28 U.S.C. § 157

Section 157(c) allows bankruptcy courts to hear non-core proceedings that are related to bankruptcy proceedings.

Perry v. EMC Mortgage Corp. (In Re Perry) · filed 2008-05-02(c)

Section 157(c) allows the bankruptcy court to also hear non-core proceedings that are nevertheless “related to” bankruptcy proceedings.

Section 157(c)(1) requires a bankruptcy court in a non-core, related proceeding to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court for de novo review.

Massachusetts v. Sohmer (In Re Sohmer) · filed 2008-05-15(c)(1)

The adversary proceeding has been pending for 15 months in this Court, and because it is at best a non-core, related to proceeding, this Court would be required to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the District Court for de novo review.

Section 157(c)(1) limits a bankruptcy judge in a non-core proceeding to proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted to the district court.

Schwab v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co. (In Re Bowler) · filed 2008-10-14(c)(1)

I have determined that the present matter presents, at best, a non-core proceeding. As such, I would be permitted only to make proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law which I would then need to submit to the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).

A prepetition insurance coverage dispute is non-core when it falls outside § 157(b)(2)’s listed categories, implicates no substantive Bankruptcy Code right, and can exist outside bankruptcy.

Delta Financial Corp. v. Westchester Surplus Lines Insurance (In Re Delta Financial Corp.) · filed 2008-12-15(b)(2)

In this case, the proceeding does not fall within the categories set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2), no substantive rights under the Bankruptcy Code are implicated, the proceeding could exist outside of the Delta Financial’s bankruptcy case, and the claim arose pre-petition.

Section 157 identifies core bankruptcy proceedings and permits a bankruptcy judge to enter final orders in non-core proceedings when the parties consent.

French v. American General Financial Services (In Re French) · filed 2009-02-13(b)(2), (c)(2)

This is a core proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (B), (O) (2006). To the extent non-core but related issues are impacted, the parties have consented to the entry of final orders or judgment by the bankruptcy judge. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (2006).

A partnership accounting claim based on state law that exists outside bankruptcy is a non-core proceeding.

Shiboleth v. Yerushalmi · filed 2009-03-26(b)(2)(B)

As an initial matter, the accounting action at issue here is a non-core proceeding. Plaintiffs’ claim for an accounting is based on New York Partnership Law and is not a right predicated on title 11.

Section 157 limits a bankruptcy court’s ability to enter judgment on non-core claims without all parties’ consent.

Taub v. Taub (In Re Taub) · filed 2009-08-14(c)(1)

Abstention would not impede and would aid the administration of this bankruptcy estate in view of the Court’s inability, in the absence of all parties’ consent, to enter judgment on non-core issues, including the Debtor’s claims related to the Grand Avenue Properties.

Section 157(b)(3) permits a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim that does not arise under or in the bankruptcy case to be classified as non-core but related when recovery may benefit the estate.

In Re Kjk Const. Co., Inc. · filed 2009-09-10(b)(3)

Count VI is a non-core related matter under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3), and any recovery thereunder may result in a recovery for the bankruptcy estate.

Section 157(b)(3) permits a court to classify a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim as non-core but related when the claim does not arise under or in the bankruptcy case and recovery may benefit the estate.

Grochocinski v. Rieger ex rel. Galena Family Trust (In re KJK Construction Co.) · filed 2009-09-10(b)(3)

That count is a claim for an alleged breach of fiduciary duty and does not “arise under” or “arise in” this case for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1334. Count VI is a non-core related matter under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3), and any recovery thereunder may result in a recovery for the bankruptcy estate.

Section 157 treats proceedings involving estate administration and the automatic stay as core, while a trustee’s claim for a prepetition state-law tort is non-core.

Boyd v. Direct Capital Corp. (In Re Pizzano) · filed 2010-10-22(b)(2)

To some extent, this proceeding is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (F), and (0) because it involves the administration of the estate and the automatic stay. To some extent, this proceeding is non-core because it involves a claim by the Trustee for recovery on a prepetition tort under state law.

Section 157 permits a bankruptcy court to submit proposed findings in a non-core proceeding related to a bankruptcy case, but a district judge enters the final judgment unless all parties consent.

In Re Caribbean Petroleum Corp. · filed 2010-12-23(c)(1), (c)(2)

Applying the case law and statutes to the facts of the case before us, this Court concludes that this is a non-core proceeding “related to” a case under Title II. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) and (c)(2), this Court may only submit proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law. Any final judgment will be entered by the district judge, absent consent of all parties.

Section 157 treats prepetition contract claims that exist independently of bankruptcy as non-core related proceedings, even when their resolution may affect the estate.

Abraham Petroleum Corp. v. Hassan & Sons Corp. (In Re Abraham Petroleum Corp.) · filed 2011-02-02(b)(2)

The court finds that this is a non-core related proceeding. The causes of action of this adversary proceeding do not arise from the bankruptcy proceedings, they exist independently of the bankruptcy, although their determination may affect the bankruptcy estate.

Section 157(c)(1) permits a bankruptcy judge to hear a related non-core proceeding but requires proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for the district court.

Welt v. Farino (In Re Antol Restoration, Inc.) · filed 2011-02-11(c)(1)

Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all core proceedings arising under title 11, and a bankruptcy judge may also hear a non-core proceeding, but must submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the District Court.

Section 157 treats a dispute over an arbitration agreement as a non-core proceeding related to a bankruptcy case when its resolution affects administration of the estate.

Segarra-Miranda v. RD Capital Group, Inc. (In Re Garrido Jiménez) · filed 2011-03-29(c)(1)

The district court fully agrees with the bankruptcy court’s finding that the validity of the arbitration agreement is a non core issue albeit related to a case under Title 11, as the bankruptcy court determination will have a direct impact on the administration of Freddy Garrido’s bankruptcy estate.

Section 157 classifies bankruptcy proceedings as core or non-core and governs bankruptcy court jurisdiction over them.

In Re Prs Ins. Group, Inc. · filed 2011-03-30(b)

Bankruptcy court jurisdiction is divided into "core" and "non-core". ... Proceedings that are merely "related to" a case under title 11, on the other hand, are non-core. ... The Court agrees that the Trustee's action does not fall within the Court's "arising in" jurisdiction. ... For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that the Trustee's action is not a core proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 157 distinguishes core proceedings from non-core proceedings and assigns bankruptcy court jurisdiction accordingly.

Logan v. Westchester Fire Insurance (In re PRS Insurance Group) · filed 2011-03-30(b)

Bankruptcy court jurisdiction is divided into “core” and “non-core”. ... The Court agrees that the Trustee’s action does not fall within the Court’s “arising in” jurisdiction.

Section 157 requires proposed findings and conclusions for district court review when a bankruptcy judge hears a non-core proceeding without appropriate consent to enter final judgment.

