42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2 permits a male employee to pursue a hostile work environment claim based on severe sexual harassment by male coworkers, even when he believes they targeted him because he is gay.

Rene v. Mgm Grand Hotel, Inc. · filed 2002-09-24(a)(1)

Like the plaintiff in Oncale, Rene has alleged a physical assault of a sexual nature that is sufficient to survive a defense motion for summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff alleging same-sex harassment to show that the conduct discriminated because of sex.

Crespo v. Schering Plough Del Caribe, Inc. · filed 2002-10-31(a)

The plaintiff. must always prove that the alleged harassing conduct was not just marked by “offensive sexual connotations,” but also amounted to discrimination because of sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging same-sex workplace harassment to show discrimination because of sex.

Collins v. TRL, INC. · filed 2003-03-19(a)(1)

In the instant case, plaintiff does not have a valid hostile work environment claim, because as we discussed above, he cannot establish that he was discriminated against because of his sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that same-sex workplace harassment occurred because of the employee’s sex.

Dick v. Phone Directories Company, Inc. · filed 2003-06-04(a)(1)

Because the court concludes that the harassment Ms. Dick endured was not “because of sex,” the Meritor/Harris “sufficiently severe or pervasive” test need not be reached.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires workplace harassment to be because of sex; sexually vulgar conduct alone does not establish that element.

King v. Super Service, Inc. · filed 2003-06-26(a)(1)

However, their harassment of King does not, in this context, fall under the umbrella of conduct prohibited by Title VII, nor does the constructive discharge that King claims resulted from that harassment.

Section 2000e-2 requires a same-sex sexual harassment plaintiff to show discrimination because of sex; affectionate behavior alone does not suffice.

Noto v. Regions Bank · filed 2003-12-17

Faron’s behavior may have been overly effusive, but Title VII prohibits discrimination, not overly effusive behavior.

A same-sex harassment claim requires evidence that the employee was personally discriminated against because of sex; a workplace history of same-sex harassment alone is insufficient.

James v. Platte River Steel Co. · filed 2004-10-25(a)(1)

Regardless of whether Platte River has a history of employing male employees who sexually harass other male employees, James must still establish that he was personally discriminated against because of his gender.

Section 2000e-2 requires evidence that same-sex harassment occurred because of sex; hostility toward someone who does not fit an occupational stereotype alone does not suffice.

Sisco v. Fabrication Technologies, Inc. · filed 2004-12-22(a)(1)

The Court also notes that there is a difference between singling out a person because he does not fit the stereotype of the typical male, and singling out a person because he does not fit the stereotype of the typical oilfield worker. Title VII does not, nor could it, protect those in every walk of life from the animus of others when they do not fit the stereotype of the particular role they are obligated to fulfill.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers same-sex harassment when it is because of sex and creates a sufficiently severe or pervasive hostile work environment.

Chavez v. Thomas & Betts Corp. · filed 2005-01-24(a)(1)

Based on the foregoing, and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, sufficient evidence exists to support the jury’s finding that Plaintiff suffered sexual harassment under Title VII, resulting in a hostile and abusive work environment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits an inference that same-sex harassment was because of sex when the harasser’s conduct was motivated by sexual desire.

Dick v. Phone Directories Co. · filed 2005-02-11(a)(1)

We now speak to the issue, however, and hold that Oncale’s first evidentiary route regarding whether same-sex harassment is because of the victim’s sex hinges on whether the harasser’s conduct is motivated by sexual desire.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) applies the same “based on sex” standard to male and female same-sex harassment claims.

Pedroza v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 · filed 2005-02-11(a)(1)

First, we do not find it appropriate in the context of Title VII to establish dual standards for the “based on sex” showing required in male and female same-sex harassment cases.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a same-sex harassment claimant relying on hostility to show general hostility toward members of that sex in the workplace; hostility toward the claimant alone is insufficient.

Walker v. SBC Services, Inc. · filed 2005-06-02(a)(1)

This Plaintiff has not done. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs claims of same-sex harassment.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff alleging sex-based harassment to show that the harassment was based on sex.

Ferguson v. General Electric · filed 2007-10-03

Ferguson failed to demonstrate that the harassment was based on her sex and that her termination was causally linked to her protected conduct.

Section 2000e-2 allows a same-sex hostile work environment claim to proceed when a jury could find that the harassment was because of sex and was sufficiently severe or pervasive.

McCarthy v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. · filed 2011-05-04(a)(1)

While not particularly strong evidence that Madsen’s behavior was “because of’ plaintiffs’ sex, plaintiffs may present this evidence to the jury to decide. ... Accordingly, the court will deny defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claim for sexual harassment under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers same-sex harassment when the evidence shows that the harassment was sexual rather than merely humiliating.

Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Incorporated · filed 2012-01-19(a)(1)

Thus if a plaintiff presents evidence that he was harassed by a member of the same sex, and that the harassment was sexual rather than merely humiliating in nature, that evidence is sufficient to support a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor.

Repeated same-sex touching of an employee’s breasts can support a finding that she experienced discrimination because of sex.

Redd v. New York Division of Parole · filed 2012-05-04(a)(1)

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that a factfinder crediting Redd's version of the events could permissibly infer that Washington's repeated touching of Redd's breasts constituted intolerable discrimination against Redd because of her sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that same-sex harassment occurred because of the employee’s sex; speculation about the harasser’s sexual orientation is insufficient.

Wasek v. Arrow Energy Services, Inc. · filed 2012-06-20(a)(1)

Wasek has not satisfied either statute’s requirement that he present evidence that Ottobre harassed Wasek because of his gender. As a result, the district court rightly dismissed Wasek’s hostile work environment claims under both Title VII and ELCRA.

Same-sex harassment violates § 2000e-2(a)(1) only when the conduct is based on the employee’s sex.

Moore v. Treatment Centers of America Group, LLC · filed 2013-09-16(a)(1)

Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to support, and the record does not support, a finding of any of these alternatives. Because Plaintiff has not shown that Akisha Fedd’s conduct was based on Plaintiff’s sex, Counts One and Two of her complaint fail as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a same-sex harassment claim based on evidence that the harasser targeted a worker for failing to conform to gender stereotypes.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Boh Bros. Construction Co. · filed 2013-09-27(a)(1)

On appeal, Boh Brothers argues that (1) the EEOC cannot, as a matter of law, rely on gender-stereotyping evidence to establish a same-sex harassment claim, and (2) even if it could, the evidence here was insufficient to sustain the jury verdict. As explained below, both of these arguments fail.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) makes same-sex harassment actionable when it humiliates workers for failing to fit gender stereotypes.

