Statute Annotations › Georgia › Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-3

Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-3

Commencement of civil action: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Georgia
Case notes
24
Cited in passing
24
Citing cases indexed
54
Case dates
1983–2020
Screened through
2025-03-11
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

48 citing cases reviewed of 54 in the citation index: 24 interpreted the section (annotated below), 24 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2025-03-11 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-3?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Commencement of civil actions

Section 9-11-3 treats a civil action as commenced when the complaint is filed, including when timely, good-faith compliance with a clerk’s specified filing procedure constitutes delivery and receipt for filing.

Forsyth v. Hale · filed 1983-04-05

“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” OCGA § 9-11-3 (Code Ann. § 81A-103). ... “Accordingly, we hold that where the undisputed evidence shows a timely and good faith compliance with the uncontroverted “intention” of the appropriate official that certain specified actions shall constitute the delivery to and receipt by him of papers for filing, the papers are to be considered filed as of the date of the compliance with that expressed intention.”
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Section 9-11-3 provides that a civil action is commenced by filing the complaint, although service must follow within a reasonable time for the filing date to relate back.

Cambridge Mutual Fire Insurance v. City of Claxton, Georgia · filed 1983-12-05

Like the federal rule, the Georgia statute provides that a civil action is commenced by the filing of a complaint. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-3 (1982) (formerly Ga.Code Ann. § 81A-103).
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Section 9-11-3 requires a civil action to be commenced by filing a complaint, so a contempt motion cannot by itself commence a separate civil action for damages.

Opatut v. Guest Pond Club, Inc. · filed 1985-03-15

“[A] motion for contempt ‘is not tantamount to the filing of a complaint.’ ” ... “[A]n application for contempt does not come within the definition of a pleading.” ... Thus, an application for contempt may not, standing alone, serve to commence a civil action for damages as it is not a complaint. OCGA §§ 9-11-3, 9-11-7.
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Section 9-11-3 provides that a civil action commences when the complaint is filed with the court.

Belco Electric, Inc. v. Bush · filed 1992-06-10

As provided in OCGA § 9-11-3, “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”
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Section 9-11-3 treats a civil action as commenced by filing a complaint, so it does not govern a special confirmation proceeding initiated by an application.

Vlass v. Security Pacific National Bank · filed 1993-06-21

“‘A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.’ (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 9-11-3. ... It is clear, however, that an application for confirmation is not a ‘complaint’ which initiates a ‘civil action’ in the superior court. ... Since it is clear that an application for confirmation merely invokes the superior court’s supervisory authority over non-judicial foreclosure sales under power and is not a ‘complaint’ by which the creditor initiates a ‘civil action’ against the debtor in the superior court, it necessarily follows that such an application need not be served on the debtor in accordance with OCGA § 9-11-4.”
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Section 9-11-3 provides that a civil action is commenced when the complaint is filed with the court, and mailing the complaint alone is not filing with the court.

Mingledorff v. Stokely · filed 1996-10-15

“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” OCGA § 9-11-3. And filing “with the court” does not mean depositing the complaint in the mail.
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Section 9-11-3 provides that a civil action is commenced when the complaint is filed with the court.

Flemister v. Hopko · filed 1998-01-07

“A civil action is commenced by filing a com*94plaint with the court.”
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Section 9-11-3(a) provides that a civil action commences when the complaint is filed with the court.

Wesley Chapel Foot & Ankle Center, LLC v. Johnson · filed 2007-07-16(a)

Generally speaking, a civil “action” is “brought” when a plaintiff files a complaint praying for a judgment against a defendant, thus initiating legal proceedings. OCGA § 9-11-3 (a) (“Acivil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”); Cochran v. Bowers, 274 Ga. App. 449, 454 (1), n. 2 (617 SE2d 563) (2005) (a medical malpractice action is commenced by the filing of the complaint).
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Section 9-11-3(a) provides that a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.

Exel Transportation Services, Inc. v. Sigma Vita, Inc. · filed 2007-11-21(a)

Otherwise, OCGA § 9-11-3 (a) is clear that “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” Since Sigma did not file its complaint with the court until April 19, 2006 •— five days past the expiration of the federal limitation period — its claims are time barred.
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Section 9-11-3(a) provides that a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.

McCallister v. Knowles · filed 2010-02-16(a)

Thus, once the suit is served, it is the commencement that is key, and, as stated in OCGA § 9-11-3 (a), a “civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”
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Section 9-11-3(a) provides that a civil action commences when the complaint is filed with the court.

Odion v. Varon · filed 2011-09-29(a)

Although an action is not a “pending” suit until after service of process is perfected, once service is accomplished, it relates back to the date of filing, and the date of filing establishes the date the action is commenced.
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Section 9-11-3 requires a civil action to be commenced by filing a complaint, so a motion for contempt cannot, by itself, commence a civil action for damages.

In Re Estate of William James Butler · filed 2020-07-17

A motion for contempt is not tantamount to the filing of a complaint[, and] an application for contempt does not come within the definition of a pleading. Thus, an application for contempt may not, standing alone, serve to commence a civil action for damages as it is not a complaint. OCGA §§ 9-11-3, 9-11-7.
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Section 9-11-3 provides that a civil action is commenced by filing the complaint.

