28 U.S.C. § 1391

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where defendants have their principal place of business.

C.R. v. Elk Grove Unified School District · filed 2025-07-14(b)(1)

Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) because defendants have their principal place of business in this district.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a judicial district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the state containing that district.

Romano v. Matagorda County · filed 2025-07-17(b)(1)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), “[a] civil action may be brought in . . . a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.” ... Venue is proper in this court, but that does not resolve whether the case should be transferred to a different division.

Section 1391(b)(1) places venue in the district where a defendant resides; presence elsewhere in the same state does not make venue proper there.

Thornock v. The City of Salem, Virginia · filed 2025-07-15(b)(1)

Rather, § 1391(b)(1) instructs that venue is proper in the district where a defendant resides.

Section 1391(e)(1)(C) permits an action against a federal agency or official to be brought where the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved.

Nunez v. Commission of Social Security · filed 2025-07-22(e)(1)(C)

Because Plaintiff resides in the Eastern District of New York and no real property is involved in this action, the Eastern District of New York is also a proper venue for Plaintiff to bring constitutional claims or to seek a writ of mandamus. See § 1391(e)(1)(C).

Section 1391(b)(1) requires all defendants to reside in the state containing the proposed venue; under subsection (c)(2), an entity resides in a district only if it is subject to personal jurisdiction there.

Doe v. Choice Hotels International. Inc. · filed 2025-07-28(b)(1)

Where GP4 is not subject to this Court’s personal jurisdiction and thus does not reside in this District, venue is not proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1) does not permit venue in a district where no defendant resides.

Franczak v. I.C. System, Inc. · filed 2025-07-30(b)(1)

Because no defendant resides in the Middle District of Florida, venue is not proper here under (b)(1).

Section 1391(e)(1)(C) permits a suit against federal-government defendants where the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved; a plaintiff dismissed for lack of standing cannot establish venue through its residence.

Dayton Area Chamber of Com. v. Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. · filed 2025-08-06(e)(1)(C)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(C), plaintiffs can sue federal-government defendants in the venue where “the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action.” The complaint alleges that “at least one Plaintiff resides in” the Southern District of Ohio, making venue proper there under § 1391(e). But, as discussed above, both the Dayton Chamber and the Ohio Chamber lack standing to sue. Without those organizations as parties to the suit, no plaintiff resides in the Southern District of Ohio.

Section 1391(b) permits venue based on a defendant’s residence or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Greer v. Ryder · filed 2025-08-06(b)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), a civil action may be brought in: ... Here, all the events underlying the claims asserted in the complaint are alleged to have occurred in Cape Vincent, New York, which located in Jefferson County and thus within the geographical confines of the Northern District. Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege that any of the individual Defendants reside within this District. ... Thus, there is no apparent basis for venue in the Western District.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in that state.

Gaynor v. Diamond · filed 2025-08-07(b)(1)

Venue is proper in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located,” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), and accordingly venue is proper in the Central District of California.

Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) do not establish venue in a district where the defendant does not reside and no events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Justice For All v. APLA Health & Wellness · filed 2025-08-12(b)(1), (b)(2)

Thus, from the face of Plaintiff’s submissions, it is clear that venue is not proper in this Court under Section 1391(b)(1), (2) or Section 1965(a).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

GUREVICH v. PNC BANK · filed 2025-08-19(b)(1)

Venue would also be proper in the Western District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) since PNC is headquartered in Pittsburgh.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in the district where the plaintiff resides for this suit against federal agencies.

Lajoie v. Department of the Treasury · filed 2025-08-19(e)

Because venue does not lie in this district, and because both convenience and the interest of justice weigh in favor of transferring the case to the district to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania—where venue is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) and where Plaintiff resides—this case is hereby transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Section 1391(b)(1) does not permit venue based on a defendant’s residence in a district where that defendant is not subject to personal jurisdiction.

Doe, (A.E.W) v. Choice Hotels International , Inc. · filed 2025-08-27(b)(1)

Where Tinicum is not subject to this Court’s personal jurisdiction and thus does not reside in this District, venue is not proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1)-(2) permits venue where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state, or where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Eckert v. City of Buffalo · filed 2025-08-25(b)(1)-(2)

But there is no indication—in her motion or elsewhere—that any defendant, let alone all defendants, reside in that state or that any of the actions that form the basis of her claims occurred there.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue where a defendant resides only if all defendants reside in the same state as that district.

Roderick · filed 2025-09-04(b)(1)

Because all defendants do not reside in the State of New York, venue is improper under Section 1391(b)(1) in this District.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Vang v. Valdese Weaver · filed 2025-09-12(b)(1), (b)(2)

Thus, the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, and not this court, appears be a proper venue for Plaintiff’s claims under the FMLA, and under state law, under Section 1391(b)(1). In addition, because Plaintiff alleges that a substantial part, if not all of the alleged events took place in Burke County, North Carolina, and not within this judicial district, the abovementioned federal district court, and not this one, is also a proper venue for those claims under Section 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b) permits venue for FMLA and state law claims where the defendant resides or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Pakuja · filed 2025-09-12(b)(1), (b)(2)

Thus, the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, and not this court, appears be a proper venue for Plaintiff’s claims under the FMLA, and under state law, under Section 1391(b)(1). In addition, because Plaintiff alleges that a substantial part, if not all of the alleged events took place in Burke County, North Carolina, and not within this judicial district, the abovementioned federal district court, and not this one, is also a proper venue for those claims under Section 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides; the court found venue improper in New York and proper in Nevada, where the defendants resided.

Cellura · filed 2025-09-24(b)(1)

In any case, “[b]ecause the Court has determined that it lacks both general and specific personal jurisdiction over Defendants, venue is not proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).”

Section 1391 permits venue in the district where the defendants reside for claims against an individual defendant or a federal officer acting in an official capacity.

Friedeberg · filed 2025-10-16(b)(1), (e)(1)(A)

Thus, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, and not this court, is a proper venue for this action under Section 1391(b)(1) and (e)(1)(A).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue based on a defendant’s residence only if all defendants reside in the state containing the district.

