28 U.S.C. § 1391

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a district where the defendants reside.

Unytite, Inc. v. Lohr Structural Fasteners, Inc. · filed 1991-08-01(a)

Venue is proper in the transferee district because defendants reside there. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where all defendants reside when jurisdiction is not based solely on diversity of citizenship.

United States v. Hemmons · filed 1991-09-25(b)

Venue in this district is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), since jurisdiction is not based solely on diversity of citizenship, and all defendants reside in this district.

In a diversity action, venue is proper in the district where the defendant resides.

Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust · filed 1992-01-29(a)(1)

The defendant resides in the District of Colorado. Thus, venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391 makes venue proper in this district where personal jurisdiction over the defendants is uncontested.

Studdard Ex Rel. Studdard v. Connaught Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1992-06-04

There is no allegation that the court does not have personal jurisdiction over defendants, which, under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, makes this District an appropriate venue.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action to be brought where the defendant corporations are headquartered.

Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Palmer Corp. · filed 1992-07-13(a)

Since the defendants in the case at bar are corporations with headquarters in New Jersey, this action could clearly have been brought in the District of New Jersey. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Eastern Marketing Corp. v. Texas Meridian Production Co. · filed 1992-09-09(a)

Having concluded that personal jurisdiction is proper, diversity venue lies, inter alia, where the Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Accordingly, venue is proper in the Southern District of West Virginia.

Section 1391(a)(3) looks to personal jurisdiction over the defendants when the action begins; jurisdiction over a prospective third-party defendant is irrelevant.

Hampton International Communications, Inc. v. Johnson & Hardin Co. · filed 1992-09-09(a)(3)

The question is whether — at the time the action is commenced — the Court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Jurisdiction over a prospective third-party defendant is irrelevant.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where all defendants reside and the claims arose.

Olde Discount Corp. v. Tupman · filed 1992-09-16(b)

Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because all defendants reside in this District and because the claims asserted by plaintiff arose in this District.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state; public officials reside where they perform their official duties.

Pierce v. Coughlin · filed 1992-11-05(b)(1)

Under the first category in § 1391(b), venue would therefore be proper in either the Northern or Southern District.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, or where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Habitat Wallpaper & Blinds, Inc. v. K.T. Scott Ltd. Partnership · filed 1992-12-01(b)

Habitat has allegedly suffered injury in this district, and the defendants have allegedly committed acts in this district that lead to the claimed infringement of Habitat's intellectual property. Therefore, this court has proper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (venue is proper in a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred). Because all defendants reside in Massachusetts, venue is proper in the District of Massachusetts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (venue is proper in a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state) and § 1400(a) (venue proper in copyright suit where defendant resides or can be found).

Section 1391(b) makes venue proper when the defendant resides in the district and the events giving rise to the claims occurred there.

Metro Brokers, Inc. v. Tann · filed 1993-03-01(b)

Because Tann resides in this district and the events giving rise to Metro Brokers' claims occurred in this district venue is proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue where all defendants reside in the same state; the court treated their main offices in the district as establishing residence there.

International Show Car Ass'n v. American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers · filed 1992-10-14(b)(1)

Both ASCAP’s and BMPs main offices are in the Southern District of New York. Therefore, both ASCAP and BMI “reside” in the Southern District of New York and venue is proper.

Section 1391(a) and (c) permits venue in a district where the defendant resides.

Plaza Forty-Eight, Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. · filed 1993-04-05(a), (c)

Venue is proper in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) and (c) because A & P “resides” in this district.

Section 1391(a)(3) permits venue in a district where the defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction when the action began.

Gilbert v. Wilson · filed 1993-05-25(a)(3)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3), a general venue statute, provides that a civil action may be brought in “a judicial district in which the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” Since the court has determined that the Northern District of New York has obtained personal jurisdiction over the defendants, venue is proper here.

Section 1391(a)(3) permits venue in a diversity case where the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Weintraub v. Walt Disney World Co. · filed 1993-06-28(a)(3)

Because the Court has personal jurisdiction over defendant Disney, there is no question that venue was proper, that process was- sufficient, and that the service of process was sufficient. With respect to the question of venue, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), relating to diversity cases, provides that venue is proper in a judicial district: ... (3) where the defendants arc subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.

Section 1391 permits venue where a defendant resides or where the claim arose.

Laflamme v. Gomez · filed 1993-09-13(b)

Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391(a) or (b), venue lies where any defendant resides or where the claim arose. LaFlamme's claim arose in the Eastern District, and the defendants reside in that district. LaFlamme has set forth no facts to indicate that venue is proper in the Northern District.

Section 1391(e) permits multiple plaintiffs to sue a federal officer in a district where one plaintiff resides, even if the others reside elsewhere.

Van Diest v. Conoco, Inc. · filed 1994-03-16(e)

Because not each of the plaintiffs reside in this district, defendant argues venue here is improper. Defendant’s specious argument ignores a long line of federal eases holding otherwise. ... To accept defendant’s narrow reading of the statute would result in an unnecessary multiplicity of lawsuits. This court does not believe Congress intended each and every plaintiff with a cause of action against a governmental officer located in Washington, D.C. to travel to that city to plead his or her case. Such a requirement would exalt the federal officer or employee above the citizens he is bound to serve. In keeping with Exxon, this court determines this action is properly venued.

For this action filed in 1991, § 1391(a)(3) permits venue in a district where the defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction when the action began.

LaCroix v. American Horse Show Ass'n · filed 1994-04-28(a)(3)

Magistrate Judge Hemann determined that venue was proper in this district because this is “a judicial district in which the defendants [were] subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action [was] commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3). ... Therefore, the Court accepts the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation and denies the motion for reconsideration regarding transfer of venue.

For a federal question action, venue is proper where the only nonalien defendant corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction; the corporation resides there for venue purposes, and alien defendants may be sued in any district.

