42 U.S.C. § 2000e

Section 2000e(k) defines discrimination because of sex to include discrimination based on pregnancy.

Shaw v. T-Mobile · filed 2021-06-01(k)

Relevant here, discrimination on the basis of sex includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions within discrimination because of sex and requires affected women to be treated the same for employment-related purposes.

Rayford v. La Petite Academy, Inc. · filed 2021-06-04(k)

As amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Title VII defines “the terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’” to include “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Section 2000e(k) includes discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions within Title VII's definition of sex discrimination.

McMyler v. Bank of Utica · filed 2021-07-02(k)

Additionally, "[t]he Pregnancy Discrimination Act amends Title VII's definition of discrimination 'because of sex' to include discrimination 'because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.'" Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 343 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).

Section 2000e includes pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions within discrimination because of sex.

Niles v. MCCI of Indiana LLC · filed 2021-07-12(k)

“The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. ... There is no dispute that Niles establishes the first and third prongs of both her race and sex claims; she was, after all, a pregnant Black woman who was fired.

Section 2000e(k) treats discrimination because of pregnancy as discrimination because of sex; an allegation that pregnancy caused assignment to less lucrative work can state a claim.

Blaylock v. Twin Restaurant, LLC · filed 2021-07-15(k)

Defendants also argue that plaintiff Frank failed to state a claim for pregnancy discrimination, but the Court disagrees. Frank alleges she was forced to work in less lucrative sections due to her pregnancy. That is enough to state a claim.

Section 2000e(k) includes discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions within discrimination because of sex.

Serrano-Colon v. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2021-07-19(k)

Plaintiff’s claims of discrimination based on her pregnancy and parental status fall under the umbrella of sex discrimination: Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination “because of sex” includes “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions . . . .” 42 U.S.C. 200e(k), and, regarding parental status, the Supreme Court and many Circuit courts, including the First Circuit, have held that “the assumption that a woman will perform her job less well due to her presumed family obligations is a form of sex-stereotyping and that adverse job actions on that basis constitute sex discrimination.” Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. V. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730 (2003)); Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free School Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 120 (2d Cir. 2004); Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004); Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 57 (1st Cir. 2000); Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir. 1999).

Section 2000e(k) compares pregnant and nonpregnant workers by their ability or inability to work, rather than by the particular limitations causing an absence.

Hills v. AT&T Mobility Services LLC · filed 2021-07-22(k)

However, the PDA does not require a comparison of particular limitations shared by pregnant and non-pregnant workers. Rather, the PDA dictates comparison of pregnant and non-pregnant workers’ “ability or inability to work.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Section 2000e(k) includes discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions within sex discrimination under Title VII.

Fugarino v. Milling Benson Woodward L.L.P. · filed 2021-08-13(k)

In 1978, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA"), thereby amending Title VII to include, as part of the definition of sex-based discrimination, any discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical ... conditions.”

Section 2000e(k) treats adverse employment actions based on pregnancy as sex discrimination under Title VII.

Twa v. Mercy Health Partners · filed 2021-08-20(k)

Adverse actions on the basis of pregnancy are treated as a prohibited form of sex discrimination under Title VII.

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy within Title VII’s protection against discrimination because of sex.

Mueller v. Car Wash Partners Incorporated · filed 2021-09-17(k)

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, it is unlawful to discharge an individual because of the individual’s pregnancy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(k), 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e(k) defines sex discrimination to include pregnancy discrimination and requires pregnant employees to be treated the same as similarly able nonpregnant employees.

SHAFFER v. CRANBERRY TOWNSHIP · filed 2021-10-08(k)

According to the Supreme Court, the two clauses of this definition stand for two distinct propositions: (1) that discrimination on the basis of sex encompasses pregnancy-based discrimination under Title VII and (2) that, in particular, an employer engages in sex-based discrimination when it treats pregnant employees less favorably than non-pregnant employees “similar in their ability or inability to work.” See Young v. UPS, 575 U.S. 206, 212 (2015).

Section 2000e(k) treats discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions as sex discrimination under Title VII.

Watkins v. Austin · filed 2022-02-03(k)

Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sex, and “[t]he Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title VII to provide that discrimination on the basis of sex includes discrimination ‘on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions.’” Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047, 1054 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). ... Accordingly, Watkins has made a prima facie showing of pregnancy discrimination sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 2000e(k) treats discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions as sex discrimination and requires equal treatment of workers similar in their ability to work.

Jones v. Wireless Time Alabama, LLC · filed 2022-02-10(k)

The PDA amended Title VII to clarify that discrimination “because of sex” includes discrimination because of “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condition” and mandates that women affected by such circumstances “shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions within sex discrimination and requires equal employment-related treatment for people with a similar ability to work.

Prowse v. Mayorkas · filed 2022-03-07(k)

Title VII, as amended in 1978, includes the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which provides that sex discrimination includes discrimination based on “‘pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by [these conditions] shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.’” Davis v. Frank, 962 F.2d 13, No. 91-55792, 1992 WL 99343, at *2 (9th Cir. May 11, 1992) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).

Section 2000e(k) requires employers to give pregnant employees the same opportunities and benefits as nonpregnant employees similarly limited in their ability to work.

McKinney v. Cleveland County Board of Education · filed 2022-03-25(k)

The PDA does not require an employer to provide special accommodations to its pregnant employees. The PDA only ensures that pregnant employees are given the same opportunities and benefits as nonpregnant employees who are similarly limited in their ability to work.

Section 2000e(k) treats discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions as sex discrimination under Title VII.

Jasnic v. Bisco, Inc. · filed 2022-03-31(k)

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act later amended Title VII by explicitly barring discrimination “on the basis of preg- nancy, childbirth or related medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). ... It is undisputed that Jasnic was a mem- ber of a protected class.

Section 2000e(k) compares pregnant workers with other workers similar in their ability or inability to work; that comparison does not require discovery about every worker.

Freyer v. Frontier Airlines, Inc. · filed 2022-04-26(k)

The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs. In Young, the Supreme Court rejected a broad interpretation of the fourth prong. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1350. ... Thus, given that Judge Hegarty is permitting similar discovery regarding pilots who received accommodations, his interpretation of Young was not contrary to law.

Section 2000e(k) defines discrimination because of sex to include discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.

Romero v. St. Vincent's Services, Inc. · filed 2022-06-10(k)

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title VII’s definition of “because of sex” to include “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions . . . .” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k); Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 210 (2015).