Glinoga · filed 2025-10-17(b)(1)

Therefore, venue is not proper under § 1391(b)(1) because the ... complaint has not alleged that one defendant resides in the Southern District of California and all defendants are residents of California.

Section 1391(b)(1) does not establish venue in a district where no defendant is alleged to reside.

Abdelzaher · filed 2025-10-15(b)(1)

Because Plaintiff does not allege that any defendant resides in a county within this district or the State of New York, venue in this district is improper under Section 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue based on a defendant’s residence only if all defendants reside in the state containing the district.

Rylander · filed 2025-10-29(b)(1)

Venue of Plaintiff’s claims is not proper in this district under Section 1391(b)(1) based on the residence of defendants; all defendants are not residents of New York.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits suit in a district where the sole defendant resides, and subsection (c)(2) treats a business defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Wright · filed 2025-10-31(b)(1), (c)(2)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), “[a] civil action may be brought in a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.” A business entity is “deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such a defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). Here, LeafFilter is incorporated and maintains its principal place of business in Hudson, Ohio, located in the Northern District of Ohio. (Doc. 14-1, ¶ 4). Thus, Ohio has general personal jurisdiction over LeafFilter, so venue is proper in the Northern District of Ohio.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue based on a defendant’s residence when all defendants reside in the state containing that district.

Berlin · filed 2025-11-07(b)(1)

Because Defendants do not reside in the State of New York, venue is not proper in this court under Section 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits a civil action to be filed in a district where the defendant resides.

Manu · filed 2025-11-10(b)(1)

The Court also notes that Manu could have filed this suit in the Middle District of Tennessee because the NCAA ... resides in that district.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Patterson · filed 2025-11-18(b)(1)

Venue for Plaintiff’s claims is therefore proper under Section 1391(b)(1) in the District of Connecticut.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue based on a defendant’s residence only if all defendants reside in the state where the district is located.

Price · filed 2025-12-04(b)(1)

As to Plaintiff’s remaining claims, for which the applicable venue provision is found at Section 1391, while at least one of the defendants may indeed reside within this judicial district, it is clear that not all of them reside within State of New York. Thus, under Section 1391(b)(1), this court is not a proper venue for Plaintiff’s remaining claims.

Section 1391(b)(1)-(2) permits venue where a defendant resides or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Sanders · filed 2025-12-06(b)(1)-(2)

An action may be brought in the “judicial district in which any defendant resides” or “in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)-(2). ... Here, Plaintiff does not allege that any of the Defendants are located in this district or that any relevant events occurred here.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where the sole defendant resides.

George · filed 2025-12-15(b)(1)

Venue is proper in this Court because Sergeant Brown resides within the Eastern District of Virginia and is the only Defendant named in this matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b) permits venue based on where defendants reside or where the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred.

Presidential Candidate P60005535 v. Kardashian · filed 2025-12-16(b)

See 28 U.S.C. §1391(b). None of the Defendants identified in the complaint are residents of this Commonwealth, nor do Emrit’s allegations suggest that any part of the events or omissions giving rise to his putative claims occurred here.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a defendant resides, subject to its same-state requirement, or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Gilot · filed 2025-12-23(b)

Here, because Defendant resides in Syracuse, and Plaintiff does not allege that the events or omissions underlying her claim arose in this judicial district, transfer of this action to the Northern District of New York is appropriate.

Section 1391(b) permits venue based on a defendant’s residence when all defendants reside in the forum state, or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Roderick · filed 2026-01-13(b)(1), (b)(2)

Because all defendants do not reside in the State of New York, venue for Plaintiff’s state law claims is not proper in this district under Section 1391(b)(1). Because Plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting that the events giving rise to his state law claims arose in this district, the district is also not a proper venue for those claims under Section 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in that state.

Laconi · filed 2025-12-24(b)(1)

The only defendant in this case, Michael Ghosh, maintains a principal place of residence in the State of Indiana, and thus the case could have been brought there pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) permit venue based on a defendant’s residence or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Amari J. Moody v. Nelnet · filed 2026-01-09(b)(1), (2)

Because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant resides in this District or that the alleged events occurred in this District, from the face of the complaint, it is clear that venue is not proper in this District under Section 1391(b)(1), (2).

Section 1391(b) permits venue where all defendants reside in the same state or where a substantial part of the events occurred or the property at issue is located.

Dobane · filed 2026-01-15(b)(1), (b)(2)

Thus, under Section 1391(b)(1), the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, and not this court, is a proper venue for this action. ... Thus, under Section 1391(b)(2), the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, and not this court, is a proper venue for this action.

Venue lies in a district where the sole defendant resides, and a corporate defendant resides in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

JENKINS · filed 2026-02-05(b)(1), (c)(2)

Here, venue lies in the District of Massachusetts because the sole Defendant in this case is a Massachusetts resident. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). ... The District of Massachusetts therefore has general personal jurisdiction over Defendant, rendering Defendant a resident of Massachusetts for venue purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2).

Section 1391(b) permits venue based on defendants’ residence or a substantial part of the events or property at issue.

Haley · filed 2026-02-18(b)

Here, Haley has not demonstrated that any defendant resides in the Southern District of New York, or that any of the events or property are located in that District. Rather, it is the Western District of New York where venue has been properly laid. Accordingly, this alternative request is denied.

Section 1391(b) does not support venue in a district when the complaint alleges neither a defendant’s residence nor conduct underlying the claims there and points to another available district.

Rollerson-Wright · filed 2026-03-05(b)

Here, it is not alleged that any defendant is a resident of Pennsylvania. Additionally, the plaintiff fails to include any factual allegations regarding where any of the alleged conduct occurred, let alone that any of the alleged conduct occurred in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Instead, it appears that many of the defendants, and possibly the conduct underlying the plaintiff’s claims, occurred in the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Thus, venue is not proper in this court.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a Texas federal judicial district when the State of Texas is the sole defendant, but does not permit venue in a New York district on that basis.

