28 U.S.C. § 157

Section 157(b)(5) governs federal venue for tort claims related to bankruptcy once they are properly in federal court; it does not determine whether those claims should remain in federal court.

B. v. Roosevelt Inn LLC · filed 2021-10-27(b)(5)

This federal venue provision dictates venue once a claim is properly in federal court. It has nothing to say about whether that claim should be in federal court.

Section 157(b)(5) governs federal venue for tort claims related to bankruptcy but does not determine whether those claims should remain in federal court.

R. v. ROOSEVELT INN, LLC · filed 2021-10-27(b)(5)

This federal venue provision dictates venue once a claim is properly in federal court. It has nothing to say about whether that claim should be in federal court.

Section 157(b)(5) directs district court trial of personal injury tort and wrongful death claims, but parties may consent to bankruptcy court adjudication.

Byrnes v. Byrnes · filed 2022-01-28(b)(5)

28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) is not jurisdictional; parties can consent to the bankruptcy court, rather than the district court, hearing personal injury torts.

Section 157(b)(4) prevents mandatory abstention from applying to personal injury tort and wrongful death claims against a bankruptcy estate.

ADRIENNE DREW, as Personal Representative of the E v. ALG Senior LLC · filed 2022-08-29(b)(4)

Since Plaintiff asserts joint and several liability against RHCSC, WPA, and ALG, the Court concludes all of Plaintiff’s claims in this case are covered by 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(4) and mandatory abstention is inapplicable.

Section 157(b)(5) directs the district court to determine where a personal injury tort claim will be tried: the district where the bankruptcy case is pending or the district where the claim arose.

In re: South Sky Aviation Corporation · filed 2023-04-19(b)(5)

And, because the Claimants’ case was originally filed in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court in and for Broward County, Florida, and the Debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding is in the Southern District of Florida, the Southern District of Florida is the appropriate location for Claim 6-1 to be tried under the statute’s terms.

Section 157(b)(5) allows personal injury and wrongful death cases pending in state or federal court to be transferred to the federal district where the bankruptcy is pending.

Rivero v. St. John the Evangelist Catholic Parish · filed 2023-08-23(b)(5)

Section 157(b)(5) ... allows the transfer of cases pending in federal court and state court to the federal district court where a bankruptcy proceeding is pending.

Section 157(b)(5) protects parties from trying personal injury or wrongful death claims in bankruptcy court but does not remove the district or bankruptcy court's authority to remand removed cases.

The Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Centre, Ne - Adversary Proceeding · filed 2024-01-16(b)(5)

Additionally, section 157(b)(5) only protects parties from having to try personal injury or wrongful death claims in bankruptcy court; it does not strip the district court or bankruptcy court of the authority to remand cases removed from state court.

Section 157(b)(5) requires personal injury tort and wrongful death claims to be tried in district court rather than bankruptcy court.

Brandy Russell, Successor-in-Interest to Decedent v. Windsor El Camino Care Center, LLC · filed 2025-02-20(b)(5)

Such personal injury claims must be tried in the District Court, not the Bankruptcy Court, by the plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5).

Section 157(b)(5) gives the district court where the bankruptcy case is pending authority to decide which district will try related personal injury and wrongful death claims.

FERGISON v. VANDERHALL MOTORWORKS INC · filed 2025-07-22(b)(5)

That statute requires that a “district court shall order that personal injury tort and wrongful death claims shall be tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending, or in the district court in the district in which the claim arose, as determined by the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (emphasis added). So, the District of Utah is supposed to decide where Plaintiff’s tort claims against Hall Labs should be tried.

Section 157 generally prevents bankruptcy courts from liquidating or determining the validity of personal injury tort or wrongful death claims without the parties’ consent.

Johnson v. Trewartha · filed 2025-08-14(b)(5)

Generally, without consent of all parties, bankruptcy courts do not have jurisdiction to liquidate or otherwise determine the validity of “personal injury tort or wrongful death claims” against the bankruptcy estate. 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(B), (b)(2)(O) and (b)(5).

Section 157 treats a debtor’s claims against a creditor as core proceedings when they concern the same subject matter as the creditor’s proof of claim.

ACME Bus Corp. v. Uniondale Union Free School District · filed 2022-01-04(b)(2)(C)

Thus, the adversary proceedings against these fifteen (15) Districts are core proceedings within this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 157.

Section 157 treats a debtor’s claim arising from the same operative facts as a creditor’s proof of claim as a core proceeding.

ACME Bus Corp. v. North Bellmore Union Free School District · filed 2022-01-04(b)(2)(C)

When breach of contract and/or common law claims arise out of the same operative facts as the proof of claim, the claims are also core.

Section 157 treats contract and common law claims arising from the same operative facts as a creditor’s proof of claim as core proceedings.

ACME Bus Corp. v. East Meadow Union Free School District · filed 2022-01-04(b)(2)(C)

When breach of contract and/or common law claims arise out of the same operative facts as the proof of claim, the claims are also core.

Section 157 treats a debtor’s claim against a creditor as a core proceeding when it involves the same subject matter as the creditor’s proof of claim.

Baumann Bus Company, Inc. v. Hewlett-Woodmere Union Free School District · filed 2022-01-04(b)(2)(C)

Thus, the adversary proceedings against these fifteen (15) Districts are core proceedings within this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 157.

Section 157 treats a debtor’s claim concerning the same subject matter as a creditor’s proof of claim as a core proceeding.

ACME Bus Corp. v. Bellmore-Merrick Central High School District · filed 2022-01-04(b)(2)(C)

Thus, the adversary proceedings against these fifteen (15) Districts are core proceedings within this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 157.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) does not make a counterclaim core merely because the debtor filed a proof of claim on the creditor’s behalf.

Scott v. American Security Insurance Co. (In re Scott) · filed 2017-06-14(b)(2)(C)

Section 157(b)(2)(C) provides that “core proceedings” include “counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C). However, the Debtor is misplacing his reliance on the Surrogate Claims as the predicate for establishing this Court’s core jurisdiction under that section.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) classifies estate counterclaims against claimants as core proceedings, but final judgment authority is limited by Article III.

Paradigm Air Carriers, Inc. v. Texas Rangers Baseball Partners (In re Texas Rangers Baseball Partners) · filed 2014-10-10(b)(2)(C)

The court notes that 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), stating that counterclaims of an estate against a claimant are “core” in nature, was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Stern v. Marshall, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011) — at least where said counterclaim is a free standing claim that would not necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process. Nevertheless, the court believes that it has Constitutional authority to issue final orders or judgments in this Adversary Proceeding as to the Counterclaim.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) treats an estate’s contract counterclaim against a creditor that filed a claim as a core proceeding on that basis alone.

Rescap Liquidating Trust v. PHH Mortgage Corp. · filed 2014-10-09(b)(2)(C)

Here, ResCap’s contract counterclaims against PHH Mortgage qualify as statutory core proceedings solely because they were brought “by the estate” against a “person[] filing claims against the estate.” § 157(b)(2)(C).

Section 157(b)(2)(C) treats an estate’s counterclaim against a creditor who filed a proof of claim as core even if the counterclaim is unrelated to that claim.

Residential Funding Co. v. UBS Real Estate Securities, Inc. (In re Residential Capital, LLC) · filed 2014-08-25(b)(2)(C)

Stem made clear that a determination whether a counterclaim is “core” under section 157(b)(2)(C) does not turn on whether that claim is related to the proof of claim; that inquiry is relevant only to a determination whether the bankruptcy court may constitutionally finally adjudicate the issue under section 157(b)(1). ... Thus, the counterclaims asserted in this action are statutorily core as counterclaims under section 157(b)(2)(C), and the Court has “arising in” subject matter jurisdiction over the claims.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) treats claims assigned to a bankruptcy estate under a reorganization plan as core counterclaims when they arise from the facts underlying a creditor’s proof of claim.

