42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats a change to employment terms or conditions as an adverse action when it causes some harm.

Mitchell v. Garland · filed 2024-07-01(a)(1)

The adverse actions that Ms. Mitchell alleges—her supervisors’ refusing to respond to her messages in a timely manner, requiring her to work on holidays, requiring her to complete a training that others did not have to complete, giving her an unfavorable performance rating, and changing her schedule without notice—meet the standard of “some harm” to the terms and conditions of her employment under Muldrow, because they represent changes that negatively impact her work environment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires some harm to a term or condition of employment for an adverse employment action, without a seriousness threshold.

Peifer v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole · filed 2024-07-03(a)(1)

Because Muldrow made clear that adverse employment action need not be serious, we will remand so that the District Court can consider in the first instance whether Peifer has asserted harms sufficient to establish “some” employment-related harm for her prima facie case under Muldrow.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employee alleging discrimination to identify a change in a term or condition of employment that made the employee worse off.

Williams v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water · filed 2024-07-16(a)(1)

Title VII protects employees from discrimination “with respect to [] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Thus, for a Title VII claim, an employee must point to a change in an “identifiable term or condition of employment” that made her “worse off.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires some injury to an employee’s terms or conditions of employment, but the harm need not be significant, serious, or substantial.

Davis v. Orange County · filed 2024-07-23(a)(1)

But an injury need not constitute significant, serious, or substantial harm to suffice under the statute.

Workplace threats alone do not satisfy the adverse employment action requirement for a discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Palmer v. Department of Air Force · filed 2024-07-29(a)(1)

The threats described in the Complaint, therefore, do not, by themselves, satisfy the adverse employment action requirement.

A written warning supports a discrimination claim under Section 2000e-2(a) only if it causes some injury to the employee’s terms or conditions of employment.

LEITE v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2024-07-30(a)

Leite has failed to produce facts from which a reasonable jury could find she suffered an adverse employment action—an essential element of a prima facie case of pregnancy and race discrimination under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action for a race discrimination claim; additional assignments within an employee’s existing duties, without lost pay, do not suffice.

Kline v. United Airlines, Inc · filed 2024-07-31(a)(1)

Except for his termination (which Kline does not claim to be racially motivated), Kline has not identified a single adverse action. Being assigned to more flights and gates might have changed or even added to Kline’s responsibilities, but he does not contend that these tasks were outside the scope of his preexisting job duties or that he was not paid for the work performed.

Disrespectful remarks do not establish an adverse employment action under § 2000e-2(a)(1) when they do not affect compensation, employment terms or opportunities, or employee status.

Christian v. Lowe's Companies, Inc. · filed 2024-08-02(a)(1)

This isolated instance of disrespectful language, even assuming it occurred, did not result in any effect on the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of Mr. Christian’s employment, deprive him of employment opportunities, or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee.

A single offensive remark, with no other comments about race or national origin, does not establish an adverse employment action under Section 2000e-2(a)(1).

Kottapalli v. ASML US, LP · filed 2024-08-14(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s second theory, that he was called a “lucky bastard,” is also insufficient to show an adverse employment action.

Denial of training equipment was not an adverse employment action where it did not alter the employee’s terms or conditions of employment.

Woods v. City of Markham · filed 2024-08-06(a)(1)

Chief White’s failure to provide the training equipment Woods sought is not an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a disparate-treatment claim when an employer delays religious accommodation requests while processing other requests, causing some harm to the terms or conditions of employment.

Desmarais v. Granholm · filed 2024-08-16(a)(1)

Because Mr. Desmarais has alleged that he was subjected to a practice, instituted by his employer, “that ‘treat[s] a person worse’ because of [a] protected trait,” he has alleged “some harm” to the terms and conditions of his employment sufficient to clear Muldrow’s low bar.

An allegedly biased investigation does not establish sex discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) without an adverse action that alters the terms and conditions of employment.

Ingram v. Regano · filed 2024-08-23(a)(1)

However, for the same reasons as those stated in the Court’s determination of Plaintiff’s Retaliation claim, the Court finds Plaintiff has not established a prima facie claim because she cannot show she suffered an adverse employment action from a biased investigation that altered the terms and conditions of her employment.

Title VII discrimination need not involve an ultimate employment decision; it must affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Yates v. Spring Indep Sch Dist · filed 2024-08-26(a)(1)

In rejecting Yates’s discrimination claims, the district court erroneously relied on this court’s former “ultimate employment decision” standard for Title VII discrimination claims, under which discrimination is actionable only if it amounts to an “ultimate employment decision[] such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, or compensating.” McCoy, 492 F.3d at 559 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, in Hamilton, our court held that a plaintiff need not show “discrimination with respect to an ‘ultimate employment decision’” but instead only “that [he] was discriminated against, because of a protected characteristic, with respect to . . . the ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’—just as the statute says.” 79 F.4th at 506 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers race or national origin discrimination that causes some harm to an identifiable term or condition of employment.

ZHANG v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA · filed 2024-08-26(a)(1)

These allegations certainly concern harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires some harm to an identifiable term or condition of employment, without a separate significance requirement.

McCray v. United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of · filed 2024-08-27(a)(1)

And so, the court will not apply the potentially offending “significant” from Ford’s adverse standard.

Section 2000e-2 does not treat dismissal of an employee’s internal ethics complaint as an adverse employment action when it does not alter the conditions of employment.

Gallego-Pagan v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation of Puerto Rico · filed 2024-09-05(a)(1)

Although she was notified that her complaint before the ethics division was dismissed on March 5, 2021, said dismissal is not an adverse employment action as it did not alter the conditions of Plaintiff’s employment.

A Title VII religious accommodation claim requires a materially adverse employment change; an offer to reinstate a former employee to a previously held position does not qualify.

O'Leary v. The New York City Department of Investigation · filed 2024-09-12(a)(1)

It is difficult for the Court to comprehend plaintiff’s proposition that such a letter constitutes a “materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment,” as is required in a Title VII failure to accommodate claim. ... A letter offering a formally terminated employee the opportunity to return to a previously held position does not fall into any of these categories, and plaintiff offers no reason to find otherwise.