Dowling · filed 2026-03-09(b)(1)

Thus, all of the United States District Courts for the federal judicial districts that are located within the State of Texas are proper venues for this action, under Section 1391(b)(1), but not this court.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where all defendants are considered residents for venue purposes.

C.C. · filed 2026-03-10(b)(1)

Further, the Court finds that it has personal jurisdiction, and the Southern District of Ohio is a proper forum for the reasons it articulated in In re Hotel TVPRA Litig., 2023 WL 3075851, at *10 (“Because this Court has personal jurisdiction over all defendants named in these [] minor cases, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255, they all are considered residents of the Southern District of Ohio for venue purposes in these actions. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). Therefore, venue is also properly laid in this district . . . .”).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue where all defendants are considered residents because the court has personal jurisdiction over them.

N.R. · filed 2026-03-10(b)(1)

Further, the Court finds that it has personal jurisdiction, and the Southern District of Ohio is a proper forum for the reasons it articulated in In re Hotel TVPRA Litig., 2023 WL 3075851, at *10 (“Because this Court has personal jurisdiction over all defendants named in these [] minor cases, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255, they all are considered residents of the Southern District of Ohio for venue purposes in these actions. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). Therefore, venue is also properly laid in this district . . . .”).

Section 1391(b)(1) does not make a district a proper venue when a defendant resides outside that district.

Lurch Jr. v. County of Marion · filed 2026-03-17(b)(1)

Thus, while it clear that this court is not a proper venue for this action under Section 1391(b)(1), because Plaintiff does not allege where Detective Henderson resides, it is unclear whether the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina is a proper venue for this action either, under that provision.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Merckx · filed 2026-03-19(b)(1)

Under this statute, venue is proper in "a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located[.]" 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(1). Since Defendant Rensselaer County is located in the Northern District of New York; this District is the proper venue for this case.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue where a defendant resides, and subsection (c)(2) treats a business defendant as residing in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

National Drayage Services (DE), LLC v. Gruup · filed 2026-03-23(b)(1), (c)(2)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), “[a] civil action may be brought in a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.” A business entity is “deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such a defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). Here, Melis is incorporated in Texas and maintains its principal place of business in Lancaster, Texas, located in the Northern District of Texas. (Doc. 1, ¶ 3). Thus, Texas has general personal jurisdiction over Melis, so venue is proper in the Northern District of Texas.

Section 1391 permits venue in the district containing a defendant entity’s main office.

LendingClub Bank, National Association v. Valley National Bank · filed 2026-03-31(b)(1), (c)(2)

Venue clearly would have been appropriate in the District of New Jersey. Defendant’s main office is in Morristown, New Jersey, which is within that district, and plaintiff does not contest that venue would have been appropriate there. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(1), (c)(2). Therefore, this action could have properly been brought in the District of New Jersey.

Section 1391(b) does not support venue in a district where no defendant resides and the complaint’s allegations have no connection to the district.

Emrit v. Prince Georges County Police Department · filed 2026-04-07(b)

It is apparent from Emrit’s complaint that there is no conceivable basis for venue in the Western District of Pennsylvania. Emrit did not allege that any of the defendants reside there, and the complaint’s allegations are in no way related to that District.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where the sole defendant resides.

Peters · filed 2026-04-15(b)(1)

Given the Eastern District of Michigan is a judicial district in which the sole defendant resides, venue is proper in the transferee jurisdiction and this second element is met.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the defendant resides and is subject to personal jurisdiction, or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Pintas · filed 2026-04-20(b)

In short, venue would be proper in the Northern District of Illinois because Defendant resides in that district and is subject to that court's personal jurisdiction, and a substantial part, if not all, of the events giving rise to this claim occurred in that district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Hardee's Restaurants LLC v. Arbor Capital Partners · filed 2026-05-05(b)(1)

The defendants all reside in Florida, which makes venue there proper. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) permit venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in that state, or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Diaz · filed 2026-05-05(b)(1)-(2)

Thus, venue is not proper in this Court under § 1391(b)(1) or (2). Because Defendants reside in New Hampshire and Plaintiffs’ claims arose in New Hampshire, under § 1391(b)(1) or (2), venue is proper in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire.

Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) permit venue where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state, or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Flores · filed 2026-05-08(b)(1), (b)(2)

Because none of the defendants resides in this district, and the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims did not arise in this district, it is clear from the face of the complaint that venue is not proper in this Court under Section 1391(b)(1), (2).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

James · filed 2026-06-01(b)(1)

This case falls under the first Section 1391(b) category above, as all Defendants–– Centurion, Dr. Rich, and Dr. Samuals––are alleged to reside in this state.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district with no connection to the defendants or the events giving rise to the claim when the action may be brought elsewhere.

Allen v. State of North Carolina · filed 2026-06-22(b)

Furthermore, this matter presents no connection to the District of Columbia. Venue in a civil action is proper only in (1) the district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state in which the district is located, (2) a district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred (or in which a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated), or (3) a district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); see also id. § 1406(a) (providing for dismissal or transfer for improper venue). All of the Defendants are located in North Carolina, and all of the alleged acts and omissions giving rise to this case also occurred there.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits a civil action in a district where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in that state.

Winter v. American Institute of Medical Sciences & Education · filed 2017-03-17(b)(1)

When venue is challenged, the court must determine whether the case falls within one of the three categories set out in § 1391(b). ... In the instant action, Defendant resides in the District of New Jersey, where it is incorporated, has its nerve center, and does business. ... Therefore, the first prong of the inquiry for a motion to transfer, venue is satisfied.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in the district where the sole defendant resides.

PEPPER v. LEVY · filed 2021-07-21(b)(1)

As an initial matter, the Court is satisfied that the action “might have been brought” there. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Defendant has not opposed Plaintiffs’ Motion, and according to Plaintiffs, Defendant is a resident of Manhattan, New York, within the Southern District of New York.

Section 1391(b) places venue for a petition challenging a conviction in the judicial district where the conviction occurred.