Ernst & Young & Ernst & Young, LLP v. Bankruptcy Services, Inc. (In Re CBI Holding Co.) · filed 2004-06-30(b)(2)(C)

TCW’s claims do, however, qualify as counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate. ... The assignment to BSI in these circumstances was equivalent to an assignment to the estate. ... TCW’s claims are counterclaims by the estate arising out of the facts that gave rise to Ernst & Young’s Proof of Claim.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) treats a debtor’s claims arising from the same transactions as a creditor’s proofs of claim as core counterclaims, even when filed in a separate complaint.

VP Energy, Inc. v. Williams Energy Marketing & Trading Co. (In re VP Energy, Inc.) · filed 2003-10-28(b)(2)(C)

The Court holds that the Debtor’s four counts nevertheless raise core matters because (a) the substance of each of the Debtor’s four counts arises entirely out of the transactions or occurrences that are the subject matter of the Proofs of Claim, (b) the filing of the Proofs of Claim significantly predate the Debtor’s filing of its complaint and amended complaint, (c) each of the Debtor’s four counts consequently constitutes, in essence, a counterclaim— indeed, a compulsory counterclaim — to the Proofs of Claim, (d) “[e]ore proceedings include ... counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate,” 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2)(C) (West 1993), and (e) the matters raised within the Debtor’s four counts consequently constitute core matters pursuant to § 157(b)(2)(C).

Section 157(b)(2)(C) treats an estate’s counterclaim arising from the same transaction as a creditor’s proof of claim as a core proceeding.

Asousa Partnership v. Pinnacle Foods, Inc. (In Re Asousa Partnership) · filed 2002-03-26(b)(2)(C)

Section § 157(b)(2)(C) identifies “counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate,” as ... “core” proceedings. ... Counts II and III fit within this grouping.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) permits a bankruptcy court to finally decide an estate counterclaim against a creditor who has filed a proof of claim.

Carrington Gardens Associates v. United States (In Re Carrington Gardens Associates) · filed 2000-05-05(b)(2)(C)

As a result, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 1334(b) and § 1491(a)(1) and may dis-positively adjudicate Carrington’s claim as a core proceeding pursuant to § 157(b)(2)(C).

Section 157(b)(2)(C) treats a claim against a creditor as a core proceeding when the creditor has filed a claim against the bankruptcy estate and the estate's claim responds to it.

Smith-Lyon v. Trustmark National Bank (In Re Gunsmith's, Inc.) · filed 2000-03-29(b)(2)(C)

Three events must occur before a matter can be deemed a core proceeding under § 157(b)(2)(C). First, a person should be in bankruptcy. Second, a person or entity such as a creditor must file a claim against the estate. Third, in response to this proof of claim, the estate must file a claim against the person who filed the original proof of claim. ... Therefore, in light of the foregoing authority, the court finds that the plaintiffs’ lawsuit constitutes a core proceeding which must be adjudicated by the bankruptcy court.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) treats a counterclaim as a core proceeding only when the bankruptcy estate brings it against a person who filed a claim against the estate.

Massachusetts Casualty Insurance v. Green (In Re Green) · filed 1999-11-22(b)(2)(C)

Nor is there jurisdiction under § 157(b)(2)(C). That section encompasses only those counterclaims brought by the bankruptcy estate against persons filing claims against the estate. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C). The trustee has abandoned the causes of action set forth in the Second Amended Counterclaim and therefore, none of those causes of action are part of the bankruptcy estate. The estate did not bring the Second Amended Counterclaim; Green brought it on his own behalf. Section 157(b)(2)(C) does not apply to the Second Amended Counterclaim.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) treats counterclaims brought by the bankruptcy estate against persons filing claims against the estate as core proceedings; a debtor's own counterclaim does not qualify.

LifeUSA Insurance v. Green (In Re Green) · filed 1999-11-22(b)(2)(C)

However, there is no core jurisdiction over the Second Amended Counterclaim under § 157(b)(2)(C). That section encompasses only those counterclaims brought by the bankruptcy estate against persons filing claims against the estate. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C). The trustee has abandoned the causes of action set forth in the Second Amended Counterclaim and therefore, none of those causes of action are part of the bankruptcy estate. The estate did not bring the Second Amended Counterclaim; Green brought it on his own behalf. Section 157(b)(2)(C) does not apply to the Second Amended Counterclaim.

Section 157 treats a compulsory counterclaim by the bankruptcy estate against a party that filed a claim as a core proceeding.

In Re the MacLeod Company, Inc., Debtor. United States of America v. The MacLeod Company, Inc. · filed 1991-06-06(b)(2)(C)

As did the bankruptcy court, we conclude that MacLeod's counterclaim is compulsory under Rule 13(a) and that the claim is a "core proceeding" under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 157.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) does not give a bankruptcy court core jurisdiction over an estate counterclaim when the debtor files an untimely claim in the creditor’s name to create that jurisdiction.

Marcus Dairy, Inc. v. Belford (In Re Naugatuck Dairy Ice Cream, Co.) · filed 1989-10-17(b)(2)(C)

I therefore conclude that the untimely filing of the purported claim renders it procedurally defective and that this court does not have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C).

Under § 157(b)(2)(C), a partnership’s claim can be deemed filed by its general partners, making counterclaims against them core proceedings.

Americare Corp. v. Hazelbaker (In re Care Enterprises, Inc.) · filed 1990-04-12(b)(2)(C)

As such, the claim filed against the debtor/plaintiffs’ estates by the partnerships are deemed to have been filed by the named general partners, as well. Accordingly, the general partners constitute persons filing claims against the estate within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C). Therefore, the counterclaims asserted against them are core proceedings.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) treats a debtor’s counterclaim against a person who filed a claim against the estate as a core proceeding.

Bicoastal Corp. v. Semi-Tech Microelectronics (Far East) Ltd. (In Re Bicoastal Corp.) · filed 1991-08-08(b)(2)(C)

In addition, by virtue of specific provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), the Bankruptcy Code has jurisdiction of any counterclaim interposed by the Debtor against persons filing claims against the estate.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) treats an estate’s counterclaim against a creditor that filed a claim as a core proceeding.

Ohio, Department of Taxation v. H.R.P. Auto Center, Inc. (In Re H.R.P. Auto Center, Inc.) · filed 1991-08-09(b)(2)(C)

This is a core proceeding under Section 157(b)(2)(C) of Title 28 since it is the estate’s counterclaim against the State which filed a claim in the second reorganization.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) gives the bankruptcy court core jurisdiction over a debtor’s counterclaim against a creditor that filed a claim, including a RICO counterclaim.

Matter of Chapman · filed 1991-09-10(b)(2)(C)

However, the RICO claim here is filed by the Debtor as a counterclaim to the Bank’s claims, and therefore this Court has core jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C).

Section 157(b)(2)(C) does not make a debtor’s lawsuit a core proceeding merely because the defendant creditor filed a proof of claim.

Roddam v. Metro Loans, Inc. (In Re Roddam) · filed 1996-02-21(b)(2)(C)

Indeed, at least under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the fact that Metro filed a proof of claim in the Chapter 13 case does not mean that the debtor's lawsuit against Metro is a "core" proceeding under section 157(b)(2)(C).

Section 157(b)(2)(C) treats an estate’s counterclaim against a person who filed a claim against the estate as a core proceeding.

St. Vincent's Hospital v. Norrell (In Re Norrell) · filed 1996-06-24(b)(2)(C)

Counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate are core proceedings by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C).

Section 157(b)(2)(C) does not make previously litigated state-law claims core proceedings merely because the debtor reasserts them as counterclaims after a creditor files a proof of claim.