A negative performance evaluation alone is not an adverse employment action under Section 2000e-2(a).

PORTER v. FRANCISCAN ALLIANCE, INC. · filed 2024-09-16(a)

Second, the 2020 Evaluation itself is not an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat the denial of a rotating remote work schedule, by itself, as an adverse employment action supporting a racial discrimination claim.

Jones v. Brookhaven National Lab · filed 2024-09-10(a)(1)

In line with the reasoning set forth in Thompson and Williams, the allegations of the Amended Complaint that Brookhaven denied Jones’s request for a rotating remote work schedule fails to plead an adverse employment action that would support a Title VII racial discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2 covers a denial of telework that disadvantages an employee in a term or condition of employment because of sex.

Miller v. O'Malley · filed 2024-09-19(a)(1)

This Court determines that SSA’s denial of Miller’s telework requests, which he submitted in August and October 2017, are adverse actions, both in the context of Miller’s sex discrimination and retaliation claims.

Section 2000e-2(a) treats repeated less desirable assignments as adverse employment actions when they materially harm an employee’s career.

Walker v. Metro North Commuter Railroad · filed 2024-09-23(a)

Because Walker adequately alleges that the troubles assignments had a materially adverse impact on his career, this collectively qualifies as an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action for a race discrimination claim; denied preferred vacation days or shifts, low evaluations, and extended probation without a tangible job consequence do not qualify.

Logan v. City of Chicago · filed 2024-09-25(a)(1)

In sum, Logan not obtaining his preferred vacation days or shifts, receiving low performance evaluations, and being subjected to an extended probationary period are not adverse actions.

A change in working conditions is an adverse employment action under Title VII only if it causes objective harm that is more than trifling.

Bonaffini v. Brooklyn College · filed 2024-09-25(a)(1)

At least, there must be an objective component and the perceived harm or injury must be, as Justice Thomas stated, “more than trifling,” even if it doesn’t rise to the level of “significant” or “material.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a materially adverse employment action for a race discrimination claim; an assignment and a reminder that it is due do not qualify, even if unfair or burdensome.

Booker v. Walsh · filed 2024-09-26(a)(1)

First, simply receiving the assign- ment to write standard operating procedures, and then receiving a reminder that the assignment was due, is not an adverse employment action, even if unfair or burden- some.

An extended probationary period can be an adverse employment action under § 2000e-2(a)(1) if it harms an employee’s terms or conditions of employment.

Johnson v. Nestle' USA · filed 2024-09-27(a)(1)

Accordingly, there remains a question of fact as to whether the offer to extend Johnson’s probationary period (rather than allowing him into the Training Program on a non-probationary basis at that time) amounted to an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a disparate treatment claim based on a lowered performance rating when the employee alleges that race or sex caused the lower rating and that it harmed the terms or conditions of employment.

Turner v. Buttigieg · filed 2024-09-30(a)(1)

Thus, because Ms. Turner alleges that she received a lower rating on her performance evaluation based on her race or sex, she has alleged “some harm” to the terms and conditions of her employment sufficient to clear Muldrow’s low bar.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can treat the denial of lucrative assignments as an adverse employment action when it disadvantages an employee.

Moorehead v. KRG MS Oak Brook LLC · filed 2024-09-30(a)(1)

Drawing inferences in Moorehead’s favor, the failure to assign Moorehead to banquets or large parties could be an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discriminatory task assignment to leave an employee worse off by changing a term or condition of employment, though the change need not be significant.

Lukie v. MetLife Group, Inc. · filed 2024-10-11(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits discrimination with respect to an employee’s “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... So, Lukie bears the initial burden of proving that MetLife’s assignment of administrative tasks “left her worse off,” even if not “significantly so.” Id. at 359.

A regular work assignment that does not disadvantageously change an employee’s conditions of employment is not an adverse employment action for a race discrimination claim.

Riley v. Acco Engineered Systems · filed 2024-10-23(a)(1)

Throughout his two-month employment with ACCO, Plaintiff was primarily assigned to solo tasks; solo work was a basic parameter of Plaintiff’s employment rather than a “disadvantageous change” that would constitute an “adverse employment action.”

A transfer that causes an employee to lose seniority and the ability to bid on routes or days off sufficiently alleges an adverse employment action under Title VII.

Hinkle-Moore v. DeJoy · filed 2024-10-23(a)(1)

By contrast, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint alleges harm connected with her transfer. She alleges that when she was transferred to the Columbus facility “she lost her seniority. As a result of the loss of seniority, Plaintiff could no longer bid on certain routes or have certain days off.” (Doc. 23 at ¶ 20). At the pleadings stage, this is sufficient to allege an adverse action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat denial of a leave request made outside company policy as an adverse employment action when the employee’s leave benefits remain available.

Grady v. DM Trans, LLC · filed 2024-10-25(a)(1)

There was no “disadvantageous” change in her employment terms or conditions based on the denial of her time off requests.

A disparate-treatment plaintiff under § 2000e-2(a) must show a change in an employment term or condition that left the employee worse off.

Murray v. Learjet, Inc. · filed 2024-11-07(a)

There is no evidence that the jobs Murray was assigned were not already within his job duties, such that they could constitute a change in his employment conditions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats an employment action as adverse when it causes some harm to compensation or another term, condition, or privilege of employment.

O'Brien v. Autozoners, LLC · filed 2024-11-20(a)(1)

Instead, the court must simply determine if the plaintiff has plausibly shown some harm as it relates to compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment.

A Title VII religious accommodation claim requires an adverse employment action; a resignation qualifies as constructive discharge only if the employee plausibly alleges intolerable working conditions.

Fron v. City of Chicago · filed 2024-11-22(a)(1)

By contrast, Fron’s claim fails because he has alleged no adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discrimination plaintiff to show harm to an identifiable term or condition of employment; a transfer does not establish an adverse action on a constructive involuntary transfer theory without evidence that the employer compelled it.