Section 2000e(k) includes discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions within sex discrimination.

Duis v. Franciscan Alliance Inc. · filed 2022-07-29(k)

Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, including discrimination “on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Section 2000e(k) defines sex discrimination to include discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.

Shkolnikova v. United States Postal Service · filed 2022-08-15(k)

Title VII was amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (the “PDA”), to clarify that pregnancy discrimination is a form of gender discrimination prohibited by Title VII.

Section 2000e(k) includes discrimination based on pregnancy within Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination.

Stidhum v. 161-10 Hillside Auto Ave, LLC · filed 2022-09-15(k)

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title VII to define discrimination “on the basis of sex” to include discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” Farmer v. Shake Shack Enters, LLC, 473 F. Supp. 3d 309, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). ... The Court finds that Plaintiff has met her “minimal” burden by alleging that the adverse employment action began once she announced her pregnancy.

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy discrimination in sex discrimination and requires pregnant workers to be treated like others similar in their ability to work.

Hills v. AT&T Mobility Services LLC · filed 2022-09-16(k)

The PDA accomplished this by first declaring that sex discrimination in Title VII includes discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The PDA then provided that “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work[.]” Id.

Section 2000e(k) protects employees from sex discrimination based on pregnancy.

EDWARDS v. TACALA GEORGIA CORP · filed 2022-10-06(k)

Edwards is clearly a member of a protected class—she is a pregnant woman. See Durham v. Rural/Metro Corp., 955 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 2020); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions within Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination.

Wright v. Legacy Cabinets Inc · filed 2022-10-28(k)

The PDA amended Title VII to clarify that the prohibition against discrimination based on an individual’s sex includes discrimination based on “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Section 2000e(k) may protect an employee terminated a few months after childbirth, depending on the facts.

DONNELLY v. MyEyeDr · filed 2022-12-06(k)

At the very least, a plaintiff who is terminated a few months after giving birth may be eligible for membership in the PDA’s protected class, depending on the facts of a case.

Section 2000e(k) covers discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; the court found that an applicant who had none of those conditions when she applied had not established membership in the protected class.

Thomas v. Amentum Services Inc · filed 2022-12-28(k)

But as the court explained at the hearing, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act prohibits discrimination because of “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). Thomas applied for the six positions at issue on May 12, May 13, June 17, July 15, July 21, and September 3. Thomas was not pregnant on any of these dates. Nor did Thomas have any pregnancy-related disabilities or medical conditions, or restrictions imposed by her doctor. And she didn’t perceive herself as having any medical conditions. As a result, the court finds that Thomas cannot establish that she is a member of a protected class, and she thus fails to make a prima facie case.

Section 2000e(k) includes discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions within Title VII’s protected classes.

PEIFER v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE · filed 2023-01-05(k)

Congress amended Title VII through the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which includes within its protected classes discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k).

Section 2000e(k) includes discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions within Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination.

Key v. Dynamic Security, Inc. · filed 2023-02-10(k)

Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, prohibits discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.

Section 2000e(k) requires women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions to be treated the same for all employment-related purposes.

Kande v. Luminis Health Doctors Community Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2023-03-13(k)

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, which amended Title VII, made clear that “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Section 2000e(k) defines sex discrimination under Title VII to include discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.

Medina v. AAM15 Management LLC · filed 2023-03-27(k)

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title VII to clarify that sex discrimination includes discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy within discrimination because of sex under Title VII.

ZERFA v. ACOSTA, INC · filed 2023-03-30(k)

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) is an amendment to Title VII stating that the terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” “include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” ... The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has shown the fourth element of a causal connection and, accordingly, she has established her prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination.

A pregnancy-related condition can support a discrimination claim under § 2000e(k) when the evidence creates a factual dispute about the reason for termination.

Holly v. Beaumont Health · filed 2023-04-28(k)

The Court findd that Plaintiff has set forth evidence sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether The Hospital discriminated against Plaintiff because of her pregnancy-related condition.

Section 2000e(k) treats discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions as sex discrimination.

Romero v. St. Vincent's Services, Inc. · filed 2023-05-16(k)

In 1978, Congress amended Title VII and specified that the term “because of sex” prohibits discrimination “on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). ... Moreover, Romero has produced no evidence suggesting animus toward her protected status or that anyone at HSVS was motivated to fire her for discriminatory reasons.

Section 2000e(k) treats pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination; a pregnancy discrimination claim requires a connection between pregnancy and the adverse employment decision.

Sharp v. Ashtabula County Sheriff's Office · filed 2023-06-05(k)

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to her employment because of that individual’s sex, including on the basis of pregnancy. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). ... There is no nexus between Plaintiff’s termination and her pregnancy.

Section 2000e(k) requires employers to treat pregnant employees the same as other employees with a similar ability to work; it does not require preferential treatment.

SYMONS v. LEHIGH VALLEY HEALTH NETWORK, INC. · filed 2023-06-08(k)

The PDA does not, however, require preferential treatment for pregnant employees. Instead, it mandates that employers treat pregnant employees the same as non-pregnant employees who are similarly situated with respect to their ability to work.

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy within sex discrimination and requires pregnant workers to be treated like others with similar ability or inability to work.

Barton v. Warren County · filed 2023-06-13(k)

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act added the following to Title VII's definitional section: the terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Section 2000e(k) defines discrimination because of sex to include discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.

Yang v. Strategic Behavioral Health Green Bay LLC · filed 2023-06-28(k)

The PDA specifies that Title VII’s “ter[m] ‘because of sex’ . . . include[s] . . . because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” § 2000e(k); see Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 212 (2015). Thus, discrimination against an employee because she is pregnant is a form of sex discrimination.

Section 2000e(k) requires a pregnancy discrimination complaint to allege that a similarly situated employee was treated differently; a comparison with other female employees alone is insufficient.

Jenkins v. Miami Dade County · filed 2023-08-24(k)

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not include allegations that a similarly situated employee, rather than just other female employees, were treated differently. Plaintiff’s Complaint therefore fails to state a claim under the PDA.

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions within discrimination on the basis of sex.

LAROCCA v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION · filed 2023-10-05(k)

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act makes clear that “pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions” are all included in the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex.

Section 2000e(k) treats discrimination because of pregnancy as sex discrimination; a plaintiff must show that pregnancy caused the challenged employment action.