(HC) Villalta v. Cates · filed 2021-10-01(b)

In this case, the petitioner is challenging a conviction from Orange County, which is in the Central District of California.1 Therefore, the petition should have been filed in the United States ... District Court for the Central District of California.

Section 1391 permits venue where the defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

City of New York v. Lopez · filed 2021-12-21(b)

Venue is proper in this judicial district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because Defendant is domiciled and resides in this district, and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in this district.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the acts giving rise to the claims occurred.

Su, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor v. Medical Staffing of America, LLC · filed 2022-01-14(b)

Venue is proper pursuant to § 1391 because a substantial part of the acts giving rise to the claims occurred in this District; Defendants have sufficient connection with this District; and Defendants are domiciled in this District.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

WENZHOU XIN XIN SANITARY WARE CO., LTD. v. DELTA FAUCET COMPANY · filed 2023-09-21(b)(1)

Section 1391(b)(1) provides that a civil action may be brought in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.” Defendant, the only party against which this suit has been filed, resides in Indiana, as it is subject to personal jurisdiction within that state.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state; venue is determined when the complaint is filed.

(PC) Gonzalez v. Koranda · filed 2024-08-19(b)(1)

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) provides, in relevant part, that venue is proper in a judicial district in which any defendant resides if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located. All defendants reside in California. When plaintiff filed this action, venue in the Eastern District of California was proper because defendants CDCR and Board headquarters are located in Sacramento, California in Sacramento County. Sacramento County is within the jurisdiction of the Eastern District of California. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to transfer is denied because venue was proper in the Eastern District of California when plaintiff filed this action.

Section 1391(b)'s general venue rules do not apply to Title VII actions.

Hakeem v. Mayorkas · filed 2024-05-23(b)

“The general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), does not apply in Title VII actions.”

Section 1391’s general venue rules do not govern ADA and Rehabilitation Act employment discrimination claims, even when an ADEA claim is joined with them.

Westfall v. Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy · filed 2022-03-31

Employment discrimination claims alleging violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act are governed by Title VII’s venue provision, § 2000e-5(f)(3), instead of the general federal venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(b)(2)'s general venue rule does not govern Title VII actions because Title VII's specific venue provision controls.

Webster v. Potter · filed 2016-05-04(b)(2)

Webster’s reliance on the general venue statute is misplaced because the “[Title VII venue] provision controls any other venue provision governing actions in federal court.”

Section 1391 does not govern venue for Rehabilitation Act or ADA employment discrimination claims, which use Title VII’s special venue provision.

Williams v. Geico Corporation · filed 2011-06-20

And even under the general venue statute -- which is not applicable here -- establishing personal jurisdiction over a defendant would not establish proper venue. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391 does not provide an additional venue for a Title VII employment discrimination claim governed by Title VII’s specific venue provision.

Thurmon v. Martin Marietta Data Systems · filed 1984-10-26

Thurmon is therefore incorrect in arguing that the general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 control and he cannot seriously contend that the specific judicial districts where his action may have been brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) should be ignored.

Section 1391’s general venue provisions do not govern Title VII claims because Title VII has exclusive venue provisions.

Stacy v. Hilton Head Seafood Co. · filed 1988-04-05

Title VII's venue provisions are exclusive; they do not merely supplement the general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391’s general venue provisions do not apply to Title VII actions because Title VII has specific venue provisions.

Weber v. Ideker, Inc. · filed 1997-09-19

The specific provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) apply to the exclusion of the general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391’s general venue rules yield to Title VII’s specific venue provision.

Harding v. Williams Property Co · filed 1998-08-31

This specific circum- scription overrides the general venue statute at 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391 does not govern venue in Title VII cases; Title VII’s specific venue provision controls.

Phillips v. Rubin · filed 1999-08-19

In his complaint, Plaintiff claimed venue was proper in this district under the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391. However, in Title VII cases, the general venue statute does not apply; rather, the more specific venue provision found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) controls.

Section 1391 supplies no additional venue for a suit bringing both Title VII and § 1981 claims when Title VII’s narrower venue rule applies.

James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc. · filed 2002-07-31

Although the parties have not asked the court to exercise pendent venue in the instant action, venue is determined by the analysis of the stricter Title VII venue provisions set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Indeed, the greater weight of authority suggests that when a plaintiff brings a Title VII action under both 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000e-5, the narrower venue provision of section 2000e—5(f)(3) controls.

Section 1391(e) does not govern venue in Title VII employment discrimination actions; Title VII’s special venue provision applies.

Amirmokri v. Abraham · filed 2002-08-30(e)

Plaintiff relies on the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), while defendant relies on the special venue provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). ... The Court agrees with the defendant that in actions brought under Title VII, venue must be determined according to the statute’s special venue provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 1391(b)'s general venue rule does not govern a Title VII action because Title VII has its own venue provision.

Perkins v. Town of Princeville · filed 2004-09-27(b)

Thus, the venue provision in Title VII, rather than the general venue provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), governs the venue determination in this case.

Section 1391 does not control venue for Title VII employment discrimination actions because Title VII’s venue provision is exclusive.

Charles A. Pinson, Jr. v. Rumsfeld · filed 2006-05-18

The venue provisions of § 2000e-5(f)(3) were intended to be the exclusive venue provisions for Title VII employment discrimination actions and that the more general provisions of § 1391 are not controlling in such cases.

Section 1391’s general venue rule gives way to Title VII’s specific venue provision in Title VII employment discrimination cases.

Tamashiro v. Harvey · filed 2006-09-19(b)

In Title VII employment discrimination cases, the explicit venue provision of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 5(f)(3), applies rather than the general provision found in Section 1391.

Section 1391’s general venue rules do not govern Title VII cases, which are governed by Title VII’s own venue provision.

Harley v. Chao · filed 2007-08-07

Venue in Title VII cases is governed by Title VII’s own venue provision, 42 U.S.C. § 20 OOe—5 (f) (3), rather than the general venue provision found in 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(e)’s general venue rule does not override Title VII’s specific venue provision.