Arredondo v. Estrada · filed 2015-07-27(a)(1)

However, humiliation based on gender stereotyping meant to separate those who are deemed less manly from the rest of a crew is actionable.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a same-sex hostile work environment claim when comparative evidence shows that a harasser targeted one sex in a mixed-sex workplace.

Smith v. Rock-Tenn Services, Inc. · filed 2016-02-10(a)(1)

Plaintiff also presented evidence to the jury that the harasser treated men and women differently: Leonard testified at trial to mooning other men at work, and to having touched at least seven colleagues, all of them male. Thus, Plaintiff has done exactly what the Supreme Court asked of him in Oncale: he has “offer[ed] direct comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace.” 523 U.S. at 80–81.

Same-sex harassment can support a hostile work environment claim when a jury could find that it was because of sex and was severe or pervasive.

Salinas v. Kroger Texas, L.P. · filed 2016-02-12(a)(1)

The court finds that the harassment alleged is sufficiently severe or pervasive to preclude summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence that harassment was because of sex; offensive sexual comments alone do not establish a hostile work environment.

Roberts v. Archbold Medical Center · filed 2016-11-16(a)

Offensive, sexual comments do not inherently create a hostile work environment under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers same-sex harassment when the evidence permits a finding that the conduct was motivated by sexual desire.

Guadalajara v. Honeywell International, Inc. · filed 2016-12-16(a)(1)

However, the Court finds here that there is ample evidence that Sanchez “intended to have some kind of sexual contact with the plaintiff.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers same-sex workplace harassment when evidence shows the harassment occurred because of sex.

Smith v. Rosebud Farm, Inc. · filed 2018-08-02(a)(1)

Because Smith introduced evidence that his coworkers only harassed male employees, the jury was free to conclude that these men discriminated against him on the basis of sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires hostile work environment conduct to be because of sex; disturbances affecting male and female employees alike do not meet that requirement.

Sanchez v. Duke · filed 2019-08-13(a)(1)

The repeated disturbances of office items were apparently not targeted at plaintiff or even at female personnel, but rather affected everyone, including male employees, and thus, plaintiff cannot establish that such actions were “because of . . . sex.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a same-sex harassment claim when the harassment is based on the employee’s sex.

Parker v. Consolidated Pipe & Supply Company Inc · filed 2020-03-18(a)

Same-sex harassment is actionable, provided it is demonstrated that the harassment was based upon the gender of the harassed employee.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers hostile work environment harassment that occurs because of an employee’s sex, even when the conduct is not sexual in nature.

CHAMBERS v. WATERS EDGE CONVALESCENT CENTER · filed 2020-07-17(a)(1)

Thus, the harassing conduct need not be sexual in nature so long as it occurs because of the victim’s sex.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence that alleged same-sex harassment was sex discrimination; speculation that a coworker’s rudeness was motivated by sex is insufficient.

Newbury v. City of Windcrest · filed 2021-03-22(a)

Newbury’s claim fails at the first step because she doesn’t establish that Jaime’s conduct was sex discrimination.

Harassment targeting a woman’s breasts can be based on sex when a jury could find that the comments would not have been made but for her sex.

Nathan v. Great Lakes Water Authority · filed 2021-03-30(a)(1)

A reasonable jury could find that Massey’s supervisors and co-workers would not have harassed Massey about her breasts “but for” Massey’s sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a plaintiff to prove same-sex harassment through evidence beyond Oncale’s three examples, including evidence of discrimination for failing to conform to sex stereotypes.

Roberts v. Glenn Industrial Group, Inc. · filed 2021-05-21(a)(1)

We adopt this well-reasoned view and recognize that additional forms of proof beyond those identified in Oncale are available to plaintiffs to demonstrate that the same-sex harassment they suffered was based on sex, including proof of discrimination based on a plaintiff’s failure to conform to sex stereotypes.

Section 2000e-2(a) covers same-sex sexual harassment.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Lindsay Ford LLC · filed 2021-11-02(a)

Same-sex sexual harassment is cognizable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers same-sex hostile work environment claims when severe or pervasive harassment is motivated by the employee’s sex.

Burke v. Louis · filed 2021-11-30(a)(1)

The record also shows a triable issue of fact as to whether Villa’s conduct was motivated by Burke’s sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a hostile work environment plaintiff to show that harassment occurred because of sex.

BRYANT v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILROAD · filed 2022-01-27(a)(1)

Upon review of the record and applicable law, it appears that Plaintiff has not produced sufficient evidence to show that Defendant McWilliams’ harassment occurred because of Plaintiff’s sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that workplace sexual harassment occurred because of the employee’s sex.

DeLaGrange v. Weaver Popcorn Manufacturing, Inc. · filed 2022-08-03(a)(1)

Plaintiff points to nothing in the record that would suggest that Bowser directed the unwanted activities toward him because of his sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers same-sex harassment when the evidence permits a finding that the employee was harassed because of his sex.

Brinson v. Eagle Express Lines, Inc. · filed 2023-09-28(a)(1)

Based on the record before it, the Court holds that a finder of fact could reasonably conclude that Berry harassed Brinson because he is male.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based workplace harassment even when the harasser and the employee are the same race.

Smith v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc. · filed 2025-09-25(a)(1)

Thus, Title VII covers harassment between persons of the same sex and similarly prohibits discrimination between persons of the same race.

Section 2000e-2 permits a discrimination claim when the alleged facts plausibly show an employment relationship and an adverse action based on a protected characteristic.

Kass-Hout v. Community Care Network Inc · filed 2021-08-20(a)(1)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged that he is Defendants’ employee such that he may seek relief under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a connection to an employment relationship for Title VII protections to apply; the economic realities of the relationship determine whether that connection exists.

Nissenbaum v. NNH Cal Neva Services Co. · filed 2013-11-22(a)(1)

As the Court already determined that the “economic realities” of Nissenbaum’s relationship to NHH does not support a finding of an employment relationship, summary judgment in favor of NHH on Nissenbaum’s Title VII claim is appropriate.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects a shareholder-director against employment discrimination only if the person qualifies as an employee under the Clackamas control test.

Robert A. Mariotti, Sr. v. Mariotti Bldg Products · filed 2013-04-29(a)(1)

For that reason, we conclude that the District Court did not err in its determination that the allegations in Plaintiff‟s complaint did not establish that he was an employee under Title VII. He is not entitled, therefore, to invoke its protections.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employers from discriminating in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, so a Title VII claim requires an employment relationship.

Smith v. Amedisys Inc. · filed 2002-07-26(a)(1)

Only “employers” as defined in Title VII are prohibited from discriminating against individuals with respect to their “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Thus, the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in a Title VII action must be one of “employment.”