Pearson v. Kansas Department of Corrections · filed 2024-12-03(a)(1)

Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, no reasonable jury could find or infer that defendant compelled plaintiff to transfer jobs.

Negative performance reviews that contribute to a demotion can qualify as adverse employment actions under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Times v. Success Academy Charter Schools, Inc. · filed 2024-12-06(a)(1)

Therefore, the performance reviews are considered adverse employment actions.

A transfer can be an adverse employment action under § 2000e-2(a)(1) when it causes some harm to the terms or conditions of employment, even if the harm is not significant.

Agapov v. UBIF Franchising Co. · filed 2024-12-16(a)(1)

Under the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Muldrow and adopted by the Second Circuit in Back, Plaintiff’s allegations that he was made to drive for longer hours and at later times of the day, and that the conditions of the work van at the Mount Kisco Store were objectively inferior to the point of being unsafe, are sufficient to show that he endured some harm to the terms and conditions of his employment when he was forcibly transferred to the Mount Kisco Store.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats promotion deferrals as adverse employment actions when they disadvantage an employee’s terms or conditions of employment.

Glanville v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, Maryland: Baltimore Police Department · filed 2024-12-31(a)(1)

Although the verbal reassignment occurred in August 2023 and is thus time barred, see supra Section III.A., the promotion deferrals, if true, constitute disadvantageous changes to the identifiable terms or conditions of Ms. Glanville’s employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a legally cognizable adverse employment action for a disparate treatment claim.

Bonazza v. MUFG Bank, Ltd. · filed 2025-01-06(a)(1)

Although Bonazza insists that he is asserting a disparate treatment claim, that claim fails because he has identified no legally cognizable adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats a transfer that could worsen an employee’s compensation as an adverse employment action.

JENKINS v. CIOCCA MANAGEMENT, INC. · filed 2025-01-09(a)(1)

The Court disagrees. Plaintiff has put forth enough evidence that a jury could find that Plaintiff was subject to an adverse employment action by Defendant, and accordingly he has adequately met this element of the prima facie discrimination claim for the purposes of surviving Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

A disparate treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action affecting the terms and conditions of employment.

Howard v. Colvin · filed 2025-01-14(a)(1)

Because Plaintiff cannot refute the evidence that she was offered help regarding her workload, she cannot show that there was an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action for a discrimination claim; denying a shift change is not actionable when the employee’s terms and conditions of employment do not change.

ARCHIE v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2025-01-16(a)(1)

Plaintiff has not contended that the terms and conditions of her employment changed at any time despite the denial of her hardship requests. As such, the denial of Plaintiff’s shift change request is not an actionable adverse employment action.

An action that could affect continued employment, demotions, or raises can be an adverse employment action; a BOLO that does not affect employment is not.

Cooper v. Airbus Americas, Inc. · filed 2025-01-28(a)(1)

Because being put on a PIP and having it altered could potentially affect his continued employment, potential demotions, and potential raises, these actions would also be considered adverse employment actions, see, e.g., Monaghan v. Worldpay U.S., Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 860 (11th Cir. 2020); however, Plaintiff has not proven that being the subject of a BOLO while he was on FMLA leave affected his employment and Airbus has presented evidence to the contrary.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires some disadvantageous change to a term or condition of employment; trivial workplace slights do not qualify.

Olson v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals America, Inc. · filed 2025-01-29(a)(1)

Not every unpleasantry or experienced slight associated with the workplace will constitute an “adverse employment action” though – a plaintiff must show some “disadvantageous” act or practice that leaves a person worse off because of her protected trait.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat public criticism or harm to an employee’s reputation as an adverse employment action.

Harris v. Buttigieg · filed 2025-01-30(a)(1)

Most of the incidents set forth in the complaint do not meet the materiality standard necessary to be an adverse employment action. For example, the allegations that his supervisors undermined his reputation and publicly criticized him in front of other employees are not legally cognizable adverse actions.

A negative employment reference must have some adverse effect on the employee’s job prospects to support a discrimination claim.

Lundberg v. Delta Response Team, LLC · filed 2025-01-31(a)(1)

At the very least, a reference would need to have some negative impact on the plaintiff’s employment prospects to qualify as an adverse employment action, see id., and Lundberg has not offered sufficient evidence that Walton’s comments to the background investigators had such an effect here.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers disadvantageous changes in employment terms or conditions without requiring significant harm.

Ismail v. Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service · filed 2025-02-03(a)(1)

"Material" or "significant" adverse action is not required: ... A reasonable factfinder could determine that being publicly escorted from work by the police and put on emergency placement status without pay was, at a minimum, a difference in treatment that affected the "what, where, and when" of how Ismail does his job.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require a significant or material change in employment conditions; diminished responsibilities or lost bonus payments can support a discrimination claim.

Schoenadel v. YouGov America, Inc. · filed 2025-02-03(a)(1)

But under Muldrow, there is at least a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the changes pointed to by Schoenadel—including having her responsibilities diminished as CCO and losing out on bonus payments—suffice to sustain a Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat warnings without consequences or minor workplace slights as adverse employment actions for a disparate treatment claim.

Sullivan v. Atlantic Plant Maintenance · filed 2025-02-05(a)(1)

Plaintiff has therefore failed to plead facts sufficient to state a claim for a disparate treatment discrimination claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires actual harm to a term or condition of employment; anticipating harm from a policy that never takes effect is insufficient.

Goecke v. 3M Company · filed 2025-02-10(a)(1)

Indeed, 3M’s change in course illustrates why, however unfair it may feel in the moment, an employee needs to have actually suffered some discriminatory harm, and not merely the anticipation of harm yet to come, before they are entitled to claim discrimination under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discriminatory transfer to cause some harm to an identifiable term or condition of employment; inconvenience in arranging childcare alone does not suffice.

