42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(b) provides criminal penalties for violations of its confidentiality rule, but does not authorize a district court to impose civil sanctions at a company's request.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Recruit U.S.A., Inc. · filed 1991-07-19(b)

The penalty provisions to which the companies refer prescribe criminal offenses, not civil sanctions.

Section 2000e-5(b)'s confidentiality restriction applies to EEOC employees and does not prohibit employers from publicly responding to discrimination charges.

Toth v. California University of Pennsylvania · filed 2012-01-09(b)

The statutory provisions relied upon by Toth apply only to employees of the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-8(e). They do not prohibit covered employers from publicly refuting allegations lodged against them.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a plaintiff who did not timely file an EEOC charge to join a timely filing plaintiff’s suit when their claims are sufficiently similar to preserve notice and an opportunity for conciliation.

Zuckerstein v. Argonne National Laboratory · filed 1987-06-17(e)

We therefore hold that under appropriate circumstances the single-filing rule may be invoked by plaintiffs who have not complied with the procedural filing requirements of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s EEOC charge-filing requirement cannot be excused under the single-filing rule when the filing plaintiff lacked standing to raise the nonfiling plaintiff’s claim.

Peners L. Griffin and Henry L. Dejerinett v. Richard L. Dugger, Etc. · filed 1987-09-23(e)

Smith cannot point to Griffin’s EEOC charge, which arguably contained a testing claim brought on behalf of others, to excuse his failure to have filed his own testing charge with the EEOC when Griffin did not have standing to raise the testing issue. We cannot permit the single-filing rule to be used to circumvent the constitutional requirement of standing.

A plaintiff who has not filed an EEOC charge may rely on a co-plaintiff’s charge when their claims arise from similar discriminatory treatment in the same time frame.

Hill v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority · filed 1988-04-11(e)

Under the “single filing rule,” plaintiffs who have not themselves filed may rely on the filing of a co-plaintiff if the claims of the filing and non-filing plaintiffs have arisen out of similar discriminatory treatment in the same time frame. ... The combination of these facts convinces us that these plaintiffs did not suffer discriminatory treatment similar to Hill’s and in the same time frame.

Section 2000e-5 permits a plaintiff who did not file an EEOC charge to join a Title VII suit when the plaintiff’s claims are substantially similar to those covered by another plaintiff’s charge.

Lange v. Cigna Individual Financial Services Co. · filed 1991-03-20(e)

Based upon these facts, the court finds that Pino’s and Lange’s claims are substantially similar and the filing of Pino’s charge was sufficient to provide Cigna with notice of Lange’s claims and encourage conciliation. Accordingly, the court will allow Lange to invoke the “single filing rule” and will grant partial summary judgment in favor of Lange with respect to the defendants’ third and fourth affirmative defenses.

The single filing rule permits a plaintiff to sue a defendant named in another plaintiff’s administrative charge when their discrimination claims are sufficiently related.

Streeter v. Joint Industry Board of Electrical Industry · filed 1991-06-21(f)(1)

Accordingly, the court holds that plaintiffs’ claims are sufficiently related so that the single filing rule applies; thus the administrative filing requirement is waived as to Streeter’s claim against Local 3 and Ellis’s claim against JIB.

A timely EEOC charge by one plaintiff can support claims by nonfiling plaintiffs arising from similar discriminatory treatment in the same time frame.

Jones v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 1992-10-27(e)

Because we hold that it was improper to grant summary judgment for Firestone on Jones’ promotion claims, we also remand the promotion claims of the .Intervenors for further proceedings pursuant to the single filing rule.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s EEOC charge requirement permits nonfiling plaintiffs to pursue similar claims when a named plaintiff timely filed a charge.

JONES v. FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY · filed 1992-12-29(e)

Because we hold that it was improper to grant summary judgment for Firestone on Jones' promotion claims, we also remand the promotion claims of the Intervenors for further proceedings pursuant to the single filing rule.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s filing requirement does not bar a substantially related claim arising in the same time frame as a timely filed claim, even if that claimant filed no separate charge.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILSON METAL CASKET COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1994-05-23(e)

Consequently, we join the above circuits and hold where a substantially related non-filed claim 2 arises out of the same time frame as a timely filed claim, the complainant need not satisfy Title VII's filing requirement to recover.

Section 2000e-5’s EEOC filing requirement permits an untimely plaintiff to proceed under the single-filing rule when another plaintiff’s timely charge gives notice of sufficiently similar discrimination claims.

Rubidoux v. Johnston · filed 1997-02-26(e)(1)

Here, plaintiff Rubidoux’s late filed charge is almost identical to plaintiff Wisthoffs. Moreover, plaintiff Wisthoffs affidavit filed with her charge specifically references plaintiff Rubidoux as someone who had a grievance against Mr. Jiminez. Consequently, the Wisthoff charge gave CMHIP and the EEOC notice of plaintiff Rubidoux’s claims of discrimination. Allowing her to proceed would not defeat the purposes behind the requirement of administrative exhaustion. Therefore, under the single-filing rule, the court has jurisdiction over plaintiff Rubidoux’s claims of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) generally requires a Title VII charge in a deferral state within 300 days; under the single filing rule, another claimant may rely on a timely charge only if the claims involve similar treatment in the same time frame.

Scarborough v. Brown Group, Inc. · filed 1997-03-11(e)(1)

In order to “piggyback” on a timely filed charge, a claim must be substantially related, arising out of similar discriminatory treatment occurring in the same time frame. ... Under the requirements of the single filing rule, the timely administrative charges filed by Roberson, Lowery, and Walker are inadequate to support the claims filed by Scarborough, Myrick, and Spurgeon.

Section 2000e-5 allows a Title VII class member to rely on another plaintiff’s timely EEOC charge under the single-filing rule when their claims arise from the same discriminatory practices.

Shuford v. Alabama State Board of Education · filed 1997-05-23(f)(1)

Threatt and Davis do not contest the allegation that they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies independently by failing to file timely charges with the EEOC. Instead, they attempt to bypass the exhaustion requirement under the single-filing rule by appending their individual claims to Dr. Newton’s and Dr. Johnson’s individual claims. ... Their claims certainly arise from the same practices that are challenged by Newton and that are the subject of the two consent decrees that have been previously entered by this court. ... Thus, Davis and Threatt may pursue their individual Title VII claims in this court.

A plaintiff with a substantially related claim arising in the same time frame as timely filed EEOC charges may sue under the single filing rule without filing her own charge.

Logan v. West Coast Benson Hotel · filed 1997-09-09(e)(1)

As such, Favreau’s action falls under the “single filing rule” exception to the filing requirement of Title VII. Furthermore, Title VII’s purpose has been met since plaintiffs Logan’s and Matthews’ claims notified both defendants, Kirshner and the Benson Hotel, of the alleged wrongdoing and the EEOC was able to attempt to conciliate with the wrongdoers before having to file an action with this court. Therefore, Favreau may properly be a plaintiff in this proceeding and defendant Benson Hotel is not entitled to summary judgment on this issue.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows a plaintiff to rely on another plaintiff’s EEOC charge when their claims involve similar discriminatory treatment in the same time frame and separate filing would serve no notice or conciliation purpose.

Vonderohe v. B & S of Fort Wayne, Inc. · filed 1999-03-11(e)(1)

Although their claims and allegations of sexual harassment are not identical, we find that they are similar enough in scope and time that the notice and conciliation policies of Title VII will not be contravened by excusing Kump from filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a plaintiff who did not file an EEOC charge to participate in a Title VII lawsuit when the original charge gives the employer notice of the class discrimination allegations.