Tucker v. Familia Dental Fort Wayne, PLLC · filed 2023-11-08(k)

In 1978, Congress extended Title VII protection to pregnant women through the PDA by amending it in two ways: (1) declaring that “sex discrimination includes discrimination ‘because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions’”; and (2) providing that “‘women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.’” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). ... Tucker has not raised a genuine issue of fact that her pregnancy played any part in Familia’s decision-making.

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy discrimination within Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination.

Bethea v. Winfield Security Corporation · filed 2023-12-14(k)

“The Pregnancy Discrimination Act makes clear that Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination applies to discrimination based on pregnancy.”

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions within Title VII’s protection against sex discrimination.

Hamilton v. Tompkinsville Drugs, LLC · filed 2024-02-09(k)

Title VII prohibits sex discrimination, which includes discrimination based on “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(k), 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Hamilton’s allegations can support a sex discrimination claim, however, because she also alleges that she had been performing well and had been promoted but upon returning from her maternity leave, her hours were reduced, she was demoted to a part-time position, and she was replaced by an employee that she previously managed.

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnant and breastfeeding women within Title VII’s protection against sex discrimination.

WEAVER v. GAT AIRLINE GROUND SUPPORT, INC. · filed 2024-02-20(k)

Thus, construing the allegations of the First Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that Plaintiff plausibly alleges both (a) causal nexus between her membership in a protected class (here, pregnant and breastfeeding women) and GAT's adverse employment decisions and (b) a claim of discrimination in violation of Title VII and the PHRA.

Section 2000e(k) treats discrimination based on pregnancy as sex discrimination under Title VII.

Duncan v. Department of the Treasury · filed 2024-02-27(k)

Discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is a type of sex discrimination protected under Title VII.

Section 2000e(k) defines discrimination because of sex to include discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.

Parker v. Children's National Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2024-03-04(k)

The first clause of the PDA provides that Title VII’s “terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions in Title VII’s definition of sex.

Curtis v. Best Care Senior Living at Port Richey, LLC · filed 2024-02-21(k)

Title VII’s definition of “sex” includes “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” § 2000e(k). Therefore, Title VII discrimination based on sex encompasses discrimination based on pregnancy.

Section 2000e(k) defines sex discrimination to include discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.

Colter v. United States Postal Service · filed 2024-03-21(k)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), sex discrimination includes discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”

Section 2000e(k) defines discrimination because of sex to include discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.

Morris v. Plymouth Court SNF, LLC · filed 2024-03-29(k)

Discrimination “on the basis of sex” includes discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions within sex discrimination; the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not create a separate cause of action.

Nunez-Renck v. International Business Machines Corporation · filed 2024-04-05(k)

But the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not provide a separate cause of action; rather, it “added new language to Title VII’s definitions subsection,” specifying that Title VII’s “ter[m] ‘because of sex’ . . . include[s] . . . because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 212 (2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).

Section 2000e(k) defines discrimination on the basis of sex to include discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.

Sobers v. Ascension Providence Hospital · filed 2024-04-23(k)

Discrimination “on the basis of sex” includes discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k); see also Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669, 669 (1983) (“Title VII was amended in 1978 by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to prohibit discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.”).

Section 2000e(k) defines discrimination because of sex to include discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.

Altwasser v. America's Auto Body, Inc. · filed 2024-04-25(k)

In 1978, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k), which added new language to Title VII’s definitions subsection, specifying that Title VII’s “ter[m] ‘because of sex’ ... include[s] ... because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” Young, 575 U.S. at 212, quoting §2000e(k), (otherwise cleaned up).

Section 2000e(k) protects employees from sex discrimination tied to childbearing capacity, including the use of an IUD.

Patterson v. Virginia Department Of Corrections · filed 2024-04-19(k)

Moreover, using an IUD implicates one’s childbearing capacity, a ground that Congress has recognized as protected by Title VII.

Section 2000e(k) defines discrimination because of sex to include discrimination based on pregnancy.

Ojeda v. Schrager · filed 2024-05-13(k)

“The Pregnancy Discrimination Act [(‘PDA’)] makes clear that Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination applies to discrimination based on pregnancy.” ... Ojeda has therefore adequately pleaded a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII.

Section 2000e(k) defines gender discrimination under Title VII to include discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.

Zhang v. The Energy Authority Inc · filed 2024-06-21(k)

Under Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, gender discrimination is defined to “include, but [is] not limited to, [discrimination] because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy discrimination within Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination.

Haner v. County of Niagara, New York · filed 2024-07-25(k)

“The Pregnancy Discrimination Act makes clear that Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination applies to discrimination based on pregnancy.” Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 210 (2015); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Under § 2000e(k), another pregnant worker cannot serve as a comparator in a disparate-treatment pregnancy claim.

GILLIAN v. DG DISTRIBUTION SOUTHEAST LLC · filed 2024-08-09(k)

The Court easily determines that the Pregnant Coworker cannot be a valid comparator.

Section 2000e(k) requires employers to treat workers affected by pregnancy the same as other workers with a similar ability to work.

Garza v. Philhaven · filed 2024-08-22(k)

The PDA does not, however, require preferential treatment for pregnant employees. Instead, it mandates that employers treat pregnant employees the same as non-pregnant employees who are similarly situated with respect to their ability to work.

A factual dispute remained over whether the employer discriminated under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act by denying work from home that it allowed other service managers.

Freudenberg v. Servcon, LLC · filed 2024-09-27(k)

Despite this, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff in violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act when it denied her request to work from home that it afforded to other service managers.

Section 2000e(k) applies to pregnancy discrimination in employment and does not cover a claim against an insurer by someone who is not its employee.

Simpson v. Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company · filed 2024-10-15(k)

Discrimination Act of 1978, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), and the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000gg, apply only in the employment context, and plaintiff was not an employee of Allstate.

Section 2000e(k) requires pregnant workers to be treated the same as other workers similar in their ability or inability to work; an accommodation claim must allege how comparable workers were treated more favorably.

(PS) Morris v. Solano County HSS Behavioral Health Divison · filed 2024-10-24(k)

The SAC fails to allege how SCHSS accommodated non-pregnant others similar in their ability or inability to work, or that SEIU assisted such others in securing accommodations.

Section 2000e(k) defines discrimination because of sex to include pregnancy, but does not extend Title VII to an employee discharged solely because of another person's pregnancy.