Moellers North America, Inc. v. MSK Covertech, Inc. · filed 1994-07-07(b)(1)

For purposes of venue, a defendant corporation is “deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). “An alien may be sued in any district.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d). Thus, venue is appropriate in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) since the only non-alien is deemed to reside in Michigan.

Section 1391(a)(1) permits venue based on defendants’ residence when all defendants reside in the same state; a corporate defendant’s residence depends on where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Kepler v. ITT Sheraton Corp. · filed 1994-08-11(a)(1)

Because each of the defendants is subject to personal jurisdiction in Michigan, venue is proper pursuant to section 1391(a).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Century Industries, Inc. v. Wenger Corp. · filed 1994-04-21(b)(1)

Whereas we thus have personal jurisdiction over the defendants, they are deemed to reside, and venue properly lies, in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. ... We base our finding on the first, rather than the second, element of Section 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the conduct giving rise to the action occurred or will occur.

Fierro v. Gomez · filed 1994-10-04(b)

Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) since defendants reside in the State of California and a substantial part of the conduct giving rise to this action occurred and will occur in the Northern District of California.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the defendant resides.

Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Southern Machinery Co. · filed 1994-12-16(b)

As defendant Southern Machinery is a resident of Rankin County, Mississippi, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi would have personal jurisdiction over Southern Machinery. Venue would also be proper in that district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(a)(3) requires personal jurisdiction over a defendant for venue under its residual venue rule.

Obermeyer v. Gilliland · filed 1995-01-06(a)(3)

Because Defendant Read is not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court, venue is improper. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3).

Section 1391(a)(1) permits a diversity action in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Snyder v. Madera Broadcasting, Inc. · filed 1995-01-17(a)(1)

The Court concludes that because defendants Madera and Owens are both California residents, the Eastern District of California constitutes a proper place of venue for the trial of this action pursuant to section 1391(a)(1).

Section 1391(a)(3) does not establish venue based on a corporate defendant’s appointment of a statutory service agent when that appointment alone does not establish personal jurisdiction.

Arkwright Mutual Insurance Co. v. Scottsdale Insurance Co. · filed 1995-01-24(a)(3)

This fact alone, however, does not constitute consent to the jurisdiction of this Court. ... Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3) does not confer venue in this Court.

Section 1391(b)(1) does not establish venue based on the United States’ residence because the United States does not reside in any one district.

EDP Medical Computer Systems, Inc. v. United States (In Re EDP Medical Computer Systems, Inc.) · filed 1995-02-23(b)(1)

The United States does not “reside” in any one district, so that § 1391(b)(1) does not apply.

Section 1391(a)(1) permits venue in the district where the defendant resides in a diversity action with one defendant.

College Craft Companies, Ltd. v. Perry · filed 1995-06-08(a)(1)

Second, personal jurisdiction and venue also are proper in the District of Minnesota because Mr. Perry is a Minnesota resident. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1)-(2) permits venue where the defendants reside or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Jones v. City of Buffalo · filed 1995-10-13(b)(1)-(2)

The Plaintiffs claims regarding the actions of New York State Defendants focus on events that took place entirely in New York. Venue for this lawsuit, therefore, is improper in the District of Columbia, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)—(2).

Section 1391(c) permits venue for a corporate defendant in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Banta Corp. v. Hunter Publishing Ltd. Partnership · filed 1995-12-27(c)

As discussed above, Adams is subject to personal jurisdiction in this district. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), venue is proper in a judicial district in which the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction. Therefore, venue of Banta’s claims against Adams is proper in this district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue based on defendants’ residence when they all reside in the same state, or on where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Meyer v. Reno · filed 1996-01-04(b)

Because all of the federal defendants do not reside in the same state, venue cannot lie in this district under § 1391(b)(1). Further, because none of the alleged events or omissions giving rise to the plaintiffs claims took place in the District of Columbia, but rather in Tennessee and/or Florida, venue cannot lie in this district under § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(1) and (c) allow venue based on defendants’ residence, which the court determined through personal jurisdiction.

Brown v. 1995 Tenet ParaAmerica Bicycle Challenge · filed 1996-07-03(b)(1), (c)

Finally, the fact that exercising personal jurisdiction over the USABA, TKA, and the ParaAmerica is appropriate is basis for concluding under the venue statute that Mr. Brown properly sued these defendants in this district.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a)(3) makes venue appropriate in a district where the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction when the action began.

Cruz v. Kentucky Action Park, Inc. · filed 1996-10-28(a)(3)

In a diversity action, such as the present case, venue is appropriate in “a judicial district in which the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3). The determination that this Court does not have jurisdiction over Defendant establishes that this district is an inappropriate venue for this action.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue where the sole corporate defendant resides; under § 1391(c), a corporation resides in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. · filed 1997-01-16(b)(1)

Dot Com is the only defendant in this case and it is a corporation. Thus, under the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), our previous discussion of personal jurisdiction is dispositive of the venue issue.

Section 1391(a)(3) permits venue in a diversity action in a district where the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Greenberg v. Greenberg · filed 1997-02-14(a)(3)

Venue of this action is proper in Colorado based on my ruling that defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in the District of Colorado. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3).

Section 1391 permits venue in the judicial district where the defendant resides or where the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.

United States v. Knudson · filed 1997-04-08(a)-(b)

In order for venue to be proper, the claim must be brought in the judicial district where Defendant resides or where the conduct giving rise to the cause of action occurred. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a)-(b). Defendant clearly resides in Hastings, Nebraska, which sits in the judicial district for the District of Nebraska. Further, Defendant filed the “Claim of Commercial Lien and Affidavit” in Clay County, Nebraska, which is within the judicial district of Nebraska. It is the recording of this so-called “Claim of Commercial Lien and Affidavit” that is the subject of this cause of action. Plaintiff has properly filed suit in the District Court for the District of Nebraska. Therefore, I hold that venue is proper.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides when all defendants reside in the same state.