Miller v. Hygrade Food Products Corp. · filed 2000-03-24(e)

Under the “single-filing rule” (or exception), a non-filing plaintiff may properly participate in a Title VII lawsuit provided that the original complainant’s administrative charge gives the employer notice of the allegations of class discrimination.

Title VII’s single filing rule does not let later intervenors treat a union’s associational suit as a class action to avoid the EEOC charge and filing deadlines.

Communications Workers of America v. New Jersey Department of Personnel · filed 2002-02-25(e), (f)(1)

The Local unpersuasively attempts to distinguish Whalen by arguing that the subsequent action in that case was an individual action, whereas here, the action is in the form of a representative action. Notwithstanding the Local’s repeated assertions that the National’s action in the District Court was in the form of a representative or class action, its arguments have no merit and must be rejected. An acceptance of the Local’s argument would eviscerate the distinction between an action filed by an entity based on associational standing, as did the National in this case, and class actions, and the attendant requirements of class certifications and the associated procedural due notice and fairness safeguards as provided by Fed. R.Civ.P. Rule 23.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits similarly situated plaintiffs to rely on another plaintiff’s timely charge only if an allegation of class discrimination is apparent on the face of that charge.

Greene v. City of Boston · filed 2002-06-14(e)

I am persuaded that for sound policy reasons our Circuit would require that an allegation of class discrimination be apparent on the face of the charge. Because that is not the case here, the motion to dismiss will be allowed.

Section 2000e-5 requires a plaintiff who filed a timely EEOC charge to obtain a right-to-sue letter before suing; the single filing rule does not excuse that requirement.

Smith v. HealthSouth Rehabilitation Center of Memphis, Ltd. · filed 2002-10-09(f)

Based on its review of the case law and the pleadings, the court finds that Vickie Smith may benefit from the single filing rule only if she did not file an EEOC charge at all or if she filed a charge that was untimely. Her only allegation in this regard is that she filed a charge but did not receive a right-to-sue letter despite her request therefor. She has not averred that the charge she filed was not timely. Thus, the single filing rule is of no application here. As a consequence, the claims of Vickie Smith must be dismissed as she has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s timely charge requirement can be excused under the single-filing doctrine only when the claims arise from the same unlawful conduct.

Tia J. Horton, and Karen Brooks, Proposed Intervenor v. Jackson County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2003-09-10(e)

The doctrine should at the very least be limited to cases, such as our hypothetical case of the discharge of all workers over 40, in which the unexhausted claim arises from the same unlawful conduct.

A plaintiff who has not filed an EEOC charge may rely on a co-plaintiff’s timely, valid charge when their claims involve similar discriminatory treatment in the same time frame.

Prewett v. STATE OF ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS · filed 2006-03-03(e)(1)

In multiple-plaintiff, non-class action suits, a plaintiff can rely on the charge of her co-plaintiff if the charge relied on is timely and not otherwise defective and the individual claims of the filing and non-filing plaintiffs have arisen out of similar discriminatory treatment in the same time frame.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s administrative charge requirement cannot be avoided through the single filing rule when plaintiffs bring individual suits rather than a class action.

Gadson v. City of Wilmington Fire Department · filed 2007-03-19(e)

Plaintiffs did not file their complaint as a class action; therefore, they may not use the single filing rule to avoid Title VII’s exhaustion requirement.

A plaintiff cannot use another plaintiff’s EEOC charge to revive a Title VII claim that was already time barred when the charge was filed.

King v. McMillan · filed 2007-05-04(f)(1)

The single-filing rule is not properly used to resurrect statutorily barred claims.

Section 2000e-5 permits a claimant to rely on another employee’s timely EEOC charge when their related grievances arise during the same time frame in a small work unit.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Taco Bell Corp. · filed 2008-09-15(f)(1)

Because Perry’s and the Aggrieved Party’s grievances occurred during the same time frame and because they occurred within a small work unit, Perry’s charge is sufficient to support piggybacking and the single filing rule is applicable.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a plaintiff who did not file an EEOC charge to join a Title VII suit under the single-filing doctrine when the plaintiff’s claim involves similar discriminatory conduct during the same period as a timely filed charge.

Riley-Jackson v. Casino Queen, Inc. · filed 2011-03-01(e)

Nor is the lack of an EEOC charge an impediment to Wright because he may proceed under the single-filing (or “piggybacking”) doctrine, a judge-made exception to the general rule that a timely administrative charge is a prerequisite to a Title VII suit. ... Finding that Wright may piggyback onto the timely-filed charges of other Plaintiffs herein, the Court proceeds to consider whether Defendant CQ has demonstrated a valid basis for summary judgment on Wright’s race discrimination and hostile work environment claims.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows claimants to recover without filing individual charges when a timely charge gave the employer notice of potential class liability.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Finish Line, Inc. · filed 2013-01-10(f)(1)

Here, as required under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e—5(f)(1), Roberts timely filed her charge of discrimination, which triggered an investigation and gave Defendant notice of its potential class liability. As such, Watson and Hopmayer can attach their claims to Roberts charge and are under no duty to file their own individual charges. Thus, the Court concludes that under the single filing rule, Watson and Hopmayer were not required to file a charge to recover, and their claims are not time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s EEOC charge requirement allows a similarly situated plaintiff to rely on another plaintiff’s charge under the single-filing exception.

['Hill v. Gray'] · filed 2014-03-21(e)(1)

Because the later-added plaintiffs argue that their discrimination claims are “similarly situated” to Ms. Hill’s discrimination claims, and because the defendants did not take the opportunity to raise any counter-arguments, this Court will apply the single-filing exception pursuant to the doctrine of vicarious exhaustion and allow these six plaintiffs to join Ms. Hill’s properly filed complaint, despite their procedural missteps.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s EEOC charge requirement allows a plaintiff to rely on another’s charge for identical claims, but not for broader claims that the charge did not put the employer on notice of.

Chicago Regional Council of Carpenters v. Pepper Construction Co. · filed 2014-03-26(e)

The court concludes that this circuit’s precedent does not permit the CRCC to piggyback on McKinney’s charge insofar as it seeks declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of a class of its members. Count I is accordingly dismissed without prejudice. As CRCC’s claims in Count II are identical to McKinney’s, CRCC may piggyback on McKinney’s EEOC charge with respect to those claims; thus, it may remain in this case as a plaintiff with respect to Count II.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a plaintiff to rely on another plaintiff’s EEOC charge only if the plaintiff could have filed a timely charge when the earliest representative charge was filed.

Barrett v. Forest Laboratories, Inc. · filed 2014-08-14(e)

Although similarly-situated plaintiffs may “piggyback” off other plaintiffs’ EEOC charges, individuals may only “piggyback” if they could have filed a timely charge at the time of the earliest class representative’s charge.

Plaintiffs who did not file EEOC charges may rely on vicarious exhaustion when another plaintiff’s charge gives the employer sufficient notice of their similar claims.

Davis v. District of Columbia Child and Family Services Agency,et Al · filed 2017-03-31(f)(1)

The Court finds that the EEOC charges filed by Mr. Morris and Mr. Ajakaiye provided ... sufficient notice to the District of the similar claims raised by other Plaintiffs.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an administrative charge before a Title VII suit, but the single filing rule permits similarly situated claimants to rely on another claimant’s timely charge.

Threat v. City of Cleveland, Ohio · filed 2020-07-31(e)(1)

Although Defendants insist Moore and Walker must file their own charges, the “single filing rule” permits similarly situated parties to join a timely filed administrative charge.