In Re BearingPoint, Inc. · filed 2011-07-11(c)(1)

At least without an appropriate consent (assuming that after Stern v. Marshall, consent would still be effective), either a district judge would have to make the factual determinations (or conduct a jury trial for that purpose), ... or I’d have to issue proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, for a supplemental round of de novo review by the district court.

Section 157 treats a state-law dispute that can arise outside bankruptcy as a non-core proceeding, even when its outcome may affect claims against the estate.

Colony Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Colony Beach & Tennis Club Ass'n (In Re Colony Beach & Tennis Club Ass'n) · filed 2011-07-27(c)(1)

Although the dispute over the lease “may be related to the bankruptcy because of its potential effect,” 825 F.2d at 97, (i.e., the potential effect on both the allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate and the counter-claims of the estate), the dispute undoubtedly qualifies as an “otherwise related” or “non-core proceeding” under Section 157.

Section 157 treats state law claims that could exist outside bankruptcy as non-core proceedings, even when they are asserted against a bankruptcy estate.

Colony Beach & Tennis Club, Ltd. v. Colony Beach & Tennis Club Ass'n · filed 2011-07-27(b)(2)

The bankruptcy court acknowledged both that the Partnership initiated the claims in state court and that each claim “could exist outside of bankruptcy.” Further, as in Northern Pipeline, each claim, including each Association counter-claim, presents a matter — the condominium form of real estate ownership and relations among the participants in that form of ownership — singularly and emphatically, preeminently and pervasively) governed by Florida law. To the governance of the condominium form of real estate ownership and those participating, the federal bankruptcy law is an awkward and unwelcome intruder. Each claim is a non-core proceeding.

Section 157(b) does not treat a state-law proceeding as core when it neither invokes a Bankruptcy Code right nor arises solely in a bankruptcy case.

Passavant Memorial Homes v. Laurel Highlands Foundation, Inc. (In re Laurel Highlands Foundation, Inc.) · filed 2012-06-12(b)

The Complaint neither invokes a substantive right provided by the Bankruptcy Code nor arises solely in the context of a bankruptcy case.

Section 157(c)(1) requires a bankruptcy judge to submit proposed findings to the district court in a non-core, related proceeding when the parties do not consent to a final judgment by the bankruptcy court.

Lacey v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (In re Lacey) · filed 2012-07-12(c)(1)

The Complaint is non-core and related to the Debtor’s bankruptcy case and all of the parties do not consent to the entry of a final order by this Court, and, as a consequence, this Court will not be entering a final judgment in the adversary proceeding.

Section 157 treats a dispute over whether a debtor’s asset entered the bankruptcy estate as core, but a dispute with a third party over the debtor’s prepetition interest in that asset as non-core.

Murphy v. Felice (In re Felice) · filed 2012-10-05(b)

A dispute between the trustee and the debtor as to whether, upon the bankruptcy filing, a particular asset of the debtor became property of the estate is a core proceeding; but a dispute between the trustee and a third party to determine whether (or to what extent) the debtor had an interest in that asset vis-a-vis the third party as of the petition date is not a core proceeding.

Section 157(b)(2) treats the question of whether a debtor must disclose a state-law claim as an estate asset as a core proceeding, even when the underlying personal injury or wrongful death action is non-core.

In re Adams · filed 2012-10-12(b)(2)

This court concludes that Adams’ personal injury/wrongful death cause of action against the state court defendants is clearly a non-core proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B). However, the question of whether Adams’ state law cause of action should be disclosed as a potential asset of her Chapter 13 bankruptcy estate is a core proceeding as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E), and (0).

Section 157(c)(1) permits a bankruptcy judge to submit proposed findings and conclusions on non-core claims related to a bankruptcy case.

Waldman v. Stone · filed 2012-10-26(c)(1)

Stone’s affirmative claims are just ordinary state-law claims for fraud. Thus they are only “related to” the bankruptcy estate, which means the bankruptcy court may submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for them.

Section 157(b)(3)'s core or non-core determination does not by itself resolve subject matter jurisdiction.

Regions Bank v. JP Realty Partners, Ltd. · filed 2012-12-06(b)(3)

With respect to the first point, the determination required by § 157(b)(3) does not completely control the subject matter jurisdiction issue.

Section 157 treats state law claims that existed independently of the bankruptcy as non-core matters when they are related to the bankruptcy and its core claims.

AASI Creditor Liquidating Trust ex rel. Welt v. Oracle USA, Inc. (In re All American Semiconductor, Inc.) · filed 2013-01-25(c)(2)

The state law claims, which existed prior to and independent of this bankruptcy, are non-core matters, but are related to this bankruptcy and the preference/fraudulent transfer counts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2).

Section 157(c)(1) allows a bankruptcy judge to submit proposed findings and conclusions in a non-core related proceeding for the district court to enter a final judgment.

Landesbank v. Deutsche Bank AG (In re Residential Capital, LLC) · filed 2013-03-20(c)(1)

For non-core proceedings, bankruptcy courts may submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court pursuant to the procedure set forth in Fed. R. BankrP. 9033; the district court then has the authority to enter a final judgment after reviewing de novo any matters to which a party timely objects.

Section 157(b) treats state-law fraud claims against nondebtor defendants that are only related to a bankruptcy case as non-core proceedings.

Sealink Funding, Ltd. v. Deutsche Bank AG (In re Residential Capital, LLC) · filed 2013-03-20(b)

The claims asserted in the Complaint against Defendants are all non-core state law claims under section 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).

Section 157 treats a proceeding that is merely related to a bankruptcy case as non-core; a lien priority dispute concerning property outside the bankruptcy estate does not make the proceeding core.

CPC Livestock, LLC v. Fifth Third Bank, Inc. · filed 2013-04-08(b)(2)(E)

Accordingly, this proceeding neither “arises under” title 11 nor “arises in” a case under title 11. Since it is only “related to” Eastern Livestock’s bankruptcy, it is “non-core.”

Section 157(b)(1) treats a prepetition insurance coverage dispute as non-core when the claim arises under state contract law and could proceed outside bankruptcy court.

Kirschenbaum v. Federal Insurance (In re EMS Financial Services) · filed 2013-04-19(b)(1)

In this case, the Adversary Proceeding concerns a dispute over coverage under an insurance contract that was entered into prior to EMS filing its bankruptcy petition. ... Therefore, rather than relying on bankruptcy laws for its existence, those claims are state common law contract claims that could proceed in a court without federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. As such, the Court finds that the Adversary Proceeding at issue is a non-core matter.

Section 157(b)(3) permits a bankruptcy court to classify a proceeding as non-core when the claim existed outside bankruptcy, even if its recovery could benefit the estate.

Laddusire v. Auto-Owners Insurance · filed 2013-06-06(b)(3)

Clearly the proceeding can and did exist outside of the bankruptcy. It involves claims relating to an insurance policy and coverage that were asserted before the bankruptcy was filed. As such, this Court concludes the State Court Action is decidedly non-core.