Section 2000e-2 requires an employment relationship to support a Title VII claim, though a non-employer may be liable for interfering with access to employment opportunities.

McQueen v. Equinox International Corp. · filed 2002-06-14

McQueen failed to establish the existence of an employer-employee relationship between himself and Equinox in order to support his Title VII claim.

A volunteer claiming employee protection under § 2000e-2(a) must show substantial benefits beyond those incidental to the volunteer activity unless there is a clear employment contract.

York v. Association of the Bar of the City of New York · filed 2002-04-03(a)

In the absence of a clear contractual employer-employee relationship, a party claiming to be an employee under Title VII must come forward with substantial benefits not merely incidental to the activity performed in order to satisfy this Circuit’s remuneration test.

Section 2000e-2(a) addresses discrimination in employment; a student who does not allege that he was an employee cannot bring a claim under it.

Rose v. Kenyon College · filed 2002-03-29(a)

Title VII provides that “it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer” to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Accordingly, Title VII provides for a private right of action by employees against employers on the grounds of unlawful discrimination in employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employment relationship; employee status depends on the economic realities of the work and the employer’s right to control it.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Fawn Vendors, Inc. · filed 1996-09-26(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Accordingly, a Title VII claim must involve an employment relationship. ... In the Fifth Circuit, this question is resolved through application of the “economic realities/common law control” test. ... After weighing the relevant factors, with particular emphasis on the extent of Fawn’s right to control Leon’s work, this Court finds that Leon was an employee of Fawn and not an independent contractor.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) addresses discrimination in employment; allegations concerning a person’s role as a student fall outside a Title VII employment claim.

Stilley v. University of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education · filed 1996-12-24(a)(1)

Accordingly, any allegations of “quid pro quo retaliation” regarding plaintiffs dissertation are not proper for a Title VII claim and will not be considered by the Court in its Title VII analysis.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not protect prisoners required to work for a state prison industry as part of their sentences.

McCaslin v. Cornhusker State Industries · filed 1996-12-20(a)

Like the FLSA, I do not find that Title VII applies to the prison setting, when prisoners are mandated to work in state-sponsored, prison-run industries.

Section 2000e-2(a) applies to employees rather than independent contractors, and employee status is determined using the common-law agency test.

Jean Anderson Hierarchy of Agents v. Allstate Life Insurance · filed 1998-04-06(a)

In application of the preceding principles, we first note that both Title VII and the FLSA/EPA state only that an employee “is an individual employed by an employer.” As the Supreme Court in Darden held this very same definition to be completely circular and explanatory of nothing (albeit in the context of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6)), we conclude that the common law agency test should be applied in this case.

Section 2000e-2 protects employees from employment discrimination but does not protect independent contractors.

Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation and Storage, Inc. · filed 2000-02-16

Considering all these factors, although it is a close call, the Court finds that plaintiff was an independent contractor and not an employee of Advance. Therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to the protections of Title VII and summary judgment is granted with respect to plaintiffs Title VII claims.

Title VII’s prohibition on discriminatory discharge protects employees, not independent contractors.

Anyan v. New York Life Insurance · filed 2002-04-03(a)(1)

Title VII and the other anti-discrimination employment statutes cover employees, not independent contractors.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects employees from sex discrimination in employment, but does not cover independent contractors.

Atkins v. Computer Sciences Corp. · filed 2003-05-19(a)(1)

Because undisputed facts show that plaintiff was not an employee of defendant for purposes of Title VII, the court lacks jurisdiction and defendant is entitled to summary judgment on that ground.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) addresses discrimination in employment by employers and does not cover a passenger with no alleged employment relationship with the defendants.

Liles v. Revetaw, Inc. · filed 2009-03-06(a)(1)

Here, the Complaint alleges that Liles was a passenger on the Water Island Ferry. There is nothing in the Complaint to support the inference that Liles has ever had any employment relationship with Rampino or Scully. Because Liles had not alleged that the Defendants were ever her employers, she has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) covers employment discrimination and requires an employer/employee relationship for a Title VII claim.

Collier v. Austin Peay State University · filed 2009-03-26(a)

Accordingly, the existence of an employer/employee relationship is a necessary prerequisite for sustaining a Title VII claim.

A claim under Section 2000e-2 requires an employer-employee relationship between the plaintiff and a defendant.

Pandozy v. Tobey · filed 2009-06-16

Additionally, Pandozy’s complaint fails to state a cause of action under Title VII, since he does not allege an employer-employee relationship between himself and any of the Defendants.

Section 2000e-2 requires a claimant to establish an employment relationship with the defendant to bring an employment discrimination claim against it.

Shah v. Bank of America · filed 2009-09-10

To establish a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Shah must first establish that he in fact was an employee of BOA, and not of Adecco, his temporary staffing agency. ... As a result, we find that the District Court properly granted BOA’s summary judgment motion because there existed no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Shah was an employee of BOA.

Section 2000e-2(a) covers a worker treated as an employee despite an independent contractor agreement.

Holland v. Gee · filed 2010-06-16(a)

Although Plaintiff signed an independent contractor agreement, the Court finds that Plaintiff is an employee for Title VII and FCRA purposes based on an analysis of the factors.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employment relationship, which a physician with hospital privileges may plausibly allege through the hospital’s control over her work.

Levitin v. Northwest Community Hospital · filed 2014-08-12(a)(1)

It therefore would be inappropriate to dismiss the Title VII claim on the ground that Levitin is not NCH’s employee.

A plaintiff bringing a hostile work environment claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) must plead an employment relationship with the defendant.

Halcomb v. Black Mountain Resources, LLC · filed 2014-08-26(a)(1)

Without any allegations of an employer-employee relationship, Halcomb’s Title VII claim cannot proceed to discovery.

Section 2000e-2 does not treat grades received in a student role as adverse employment actions, even when the student also works for the institution.

Stewart v. Morgan State University · filed 2014-09-03(a)

Indeed, Plaintiff acknowledges that he served a “dual role” as a student and an employee, and the two “Cs” he received in Dr. Welsh’s classes related to his role as a student and were not connected to any adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can protect volunteers who qualify as employees under the common-law agency test; remuneration is a nondispositive factor.

Sister Michael Marie v. American Red Cross · filed 2014-11-14(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits, among other things, religious discrimination against individuals in the context of the employment relationship. ... Thus, in this circuit, remuneration is not an independent antecedent requirement, but rather it is a nondispositive factor that should be assessed in conjunction with the other Darden factors to determine if a volunteer is an employee.