Under § 2000e-5’s EEOC charge procedure, similarly situated employees may rely on another employee’s charge under the single-filing rule.

Kniss v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 2020-11-19(e)(1)

Mr. Swartwood and Mr. Raburn may piggyback on Mr. Kniss’s filed EEOC charge.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s EEOC filing requirement permits a nonfiling employee to rely on another employee’s timely charge only when it gives the employer sufficient notice of the nonfiling employee’s claim.

Barnes v. Rochester City School District · filed 2024-12-20(e)(1)

The Court is not persuaded that Barnes’ charge of discrimination gave Defendant sufficient notice of its alleged discriminatory actions against Robinson that had occurred on, and prior to, June 29, 2015.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) provides subject matter jurisdiction and venue for Title VII and Rehabilitation Act actions, but does not confer personal jurisdiction.

Carroll v. Tennessee Valley Authority · filed 1988-03-07(f)(3)

Accordingly, although subject matter jurisdiction and venue may be predicated on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), personal jurisdiction may not.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) designates venues for Title VII claims but does not confer personal jurisdiction over a defendant lacking minimum contacts with the forum.

Jones v. Campbell University · filed 2018-09-04(f)(3)

To the extent that Jones previously argued that Title VII’s provisions on venue could confer personal jurisdiction, that argument is similarly unreasonable. The difference between the two concepts is often lost on first-year law students, but licensed attorneys are expected to understand that a statute designating the proper venue for a claim cannot override the Constitution’s requirement that a defendant have minimum contacts with any forum that exerts power over him.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) bars a charging party who knowingly declines to intervene in a valid EEOC suit from bringing a separate suit on the same charge after that suit ends in a consent decree.

Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc. · filed 1989-03-28(f)(1)

A common sense reading of § 706(f)(1) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), in keeping with its purpose,... leads to a reasonable and logical conclusion that Riddle’s present independent suit against Cerro Wire is not authorized by the federal statute under which it is brought.

Section 2000e-5(f) precludes the EEOC from filing a separate Title VII action based on the same facts after the charging party files suit, but allows the EEOC to seek leave to intervene in that suit.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Harris Chernin, Inc. · filed 1991-07-15(f)

The Magistrate Judge agrees with Chernin’s position that the EEOC may not maintain a separate Title VII action, but points out that rather than granting summary judgment, the court should dismiss this claim and grant the EEOC leave to intervene in Rosenthal’s Title VII action. ... After a de novo review of the authorities, this court accepts the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation on this issue. ... The Eighth and Tenth Circuits have addressed the issue, and have interpreted the relevant language in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f), to preclude the EEOC from so filing.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits an aggrieved employee to bring an individual Title VII action despite a union’s participation in an earlier consent decree when the employee’s claim had not yet accrued.

Barfus v. City of Miami · filed 1991-07-26(f)(1)

Thus, the district court's determination that the union members are bound by the consent decree because the union was a signatory is an insufficient basis on which to deprive appellants of their Title VII cause of action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits an employee to bring an individual Title VII action for a claim arising after the employee’s union joined a consent decree.

Barfus v. City of Miami · filed 1991-07-26(f)(1)

Thus, it cannot be the case that these non-minority union members, by their union’s participation in the consent decree negotiations, waived their right to bring a separate Title VII action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) precludes a charging party who did not intervene in an EEOC action from bringing a separate suit on the same claims after that action ends in a consent decree.

Francis v. American Telephone & Telegraph Company · filed 1994-01-19(f)(1)

Francis concedes that this case is controlled by an earlier in banc decision of this Court: "We read Sec. 706(f)(1) [of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988),] in these circumstances to preclude suits by individuals who are charging parties, but who have not intervened in the pending EEOC action in their behalf, once the EEOC action has been concluded by a consent decree." ... Hence, we find the district court properly relied on Adams as grounds for dismissing Francisn' action, and affirm that result.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s intervention provision does not bar an independent EEOC suit for other employees merely because the charging employee has already sued.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Swift Transportation Co. · filed 1999-11-12(f)(1)

Allowing the EEOC to file an independent action here would not render superfluous the intervention provision of section 706(f)(1). In fact, the intervention provision does not even seem applicable.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a person to file a private suit within 90 days after the EEOC dismisses their charge.

Pitts v. Maryland Department of Transportation · filed 2023-09-19(f)(1)

So although the EEOC has a duty to properly investigate charges of discrimination, a plaintiff may proceed with a private lawsuit under Title VII within 90 days of the EEOC dismissing a plaintiff’s charge, which the EEOC did here.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits courts’ authority to award affirmative relief in pattern-or-practice and class actions when a violation does not depend on its effect on a particular employee.

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins · filed 1989-05-01(g)

We think that this provision merely limits courts’ authority to award affirmative relief in those circumstances in which a violation of the statute is not dependent upon the effect of the employer’s discriminatory practices on a particular employee, as in pattern-or-practice suits and class actions.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits retroactive relief for identifiable victims who prove they were harmed by an unlawful employment practice.

United States v. City of Warren · filed 1991-02-14(g)

In sum, this Court concludes that retroactive relief is appropriate if the Government can bring forward identifiable victims who can prove they were victims of the discrimination (via disparate impact) brought about by Warren’s use of the preapplication residency requirement.

Section 2000e-5(g) governs a court’s remedies after liability is established and does not regulate private parties’ conduct.

United States v. New York City Bd. of Educ. · filed 2011-05-05(g)

Section 706(g), being a remedial provision and not a liability provision, does not speak to the actions of private parties; only a court is limited by it.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits the remedies a court may order; it does not govern an employer’s voluntary actions.

United States v. Brennan · filed 2011-05-05(g)

Section 706(g), being a remedial provision and not a liability provision, does not speak to the actions of private parties; only a court is limited by it.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an aggrieved party to file an EEOC discrimination charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, subject to waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling.

Crump v. Dulmison, Inc. · filed 1989-06-13(e)

Section 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), requires an aggrieved party to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within one hundred and eighty days from the date upon which the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. A party’s noncompliance with this statutory requirement bars action in a federal court unless such noncompliance is excused by waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge before a Title VII claim against a union may proceed.

O. Brown v. Laborer's International Union of North America, Mail Handler Division, U.S. Postal Service · filed 1989-06-22(e)

Since Section 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e) (1982) requires that an unlawful employment practice charge be filed with the EEOC within 180 and since Brown failed to file a charge with any agency, the district court properly dismissed this claim.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s EEOC charge-filing period may be equitably tolled when an employer withholds information supporting a Title VII claim.

Ross v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp. · filed 1989-08-11(e)

The court finds that the second extraordinary circumstance is applicable under the present facts and requires the court to equitably toll any timing deficiencies.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII claimant to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act.

Beavers v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. · filed 1990-11-21(e)

In order to assert a claim of discrimination under Title VII, a claimant must have filed a complaint with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory practice occurred. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e). ... None of the named plaintiffs filed a timely EEOC charge which is a necessary prerequisite for a Title VII action. Accordingly, the Title VII claims of the plaintiffs, including the class members, will be dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 300-day filing period begins when later events first reveal the possibly discriminatory nature of an employment decision and the employee is or should be aware of them.

Clark v. Emerson Electric Co. · filed 1990-12-05(e)

The Court agrees with plaintiff however that, where the possibly discriminatory nature of an employment decision is discernible only upon later events, the 300-day period does not commence until the plaintiff is or should be aware of those later events.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits an EEOC charge within 300 days when the state agency defers processing before that deadline.