Section 157 permits bankruptcy courts to determine whether a proceeding is core or non-core; a prepetition state-law foreclosure action connected to bankruptcy only by the debtor’s filing is non-core.

Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. AIG Federal Savings Bank (In re Laddusire) · filed 2013-06-20(b)(3)

Bankruptcy courts may determine whether a proceeding is core or non-core. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3). ... As such, this Court concludes that the Foreclosure Action is a non-core proceeding.

Section 157(c)(1) calls for proposed findings and conclusions in non-core adversary proceedings.

J. Aron & Co. v. SemCrude, L.P. (In re SemCrude, L.P.) · filed 2013-06-28(c)(1)

These adversary proceedings constitute non-core proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).

Section 157 treats prepetition state-law contract claims that could proceed outside bankruptcy as non-core proceedings, even when they may affect the bankruptcy estate.

Sunset Marine of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Tracker Marine, LLC · filed 2013-07-24(b)(2)

As a consequence, the instant adversary proceeding is a non-core proceeding that falls squarely under the “related to” type of jurisdiction. Both actions would and could survive outside of bankruptcy and if it had not been for the bankruptcy filing of Debtor, the actions would have been or could have been resolved in a non-bankruptcy forum.

Section 157(c)(1) requires a bankruptcy court to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court in a non-core proceeding.

Listecki v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee) · filed 2013-07-29(c)(1)

Also, since the bankruptcy court should have submitted “proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law,” § 157(c)(1), the Court could simply treat the bankruptcy court’s order as such and review it accordingly.

Section 157(c)(1) applies to non-core bankruptcy proceedings.

Messer ex rel. Fine Diamonds, LLC v. Peykar International Co. (In re Fine Diamonds, LLC) · filed 2013-11-18(c)(1)

It is non-core matters to which 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1), mentioned in Rule 9033(a), applies.

A prepetition breach of contract claim is non-core when the bankruptcy filing merely triggered the contract’s early termination.

Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. v. Intel Corp. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.) · filed 2013-12-19(b)(1)

The commencement of the LBHI case was the triggering event for early termination but is not a relevant factor for determining whether claims are core or non-core.

State law claims that can be pursued independently of a bankruptcy case are non-core proceedings.

Ritchie Capital Management, L.L.C. v. Opportunity Finance, L.L.C. · filed 2014-06-05(b)

Plaintiffs assert state law claims in this case-aiding and abetting, conspiracy, and unjust enrichment — all of which they could pursue irrespective of the Pet-ters bankruptcy and, thus, are non-core.

Section 157 treats a state-law insurance coverage dispute between nondebtors as non-core when the coverage question is separate from whether potential proceeds are property of the estate.

Longview Power, LLC v. First American Title Insurance (In re Longview Power, LLC) · filed 2014-08-12(b)(2)(A)

Considering each of these arguments and supporting authorities, the Court finds that the question of whether coverage exists under the Title Insurance Policy is non-core. The bottom line is that the coverage dispute implicates state law rights and defenses as between First American and the Collateral Agent. The policy itself has not been assigned, only the proceeds arising out of losses incurred by the Longview Lenders due to the Mechanics’ Liens. The question of whether the potential proceeds are property of the estate is separate from the question of whether First American is obliged to perform under the Title Insurance Policy.

Section 157(c)(1) allows a bankruptcy judge to hear a non-core proceeding related to a bankruptcy case; whether the proceeding is core affects the judge’s authority to enter orders and judgments.

Hilton Worldwide, Inc. Global Benefits Administrative Committee v. Caesars Entertainment Corp. · filed 2015-04-14(c)(1)

Thus, whether a suit is "related to” a pending bankruptcy is a threshold question of subject matter jurisdiction, while whether a proceeding is core or non-core affects whether the bankruptcy judge may enter appropriate orders and judgments, only after it is determined that jurisdiction is proper.

Section 157(c)(1) permits a bankruptcy judge to hear a related non-core proceeding even when the parties have not consented to the judge entering final judgment.

Harbinger Capital Partners LLC v. Ergen · filed 2015-04-28(c)(1)

But the Bankruptcy Court’s inability to enter final judgment absent consent did not deprive it of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims Harbinger now asserts.

Section 157(c)(1) authorizes a bankruptcy court to hear a non-core proceeding related to a bankruptcy case and submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Smith v. First American Title Insurance (In Re Stevenson) · filed 2015-06-16(c)(1)

We reject that argument. As the Bankruptcy Court correctly stated, HSBC’s claim for equitable subrogation is “related to the bankruptcy case” and is “non-core in nature. The bankruptcy court is authorized to hear and make proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in such non-core ‘related to’ proceedings.”

Section 157 treats prebankruptcy state-law tort and insurance claims as non-core when they could exist outside bankruptcy.

Laddusire v. Auto-Owners Insurance (In re Laddusire) · filed 2015-11-19(b)(2)

Clearly the proceeding can and did exist outside of the bankruptcy. The claims are not claims created by the Code. The State Court Action involves claims relating to alleged personal injury and property damage claims together with associated insurance coverage that were asserted before the bankruptcy was filed. As such, this Court concludes the State Court Action is decidedly non-core.

Section 157(b) treats the trustee’s state-law claim derived from the debtor as a non-core proceeding.

Larson v. Swift Rock Financial, Inc. (In re Craig) · filed 2015-12-09(b)

In contrast to the § 548 claim, the CUDMSA claim asserted by the trustee is a non-core claim that is derivative of the debtor.

Section 157(c) treats related-to cases as non-core proceedings and, absent party consent, limits the bankruptcy court to submitting proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Intelect Corporation v. Cellco Partnership Gp · filed 2016-02-05(c)

“Related to” cases are non-core proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c), which means that, absent the consent of the parties, the bankruptcy court may only submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Section 157 allows a bankruptcy court to rule on a motion to dismiss even if the proceeding is non-core or the court lacks authority to enter a final order.

Salus Capital Partners, LLC v. Standard Wireless Inc. · filed 2016-05-11

The Court has the power to enter an order on this Motion to Dismiss even if the’'matter is non-core or it has no authority to enter a final order.

Section 157(c)(1)'s limits on a bankruptcy court's authority apply only to non-core proceedings; turnover of assets to the debtor's estate is a core proceeding.

BCL-Sheffield, LLC v. Gemini Int'l, Inc. · filed 2016-08-11(c)(1)

The turnover of the defendants’ assets to the debtor’s estate, and the liquidation of the assets for the benefit of the defendants, is a core proceeding, see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(E), based therefore on bankruptcy law, and so the limitations on the bankruptcy court’s authority that are imposed by section 157(c)(1) are irrelevant, because those limitations are applicable only to a bankruptcy court’s administration of non-core proceedings.

Section 157(c) does not give a bankruptcy court authority over a non-core proceeding whose outcome cannot conceivably affect the bankruptcy estate.