Kamine/Besicorp Allegany, L.P. v. Rochester Gas & Electric Co. (In Re Kamine/Besicorp Allegany, L.P.) · filed 1997-03-19(b)(2)(C)

For that reason, core jurisdiction over the debtor’s Counterclaims asserting state court causes of action, which have been previously determined to be non-core by the New Jersey District Court, do not under the facts and procedural history of this particular case, constitute “core proceedings” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C).

Section 157(b)(2)(C) treats a debtor’s claims against a creditor that filed a proof of claim as core proceedings when those claims are equivalent to counterclaims.

Caldor Corp. v. S Plaza Associates, L.P. (In Re Caldor, Inc.) · filed 1998-01-30(b)(2)(C)

It is also a core proceeding under § 157(b)(2)(C) because Caldor’s claims against S Plaza are the equivalent of counterclaims against an entity that has filed a claim against the estate.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) treats an estate’s action against a party that filed a claim as a core counterclaim when the action is a counterclaim in substance, even if the complaint does not label it one.

Brown v. Death Row Records, Inc. (In Re Brown) · filed 1998-04-28(b)(2)(C)

However, we believe that another basis for classification of the Proceeding as core arises from 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), which states that counterclaims by the estate against parties filing claims against the estate are core. We recognize that the Complaint is not designated as raising counterclaims to proofs of claim. However, the Proceeding is nevertheless such an action in substance.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) treats claims that are, in essence, counterclaims to a creditor’s proofs of claim as core proceedings.

Allen v. City Finance Co. · filed 1998-07-13(b)(2)(C)

Under § 157(b)(2)(C), “counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate” are core proceedings. ... The claims asserted by Ferguson, Miles, and Edwards in this lawsuit were, in essence, counterclaims to the proofs of claims filed by City Finance in the bankruptcy estates.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) does not treat a debtor’s suit against a creditor as a core counterclaim when the creditor filed no proof of claim in the bankruptcy case.

Chickaway v. Bank One Dayton, N.A. · filed 2001-03-05(b)(2)(C)

There is, however, a difference in this case which, in the court’s view, makes § 157(b)(2)(C) inapplicable, and that is the fact that Bank One did not file a proof of claim in Ms. Chickaway’s bankruptcy case, which was a “no asset” case.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) treats an estate’s lender-liability claim arising from the same transaction as a creditor’s proof of claim as a core proceeding.

Cabrera v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF WHEATON · filed 2001-07-18(b)(2)(C)

Lender-liability actions arising out of the same transaction that forms the basis of a creditor’s proof of claim are core matters. Initially, we note that the plain language of section 157(b)(2)(C) makes “counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate” core proceedings.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) treats a trustee’s counterclaim against a creditor that filed a proof of claim as a core proceeding.

Newhouse v. Aetna Life Insurance (In Re Heritage Southwest Medical Group, P.A.) · filed 2004-05-20(b)(2)(C)

In addition, the trustee’s claims against Aetna raise a core matter. Aetna has filed a proof of claim in the underlying bankruptcy case. The trustee’s claims against Aetna amount to counter-claims.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) treats counterclaims by the estate against persons who filed claims against it as core proceedings.

Marcus v. Fried (In Re Geneva Steel, LLC) · filed 2006-04-18(b)(2)(C)

Because the Trustee’s causes of action are counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate, the Trustee’s causes of action are “core” proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C).

A debtor’s counterclaims arising from the same transaction as a creditor’s proof of claim are core proceedings when they affect allowance of that claim.

Enron Corp. v. Citigroup, Inc. (In Re Enron Corp.) · filed 2006-08-14(b)(2)(B) and (C)

The Court concludes therefore that Common Law Claims are core claims pursuant to § 157(b)(2)(B) and (C) and that it thus has jurisdiction over the Common Law Claims.

Section 157(b)(2) treats counterclaims directly tied to a creditor’s claims against the bankruptcy estate as core proceedings.

Enron Corp. v. Citigroup, Inc. (In Re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp.) · filed 2008-03-17(b)(2)

In short, this Court agrees with the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court that the proceedings involved here are core proceedings that may be tried in the Bankruptcy Court without a jury, and Citigroup’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) treats a trustee’s claims about the value of a receiver’s services as core counterclaims when the receiver has sought compensation from the bankruptcy estate.

Riley v. Decoulos (In Re American Bridge Products, Inc.) · filed 2009-01-08(b)(2)(C)

It invited counterclaims addressed generally to the value of the services claimed to have been rendered and particularly to losses to the estate caused by negligence and/or breach of fiduciary duty, just as in In re CBI Holding Co., Inc. Such claims are core proceedings under § 157(b)(2)(C).

Section 157(b)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to resolve a compulsory counterclaim against someone who has sought compensation from the estate as a core proceeding.

In Re American Bridge Products, Inc. · filed 2010-03-09(b)(2)

Finally, the bankruptcy court had authority to resolve Riley's claims. Decoulos had made his own claim in the bankruptcy court for compensation and a compulsory counterclaim appears to fall within the statutory definition of core proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2); In re CBI Holding Co., Inc., 529 F.3d 432, 460 (2d Cir. 2008); In re Am. Bridge Prods., 398 B.R. at 729-30.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) does not require a creditor to file a proof of claim before the estate asserts a counterclaim for the counterclaim to qualify as core.

Gorilla Companies LLC v. Corwin (In Re Gorilla Companies LLC) · filed 2010-05-06(b)(2)(C)

Use of the participle “filing” indicates that the respective timing is not critical, as would have been indicated if Congress had used words such as “persons who had filed claims against the estate.”

Section 157(b)(2)(C) identifies counterclaims by the bankruptcy estate against persons filing claims as core proceedings that a bankruptcy judge may finally decide.

In RE McELWEE · filed 2012-05-03(b)(2)(C)

The statute also gives bankruptcy judges the authority to make final decisions concerning "core proceedings" which arise in a bankruptcy case. ... Included among the enumerated core proceedings are "counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate". 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C). ... Under Stern v. Marshall , do I have the authority to render a final judgment on the Claim Objection, which included the paragraph 11 "counterclaim"? I answer this question in the affirmative because I conclude that the defensive counterclaim which was plead is necessarily resolved by ruling on the allowability of Claim 11-2.

The Stern limitation on § 157(b)(2)(C) for estate counterclaims against claimants does not extend to a party’s counterclaim against the estate for conduct during bankruptcy proceedings.

Tanguy v. West · filed 2013-08-08(b)(2)(C)

Moreover, as this court has previously noted, while it is true that Stern invalidated 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) with respect to “counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate,” Stern expressly provides that its limited holding applies only in that “one isolated respect.” See In re Renaissance Hosp. Grand Prairie Inc., 713 F.3d 285, 294 n.12 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620). We decline to extend Stern’s limited holding herein.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) treats an estate’s action against a party that filed a proof of claim as a core counterclaim, even when the action began with a complaint.

Shaia ex rel. Estate of Connelly v. Taylor (In re Connelly) · filed 2012-03-30(b)(2)(C)

The instant Adversary Proceeding therefore constitutes a counterclaim against the Defendants and is a core proceeding under § 157(b)(2)(C).

Section 157(b)(2)(C) treats a debtor’s counterclaims against a creditor’s proofs of claim as core proceedings; that classification can make a contractual forum selection clause unenforceable for those claims.

Welded Construction, L.P. v. The Williams Companies, Inc. · filed 2019-10-16(b)(2)(C)

Thus, because the Court finds that Welded’s claims against Transco are core matters, the forum selection clause found in the Contract between Welded and Transco is unenforceable in this proceeding as to Debtor’s claims against Transco.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) treats a counterclaim by the bankruptcy estate against a creditor that filed a claim as a core proceeding.