Employee coverage under § 2000e-2 can depend on promised benefits and the hiring party’s control; a genuine dispute about entitlement to benefits can preclude summary judgment.

Consolmagno v. Hospital of St. Raphael School of Nurse Anesthesia · filed 2014-12-18(a)(1)

Therefore, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that Consolmagno was not their employee and thus is not entitled to Title VII’s protection is denied.

A hospital physician’s professional autonomy does not categorically exclude the physician from Title VII’s employee protections.

Fabian v. Hospital of Central Connecticut · filed 2016-03-18(a)

Hospital physicians are not for that reason, however, simply excluded as a class from protection under Title VII.

Title VII’s prohibition on sex-based firing protects employees but does not extend to partners.

Bowers v. The Ophthalmology Group · filed 2016-05-16(a)

Title VII prohibits an employer from firing an individual on the basis of sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ... Accordingly, the statute does not extend to “partners.”

A Title VII discrimination claim against an employer requires an employment relationship; an independent contractor does not qualify.

Hill-Keyes v. Commissioner of United States Social Security Administration · filed 2016-08-16

In order to prevail on her claims under Title VII and § 501 of Rehabilitation Act, Hill-Keyes had to have an “employment relationship” with SSA.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can cover a medical resident who plausibly qualifies as an employee under the Darden factors, even if she is also a student.

Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center · filed 2017-03-07(a)(1)

While we won’t (and can’t) speak for all residents, we agree here it’s plausible Doe was Mercy’s “employee” notwithstanding any other status the law may or may not have reposed on her (for example, a “student”). We rely on Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992), to decide if a person is an “employee” under Title VII, see Covington, 710 F.3d at 119. Applied to Doe’s complaint, Darden’s factors indeed suggest she was an employee under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) protects employees from race and sex discrimination; disputed facts about a hiring party’s control can preclude judgment on employee status.

Pamela M. Perry, M.D. v. The Schumacher Group of Louisiana · filed 2020-04-07(a)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination against “any individual” with respect to that individual’s terms and conditions of employment because of race or sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ... Genuine disputes of material fact regarding a hiring party’s right to control or ... degree of control over the manner and means of performance preclude summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law. ... Therefore, the district court improperly granted summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law on all the Title VII claims based on Dr. Perry’s employment status.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plausible employment relationship for a worker to bring a Title VII discrimination claim against the alleged employer.

Tyler v. Uber Technologies, Inc. · filed 2020-09-17(a)(1)

Thus, plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support a plausible claim that Uber was his employer under the Spirides test. Therefore, his Title VII claims will be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not protect an equal equity partner who controls the firm because that partner is not an employee.

Shawna Lemon v. Myers Bigel, P.A. · filed 2021-01-19(a)(1)

In short, Lemon is a partner and equal owner of the firm, not an employee, and she is not within the scope of Title VII’s coverage.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover a prisoner's discrimination claim against a correctional facility when the prisoner is not its employee.

Whyte v. Centre County Correctional facility · filed 2021-04-09(a)(1)

Title VII, however, prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of an individual’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Plaintiff, however, is not an employee of CCCF. Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to Title VII will, therefore, be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff to allege an employment relationship to bring a Title VII discrimination claim; an employer’s control over the plaintiff’s work can establish that relationship despite the use of 1099 forms.

MOFFETT v. WOODLAKE PROPERTIES, LLC · filed 2021-09-09(a)

The issue before this Court is whether Plaintiff is considered an employee under Title VII, FLSA, PMWA, and WPCL, because only “employers” can be held liable for discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.; 43 P.S. §333.103(g) et seq.; 43 P.S. § 260.1 et seq. ... Here, Plaintiff has successfully pled that she was Defendants’ employee.

Section 2000e-2(a) protects employees from employment discrimination; a plaintiff who is not an employee of a defendant cannot bring a claim against that defendant under Title VII.

Kifor v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts · filed 2022-01-03(a)

But Kifor is not an employee of any of the defendants. “[C]ourts have limited Title VII’s protections to employees only.” ... Thus, Kifor’s claim for discrimination in violation of Title VII will be dismissed.

A Title VII discrimination plaintiff must show an employment relationship; under the Darden factors, Payne’s university-arranged internship did not make him Prevention Point’s employee.

Edward Payne, Jr. v. Prevention Point Philadelphia · filed 2022-03-15

Weighing all of these factors together, there is no basis to conclude that Payne was an employee of Prevention Point for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employer-employee relationship for an employment discrimination claim.

Doe v. Related Companies LLP · filed 2022-09-19(a)

Plaintiff does not allege an employer-employee relationship, and she thus fails to state a claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a voluntary intern to receive remuneration to qualify as an employee who can bring a Title VII harassment claim.

Eagan v. Vibrant Church · filed 2022-09-20(a)(1)

She therefore cannot satisfy the first prong of the Fifth Circuit’s threshold-remuneration test because she makes no assertion that she received remuneration in any form from the defendants. To maintain a Title VII claim, obviously the plaintiff must be an “employee” within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not protect an appointed judge who serves at a policymaking level because that judge is not an employee under Title VII.

Wheale v. Polk County, Georgia · filed 2022-10-04(a)(1)

Because Judge Wheale is an appointee ... engaged in policymaking, she is not an “employee” and not protected by Title VII or the Equal Pay Act.

Section 2000e-2(a) protects employees from employment discrimination, so a plaintiff who claims to be self-employed cannot rely on it.

Richardson v. United Methodist Church S.C. · filed 2024-03-19(a)

It agrees with the Report that Reverend Richardson’s assertion that she is self-employed “guts her Title VII claim[,]” which depends on her being an employee.

Section 2000e-2 protects employees from discriminatory employment practices; a graduate fellow’s job title alone does not determine whether she is an employee.

Huang v. Ohio State Univ. · filed 2024-08-28

Title VII “protect[s] employees.” Shah v. Deaconess Hosp., 355 F.3d 496, 499 (6th Cir. 2004); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3. ... Because a job title is not determinative of employee status, it does not constitute a material fact in this analysis.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employment relationship for a discrimination claim; an unpaid trainee must receive substantial benefits and be subject to sufficient employer control to qualify as an employee.

Clark v. Marquis Companies · filed 2024-12-16(a)

There is no evidence in the record before the Court that plaintiff received compensation, insurance, annual leave, or any other salary or non-salary benefits in the course of participating in the CNA Program. ... Given the undisputed record, summary judgment as to plaintiff’s Title VII and state law claims is appropriate.

Section 2000e-2 does not cover an unpaid mentor as an employee when the mentor receives neither pay nor significant employment benefits.