Stafford v. WB Frozen, US, LLC · filed 2025-02-13(a)(1)

Because the plaintiff cannot establish that the transfer was an adverse employment action, she cannot establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination based on that action, and the court has no need to consider the other elements of the prima facie case or the remaining steps of the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) may cover denial of a professor’s request to teach a course when the denial harms a term or condition of employment.

Kalia v. The City College of New York · filed 2025-02-18(a)(1)

Because a professor’s courseload is a component of the “terms or conditions” of his or her employment, Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 355, denying a request to teach a course may constitute an adverse employment action under Title VII.

A disproportionately heavy workload can be an adverse employment action under Title VII when similarly situated employees receive lighter workloads.

Gahfi v. City of New York · filed 2025-02-28(a)(1)

Thus, plaintiff has adequately alleged an adverse employment action in the form of a disproportionately heavy workload.

A material change in an employee’s responsibilities can qualify as an adverse employment action under Title VII.

Hamilton v. Siemens Healthcare Diagnostics, Inc · filed 2025-03-18(a)

Third, Plaintiff points to assignment of “duties outside the scope of his job title.” ... Further, they clearly describe an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires harm to an identifiable term or condition of employment; denial of pizza, pies, and swag does not qualify as an adverse employment action.

Mills v. Amazon.com Services, LLC · filed 2025-03-19(a)(1)

Thus, the alleged denial of “staff benefits” does not constitute an adverse employment action.

A transfer that does not change an employee’s working conditions is not an adverse employment action under Title VII.

BOSTON v. GRAPHIC PACKAGING INTERNATIONAL, LLC · filed 2025-03-24(a)(1)

Accordingly, we find that Plaintiff has not shown that the transfer was an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not support a sex discrimination claim based on a move to a smaller office unless the move affects the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

WEBSTER v. MHM HEALTH PROFESSIONALS LLC · filed 2025-03-24(a)(1)

And while Webster may have been understandably frustrated when MHM moved her into a smaller office, she likewise has not shown that such a change affected the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires some harm from an employment action; unfair work assignments alone do not establish an adverse employment action.

Budhan v. Brightworks Sustainability LLC · filed 2025-03-26(a)(1)

But “allegations of unfair work assignments, without more, do not amount to adverse employment actions.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discrimination plaintiff challenging reprimands or coaching to show harm to an identifiable term or condition of employment.

Miller v. City of Aurora · filed 2025-03-29(a)(1)

Miller has failed to make out a prima facie Title VII claim based on either her four reprimands or her placement on what she labels an indefinite performance improvement plan because neither constitute an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires some harm to an identifiable term or condition of employment; written reprimands with no such effect are not adverse employment actions.

Davis v. Orange County · filed 2025-03-30(a)(1)

Ultimately, even under Muldrow’s lower threshold, Plaintiff still fails to show that the written reprimands amounted to adverse employment actions under the Title VII’s discrimination provision.

A Title VII disparate treatment claim based on reassignment requires evidence of a disadvantageous change in an employment term or condition.

Williams v. District of Columbia · filed 2025-03-31(a)

Because Plaintiff fails to produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action or that Defendant’s asserted reason was not the actual reason for her work reassignments, the court grants summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim as to her work reassignments.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate-treatment plaintiff to connect discriminatory harm to an identifiable term or condition of employment.

Buck v. Modine Manufacturing Company · filed 2025-03-31(a)(1)

Here, no formulation of Muldrow supports Buck’s claims, because in any case Buck is still required to connect the discriminatory harm to “an identifiable term or condition of employment.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires some harm to an identifiable term or condition of employment for a disparate treatment claim, but the harm need not be significant or material.

Franco v. City of New York · filed 2025-03-31(a)(1)

Under Title VII, an adverse employment action is an action that imposes “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.” Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 601 U.S. 346, 355 (2024). The harm need not be significant or even material, but the adverse action “must have left [the plaintiff] worse off.” Id. at 359.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat performance reviews as adverse employment actions without a material effect on employment.

Nguyen v. McDonough · filed 2025-03-31(a)(1)

Here, Plaintiff’s 2018 “marginal” and “satisfactory” performance reviews, without more, do not constitute adverse employment actions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a race discrimination plaintiff to allege some injury affecting the terms or conditions of employment; a write-up without such an effect is not an actionable adverse employment action.

Phifer v. Koch Foods of Alabama, LLC (MAG+) · filed 2025-04-30(a)(1)

Here, because the Plaintiff did not plead any facts to suggest that the write-up injured him in a way that impacted his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, the write-up is not an actionable adverse employment action, even under the some-injury standard.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) discrimination claims can be assessed for adverse employment action without requiring significant harm.

Cordova v. Textron Aviation, Inc. · filed 2025-04-30(a)(1)

After all, plaintiff here brings her discrimination claims, in part, under the same statutory provision at issue in Muldrow, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). And Muldrow largely rests on a textual reading of that very provision, making application to this case likely. And so, the court won’t append the offending “significant” to the adverse standard here.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats a transfer that causes some harm to an identifiable term or condition of employment as an adverse employment action; the harm need not be significant.

Miller v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, The · filed 2025-05-01(a)(1)

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established that her assignment to the RM channel was an adverse employment action.

A Title VII sex discrimination claim fails at the prima facie stage when the employee cannot establish an adverse employment action, including a claimed constructive discharge.

PICARDI v. PULMONARY CONSULTANTS, INC. · filed 2025-05-21(a)(1)

However, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the third element of the prima facie case of sex discrimination -- that she was subjected to an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers sex discrimination affecting employment terms, including forced use of leave, denial of overtime pay, and failure to promote.

Russell v. Village Of Skokie · filed 2025-05-23(a)(1)

Under this standard, Plaintiff’s allegations of forced use of leave, denial of payment for overtime, and failure to promote easily qualify as adverse employment actions.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a race-discrimination claim to allege harm to a term or condition of employment; delayed handling of internal complaints alone does not meet that requirement.

Shed v. University of South Florida Board of Trustees · filed 2025-05-30(a)

Moreover, USF’s alleged failure to timely ad- dress Mr. Shed’s internal complaints did not result in a change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of his employment.