Kidd v. Vilsack · filed 2009-07-14(e)

Instead, he contends that venue is proper in the District of Columbia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because the Forest Service, which is an agency of the United States Department of Agriculture, is headquartered in the District and defendant is located here. (Reply at ¶¶ 1, 4.) However, this general venue statute cannot trump Title VII’s special venue provision.

Section 1391(b)'s general venue rule yields to Title VII's specific venue provision for employment discrimination actions.

Pritchett v. Paschall Truck Lines, Inc. · filed 2010-05-28(b)

Title VII includes its own venue provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), which supersedes the general venue provision of § 1391.

Section 1391’s general venue rules do not govern Title VII actions; the Title VII venue provision governs instead.

Foley v. Holder · filed 2010-10-05

In a Title VII action, venue is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) rather than the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(e) does not govern venue in Title VII cases because Title VII has its own venue provision.

Ellis-Smith v. Secretary of the Army · filed 2011-06-22(e)

The only cases Plaintiff cites to support venue in this district, Smith v. Dalton, 927 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C.1996), and Bartman v. Cheney, 827 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C.1993), are cases applying 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), which is inapplicable in Title VII cases where venue is prescribed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 1391 does not govern venue for Title VII claims; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) does.

Herbert v. Sebelius · filed 2013-02-25

Venue in Title VII cases is not set by the general venue statute at 28 U.S.C. § 1391, but rather by the venue provision in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 1391’s general venue rules do not govern Title VII cases; Title VII has its own venue provision.

Taylor v. Veterans Affairs Administration · filed 2014-01-31

Venue in Title VII cases is not set by the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, but rather by the venue provision in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3).

Section 1391(b) does not govern Title VII actions because Title VII has its own venue provision.

Stout v. Napolitano · filed 2014-02-24(b)

The general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), does not apply in Title VII actions.

Section 1391(b)’s general venue rules do not apply to Title VII actions, which have a specific venue provision.

Parker v. US Department of Health and Human Services · filed 2014-06-27(b)

The general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), does not apply in Title VII actions.

Section 1391(b)'s general venue rules do not control Title VII employment discrimination actions because Title VII has its own venue provision.

Coley v. Esper · filed 2019-02-14(b)

Generally, the courts look to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) for proper venue. However, Title VII has its own venue provision that supersedes § 1391.

Section 1391 does not govern venue in Title VII employment discrimination actions because Title VII has an exclusive venue provision.

Rodriguez-Aragones v. Pompeo · filed 2019-11-19

Given that the Title VII venue provision is exclusive, the Court need not analyze venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, and also need not address the issue of whether Plaintiff actually lived in Rhode Island or Massachusetts.

Section 1391 does not govern venue when a Title VII claim is joined with an ADEA claim; Title VII’s mandatory venue provision applies.

Fitten v. Wormuth · filed 2020-05-26

Plaintiff’s § 1391 argument is rejected because the Title VII venue provision is mandatory, see Kim, 2014 WL 1580614, at *2, and the provision applies even when other claims are asserted together with a Title VII claim.

Section 1391’s general venue rules yield to Title VII’s venue provision in Title VII and ADA cases.

Morningstar v. Kroger Company · filed 2020-06-25

Title VII’s venue provision displaces the general venue provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and applies to ADA cases as well.

Section 1391 does not govern venue for Title VII claims, which have their own venue provision.

Jane Doe 1 v. Jetblue Airways Corporation · filed 2020-08-11

Venue in a Title VII claim is not determined by the general venue statue, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, but rather is strictly governed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 1391(e)(1) generally governs venue in suits against federal officers or agencies, but Title VII claims follow Title VII’s specific venue provision.

Escander v. McCarthy · filed 2020-09-16(e)(1)

In a typical action against a federal agency, venue is determined under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1), which provides that a “civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof . . . may . . . be brought in any judicial district in which (A) a defendant in the action resides, (B) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (C) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). But Escander brings this action under Title VII, which has its own venue provisions specifying that a plaintiff may bring suit in (1) “any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed,” (2) “the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered,” or (3) “the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3).

Section 1391 supplies the general venue rules, but Title VII’s own venue provision governs Title VII cases.

Martens v. Del Toro · filed 2022-10-18

In most civil cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides the venue requirements. But for Title VII cases, Title VII’s venue provision governs instead.

Section 1391 does not govern venue in Title VII actions because Title VII has an exclusive venue provision.

Ricky Hill v. AMB Sports & Entertainment, LLC · filed 2023-02-16

As such, “venue is determined pursuant to the statute’s exclusive venue provision without consideration of 28 U.S.C. § 1391.”

Section 1391(e)'s plaintiff-residence venue rule does not govern Rehabilitation Act and ADA employment discrimination claims because Title VII's specific venue provisions apply.

Aytes v. McWilliams · filed 2023-03-27(e)

For claims against the United States, § 1391(e) provides a general venue provision which permits suits to be brought in the district where the plaintiff resides. However, contrary to Ms. Aytes’ assertion, the general venue provisions of § 1391 do not apply to her case. Instead, as her causes of action arise under the Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act, the venue provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), apply to her claims.

Title VII’s specific venue provision displaces Section 1391’s general venue rules for Title VII claims.

Ikem v. Mondelez International, Inc. · filed 2023-05-10

Title VIT’s “specific venue provision displaces general venue provisions.”

Section 1391’s general venue rules do not control Title VII suits; Title VII’s specific venue provision does.

Velasco v. Haaland · filed 2023-05-19

For Title VII suits, it is the venue provision of Title VII found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), and not the general federal venue statute found at 28 U.S.C. § 1391, that controls.

Section 1391(e)(1)(B)’s general venue rule does not apply when Title VII’s specific venue provision controls.

Podell v. Whitworth · filed 2023-07-31(e)(1)(B)

Given that the Title VII exclusive venue provision applies in this case, not the § 1391 provision, Plaintiff’s reliance on § 1391 is without merit.

Section 1391’s general venue rules do not govern Title VII cases because Title VII has an exclusive venue provision.

Dumas v. Mohawk Field Services, Inc. · filed 2023-11-07

Plaintiff’s Complaint improperly relies on § 1391 to support venue in this Title VII case.