Wells v. Texas Tech · filed 2025-03-03(a)(1)

Because Wells was not an “employee” for purposes of Title VII while acting as a mentor for the Hub program in 2022, the district court did not err in finding her Title VII claims untimely.

Section 2000e-2 protects employees from sex discrimination regardless of whether they are employed at will.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Midwest Farms, LLC · filed 2025-03-18(a)(1)

Moreover, the Court agrees with the EEOC that whether Ms. Denny and other class members were at-will employees is immaterial to the EEOC’s claims because Title VII applies regardless of the parties’ contractual relationship.

Section 2000e-2(a) protects against race discrimination, and a Black plaintiff satisfies the protected-class element of a Title VII claim.

Shepherd v. Goodwill Industries of South Texas, Inc. · filed 2011-07-25(a)

Under Title VII, to meet this burden, Plaintiff must prove: (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified to do the job, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) others outside the protected group (non-Blacks) were treated more favorably than she was. ... It is not in dispute that Plaintiff is Black and is certified as a blind individual. Therefore, she qualifies as belonging to a protected class under both Title VII and the ADA.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects individuals from employment discrimination; an organization cannot claim that protection for discrimination suffered by others.

Lulac Councils 4433 & 4436 v. City of Galveston · filed 1996-10-15(a)(1)

Furthermore, the Lulac Councils themselves suffered no discrimination in the employment setting because they, as organizations, are neither employees of the Defendant nor “individuals” protected from unlawful employment practices under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects individuals from employment discrimination; an organization is not protected in its own right.

Texas Peace Officers Ass'n v. City of Galveston · filed 1996-10-31(a)(1)

Furthermore, TPOA itself suffered no discrimination in the employment setting because it, as an organization, is neither an employee of the Defendant nor an “individual” protected from unlawful employment practices under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 applies to an employer that controls hiring decisions and the manner and means of an employee’s work.

Sutherland v. Michigan Department of Treasury · filed 2003-11-25

Rather, as the appointing authority, only the Department of Treasury was their employer under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) can apply to a state agency as a de facto employer when it extensively controls municipal hiring.

Bradley v. City of Lynn · filed 2005-12-06(a)

Accordingly, the current record on summary judgment supports a finding that the HRD constitutes a Title VII employer of plaintiffs with respect to the entry-level hiring of firefighters and police officers, and the Court denies State defendants’ motion.

A discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant was his employer; the hybrid test determines employee status.

Benaissa v. Salina Regional Health Center · filed 2021-12-02(a)(1)

The district court rejected Dr. Benaissa’s suggestion to use the EEOC test because its factors were substantially similar to those of the hybrid test and this circuit has endorsed the hybrid test. We agree with the district court’s decision.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not treat discrimination against a student who is not an employee as an unlawful employment practice.

Dufort v. Liberty University · filed 2023-01-09(a)

While she repeatedly complained about Defendant’s alleged discriminatory treatment of Student A, this fails to constitute an actual unlawful employment practice under Title VII because Student A was not Defendant’s employee.

Section 2000e-2(n)(1) protects an employment discrimination consent judgment from collateral attack when affected persons receive adequate notice and a reasonable opportunity to object.

United States v. Baltimore County, Maryland · filed 2021-05-19(n)(1)

The parties agree, and the court is satisfied, that the notice provisions of the Agreement and procedures set forth therein are sufficient to meet the requirements of Section 703(n)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n)(1) and to protect the Agreement from collateral attack, while addressing due process concerns.

Section 2000e-2(n)(1) bars a collateral challenge to an employment practice within the scope of a consent decree when the challenger had notice and a reasonable opportunity to object.

Querim v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 2000-03-06(n)(1)(B)(i)

Therefore, because plaintiff had notice and a hearing as to the Decree and because his position on the Casual List was not affected beyond the extent contemplated in the Decree, plaintiff is estopped from making a collateral attack on the Decree, as amended by the Agreement and Order.

Section 2000e-2(n)(1) limits later challenges to an employment consent decree when affected people had notice and an opportunity to object or were adequately represented by someone who objected.

Thomas v. Christopher · filed 1996-11-07(n)(1)

Accordingly, the Court finds that the conditions of Section 108 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 were satisfied and that the terms of the Consent Decree may not be challenged hereafter by anyone who either had actual notice of the settlement or whose interests were adequately represented by another person who presented objections at the Fairness Hearing.

Section 2000e-2(n) requires actual notice and a reasonable opportunity to object before a settlement can bar later challenges.

Stewart v. Rubin · filed 1996-11-21(n)

This notice, under all of the circumstances, was sufficient to apprise interested parties of the proposed settlement and afford them an opportunity to comment on the terms of the Settlement Agreement at the Fairness Hearing.

Section 2000e-2(n) does not apply when applicants seek to invoke a consent decree to change hiring practices rather than challenge actions taken under it.

Pahaham v. Danbury Police Department · filed 1997-10-15(n)

Here, however, the applicant-movants are not challenging actions taken pursuant to the consent decree but are attempting to invoke one of its provisions to require the City to change its hiring practices to increase the number of African Americans hired as entry level police officers. Therefore, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n) does not apply, and we need only consider whether under Rule 24 these non-parties should be allowed to intervene.

Section 2000e-2(n)(1)(B)(ii) allows a person to challenge an employment discrimination consent decree when a prior challenger with conflicting interests did not adequately represent that person.

Rutherford v. City of Cleveland · filed 1998-03-04(n)(1)(B)(ii)

In the absence of commonality and the presence of a conflict, the FOP and the CPPA did not meet the adequate representation requirements under Rule 23 and thereby failed to qualify as adequate representatives under § 108.

Section 2000e-2(n)(1)(B)(ii) does not bar a challenge to an employment consent decree when the challenger’s interests were not adequately represented in the earlier litigation.

Rutherford v. City Of Cleveland · filed 1998-04-27(n)(1)(B)(ii)

Accordingly, to satisfy the adequate representation requirements under Rule 23 and thereby under § 108, there must be an absence of a conflict of interest, and the presence of common interests and injury. ... In the absence of commonality and the presence of a conflict, the FOP and the CPPA did not meet the adequate representation requirements under Rule 23 and thereby failed to qualify as adequate representatives under § 108.

Section 2000e-2(n)(1)(B) precludes a nonclass member who had actual notice and a reasonable opportunity to object from later challenging an employment discrimination consent decree.

Allen v. Alabama State Board of Education · filed 2000-01-05(n)(1)(B)

Additionally, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 precludes challenges to consent decree judgments resolving employment discrimination claims from those non-class members who had actual notice of the proposed decree and a reasonable opportunity to present objections. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(n)(l)(B).