A racial discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action.

Byrne v. American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, (A.S.P.C.A.) · filed 2025-06-03(a)(1)

Even if plaintiff is attempting to raise a Title VII discrimination claim, she has pointed to no adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that an employer took an adverse employment action because of an employee’s protected trait.

Lin v. Franciscan Alliance, Inc. · filed 2025-06-20(a)(1)

But the problem with Dr. Lin’s case is that he has no evidence that he was subjected to an adverse employment action. Recall that Dr. Lin voluntarily resigned from Franciscan.

An assignment of additional duties is not an adverse employment action when it increases the employee’s pay and does not worsen working conditions.

Garrison v. American Sugar Refining, Inc. · filed 2025-06-25(a)(1)

But plaintiff benefitted financially from the assignment of sugar-loss monitoring tasks; after all, this policy caused him to earn overtime at a higher rate than he otherwise would have earned as a Lab Tech, and it did not materially worsen his working conditions.

An adverse employment action under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must harm an identifiable term or condition of employment.

Martinez-Medina v. Rollins · filed 2025-07-22(a)(1)

The first three acts are not adverse employment actions because they did not affect “an identifiable term or condition of [Martinez-Medina’s] employment.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employee challenging a job transfer to show some harm to a term or condition of employment; a brief change in hours and location without objective harm is insufficient.

Paterakos v. City of Chicago · filed 2025-08-12(a)(1)

Even under Muldrow, though, we agree with the district court that the one-week assignment to the DePaul Center to enable social distancing in the earliest stages of the pandemic did not constitute an adverse employment action. Although Paterakos’s failure to show “significant” harm from the brief assignment to the DePaul Center is not necessarily decisive, her failure to show that she suffered any harm is.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action; sporadic insults alone do not qualify without a disadvantageous change in an employment term or condition.

Watkins v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2025-08-15(a)(1)

Absent any “‘disadvantageous’ change in an employment term or condition,” Muldrow, 144 S.Ct. at 974, sporadic derogatory language or insults do not alone constitute an adverse employment action.

Termination qualifies as an adverse employment action for a race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Younger v. City Of Lynchburg · filed 2025-08-15(a)(1)

Here, Younger alleges that he was the subject of various forms of discipline and that he was ultimately terminated, amounting to adverse employment actions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a race discrimination claim based on denial of a position that would increase an employee’s title.

Nash v. City Of Cincinnati · filed 2025-08-19(a)(1)

If Defendant Cincinnati would have promoted Plaintiff to the role of investigator, she would have, at least facially, received an increase in title. Thus, this would not have been a lateral transfer and Defendants’ argument fails.

Paid administrative leave that does not affect compensation or other terms, conditions, or privileges of employment is not an adverse employment action under Title VII.

Burchfield v. South Louisiana Medical Associates, A Professional Corporation · filed 2025-08-26(a)(1)

That’s because placement on paid leave did not adversely affect Burchfield’s “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can cover a change in job responsibilities that leaves an employee worse off in a term or condition of employment, even without a change in pay or title.

Bethel v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2025-08-27(a)(1)

While changes in job responsibilities alone may not typically be considered serious enough to rise to an adverse action, in this instance, not only was Bethel’s supervisory authority stripped from him, costing him his autonomy in supervising, but the action additionally subjected Bethel to become supervised. It cannot be said that Plaintiff has not pled he was worse off.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a race-discrimination plaintiff to show some harm to an identifiable term or condition of employment; a negative appraisal without such harm does not suffice.

Woods v. Collins · filed 2025-08-29(a)(1)

Under Title VII, a plaintiff must show “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.” Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 354-55. But Woods points to no evidence that his 2020 appraisal was used as a basis for a reduction in pay, transfer, or other change to a term or condition of his employment. He has not created a genuine issue of fact on whether the negative appraisal caused some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of his employment.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence that a challenged employment decision was adverse or motivated by race; an offer that included a raise and relocation stipend did not support that claim.

Harris III v. Grumman · filed 2025-08-29(a)

Plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Northrop Grumman’s decision to offer him a salary of $144,284.66 (plus a $50,000 relocation stipend) for that position was either an adverse employment action or was motivated by his race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discrimination plaintiff to allege an adverse employment action affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Williams v. Family Health International · filed 2025-09-02(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Plaintiff here has not alleged that she suffered an adverse employment action, so her complaint fails to state a claim of discrimination under Counts I, III, and V.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plausible qualifying adverse employment action for a religious discrimination claim based on such an action.

Acosta · filed 2025-09-05(a)(1)

However, the Court finds that no such claim can be plausibly alleged here, given the absence of a qualifying adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action for a discrimination claim; unsatisfactory evaluations, AWOL status, and denial of training do not qualify here.

Oji v. McDonough · filed 2025-09-11(a)(1)

As set forth below, the Court finds that unsatisfactory performance evaluations, placement on AWOL status, and denial of training do not constitute adverse employment actions and, therefore, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie claim of discrimination as to these claims.

Section 2000e-2(a) treats a demotion that leaves an employee worse off as an adverse employment action.

Olsen v. City of Richmond · filed 2025-09-16(a)

The Court finds that the City’s demotion of Plaintiff, alongside the attending consequences, constitute an adverse employment action, thus satisfying the third element of the discrimination analysis.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a disparate treatment claim based on a disproportionately heavy workload compared with similarly situated coworkers.

Wilson · filed 2025-09-19(a)(1)

Moreover, even if the Court were to consider the CBA, the Court’s holding would not change because Plaintiff has alleged sufficiently to withstand the motion to dismiss that he was consistently assigned a disproportionately heavy workload as compared to his female, non-Black colleagues, subject to the same CBA provisions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plausible adverse employment action and facts supporting an inference of discrimination for a disparate-treatment claim.

Owens v. Bisignano · filed 2025-09-22(a)(1)

Plaintiff fails to plausibly state a violation of Title VII above a speculative level because her alleged instances of discrimination do not, as a matter of law, amount to adverse employment actions.