Ronen v. RedRoute, Inc. · filed 2025-01-24(k)

The PDA did not expand Title VII to encompass claims based on the protected characteristics of others.

Section 2000e(k) treats discrimination on the basis of pregnancy as discrimination on the basis of sex.

John v. Brooklyn Eye Center · filed 2025-01-28(k)

Under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL, discrimination on the basis of pregnancy constitutes discrimination “on the basis of sex.”

Section 2000e(k) covers discrimination based on a woman’s IVF efforts to become pregnant.

Stokka v. Scottsdale Unified School District · filed 2025-02-27(k)

The reasoning in Hall is persuasive. As the Seventh Circuit noted, only women undergo IVF treatment. Id. As alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint, she was terminated based on her gender-specific efforts and ability to become pregnant—which is a cognizable claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e(k) defines discrimination because of sex to include discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.

Forbes v. Tri-County Care, LLC. · filed 2025-03-07(k)

The phrase “because of sex” includes “because of . . . pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”

Section 2000e(k) includes discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions within sex discrimination under Title VII.

BRENNAN v. FIVE BELOW, INC. · filed 2025-03-13(k)

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title VII to state that discrimination on the basis of sex includes discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). ... Because Brennan has shown a genuine dispute of material fact as to her pregnancy discrimination and PHRA claims, summary judgment is denied.

Section 2000e(k) treats pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination; a leave policy that imposes an extra requirement on pregnant employees is facially discriminatory.

Gabbard v. Butler County, Ohio · filed 2025-03-20(k)

Since the BCAC’s Unpaid Pregnancy- Related Leave Policy places an additional burden for leave on pregnant employees, the policy is facially discriminatory under the PDA.

Section 2000e(k) treats pregnancy discrimination as discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII.

Ong v. Deloitte Consulting LLP · filed 2025-03-21(k)

Under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL, discrimination on the basis of pregnancy constitutes discrimination “on the basis of sex.”

Section 2000e(k) protects against pregnancy discrimination; a pregnant employee fired and replaced while on maternity leave may establish a prima facie case.

Brown v. Amesbury Management · filed 2025-03-27(k)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has made a prima facie case here. As set forth in the undisputed material facts, Plaintiff was pregnant, went on maternity leave, and was fired and replaced while on maternity leave.

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy within discrimination on the basis of sex, so pregnancy discrimination is analyzed like sex discrimination.

Simpson v. CSL Plasma · filed 2025-04-22(k)

Because pregnancy is included as a term in “on the basis of sex,” the analysis for pregnancy discrimination is the same analysis as sex discrimination.

Section 2000e(k) defines discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions as sex discrimination under Title VII.

DeGrosky v. HUB Stadium of Fountain Walk at Novi, LLC · filed 2025-04-04(k)

Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act provisions of Title VII, discrimination because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions is defined as a kind of sex discrimination and is prohibited.

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy-based discrimination within Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination; a plausible allegation that pregnancy motivated a trade states a claim.

Hamby v. WNBA, LLC · filed 2025-05-06(k)

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act expanded Title VII protections to discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k); Young, 575 U.S. at 212. ... Hamby has therefore plausibly stated claims for discrimination based on her pregnancy under Title VII and NRS § 613.330, and I deny the Aces’ motion to dismiss them.

Section 2000e(k) covers discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, but does not protect an employee’s status as a new parent.

Dryden v. State of South Dakota Department of Education · filed 2025-06-04(k)

Because an employee’s parental status is not protected under the PDA, Dryden has failed to make a prima facie showing of discrimination.

Section 2000e(k) requires employers to treat pregnant employees the same as non-pregnant employees who are similarly situated in their ability to work; it does not require preferential treatment.

Garza v. Philhaven · filed 2025-06-18(k)

The PDA does not, however, require preferential treatment for pregnant employees. Instead, it mandates that employers treat pregnant employees the same as non-pregnant employees who are similarly situated with respect to their ability to work.

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy discrimination within discrimination because of sex.

Patterson v. Spriggs Construction LLC · filed 2025-07-18(k)

Title VII and its state counterparts “prohibit[] an employer from discriminating against an employee ‘because of sex,’ which includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.” Prebilich- Holland v. Gaylord Entertainment Co., 297 F.3d 438, 442 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions within Title VII’s definition of discrimination because of sex.

Richmond v. Team One Contract · filed 2025-08-04(k)

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title VII’s definition of the phrase “because of sex” to include “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”

Title VII’s definition of discrimination because of sex includes discrimination because of pregnancy.

LaPolice v. FAM, LLC · filed 2025-08-18(k)

The phrase “because of sex” includes “because of or on the basis of pregnancy.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Section 2000e(k) does not require a pregnant employee alleging a discriminatory layoff to show less favorable treatment than nonpregnant employees with similar work limits when the claim is not based on unequal accommodations.

Bunnell v. Wm. Beaumont Hosp. · filed 2025-09-04(k)

Accordingly, Bunnell does not need to demonstrate that she was treated less favorably than non-pregnant employees with similar limits on their ability to work in order for her pregnancy-discrimination claim to survive summary judgment. She need only show a nexus between her lay off and her pregnancy.

Section 2000e(k) covers discrimination based on a nursing mother’s need to express breastmilk as sex discrimination.

WEAVER v. GAT AIRLINE GROUND SUPPORT, INC. · filed 2025-09-15(k)

From here, the analysis of Plaintiff’s discrimination claim closely parallels that of her retaliation claim: Defendants have proffered non-discriminatory reasons for Plaintiff’s discipline and discharge, but Plaintiff’s evidence suffices to create a triable issue as to whether those proffered reasons constitute a pretext for discrimination based on Plaintiff’s need to pump breastmilk (which, under the PDA as interpreted in Young, would amount to discrimination based on sex, in violation of Title VII).

Section 2000e(k) makes pregnancy discrimination a form of sex discrimination under Title VII; it does not create a separate cause of action.

Aguilera · filed 2025-11-04(k)

Individual employees or supervisors are not subject to suit under Title VII. Further, the PDA does not create a separate cause of action for pregnancy discrimination but merely “makes clear that Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination applies to discrimination based on pregnancy.” Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 210 (2015). Therefore, plaintiff’s Title VII claims against the individual defendants for race discrimination, pregnancy discrimination, and Title VII retaliation should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

A pregnancy discrimination claim under the PDA must allege facts showing satisfactory job performance at the time of the adverse employment action.