Carillo v. Darden · filed 1998-02-06(b)(1)

Venue in this case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). In pertinent part, § 1391(b) provides that venue is proper in “a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). ... Thus, the Northern District is a proper venue in this case.

In a diversity action, § 1391 permits venue where a defendant resides and treats a corporation as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Owens v. Blue Tee Corp. · filed 1998-02-10(a), (c)

The court finds that although venue is proper, Mid-America’s claims constitute compulsory counterclaims to the prior Oklahoma action and therefore should be dismissed. ... “[A] defendant corporation is deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). ... Here, neither party argues or presents evidence that defendant corporation, Gefco, does not “reside” within the state of Alabama. In fact, Gefco has admitted that this court has personal jurisdiction over it.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides when all defendants reside in the same state.

Jones v. McAndrew · filed 1998-02-20(b)

Venue in this district is proper, however, for a § 1983 action, because two of the defendants, Mr. Singletary and Mr. Butterworth, reside in this district, and all deféndants reside in this state.

Section 1391(b) permits a nondiversity civil action in a district where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

National Paintball Supply, Inc. v. Cossio · filed 1998-03-12(b)

Clearly, under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), this action could have just as easily have been commenced in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California as it was commenced in this Court. We thus find that the Southern District of California is a proper venue.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides when all defendants reside in the same state.

XR Co. v. Block & Balestri, P.C. · filed 1999-03-24(a)(1)

Because the Block defendants reside in Dallas, Texas, the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, is a proper alternative venue for this action.

Section 1391(a)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides when all defendants reside in the same state.

Boyd v. Snyder · filed 1999-04-13(a)(1)

Venue is proper in the Northern District of Illinois under § 1391(a)(1) because two of the defendants reside in this district and all defendants reside in Illinois. Venue is also proper in the Southern District of Illinois under § 1391(a)(1) because four of the defendants reside there.

Section 1391(b) permits venue based on defendants’ residence or where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Folkes v. Haley · filed 1999-05-28(b)(1), (b)(2)

Here, because Defendants Warden Johnson and Officer Davis reside in the Southern District of Alabama, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs claims occurred at the Fountain Correctional Facility, located in the Southern District of Alabama, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), the court finds that this case originally could have been filed in the Southern District of Alabama, the transferee venue.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the corporate defendant is incorporated and has its principal place of business.

CoolSavings. Com., Inc. v. IQ. Commerce Corp. · filed 1999-06-10(b)

Venue is also proper in the Northern District of California, since that is IQ’s place of incorporation and principal place of business.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a federal official sued in her official capacity is deemed to reside.

Vencor Nursing Centers, L.P. v. Shalala · filed 1999-07-08(b)

Under § 1391(b), venue is proper in this District, as the Secretary is deemed to reside here when she is sued in her official capacity.

Section 1391(a)(1) and (a)(2) allow venue where all defendants reside in the same state or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Houston Trial Reports, Inc. v. LRP Publications, Inc. · filed 1999-08-31(a)(1), (a)(2)

The Southern District of Florida is such a district because it would be a proper venue for the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and it has personal jurisdiction over both defendants. Venue would be proper there under § 1391(a)(1) and (a)(2).

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a defendant resides.

LaRouche v. Fowler · filed 1999-11-01(b)

The complaint makes allegations which satisfy the general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1994). For example, the fact that the defendant DNC is a resident of the District of Columbia makes venue in this court proper.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where defendants reside.

Amazon. Com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble. Com, Inc. · filed 1999-12-01(b), (c)

Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) and 1400(b) because Defendants reside here (28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides when all defendants reside in the same state.

McGrath v. Johnson · filed 1999-09-24(b)(1)

Thus, if all the defendants to an action reside in the same state, then “the district of residence of any one of them ... is a proper venue.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (commentary on the 1998 and 1990 revisions of Section 1391). Here, all the defendants reside in Pennsylvania and the Mahanoy defendants reside in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Thus, venue is proper.

Section 1391(a)(1) permits venue in a judicial district where the defendant resides.

Grand Kensington, LLC v. Burger King Corp. · filed 2000-02-01(a)(1)

Initially, the Court finds that this action could have been brought in the Southern District of Florida because it is a judicial district in which defendant resides.

In a nondiversity civil action, § 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Federal Trade Commission v. Five-Star Auto Club, Inc. · filed 2000-05-17(b)(1)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), a civil action not founded on diversity of citizenship may be brought in a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state. For purposes of venue, a corporate defendant is “deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). ... The individual Defendants reside in this District and the corporate Defendant’s principal place of business was in this District. ... Venue is proper in this District.

Section 1391(a)(1) permits venue in a district where the defendants are incorporated.

Kalamazoo Realty Venture Ltd. Partnership v. Blockbuster Entertainment Corp. · filed 2000-07-06(a)(1)

Venue is also proper in the requested transferee district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1), because defendants are incorporated in Delaware.

Section 1391(a)(3) permits venue based on a defendant’s personal jurisdiction only when no other district is available.

Syed v. Housel · filed 2000-07-20(a)(3)

Secondly, as noted above, Plaintiffs do not have personal jurisdiction over Defendant and the District of Con ... necticut is not the only district in which this action could have been brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3).

Section 1391(b)-(c) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred and the defendants are located.

Federal Trade Commission v. Think Achievement Corp. · filed 2000-09-29(b)-(c)

Because a substantial part of the events and conduct giving rise to this claim occurred in this District and because the Defendants are located in Merrillville and Crown Point, Indiana, venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)-(c).

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state, and treats a corporate defendant subject to personal jurisdiction in a district as a resident there.