Jet Sales West LLC v. City of El Paso · filed 2021-12-22(b)(2)(C)

As to count two, 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) provides that “Core proceedings include, but are not limited to-- counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate;” ... Count two is essentially a counterclaim against the City, which filed a claim against the estate.

Section 157(b)(2)(A) gives the bankruptcy court authority to decide matters involving professional fees and administrative expenses even when no party objects.

In Re Inslaw, Inc. · filed 1989-10-24(b)(2)(A)

This Court has the authority by law to approve professional fees and administrative expenses regardless of whether a party in interest has filed an objection. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A); 11 U.S.C. §§ 327, 328, 329, 330, 331 (Supp. V 1987); Bankruptcy Rule 2016.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) does not make state law claims against a defendant core merely because other defendants filed proofs of claim.

Peterson v. 610 W. 142 Owners Corp. (In Re 610 W. 142 Owners Corp.) · filed 1998-03-30(b)(2)(C)

However, Dvora Scharf did not file a proof of claim in the bankruptcy ease. Therefore, the state law claims asserted against her are not core under § 157(b)(2)(C).

Section 157(b)(2)(B) treats an action against a debtor as core when the plaintiff filed a proof of claim raising the same issues.

Beneficial National Bank USA v. Best Receptions Systems, Inc. (In Re Best Reception Systems, Inc.) · filed 1998-03-05(b)(2)(B)

The court agrees that where a party has filed a proof of claim in a debtor’s case, any action asserted by that party against the debtor that raises the same issues as those encompassed by the proof of claim is a core proceeding under the authority of 28 U.S.C.A § 157(b)(2)(B).

Section 157(b)(2)(B) and (C) treat claim objections and counterclaims as core proceedings in which the bankruptcy court may enter a final order.

Slefco v. First National Bank of Stuttgart (In Re Slefco) · filed 1989-10-27(b)(2)(B) and (C)

Moreover, the Court finds that it is a “core proceeding” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) and (C) and may enter a final order.

Section 157(b)(2)(B) treats an objection to a claim as a core proceeding in which the bankruptcy court may enter final judgment.

In Re Gran · filed 1989-11-27(b)(2)(B)

The matter before the Court is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B), and the Court has jurisdiction to enter a final judgment.

Section 157 treats objections to proofs of claim and counterclaims to those claims as core proceedings that a bankruptcy court may fully determine.

In Re Milbourne · filed 1989-12-19(b)(2)(B), (b)(2)(C)

As it is in the form of an objection to Mid-Penn's secured proof of claim, this proceeding is uncontestably core in nature pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B). The fact that the Debtor raises significant claims against Mid-Penn and ultimately is awarded a significant monetary recovery against Mid-Penn does not change this result, because counterclaims to proofs of claim are also within the scope of core proceedings.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) treats counterclaims to a creditor’s proof of claim as core proceedings.

Light Foundry Associates v. Alter (In Re Light Foundry Associates) · filed 1990-03-29(b)(2)(C)

Therefore, no jury trial is appropriate in this core proceeding, which presents to us counterclaims to the Defendant’s proof of claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C).

Section 157(b) sets bankruptcy courts’ jurisdictional parameters but does not determine where claims must be brought for preclusion purposes.

Sure-Snap Corp. v. State Street Bank & Trust Co. · filed 1991-11-07(b)

The provisions cited, 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) and § 1334(b), set out the general jurisdictional parameters conferred on bankruptcy courts; they do not delimit where the actions should be brought in circumstances such as these.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) permits a bankruptcy court to decide a debtor’s counterclaim arising from the same facts as a creditor’s proof of claim, even when the debtor captions it as a turnover complaint.

Fang Operators, Inc. v. Carpenter (In Re Fang Operators, Inc.) · filed 1993-09-22(b)(2)(C)

It is well settled that an objection to a creditor’s proof of claim is within the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court as a counterclaim under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (Core proceedings include, but are not limited to counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate.). ... Despite being captioned a Complaint to Compel Turnover of Property, the proceeding brought by the Debtor is a counterclaim. It arises out of the same facts and circumstances as the defendants’ claim against the estate, and a decision on the Debtor’s complaint will affect the court's decision on the defendants’ proof of claim. Therefore, the court holds that it has summary jurisdiction over the Debtor’s Complaint to Compel Turnover of Property.

Section 157(b)(2)(B) treats a creditor’s state law contract claim as a core proceeding when the creditor files a proof of claim in the bankruptcy court.

176-60 Union Turnpike, Inc. v. Howard Beach Fitness Center, Inc. · filed 1997-06-16(b)(2)(B)

Where, as here, a creditor files proof of a pre-petition contract claim arising under state law against the debtor in the bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy court has “core” jurisdiction to determine that claim pursuant to Section 157(b)(2)(B).

Section 157(b)(2)(B) does not make an action a core proceeding merely because it is intertwined with an indemnity proof of claim when no indemnity claim is asserted in the action.

Davis v. Life Investors Insurance Co. of America · filed 2002-05-30(b)(2)(B)

The court rejects Life Investors’ contention that this is a core proceeding merely because it is “intertwined with” its indemnity claim. Although it certainly has contended in its various memoranda to the court that it will have a right to absolute indemnity in the event the plaintiff recovers a judgment against it in this case— which, as noted, is the premise of its proof of claim in McNatt’s bankruptcy — the fact of the matter is, Life Investors has not asserted a claim for indemnity in any pleading in this case.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) treats a debtor’s counterclaim to a proof of claim as core when the counterclaim is factually and legally related to that claim.

Bottcher v. Emigrant Mortgage Co. (In Re Bottcher) · filed 2010-11-24(b)(2)(C)

While Congress included counterclaims to proofs of claim within the definition of core proceedings in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), courts have limited this definition to counterclaims that are factually and legally related to the claim being asserted in a proof of claim. ... In this case, the plaintiffs MCCCDA and Chapter 93A claims arise from the same loan as, and are factually and legally related to, the loan that gives rise to the defendant’s proof of claim. Accordingly, this Court has core jurisdiction over Counts II and V of the complaint.

Section 157 treats objections to claims as core proceedings that bankruptcy judges may resolve by final order.

In re Borin · filed 2011-11-02(b)(2)(B)

An objection to claim is clearly a “core” proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B), and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Stern v. Marshall, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011), does not undermine this court’s authority to enter a final order.

Section 157(b)(2)(B) treats a claim objection as a core proceeding in which the bankruptcy court may enter a final order.

In re Culinary Health Innovations, LLC · filed 2012-11-07(b)(2)(B)

The Court has jurisdiction over this contested matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334 and declares it to be a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B), over which the Court has authority to enter a final order on the merits.

Section 157(b)(2)(B) gives the bankruptcy court authority to resolve disputes over exemptions, including the extent of an allowance claimed as exempt.

In re Stumpff · filed 1989-10-27(b)(2)(B)

The United States Code itself empowers the Bankruptcy Court with the necessary jurisdiction to resolve disputes surrounding exemptions. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B).

Section 157(b)(2)(B) empowers a bankruptcy court to resolve disputes over claimed exemptions, including their extent.

In Re Stumpff · filed 1989-12-22(b)(2)(B)

The United States Code itself empowers the Bankruptcy Court with the necessary jurisdiction to resolve disputes surrounding exemptions. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B).

Section 157(b)(2) gives bankruptcy courts core jurisdiction to allow or disallow exemptions from estate property, but does not extend that jurisdiction to exemptions claimed in state court proceedings.