Hines · filed 2026-03-19(k)

To state a discrimination claim under the PDA, the Plaintiff must allege facts to show, among other things, that she was “performing [her] job duties at a level that met [her] employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of the adverse employment action.” ... Given this, the Plaintiff has not alleged facts to show a satisfactory job performance on the date of the alleged adverse employment action in this case. And so, the Court DISMISSES the Plaintiff’s PDA discrimination claim in Count I of the amended complaint.

Section 2000e(k) extends Title VII’s coverage of sex discrimination to pregnancy.

Iodice v. Southeastern Packing & Gaskets, Inc. · filed 1983-08-03(k)

Pursuant to the 1978 amendments, the coverage of Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964 was extended to cover pregnancy. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Section 2000e(k) covers discrimination based on pregnancy; a discharge caused solely by insubordination does not violate it.

Flood v. Blest Co. · filed 1985-12-06(k)

Plaintiff seeks recovery specifically under 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k) which prohibits discrimination against women on the basis of pregnancy. ... However, the Court finds that plaintiff's pregnancy was not a discernible factor in the decision to terminate her employment.

Section 2000e(k) treats pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination and requires pregnant employees to be treated like others with similar ability to work.

Richards v. City of Topeka · filed 1996-07-01(k)

The PDA was designed to ‘“prevent the differential treatment of women in all aspects of employment based on the condition of pregnancy.’ ” ... This dispute over what was said is a factual issue, one that must be considered by the jury.

Section 2000e(k) covers adverse treatment after childbirth when it is motivated by an employee’s pregnancy or planned maternity leave.

Vargas v. Globetrotters Engineering Corp. · filed 1998-05-07(k)

The Seventh Circuit, however, has indicated that a PDA claim is properly alleged if an employer, upon learning of an employee’s pregnancy (or her intent to take a maternity leave), sets out to treat her worse than other employees or prospective employees. ... As long as these questions remain unanswered, summary judgment in favor of GEC on the PDA claim is inappropriate.

Section 2000e(k) defines discrimination because of sex to include discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.

Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists · filed 2006-07-26(k)

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title VII in 1978 and provides: “The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes----” ... There is a genuine issue as to a material fact — whether defendant terminated plaintiff because of her sex and pregnancy or because of an evenly applied religious and moral code. Therefore, defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs Title VII claim is denied.

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy within Title VII’s definition of sex discrimination.

Hunter v. Mobis Alabama, LLC · filed 2008-06-02(k)

Here, it is undisputed that Hunter was (1) pregnant and thus protected by her class; (2) qualified for her job; and (3) was terminated.

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy within Title VII’s protection against sex discrimination.

Williams v. Silver Psychotherapy, LLC · filed 2025-05-27(k)

It is undisputed that as a pregnant woman, Plaintiff was a member of a protected class.

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions within Title VII’s definition of sex discrimination.

Sparrow v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2024-07-26(k)

Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) make it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex,” a term that includes “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”

Section 2000e(f)’s immediate adviser exception is construed narrowly and applies to employees in a close personal relationship with an elected official.

Goodwin v. Circuit Court · filed 1984-03-06(f)

The legislative history of this exemption shows that it is meant to apply to those employees who are in “a close personal relationship” with the official. ... Thus the job did not entail the sort of personal relationship contemplated in the exception.

Section 2000e(f)’s immediate-adviser exception is construed narrowly and does not exclude a hearing officer whose recommendations to a judge are formal and detached.

Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis County · filed 1984-03-06(f)

The Circuit Court argues that Goodwin was an immediate adviser to an elected official and thus does not qualify to sue under Title VII. We reject this argument. ... Here the testimony clearly showed that Judge Corrigan and Goodwin had very few personal contacts. Thus the job did not entail the sort of personal relationship contemplated in the exception.

Section 2000e(f) excludes elected public officials from Title VII’s definition of employee.

Jarman v. City of Northlake · filed 1997-01-16(f)

This case is unusual, however, because Dexter, as an elected official, was not an “employee” of Northlake.

Section 2000e(f) excludes elected officials from Title VII’s definition of employee.

Frank v. Harris County · filed 2004-12-15(f)

For purposes of Title VII, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 provides that elected officials are not employees.

Section 2000e(f)’s immediate adviser exemption is construed narrowly and does not exclude assistant city attorneys whose position does not involve directly advising the mayor.

Kelley v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2008-09-17(f)

Because the position of assistant city attorney does not act as an immediate adviser to the office of the mayor, Ms. Kelley was covered by Title VII’s definition of employee.

Section 2000e(f) excludes people elected to public office by qualified voters from Title VII’s definition of employee.

GREENMAN v. CITY OF HACKENSACK · filed 2020-09-12(f)

Thus, Title VII specifically excludes elected official from the definition of employee.

Section 2000e(f) excludes officials elected to public office from Title VII’s definition of employee.

Brown · filed 2026-02-19(f)

Because Caroline Brown was an elected member of the Council when she was allegedly subjected to discrimination, she was not a protected employee under Title VII or the MFEPA.

Section 2000e(k) does not bar state laws restricting employer-provided abortion benefits beyond the coverage the section requires.

National Educ. Ass'n of RI v. Garrahy · filed 1984-12-03(k)

Thus, far from imposing an affirmative bar to state legislation affecting the provision of abortion benefits, the language of the PDA states only a position of deliberate federal statutory neutrality with respect to these benefits.

Section 2000e(k) protects an employee from adverse employment action for contemplating an abortion.

Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., D/B/A Holiday Inn and Conference Center of Holland, Cross-Appellee · filed 1996-07-24(k)

A woman's right to have an abortion encompasses more than simply the act of having an abortion; it includes the contemplation of an abortion, as well. Since an employer cannot take adverse employment action against a female employee for her decision to have an abortion, it follows that the same employer also cannot take adverse employment action against a female employee for merely thinking about what she has a right to do. As a result, the district court's legal conclusion that Title VII, as amended by the PDA, applies to the action of Holland Hospitality in discharging Turic, is affirmed.

Section 2000e’s extension of Title VII to state and local government employees does not displace their existing § 1983 remedy for Fourteenth Amendment violations.

Trigg v. Fort Wayne Community Schools · filed 1985-06-25

By contrast, the legislative history of § 2 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, clearly indicates that § 2 was not intended to displace the existing § 1983 remedy for Fourteenth Amendment violations for state employees.

