisite time period.

Section 67-5279(5) requires courts to interpret state law without deferring to an agency’s interpretation.

First Presbyterian Church of Boise, Idaho, Inc. v. Ada County · filed 2025-08-20(5)

Our decision is based on the plain language of section 63-602B and we will not defer to the IBTA on the interpretation of state law. See I.C. § 67-5279(5).