In re: Booker Theodore Wade, Jr. · filed 2015-11-03(b)(2)

The bankruptcy court had core jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) with respect to “allowance or disallowance of . . . exemptions from property of the estate.” That jurisdictional provision does not extend to determining an ... exemption that a debtor might claim in state court proceedings.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment on non-core claims with all parties’ consent.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. HomeBanc Corp. (In re HomeBanc Mortgage Corp.) · filed 2017-05-31(c)(2)

The Supreme Court has since confirmed that, due to the parties’ consent, I have authority to enter final judgment on all of the claims before me.

Section 157(c)'s final-judgment procedure permits implied consent when a party has notice of the right to object and participates without objecting.

Herrera-Edwards v. Moore (In re Herrera-Edwards) · filed 2017-06-19(c)(2)

Based on his conduct in this proceeding, the Court concludes that Mr. Moore gave implied consent to the entry of a final judgment by this Court.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy judge to adjudicate a related, non-core matter when the parties consent; seeking final judgment from that judge can imply consent.

Settlers' Housing Service, Inc. v. Schaumburg Bank & Trust Co. (In re Settlers' Housing Service, Inc.) · filed 2017-05-19(c)(2)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2), parties may consent to adjudication of related, non-core matters in the bankruptcy court. ... In this case,- both parties have sought entry of final judgment in their favor, and have thereby implicitly consented to adjudication by this court,' or at least forfeited any objection to adjudication of Settlers’ tortious interference claim by this court.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy judge to enter final judgment in a noncore proceeding when the parties consent, including by implied consent.

Tillette v. Beneficial West Virginia, Inc. (In re Tillette) · filed 2016-09-06(c)(2)

This is a noncore proceeding related to a case under Title 11. The parties are deemed to have implicitly, if not explicitly, consented to entry of final judgment by the undersigned subject to review under 28 U.S.C. § 158 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2).

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to enter a final judgment on a non-core claim when the parties consent.

International Electric, Inc. v. Anthony & Gordon Construction Co. (In re International Electric, Inc.) · filed 2016-08-29(c)(2)

Additionally, 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) only allows adjudication of non-core claims when parties consent.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to render a final decision in a related proceeding when the parties consent.

Music Mix Mobile, LLC v. Newman (In re Stage Presence Inc.) · filed 2016-07-19(c)(2)

These consents are sufficient as a statutory and constitutional matter to permit this Court to render a final decision.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to adjudicate a non-core claim when a defendant impliedly consents by failing to defend after receiving a summons warning that failure to respond will be deemed consent.

Campbell v. Carruthers (In re Campbell) · filed 2016-06-14(c)(2)

Nevertheless, the Court concludes that Car-ruthers has impliedly consented to the Court’s adjudication of Campbell’s FDCPA claim.

Section 157(c)(1) does not require a bankruptcy judge to submit proposed findings and conclusions to the district court when the parties consent to the bankruptcy judge deciding the matter.

RSH Liquidating Trust v. Magnacca · filed 2016-06-08(c)(1)

Stated differently, the Trust agrees that I need not" submit proposed findings and conclusions to the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1), This consent is sanctioned by Wellness Int’l. Net. Ltd. v. Sharif, - U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1932, 191 L.Ed.2d 911 (2015).

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to enter a final judgment when the parties expressly, knowingly, and voluntarily consent.

Madden v. Morelli (In re Energy Conversion Devices, Inc.) · filed 2016-04-15(c)(2)

This is because both parties in this adversary proceeding have expressly, knowingly, and voluntarily consented to this bankruptcy court entering a final order or judgment, as permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2).

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment with the parties’ implied consent.

Wilkins v. AmeriCorp Inc. (In re Allegro Law LLC) · filed 2016-02-16(c)(2)

Given the counterclaims filed by AmeriCorp and Seton, and the claim for administrative expenses filed by the Receiver on their behalf, the Court concludes that they have impliedly consented to adjudication by this Court.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to enter a final judgment in a non-core proceeding with the parties’ consent, which may be implied from their conduct.

Feggins v. LVNV Funding LLC (In re Feggins) · filed 2015-11-20(c)(2)

A bankruptcy court may enter a final order in a non-core proceeding with consent of the parties. ... Based upon these filings, the Court concludes that the Defendants have consented to entry of a final judgment by a bankruptcy court.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment when the parties consent; participation through trial without objection can establish consent.

Gulf Coast Endoscopy Center of Venice, LLC v. DeMasi (In re DeMasi) · filed 2015-11-13(c)(2)

Despite actively participating in these proceedings up through trial, neither party has objected to this Court entering a final judgment. So all parties are ... deemed to have consented to this Court's authority to enter a final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2).

Section 157 permits a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment with a party’s knowing and voluntary consent, which may be implied when the party seeks final judgment without raising an objection.

True Traditions, LC v. Wu · filed 2015-09-08

The bankruptcy court did not err in concluding that Appellant’s actions constituted implied consent to its authority to enter final judgment.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to enter a final order in a non-core, related proceeding when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent, including through their conduct.

Perkins v. LVNV Funding, LLC (In re Perkins) · filed 2015-07-08(c)(2)

After Wellness, it is clear that this court has the authority to enter a final judgment or order disposing of a non-core, related to proceeding upon the consent of the parties. ... In sum, the parties’ actions are indicative of their knowing and voluntary consent to the entry of a final judgment or order by this court. The court therefore concludes that it has the authority to enter an order with respect to the Motion to Dismiss.

Section 157(b)(2)(C) treats estate counterclaims against a creditor’s claim as core proceedings, but a bankruptcy judge may lack constitutional authority to enter final judgment on them.

Settlers' Housing Service, Inc. v. Bank of Schaumburg (In re Settlers' Housing Service, Inc.) · filed 2014-11-18(b)(2)(C)

In this proceeding, the counts asserting counterclaims to the Bank’s claim are statutorily core under § 157(b)(2)(C), but under Stem, the statute cannot Constitutionally authorize entry of a final judgment.

A party that seeks final judgment from a bankruptcy court consents to its adjudication and waives an objection to its authority to enter final judgment.

Kapila v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. (In re Pearlman) · filed 2014-09-26

By asking this Court for a final judgment in its favor, SunTrust has consented to this Court’s jurisdiction and waived its Stem objection.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment on a Stern claim against a nonclaimant to the bankruptcy estate when the parties consent.

Mastro v. James Rigby, Jr. · filed 2014-08-22(c)(2)

This consent permitted the bankruptcy court to enter final judgment on the Trustee’s Stern claims under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2).

Section 157 permits a bankruptcy judge to finally adjudicate related, noncore claims when the parties consent.

In Re Olde Prairie Block Owner, LLC · filed 2011-02-14(c)(2)

Moreover, the parties consented in writing [Docket Nos. 346, 350] to the bankruptcy judge finally adjudicating all the claims, even if they might lie under related and not core jurisdiction.

A party can impliedly consent to a bankruptcy court’s final judgment in a non-core proceeding by seeking final adjudication there and failing to invoke de novo district court review.

Slagter v. Stonecraft, LLC (In Re Stonecraft LLC) · filed 2007-12-21(c)(1)

In this bankruptcy appeal, only one significant issue is presented: whether the appellant, John Slagter, impliedly consented to the bankruptcy court rendering final judgment in an adversary proceeding thereby treating this non-core proceeding as though it were a core proceeding. For the following reasons we answer this question in the affirmative.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy judge to enter final judgment in a related non-core proceeding when the parties consent.

Texas Workers' Compensation Insurance Fund v. A.C. Painting, Inc. (In Re A.C. Painting, Inc.) · filed 2002-06-05(c)(2)

The Fund’s claims against Chen and Martin are related to the A.C. Painting bankruptcy case. But, the' claims constitute non-core matters. The parties have consented to the entry of a final judgment by this court on the non-core matters. 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(C)(2) and 1334.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment in a non-core proceeding when the parties consent.