Section 2000e(k) does not make new-parent status a protected class under Title VII.

Van Soeren v. Disney Streaming Service · filed 2020-10-16(k)

Plaintiff’s Title VII claim cannot survive the first step of the McDonnell Douglas standard because familial status — such as being a new parent — is not a protected class under Title VII.

Section 2000e(k) does not protect leave taken to raise a child rather than pregnancy leave.

Record v. Mill Neck Manor Lutheran School · filed 1985-06-25(k)

Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, does not protect people wishing to take child-rearing leaves as opposed to women wishing to take pregnancy leaves.

Section 2000e(k) requires employers to treat pregnancy-related work limitations the same as other conditions that similarly affect employees’ ability to work.

Maddox v. Grandview Care Center, Inc. · filed 1986-01-24(k)

The statute specifies that “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to do work....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). ... We agree with the district court that this case presents the type of discrimination which Congress intended the PDA to eradicate.

Section 2000e(k) requires pregnancy and related conditions to be treated as illnesses only when incapacitating.

Barrash v. Bowen · filed 1988-03-24(k)

Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(k), pregnancy and related conditions must be treated as illnesses only when incapacitating.

Section 2000e(k) permits limited preferential treatment for pregnancy, including up to one year of unpaid maternity leave after childbirth without proof of continuing disability.

Schafer v. Board of Public Education · filed 1989-09-14(k)

The provision of this flat one year period for recovery from childbirth despite the necessity for a showing of continuing disability in other cases is precisely that limited accommodation of pregnancy which Guerra allows.

Section 2000e(k) permits favorable leave during pregnancy-related physical disability, but does not permit women-only childrearing leave beyond that period without a showing of disability.

Schafer v. Board Of Public Education Of The School District Of Pittsburgh, Pa. · filed 1990-05-17(k)

We hold as a matter of law that Article 31, Sec. 3(c) of the collective bargaining agreement contravenes Title VII and is thus per se void for any leave granted beyond the period of actual physical disability on account of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions.

Section 2000e(k) does not treat leave to care for a newborn child’s medical needs as a pregnancy-related medical condition.

Barnes v. Hewlett-Packard Co. · filed 1994-03-07(k)

In the present ease, it can hardly be said that the desire to provide medical treatment to a newborn child, which Barnes sought leave to pursue here, is any more a “related medical condition” than the desire to breastfeed or wean a child.

Section 2000e(k) protects pregnant employees’ right to work on equal terms but does not require an employer to provide different benefits to a pregnant employee who is able to work.

Armstrong v. Flowers Hospital, Incorporated · filed 1994-10-03(k)

To the extent that a pregnant employee is able and willing to work, in spite of her concerns regarding risk to the fetus, the PDA protects her right to remain in the work place. The language of the statute simply does not address the right of a pregnant employee, fully able to work, to receive benefits that are different from, and arguably superior to, the benefits available to other employees.

Section 2000e(k) does not require employers to grant leave to prospective parents.

Cooper v. Drexel Chemical Co. · filed 1996-04-22(k)

As the PDA does not require that employers grant leave to prospective parents, Mr. Cooper has no protection under Title VII under the facts at bar.

Section 2000e(k) requires employers to treat pregnancy-related leave the same as comparable leave for other temporary disabilities; considering an employee's absence on maternity leave does not violate the section if the employer would consider other disability leave the same way.

In Re: CARNEGIE CENTER ASSOCIATES, Debtor. Deborah RHETT, Appellant, v. CARNEGIE CENTER ASSOCIATES · filed 1997-10-31(k)

We hold, in agreement with the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the plain language of the PDA, and the regulations under the PDA, that an employee alleging a PDA violation must show that her employer treated her differently than it would have treated an employee on leave for a temporary disability other than pregnancy. It is not a violation of the PDA for an employer to consider an employee's absence on maternity leave in making an adverse employment decision if it also would have considered the absence of an employee on a different type of disability leave in the same way.

Section 2000e(k) requires employers to treat pregnant employees as well as they would be treated if not pregnant, but does not require maternity leave or other special assistance.

Tari MARSHALL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1998-10-07(k)

The PDA does not require employers to offer maternity leave or other special assistance to pregnant employees; however, it does require employers to treat a pregnant employee as well as that employee would have been treated had she not been pregnant.

Section 2000e(k) requires equal treatment for employees affected by pregnancy but does not require employers to give them more favorable leave treatment.

Davidson v. Franciscan Health System of Ohio Valley, Inc. · filed 2000-01-20(k)

The case law and the statute are clear — the PDA does not require that employers treat pregnant employees more favorably.

A state licensing board does not become an employer or employment agency under § 2000e merely by regulating access to a profession.

George v. New Jersey Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners · filed 1985-11-27(b), (c)

This court concludes that the 1972 amendments to Title VII refer to governmental entities in their role as employers in the customary sense of the word and not in their role as regulators.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer does not cover a state board's licensing activities when the board neither pays nor engages the services of license applicants.

Haddock v. Board of Dental Examiners of California · filed 1985-11-26(b)

A simple reading of this definition suffices to demonstrate that it is not intended to apply to the kind of licensing activity in which the Board engages. In its licensing role, the Board neither pays the wages nor engages the services of the examinees. More specifically, there is no employer-employee relationship between the Board and Haddock.

Section 2000e does not treat a state board exercising its professional licensing authority as an employer or employment agency with respect to license applicants.

George v. New Jersey Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners · filed 1986-06-27(b), (c)

We need only add that ... Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, is not applicable to the licensing functions of a public agency exercised under the police powers of a state.

Section 2000e’s definitions of employer and employment agency do not cover a state board exercising its licensing authority under the state’s police power.

George v. New Jersey Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners · filed 1986-07-29(b), (c)

We need only add that Haddock v. Board of Dental Examiners of Cal., 777 F.2d 462 (9th Cir.1985), involving the licensing of dentists by the State of California, and Darks v. City of Cincinnati, 745 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir.1984), involving the licensing of dance halls by the City of Cincinnati, are in accord with our view that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, is not applicable to the licensing functions of a public agency exercised under the police powers of a state.

Section 2000e(f) extends Title VII’s protection for employment abroad only to U.S. citizens, excluding lawful permanent residents who are not citizens.