DeLoach v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. · filed 2000-11-30(b)(1), (c)

The present suit is based on federal question jurisdiction, see Compl. ¶ 2, and therefore may be brought in “a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). ... Accordingly, “all defendants” i'eside in North Carolina, and venue is proper in the Middle District of that state.

In a diversity action, venue is proper under § 1391(a)(1) where all corporate defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in the district and therefore reside there under § 1391(c).

Divicino v. Polaris Industries · filed 2001-01-25(a)(1), (c)

On this basis, the Court concludes that Polaris, like CVM, resides in Connecticut because it is subject to personal jurisdiction here pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. § 33-929(f)(3). Accordingly, because both defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in Connecticut, venue is proper here pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue based on a defendant’s residence only if all defendants reside in the same state.

Abrams Shell v. Shell Oil Co. · filed 2001-09-18(b)(1)

This is because, contrary to Plaintiffs’ arguments, not all of the named Defendants “reside,” for purposes of venue, here in the State of California.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a substantial portion of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Pharmacia Corp. v. Alcon Laboratories, Inc. · filed 2002-05-14(b)

A substantial portion of the events giving rise to plaintiffs’ claims and Aleon’s defenses occurred in this District. Venue is proper, therefore, in this District. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(a)(1) permits a diversity action in a district where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Reach & Associates, P.C. v. Dencer · filed 2003-06-19(a)(1)

Based on these assertions, the Court concludes that venue is proper against the remaining Defendants in this district because all of them reside in the same state, Delaware.

In a diversity case, venue is proper where the sole remaining defendant resides; under § 1391(c), a corporate defendant resides in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

LaSalle Bank N.A. v. Mobile Hotel Properties, LLC · filed 2003-08-01(a)(1), (c)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), “... a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” There is no dispute over the fact that this court has in personam jurisdiction over Mobile Hotel. Thus, venue is proper in this district.

Section 1391 permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred and treats a corporation as residing in a district where its contacts support personal jurisdiction.

New York Access Billing, LLC v. ATX Communications, Inc. · filed 2003-10-21

According to the billing summary of interstate and intrastate charges, the defendants incurred a substantial amount of charges in New York, second only to Pennsylvania. ... Venue in the Northern District of New York is therefore proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... It has been established that the defendants had sufficient contact with the state of New York to withstand the due process analysis thereby making them subject to personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of New York. Venue pursuant to § 1391(c) is therefore proper.

Section 1391(e)(3) permits a suit against a federal officer in a district where any one plaintiff resides.

AJ Taft Coal Co., Inc. v. Barnhart · filed 2003-11-14(e)(3)

This court concludes that under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(3), a suit can be brought in any district in which a single plaintiff resides.

Section 1391 does not permit venue based solely on a plaintiff’s residence.

Iannello v. Busch Entertainment Corp. · filed 2004-01-27

Although 28 U.S.C. § 1391 formerly permitted venue in “the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside,” that section has been amended to eliminate venue, based on plaintiffs’ residence.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits a nondiversity civil action in a district where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Lawman Armor Corp. v. Simon · filed 2004-05-07(b)(1)

Based on the evidence that defendant resides in Grosse Point Woods, Michigan, venue is proper in the Eastern District of Michigan under Section 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(e) permits a suit against a federal agency in the district where the plaintiff resides.

Randolph v. Barnhart · filed 2004-09-13(e)

While her appeal to the Appeals Council was pending, Randolph moved from Louisiana to Nebraska. Nebraska is thus a proper forum for this suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (detailing venue requirements for suits brought against federal agencies).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a federal-question case where the defendant maintains a regional office.

Bailey v. Union Pacific Railroad · filed 2005-04-06(b)

Venue is proper in Colorado pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) due to federal question jurisdiction and the regional office maintained here by defendant.

Section 1391(b)(1) and (b)(2) permit venue where the defendant is located and the alleged fraud occurred.

Saltire Industrial, Inc. v. Waller Lansden Dortch & Davis, PLLC · filed 2005-09-12(b)(1), (b)(2)

This cause of action originally could have been brought in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, because venue would have been proper there. The defendant is located there, and the plaintiffs contend that the alleged fraud occurred in that District in papers presented by Waller Lansden in the District Court in the Middle District of Tennessee. Therefore, venue was proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(1) and (b)(2).

In a diversity case, § 1391(a)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Algodonera De Las Cabezas, S.A. v. American Suisse Capital, Inc. · filed 2005-12-19(a)(1)

Accordingly, both defendants were “residents” of the Southern District of Florida, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Venue was thus proper in the Southern District within the meaning of § 1391(a)(1).

Section 1391(a) permits venue where the defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Cormier v. Fisher · filed 2005-12-21(a)(1), (a)(2)

As for venue, again either district would be appropriate. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) Georgia would be proper as a district where the defendant resides and under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2), Virginia would be proper as a district in which a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Section 1391(e)(3) permits venue where the plaintiff resides in an action against federal officials if no real property is involved.

Raduga USA Corp. v. United States Department of State · filed 2006-03-03(e)(3)

Plaintiff Raduga USA is a California corporation with its office located in San Diego. ... No real property is involved in this action. As such, venue is proper under § 1391(e).

Section 1391(a)(1) permits venue in a diversity action where both defendants have their principal places of business.

Perceptron, Inc. v. Silicon Video, Inc. · filed 2006-03-29(a)(1)

In this case, the action could have been brought in the Northern District of New York because it is the principal place of business of both Defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1).

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action when a forum-selection clause subjects the defendant to personal jurisdiction in the chosen district.

Beatie and Osborn LLP v. Patriot Scientific Corp. · filed 2006-05-09(a)(3)

As discussed above, Patriot has made itself subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Court by virtue of the forum-selection clause. Therefore, by operation of § 1391, venue is proper.

