28 U.S.C. § 1367

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to dismiss supplemental state law claims without prejudice after resolving the federal claims.

M. Ashley Dickerson, AKA Mahala Ashley Dickerson William F. Bocast William Andrew Mary Andrew v. Duke Williams Jean Will · filed 1994-07-22(c)

The district court properly invoked 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(c) to dismiss plaintiffs' state law claims without prejudice.

Section 1367(c) requires a court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims unless a listed exception applies.

Gard v. Teletronics Pacing Systems, Inc. · filed 1994-08-09(c)

Thus, I conclude the JIA sweeps broadly, mandating the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction unless one of the exceptions in § 1367(c) is met.

Section 1367(c)(1) and (3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims that raise novel or complex state-law issues or when all claims within its original federal-question jurisdiction have been dismissed.

Saavedra v. City of Albuquerque · filed 1994-08-25(c)(1), (c)(3)

Due to the Court’s disposition of counts I and II, no federal claims remain. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c)(1) and (3) (1988) permit a court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims when the supplemental claims raise novel or complex issues of state law or when the district court has dismissed all claims over which it had original federal question jurisdiction. ... Additionally, count VI involves novel issues with respect to the New Mexico Open Meetings Act for which little or no New Mexico caselaw exists to provide guidance to this Court. Therefore, counts III, IV, V and VI are dismissed.

Section 1367(a) does not justify retaining state apportionment claims after the federal Voting Rights Act issue disappears.

Sexson v. Servaas · filed 1994-08-25(a)

The court also considered whether the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(a), allowed it to retain jurisdiction over the state issues. Ultimately, the court determined that it was bound by Voinovich to remand the remaining state law issues. We agree; the district court was compelled to remand the state law issues once the federal claim was eliminated. It would have been improvident for the district court to exercise jurisdiction over the state claims when it became clear that the Voting Rights Act was not implicated.

Section 1367(c) allows a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction for its listed reasons and, according to this court, requires exercising it when none is present.

Richardson v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. · filed 1994-09-14(c)

However, in the absence of any of these four factors, supplemental jurisdiction must be exercised.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it has dismissed the only claim within its original jurisdiction and the state claims raise novel issues of state law.

Pearson v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1994-09-30(c)(1), (c)(3)

Because summary judgement has been granted on the only claim providing this court with original jurisdiction, and because the ease raises novel issues of state law, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims after dismissing federal claims, and subsection (c)(4) permits it to decline jurisdiction over related claims against another defendant.

Rockler v. Minneapolis Community Development Agency · filed 1994-10-17(c)(3), (c)(4)

Given the fact that Plaintiffs’ taking claims must first be resolved in state court, this court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). As the claims asserted against LSGI are so interrelated to the claims against the City, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims against LSGI as well under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when factually separate state claims would complicate the trial of a federal claim.

Hirschinger v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1994-11-03(c)(4)

The instant case presents exceptional circumstances for declining jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state claims. ... Plaintiffs federal claim has nothing to do with her state claims. They arise from conduct taking place at different times and out of different relationships. Furthermore, because the state claims are triable to a jury, in the end, the state claims will predominate over the federal claim, causing the problems discussed above.

Section 1367 permits a district court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when the federal claim falls out before trial.

Hardy v. City Optical · filed 1994-11-07(c)(3)

The complaint contains state as well as federal claims, but the only basis for federal jurisdiction over the former is the federal district court's supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367, properly relinquished in a case in which the federal claim falls out before trial.

Section 1367 permits a district court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when the federal claim falls out before trial.

Hardy v. City Optical Inc. · filed 1994-11-07(c)(3)

The complaint contains state as well as federal claims, but the only basis for federal jurisdiction over the former is the federal district court’s supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, properly relinquished in a case in which the federal claim falls out before trial.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state-law claims raise novel or complex issues or all claims within its original jurisdiction have been dismissed.