Scheerer v. Rose State College · filed 1991-04-05(e)

The evidence in this case shows that the Oklahoma Human Rights Commission deferred processing of Plaintiff’s initial charge and notified EEOC of such on April 23, 1986, the 299th day. The court therefore finds that Plaintiff’s charge was indeed filed within the statutory period.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s filing period begins anew upon renegotiation or maintenance of a seniority system if there is evidence of discriminatory motive at that time.

Chambers v. Parco Foods, Incorporated · filed 1991-06-20(e)

Thus, if a plaintiff can point to evidence of discriminatory motive in the renegotiation or "maintenance" of a seniority system, then that date provides the time at which the statute of limitations begins to run, for it is at that point that the "discriminatory act" took place.

Section 2000e-5 requires a Title VII claimant to file an EEOC charge within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurs.

Miller v. Beneficial Management Corp. · filed 1991-10-18(e)

Under Title VII Miller was required to file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days "after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). Miller filed her charge with the EEOC on 27 February 1989. For the reasons set forth above, the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred in July 1984 when Miller transferred to Government Relations. Accordingly, Miller's charge filed with the EEOC on 27 February 1989 was beyond the 300 day filing requirement. Summary judgment is granted on Count VI.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a discrimination charge to be filed with the EEOC within 180 days after the discrimination occurred.

Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers International Union of North America · filed 1991-12-10(e)

Under Title VII, a charge of discrimination must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days after the discrimination occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... The Court finds that plaintiffs’ charges of discrimination were timely filed with the EEOC because defendants discriminated against plaintiffs within 180 days before they filed their discrimination charges.

Section 2000e-5(e) bars a Title VII claim when the employee fails to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of termination in a deferral state.

Money v. Great Bend Packing Co., Inc. · filed 1992-01-22(e)

Because the plaintiffs did not file with the EEOC within three hundred days of the date they were terminated from their employment, the plaintiffs are barred by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII discrimination charge to be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the unlawful employment practice.

Lenoir v. Roll Coater, Inc. · filed 1992-04-13(e)

A charge of discrimination under Title VII must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... Ms. Lenoir does not show that an official policy of promoting or tolerating these slurs existed and continued to affect her during the limitations period.

A Title VII charge filed more than 300 days after an employer adopts a challenged accommodation policy is untimely when later applications of the policy do not constitute new violations.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons, Inc. · filed 1992-04-13(e)(1)

In sum, R.R. Donnelley's adoption of the accommodation policy, not each application of that accommodation, was the relevant act that triggered the statute of limitations, and since Miller failed to file his charge of discrimination within 300 days of December 14, 1982, the plaintiffs’ Title VII claim is barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory practice when that filing period applies.

Rodriguez v. Richmond Memorial Hospital Roy Williams Ron Shea · filed 1992-05-18(e)

Because she did not file a discrimination charge with the EEOC until May 24, 1991, this claim is barred by the 180 day limitations period of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1988).

Section 2000e-5(e) generally requires a discrimination charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice; timely filing is not jurisdictional and may be equitably tolled when the facts warrant it.

Johnson v. The Injured Workers' Insurance Fund, A/K/A Maryland State Accident Fund · filed 1992-10-23(e)

Under Title VII, an aggrieved party generally has 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1988). ... Therefore, this claim was untimely. While the timely filing of a charge is not jurisdictional, Johnson has alleged no facts warranting equitable tolling. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of this claim.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires claimants to file an EEOC charge within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Tucker v. Union Underwear Co. · filed 1992-11-03(e)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) requires claimants to file charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Section 2000e-5(e) bars a Title VII action when the discrimination charge is filed with the EEOC more than 300 days after the challenged firing.

Stenson Fears, Jr. v. Kurt Manufacturing Company · filed 1993-02-24(e)

More than 300 days later, Fears filed a race discrimination charge with the state fair employment practices agency and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). ... Fears's action is time-barred. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1988); Worthington v. Union Pac. R.R., 948 F.2d 477, 479 (8th Cir. 1991).

Section 2000e-5(e)'s charge-filing deadline is subject to equitable tolling for duress only when coercive acts or threats prevent a person from exercising legal rights.

Moses v. Phelps Dodge Corp. · filed 1993-03-05(e)

Likewise, Plaintiff also concedes that she did not file a charge of discrimination within the time periods set forth under Title VII and the ACRA. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) and A.R.S. § 41-1481.A. Thus, the discrimination claims set forth at Count I are also time barred unless the doctrine of equitable tolling applies. ... In the absence of evidence of specific acts by Defendants which were sufficiently coercive or threatening in nature to preclude the exercise of Plaintiffs free will and judgment and prevent her from exercising her legal rights after her termination, the doctrine of equitable tolling simply does not apply.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge, and racially discriminatory wage payments constitute a continuing violation for purposes of the filing deadline.

Calloway v. Partners National Health Plans · filed 1993-03-19(e)

As a prerequisite to bringing suit under Title VII, a charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the date of the act giving rise to the charge. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e) (1992). ... Today we conclude that race based, discriminatory wage payments constitute a continuing violation of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a claimant to file an EEOC charge within 180 days after the claimant knows or has reason to know of the alleged discriminatory act, subject to equitable tolling.

Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman · filed 1993-04-05(e)

Indeed, we conclude that since the Plaintiff here knew or had reason to know that the alleged discriminatory act occurred on April 10,1990, we find that her action in this Court is barred by the 180-day statute of limitations.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an employee to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the challenged employment decision.

Berez v. Prudential Insurance Company of America · filed 1993-04-09(e)

The district court correctly ruled that Berez's claims pertaining to the two Development Manager positions were time barred because Berez had failed to file charges with the EEOC within 300 days of the appointments of David West and Wilson Baker in 1984 and 1985, respectively. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e)(2) allows a claim involving a discriminatory seniority system to accrue when the discriminatory act occurs or when its consequences injure the plaintiff.

Brunet v. City of Columbus · filed 1993-07-28(e)(2)

Section 2000e-5(e)(2) provides for the accrual of a cause of action when the consequences of the discriminatory act are felt by the plaintiff; it did not alter that portion of the decision recognizing that a cause of action accrues at the time of the discriminatory act.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 300-day charge-filing period is not extended for an isolated failure to promote that occurred outside the period.

West v. Boeing Co. · filed 1994-01-05(e)

The “continuing violation” doctrine is simply not applicable to this case. ... It does not make actionable an “isolated” or “unrelated” incident of discrimination that occurred outside that period. ... Accordingly, plaintiffs Title VII claim based on Boeing’s allegedly discriminatory failure to promote plaintiff because of her sex is untimely and must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely administrative charge; a claim not filed within the applicable 300-day period cannot proceed in federal court.

Amin v. Southland Corporation · filed 1994-03-02(e)

Amin failed to lodge his claim with regard to the first time Southland rehired him with Arlington County or the EEOC within 300 days of the discriminatory act as required by 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2000e-5(e) (West Supp.1993). Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment as to this claim.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s charge-filing deadline is subject to equitable tolling when EEOC oversight prevents a timely state filing.

Tate v. Shelby County Road Department · filed 1994-03-22(e)

Here, had the EEOC done what it was supposed to do under the agreement, namely file the charges with the THRC 5 , plaintiff's filing would have been timely because it was within 300 days of the alleged discrimination. ... We hold that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to the facts of this case.

Section 2000e-5(e) sets a deadline for filing a sexual harassment charge based on the alleged conduct.