Section 2000e-2(n) prevents further litigation about matters covered by Title VII consent decrees.

Edmonds v. Operating Engineers · filed 2011-12-22(n)

What is more, Title VII has its own rule of preclusion, which prevents further litigation about matters covered by consent decrees. 42 U.S.C. §2000e–2(n).

An employee alleging discharge because of an interracial marriage alleges discrimination based on the employee’s own race and may pursue a Title VII claim.

Rosenblatt v. Bivona & Cohen, P.C. · filed 1996-11-26(a)(1)

Had he been black, his marriage would not have been interracial. Therefore, inherent in his complaint is the assertion that he has suffered racial discrimination based on his own race. As a result, plaintiff has standing to pursue his civil rights claims under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(m) does not govern employment decisions made before the 1991 Civil Rights Act took effect.

University & Community College System of Nevada v. Farmer · filed 1997-01-03(m)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. V 1993) states: ... The conduct Farmer complains of occurred prior to the effective date of the amended 1991 Civil Rights Act; therefore, those applicable portions of the amended Act are not controlling.

For a prima facie disparate treatment claim based on denied training, a plaintiff must show that similarly situated employees outside the protected class received the training.

Grant v. Miami-Dade County Water & Sewer Department · filed 2015-11-23(a)(1)

Grant failed to present evidence suggesting that Grant was denied training that was provided to other similarly situated employees outside of his protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits national origin discrimination in employment terms, but an employee must show that an employer’s stated reason for denying training was pretextual.

Gira H. PATEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1997-01-28(a)(1)

Because Kraft honestly believed that a certain typing speed was necessary in order to benefit from WordPerfect training, the fact that WordPerfect was necessary to carry out the duties of a cash processor would not enable a rational trier of fact to conclude that the 30-wpm requirement was pretextual.

A plaintiff claiming discriminatory denial of training need not show that the training was material to promotion to establish a prima facie case.

Ester v. Pafford and Thomas A. Krudy, Trustee in Bankruptcy for the Estate of Ester v. Pafford v. Alexis M. Herman, Secr · filed 1998-07-29(a)(1)

Whether the training is ma-ferial to Pafford’s further promotion is irrelevant to whether the DOL denied Pafford training for a discriminatory reason. Therefore, the district court erred in requiring Pafford to produce such evidence.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a denial of training to occur under circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Thompson v. Potomac Electric · filed 2002-12-12(a)

Consequently, Thompson has failed to demonstrate that PEPCO did not provide him with training under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(d) makes unions responsible for discrimination in training and apprenticeship programs they administer, including a knowing failure to address discriminatory denial of training.

Maalik, Safiyyah v. Int'l Union Elev 2 · filed 2006-02-09(d)

Just as §703(a) makes employers rather than unions answerable for terms and conditions in the workplace, so §703(d) makes both employers and unions answerable for the administration of joint training and apprenticeship programs.

Section 2000e-2(d) protects access to job training from racial discrimination.

La Grande v. DeCrescente Distributing Co., Inc. · filed 2010-03-23(d)

Training is a benefit of employment that receives protection under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires allegations that plausibly connect an adverse employment action to discrimination; disagreement with an employer’s nondiscriminatory reasons alone is insufficient.

Offor v. Mercy Medical Center · filed 2016-03-10(a)(1)

While the Plaintiff may disagree with the clearly non-discriminatory reasons offered by Dr. Devarajan for her discipline, the existence of such a disagreement, without more, does not give rise to a cognizable discrimination claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discrimination complaint to allege an adverse employment action because of a protected characteristic, including national origin.

Ndzerre v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2016-03-23(a)(1)

To adequately plead a viable claim of discrimination .under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege that (i) he suffered an adverse employment action (ii) because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a sex discrimination complaint to allege facts supporting an inference that an employment privilege was denied because of sex.

Boyce v. New York City Mission Society · filed 1997-05-05(a)(1)

However, even if Plaintiff were qualified, the Complaint lacks specific factual allegations to support a pleading that the Plaintiff was discharged under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination based on sex.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a race discrimination claim to proceed when the complaint alleges adverse employment actions because of race.

Vamper v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 1998-03-24(a)

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint states a claim for race discrimination under Title VII and the FRCA because it repeatedly alleges that Plaintiff was subject to adverse actions by UPS because of his race.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Scelta v. Delicatessen Support Services, Inc. · filed 1999-06-03

In other words, to recover under Title VII a plaintiff must prove that an “employer” discriminated against him/ her because of his/her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a) covers employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, gender, or national origin; a plaintiff must allege which kind of discrimination occurred.

Vizcarrondo v. Board of Trustees of the University of Puerto Rico · filed 2001-03-21(a)

Further, nowhere in the complaint does plaintiff clearly establish which of the different categories of discrimination addressed in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), he has been a victim of on the part of defendants.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a Title VII claimant to allege discrimination based on a statutorily prohibited ground.

Guerrera v. Tempe Union High School · filed 2002-04-16(a)(1)

The district court properly dismissed Guerrera’s Title VII claim because Guerrera failed to allege that defendant discriminated against him on the basis of a statutorily prohibited ground.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discrimination claim to identify a protected characteristic and facts connecting it to the employer’s conduct.

Soler v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co. · filed 2002-09-30(a)(1)

The mere recitation of all the protected groups and/or grounds upon which a discrimination action maybe brought in a court of law without specifying which are the ones at stake in this case, and the conclusory assertion that federal and state antidiscrimination laws have been violated, does not pass muster. Without any other allegation indicating a discriminatory animus or motive by the defendants or of some causal nexus between being a member of a protected class and the alleged hostile work environment to which Mrs. Cruz Soler was avowedly exposed by the employer, the scant allegations are clearly insufficient to state a cause of action under Title VII.

A sex discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) can survive dismissal when allegations of unequal compensation and benefits give the employer fair notice of the claim, even if the allegations appear weak.

Gavura v. Pennsylvania State House of Representatives · filed 2002-12-13(a)(1)

While these allegations admittedly are not strong, particularly in light of other allegations in the complaint indicating that other female employees, including one who presumably was married, did receive the benefits denied to Gavura, they at least are sufficient to give appellees fair notice of what her claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. As Gavura’s allegations meet our lenient standards of notice pleading, the trial court erred in granting appellees’ motion to dismiss Gavura’s sex discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts supporting an inference that an employer treated an employee differently because of a protected characteristic.

Chandler v. W.E. Welch & Associates, Inc. · filed 2008-02-05(a)(1)

Even if true, this allegation does not support an inference that defendants discriminated against plaintiff based on any of the protected characteristics.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) provides a wrongful termination claim under Title VII; the plaintiff must allege that people unlike her were treated better.