Pennsylvania Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Pompelia (In re Pompelia) · filed 2016-10-25(c)

PPCIGA does not assert this adversary proceeding is “core” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) and this Court has found it lacks “non-core” jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c). The matter at issue neither “arises in,” “arises under,” nor is “related to” a case under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 157 distinguishes core proceedings from non-core related matters; the bankruptcy court concluded it could not hear allegations that fit neither category.

Kinney v. Atlanta Police Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation (In re Kinney) · filed 2016-11-07(b), (c)

The Court concludes that the allegations set forth in the Debtor's Complaint do not constitute "core proceedings” as described in Section 157(b). In addition, as these allegations also do not constitute non-core, related matters as addressed in Section 157(c), the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear them.

Section 157(c) permits a bankruptcy court to enter final orders on non-core claims when the parties consent.

Hackman v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC. (In re Hackman) · filed 2017-01-04(c)

The remaining Counts of the Amended Complaint present non-core claims under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c). The Court finds that the Plaintiff and the Defendant have consented to entry of final Orders by the Bankruptcy Court.

Section 157(c)(1) requires a bankruptcy court to submit proposed conclusions of law to the district court when the parties do not consent to final adjudication of a related non-core proceeding.

Wortley v. Bakst · filed 2017-01-05(c)(1)

The parties here did not consent, meaning that the bankruptcy court lacked authority to enter the final order of dismissal and instead should have submitted proposed conclusions of law to the district court under § 157(c)(1).

Section 157(b)(2)’s list of core proceedings does not include state-law claims that can exist independently of bankruptcy.

ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Essar Global Fund Ltd. · filed 2017-01-12(b)(2)

Neither Plaintiffs claim for breach of contract nor Defendants’ counterclaims for equitable estoppel and fraudulent inducement fall within the non-exhaustive list of core proceedings set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). More generally, the claims do not involve rights created by the bankruptcy laws, nor could the claims exist only in a bankruptcy case or in a court with federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.

Section 157(b)(2)(A) and (N) classify a proposed compromise that would result in a sale of estate property as a core proceeding.

In Re Gregerson · filed 2004-07-19(b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(N)

Although Forker couches his request as a motion to sell estate property free and clear of claims, liens, and encumbrances, I conclude it is, in the first instance, a motion to compromise a dispute with one of the corporations and its non-debtor shareholders. Approval of the compromise would result in a sale. This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (N).

Section 157(b)(2)(A) and (O) cover a trustee’s motion to approve settlement of an estate’s personal injury lawsuit as a core proceeding.

In Re Del Grosso · filed 1989-10-13(b)(2)(A), (O)

The motion constitutes a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (O).

Section 157(b)(2) treats approval of settlements of bankruptcy estate claims as a core proceeding that the bankruptcy court may finally decide, subject to district court review.

W.J. Services, Inc., Wood F. Jones and Mary L. Jones v. Commercial State Bank of El Campo · filed 1993-05-12(b)(2)

A proceeding to determine the acceptability of agreements compromising claims of the bankruptcy estate is a core proceeding which can be finally heard and determined by the bankruptcy court subject to review by the district court.

Section 157(b)(2) permits bankruptcy courts to approve a trustee’s proposed compromise of estate claims, including legal claims.

Ring, Donna S. v. Rameker, William J. · filed 2005-06-29(b)(2)

Bankruptcy courts may approve a trustee’s proposal to compromise claims of the estate, including legal claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2); W.J. Servs. v. Commercial State Bank of El Campo, 990 F.2d 233, 234 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); In re Holywell Corp., 913 F.2d 873, 881 (11th Cir. 1990), subject to review by the district court and, in turn, this court, 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), (d); see In re Weinhoeft, 275 F.3d 604, 604 (7th Cir. 2001).

Section 157 treats a trustee’s settlement of estate counterclaims as a core matter because it administers property of the estate.

Chan v. Brady · filed 2023-03-30(b)(2)(A), (O)

Because the Trustee’s settlement of Chan’s counterclaims constitutes the administration of the property of the estate, it is a core matter under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (O); see also Woodson v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (In re Woodson), 839 F.2d 610, 620 (9th Cir. 1988); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(a).

Section 157(b)(2) does not bar a bankruptcy court from deciding whether a personal injury debt is dischargeable after a state court resolves the underlying tort claim.

Bouchillon v. Caffey · filed 2015-09-16(b)(2)(B), (b)(2)(O)

Moreover, while the ruling of the bankruptcy court in this case was clearly informed by the policy considerations un-dergirding 28 U.S.C. § 157, the court merely determined that the state court was the appropriate one to decide the underlying tort of negligence. The bankruptcy court made clear that it had jurisdiction to determine “dischargeability of any debts arising from the tort,” and it merely stayed, but did not dismiss, the adversary petition to determine the .debt non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(9). Thus, the ruling of the bankruptcy court in this case is properly regarded as a discretionary ruling regarding the timing of its ruling on the '§ 523(a)(9) motion, since nothing precludes it from addressing the merits of the motion once the underlying state court proceedings are concluded.

Section 157(b)(2)(B) gives the bankruptcy court core jurisdiction to liquidate claims against the estate, but excludes personal injury tort claims.

In re Ocean 4660, LLC · filed 2015-07-21(b)(2)(B)

Mr. Frank’s stay relief motion sought to liquidate claims over which this Court has core jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 157(b)(2)(B). Because Mr. Frank’s claims are within this Court’s jurisdiction and Ms. Campo’s claim is not, disparate treatment was entirely appropriate.

Section 157 permits a bankruptcy court to disallow a personal injury tort claim as a matter of law, but limits its authority to estimate or liquidate the claim.

In re Residential Capital, LLC · filed 2014-11-18(b)(2)(B), (b)(5)

Fourth, as previously noted, to the extent the Claims allege a personal injury tort, mandatory withdrawal is not required because this Court has jurisdiction over the allowance or disallowance of personal injury tort claims; the only limitation being that the Court lacks authority to estimate or liquidate such claims, which is unnecessary here.

Section 157 does not give the bankruptcy court jurisdiction over a wrongful death action against the debtor.

In Re Carematrix Corp. · filed 2004-02-19(b)(5)

The Court does not have jurisdiction over the Executor’s wrongful death action against CareMatrix pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(B) and (O) and 157(b)(5).

Section 157(b)(5) assigns the determination of venue for tort claims to the home district court with bankruptcy jurisdiction.

Kennamer v. Able Supply Company · filed 2002-04-10(b)(5)

Garlock also contends that we exceeded our jurisdiction by determining “on the merits” under § 157(b)(5) the venue of the tort claims against it. As Garlock correctly points out, such an analysis belongs only in the “Home” district court with bankruptcy jurisdiction. Our analysis, however, did not purport to determine the venue in which to proceed.