Section 1391(e)(1) permits venue in the district where a federal officer sued in an official capacity maintains an official residence.

Schreiber v. Kohn · filed 2006-06-12(e)(1)

Under this standard, venue is not improper in the District of Columbia, as the sole named defendant maintains his official residence in Washington.

Section 1391(a)(1) permits venue where defendants reside, and subsection (a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Iron Mountain Information Management, Inc. v. Taddeo · filed 2006-06-30(a)(1), (a)(2)

Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) and (a)(2) because the defendants reside in this District and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in this District.

Section 1391(e)(3) permits venue in a suit against a federal agency where the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved.

Ballanger v. Johanns · filed 2006-09-15(e)(3)

Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because the Plaintiff resides in the Southern District of Iowa and no real property is involved.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state and jurisdiction is not based solely on diversity of citizenship.

JTH Tax, Inc. v. Lee · filed 2007-04-02(b)(1)

Venue is proper in a civil action, where jurisdiction is not based solely on diversity of citizenship, in any “judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). Because the parties acknowledge that Lee resides in Illinois and is thus subject to personal jurisdiction therein, this court finds that there is no question that JTH could have originally filed this action in Illinois. Accordingly, this court finds that venue would be proper in the Central District of Illinois and that this action meets the initial eligibility criteria for transfer set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Equal Rights Center v. Equity Residential · filed 2007-04-13(b)(1)

In other words, defendants having nowhere challenged personal jurisdiction in this forum, plaintiff has established proper venue pursuant to under § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b) makes the defendant’s residence relevant to whether a district is a proper venue.

Aaron Fine Arts v. O'Brien · filed 2007-06-26(b)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) venue would not be proper in the Central District of California, where the California Suit is pending, because O’Brien resides in Petaluma, California, which is not located in the Central District. Accordingly, the Court will not transfer the case to that district.

In a diversity case, venue is proper under § 1391(a)(1) when all defendants are deemed to reside in the district because they are subject to personal jurisdiction there.

JOHNSEN, FRETTY & CO., LLC v. Lands South, LLC · filed 2007-12-06(a)(1)

Because the court has found that venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1), the court need not analyze the Defendants second and third arguments, which discuss § 1391(a)(2) and § 1391(a)(3).

Section 1391(e)(3) permits venue where the plaintiff resided when the action was filed; a prisoner's residence generally is the place of domicile immediately before incarceration.

Keys v. Department of Justice · filed 2008-08-05(e)(3)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(3), venue in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was proper if Keys resided in Philadelphia at the time he filed the action. At that time, Keys was imprisoned within the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Prisoners, however, generally are deemed to be residents, not of their place of incarceration, but of their place of domicile immediately before their incarceration.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state; subsection (c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

L'Athene, Inc. v. EARTHSPRING LLC · filed 2008-08-07(b)(1)

Subsection 1391(b)(1) states that venue is proper in the “judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State.” For the purposes of venue, a defendant “that is a corporation ... reside[s] in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. 1391(c). Since personal jurisdiction is proper over defendants, venue is also proper.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where a corporate defendant is headquartered.

ESPN, Inc. v. Quiksilver, Inc. · filed 2008-09-15(b)(1)-(2)

Quik-silver’s Huntington Beach, California, headquarters are located in the Central District of California. Thus, Quiksilver is clearly subject to personal jurisdiction in California, and venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(l)-(2).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides, including a corporation’s principal place of business.

Turnley v. Banc of America Investment Services, Inc. · filed 2008-09-17(b)

The fact that BAI has its principal place of business in Massachusetts qualifies under § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides when all defendants reside in the same state.

Fowlkes v. Rodriguez · filed 2008-11-07(b)(1)

Section 1391(b), the relevant venue provision for an action under § 1983 provides: ... The defendants remaining in this action are the County Defendants and DCJS Defendants, other than Mr. Steinhardt and Ms. Szady, all of whom reside in the Northern District of New York.

Section 1391(e) supports venue in the district where a plaintiff resides in a suit against federal officials.

Ruiz v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-12(e)

As Petitioners are residents of Connecticut, the most appropriate district court is the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides when all defendants reside in the same state.

Sullivan v. Tribley · filed 2009-02-18(b)

Venue was proper in this district since it was “a judicial district where any defendant resides” and “all defendants reside[d] in the same State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Demery v. Montgomery County, Maryland · filed 2009-03-18(b)

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Here, Montgomery County is a chartered county of the State of Maryland and Fumagalli resides in Maryland. (See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Change Venue at 4.) Therefore, this action could have been brought in the potential transferee district.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in the district where a plaintiff resides when the action involves no real property.

Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service · filed 2009-06-08(e)

Venue is proper in this district because plaintiffs Sierra Club and Center for Biological Diversity reside here and no real property is involved in the action.

Section 1391(a)(1) permits a diversity action to be brought in a judicial district where a defendant resides.

World Energy Alternatives, LLC v. Settlemyre Industries, Inc. · filed 2009-11-16(a)(1)

In a civil action founded on diversity of citizenship, jurisdiction is proper in any judicial district where a defendant resides. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1). Settlemyre is an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in Clinton County, Ohio. Accordingly, the action could have been brought in the Southern District of Ohio.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the property at issue is situated in a suit against a federal agency.

National Association of Home Builders v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency · filed 2009-12-30(e)

Venue is appropriate where “a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). As noted in Part II supra, the reaches of the Santa Cruz River at issue are located exclusively in Arizona. See Compl. ¶ 1.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in a suit against a federal agency or officer in a district where a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

New Hope Power Co. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers · filed 2010-07-20(e)

Here, venue is proper in the Southern District of Florida in part because plaintiffs’ property, the Mill Lot, is located in Palm Beach County, which is within the Southern District of Florida.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where a defendant’s headquarters gives the court personal jurisdiction over it.