Charles v. Scarberry · filed 2009-08-10(a)(1)

Charles did not state a claim for relief under Title VII: Absence of allegations that persons who were not like her were treated better.

Specific allegations of disparate treatment and racial hostility can sufficiently plead race and national origin discrimination under § 2000e-2(a).

Apau v. Printpack Inc. · filed 2010-07-08(a)

Notably, Mr. Apau’s Complaint presents specific factual allegations of disparate treatment between himself and Caucasian coworkers and an ongoing atmosphere of racial hostility. ... Thus, the Court concludes that Mr. Apau has sufficiently pled Count I (race discrimination) and Count II (national origin discrimination) and Printpack’s Motion to Dismiss will be denied as it relates to those counts.

A racial discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) can survive dismissal at an early stage even if the complaint does not identify similarly situated nonminorities who were treated differently.

Smith v. Board of Trustees Lakeland Community College · filed 2010-09-28(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. ... While Smith does not identify any similarly situated non-minorities who she alleges were treated differently, which arguably is required by Twombly, at this early stage of the proceedings, the Court declines to dismiss Smith’s racial discrimination claims against Defendants Beverage, Law, Killeen, and Soto-Schwartz on those grounds.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race discrimination in employment; a complaint alleging only a belief that race caused a discharge does not state a plausible claim.

Richards v. JRK Property Holdings · filed 2010-12-20(a)

However, the complaint did not set forth any factual allegations to support a racial discrimination claim. The only facts alleged were: (1) Richards was terminated from her position as a property manager in October 2008; and (2) Richards believed she was terminated because she is African-American. Richards provided no facts that lend support to her belief that she was terminated because of her race.

A race discrimination claim can survive dismissal when specific factual allegations plausibly link adverse employment actions to race.

Brown v. Children's National Medical Center · filed 2011-03-30(a)(1)

Treating plaintiffs factual allegations as if they were true, and drawing all reasonable inferences stemming from such factual allegations in her favor, the Court concludes that plaintiff adequately states a claim of discrimination based on race and a claim for retaliation under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discrimination complaint to allege that an employer acted against the plaintiff because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Lance v. Wilson · filed 2011-09-09(a)(1)

Absent allegations that the defendant is an employer who discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex or national origin, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plausible connection between alleged employment discrimination and the employee’s race, gender, or another protected characteristic.

Williams v. Time Warner Inc. · filed 2011-09-28(a)

In assessing claims of employment discrimination, this Court has made clear that there must be a causal connection between the discrimination and a plaintiff’s race or gender – namely, that the plaintiff was discriminated against “because of” her race, gender, or other protected characteristic.

A discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must allege facts that make discriminatory treatment plausible; protected status and termination alone are insufficient.

Khalik v. United Air Lines · filed 2012-02-06(a)(1)

These facts do not sufficiently allege discrimination or retaliation. There is no context for when Plaintiff complained, or to whom. There are no allegations of similarly situated employees who were treated differently. There are no facts relating to the alleged discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, gender, or national origin; a complaint must allege facts that make such discrimination plausible.

Patel v. Georgia Department BHDD · filed 2012-08-08(a)(1)

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to discharge or discriminate against any individual on the basis of his race, gender, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Patel, in his initial complaint, failed to provide any factual allegations that he was subject to discrimination or retaliation. He presented no allegation that a comparable person not of his protected class was treated more favorably, nor that he suffered any adverse employment action as a result of engaging in protected expression.

A Title VII race or sex discrimination claim must allege facts suggesting the employer discharged the employee because of race or sex.

Mayes v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals · filed 2013-01-09(a)(1)

Here, although plaintiff describes some of the events leading to his termination, he provides no meaningful detail suggesting the termination was because of his race or sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a race discrimination complaint to allege facts supporting a plausible inference that the employer took an adverse employment action because of race.

Prewitt v. Continental Automotive · filed 2013-02-26(a)(1)

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, a reasonable court could not draw the necessary inference that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of his race.

A qualified employee plausibly alleges race discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) by alleging a race-motivated termination and replacement by or more favorable treatment of workers outside the employee’s race.

Smith v. CH2M Hill, Inc. · filed 2013-06-05(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employers from discharging an employee on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Here, Smith’s allegations are sufficient to state a plausible claim for race discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a complaint must allege facts supporting an inference of a violation.

Badger v. City of Philadelphia Office of Property Assessment · filed 2014-04-15(a)(1)

The PAC does not contain any facts from which a court could infer that defendants violated Title VII (which prohibits discriminatory employment practices based upon an individual's “race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)), nor any facts related to libel, defamation, or 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (regarding discrimination in the making or enforcement of contracts).

A Title VII sex discrimination claim requires facts plausibly connecting the adverse employment action to the employee’s sex.

Lupton v. American Fidelity Assurance Co. · filed 2014-05-20(a)

Even if the Court construes this as true, plaintiff fails to set forth sufficient allegations showing but for him being a male, he would not have been terminated from his position. The Court finds plaintiffs allegation of gender discrimination is of the general nature referred to by the Khalik court and, further, is conclusory and devoid of the further factual enhancement needed for a plausible claim. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs gender discrimination claim should be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination to plead facts supporting a plausible inference that an adverse employment action occurred because of a protected characteristic.

Lawtone-Bowles v. City of New York · filed 2014-05-30(a)

To state a claim for employment discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege that she suffered an advérse employment action because of her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Section 2000e-2 permits a sex-discrimination claim to proceed when an employee sufficiently alleges that her employer denied her job opportunities while treating male employees more favorably.

Carlson v. CSX Transportation, Incorpora · filed 2014-07-10

The allegations in her complaint are easily sufficient to state claims for sex discrimination and retalia- tion.

A sex-discrimination complaint under Title VII must allege a specific adverse employment action imposed because of the plaintiff’s sex.

Smith v. EMB, Incorporated · filed 2014-09-29(a)(1)

For Smith’s claim of sex discrimination, she needed to plead only that EMB imposed a specific adverse employment action on the basis of her sex.

Section 2000e-2 permits a sex discrimination claim based on specific allegations of disparate treatment.

Adkins v. Atria Senior Living, Inc. · filed 2015-07-01

After reviewing the Complaint, the Court concludes that Ms. Adkins has specifically described instances of disparate treatment, and has provided Atria with sufficient notice of the claims against it. The Court therefore declines to dismiss Ms. Adkins’ Count Three.

A race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) can be pleaded by alleging an adverse employment action because of race, without pleading a prima facie case.