Harris v. Joint School District No. 241 · filed 1994-11-18(c)(1), (c)(3)

Section 1367(c) of 28 U.S.C. provides that a district court " 'may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim' if any one of the four circumstances listed in the statute exist." O'Connor, 27 F.3d at 362-63 (quoting the statute). As did the court in O'Connor, we find that "two of those circumstances ... exist in the present case," id. at 363: "the [state] claim[s] raise[d] ... novel or complex issue[s] of State law ... [and] the district court ha[d] dismissed all claims over which it ha[d] original jurisdiction...." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(c)(1), (3); see O'Connor, 27 F.3d at 363.

Section 1367(c) does not authorize a district court to decline a claim within its original jurisdiction or remand that claim to state court.

Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster · filed 1995-01-31(c)

First, nothing in § 1367(c) authorizes a district court to decline to entertain a claim over which is has original jurisdiction and, accordingly, that section clearly does not sanction the district court's remand of this entire case, including the civil rights claims, to the state court.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims and dismiss them without prejudice.

Taylor v. Albertson's, Inc. · filed 1995-02-09(c)

However, the Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), declines to entertain jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims and they are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Section 1367 requires a court to accept supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when none of the listed grounds for declining jurisdiction applies.

Veneklase v. City of Fargo · filed 1995-02-17(c)

Since this court concludes that none of the exceptions listed above apply to the circumstances of this case, it must accept jurisdiction over the state law claims alleged by plaintiffs.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when it has dismissed all claims within its original jurisdiction or the remaining claims raise novel or complex state-law issues.

Edmondson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Association · filed 1995-03-10(c)

The present case implicates two of the three specific bases for declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under Sec. 1367(c), each independently sufficient. The court dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, Sec. 1367(c)(3), and the local law claims raise "novel or complex issue[s] of State law," Sec. 1367(c)(1), issues that appear to have been resolved in conflicting ways by D.C. courts and federal courts attempting to apply D.C. law.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when it has dismissed all claims within its original jurisdiction and the remaining claims raise unsettled issues of local law.

Edmondson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass'n · filed 1995-03-10(c)

The court dismissed all claims over which it-had original jurisdiction, § 1367(c)(3), and the local law claims raise “novel or complex issue[s] of State law,” § 1367(c)(1), issues that appear to have been resolved in conflicting ways by D.C. courts and federal courts attempting to apply D.C. law.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims of plaintiffs whose federal claims afford them no relief, even when other plaintiffs retain federal claims.

Pew v. Scopino · filed 1995-03-15(c)

Since only the Bowies are entitled to any relief on their federal causes of action, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims of Pew and the Keenes.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when summary judgment resolves the federal claim.

Nelson v. Upsala College · filed 1995-03-24(c)

Nelson pleaded a number of claims under New Jersey law but the district court in the exercise of its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) declined to exercise jurisdiction over most of them. ... While Upsala's substantive contentions might be correct, we conclude that there is no reason for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in this case as summary judgment is being granted on the federal claim.

Section 1367(c) permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim for compelling reasons, including when its resolution is more properly pursued in state court.

Spivey v. Board of Church Extension · filed 1995-03-24(c)

While the Court may have the power to hear this state law claim, it also has the discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction if there are compelling reasons. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The dissolution of Terrace potentially involves many more issues than simply the aspects of the mortgage foreclosure that affect this action, that is based primarily upon Federal questions of securities fraud. At this point in the case it is the Court’s judgment that the judicial determination of the dissolution of Terrace is more properly pursued at the state level. Therefore, the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this state law issue at this time and the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Appointment of Receiver is denied.

Section 1367(c) allows a court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when the grounds for declining jurisdiction are not met.

Ladner v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc. · filed 1995-03-27(c)

In addition, the court concludes that this case does not meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and will exercise pendent jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims.

Section 1367(c) allows a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim if the federal claim is later dismissed or another reason under the subsection warrants declining jurisdiction.