Section 157(b)(5) places a merits determination of venue for bankruptcy-related tort claims in the home district court with bankruptcy jurisdiction.

Webb v. AC&S Inc · filed 2002-04-10(b)(5)

Garlock also contends that we exceeded our jurisdiction by determining “on the merits” under § 157(b)(5) the venue of the tort claims against it. As Garlock correctly points out, such an analysis belongs only in the “Home” district court with bankruptcy jurisdiction.

Section 157(b)(5) places a merits determination of tort-claim venue in the home district court with bankruptcy jurisdiction.

Porter v. AC&S Inc · filed 2002-04-10(b)(5)

Garlock also contends that we exceeded our jurisdiction by determining “on the merits” under § 157(b)(5) the venue of the tort claims against it. As Garlock correctly points out, such an analysis belongs only in the “Home” district court with bankruptcy jurisdiction.

Section 157(b)(5) can apply to mass tort claims involving multiple nondebtor codefendants, but transfer depends on the circumstances of the claims.

Webb v. AC&S Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) may permit transfer of mass tort claims against nondebtor codefendants, but whether transfer is appropriate depends on the circumstances of the claims and their relationship to the debtor.

Sterling v. AC&S Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) can permit transfer of mass tort personal injury claims against nondebtor co-defendants, but the transfer must be appropriate in the circumstances.

Kennamer v. Able Supply Company · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) may permit transfer of mass tort claims against multiple nondebtor codefendants, but the transfer must be appropriate in the circumstances.

Tipple v. Able Supply Co · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) may permit transfer of mass tort claims against multiple nondebtor codefendants, but a tenuous relationship to the debtor and insubstantial contribution claims do not justify transfer.

Mims v. AC & S Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) may permit transfer of mass tort claims against multiple nondebtor codefendants when their relationship to the debtor justifies it.

Stearns v. A C & S Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) may allow transfer of mass tort claims against multiple nondebtor codefendants when their relationship to the debtor and the circumstances make transfer appropriate.

Combs v. Able Supply Co · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) may allow transfer of mass tort claims against multiple nondebtor codefendants, but the party seeking transfer must show that it is appropriate under the circumstances.

Hill v. ACands, Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) can apply to claims against multiple nondebtor codefendants in a mass tort case, but transfer must be appropriate under the circumstances.

Smith v. ACands, Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) may permit transfer of mass tort claims against multiple nondebtor codefendants, but whether transfer is appropriate depends on the circumstances.

Brame v. Able Supply Co · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) prevents a bankruptcy court from adjudicating and liquidating personal injury claims, even in a dischargeability proceeding.

Leathem v. Von Volkmar (In Re Von Volkmar) · filed 1998-02-02(b)(5)

It seems clear that notwithstanding Hallahan’s judicial economy discussion and the bankruptcy court’s ability to now conduct jury trials pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(e), the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) flatly prohibits a bankruptcy court from adjudicating and liquidating personal injury claims even when brought within a dischargeability proceeding.

Section 157(b)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to determine whether a personal injury debt is dischargeable while leaving liability and damages for another forum to decide.

Roberts v. Spencer (In Re Spencer) · filed 1994-05-27(b)(2)

It is clear from (I) that bankruptcy courts are to hear and determine the dis-chargeability of particular debts. It is equally clear from (B) and (0) that bankruptcy courts are not to determine personal injury tort or 'wrongful death claims. ... For these reasons, this court limits its determination to the dischargeability of the debt and makes no attempt to assess damages or grant a judgment on the liability issues.

Section 157(b)(5) requires personal injury tort actions to be tried in district court rather than determined by the bankruptcy court.

Williamson v. Patterson (In Re Patterson) · filed 1993-02-04(b)(5)

Congress has mandated trial in the district court of personal injury tort actions, 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5), and thereby specifically excepted such actions from bankruptcy court jurisdiction.

Section 157(b)(5) assigns personal injury claims to district courts within the federal bankruptcy system but does not require their removal from state court.

Brenes v. United States Lines, Inc. (In Re United States Lines, Inc.) · filed 1991-06-27(b)(5)

Based on the context of § 157, with its definition of “core” and “non-core” proceedings and its identification of which claims are properly heard by the bankruptcy court and which are not, it is apparent that subsection (b)(5) is meant to designate which court, as between the bankruptcy court and the district court, should hear personal injury claims against the debtor, and, secondarily, to identify which court should determine the venue for such claims. Nothing in either the language of the statute or its legislative history indicates that Congress intended to extend the district court’s removal power.

Section 157(b)(2)(B) bars the bankruptcy court from hearing personal injury and wrongful death claims, allowing their liquidation in an appropriate non-bankruptcy forum.

In Re Allegheny International, Inc. · filed 1989-10-17(b)(2)(B)

In this case, the court has developed a practice of granting relief from stay, with the debtor’s consent, so that creditors asserting claims for personal injury and/or wrongful death, which this court is statutorily barred from hearing, 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B), may liquidate their claims in the appropriate non-bankruptcy forums.

Section 157(b)(2)(B) permits a bankruptcy court to disallow a personal injury or wrongful death claim that has no legal basis, although it cannot liquidate or estimate the claim for purposes of distribution.

In Re Chateaugay Corp. · filed 1990-03-07(b)(2)(B)

Although § 157(b)(2)(B) ... restricts a bankruptcy court’s power to liquidate or estimate personal injury tort or wrongful death claims for purposes of distribution, it imposes no corollary restriction upon a bankruptcy court’s ability to disallow such claims in the first instance if they are not sustainable at law.

Section 157(b)(5) does not require a showing that transfer is necessary to administer the bankruptcy case.

Coker v. Pan American World Airways · filed 1991-12-03(b)(5)

To the extent these statements imply that the standard for invoking section 157(b)(5)'s transfer power is one of necessity, they are without support in the Code or in its legislative history, and are erroneous.

Section 157(b)(2)(B) permits a bankruptcy court to determine whether personal injury claims are valid, while limiting its authority to liquidate them for distribution.

In Re Standard Insulations, Inc. · filed 1992-04-13(b)(2)(B)

From the plain language in § 157, the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to reduce a personal injury claim to a dollar value is limited, but it does not appear that § 157(b)(2)(B) is intended to limit the authority to determine the validity of claims against the estate.

Section 157 permits bankruptcy courts to disallow legally deficient personal injury and wrongful death claims in the first instance.

In Re Chateaugay Corp. · filed 1992-10-15(b)(2)(B)

The Bankruptcy Court was correct in concluding that the actual provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157, as well as the broad jurisdictional mandate enunciated by the Second Circuit in In re Ben Cooper, Inc., 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir.1990), compel a finding that the Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction to disallow legally deficient personal injury tort and wrongful death claims in the first instance.

Section 157 permits a bankruptcy court to liquidate a wrongful discharge claim when the alleged emotional distress does not qualify as a personal injury tort.