Section 1391’s general venue rules are displaced by Title VII’s specific venue provision for Title VII claims.

Woods v. Louisiana Special School District · filed 2023-12-04

Although defendant does not cite it, “Title VII contains a specific venue provision which displaces the general venue provision set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1391.”

Section 1391(b)’s general venue rule does not govern ADA employment discrimination claims, which use Title VII’s special venue provision.

Morris v. ARTA Travel · filed 2023-11-30(b)

Venue in a civil action is usually governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), but claims under the ADA are governed by the special venue provisions adopted in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

Section 1391’s general venue rules do not govern Title VII actions, which have their own controlling venue provision.

Cheng v. Bureau of Labour Statistics · filed 2024-04-22

“Venue in Title VII cases is governed by Title VII’s own venue provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), rather than the general venue provision found in 28 U.S.C. § 1391.”

Section 1391(e)(1) permits venue where a substantial part of the events occurred or the plaintiff resides, but Title VII’s narrower venue rule controls when the claims primarily concern Title VII discrimination.

Pham v. Garland · filed 2024-07-23(e)(1)

Under the general venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), venue is proper where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred,” or where “the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved.” ... Further, where, as here, the claims primarily concern allegations of discrimination actionable under Title VII, the narrower venue provision within Title VII controls.

Title VII’s specific venue provision governs Title VII claims instead of § 1391’s general venue rules.

Bradford v. Armed Forces Benefit Association · filed 2025-05-02

Here, because only Plaintiff’s Title VII claims remain viable, the Court looks to Title VII’s venue provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), which provides for venue “in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.” See also Harding v. Williams Prop. Co., 163 F.3d 598 (table), 1998 WL 637414 at *2 n.5 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that Title VII’s venue provisions “override” those in 28 U.S.C. § 1391).

Section 1391’s general venue rules do not govern Title VII claims because Title VII has a special venue provision.

Harrison v. Austin · filed 2025-05-05

Title VII claims are subject to a special venue provision that overrides the general venue provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391’s general venue rules do not govern Title VII or ADA claims, which are governed by a specific venue provision.

Rivera v. Sedgwick Claims Management Services · filed 2025-07-07

But Section 1391 has no relevance here; rather, Section 2000e- 5(f)(3) alone governs venue for Title VII and ADA claims.

Section 1391’s general venue rules do not govern ADA or Title VII cases, which have a specific venue provision.

Stallings v. Southwestern Illinois College · filed 2025-08-07

Although venue in civil actions is generally governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391, venue in both Title VII and ADA cases is controlled by the specific provisions set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 1391 does not govern ADA claims covered by the exclusive venue provision in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

GRIECO v. ALACRITY ADJUSTING SOLUTIONS, LLC · filed 2025-09-23

But Grieco’s ADA claims are governed by the exclusive venue provision in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), not Section 1391.

Section 1391 does not determine venue in Title VII cases; Title VII’s special venue provision governs.

Phillips v. Hill · filed 2025-11-04

Venue in a Title VII case is not determined under the general venue statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391; see, e.g., Taylor v. Shinseki, 13 F. Supp. 3d 81, 86 (D.D.C. 2014). Rather, Title VII’s special venue provision governs.

Section 1391(b) does not govern venue in Title VII employment discrimination actions because Title VII has an exclusive venue provision.

Reinauer · filed 2025-11-17(b)

Thus, Reinauer’s reliance on § 1391 to support venue here is inapposite.

Section 1391(b)'s general venue rules do not apply to Title VII claims.

Rajkumar · filed 2026-02-02(b)

And in any event, the general venue statute for civil actions does not apply to Title VII claims.

Section 1391(c)'s general corporate venue rule does not expand the districts permitted by Title VII's specific venue provision.

Stebbins v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1969-05-20(c)

He relies instead on the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (Supp. IV 1965-1968), alleging that Nationwide is licensed to do and doing business in the District. The venue of the right of action here in suit was limited by the statute which created the right.

Section 1391(c)'s general corporate venue rule does not expand the districts available for a Title VII employment discrimination suit because Title VII limits venue to specified districts.

Stebbins v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company et al. · filed 1969-10-27(c)

He relies instead on the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (Supp. IV 1965-1968), alleging that Nationwide is licensed to do and doing business in the District. ... The venue of the right of action here in suit was limited by the statute which created the right.

Section 1391’s general venue rules yield when another statute sets specific limits on where a claim may be brought.

Al-Sammarraie v. Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 2026-04-27(e)

But while § 1391(e) generally governs venue in a “civil action in which a defendant is . . . an agency of the United States,” it applies “except as otherwise provided by law.” ... Here, the CVRA itself provides its own, more stringent limitations on where a motion seeking to enforce rights under the CVRA may be brought, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3), and Al-Sammarraie has failed to allege any facts demonstrating that this provision is satisfied in this District.

Section 1391 supplies the general venue rules for Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Texas Labor Code claims that lack special venue provisions.

Ramirez v. Plains All American GP, LLC · filed 2022-03-01

Thus, the general federal statute of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and the related transfer statute of 28 U.S.C. § 1404 apply to those claims ... as well.

Section 1391(b)’s general venue rule yields when another law provides a venue rule for the claim.

Como v. Commerce Oil Co., Inc. · filed 1985-03-26(b)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides that this action, which claims violations of federal securities law and state law, “may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law.” The critical language of this section is “except as otherwise provided by law.” ... In the instant case, venue is surely proper under the broad venue provisions of the securities laws.

Section 1391(b) permits venue outside the district where all defendants reside or the claim arose when another law authorizes it.

Harvey v. Harvey · filed 1990-10-17(b)

This interpretation of the statute ignores its last clause, which states that venue can be proper in a district other than the one where all defendants reside or the claim arose if “otherwise provided by law.” The court is thus obliged to consider 28 U.S.C. § 1392(a), which allows civil actions to be brought in any district of a state where any of several defendants reside in that same state. This statute allows venue as to Dr. Hunter to be proper in the Middle District of Georgia, where this action was filed.