Roling v. E TRADE SECURITIES, LLC · filed 2010-11-22

Further, because E*Trade’s corporate headquarters are located within the Southern District of New York, that court has personal jurisdiction over E*Trade and venue would therefore be proper there. 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Accordingly, this action could have been brought in the Southern District of New York.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Pension Advisory Group, Ltd. v. COUNTRY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY · filed 2011-02-11(a)(1)

As an initial matter, Defendants are correct that the Central District of Illinois is a district “in which the claim could have been filed,” ... in light of Defendants’ undisputed residency within that District. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) (“A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State.”).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a judicial district where any defendant resides.

Spaeth v. Michigan State University College of Law · filed 2012-02-17(b)(1)

As applicable here, venue is proper in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1); see Diersen v. Walker, No. 99-5389, 2000 WL 274238, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 2, 2000) (citing Rebar v. Marsh, 959 F.2d 216, 219 (11th Cir. 1992) (applying 28 U.S.C. § 1391 to ADEA claims)).

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where no defendant is alleged to reside and the alleged events have no connection to that district.

Day v. City of Galveston · filed 2012-05-11(b)

First, Day’s complaint makes it abundantly clear that there is no conceivable basis for venue in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania because none of the defendants is alleged to reside there and because his allegations are not related in any way to that District. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits a civil action in a district where the sole defendant resides.

Intersport, Inc. v. T-Town Tickets LLC · filed 2012-09-12(b)(1)

Defendant omits the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) which provides that a civil action may be brought in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). Under this provision, the Northern District of Alabama is a proper venue because defendant, the only defendant to this action, “resides” within this district.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in the district where a petitioner resides for a suit seeking review of a federal agency’s visa-petition decision.

Zamora v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-09-25(e)

As the record reflects that Zamora is a resident of Houston, Texas, the most appropriate district court is the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

Section 1391(b)(1) makes defendants’ residence relevant to whether venue is proper in a district.

Operation: Heroes, Ltd. v. Procter & Gamble Productions, Inc. · filed 2012-10-11(b)(1)

Because P & G Defendants reside in Cincinnati, Ohio, venue would be proper there. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Andrews v. A.C. Roman & Associates, Inc. · filed 2012-12-20(b)(1)

There is no dispute that the action could have been brought in the Eastern District of New York based on Defendants’ residence there. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), (2) and (d).

Section 1391(e)(1)(C) permits venue in a suit against a federal officer where a plaintiff resides, if no real property is involved; one plaintiff’s residence makes venue proper for all plaintiffs.

Crane v. Napolitano · filed 2013-01-24(e)(1)(C)

Because Plaintiff Engle resides in the Northern District of Texas, venue is proper in this district as to all plaintiffs.

Section 1391(b)(1)-(2) permits venue where the defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Wing Spot Chicken & Waffles, Inc. · filed 2013-01-30(b)(1)-(2)

Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b)(l)-(2) because the defendant restaurant resides in Hampton, Virginia, which is within the Eastern District of Virginia, and substantially all of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in this district.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Rush v. Fischer · filed 2013-02-14(b)(1)

With respect to the first part, a civil action may be brought in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). ... Because defendants Can-field, Gorge, and Oaks reside in the Western District of New York 'and the other defendants reside in the State of New York, venue would have been proper in the Western District of New York.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state, and (b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

APR, LLC v. American Aircraft Sales, Inc. · filed 2013-02-19(b)(1), (b)(2)

Venue is proper pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) and (2), which state that a civil action may be brought in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district if located” or “in a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” American Aircraft is a Florida corporation and has offices only in Florida; Tolbert is a resident of Florida. Moreover, the aircraft at issue was located, inspected, and delivered in Florida. Therefore, the Middle District of Florida is a proper venue for this action.

Section 1391(b) permits venue based on residence or where the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Pu v. Columbia College Chicago · filed 2013-03-20(b)(1), (b)(2)

Venue is appropriate in this district because all parties resides in this district and the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in the district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in that state, or where a substantial part of the events or property at issue is located.

Clemons v. WPRJ, LLC · filed 2013-01-28(b)

Both the first two prongs of the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), are met by the destination forum: all Defendants reside in the Phoenix area and a substantial part of the events or omissions in dispute occurred in, and all of the property at issue is located in, Arizona. The Southern District of Texas does not satisfy either prong of § 1391(b).

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action to be brought in a district where a defendant resides when all defendants reside in the same state.

Gutierrez v. Caddell Construction Co., Inc. · filed 2013-08-22(a)

The Middle District of Alabama,4 where Caddell has its principal place of business and where Caddell is incorporated, could have exercised jurisdiction at the time this action was filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (“A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded . . . on diversity of citizenship may . . . be brought in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . .; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought . . ., any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.”).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue when all defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum state.

Bank of America, N.A. v. Wilmington Trust FSB · filed 2013-05-03(b)(1)

Therefore, the Court finds that, because all defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in New York, Section 1391(b)(1) is satisfied.

Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) permits venue where the defendant resides and the property at issue is located.

Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. Ott · filed 2013-10-28(b)(1) and (2)

Finally, venue is appropriate in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) and (2) because Ott presently resides and the property that is the subject of this suit is located in the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division.

When there is only one defendant, § 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where that defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Weiner v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation · filed 2013-11-20(b)(1), (c)(2)

Venue and jurisdiction are proper in both the Southern District of New York and this district. Novartis is the only defendant, so venue is proper in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(1), (c)(2).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the judicial district where a single defendant resides.

United States ex rel. Price v. Peters · filed 2013-12-18(b)

Venue is proper in the Central District of Illinois, Springfield Division, because Defendant resides in this judicial district and division. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a judicial district where a defendant resides when all defendants reside in the same state.