In Re Atron Inc. of Michigan · filed 1994-09-21(b)(2)(B), (b)(5)

Because the Claimant has not alleged a personal injury tort as anticipated by Congress in drafting 28 U.S.C §§ 157(b)(2)(B) and 157(b)(5), this Court has jurisdiction to determine Mr. Fang’s wrongful discharge claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B). We therefore deny Claimant’s motion to transfer the liquidation of his claim to the district court.

Section 157(b)(5) does not require a personal injury plaintiff to file in the district where the bankruptcy case is pending.

Stokes v. Southeast Hotel Properties, Ltd. · filed 1994-12-21(b)(5)

This Court can discern nothing in the language or purpose of the statute to warrant the conclusion that in enacting this statute the Congress intended to prevent a party from filing their personal injury lawsuit in a district or state court other than the bankruptcy district court.

Section 157(b)(5) gives the district court where the bankruptcy case is pending sole authority to set the trial venue for personal injury tort and wrongful death claims against bankruptcy debtors.

Calumet National Bank v. Levine · filed 1995-02-22(b)(5)

Under section 157(b)(5), the district court for the bankruptcy district has sole authority for ultimately fixing venue for PITWD actions against bankruptcy debtors.

Section 157(b)(5) applies to removed state court claims asserted against a bankrupt entity, not claims asserted against non-bankrupt defendants.

Luevano v. Dow Corning Corp. · filed 1995-06-28(b)(5)

28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) is applicable only where the plaintiffs’ state court claims which have been removed are being asserted against the bankrupt entity. In this case, the plaintiffs’ state court claims which have been removed are being asserted against the non-bankrupt defendants.

Section 157(b)(5) lets the district court where the bankruptcy case is pending choose whether to try a personal injury claim in that district or in the district where the claim arose.

Broughton v. Celotex Corp. · filed 1995-07-11(b)(5)

As noted supra, Section 157(b)(5), while apparently mandating that personal injury cases arising out of bankruptcy proceedings be tried in federal district court, allows the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending to choose between (2) two forums. The case may be tried either in the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending, or in the court in which the claim arose.

Section 157(b)(5) allows a district court to fix the trial venue for personal injury and wrongful death claims against nondebtor defendants when the claims are related to a debtor’s bankruptcy case.

Lindsey v. O'Brien · filed 1996-04-09(b)(5)

We agree with the Fourth Circuit that Section 157(b)(5) should be read to allow a district court to fix venue for cases pending against nondebtor defendants which are “related to” a debtor’s bankruptcy proceedings pursuant to Section 1334(b).

Section 157(b)(5) allows a district court to fix trial venue for personal injury tort and wrongful death claims against nondebtor defendants when those claims are related to a debtor’s bankruptcy case.

In Re Dow Corning Corporation · filed 1996-06-03(b)(5)

We agree with the Fourth Circuit that Section 157(b)(5) should be read to allow a district court to fix venue for cases pending against nondebtor defendants which are "related to" a debtor's bankruptcy proceedings pursuant to Section 1334(b).

Section 157(b)(5) requires the district court, on a properly filed motion, to set venue for covered personal injury tort and wrongful death claims in one of the two districts the provision specifies.

In re Dow Corning Corp. · filed 1996-11-18(b)(5)

Thus, the plain language of the Section 157(b)(5) instructs that the district court, upon a properly filed motion, must set venue for claims falling within the ambit of Section 157(b)(5) in one of two possible jurisdictions.

Section 157(b)(2)(B) excludes liquidation or estimation of personal injury and wrongful death claims for allowance and distribution from core proceedings.

In Re Dow Corning Corp. · filed 1997-07-29(b)(2)(B)

However, the liquidation or estimation of a personal injury or wrongful death claim for purposes of allowance and distribution is not a core proceeding.

Section 157(b)(5) requires wrongful death actions to be transferred to the district court, which may then abstain.

Santos Ex Rel. Estate of Santos v. Durheim (In Re Durheim) · filed 1997-10-24(b)(5)

First, it appears clear that the bankruptcy court was correct in concluding that wrongful death actions must be transferred to the federal district court and that transfer does not preclude abstention.

Section 157(b)(2)(B) permits a bankruptcy court to enter a final order disallowing a personal injury claim on summary judgment before trial.

In Re Dow Corning Corp. · filed 1997-11-20(b)(2)(B)

After such analysis, we conclude that a bankruptcy court may enter a final order on a motion for summary judgment disallowing a personal injury claim without running afoul of the “but not the liquidation” clause of § 157(b)(2)(B).

Section 157(b)(2)(B) leaves bankruptcy courts able to decide whether a personal injury proof of claim is barred by limitations, even though they cannot liquidate or estimate the claim for distribution.

In Re C & G Excavating, Inc. · filed 1998-01-29(b)(2)(B)

While bankruptcy courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to liquidate or estimate contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims for purposes of distribution, see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B), several courts have determined, and we agree, that bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction to decide corollary issues involving the validity of a proof of claim for personal injuries or wrongful death, such as whether the statute of limitation on the underlying cause of action has expired.

Section 157(b)(5) prevents bankruptcy courts from trying personal injury and wrongful death claims.

In Re Fowler · filed 2001-03-05(b)(5)

It is a personal injury and wrongful death claim which cannot be tried in this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 157.

Section 157(b)(5) gives the district court authority to determine where personal injury claims will be tried.

In Re New York Medical Group, P.C. · filed 2001-08-09(b)(5)

The bankruptcy court cannot exercise the authority granted to the district court under § 157(b)(5).

Section 157(b)(5) may allow transfer of mass tort personal injury and wrongful death claims against multiple nondebtor codefendants when the circumstances justify it.

Arnold v. Garlock, Inc. · filed 2001-12-28(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) may allow transfer of mass tort claims against multiple nondebtor codefendants, but transfer depends on the circumstances of the case.

Thomas v. Acands Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) does not warrant transfer of mass tort claims against nondebtor codefendants when their asserted contribution claim against the debtor is invalid and their relationship to the bankruptcy is too tenuous.

Gill v. Acands Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) may allow transfer of mass tort claims against multiple nondebtor codefendants when the circumstances make transfer appropriate.

Snow v. AC&S Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) may permit transfer of mass tort claims against nondebtor codefendants, but the circumstances must justify the transfer.

Burdo v. AC&S Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) may apply to personal injury and wrongful death claims against multiple nondebtor codefendants in a mass tort case, but transfer must be appropriate under the circumstances.

Porter v. AC&S Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) may permit transfer of mass tort claims against nondebtor codefendants, but transfer depends on their relationship to the debtor and the circumstances of the claims.

Jackson v. AC&S Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) may allow transfer of personal injury and wrongful death claims involving non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case, but the circumstances must support the transfer.

Armstrong v. Able Supply Company · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) may permit transfer of mass tort claims against multiple non-debtor co-defendants when the circumstances justify it.