Kraft v. Ekco Housewares Company, a Corporation · filed 1994-03-23(e)

The statute of limitations for filing a charge of sexual harassment based on Suda's conduct had expired well before Kraft filed the charge of sexual harassment based on Soto's conduct.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an employee to file an EEOC charge within the applicable filing period to preserve a Title VII claim.

Wyatt v. Kinney Shoe Corporation, Etc. · filed 1994-04-06(e)

We have carefully considered these claims and agree with the district court that these claims are time-barred because Wyatt did not file his Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory acts. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e) (time for filing Title VII charge); 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(d)(2) (same under Age Discrimination in Employment Act).

Section 2000e-5(e) gives a plaintiff 300 days to file a discrimination charge when the plaintiff files with a state agency authorized to address discrimination complaints.

Yee v. Multnomah County · filed 1994-04-29(e)

Where, as here, a plaintiff files a complaint with a state agency authorized to address discrimination complaints, Title VII provides for a 300-day statute of limitations. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e). Yee must allege discriminatory conduct within the 300-day period prior to his February 8, 1988, filing of a state complaint, a period that extends back to April 1987.

A Title VII claimant in a deferral state must file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Cornell v. General Electric Plastics · filed 1994-05-24(e)(1)

Because West Virginia is a so-called “deferral” state, ... a charge must be filed with the EEOC within three-hundred days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. ... The Court concludes Plaintiff has not preserved her federal rights under Title VII and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment must be GRANTED in regard to that claim.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives a plaintiff in a state with an agency authorized to address employment discrimination 300 days to file an EEOC charge; an untimely charge bars the claim unless the filing period is tolled.

Carrasco v. New York City Off-Track Betting Corp. · filed 1994-06-30(e)

In states such as New York that have an agency with the authority to address charges of discriminatory employment practices, the statute of limitations for filing a charge with the EEOC is 300 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... Accordingly, plaintiffs charge of discrimination is time-barred and is hereby dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge in a state, such as Illinois, with an agency authorized to handle employment discrimination complaints.

Melendez v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1994-08-15(e)

For “deferral” states such as Illinois, however, which have their own agencies with the authority to administer these complaints, the period is extended 300 days.

In a district with a 706 agency, a Title VII charge must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Webb v. District of Columbia · filed 1994-08-22(e)(1)

In a district with a 706 agency, a charge is untimely under Title VII if it is not filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 300-day EEOC charge filing period is subject to equitable tolling when circumstances beyond the claimant's control cause a late filing.

Houston v. Saint John's Mercy Skilled Nursing Center · filed 1994-10-18(e)

Houston had 300 days from the date of her allegedly wrongful termination in which to file a claim with the EEOC, see 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e), but she did not file her claim until over a year later. ... Equitable tolling is generally appropriate only when the circumstances that cause a plaintiff to miss a filing deadline are beyond his or her control. ... Houston has not shown that such circumstances exist in her case.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge; a charge filed within 180 days after the claim arose satisfies that requirement.

Wagner v. Nutrasweet Co. · filed 1994-12-05(e)

As pled, the Complaint satisfies all jurisdictional prerequisites required by Title VII and the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”). ... Third, Wagner filed a claim with the EEOC within 180 days from the date her cause of action arose.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a discrimination charge to be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Malone v. Chambers County Board of Commissioners · filed 1994-12-21(e)

Malone alleges he filed a charge with the EEOC within one hundred and eighty days of his dismissal. Thus, the court finds that the statute of limitations does not bar his Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII claimant to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice.

Splunge v. Shoney's, Inc. · filed 1994-12-22(e)

First, under Title VII, a plaintiff has 180 days from the date of the alleged unlawful practice to file a charge with the EEOC. ... Hence, the court finds that each plaintiff timely filed a charge of discrimination charging quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile work environment sexual harassment.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day EEOC filing period does not bar earlier related acts in a continuing hostile-environment claim when acts occurred within the filing period.

Mills v. Amoco Performance Products, Inc. · filed 1994-12-23(e)

Mills’ hostile environment sexual harassment claim is an archetypal continuing violation claim, composed of many alleged acts that occurred within the limitations period. In any event, Amoco’s argument at summary judgment overlooks the question of whether there was a continuing violation of Title VII and, therefore, necessarily fails to show under Rule 56 that it is entitled to summary resolution against Mills with respect to conduct that antedates March 2, 1991.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an employee to file a discrimination charge with the state agency within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act.

James L. Bolden, Jr. v. Prc Inc., Formerly Known as Planning Research Corporation, and Robert Carver · filed 1995-01-31(e)

To bring a Title VII cause of action, an employee must file a discrimination charge with the state agency within 300 days after the alleged discriminatory act occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... We agree with the district court Mr. Bol-den failed to file a timely charge of discrimination concerning the denial of promotion to Technician III.

A Title VII complainant must file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice; awareness of the alleged discrimination prevents use of a continuing-violation theory to revive claims after that deadline.

Mirza v. Department of Treasury · filed 1995-02-09(e)(1)

Evidently, Ms. Mirza believed that she had been the object of discrimination at the Bank and understood the charge-filing procedure mandated by federal law, but nevertheless declined to comply with the administrative filing requirements of Title VII. Accordingly, she may not rely on a “continuing violation” theory to revive her pre-FIRREA Title VII claims against the Bank.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful practice; failure to file a timely charge bars a federal action on that claim.

Abul A. Ali Bih Jeng, and Muti Ul Haq v. State of Maryland, Department of the Environment, and Barry O'Brian Jeffrey L. · filed 1995-03-06(e)

Both Title VII and the ADEA require a plaintiff to file an employment discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred. ... We hold that the district court correctly found that the majority of Appellants' claims were barred because they were not timely filed or because they were never filed with or investigated by the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge when it is initially filed with a state agency; pursuing a grievance does not toll that period.

McNeill v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. · filed 1995-03-08(e)

Under § 2000e-5(e), Title VII provides that an EEOC Charge shall be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice, unless initially filed with a state agency, in which event the Charge must be filed within 300 days of the event. ... Although Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Public Law Board, the 300-day statute of limitations period was not tolled. As a result thereof, the EEOC dismissed Plaintiffs Charge as untimely, and thus, the Plaintiffs current claim is time-barred under the 300-day statute of limitations.

Section 2000e-5(e) generally allows 180 days to file an EEOC charge, extended to 300 days when the claimant first starts proceedings with an authorized state or local agency.

Russell v. Delco Remy Division of General Motors Corporation, Saegertown Manufacturing Company and Jordan Chal · filed 1995-04-06(e)

Section 706(e) of Title VII generally requires a claimant to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e~5(e). However, if a claimant initially institutes proceedings with a state or local agency that possesses the authority to address the alleged discrimination, the time limit for filing with the EEOC is extended to 300 days.

In a state with a workshare agreement, a Title VII charge filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discrimination satisfies the filing deadline.

Brennan v. National Telephone Directory Corp. · filed 1995-04-07(e)(1)

Provided there is a workshare agreement, therefore, the aggrieved employee meets the statutory, filing requirement as long as the claim is filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the allegedly discriminatory conduct. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l). Thus, since the claim was filed on October 6, 1992, the claim was timely filed as long as the discriminatory conduct occurred after December 11, 1991. Ms. Brennan’s deposition testimony indicates that the conduct occurred after December 20, 1991. Thus, we cannot say that the facts concerning our jurisdiction over this matter are undisputed. Accordingly, we must reject the defendants’ argument.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives employees in states with an agency addressing discrimination charges 300 days to file an EEOC complaint; a pattern of related acts alone does not establish a continuing violation.