Shekoyan, Vladmir v. Intl · filed 2005-06-03(f)

Yet even assuming, arguendo, that a lawful permanent resident qualifies as a U.S. national—a matter the parties dispute—Shekoyan faces a significant problem: Title VII does more than merely exclude an alien employed overseas from protection; it affirmatively grants protection only to “a citizen of the United States.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). Especially in light of the presumption against extraterritoriality, the Congress’s express language extending the extraterritorial reach of Title VII only to American citizens controls.

Section 2000e(f) excludes people employed abroad from Title VII’s definition of employee unless they are American citizens.

Russell v. Midwest-Werner & Pfleiderer, Inc. · filed 1997-02-25(f)

Unless an American citizen, a person employed abroad is not an “employee” under Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) extends Title VII coverage overseas, but its 1991 amendment does not apply to conduct before November 21, 1991.

Kimble v. Holmes & Narver Services, Inc. · filed 1993-06-17(f)

Congress responded to this decision in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1078 (1991) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f)), which specifically extended the application of Title VII overseas. However, § 109(c) explicitly stated that the amendments contained in § 109 were not to apply to conduct occurring before the date of enactment (November 21, 1991). Because the conduct at issue in the present appeal occurred well before the enactment of the amendments to § 2000e(f), the Aramco decision is determinative of this appeal.

A prison inmate worker must show that his prison work qualifies him as an employee under Title VII.

Thorpe v. Aramark Correctional Services, LLC · filed 2024-07-31(f)

The Magistrate Judge determined that Plaintiff’s Title VII claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that a prison inmate worker is an employee for purposes of Title VII. ... Thus, the Court concludes that the parties’ objections are without merit, and that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 31) should be ADOPTED and APPROVED.

Section 2000e does not cover a prisoner's pay-discrimination claim arising from prison employment.

Taylor v. Lambert · filed 1987-05-05

Upon consideration, we agree that plaintiff's claim based on pay discrimination in his prison employment is not cognizable under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 206(d) and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e.

Section 2000e(f) does not treat a prisoner required to work for a state prison industry as part of a sentence as an employee covered by Title VII.

McCaslin v. Cornhusker State Industries · filed 1996-12-20(f)

In reliance on Williams v. Meese, E.E.O.C. decision 86-7, and the cases dealing with the FSLA, I conclude that Title VII does not apply to the prisoner working in the state prison, for the state prison industry as part of his or her sentence.

Section 2000e’s definition of “employee” excludes an inmate whose work relationship with prison officials arises from incarceration.

Portley-El v. Zavaras · filed 1999-07-27(f)

Portley-El is not an “employee” for purposes of Title VII.

A prisoner working for UNICOR is not an employee under Title VII because the relationship arises from incarceration rather than employment.

Wilkerson v. Samuels · filed 2013-05-03(f)

Similarly, for purposes of Title VII, Wilkerson’s relationship with UNICOR is one of a prisoner, not an employee.

An inmate performing prison labor is not an employee of the prison for purposes of Title VII.

Morgan 313765 v. Rewerts · filed 2024-07-22(f)

However, courts that have addressed the issue have consistently found that the relationship between a department of corrections and an inmate performing labor is not an employment relationship within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e(a) does not define “party,” so the term takes its ordinary legal meaning in Title VII notice regulations.

Banks v. Rockwell International North American Aircraft Operations · filed 1987-08-04(a)

The term “party” is not defined in the definitions applicable to Title VII actions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a). Therefore, the Court gives “party” its everyday legal meaning.

Section 2000e(f) does not exclude nonresident aliens who apply for employment in the United States from Title VII’s protection.

Hartman v. Wick · filed 1988-02-16(f)

Thus, in light of the plain language of the statute, the silent legislative history, and accepted rules of statutory construction, the Court must find that Title VII applies to non-resident aliens who apply for employment within the United States.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer does not exclude foreign corporations doing business in the United States.

Ward v. W & H VOORTMAN, LTD. · filed 1988-05-25(b)

For example, certain bona fide private membership clubs and employers with less than 15 employees are not subject to its requirements. 42 U.S.C. A. § 2000e(b). ... Title VII, however, does not expressly exempt from its provisions foreign corporations doing business here.

Section 2000e includes corporations owned by foreign governments that engage in commercial activity in the United States within its definitions of persons and employers.

Starrett v. Iberia Airlines of Spain · filed 1989-11-08(a)-(b)

Because of this broad governmental coverage, this Court holds that, in the absence of express intent on the part of Congress to exclude corporations owned by foreign governments which are engaged in commercial activity in the United States, such corporations are employers and persons within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 630(a)-(b) (ADEA) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)-(b) (Title VII).

Section 2000e(b)’s fifteen-employee threshold may include employees of an integrated foreign company, even when its overseas operations are exempt from Title VII.

Wildridge v. IER, INC. · filed 1999-09-02(b)

The same reasoning applies here. The exemption for overseas operations of foreign companies speaks only to the substantive protections of Title VII. It does not preclude counting employees of these foreign entities for purposes of determining whether the minimum-employee threshold is met.

A foreign state's commercial employment activities in the United States can fall within Title VII's employer definition.

Mukaddam v. Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations · filed 2001-03-27(b)

The question of whether the mission is an “employer” under Title VII or the NYSHRL is controlling in the sense that a resolution favorable to defendant would be dispositive. But there is no substantial ground for difference of opinion on the matter. Both Title VII and the NYSHRL apply to foreign states’ commercial employment activities in the United States.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to have at least 15 employees for Title VII coverage; evidence of joint employment can create a factual question about whether that threshold is met.

Jacobsen v. Meron Medical, LLC · filed 2022-05-18(b)

An analysis of the Darden factors persuades me that there are genuine issues of material fact and there is evidence in the record from which a reasonable juror could find that Insperity was Plaintiff’s joint employer.

A district court treated § 2000e(b)’s employee threshold as jurisdictional, contrary to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Arbaugh that it is a nonjurisdictional element.

Spears v. Nanaki L L C · filed 2022-05-23(b)

The Court is persuaded by this argument and notes the jurisprudence following the precedent that numerosity is a jurisdictional issue. Accordingly, the jurisdictional requirement in the instant case is not met and Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).

A county does not become a joint employer under Title VII merely by paying an employee’s wages and approving their amount; control over the fundamental aspects of employment matters.

Chames v. Calhoun County Commission · filed 2022-04-26(b)

That the County paid Plaintiff’s wages and had authority to approve the amount of Plaintiff’s pay is insufficient to demonstrate that the County controlled “the fundamental and essential aspects of the employment relationship when taken as a whole.”