Johnson v. District of Columbia · filed 2015-07-17(a)(1)

Rather, at this stage, a claim has sufficient “factual heft” when it includes two basic assertions: that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, and that this was ... because of the plaintiff’s race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a sex-discrimination complaint to plausibly allege facts suggesting that the employer acted with discriminatory motivation.

Dechberry v. New York City Fire Department · filed 2015-08-14(a)(1)

Plaintiff need only present “some minimal evidence suggesting that the employer acted with discriminatory motivation.” ... Applying that standard here, plaintiffs Title VII discrimination claim fails as a matter of law.

A Title VII discrimination claim fails when the complaint alleges neither discrimination based on a protected characteristic nor facts describing a prima facie case.

Alja-Iz v. United States Virgin Islands Board of Education · filed 2015-08-28

There is even less to Alja-Iz’s claims under Title VI and Title VII. Alja-Iz never pleaded even the bare legal conclusion that he failed to received certifications as a result of discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or any other characteristic protected under either of those statutes—let alone pleaded any facts sufficient to describe a prima facie case of discrimination.

A Title VII sex discrimination complaint states a plausible claim when it alleges that the employer took an adverse employment action because of the plaintiff’s sex.

Deka v. Countryside Ass'n for People with Disabilities, Inc. · filed 2015-10-14(a)(1)

In her Complaint, Deka attributes her termination from her position of five years to sex discrimination, satisfying the Carlson, Tamayo, and Concentra pleading standard. She also alleges that Countryside expressed an interest in hiring males, refused to terminate an employee because he was a male, and replaced her with a male employee subsequent to her termination. Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Deka, she has successfully alleged a plausible Title VII claim against Countryside.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a race discrimination claim to proceed when the alleged facts plausibly show protected class membership, job qualification, termination, and replacement by someone with similar qualifications.

Butler v. Adecco USA Inc. · filed 2016-05-24(a)(1)

Considering that Plaintiffs pro se filings should be liberally construed, I find that the factual allegations in her complaint state a plausible claim that she was a member of a protected class; that she was qualified for the Sun Life position; that she was terminated; and that she was replaced by someone with similar qualifications. Sun Life’s and Adecco’s motions to dismiss are denied with regard to counts I-IV.

A discriminatory hiring claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must plead facts making discrimination plausible, but need not establish a prima facie case with evidence at the pleading stage.

Chhim v. University of Texas at Austin · filed 2016-09-02(a)(1)

Although Chhim did not have to submit evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination at this stage, he had to plead sufficient facts on all of the ultimate elements of a disparate treatment claim to make his case plausible.

A Title VII discrimination complaint must allege facts connecting an adverse employment action to a protected characteristic; protected status and termination alone are insufficient.

Alicea v. North American Central School Bus, LLC · filed 2017-02-06(a)

Under either statute, the complaint must set forth some facts indicating a relationship between the plaintiffs protected characteristic (such as race, sex, or age) and some adverse employment action taken against the plaintiff. It is not enough to allege, without more, that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class and that she was fired, or even that she was fired unfairly.

A Title VII race discrimination complaint must allege facts supporting an inference that the employer acted because of the employee's race.

Jordan v. Staffing Plus · filed 2017-10-03(a)

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee based on race. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ... However, plaintiff does not allege his race or provide any facts to support his allegation that his employer's decision to terminate him was based on his race, or that any interference with an employment contract between him and Staffing Plus occurred because of his race. Accordingly, he has not stated a claim under the federal statutes prohibiting employment discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts plausibly connecting an adverse employment action to a protected trait to state a discrimination claim.

Yin v. Thermo Fisher Scientific · filed 2017-12-11(a)(1)

However, the complaint does not allege any facts from which the Court can reasonably infer that Thermo Fisher took adverse employment actions against Yin because of his race, ethnicity, national origin, or age. In other words, Yin has not alleged any plausible connection between his membership in those protected classes and Thermo Fisher’s alleged misconduct. Because he fails to indentify a basis for inferring such a nexus, Counts One and Two fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires factual allegations that plausibly link an employer’s conduct to discrimination based on race or another protected characteristic.

Armour v. Universal Protection Services · filed 2018-02-16(a)(1)

Ms. Armour purported to bring claims pursuant to Title VII, which makes it unlawful “to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... We agree with the district court that Ms. Armour’s allegations of discrimination and retaliation were entirely conclusory.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a sex discrimination claim to proceed when the plaintiff alleges that her employer took an adverse employment action because of her sex and gives notice of the basis for the claim.

Glenn v. Barrington 220 Community Unit School District · filed 2018-10-25(a)

A Title VII plaintiff needs only allege that the defendant took an adverse employment action against her on the basis of her sex and provide notice of the basis for her claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discrimination complaint to plausibly connect the employer’s conduct to a protected characteristic.

Rubert v. King · filed 2019-04-30(a)(1)

What he does not allege, however,is that Walmart knew that the allegedhostile work environment was based on Plaintiff’s race, color, or national origin, or that Walmart fired him because of his race, color, or national origin.

A claim of race discrimination in overtime or promotional opportunities must plead facts supporting a plausible inference of discrimination.

Palmer v. Pentair · filed 2019-07-18(a)(1)

Because plaintiff has not alleged any facts in support of an inference of either discrimination or retaliation, the court dismisses plaintiff’s Title VII claims on overtime and promotional opportunities.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in employment, and a complaint with sufficient factual allegations of such discrimination can survive dismissal.

Bruton v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections · filed 2019-07-29(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against anyone because of that person’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is supported by sufficient factual allegations to avoid dismissal of her race discrimination claim against the Department of Corrections.

A complaint alleging employment discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must state facts sufficient to support a Title VII claim.

Scott v. Hertz · filed 2019-08-01(a)(1)

The Court is unable to determine when, where, how, and by whom the Defendant failed to conduct itself in accordance with the law. ... The Court further finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a Title VII claim.

A Title VII race discrimination complaint need not plead a prima facie case if its facts plausibly suggest intentional discrimination.

FOY V. WILSON, SECRETARY OF AIR FORCE · filed 2019-08-06

Foy has thus pleaded sufficient facts to plausibly suggest intentional race discrimination. Accordingly, Wilson’s motion to dismiss Foy’s race discrimination claim is DENIED.

A Title VII sex discrimination complaint survives dismissal when its allegations provide at least minimal support for an inference of discriminatory intent.

Menaker v. Hofstra Univ. · filed 2019-08-15(a)(1)

Thus the only remaining question is whether the complaint alleges circumstances that provide at least minimal support for an inference of discriminatory intent. We conclude that it does.