Shaheen v. Smith · filed 2013-11-13(b)(1)

Venue for this action is proper in “a judicial district where any defendant resides,” or “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred,” or “if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought . . . any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)-(3). The defendant Charles J. Smith lives, resides, and does business in Reno, Nevada. Compl. ¶ 6. The defendant company “How2GoPublic.com” is organized under the laws of Nevada, with its principal place of business in Nevada. Compl. ¶ 5. Therefore, the District of Nevada district court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants, and that is where venue is proper.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in the district where a sole defendant resides, and § 1391(c)(2) treats an entity as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Evanston Insurance v. Western Community Insurance · filed 2014-03-31(b)(1)

However, because the propriety of venue under § 1391(b)(1) turns on whether the Court can permissibly exercise personal jurisdiction over Western in this specific matter, the personal jurisdiction analysis and the venue analysis effectively collapse into a single inquiry. Because the Court has already concluded that personal jurisdiction in Nevada is proper, venue is therefore also proper.

Section 1391(c)(3) permits a defendant who does not reside in the United States to be sued in any judicial district, while § 1391(c)(2) permits venue over an entity in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

USHA Holdings, LLC v. Franchise India Holdings Ltd. · filed 2014-03-27(c)(2), (c)(3)

The court also notes that venue is also proper in the Eastern District of New York because Marya, as a defendant not resident in the United States, may be sued in any judicial district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3), and Franchise India and FAPL may be sued in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) because this court has determined it has personal jurisdiction over them.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue based on a defendant’s residence only if all defendants reside in the state containing the district.

Rudolph v. HR Specialist, Inc. · filed 2014-04-11(b)(1)

Defendants acknowledge, and the court agrees, that venue is not proper in Delaware. Not all defendants are resident of Delaware.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits a civil action against a sole defendant in a judicial district where that defendant resides.

Hausfeld v. Love Funding Corp. · filed 2014-04-18(b)(1)

It is undisputed that venue would be proper in the District of Columbia. The general venue provision provides that a civil action may be brought in a judicial district in which any defendant resides. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). Defendant is a corporate resident of the District of Columbia.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits a civil action in a district where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in that state.

BioVeris Corp. v. Wohlstadter · filed 2014-06-11(b)(1)

In the absence of any such clause, it is clear that venue is proper in this court since Mr. Wohlstadter is a resident of Madison County, Virginia, within this district and division.

Section 1391 permits a civil action in a district where a defendant resides and treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Saunders v. USSA Life Insurance · filed 2014-10-17(b)(1), (c)(2)

As to whether this action could have been brought in the Western District of Texas, Defendant has demonstrated that it is a Texas corporation with its principal place of business in San Antonio. Plaintiffs do not argue otherwise. Thus, the court finds that Defendant has met its burden on this level of the analysis.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Ross v. Davis · filed 2014-11-21(b)(1)

In addition, both Defendants are from California, and Davis resides in San Francisco, making venue proper in the Northern District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391 permits venue where an entity defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Matos v. Seton Hall University · filed 2015-05-04(b)(1), (c)(2)

Seton Hall’s assertion that venue is improper fails. “A civil action may be brought in a judicial district in which any defendant resides,” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), and “an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued in its common name ... shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). Because Seton Hall is subject to this Court’s personal jurisdiction, venue is proper.

Section 1391 permits a civil action in a district where the defendant resides; an entity resides in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Le v. Zuffa, LLC · filed 2015-06-02(b)(1), (c)(2)

As the Complaints reveal, Defendant is a Nevada limited liability company headquartered in Las Vegas and is therefore subject to suit in that district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), (2), (c)(2) (designating that a civil action may be brought in "a judicial district in which any defendant resides” or “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred,” and specifying that, for venue purposes, a corporation shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction.”).

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where a defendant entity is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Sturm, Ruger v. Armscor, et al. · filed 2015-07-28(b)(1), (c)(2)

While plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that venue is proper when challenged by a defendant, see Johnson v. Gen. Dynamics Info. Tech., Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d 236, 239 (D.N.H. 2009), in this case, plaintiff carried that burden by making a prima facie showing that the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in this district. ... Thus, the court concludes that venue is proper in the District of New Hampshire.

Section 1391 allows a court to consider a defendant’s residence when determining whether venue is proper in a proposed transferee district.

Seneca Companies v. Becker · filed 2015-09-17(b)(1)

Seneca has alleged Becker violated CFAA, a federal statute, which can be brought in any district court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”), and Becker is a citizen of Minnesota, making venue proper in the District of Minnesota, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (“A civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides ... ”). Accordingly, Seneca could have brought suit in the District of Minnesota.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where the defendant resides.

Oceana Capitol Group Ltd. v. Red Giant Entertainment, Inc. · filed 2015-12-17(b)(1)

Since Defendant is a Nevada corporation, venue lies in. this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(a)(1) supports venue in a district where all plaintiffs and defendants reside.

Beam v. Western Wayne School District · filed 2016-02-24(a)(1)

Venue is appropriate in the Middle District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) because all plaintiffs and defendants reside within this state and within this judicial district.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where the defendant corporation has its headquarters.

Chapel Investments, Inc. v. Cherubim Interests, Inc. · filed 2016-04-14(b)(1)

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) because Defendant’s headquarters is within this district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the defendant resides.

Selective Way Insurance Co. v. Glasstech, Inc. · filed 2016-05-17(b)

In connection with a Section 1404(a) motion, the Court must determine, at the outset, whether the proposed alternative forum (here, Ohio) constitutes a venue where the action could originally have been brought. In this case, though, the inquiry proves relatively straightforward, because Glasstech resides in Ohio, and the contractual backdrop for this litigation occurred in exchanges between an individual housed in Ohio and one in New Jersey. Thus, this action could originally have been brought in Ohio. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue where the sole defendant resides; under § 1391(c)(2), an entity resides where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Resource Associates Grant Writing & Evaluation Services, Inc. v. Southampton Union Free School District · filed 2016-06-15(b)(1)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue would be proper in the Eastern District of New York, because it is “a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). Southampton Union is the only defendant in this case, and it “resides” in the Eastern District of New York, because it “is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question .... ” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a judicial district where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in that state.