Section 1391 may be considered alongside the special venue provision for copyright cases when that provision does not clearly supersede the general venue rules.

Waste Distillation Technology, Inc. v. Pan American Resources, Inc. · filed 1991-10-10

The parties have not argued that § 1400 excludes venue consideration under § 1391, the general venue statute. ... Here, both sections are cited in the complaint and it is not apparent that § 1400 supersedes the general venue provisions, either by its terms or effect. Thus, venue under each is considered.

Section 1391(c)’s corporate residence rule applies to other Title 28 venue statutes, including the copyright venue statute.

Milwaukee Concrete Studios, Ltd. v. Fjeld Manufacturing Co. · filed 1992-06-02(c)

Furthermore, the use of the phrase “under this chapter” in § 1391(c) demonstrates that its principle is applicable to all other venue statutes in Title 28 — including § 1400.

Section 1391(e) does not govern venue for a tort claim against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act; § 1402(b) does.

Dicken v. United States · filed 1994-08-31(e)

But while the District of Maryland is indeed one of the judicial districts in which this case may be pursued, venue arises not under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), the statute invoked by plaintiff, but under 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b).

Section 1391 governs venue in federal court except when another law provides a special venue rule.

City of Waco v. Schouten · filed 2005-03-29

There are two types of federal venue statutes: special venue statutes and 28 U.S.C. § 1391. The general venue statute, which governs venue of all claims brought in federal court except where venue is “otherwise provided by law.” See §§ 1391(a) & (b). Special venue provisions are typically intended to control venue of all claims brought under the statutes to which they relate. The Clean Water Act contains a special venue provision.

Section 1391(e)’s general venue rules yield when another law provides a specific venue rule.

Roman-Salgado v. Holder · filed 2010-08-11(e)

As the defendants correctly note, § 1503(a)’s specific venue provision overrides the general venue provisions of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (providing the general rules for venue in federal court and specifying that they control “except as otherwise provided by law”).

Section 1391’s general venue rules do not govern Rehabilitation Act claims; Title VII’s special venue provision controls.

Slaby v. Holder · filed 2012-11-04

Although the complaint asserts jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, see Compl. ¶¶ 1-2, the “proper venue for litigating a Rehabilitation Act claim is determined by the special venue provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).”

Section 1391 generally governs venue for ADEA claims, but a specific venue statute controls when those claims arise from the same core facts as claims governed by that statute.

Swank v. Wolfe · filed 2020-05-04

By contrast, the ADEA does not have its own venue-setting provision, so the general venue-setting statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, applies. ... Thus section 2000e-5(f)(3) applies to all of Swank's claims.

Section 1391's general venue rules do not apply to claims governed by the Carmack Amendment's restrictive venue provision.

Azzil Granite Materials, LLC v. Canadian Pacific Railway Corporation · filed 2020-05-12

Indeed, the Plaintiff asserts that venue is appropriate in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1409 and 1391. ... The special venue provisions of the Carmack Amendment are restrictive, so as to preclude application of the general venue provision. ... As a result, this Court finds that the specific venue provision of 49 U.S.C. § 11706(d)(2)(A) governs this action.

Section 1391’s general venue rules do not apply when another statute supplies its own venue provision.

McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Services, LLC · filed 2020-10-15(a)

Because ERISA has its own venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 does not apply.

Section 1391 supplies venue for an FAA Chapter Two proceeding when the FAA’s venue provision permits additional venues rather than requiring an exclusive forum.

Jones Day v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe · filed 2022-08-01(a)

Rather, § 204 is a permissive, supplemental venue provision in addition to the general venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Neither party argues that the Northern District of California is an improper venue under § 1391. Under § 1391, the Northern District of California is a proper venue because it is Orrick’s principal place of business.

Section 1391(b)'s general venue rules yield when another statute provides the governing venue rule.

Nat'l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Universal Smart Conts., LLC · filed 2026-02-03(b)

To the extent Appellants contend that venue was improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), that argument fails because section 1391 applies “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law.” Section 161(2), not section 1391(b), controls our venue analysis in this case.

Section 1391(b) does not govern venue for securities actions covered by the Securities Exchange Act’s specific venue provision.

Bianco v. Texas Instruments, Inc. · filed 1985-10-11(b)

In addition to the motions to dismiss based on standing, defendants Ball, Fleece and Fox have moved to dismiss the complaint for improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because this is not the district where plaintiffs’ claims arose. Venue in this case, however, is governed by the more liberal venue provision of the 1934 Act, which provides that securities actions may be brought in "the district wherein any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred.” 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.

Section 1391’s general venue provisions do not govern Exchange Act claims; venue for those claims is governed exclusively by 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.

Mazuma Holding Corp. v. Bethke · filed 2014-03-03

With respect to the first step, the venue of an Exchange Act claim is exclusively governed by 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, without regard to the general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391 does not govern venue for Exchange Act claims; 15 U.S.C. § 78aa governs those claims exclusively.

City of Warren Police and Fire Retirement System v. Zebra Technologies Corporation · filed 2019-08-23

With respect to the first part of the inquiry, venue of an Exchange Act claim is exclusively governed by 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, irrespective of the general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a federal question case where the claim arose, even if the defendant resides elsewhere.

United States v. Lulac, Gi Forum and Naacp, Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Appellees v. State of Texas · filed 1986-09-12(b)

The appellants offer us no evidence, however, that the Commissioner of Education resides solely in the Western District ... and we have noted that they say nothing at all about where the claim in this case aróse, a second basis for venue under § 1391(b). Thus, the appellants have not shown that venue was improper and certainly have not shown that their inability to raise this objection in the context of a separate private suit was prejudicial.

In a federal question case, § 1391(b) permits venue where all defendants reside or where the claim arose, absent a statutory exception.

Berger v. King World Productions, Inc. · filed 1990-03-21(b)

Venue is thus determined under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which states in pertinent part that “[a] civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law.” ... Based on the record at this time, the court must find that venue in this matter is proper only in New York, which is where all defendants reside and where the claim arose.