Robinette v. Johnston · filed 1986-06-17

Georgia law similarly provides that an action is commenced by the filing of the complaint. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-3 (Michie 1982).
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Section 9-11-3 provides that a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.

Day v. Burnett · filed 1991-04-01

“ ‘A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.’ OCGA § 9-11-3.
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Section 9-11-3 provides that a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.

Lackey v. Crittenden · filed 1995-05-12

“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” OCGA § 9-11-3. “[A]n action brought on [May 19,1993], seeking to recover damages for injuries to the person alleged to have been sustained on [May 17, 1991], is barred by the statute of [limitation], which requires such actions to be brought within two years after the right of action accrues. [Cits.]”
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Section 9-11-3(a) provides that an action is initiated by filing the complaint with the court, so the mailbox rule does not make an initial habeas petition filed when a prisoner delivers it to prison officials.

Roberts v. Cooper · filed 2010-03-15(a)

Rather, “[t]he Civil Practice Act, OCGA § 9-11-1 et seq., applies in habeas corpus proceedings with regard to questions of pleading and practice. [Cit.]” State v. Jaramillo, 279 Ga. 691, 693 (2) (620 SE2d 798) (2005). Under the Civil Practice Act, an action is initiated “by filing a complaint with the court.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 9-11-3 (a).
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Section 9-11-3 provides that a civil action commences when the complaint is filed with the court.

Dye v. Amdocs, Inc. · filed 2020-08-31

In Georgia, a civil suit commences when the complaint is filed with the court. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-3.
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A suit commences only after the petition is filed and the defendant is properly served.

Thorburn Co. v. Allied Media of Georgia, Inc. · filed 1999-04-28

A suit commences only after the filing of a petition and the proper service of process upon the defendant as required and authorized by law.
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Section 9-11-3 treats an action as commenced when the complaint is filed, subject to the service-related limitation on tolling the statute of limitations.

Roberts v. Jones · filed 2005-05-09

Georgia law, like federal law, states that an action is commenced with the filing of the complaint with the court. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-3; Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 3. The Georgia statute is limited, unlike the federal rule, by the next statute which impacts the running of the statute of limitations. O.C.G.A. § 9-ll-4(c) provides that service is to made within five days of the filing of the complaint.
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A motion to confirm an arbitration award is not a complaint commencing a civil action and does not allow discovery under the Civil Practice Act.

Fuller Enterprises, Inc. v. Hardin Construction Group, Inc. · filed 1994-11-22

Accordingly, since the application is not a complaint initiating a civil action, under Vlass, we find Hardin is not entitled to conduct discovery under the CPA.
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A civil action is brought when the complaint is filed; amending it to name the real party in interest does not start a new action.

Rooks v. Tenet Health System GB, Inc. · filed 2008-07-07(a)

under OCGA § 9-11-3 (a), a civil “action” is “brought” when a plaintiff files a complaint against a defendant, thus initiating legal proceedings. ... Here, the wrongful death action was initiated within five years of the alleged negligent acts. And an amendment to that suit to correct the real party in interest does not “initiate” a new claim. We therefore hold that the statute of repose does not prevent amendment of the complaint to indicate that Deborah is the real party plaintiff on the wrongful death claim.
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Civil case filing form

Subsection (b) refers to the civil case filing form filed with a complaint, not the method used to file the complaint.

Batesville Casket Co. v. Watkins Mortuary, Inc. · filed 2008-10-07(b)

The “form” referred to in that section clearly refers to the civil case filing form which is to be filed along with the complaint, not the method of filing.
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Section 9-11-3(b) requires the court to allow correction of a missing or inaccurate civil case filing form and bars dismissal of a civil action on that basis.

Brewton v. Kriten Poss · filed 2012-06-14(b)

OCGA § 9-11-3 (b) provides that [i]f, after a civil action has been filed, the court presiding over the civil action decides that the civil case filing form has not been filed or has been filed incorrectly, the court shall require the plaintiff to file the civil case filing form or an amended form. In no case shall the failure to accurately complete the civil case filing form required by this Code section provide a basis to dismiss a civil action.
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Presentation of motions at a hearing

A motion presented and argued at a hearing is effectively presented to the trial court.