Photographic Illustrators Corp. v. A.W. Graham Lumber, LLC · filed 2016-06-27(b)(1)

Defendant is a resident of Kentucky, so personal jurisdiction and venue would also have been appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) (“A civil action may be brought in a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.”).

Section 1391(e) supports venue where the detention facility’s warden is a proper respondent to an immigration habeas petition.

Jarpa v. Mumford · filed 2016-09-30(e)

What is more, given Respondent Mumford, as Warden of the Worchester County Detention Center, is a proper party, venue in this Court is proper on that basis alone.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where the defendant resides.

E.E. ex rel. Epsey v. Eagle's Nest Foundation · filed 2016-07-29(b)(1)

Because venue and personal jurisdiction are proper over Defendant in that district and division, the Court transfers Plaintiffs case to the Western District of North Carolina, Asheville Division. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1); N.C.G.S.§ 1-75.4(1)(d).

Section 1391(b) permits venue based on defendants’ residence or where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to a claim occurred.

Malnes v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Ag · filed 2016-12-22(b)(1), (b)(2)

Dismissal of Malnes’ action was proper because venue in the District of Arizona was improper. Malnes has not established that all defendants are residents of Arizona or that “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to [his] claim[s]” occurred in Arizona. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) & (2) (describing where a civil action may be brought).

Section 1391 permits venue where an entity defendant resides, including a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Zaletel v. Prisma Labs, Inc. · filed 2016-12-22(b)(1), (c)

And because defendant is subject to general personal jurisdiction in Delaware, venue is proper there.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits a civil action to be brought in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Smith v. Yeager · filed 2017-01-13(b)(1)

There is no dispute that this case could have been brought in the Eastern District of Virginia, as the plaintiffs are residents of New York and all of the defendants reside in Virginia, Compl. ¶¶ 2–7, where the proposed transferee court, the Eastern District of Virginia, is located, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) (“A civil action may be brought in . . . a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.”).

Section 1391(b)(1) does not permit venue based on defendants’ residence when a defendant does not reside in the forum state.

Stryker Sales Corp. v. Zimmer Biomet, Inc. · filed 2017-02-01(b)(1)

Thus, because defendant Tragus does not “reside” in Michigan, venue for this action is improper in the Western District of Michigan, ... and this court must apply the substantive law of California.

Section 1391(e)(1) permits venue where a federal agency or official defendant resides, even when the events giving rise to the claim occurred elsewhere.

Bourdon v. United States Department of Homeland Security · filed 2017-02-16(e)(1)

Defendants may rightfully argue that the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Florida, but that does not detract from the plain statutory basis for venue in the District of Columbia based on the residence of several of the Defendants. Venue is technically valid in this District.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits a civil action in the district where its sole defendant resides.

ARRIS Group Inc. v. Mobile Telecommunications Technologies, LLC · filed 2017-03-20(b)(1)

Here, ARRIS filed its Complaint in the District in which MTel is organized and exists as a legal entity and, therefore, resides. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). Hence, venue is proper.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in that state.

Enigma Software Group USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes Inc. · filed 2017-05-12(b)(1)

Because Malwarebytes resides in the Northern District of California, venue is proper there.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where the defendants reside.

Unlimited Technology, Inc. v. Leighton · filed 2017-07-19(b)(1)

This action could have been brought in the Northern District of Georgia. Leighton resides there and his related companies which are also defendants are located in that district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) (in diversity case, venue proper where defendant resides).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in that district's state.

Ragner Tech. Corp. v. Berardi · filed 2018-02-07(b)(1)

According to the Second Amended Complaint, the Berardi Defendants reside in Florida. Accordingly, § 1391(b)(1) does not provide for venue in the District of New Jersey.

Section 1391 permits venue where the defendants have their principal places of business in the district.

Neft v. United Cont'l Holdings, Inc. · filed 2018-03-05

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because Defendants have their principal places of business in this district.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the defendants have their principal places of business.

Neft v. United Continental Holdings, Inc. · filed 2018-03-05

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because Defendants have their principal places of business in this district.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Brinson v. Lashbrook · filed 2018-03-12(b)(1)

Because the Court denies the motion to sever and because other defendants reside in this district, however, venue in this district is appropriate.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides when all defendants reside in the same state.

Colon-Perez v. Metan Marine · filed 2018-04-04(b)(1)

Venue in the District of Massachusetts is also proper under the general venue statute 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) given that both defendants reside in Massachusetts.

Section 1391(e)(1)(C) permits a suit against the federal government in a district where a plaintiff resides.

Stewart v. Hargan · filed 2018-04-10(e)(1)(C)

They easily clear this hurdle, as venue in a suit against the federal government will lie in any district in which a plaintiff resides. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(C); Gardner v. Mabus, 49 F. Supp. 3d 44, 47 (D.D.C. 2014). Here, several Plaintiffs reside in the area served by the Frankfort Docket of the Eastern District of Kentucky.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue where a defendant resides when all defendants reside in the same state.

Beall v. Edwards Lifesciences LLC · filed 2018-04-26(b)(1)

The Court agrees that the Central District of California is an appropriate venue because Edwards "resides" there.

Section 1391(e)(1)(C) permits a suit against the federal government in a district where a plaintiff resides.

Center for Biological Diversity v. Ross · filed 2018-05-10(e)(1)(C)

Under the general venue statute, venue in a suit against the federal government will lie in any district in which a plaintiff resides.