A nondisciplinary workplace notice that causes no change in employment is not an adverse employment action for a Title VII sex-discrimination claim.

Cooperstein v. University of Utah · filed 2025-09-22(a)(1)

Therefore, even though Cooperstein argues that the dress code rule was not applied as frequently to women, there was no material adverse action applied against him as a man because the Rapid Assessment is not disciplinary.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not cover allegations that involve no adverse employment action by a defendant.

Hawkins v. Woosley · filed 2025-09-26(a)(1)

Thus, Title VII is wholly inapplicable to Plaintiff’s allegations, as nothing in the complaint suggests that any of the Defendants committed an adverse employment action against him.

Section 2000e-2 requires an adverse employment action for a discrimination claim; a resignation alone does not qualify.

Heard v. Field Core · filed 2025-09-15(a)(1)

And resignations are not adverse employment actions.

A religious discrimination claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action.

Ali v. City of Cleveland · filed 2025-09-16(a)(1)

To establish a claim for religious-based Title VII discrimination as alleged in Count Three and Title VII retaliation as alleged in Count Four, Plaintiff must show that he suffered an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment to show a materially adverse employment action.

Bilyeu v. UT-Battelle, LLC · filed 2025-09-29(a)(1)

Muldrow thus abrogates the “materially adverse” standard discussed in Tepper and relied on by the district court. So we must vacate the grant of summary judgment on Mr. Bilyeu’s disparate treatment claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse change in employment terms or conditions; mere inconveniences and changes in job responsibilities do not suffice.

Groom v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervison · filed 2025-09-29(a)(1)

On their face, most of these “incidents” do not constitute materially adverse changes in Groom’s terms of employment; rather, they are inconveniences and alterations of job responsibilities.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers disadvantageous changes in employment terms or conditions even when an employee’s pay stays the same.

DeVillez v. Dolgen Corp, LLC · filed 2025-09-29(a)(1)

Thus, the lack of change in Plaintiff’s pay does not show that she did not suffer an adverse employment decision.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a race discrimination plaintiff to show an adverse employment action that caused some injury to employment terms or conditions.

Baker · filed 2025-09-29(a)(1)

Plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case of discrimination based on the April 2021 incident because he did not suffer an adverse employment action.

A written reprimand or proposed removal is not an adverse employment action if it causes no change in the terms or conditions of employment.

Palmer v. Dep't of the Air Force · filed 2025-10-15(a)(1)

The written reprimand and notice of proposed removal do not qualify as adverse employment actions because the undisputed facts establish that neither action resulted in changes to the terms or conditions of Palmer’s employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats involuntary termination as an adverse employment action in a race discrimination claim.

VAN · filed 2025-10-24(a)(1)

So, as a matter of law, Van suffered an adverse action.

Section 2000e-2(a) treats an employer’s failure to renew a fixed-term employment contract as an adverse employment action.

Dixon · filed 2025-10-27(a)

Therefore, the court finds the Academy’s nonrenewal of Plaintiff’s contract constitutes an adverse employment action under Title VII and overrules Defendants’ objection.

An adverse employment action can include a forced resignation from an employee affinity group leadership role when it plausibly harms career advancement opportunities.

Rhone v. Blinken · filed 2025-10-28(a)(1)

Because Plaintiff has plausibly alleged an adverse employment action and a nexus between that action and her race, her claim that her forced resignation from BIG constituted racial discrimination in violation of Title VII withstands Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence that alleged interference with job duties affected an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment to support a disparate treatment claim.

Span · filed 2025-11-19(a)

But Plaintiff sets forth no evidence that his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of his position were materially affected by these events.

Section 2000e-2(a) can treat failure to appoint an employee to a temporary position as an adverse employment action when the position changes employment conditions, such as pay.

Jackson v. City of Yachats · filed 2025-12-09(a)

Failure to appoint an employee to a temporary position can be an adverse employment decision if the temporary move involves a change in conditions of employment such as an increase in pay.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a race discrimination claim to allege an adverse employment action; harassment, criticism, and a written reprimand without employment consequences do not suffice.

Middleton · filed 2025-12-15(a)(1)

These allegations are not sufficient to constitute an “adverse employment action” as a matter of law, and therefore, cannot support a cause of action for disparate-treatment discrimina- tion.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats failure to promote and temporary removal from paid leave as adverse employment actions, but a medical-clearance request without identifiable harm does not qualify.

West · filed 2025-12-19(a)(1)

The Court concludes that the failure to promote Plaintiff to the role of Captain and the temporary removal from paid administrative leave rise to the level of adverse employment actions, but the request for medical clearance is not an adverse employment action under Title VII.

A hostile work environment can satisfy the adverse employment action requirement for a Title VII disparate treatment claim without an allegation that the employee was fired.

SHEEHAN · filed 2025-12-23(a)(1)

However, the Amended Complaint need not allege that Polascak was fired in order to allege that she suffered an adverse employment action. ... Rather, it is enough allege that she experienced a hostile work environment.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a race discrimination complaint to plausibly allege an adverse employment action because of race; an employee’s subjective view of working conditions does not establish constructive discharge.

Galloway · filed 2025-12-29(a)

The plaintiff alleges that she was forced to resign due to stress, but her own perception of the work environment is not enough. ... The complaint lacks these allegations, and so it does not state a claim for race discrimination under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 treats adoption of an EEOC conciliation agreement as discrimination only if the agreement is a bad faith attempt to bestow unequal employment benefits.

Plott v. General Motors Corporation, Packard Electric Division · filed 1995-12-20

In order to show that the adoption of an EEOC conciliation agreement was an independent act of discrimination, a party must demonstrate that the agreement constitutes a bad faith attempt to bestow unequal employment benefits.

In a Title VII discrimination case, the court must give a business judgment instruction when the defendant requests one.