Section 1391(b) governs venue for federal claims without a special venue statute, including § 1981 claims, and permits venue where the claim arose.

Helder v. Hitachi Power Tools, USA Ltd. · filed 1991-06-05(b)

Section 1391(b) makes clear that venue for federal claims are determined by § 1391(b) unless a special venue statute exists and is applicable to the federal claims at issue. ... Thus, the Court concludes that with respect to plaintiffs claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, venue is proper not in the Eastern District of Michigan, but rather in the Western District of Michigan.

Section 1391(b) places venue for a federal question action where the defendants reside, a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, or, if no other district is available, a defendant may be found.

Sani-Dairy v. Yeutter · filed 1991-10-29(b)

Section 1391 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that any civil action brought pursuant to this Court’s federal question jurisdiction must be brought where (1) any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state; (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; or (3) any defendant may be found, if there is not a district in which the action may otherwise be brought. ... Accordingly, the proper venue for this action is New York and not the Western District of Pennsylvania.

Section 1391(e)'s federal officer venue rule applies only to executive branch officers, not bankruptcy court officers.

King v. Russell · filed 1992-05-11(e)

We agree with the Second and Fifth Circuits and conclude that § 1391(e) does not apply here, as the federal defendants are all officers of the bankruptcy court.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a federal civil rights case where the defendants reside, where a substantial part of the events occurred, or, if no other district qualifies, where a defendant may be found.

Brown v. Rochester Super 8 Motel · filed 1995-09-25(b)

Because this case arises out of federal civil rights law, the appropriate venue statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) which mandates that a case not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in (1) a district where any defendant resides if they all reside in the same state; (2) a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim took place; or (3) a district where any defendant may be found, if there is no other district where the ease may be brought.

Section 1391(b) governs venue in federal-question cases, and the plaintiff must establish that the chosen district qualifies under one of its three subdivisions.

Anonymous v. Kaye · filed 1996-12-23(b)

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) is the venue statute applicable to federal question cases. The district court concluded that appellant failed to establish that venue in the Southern District of New York was proper under any of the three subdivisions of § 1391(b). Having reviewed the record, we may not say that this determination constitutes an abuse of discretion.

Section 1391(b) permits a federal question action in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state, or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Solar v. Annetts · filed 2010-03-16(b)

As to the first prong, Solar could have properly filed his action in the Northern District because five Defendants — -all those who remain in this action — reside in the Northern District, and a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim[s] occurred” in the Northern District.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the defendant resides or a substantial part of the events occurred; its personal-jurisdiction option applies only if neither basis is available.

Cooney v. Barry School of Law · filed 2014-01-10(b)

The permissible venue for non-employee claims under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, is determined by the general venue provision for federal question cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). That statute allows venue in either (1) the district of the defendant’s residence; (2) the district where “a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred”; or, (3) if neither of those can be applied, any district where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. This third grant has no applicability because defendant resides in the Middle District of Florida and that is where the events giving rise to this action occurred. Venue is therefore improper in this district.

Section 1391(b) places venue for a federal-question case where a defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Smith v. Unis · filed 2019-07-29(b)

Under the revised venue statute, venue in federal-question cases lies in the district in which any defendant resides or in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... In these circumstances, venue is proper only in the Eastern District.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a federal-question case where a defendant resides or a substantial part of the events occurred; public officials reside where they serve for a suit challenging their official acts.

Dicken 928889 v. Bush · filed 2020-04-21(b)

Under the revised venue statute, venue in federal-question cases lies in the district in which any defendant resides or in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... Defendants “reside” in those counties for purposes of venue over a suit challenging official acts.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a federal-question case where a defendant resides or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Ball v. Streeval · filed 2020-09-15(b)

Under the revised venue statute, venue in federal-question cases lies in the district in which any defendant resides or in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) places venue in a federal-question case where a defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Parker v. Bureau of Prisons · filed 2020-11-10(b)

Under the revised venue statute, venue in federal-question cases lies in the district in which any defendant resides or in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... In these circumstances, venue is proper only in the District of Minnesota.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue for a federal question claim in a district where the defendant’s alleged conduct did not occur and venue is otherwise unsupported.

Scott v. Tonkin · filed 2020-11-25(b)

Venue for Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Keith, however, is not proper in this district.

Section 1391(b) places venue in a federal-question case where a defendant resides or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Johnson 753595 v. Nagy · filed 2021-01-28(b)

Under the revised venue statute, venue in federal-question cases lies in the district in which any defendant resides or in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... In these circumstances, venue is proper only in the Eastern District.

Section 1391(b) governs where a federal question civil action may be brought.

Christian v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole · filed 2021-02-23(b)

Venue for Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants, however, is not proper in this district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) is the venue provision for federal question cases.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Nash 406338 v. Washington · filed 2022-02-03(b)

Under the revised venue statute, venue in federal-question cases lies in the district in which any defendant resides or in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... In these circumstances, venue is proper only in the Eastern District.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a federal-question case where a defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Richardson 361621 v. Fuller · filed 2023-02-27(b)

Under the revised venue statute, venue in federal-question cases lies in the district in which any defendant resides or in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a federal-question case where a defendant resides or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Bonham 680736 v. Laurain · filed 2023-07-03(b)

Under the revised venue statute, venue in federal-question cases lies in the district in which any defendant resides or in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Section 1391(b) places venue in a federal-question case where a defendant resides or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Levitan 859804 v. Maclean · filed 2023-09-26(b)

Under the revised venue statute, venue in federal-question cases lies in the district in which any defendant resides or in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... In these circumstances, venue is proper only in the Eastern District.

Section 1391(b) places venue where a defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Levitan v. Hildreth · filed 2023-09-27(b)

Under the revised venue statute, venue in federal-question cases lies in the district in which any defendant resides or in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... In these circumstances, venue is proper only in the Eastern District.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a federal-question case where a defendant resides or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Tompkins 518783 v. Barber · filed 2023-10-18(b)

Under the revised venue statute, venue in federal-question cases lies in the district in which any defendant resides or in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.