Marsh v. Way · filed 1985-12-03(b)(1)

Here, the trial court’s order states that the motion to open default was presented and argued at a hearing. The motion, therefore, was effectively *285presented to the trial court. OCGA § 9-11-3 (b) (1); Newport Timber Corp. v. Floyd, 247 Ga. 535, 537, fn. 2 (277 SE2d 646) (1981).
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24 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Watters v. Classon, the court cited § 9-11-3 to establish that the action was timely filed; its decision about diligence in later service concerned § 9-11-4(c). opinion →
CABELLERO v. Pate, the court cited § 9-11-3 only for the general definition of when a civil action commences, as part of interpreting OCGA § 45-9-1 (c) and § 9-11-26 (b) (2); it did not decide an issue about § 9-11-3 itself. opinion →
International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Saunders, the court quoted § 9-11-3 only as support for its holding about when the five-year period under § 9-2-60 (b) begins; it did not construe or decide the meaning, requirements, or application of § 9-11-3 itself. opinion →
Davis v. Johnson, the court merely recited § 9-11-3's commencement rule as background to its analysis of service diligence and relation back under § 9-11-4(c). It did not interpret or decide how § 9-11-3 applies. opinion →
Land v. Casteel, the court cited § 9-11-3 for the general commencement rule as background to its analysis of diligence in perfecting service and relation back for limitations purposes; it did not construe or decide any issue about the statute itself. opinion →
Anderson v. Hughes, the court cited § 9-11-3 only for the general proposition that filing commences a civil action; its decision concerned laches and diligence in perfecting service under § 9-11-4(c), without construing or independently applying § 9-11-3. opinion →
Hattaway v. Engelhard Corp., the court recited § 9-11-3's general commencement rule but did not construe or independently apply that statute; its remand ruling turned on the interaction of Georgia's renewal statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61, with the federal removal deadline. opinion →
C-Staff, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance, the opinion cites § 9-11-3 only in a footnote as an example supporting the general Civil Practice Act requirement that a complaint be filed and defendants served; the court construes OCGA § 9-11-69, not § 9-11-3. opinion →
Cochran v. Bowers, the statute appears only in a footnote stating the general rule for when a civil action is commenced; the court did not construe or decide anything about § 9-11-3. The holding concerns OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b). opinion →
Gladowski v. Department of Family & Children Services, the court mentions § 9-11-3 in a footnote as background support for distinguishing administrative review under § 50-13-19 from civil actions; the decision does not construe or independently apply § 9-11-3. opinion →
Kirkland v. Tamplin, the court cited § 9-11-3(a)'s filing rule as support while deciding which action was prior under the prior-pending-litigation statute, § 9-2-5(a); it did not independently construe or apply § 9-11-3. opinion →
Fox v. City of Cumming, the court cited § 9-11-3(a) only by analogy while interpreting OCGA § 22-1-11; it did not decide any issue about the meaning, requirements, or application of § 9-11-3. opinion →
Taylor v. Williams, the statute appears only in the dissent's contrary analysis. The majority held that a pro se state habeas petition is properly filed when deposited in the prison mail system and did not construe or apply § 9-11-3(a). opinion →
Hawkins v. the State, the statute appears in a footnote quoting its text and recounting the trial court’s procedural dismissal; the appellate court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about § 9-11-3. opinion →
Classic Commercial Services, Inc. v. Baldwin, the court cited § 9-11-3(a) in a string of authorities while analyzing when residence and service establish personal jurisdiction; it did not construe or independently apply the statute. opinion →
Classic Commercial Services, Inc. v. Baldwin, the court cited § 9-11-3 (a) in a string of authority supporting its jurisdictional discussion, but did not interpret or independently decide the statute; its actual ruling concerned residence, service, and the need to consider long-arm jurisdiction. opinion →
ANGLIN v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY A/S/O BARRY L. RICHMAN, OCGA § 9-11-3 appears only in a string citation to this general proposition; the court's actual holding construed service requirements under OCGA § 9-11-4, not § 9-11-3. opinion →
Anglin v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., section 9-11-3 appears only in a string citation in a footnote; the court's service-of-process holding construes and applies OCGA § 9-11-4, not § 9-11-3. opinion →
Preferred Women's Healthcare, LLC v. Sain, the court quoted § 9-11-3(a) only to explain the general concept of when a civil action is commenced while deciding whether the medical-malpractice statute of repose barred adding a defendant. The holding was about OCGA § 9-3-71(b), not an independent interpretation or application of § 9-11-3. opinion →
McWilliams v. Parker, the statute is quoted only as the basis of McWilliams’s rejected argument. The court’s decision applies the renewal statute and controlling service-of-process precedent; it does not construe or independently decide the meaning or application of § 9-11-3. opinion →
Fashion Group LLC v. Bank of America, the court cited § 9-11-3(a) only as a parallel authority for the proposition that an action is commenced by filing a complaint; it did not interpret or develop the statute, and the dismissal rested on the plaintiff's failure to file a complaint and properly serve the defendant. opinion →
STATE OF GEORGIA v. EDWARD CLAY, the court cited OCGA § 9-11-3 (a) for the general definition of when a civil action is commenced, but its holding concerned the meaning and application of OCGA § 50-15-4 to duplicative public lawsuits, not the construction of § 9-11-3. opinion →
Warbler Investments, LLC v. City of Social Circle, section 9-11-3 (a) appears only in a footnote to the dissent, cited to support the dissent’s argument about when an action begins; the majority did not adopt that argument or construe the statute. opinion →
ATLANTA IMPOUND, INC v. ATTIA, the opinion's class-certification analysis construes and applies OCGA § 9-11-23, not § 9-11-3. The only reference to § 9-11-3 is an apparent miscitation in a quoted parenthetical from another case, and this court does not analyze or apply § 9-11-3. opinion →

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