Burrell v. City University of New York · filed 1995-08-17(e)

In states such as New York, however, where an agency addresses charges of discrimination, the employee must file an EEOC complaint within three hundred days. ... While the minimally required characteristics of a “policy or practice” have not been established, the Second Circuit requires something more than a pattern of related actions by one individual directed against another individual over a period of five months. Thus, Burrell’s sexual harassment claim is time barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII claimant to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of at least one alleged discriminatory act.

Simon v. Morehouse School of Medicine · filed 1995-09-06(e)

Title VII requires that parties aggrieved by discriminatory acts file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Thus, in order for a charge to be timely filed, the plaintiff was obliged to allege the commission of at least one discriminatory act which occurred within 180 days immediately preceding the day she filed her EEOC charge. ... This Court is compelled to conclude that the plaintiff has done so.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful conduct.

Thanning v. Gulotta · filed 1995-09-19(e)(1)

A Title VII plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days of alleged unlawful conduct. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l). Plaintiff in the instant case filed a charge with the EEOC on October 14, 1993. As such, plaintiff cannot recover for discriminatory conduct occurring more than 300 days before that date.

For a continuing Title VII violation, the charge filing period begins with the employer’s last discriminatory act and may run for up to 300 days.

Whitmore v. O'Connor Management, Inc. · filed 1995-10-05(e)(1)

Accordingly, a plaintiff will be accorded, at most, three hundred (300) days from the date of the “last occurrence of discrimination” within which to file his/her claim under Title VII. ... Accordingly, and because there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding the above-mentioned dates which would require submission to a jury, this Court may and does decide that as a matter of law Plaintiffs Title VII claims are procedurally barred due to failure to timely file.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge when a local agency addresses discrimination, but filing with that agency does not substitute for filing with the EEOC.

Perezic v. Crespo · filed 1995-10-18(e)(1)

Plaintiff is correct that Title VII takes into account the timing of a filing with the local authorities, but it does so by extending the final filing date from 180 days to 300 days after the alleged discriminatory act. ... It does not, however, provide that the date of the local filing can be substituted for the date of filing with the EEOC.

A series of related harassment incidents can satisfy the 180-day EEOC charge deadline if at least one incident falls within that period.

Munn v. MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF SAVANNAH · filed 1995-10-26(e)

This Court does not find that the 180 days limitation period time-bars any of Plaintiffs claims regarding the 1993-1994 incidents due to this Court’s recognition of the “continuing violation” theory.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an administrative discrimination charge to be filed within 300 days of the alleged unlawful practice.

Wright v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1995-12-14(e)

Title VII requires that an administrative charge of discrimination be filed within 300 days after an alleged unlawful practice occurs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... Accordingly, the court may consider only those alleged discriminatory acts that occurred within 300 days of August 26,1993, or after October 30, 1992.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a timely discrimination charge; the 300-day filing period barred claims based on conduct from 1980 to 1985 when the charge was filed in 1993.

Martinez v. CAPITAL CITIES/ABC-WPVI · filed 1995-12-15(e)(1)

These allegations must be dismissed. The 300 day period provided by Title VII and the ADEA, and the 180 day period provided by the PHRA, had long since passed when plaintiff filed his charge with the EEOC in 1993.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s EEOC charge deadline does not bar a discriminatory pay claim while the pay disparity continues.

Swartzbaugh v. State Farm Ins. Companies · filed 1995-12-27(e)

In the present case, the plaintiff is still employed by defendant; therefore, the alleged discrimination in pay is continuing and the claim is not untimely.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge when the claimant initially files with an authorized state or local agency.

Duguay v. Androscoggin Valley Hosp. · filed 1996-01-25(e)(1)

Accordingly, as plaintiff initially filed a charge with the New Hampshire Commission for Human Rights, the 300-day period applies.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a complainant to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Scott v. Performance Contractors, Inc. · filed 1996-01-25(e)

To maintain a Title VII action, a complainant must first file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. ... The date on Exhibit A is October 26, 1993, more than 180 days after the alleged unlawful conduct that culminated in plaintiffs firing on March 29, 1993. Because the plaintiff’s conclusory allegation cannot be taken as true, and because the EEOC charge attached to the complaint controls, plaintiffs Title VII claim must be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s charge-filing deadline bars promotion claims that an unsuccessful continuing-violation argument cannot make timely.

Goodgame v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. · filed 1996-02-28(e)(1)

The only issue plaintiffs raise on appeal concerning their Title VII claims is Brown's argument that, since his Title VII claims amounted to a continuing violation by ACIPCO, the trial court erred in finding that two of them were untimely. We find Brown's argument meritless and do not discuss it further.

In Kansas, Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII charge to be filed within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act.

Parrett v. Raytheon Company · filed 1996-02-29(e)(1)

In Kansas, a plaintiff must file Title VII discrimination charges within 300 days after the alleged discriminatory act occurred.

Section 2000e-5(e)(2) extends the filing period for challenges to seniority systems adopted for an intentionally discriminatory purpose.

Kennedy v. Chemical Waste Management, Incorporated · filed 1996-04-22(e)(2)

But the provision is applicable only to “a seniority system that has been adopted for an intentionally discriminatory purpose in violation of this subchapter [i.e., Title VII],” and Kennedy does not claim that the defendants’ seniority system discriminates against disabled persons or anybody else.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s charge-filing deadline may be equitably tolled when an employee lacked reason to know of the discrimination, the employer actively misled her, and she relied on that misconduct to her detriment.

Lawton v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co. of America · filed 1996-05-10(e)

To qualify for an exception, a complaining party must allege and prove not only that she had no reason to be aware of the employer’s improper motivation when the alleged violation occurred, but also that the employer actively misled her and that she relied on the misconduct to her detriment. ... Because plaintiff has neither alleged nor offered any evidence suggesting that 1) the company made misrepresentations to her with respect to the 1987, 1990 and 1991 employment decisions which form the basis for her pre-termination claims, or 2) Lawton acted to her detriment upon any such misrepresentations, this Court concludes that the instant case fails to present exceptional circumstances warranting the application of the equitable tolling doctrine.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a charge within 180 days; a later verification of a timely written charge relates back to its initial filing date.

Whitekiller v. Campbell Soup, Inc. · filed 1996-05-16(e)

In light of the above authority, this court holds that plaintiff timely-filed her charge. From the March 11,1995 receipt for certified mail, it is clear that plaintiff timely sent the EEOC a “written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices complained of.” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b). This mailing was clearly sufficient to initiate the EEOC process, leading to the EEOC sending plaintiff a completed form to verify, which she did promptly. Under 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b), this amendment related back to the original filing date and was timely.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) gives a claimant 300 days to file a disability discrimination charge in this case, measured from the discriminatory act rather than its later consequences.

Patsy L. Conner v. Reckitt & Colman, Inc. · filed 1996-06-04(e)(1)

The statute of limitations for a disability discrimination claim under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (1994) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5), is 300 days. The statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the discriminatory act, and not when the consequences of the act become most painful.

Section 2000e-5(e), applied to ADA claims through Section 12117(a), requires an administrative charge within 300 days of the alleged discrimination.

Braziel v. Loram Maintenance of Way, Inc. · filed 1996-07-09(e)

The ADEA and the ADA require a plaintiff, as a prerequisite to filing a lawsuit, to file an administrative charge within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory conduct.

A Title VII claim first filed with a state agency must be filed within 240 days of the challenged action.

Yee v. Hughes Aircraft Company, Larry Spicer, Terian Day, Gary Osborn, Frank Taormina, Steve Dorfman, · filed 1996-07-22(e)(1)

A Title VII claim, which is first filed with a state agency, must be filed within 240 days from the date of the challenged action.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII claimant in a deferral state to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of learning of the injury, even if the claimant has not yet learned that it may be unlawful.