Meiburger v. World Computer Systems (In re Maxima Corp.) · filed 2002-05-03(c)(2)

While this breach of contract action is not the core proceeding, the parties consented to entry of final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2).

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment in a noncore proceeding when the parties consent.

Meiburger v. World Computer Systems (In re Maxima Corp.) · filed 2002-05-08(c)(2)

While this breach of contract action is not the core proceeding, the parties consented to entry of final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2).

Section 157(c)(2) allows a bankruptcy court to enter orders and judgments in a non-core proceeding when the parties consent.

River Oaks Furniture, Inc. v. BDO Seidman (In Re River Oaks Furniture, Inc.) · filed 2001-04-04(c)(2)

This matter would primarily be defined as a “non-core” proceeding. However, the parties have agreed that this court may enter all appropriate orders and judgments as contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2), subject to appellate review as specified in 28 U.S.C. § 158.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy judge to enter final judgment on non-core claims when the parties’ stipulation establishes their consent.

Schwab v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (In Re Derienzo) · filed 2000-10-18(c)(2)

This agreement between the parties is unequivocal and provides ample evidence that the non-core matters raised by Counts Two, Three, and Four may be adjudicated as a final judgment by this Court.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to enter a final order in a related proceeding when the parties impliedly consent by stipulating that it is a core proceeding.

Dutton v. Kondora (In Re Kondora) · filed 1996-04-10(c)(2)

The Court further concludes that the parties have at least impliedly consented to this Court entering a final order on this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c) by their stipulation that these are core proceedings.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to decide a related matter with the parties’ express consent; without that consent, it submits proposed findings and conclusions to the district court.

United States v. Yochum (In Re Yochum) · filed 1993-07-03(c)(2)

Alternatively, the bankruptcy court may hear and decide the issue as a “related matter” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) with the express Consent of the parties. Clearly the parties in this case do not consent to this matter. Thus it would be appropriate for the Bankruptcy Court to enter proposed finding and conclusions with regard to the attorneys fees.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment in a related non-core proceeding when the parties impliedly consent by failing to object in time.

Doug Smith, Inc. v. Freedom Electrical Contractors, Inc. (In re Doug Smith, Inc.) · filed 1991-10-29(c)(2)

Where no party, as here, timely objects, the bankruptcy court may entertain jurisdiction over the matter and enter a final judgment, order, or decree.

Section 157(c)(2) permits implied consent to a bankruptcy court’s entry of final judgment in a related proceeding.

In Re G.S.F. CORPORATION, Debtor, Chase Commercial Corporation, Appellant · filed 1991-07-23(c)(2)

Nor is it necessary that consent be explicit. Rather, implied consent will suffice.

Section 157(c)(2) allows a bankruptcy judge to enter final judgment when both parties consent; their shared representation that the proceeding is core constitutes consent.

Rooster, Inc. v. Raphael Roy, S.R.L. (In Re Rooster, Inc.) · filed 1991-05-16(c)(2)

Whether this proceeding is in fact core, the representation of both parties that it is constitutes consent to my rendering a final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2).

Section 157(c)(2) requires every party’s consent before a bankruptcy court may enter final judgment in a noncore related proceeding.

Transamerica Automotive Finance Corp. v. Artibee (In re PAL Nissan, Inc.) · filed 1991-04-29(c)(2)

For the bankruptcy court to enter a final judgment, all parties must consent.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy judge to determine a non-core proceeding when both parties consent; their pleadings can establish that consent.

Provident National Bank v. First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A. (In Re Johnson) · filed 1991-03-11(c)(2)

Provident’s allegation that this proceeding is core was admitted by 1st PA. in its Answer. These averments constitute a consent on the part of both parties that we can determine this proceeding even if it is non-core.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy judge to determine a proceeding when the parties expressly consent.

Gerst v. West Poplar Apartments (In Re Gerst) · filed 1989-11-01(c)(2)

They also both expressly consented, by their respective counsel, that we could determine it. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2).

Section 157(c)(2) allows a bankruptcy court to hear and determine a proceeding when the parties expressly consent, even if its core status is uncertain.

Streamlight, Inc. v. International Health & Safety Corp. (In Re Streamlight, Inc.) · filed 1989-12-15(c)(2)

This court will hear and determine this proceeding. ... Although there is some question as to whether this proceeding presented sufficiently straightforward facts and claims that it could be considered a “garden-variety” accounts receivable action and hence was a core proceeding, ... the parties all expressly consented to this court’s determining it. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2).

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy judge to decide a proceeding when the parties consent on the record.

Fonseca v. Philadelphia Housing Authority (In Re Fonseca) · filed 1990-02-07(c)(2)

If this were not in itself conclusive that this proceeding was in fact core and that we could decide it, ... the parties, by their counsel, consented on the record at the trial that we could determine it. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2). We may and therefore shall proceed to do so.

Section 157(a), together with § 1334(b), limits bankruptcy court jurisdiction to matters arising under, arising in, or related to a bankruptcy case.

In Re Stein & Day, Inc. · filed 1990-05-10(a)

A bankruptcy court’s subject matter jurisdiction is limited by 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and § 1334(b) to those issues which “arise under”, “arise in” or are “related to” a bankruptcy. Generally, bankruptcy courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate controversies between third parties which do not involve the debtor or property of the debtor, unless the court cannot perform its administrative duties without resolving the controversy.

Section 157(c)(2) allows a bankruptcy judge to enter a final order with the parties’ express consent, whether the proceeding is core or non-core.

Valley Forge Plaza Associates v. Rosen Agency, Inc. (In Re Valley Forge Plaza Associates) · filed 1990-05-11(c)(2)

Counsel for both parties expressly consented to our entering a final order in this proceeding, allowing us to do so irrespective of whether this proceeding is core or non-core.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy judge to hear and determine a non-core proceeding with the parties’ express consent; admitting a complaint’s allegation that the proceeding is core can constitute that consent.

Evans v. Union Mortgage Co. (In Re Evans) · filed 1990-05-31(c)(2)

Although there may have been some dispute as to whether this matter is core and could be determined by us, ... the Defendant admitted the allegation in the Debtor’s Complaint that the matter is core. Therefore, we deem the parties to have expressly consented to our hearing and determining this matter, even if it were deemed non-core. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2); Bankruptcy Rules (“B.Rules”) 7008(a) and 7012(b); and In re St. Mary Hospital, 101 B.R. 451, 454, 457 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1989).

Section 157(c)(2) permits parties to consent through their conduct to a bankruptcy judge’s final adjudication of a related proceeding; failing to object to the judge’s jurisdiction in time can constitute consent.

In Re Windmill Farms Management Co. · filed 1990-07-18(c)(2)

Thus, authority exists for the proposition that absent even express consent, parties can consent through conduct to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction by failing to timely object to that jurisdiction. The court finds that Vanderpark has consented to the final adjudication of the present controversy due to its failure to raise timely a jurisdictional objection before this court, and to preserve its jurisdictional objections during the appellate process before the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) and Court of Appeals.

Section 157(c)(2) allows a party to consent to bankruptcy court jurisdiction in a related noncore proceeding through its conduct; with consent, the district court reviews the bankruptcy court’s factual findings for clear error.

Mann v. Alexander Dawson Inc. (In re Mann) · filed 1990-07-12(c)(2)

Here, Mann chose to file this adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court, and he never objected to the court's jurisdiction prior to the time it rendered judgment against him. Through this conduct, he consented to the court's jurisdiction. ... The district court therefore properly reviewed the bankruptcy court's factual findings for clear error, as will we.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to hear and determine a non-core proceeding when a party’s admission that it is core expresses consent.