An entity is a joint employer under Title VII when it exercises significant control over a worker’s employment; no single factor decides that question.

Gordon v. Carl Amber Brian Isaiah and Associates, Co. · filed 2022-03-22(b)

Ultimately, the Court is mindful that control is the guidepost, and after balancing all of the Butler factors, including the first three, the Court finds no merit to Plaintiff’s objections, and the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s determination that CBAIA was not Plaintiff’s joint employer and therefore cannot be held liable for Plaintiff’s Title VII claims.

A factual dispute over whether a franchisor was the worker’s employer can prevent summary judgment on Title VII liability.

WARD v. COTTMAN TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS, LLC · filed 2022-03-29(b)

These disputes leave a genuine issue of material fact as to whether CTS was Ward’s employer and thus whether CTS is liable for discrimination under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 2000e requires facts showing an employment relationship with a defendant, including facts showing control when multiple entities are alleged to be joint employers.

Erbe v. Campbell · filed 2021-05-11(b), (f)

In sum, Erbe has not adequately alleged that she is an employee of Think Big Pikesville or that Think Big Enterprises were her joint employers for the purposes of a Title VII claim.

Section 2000e(f) allows a Title VII plaintiff to treat an entity as a joint employer when the facts show it controlled the plaintiff’s employment.

Carter v. Dominion Energy, Inc. · filed 2021-03-26(f)

Under both, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege that Dominion/VEPCO was their employer. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f); ... Therefore, under Butler, Plaintiffs’ alleged facts are insufficient to sustain a claim that Dominion/VEPCO acted as a joint employer.

An entity may be a joint employer under Title VII when it exercises sufficient control over workers, regardless of contractual labels.

Al-Kharouf v. District of Columbia · filed 2020-10-30(b)

Plaintiffs have submitted evidence raising a genuine dispute of fact about whether the District’s control over Plaintiffs created an employer-employee relationship, despite this contract language.

A Title VII plaintiff claiming joint employment must allege facts showing the additional employer’s control over the work or essential employment terms; daily supervision alone is insufficient.

Mack v. Aspen of D.C., Inc. · filed 2017-03-31(b)

Title VII prohibits “employers” from discriminating against their employees 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, § 2000e-2, § 2000e-3. ... But she must provide more detail than she has for the Court to include that the District was her employer for purposes of Title VII liability, particularly when she explicitly alleges that another entity_Aspen_was her employer.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer can include a joint employer when the economic realities show that it controlled the worker’s employment.

Phillips v. Board of Trustees · filed 2016-11-03(b)

Having considered the Layton factors, the court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to present substantial evidence that indicates UAHSF was her employer while she worked in the PM & R Department of UAB’s School of Medicine.

Section 2000e’s employee definition can cover a worker jointly employed by a hospital and a staffing company.

Scott v. Sarasota Doctors Hospital, Inc. · filed 2015-11-05(f)

Analyzing the evidence in a light 'most favorable to Scott, there is certainly an issue of fact on the issue of whether the Hospital and Emcare operated as a single employer with respect to Scott.

Title VII’s definition of employer allows multiple entities to be joint employers of the same worker.

Butler v. Drive Automotive Industries of America, Inc. · filed 2015-07-15(b)

We now hold that the joint employment doctrine is the law of this Circuit.

Section 2000e’s employer and employee definitions allow a Title VII claim against an indirect employer that exercises sufficient control over a worker; directing an alleged discriminatory act alone is insufficient.

Love v. JP Cullen & Sons, Incorporated · filed 2015-03-09(b), (f)

For these reasons, this final consideration does not alter our conclusion that Cullen exercised insufficient control over Love, and that Cullen is not liable as an indirect employer under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) allows multiple entities to qualify as an employee’s employer for Title VII liability when they exercise sufficient control over the employment relationship.

Tamayo v. Blagojevich · filed 2008-05-27(b)

We have also held that multiple entities may be considered an employee’s “employer” for the purposes of Title VII liability.

Section 2000e(f) permits a joint-employment test to determine whether a contractor’s worker is also an employee of a federal agency.

Butterbaugh v. Chertoff · filed 2007-03-20(f)

Thus, in choosing the proper test for discerning whether Plaintiffs were Defendant’s employees, the Court still looks to § 2000e(f). The Court’s taxonomy — applying Dar-den to § 2000e(b) and Browning-Ferris to § 2000e(f) — helps explain why a rose may not be a rose may not be a rose.

Section 2000e(b) requires a joint employer to possess employer attributes to some degree, including control over hiring, supervision, or firing.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Pacific Maritime Association · filed 2003-11-24(b)

Logically, before a person or entity can be a joint employer, it must possess the attributes of an employer to some degree. ... These circumstances are not present here. Accordingly, we conclude that PMA was not a joint employer of Jones.

Section 2000e(b) can cover an entity that exercises sufficient control over workers to qualify as their employer under common law agency principles or as a joint or single employer.

Rivera v. Puerto Rican Home Attendants Services, Inc. · filed 1996-04-29(b)

Consequently, plaintiffs’ allegations would permit proof of control sufficient to bring the City within the definition of “employer” under the common law agency principles or that would warrant treating the City and PRHAS as joint employers or a single employer.

Under § 2000e(b), a company may be an employer under Title VII when it substantially controls a worker’s employment, even if it does not pay the worker directly.

Duplessis v. Warren Petroleum, Inc. · filed 1996-03-27(b)

However, under Title VII Warren Petroleum does not have to directly pay a plaintiff in order to be considered an employer. Under the functional definition and considering the factors of the hybrid test used in multiple employer cases, Warren Petroleum exercised a right of control over the plaintiffs' work, provided the equipment, set up the work schedule and job assignment, and the place of work on a daily basis. There remain genuine issues of material fact as to whether Warren Petroleum can be considered plaintiffs' employer liable for racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 2000e and La.R.S. 51:2242 et seq. and it is not clear that the defendants carried their burden of proof relating to a summary judgment in a discrimination suit.

Section 2000e(b)'s fifteen-employee requirement can be satisfied when a smaller entity and a larger entity are joint employers.

Johnson v. El Paso Pathology Group, P.A. · filed 1994-06-27(b)

Therefore, unless the System, which had more than fifteen employees, was also her employer, she cannot maintain her suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... The fact situation in this case is more suited to an analysis under the Trevino case, and the Court is of the opinion that, under the factors outlined in Trevino, Defendants were the joint employers of Plaintiff.