Paul Cruse, Annette Decaussin, Rebecca Guiterrez, Don Jenkins, and Colleen Stevenson v. Chicago Park District · filed 1996-08-20(e)

In order to bring a claim of discrimination in federal court under either Title VII or the ADEA, the plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the time that his action began to accrue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2). The plaintiff's action accrues when he discovers that he has been injured, not when he determines that the injury was unlawful. Thelan v. Marc's Big Boy Corporation, 64 F.3d 264, 267 (7th Cir.1995). Thus, Cruse's discrimination action accrued on January 17, 1994, the date that he was formally notified of his termination, and he was therefore required to file his claim with the EEOC by November 22, 1994 (within 300 days, because Illinois is a "deferral" state). He in fact filed his claim on December 21, 1994, several weeks too late.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) gives a Texas Title VII claimant 300 days to file an EEOC charge, subject to a continuing-violation exception when related harassment extends into that period.

Wilson v. Sysco Food Services of Dallas, Inc. · filed 1996-08-22(e)(1)

In Texas, a Title VII plaintiff must file her EEOC charge within 300 days after the occurrence of the alleged discriminatory practice. ... Since Plaintiff has alleged facts which demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the existence of a continuing violation, summary judgment is inappropriate on this issue.

A Title VII claimant must file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act when that filing period applies, subject to equitable tolling.

Henry v. Colonial Baking Co. of Dothan · filed 1996-08-30(e)(1)

To have a viable action under Title VII, Henry was required to file a timely EEOC charge asserting her discrimination claim within 180 days from the time the alleged discriminatory act occurred. ... Based on the fpregoing, the court finds that Colonial Baking’s motion for summary judgment as to Henry’s claims under Title VII is due to be granted because she failed to timely file her EEOC charge.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII discrimination charge to be filed within 300 days of the alleged discrimination.

Mandy v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing · filed 1996-09-26(e)(1)

Given that plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination on March 21, 1994, plaintiffs discrimination claims are timely only if the alleged sexual harassment occurred on or after March 21, 1993 for purposes of her MHRA claim, and on or after May 25, 1993 for her Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5 requires a Title VII plaintiff to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Grant v. UOP, Inc. · filed 1996-10-04(d)

In order to sustain a Title VII claim a plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d); ... Grant’s claims for the events occurring in September of 1992 and in 1993 are barred because he did not file his claim with the EEOC within 180 days of these acts.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file an EEOC charge within 300 days, beginning when the employee learns of the adverse employment act.

Harris v. United Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1996-12-20(e)(1)

The limitations period for Harris’ sex discrimination claim began to run when he became aware — one or two months from April 4, 1994 — that United was treating his absence as unauthorized, even if the full effects of that unauthorized absence are not felt until a later date. However, he did not file his EEOC charge until August 25, 1995, more than 300 days after he knew that his absence was unauthorized.

Section 2000e-5(e) bars a hostile environment claim filed outside the charge-filing period when the plaintiff cannot show a related violation within that period.

Stilley v. University of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education · filed 1996-12-24(e)

Accordingly, not being able to rely on the continuing violations theory, plaintiffs Title VII claims of hostile environment are untimely and barred by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e) gives a claimant in Massachusetts 300 days to file an EEOC charge.

Smith v. Mitre Corp. · filed 1997-01-03(e)

The charge filed with the EEOC was timely, in that it came within the 300-day limit applicable in Massachusetts.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII complainant to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of a discriminatory act.

Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores · filed 1997-02-20(e)

A Title VII complainant must file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 300 days of the discriminatory act or occurrence.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an Ohio Title VII claimant to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful act.

Stanley v. Lawson Co. · filed 1997-02-26(e)

In Ohio, a Title VII claimant must file her discrimination charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); ... Plaintiff alleges that she filed a complaint with the EEOC on January 23, 1992. Thus, the incidents on which she bases her claim must have occurred on or after March 30, 1991. All of the alleged customer comments occurred prior to March 30, 1991.

A letter timely submitted to the EEOC and clearly intended as a discrimination charge can satisfy the charge-filing deadline despite the agency’s delay in processing it.

Baradell v. BD. OF SOCIAL SERVS. PITTSYLVANIA CTY. · filed 1997-02-27(f)(1)

On November 9, 1994, well within the limitations period, Ms. Baradell submitted a letter to the EEOC which was clearly intended to be a charge of discrimination. ... If Ms. Baradell’s undisputed allegations concerning the EEOC’s handling of her case are true, it is clear that she cannot be said to have filed her charge in an untimely manner.

In a deferral state, § 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII claimant to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful act.

Harrell v. Spangler, Inc. · filed 1997-03-21(e)

To comply, a plaintiff must have filed an EEOC charge within 300 days of the employer’s allegedly unlawful action. ... Therefore plaintiffs EEOC charge was not timely filed as to her claim that defendant unlawfully discriminated against her by failing to give her a raise in connection with her promotion.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge within 300 days of a discriminatory act; earlier incidents may still be admitted as background evidence of a timely hostile work environment claim.

Peggy Kimzey, Cross-Appellant/appellee v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Appellee/cross-Appellant · filed 1997-03-26(e)

A Title VII complainant must file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 300 days of the discriminatory act or occurrence. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... The incidents which occurred prior to that date were relevant, however, to illustrate a pattern of sex discrimination and its effects on Kimzey and in determining whether a hostile work environment existed.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s charge-filing deadline is not tolled by the discovery rule when the employee knew of the alleged injury when it occurred.

Jordan v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc. · filed 1997-04-03(e)

The discovery rule cannot toll the time limit for filing a charge because the Plaintiffs purported injury (discharge) occurred with his full knowledge by July 1989, when he resigned from SmithKline.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s charge-filing deadline applies to ADA employment claims, and deception unrelated to filing requirements does not toll it.

Caruthers v. Proctor & Gamble Manufacturing Co. · filed 1997-04-18(e)(1)

Here, the active deception that the plaintiff imputes to the defendant is not related to procedural requirements. ... Caruthers may not invoke the continuing violation or equitable tolling doctrines. Accordingly, he cannot seek damages for the defendant’s allegedly discriminatory conduct occurring before April 6, 1993.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII plaintiff in Texas to file a discrimination charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Harvey v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. · filed 1997-04-23(e)

In Texas, to sustain a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must file her charge of discrimination within 300 days of the “alleged unlawful employment practice.”

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge to be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, measured from when the employee is unequivocally informed of the adverse decision.

Sumner v. Michelin North America, Inc. · filed 1997-06-13(e)(1)

In order to be timely, a charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the “alleged unlawful employment practice.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(l). ... By contacting the EEOC for the first time on August 3, 1994, he missed the deadline, and his ADA action is therefore time-barred.

In a deferral state, a Title VII claimant must file an EEOC charge within 300 days of learning of the challenged employment decision.

Parker v. City of Chicago, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1997-06-13(e)(1)

Defendants were granted summary judgment on Parker's race discrimination claim based on Parker's failure to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of learning that he had been denied the promotion, as mandated by Title VII in a "deferral state" such as Illinois. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Philbin v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 929 F.2d 321, 322 (7th Cir.1991). As stated above, Parker knew by February 25, 1991 that he had not been selected for the vacant COE positions. He filed his EEOC charge February 27, 1992, just over a year later, and thus the claim is untimely.

Section 2000e-5 requires a plaintiff to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act.

Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 1997-07-07(e)(1)

Title VII requires a plaintiff to file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act(s). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. ... Johnson’s charge indicates that it was filed with the EEOC on 14 March 1995, the 29th day after the most recent incident of sexual harassment. Thus, there is evidence in the record indicating that Johnson’s claims of sexual harassment fall within the 180-day time period. Accordingly, summary judgment cannot be predicated on this ground.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful act; earlier events offered only as context need not fall within that period.

Garcia v. Fry · filed 1997-07-15(e)(1)

Clearly, then, the events of 1993 and earlier do not comprise the retaliatory conduct about which Ms. Garcia complains, but are alleged to trigger retaliation. Therefore, the events set forth in paragraphs 21 through 27 need not fall within the 300-day statute of limitations.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII claimant to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the discriminatory act; continuing effects of that act do not extend the deadline.

Powers v. Pinkerton, Inc. · filed 1997-08-11(e)

Therefore, because the sole retaliatory act in violation of Title VII was the April 19, 1993 demotion, this claim is barred because plaintiff did not file a timely EEOC charge.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s 180-day EEOC filing period begins when the employee receives formal notice of the adverse employment decision.

Morrow v. Auburn University at Montgomery · filed 1997-08-18(e)(1)

The court agrees with plaintiff that the limitations period for filing an EEOC charge related to plaintiffs denial of tenure commenced July 15,1994, the date when plaintiff was formally notified that she would continue as a temporary instructor which consequentially meant that she would not be considered for tenure.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives a person in Illinois 300 days after alleged discrimination to file an EEOC charge.

Saldana v. City of Chicago · filed 1997-08-21(e)

In Illinois, an individual complaining of discriminatory treatment must file a complaint within 300 days of the alleged discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a claimant in Illinois to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of alleged harassment or lose the ability to litigate that claim.

Speer v. Rand McNally & Company, a Delaware Corporation · filed 1997-08-27(e)

In Illinois, an individual must file an EEOC charge within three hundred days of the alleged harassment. Failure to do so bars litigation over those claims.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discrimination; a passing reference to an act does not preserve a later claim when it gives no notice that the act is alleged to be discriminatory.

Wade v. Norfolk Southern Co · filed 1997-08-27(e)(1)

Under Title VII, a plaintiff must file her charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discrimination. ... We find that the magistrate judge correctly held that this passing reference was insufficient to give Defendant notice that Wade considered this act discriminatory.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) bars claims based on discriminatory acts that occurred more than 180 days before the plaintiff filed an EEOC charge.

McKiver v. General Electric Co. · filed 1997-12-04(e)(1)

Because these alleged acts occurred more than 180 days prior to Plaintiff's initiation of her EEOC charge, they are time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) bars Title VII claims based on acts occurring more than 300 days before the plaintiff files an EEOC charge.

Brown-Hiltz v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 1997-12-11(e)

We agree with the district court that these claims are time-barred because they allegedly occurred prior to 300 days before the filing of Brown's EEOC charge. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); Koelsch v. Beltone Electronics Corp., 46 F.3d 705, 707 (7th Cir.1995).

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a discrimination charge to be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Plain v. Sears Roebuck & Co · filed 1997-12-15(e)(1)

With respect to the nonspecific instances of discriminatory conduct alleged in the charge, they would have had to have occurred within the 180 days preceeding her February 13, 1995, filing date.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII plaintiff in Texas to file a discrimination charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, subject to the continuing violation exception.

Dupont-Lauren v. Schneider (USA), Inc. · filed 1998-01-21(e)

In Texas, to maintain a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must file her charge of discrimination with the EEOC and/or the Texas Commission on Human Rights within 300 days of the “alleged unlawful employment practice.” ... Therefore, unless a continuing violation is established, Dupont-Lauren may recover only for conduct that occurred on or after April 24, 1994, 300 days prior to February 17,1995.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged discrimination unless older incidents are part of a continuing pattern or practice.

Stapp v. Overnite Transportation Co. · filed 1998-02-05(e)

Any alleged discrimination occurring outside of this time frame is time-barred and will not be considered by the court unless the acts complained of constitute part of a continuing pattern or practice of discrimination. ... Accordingly, incidents of alleged discrimination occurring prior to September 14, 1993, will not be considered by the court in deciding this motion, nor will they be admissible at trial.

In Illinois, § 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the challenged act.

McLaughlin v. Cook County Dep't of Corrections · filed 1998-02-05(e)(1)

The DOC is correct that a plaintiff in Illinois must file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the occurrence of the act that is the basis for the charge and that failure to do so renders the charge untimely.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff in New Mexico to file a discrimination charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Ewing v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1998-04-24(e)(1)

State Farm argues that Plaintiffs claims of discrimination, other than the appointment of Mr. May-field, are barred because these events are outside the 300-day period for filing a charge of discrimination in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). ... State Farm is correct.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII charge to be filed within 300 days of the discrimination when the complaint was initially filed with a state agency.

Mahan v. Boston Water & Sewer Commission · filed 1998-05-15(e)(1)

Under Title VII, where a complaint initially has been filed with a state agency such as the MCAD, a charge must be filed within 300 days after the discrimination occurred.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) bars a Title VII claim filed more than 300 days after the challenged employment decision unless equitable tolling applies.

Quiros v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. · filed 1998-06-05(e)(1)

Since Quiros filed his claim with the New York State Division of Human Rights (“NYSDHR”) on February 10, 1993, more than 300 days after he was denied this promotion in 1990, this claim is time-barred.

In a deferral state, a Title VII claimant must file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory employment practice.

Fierro v. Saks Fifth Avenue · filed 1998-07-07(e)(1)

Under Title VII, a party in a “deferral” state such as New York must file such a charge within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory employment practice.

Section 2000e-5(e) bars claims based on acts outside the EEOC charge-filing period when the continuing violation doctrine does not apply.

Shapira v. Lockheed Martin Corp. · filed 1998-07-13(e)

As will be discussed below, the court finds that there is no genuine issue of fact that a discriminatory act occurred within the limitations period, thus the continuing violation doctrine does not apply in this case. Any alleged discriminatory act occurring before June 1, 1995, is time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an aggrieved party to file an EEOC charge within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Martin v. UT Health Center · filed 1998-07-24(e)(1)

The plaintiff failed to file a complaint with the EEOC within the three hundred day jurisdictional window. Consequently, the district did not err by ordering dismissal.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) sets a deadline for filing a Title VII charge with the EEOC before pursuing the claim in federal court.

Sullivan v. St Univ · filed 1998-08-31(e)(1)

Defendants correctly argued that charge #141960280, which was filed more than 500 days after the discrim- inatory event, was not timely filed with the EEOC. Therefore, Appellant cannot pursue this claim in federal court.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives employees in Illinois 300 days to file a Title VII charge after an alleged unlawful employment practice.

Kielczynski v. Village of LaGrange, Ill. · filed 1998-09-08(e)

In Illinois, the limitations period for a Title VII charge is 300 days in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). This means that a charge must be filed within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge on October 3, 1996, alleging sexual discrimination in her ranking on the May, 1996, Police Sergeant’s Eligibility Register. The alleged discrimination is timely because it falls within 300 days of Plaintiffs EEOC charge filing.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an employment discrimination charge in Illinois to be filed within 300 days of the discriminatory act.

Enright v. Illinois State Police · filed 1998-09-14(e)

In Illinois, a charge of employment discrimination must be filed with the Illinois Department of Human Rights or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 300 days of the discriminatory act. Failure to do so bars litigation over those claims.