McDowell v. AC&S Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) can apply to mass tort claims against multiple nondebtor codefendants, but the circumstances must justify transfer.

Finch v. AC & S Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) may permit transfer of mass tort claims against multiple nondebtor codefendants, but transfer was unwarranted where their relationship to the debtor and contribution claims were insufficient.

Royer v. AC & S Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) may permit transfer of mass tort claims against multiple nondebtor codefendants, but a tenuous contribution claim does not justify transfer.

Smith v. Able Supply Company · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) can apply to mass tort claims against nondebtor codefendants, but transfer is inappropriate when their asserted relationship to the debtor does not justify it.

Fox v. AC & S Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) may permit transfer of mass tort claims against multiple nondebtor codefendants, depending on the circumstances of the case.

Sams v. Alcoa Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) can apply to mass tort claims against multiple non-debtor co-defendants, but transfer must be appropriate under the circumstances.

Madden v. Able Supply Co · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) permits transfer of personal injury and wrongful death claims in some mass tort cases, but efficiencies from issue preclusion alone cannot justify transfer.

Poore v. AC & S Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

The efficiencies to be obtained from issue preclusion, therefore, cannot in this circuit serve as a basis for the transfer of cases under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5).

Section 157(b)(5) may permit transfer of mass tort claims against multiple nondebtor co-defendants, depending on their relationship to the debtor and the circumstances of the claims.

Allphin v. AC & S Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) may permit transfer of mass tort claims against nondebtor co-defendants, but transfer requires circumstances that justify it.

Nelson v. AC & S Incorporated · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) can permit transfer of mass tort claims against nondebtor codefendants, but transfer is inappropriate when their connection to the debtor and their contribution claims are too tenuous.

Wayne v. AC & S Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) may permit transfer of mass tort claims against multiple nondebtor codefendants, but transfer requires circumstances that justify it.

Sanden v. ACands Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) can permit transfer of mass tort claims against nondebtor codefendants, but transfer was inappropriate where the asserted connection to the debtor was too tenuous.

Coats v. ACands, Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) may permit transfer of mass tort claims against multiple nondebtor codefendants, but transfer is not appropriate on an insufficient showing of their relationship to the debtor.

Volkmann v. ACands Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) may permit transfer of mass tort claims against nondebtor codefendants, depending on their relationship to the debtor and the circumstances of the claims.

Douglas v. Able Supply Co · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) may permit transfer of mass tort claims against nondebtor codefendants, but an invalid contribution claim and a tenuous relationship to the debtor do not justify transfer.

Lehnhoff v. Acands, Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) can apply to mass tort claims against nondebtor co-defendants, but transfer depends on the circumstances of the case.

Evans v. Acands, Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) may permit transfer of mass tort claims against multiple nondebtor codefendants, but a tenuous connection to the debtor does not justify transfer.

Diaz v. Able Supply Co · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) may permit transfer of mass tort claims against nondebtor codefendants, but the transfer must be appropriate in the circumstances.

Short v. Acands, Inc · filed 2002-01-03(b)(5)

We do not disagree that the transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) may be applicable to multiple, non-debtor co-defendants in a mass tort case. Our holding today is that Garlock, in these cases and under these circumstances, has not shown that such a transfer is appropriate.

Section 157(b)(5) does not apply to contingent contribution claims rather than personal injury or wrongful death claims.

In Re North American Refractories Co. · filed 2002-06-28(b)(5)

Thus, this argument is unavailing and, at this time, § 157(b)(5) does not apply.

Section 157(b)(5) requires personal injury and wrongful death claims to be tried in the district court where the bankruptcy case is pending or where the claim arose.

In Re EBG Health Care II, Inc. · filed 2003-12-03(b)(5)

Finally, since the United States District Court has exclusive jurisdiction over wrongful death/personal injury suits, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5), I will transfer the objection to claim to the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri for either a determination on the merits, or for transfer to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.

Section 157(b)(4) exempts personal injury and wrongful death claims against a debtor’s estate from mandatory abstention; the exemption also extends to claims against a nondebtor whose liability would effectively be borne by the debtor.

Berry v. Pharmacia Corp. · filed 2004-09-29(b)(4)

However, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(4), it cannot reasonably be contended that mandatory abstention applies to plaintiffs’ claims against Solutia. ... Moreover, in the court’s opinion, this exemption from mandatory abstention should extend, as well, to plaintiffs’ claims against Pharmacia.

Section 157(b)(2)(B) permits estimation of a wrongful death claim for plan confirmation but excludes its liquidation or estimation for distribution from core proceedings.

In re Pike · filed 2005-02-02(b)(2)(B)

What 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) makes non-core is only “the liquidation or estimation of ... unliquidated ... wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of distribution.”

Section 157 limits a bankruptcy court’s authority to liquidate wrongful death claims or conduct trials of those claims.

Roos v. Red · filed 2005-06-28(b)(2), (b)(5)

Similarly the bankruptcy court would not have had jurisdiction to liquidate the wrongful death claim or conduct a trial in the action.

Section 157(b)(5) requires personal injury and wrongful death claims to be tried in district court, though a bankruptcy court may resolve them by dispositive motion or settlement.

In Re Dilley · filed 2005-09-15(b)(5)

While, conceivably, the Petitioners’ claims could be determined by dispositive motion or settled in this court, those claims would never be tried here. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) ("The district court shall order that personal injury and wrongful death claims shall be tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending....").

Section 157(b)(5) requires the district court to determine where personal injury tort and wrongful death claims against a bankruptcy estate will be tried.

In Re Amtrol Holdings, Inc. · filed 2008-04-01(b)(5)

It is the District Court, not this Court, which is authorized to determine in which federal district court the Elder Claims are to proceed. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) requires that: The district court shall order that personal injury tort and wrongful death claims shall be tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending, or in the district court in the district in which the claim arose, as determined by the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending.

Section 157(b)(2) excludes liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury claims from core proceedings, while section 157(b)(5) requires such claims to be tried in district court.

In Re Alper Holdings USA · filed 2008-04-03(b)(2), (b)(5)

Section 157(b)(2) of title 28 of the United States Code, which outlines a non-exhaustive laundry list of matter that fall within the category of “core” proceedings, specifically excludes from the definition of core the “liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury or wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). Section 157(b)(5) goes to say that “the district court shall order that personal injury tort and wrongful death claims shall be tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending....” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5). However, as previously stated on the record at the hearing denying the Adkins Claimants’ application for a stay pending the determination of their motion before the District Court to withdraw the bankruptcy reference, this matter does not concern “the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims” so as to implicate Section 157(b)(2)(B), but rather merely concerns the allowance or disallowance of timely filed proofs of claim as a matter of law.

Section 157(b)(5) gives parties a waivable right to have personal injury tort claims heard in district court.