Stemmons v. Missouri Department of Corrections · filed 1996-05-07(a)(1)

We believe, therefore, that, in an employment discrimination case, a business judgment instruction is “crucial to a fair presentation of the case,” Walker, 995 F.2d at 849, and we agree with the department that the district court must offer it whenever it is proffered by the defendant.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not allow a court to second-guess an employer’s personnel decision merely because it was unwise, so long as it was nondiscriminatory.

Rosenberg v. Chesapeake Pharmaceutical & Health Care Packaging · filed 2012-08-27(a)(1)

It is not a court’s role to second-guess an employer’s personnel decisions, even if foolish, so long as they are non-discriminatory.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not create a standalone claim for an employer’s failure to issue or enforce Title VII policies or remove an employee’s authority to investigate complaints.

Bowie v. Hodge · filed 2021-01-06(a)

The court agrees with defendants that Title VII does not require or prohibit such actions and these actions do not, on their own, give rise to a cause of action under Title VII. Further, the court finds defendants’ motion to dismiss unopposed on this point. Accordingly, the claims of violation of Title VII by failing to issue or enforce policies or remove Hodge’s investigatory authority must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not impose liability for failing to investigate or remedy a discrimination complaint when no discrimination occurred.

Karibian v. Columbia University · filed 1996-06-28(a)(1)

If what occurs is an employer’s failure to investigate and take remedial measures in response to a complaint of discrimination, and if it turns out that no actual discrimination has occurred, then there is nothing which actually constitutes any conduct banned by the statute.

An employer’s failure to investigate an employee’s discrimination complaint is not an adverse employment action under § 2000e-2(a).

Coon v. UNC Rex Hospital · filed 2021-08-16(a)

Second, as discussed above, an employer’s failure to investigate its employee’s discrimination complaints does not constitute “adverse employment action” for purposes of Title VII’s antidiscrimination provision.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make an employer’s failure to investigate or prevent discrimination a separate disparate treatment claim when it causes no additional harm.

De Silva v. Pima County Government · filed 2024-11-12(a)(1)

The court concludes that if there is no additional harm, then the employer’s alleged failure to investigate, or prevent, or remediate does not constitute an averse action for the purposes of asserting a Title VII disparate treatment claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) applies to a labor organization sued for discrimination against its own employee only if the organization meets Title VII’s definition of an employer.

Anita Ferroni, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Warehousemen Local No. 222, Defendant-Appel · filed 2002-08-07(a)(1)

There is no indication that a labor organization that is sued by an employee alleging discrimination in the employment relationship should be treated any differently than any other employer. We therefore conclude that the Union must meet the statutory definition of employer in order for there to be jurisdiction over Ferroni’s discrimination claim, which concerns only the employer-employee relationship.

Section 2000e-2(c)(3) permits a wage discrimination claim against a union that causes or attempts to cause an employer to discriminate.

Stemple v. City of Dover · filed 1997-03-31(c)(3)

As made clear by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(3), if the unions, in the context of collective bargaining, have espoused the attitude which plaintiffs allege in Paragraph 14 of the complaint and have thereby “cause[d] or attempted] to cause [the City] to discriminate against [the plaintiffs] in violation of [that] section[,]” then the unions may be hable for Title VII discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(c)(1) covers discrimination by a union in its role as a labor organization, but does not cover its conduct as an employer.

Yerdon v. Henry · filed 1996-08-06(c)(1)

This result cannot be squared with the structure of § 703 as a whole, and we find that § 703(c)’s mandate that a labor organization may not “otherwise discriminate” applies only to a labor union in its role as a labor union and not as an employer.

A union that employs its stewards may be sued for discrimination both as an employer and as a labor organization.

Daggitt v. United Food & Commercial Workers International Union Local 304A · filed 1999-08-20

The Union argues that union stewards should not be counted as employees because any stewards who feel discriminated against would be required to bring a Title VII suit against the Union in its capacity only as a labor organization under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(l), rather than under the employment discrimination provision of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). The Court does not agree. If, as the Court concludes, the union stewards are in an employment relationship with the Union, there is no reason why the stewards could not also sue the Union as an employer and as a labor organization, as the plaintiff does here.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a discrimination claim against a union acting as an employer when the union employs the worker.

Ali v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 21 · filed 2011-03-11(a)

A union that employs workers may be liable, like any other employer, for discrimination arising out of the employment relationship. ... With Ali now abandoning her contention that IBEW Local 21 was her employer, the allegations set forth in her complaint fail to state a claim of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 allows a same-sex harassment claim when the harassment is directed at an employee because of sex.

Gerd v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 1996-08-19(a)(2)

I hold that a cognizable claim for same-sex harassment lies under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a same-sex hostile work environment claim when the harassment is based on gender.

McElroy v. TNS Mills, Inc. · filed 1996-08-28(a)(1)

Based on these cases, the court finds that a cause of action exists under Title VII for same-sex hostile work environment sexual harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a same-sex harassment claim when the harassment is because of the employee’s sex.

Johnson v. Hondo, Inc. · filed 1996-09-09(a)(1)

In conclusion, the Court holds that same-sex harassment claims are cognizable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers same-sex harassment when the harassment is because of the employee’s sex.

Ward v. Ridley School District · filed 1996-10-04(a)(1)

Although the Third Circuit has yet to address this issue, this Court agrees with two recent decisions in this district which found that same-sex sexual harassment is indeed actionable under Title VII. ... However, it is still incumbent upon a plaintiff to establish that the harassment was “because of’ that person’s sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a same-sex hostile work environment claim when an employee is sexually harassed because of the employee’s sex.

Wrightson v. Pizza Hut · filed 1996-11-15(a)(1)

Accordingly, we hold that a same-sex "hostile work environment" sexual harassment claim may lie under Title VII where a homosexual male (or female) employer discriminates against an employee of the same sex or permits such discrimination against an employee by homosexual employees of the same sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits hostile environment sexual harassment even when the harasser and victim are the same sex.

Miller v. Vesta, Inc. · filed 1996-11-22(a)(1)

The court holds that Title VII prohibits sexual harassment, in the form of a hostile environment, by a person of the same sex as the victim of the harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires workplace harassment to be based on sex; harassment inflicted without regard to gender is not actionable.