Grigsby v. Thorp Consumer Discount Co. (In Re Grigsby) · filed 1990-11-09(c)(2)

In any event, ITT’s admission that it is core may be deemed an expression of consent to allowing this court to determine the matter, even if it is non-core. ... We are therefore empowered to both hear and determine this proceeding.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to determine a proceeding with the parties’ express consent, regardless of whether it is core.

Creative Conservation, Inc. v. Township of Ridley (In re Creative Conservation, Inc.) · filed 1991-08-29(c)(2)

However, at the commencement of the trial, both counsel expressly consented to the determination of this proceeding by this court. Therefore, irrespective of whether the proceeding is or is not core, we may determine it.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to hear and determine a noncore proceeding when the parties consent, including by failing to object to its jurisdiction in time.

Cain Partnership, Ltd. v. Pioneer Investment Services Co. (In re Pioneer Investment Services Co.) · filed 1991-09-18(c)(2)

Under these circumstances, we conclude that the Partnership impliedly, if not expressly, consented to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court to hear and determine this noncore but related proceeding.

Section 157 permits a bankruptcy court to determine a non-core proceeding when both parties expressly consent; alleging that the matter is core in a complaint and admitting that allegation in the answer constitutes consent.

Nationwide Life Insurance v. American Medical Imaging Corp. (In Re American Medical Imaging Corp.) · filed 1991-10-31(c)(2)

This proceeding is possibly a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(B), (G), or (0). In any event, it is our belief that an allegation in a Complaint that a matter is core and admission of such an allegation in the Answer constitutes express consent on the part of both parties to this court to determine the proceeding, even if it is non-core.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to determine a non-core proceeding when the parties consent through their pleadings.

Miller v. Printech Instant Ads, Inc. (In Re Lila, Inc.) · filed 1991-11-15(c)(2)

In the Answer, the Defendant requested the court to enter judgment in its favor. It appears that both parties, by these pleadings, expressly consented that this court could determine this proceeding, even if it were non-core.

Section 157(c)(2) allows a bankruptcy court to hear and determine a noncore proceeding when the parties consent; consent may be implied when a party waits until after adjudication to object.

In Re Pioneer Investment Services Company · filed 1991-12-19(c)(2)

Notwithstanding this limitation, section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to hear and determine a noncore proceeding if the parties consent. ... Under these circumstances, we conclude that the Partnership impliedly, if not expressly, consented to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court to hear and determine this noncore but related proceeding.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment in a non-core proceeding with the parties’ consent.

In the Matter of Dennis R. Kroner, Debtor. Appeal of David R. Herzog, Trustee · filed 1992-01-08(c)(2)

Since bankruptcy courts are without jurisdiction to enter final judgments in non-core proceedings, absent the consent of the parties, a bankruptcy court’s judgment in a core proceeding naturally has no effect on a party who brings a subsequent non-core action in the district court because he has not consented to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over the claim.

Section 157(a) permits a district court to refer a bankruptcy matter to the bankruptcy court after resolving the legal issues that prompted withdrawal of the reference.

In Re National Gypsum Co. · filed 1992-02-12(a)

At this time, the Court is of the opinion that this case should be referred to bankruptcy court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a). ... Having determined the foregoing legal issues, the Court REFERS this case to bankruptcy court for further proceedings in the light of this opinion.

Section 157 treats proceedings within its listed categories as core, and a party’s admission of core status can constitute consent to bankruptcy court determination even if the proceeding is not core.

641 Associates, Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Finance, Inc. (In Re 641 Associates, Ltd.) · filed 1992-05-13(b)(2)(C), (b)(2)(E)

The Proceeding appears to us to be core under at least 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(C) and (b)(2)(E). Balcor’s admission of core status constitutes consent that this court determine this matter, even assuming arguendo that it is not core.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy judge to enter a final judgment in a non-core, related proceeding when the parties consent, and that consent may be implied.

James ABRAMOWITZ, D.D.S., Appellee, v. Toni PALMER, Appellant · filed 1993-08-27(c)(2)

Implied consent is sufficient to grant the bankruptcy court authority to enter a final judgment. ... Accordingly, we hold that the parties consented to the bankruptcy court’s issuing a final order in the non-core, related proceedings against Toni Palmer.

Section 157(c)(1) permits a bankruptcy judge to hear a noncore proceeding related to a bankruptcy case but requires all parties’ consent for the judge to enter final judgment.

Batesville Truck Line, Inc. v. Langston Companies, Inc. (In Re Batesville Truck Line, Inc.) · filed 1994-10-19(c)(1)

However, while a bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a core proceeding, but is “otherwise related to a case under title 11,” the bankruptcy judge may not, without the consent of all parties, enter judgment in the proceeding.

A party may consent to the bankruptcy court’s final adjudication of a related non-core proceeding by filing it there and failing to object before judgment.

Southerland v. Milam · filed 1995-04-03(c)(2)

Appellant did consent to the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction, and the Bankruptcy Court’s entry of the Dismissal Order was proper. By filing the Adversary Proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court, and never objecting to the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction prior to the time it rendered its judgment, Appellant consented to the court’s jurisdiction.

Section 157 permits a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment in a core proceeding when a party fails to object to its exercise of that authority.

Texas General Petroleum Corporation. v. Leyh · filed 1995-06-01(b)(1)

A party who fails to object to a bankruptcy court's assumption of core jurisdiction consents to that court's entry of final judgment.

A party who fails to object to a bankruptcy court’s exercise of core jurisdiction consents to its entry of final judgment.

McFarland v. Leyh (In re Texas General Petroleum Corp.) · filed 1995-06-01(b)(1)

A party who fails to object to a bankruptcy court’s assumption of core jurisdiction consents to that court’s entry of final judgment.

A party who fails to object to the bankruptcy court’s assumption of core jurisdiction consents to its entry of final judgment.

McFarland & Tondre v. Texas General · filed 1995-06-01(b)(1)

A party who fails to object to a bankruptcy court's assumption of core jurisdiction consents to that court's entry of final judgment.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy judge to enter final judgment in a related, non-core proceeding when all parties consent.

In re Highway Equipment Co. · filed 1995-08-15(c)(2)

The bankruptcy court properly characterized this action as a related, non-core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 157(c)(2) with all parties consenting. ... "A related proceeding with the consent of all parties functionally has the same effect as a core proceeding, permitting the bankruptcy court to entertain jurisdiction over the matter and to enter a final judgment, order, or decree." ... The bankruptcy court properly retained jurisdiction over Highway's adversary proceeding.

Section 157(c) permits a bankruptcy judge to decide a non-core proceeding involving independent state-law rights when the parties consent.

Ellenberg v. Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's Subscribing to Policy No. ZKQ200037/P1147-1-92 (In Re Prime Commercia · filed 1995-09-01(c)

This is a non-core proceeding because the adjudication of the rights and legal obligations of the parties under the Policy raises issues under state law that exist independently of Prime’s bankruptcy case. Although the Policy may be property of the estate, the proceeds of the Policy are not. The parties have specifically consented to having this court decide this matter.

Mere silence does not constitute consent to proceed before the bankruptcy court under § 157(c)(2).

In The Matter Of Mount Calvary Baptist Church · filed 1996-01-02(c)(2)

Church Mutual, by mere silence, did not consent to proceed in the bankruptcy court under Sec. 157(c)(2).

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment in a related proceeding with the parties’ consent.

Gibson v. Rotunno · filed 1996-12-20(c)(2)

The statutes further provide that the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to enter final judgment in such “related” matters with consent of the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2). The parties, including Gibson, gave their consent to entry of judgment by the bankruptcy court.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy judge to finally resolve a related proceeding with the parties’ consent without deciding whether the proceeding is core.

In Re Ralph Lauren Womenswear, Inc. · filed 1997-01-21(c)(2)

Inasmuch as Kreisler has expressly consented to my final resolution of this matter, it is unnecessary for me to decide whether my jurisdiction is core or noneore.