Adelson v. Smith (In Re Smith) · filed 2008-06-24(b)(5)

To be clear, the district court will almost always hear personal injury cases, especially if a timely request to do so is made. That is the allocative aspect of Section 157(b)(5). But since the right to have such cases heard in district court is not jurisdictional, it is also not inviolable; parties may waive the right by consent or by action.

Section 157(b)(2)(B) permits a bankruptcy court to allow or disallow personal injury claims, but excludes their liquidation or estimation from core proceedings.

Flake v. Alper Holdings USA, Inc. (In Re Alper Holdings USA, Inc.) · filed 2008-12-15(b)(2)(B)

28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) expressly provides that allowance or disal-lowance of claims is a core proceeding (over which the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction), but excludes the “liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury ... claims.” The bankruptcy court clearly had jurisdiction to disallow the personal injury claim.

Section 157 prevents a bankruptcy court from finally liquidating contested personal injury tort claims without district court review.

In Re American Capital Equipment, Inc. · filed 2009-05-26(b)(2)(B), (c)(1)

The Alternative Dispute Resolution Process thus violates 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) and is, therefore, forbidden by law.

Section 157(b)(5) governs venue rather than subject matter jurisdiction, and a party in default waives an objection to venue.

Sellers v. Osyka Permian, LLC · filed 2009-08-20(b)(5)

However, § 157(b)(5), on which this argument is based, relates to venue, not jurisdiction, see Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 981 F.2d 824, 834 (5th Cir.1993); and, while objections to subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, "a party in default waives any objection to venue,” Rogers v. Hartford Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 933, 942-943 (5th Cir.1999).

Section 157(b)(2)(B) bars a bankruptcy court from determining liability or damages on personal injury and wrongful death claims for purposes of distribution in the bankruptcy case.

Johnson v. Weihert (In re Weihert) · filed 2013-02-06(b)(2)(B)

In this case, the alleged injuries constituted both personal injury and wrongful death claims. Since the debt is being held dischargeable, any determination of liability or damages would have to be for purposes of distribution in the bankruptcy case. Therefore, this Court does not have the jurisdiction to enter a judgment on liability or damages in this case.

Section 157(b)(5) reserves trial of personal injury tort and wrongful death claims to the district court, while the bankruptcy court may decide whether the claim is nondischargeable.

Estate of Jackson v. Hardaway (In re Hardaway) · filed 2016-10-05(b)(5)

Although the complaint in this adversary proceeding alleges a claim for a personal injury tort and wrongful death, which can only be tried by the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5), the determination of whether-the claim is nondischargeable is a core proceeding which this Court may hear and determine under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I).

Section 157(b)(5) governs where personal injury tort and wrongful death claims are tried; it does not prevent a bankruptcy judge with referred jurisdiction and authority from trying them.

Kozec v. Murphy (In re Murphy) · filed 2017-06-27(b)(5)

A personal injury tort or wrongful death claim shall indeed be tried in the district court, but a district court includes its unit bankruptcy court when the bankruptcy judges’ jurisdiction and authority to adjudicate the claim are established.

Section 157(b)(2)(B) excludes the liquidation or estimation of personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against a bankruptcy estate from core proceedings, and the exception is limited to claims involving bodily injury, physical trauma, or severe psychiatric impairment.

In re Gawker Media LLC · filed 2017-08-21(b)(2)(B)

For these reasons, the Court concludes that the “personal injury tort” exception to core jurisdiction set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) is limited to claims involving bodily injury, physical trauma and/or a severe “psychiatric impairment beyond mere shame and humiliation,” Cohen, 107 B.R. at 455, and the Claims do not meet this definition.

Section 157(b)(5) directs that personal injury tort and wrongful death claims be tried in the district court where the bankruptcy case is pending and does not itself confer jurisdiction.

Corcoran v. McCabe (In re McCabe) · filed 2018-05-11(b)(5)

The Court finds that § 157(b)(5) is not a jurisdictional statute and did not deprive the Bankruptcy Court of jurisdiction.

Section 157(b)(5) governs federal trial venue for personal injury and wrongful death tort claims; it does not confer jurisdiction.

Holman v. Johnson & Johnson · filed 2019-05-22(b)(5)

Section 157(b)(5), by contrast, is not jurisdictional at all; that section relates only to the proper federal trial venue for personal injury and wrongful death tort claims.

Section 157(b)(5) is a venue provision that does not prevent a district court from deciding whether removal was proper.

Kerkhof v. Johnson & Johnson · filed 2019-06-03(b)(5)

Critical to this Court's decision, however, is that the provision on which J&J relies "is not jurisdictional." ... This means that although the District of Delaware is conferred authority to determine venue, no impediment exists to this Court deciding the more fundamental question presented-the propriety of removal in the first instance.

Claims seeking purely economic damages do not concern personal injury torts under § 157(b)(2)(B).

Seghers v. Johansen · filed 2019-06-26(b)(2)(B)

The Court notes that the damages Seghers requests are purely economic and thus his claims do not concern “personal injury torts” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B).

Section 157(b)(5) directs that personal injury tort and wrongful death claims be tried in the district court where the bankruptcy case is pending.

In re: Shawne Merriman · filed 2020-07-13(b)(5)

Although not raised by any party, personal injury tort and wrongful death claims are non-core proceedings, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(B) and (O), and such claims are to be tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending, see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5).

Section 157(b)(5)’s district court trial requirement is not jurisdictional.

In re: HAYLEY MARIE ROBINSON · filed 2021-08-12(b)(5)

We finally acknowledge that the law regarding whether defamation is a “personal injury tort” that ”shall be tried in the district court” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) is unclear. But the Supreme Court determined in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 479-80 (2011), that this statute is not jurisdictional. And Rule 7012-1(c) of the Local Rules of the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Washington provides that silence, in the face of a requirement that the parties file a document regarding consent to adjudication by the bankruptcy court, constitutes deemed consent. Here, the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to liquidate the defamation claim and to determine if it was nondischargeable.

Section 157(b)(5) requires withdrawal of the reference for personal injury tort claims unless their central focus is a financial, business, contract, or property interest.

In Re: The Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese New Orleans · filed 2021-08-25(b)(5)

Because Asare’s claims are based on personal injury torts under the broader view, the Court must withdraw the reference under § 157(b)(5) unless the claims have characteristics of financial, business, contract, or property tort claims.

Section 157(b)(2)(B) treats the liquidation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort claims against a bankruptcy estate as a non-core matter.

Promise Healthcare Group, LLC · filed 2021-09-30(b)(2)(B)

Significantly, however, the actual liquidation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort claims against the estate are non-core matters.

Section 157 treats a decision to permit state court liquidation of a claim as core, but treats the actual liquidation of a contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort claim against the estate as non-core.

Promise Healthcare Group, LLC · filed 2021-10-04(b)(2)(B)

The determination whether to provide relief from the plan injunction to permit the claim to be liquidated in state court is a core matter under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b). Significantly, however, the actual liquidation of a contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort claim against the estate is a non-core matter. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B).