Pasqua v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company · filed 1996-11-26(a)(1)

Harassment that is inflicted without regard to gender, that is, where males and females in the same setting do not receive disparate treatment, is not actionable because the harassment is not based on sex.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a same-sex sexual harassment claim when the employee is harassed because of his sex.

Yeary v. Goodwill Industries-Knoxville, Inc. · filed 1997-02-24(a)

There is no question that Yeary has sufficiently alleged that he was harassed “because of’ his sex. He claims that because he is a male, he was subjected to objectionable treatment to which women employees at Goodwill were not subjected.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a claim for same-sex sexual harassment when the harassment is because of the employee’s sex.

Caldwell v. KFC Corp. · filed 1997-03-25(a)(1)

First, nothing in the Civil Rights Act suggests that Congress intended Title VII’s protections to apply only to persons who are harassed by members of the opposite sex.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence that workplace harassment was based on sex; ridicule alone is insufficient.

Noble v. Monsanto Co. · filed 1997-06-11(a)

Ridicule is not actionable absent showing that the harassment was based on sex. No such showing was made, nor was any material question of fact raised related to Noble’s nicknames to suggest the inference of sexual harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a claim for sexual harassment regardless of the gender of the employee or the harasser.

Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Belleville · filed 1997-07-17(a)(1)

Unless we read into the statute limitations that have no foundation in the broad, gender-neutral language that Congress employed, it is evident that anyone sexually harassed can pursue a claim under Title VII, no matter what her gender or that of her harasser.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits claims for same-sex sexual harassment.

Griswold v. Fresenius USA, Inc. · filed 1997-09-10(a)(1)

A claim for same-sex sexual harassment is cognizable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers same-sex sexual harassment when the harassment occurs because of the employee’s sex, regardless of either person’s sexual orientation.

Rasmusson v. Copeland Lumber Yards, Inc. · filed 1997-10-31(a)(1)

The court concludes that a claim of same sex harassment is actionable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 covers same-sex sexual harassment when a supervisor harasses an employee because of sex.

Lucero-Nelson v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 1998-02-24(a)(1)

While the Circuit Courts remain split on the issue, this Court finds that the “weight of the case law and the better reasoned cases support the viability of ‘same-sex’ ” Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers same-sex workplace harassment when it discriminates because of sex and meets the statutory requirements.

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. · filed 1998-03-04(a)(1)

We see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents for a categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a same-sex harassment claim when the evidence supports an inference that the employee was harassed because of sex; no single method of proof is required.

Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp. · filed 1999-02-19(a)

Yet we discern nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision indicating that the examples it provided were meant to be exhaustive rather than instructive. The Court’s focus was on what the plaintiff must ultimately prove rather than the methods of doing so.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers same-sex harassment when the employee shows that the harassment occurred because of sex.

Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp. · filed 1999-02-19(a)(1)

So long as the plaintiff demonstrates in some manner that he would not have been treated in the same way had he been a woman, he has proven sex discrimination. ... Reading the record in the light most favorable to Shepherd, we believe that the finder of fact could infer that the harassment was sex-based.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a same-sex hostile work environment claim to proceed when a jury could find that the employee was harassed because of his sex.

Fry v. Holmes Freight Lines, Inc. · filed 1999-11-15(a)(1)

Therefore, because plaintiff has proffered facts from which a reasonable jury could conclude that he experienced a hostile work environment because he is a man, summary judgment will be denied as to Count I.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers race-based harassment even when the harasser and employee are of the same race.

Ross v. Douglas Cty. · filed 2000-12-11(a)(1)

Given the Oncale decision, we have no doubt that, as a matter of law, a black male could discriminate against another black male “because of such individual’s race.”

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a sexual harassment claim when an employee is singled out for mistreatment because of sex, even if the harasser also mistreats other employees.

Leake v. Ryan's Family Steak · filed 2001-03-08(a)

If Leake can prove that this conduct would not have occurred but for the fact that he is male, then he is eligible for a remedy under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires proof that harassment occurred because of the plaintiff’s sex; similar treatment of someone of another sex does not automatically defeat a claim.

Brown v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service · filed 2001-07-24(a)(1)

We hold that, though there is no per se bar to maintaining a claim of sex discrimination where a person of another sex has been similarly treated, on the facts of this case plaintiff cannot show that she was discriminated against because of her sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers same-sex workplace harassment when the conduct is because of the employee’s sex and is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter employment conditions.

Winters v. Florida, Department of Corrections · filed 2001-09-13(a)(1)

While he may have been verbally abusive to both men and women, the evidence — viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff — could lead a reasonable juror to conclude that plaintiff would not have been the object of Lovett’s unsolicited, unwelcome touching and rubbing but for the fact that he is male. Consequently, a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether Lovett’s actions toward plaintiff were based on plaintiffs sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging same-sex harassment to show that the harassment occurred because of sex.

Bianchi v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2002-01-07(a)(1)

Bianchi may only claim the protections of Title VII if he can demonstrate he was discriminated against because of sex. ... Because Bianchi has not met his burden in demonstrating he suffered discrimination because of his gender, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Counts I and II of the amended complaint.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a hostile work environment claim based on harassment by a person of the same sex.

Miner v. Mid-America Door Co. · filed 2002-01-22(a)(1)

The fact that Plaintiffs and Hutson are all males does not impede Plaintiffs' claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) makes harassment actionable only when it is motivated by the victim’s sex.

Marquis v. Tecumseh Products Co. · filed 2002-03-20(a)(1)

Harassment is actionable under Title VII only if it is motivated by one of the impermissible considerations set forth in the statute itself — in this case, the victim’s sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a same-sex harassment claim when the harassment is motivated by the employee’s gender; proof of sexual desire is unnecessary.

Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc. · filed 2002-05-09(a)(1)

Proof that the harassment was motivated by sexual desire is, therefore, unnecessary to create an inference of sex discrimination; rather, the plaintiff must simply show that the harassment was motivated by his gender.