Section 157 does not give bankruptcy courts exclusive jurisdiction over post-discharge criminal matters involving a debtor.

United States v. Kunzman · filed 1997-10-01

Bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases and some civil matters arising in or related to such cases. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 157, 1334. Neither of these statutes, however, grants bankruptcy courts exclusive jurisdiction over post-discharge criminal matters involving the debtor.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to enter a final order on non-core related claims when the parties consent.

Caldwell v. Hanes (In Re Hanes) · filed 1997-09-17(c)(2)

The claims against Joseph Mitchell and Reid & Priest are non-core related claims under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). The parties have consented to this Court’s entry of a final order and judgment on these claims.

Section 157(e) permits a bankruptcy court to conduct a jury trial only with the express consent of all parties.

Woods v. Passodelis (In Re Passodelis) · filed 1999-05-21(e)

However, plaintiffs, by removing said causes of action to this Court, have implicitly, if not explicitly, attempted to withdraw their jury trial demand with respect to said actions given that (a) this Court may only conduct a jury trial “with the express consent of all the parties” to said actions, 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(e) (West 1998), and (b) Penn Mutual does not consent to a jury trial in this Court regarding any of the actions to which it is named as a defendant.

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to decide a non-core claim on the merits with the parties' consent; failure to contest that authority can establish consent.

Brandt v. Wand Partners · filed 2001-03-02(c)(2)

Even if for some reason the claims at issue are not within this rubric (the parties have not briefed the issue and we do not decide it), Brandt did not contest the bankruptcy court's power to dismiss on the merits, so there was also jurisdiction by consent.

Section 157(c)(2) requires the parties’ consent for a bankruptcy judge to hear and determine a related proceeding and enter final orders or judgment.

Shubert v. Roche Holding Ag · filed 2001-08-03(c)(2)

Defendants do not consent to final orders or judgment by the bankruptcy judge (Notice of Removal at ¶ 7), thus this Court may not refer this case to a bankruptcy judge under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2).

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to enter final orders in a related, non-core proceeding when the parties consent.

Durkan Patterned Carpet, Inc. v. Premier Hotel Development Group (In Re Premier Hotel Development Group) · filed 2001-10-11(c)(2)

However, even if the principal action is non-core, it is otherwise related to the underlying bankruptcy case and since Durkan and First Tennessee have also consented to entry of final orders and judgment by this court, this matter is properly before the court.

Section 157(c) permits a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment in a noncore proceeding when the plaintiff alleges and the defendant admits that the claim is core, thereby expressly consenting to final judgment.

Stipetich v. First Mount Vernon Industrial Loan Ass'n (In Re Stipetich) · filed 2003-06-20(c)(2)

In light of the foregoing, the Court rules that the parties herein expressly consented to the entry of final orders and judgments with respect to the Debtor’s usury law violation claim, with such express consent effected by virtue of the Debtor’s allegation and First Mount Vernon’s admission to the effect that such claim is core; such ruling negates the necessity of having to resolve whether the consent called for by § 157(c) can be supplied by implication.

Section 157 permits a bankruptcy court to enter judgment when the parties agree to treat a proceeding as core and it is at least related to a bankruptcy case.

Pemaquid Underwriting Brokerage, Inc. v. D & H Alternative Risk Solutions, Inc. (In Re Pemaquid Underwriting Brokerage, · filed 2005-01-12(b)(1)

The parties contend that this is a core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A)(E) and (0)). They have stipulated and agreed that it should be treated as core. Given that stipulation and this Court’s conclusion that, as a minimum, the proceeding is “related to a case under title 11” per 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), this Court will enter judgment.

Section 157(c)(2) permits implied consent to a bankruptcy court’s authority over a non-core related proceeding when a party does not object before an unfavorable order.

Galaxy Computer Services, Inc. v. Baker · filed 2005-05-27(c)(2)

In the Fourth Circuit, a party who fails to object to a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over a non-core related matter until after the entry of an unfavorable order has impliedly consented to the court’s power. ... At no time before the Bankruptcy court entered its summary judgment order did the Defendants raise the core/non-core issue. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Defendants impliedly consented to the bankruptcy’s court’s power.

Section 157(c)(2) allows a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment with the parties’ consent without deciding whether the proceeding is core.

Exemplar Manufacturing Co. v. Lear Corp. (In Re Exemplar Manufacturing Co.) · filed 2005-10-14(c)(2)

The parties have consented to the bankruptcy court entering a final judgment in this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2), thus making it unnecessary to decide whether this is a “core” proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2).

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy judge to enter a final judgment in a related proceeding when all parties consent.

Veldekens v. GE HFS Holdings, Inc. (In Re Doctors Hospital 1997, L.P.) · filed 2006-10-05(c)(2)

Further, this Court has the power to enter final orders and judgment because the parties consented to such action under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) in their Agreed Motion for Referral to District Judge Gilmore.

Section 157 permits a bankruptcy judge to enter a final order in a related adversary proceeding when the parties consent.

McDaniel v. ABN AMRO Mortgage Group · filed 2007-03-08(c)(2)

However, both parties have consented to a determination of McDaniel’s adversary claim by the Bankruptcy Court. Further, the Bankruptcy Court agrees because it entered a final order and not findings of fact and conclusions of law. Therefore, the Bankruptcy court has the power to enter final orders regarding the adversary claim and has done so.

Consent to bankruptcy court jurisdiction waives a party’s right under § 157 to trial in district court.

Edge Petroleum Operating Co. v. GPR Holdings, L.L.C. · filed 2007-03-28

Edge waived any right it had to trial in district court rather than bankruptcy court under 28 U.S.C. § 157 but did not waive its contention that federal courts should abstain from adjudicating this case.

Section 157 permits a bankruptcy court to hear and decide a related proceeding with the parties’ consent without resolving whether the proceeding is core.

In Re Wool Growers Central Storage Co. · filed 2007-07-19(c)(2)

This question becomes academic because, as stated above, the parties have consented to this Court both hearing and deciding the issue before it. The Court is satisfied that it has jurisdiction and that it may both hear and decide the case and the issue before it.

Section 157(c) permits a bankruptcy court to enter final orders and judgments in a related, noncore proceeding when the parties expressly consent.

In Re Flanagan · filed 2007-08-09(c)

This proceeding is not a "core proceeding," but is "related to" a case under Title 11 within the contemplation of 28 U.S.C. § 157(c). Nonetheless, the parties have expressly consented to this Court entering final orders and judgments.

Section 157(c)(1) permits a bankruptcy judge to hear non-core proceedings and submit proposed findings, while § 157(c)(2) permits final determination with the parties’ consent.

Figard v. PHH Mortgage Corp. (In Re Figard) · filed 2008-02-26(c)(1), (c)(2)

This matter is a non-core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1), and each of the parties has consented to the Court hearing and determining this matter on a final basis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2).

Section 157(c)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment with the parties’ consent, which may be shown by continuing to litigate through trial.

Buenting v. Crystal Cascades Civil, LLC (In Re Crystal Cascades Civil, LLC) · filed 2008-11-03(c)(2)

By continuing to prosecute the litigation through trial in this matter after the real property was sold, each party consented to this court’s entry of final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2).

Section 157(c)(2) permits implied consent to a bankruptcy court’s entry of final judgment in a non-core proceeding when a party fails to object to that authority in bankruptcy court.

Beitel v. OCA, Inc. · filed 2008-12-18(c)(2)

Even though this is a non-core proceeding, we nevertheless conclude that the bankruptcy court exercised its adjudicative power appropriately because Dr. Beitel impliedly consented to the bankruptcy court’s entry of final orders and judgments.