Chaney v. Suburban Bus Division of the Regional Transportation Authority · filed 1995-04-06(c)

In light of our remanding the § 1983 claim, we must also vacate and remand the district court’s decision on the supplemental claim. Our decision does not, however, prevent the district court from dismissing the state claim at a later time should the § 1983 claim be resolved on summary judgment or otherwise be dismissed, or should the court find other reasons why it should not, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), exercise its supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c) allows a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it resolves the federal claims before trial and the state claims raise novel or complex state law issues.

Fillmore v. Eichkorn · filed 1995-05-18(c)

Since summary judgment shall be granted on the federal claims before trial, the court does not believe it would be unfair or inconvenient to the parties to require plaintiff to pursue his state law claims in state court. Furthermore, these claims raise novel and potentially complex issues of state law. Therefore, the court shall not retain jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims and shall dismiss those claims without prejudice in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after disposing of the federal claims.

Cybulski v. Cooper · filed 1995-06-16(c)(3)

The Court, in its discretion, declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Thus, this claim is dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(1) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim that raises novel or complex issues of state law.

1120 Cent. Condominiums Owners Ass'n v. City of Seal Beach · filed 1995-06-21(c)(1)

Amendment would have been futile because the district court would have declined to exercise its discretion to assume supplemental jurisdiction based on the "novel or complex issue[s] of State law" raised by the proposed claim. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(c)(1). The district court properly invoked one of the permitted bases for declining jurisdiction, and properly weighed the Gibbs factors.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when it dismisses all federal claims or the state claims raise complex issues of state law.

SBC Enterprises, Inc. v. City of South Burlington · filed 1995-06-30(c)(1), (c)(3)

However, the Court declines supplemental jurisdiction for these Counts pursuant to § 1367(e)(3), since the Court is dismissing all federal claims in this order. Even if this were not the case, the Court would decline supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(1) because the claims raise complex issues of state law.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives a district court discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing the claims over which it had original jurisdiction.

70 Fair empl.prac.cas. (Bna) 625, 32 fed.r.serv.3d 867 Robin Floyd Panis v. Mission Hills Bank, N.A. · filed 1995-07-31(c)(3)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(c)(3), a district court has discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction once it has dismissed the claims over which it had original jurisdiction. We find the district court did not abuse that discretion in dismissing Panis' conversion claim.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction and remand a case when state claims substantially predominate and raise complex state-law issues.

Spaulding v. Mingo County Board of Education · filed 1995-08-25(c)

Because the federal question raised by the Complaint does not preclude remand, because the fifteen state claims substantially predominate over the federal claims, because the claims raise complex issues of state law, because federal and state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over the Rehabilitation Act and the IDEA, and because the Court gives deference to the Plaintiffs’ choice of forum, and in the general interests of judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the case under Title 28 United States Code Section 1367.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when all original-jurisdiction claims have been dismissed; when federal claims remain pending, the remaining state claims may be remanded for further proceedings.

Alexis v. McDonald's Restaurants of Massachusetts, Inc. · filed 1995-10-10(c)(3)

Since only one state law claim was addressed on the merits below, see supra note 12, and federal claims remain pending, the state law claims against Leporati must be remanded as well. See 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3) (district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where all claims over which court has original jurisdiction have been dismissed).

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims when none of its listed grounds for declining jurisdiction applies.

McClelland v. Gronwaldt · filed 1995-11-16(c)

The Court also notes that section 1367(c) provides in pertinent part that district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim, if (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. None of these elements are present in this case.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after considering the remaining federal claims and the complexity of the state-law issues.

Young v. Easter Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1995-11-29(c)

After considering these factors, the Court must decline to continue its exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ claims brought pursuant to the law of Indiana. This Order and Memorandum disposes of all claims over which this Court has original jurisdiction, except an ADA claim brought by an individual Plaintiff. As a result, the issues presented in the state law claims are no longer a part of the same ease or controversy as the subject matter of the case now before the Court. ... Furthermore, the Plaintiffs remaining state law claim presents complex issues of state law concerning state contract and tort law.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state law claims and dismiss them without prejudice.

Powell v. Haverty Furniture Companies, Inc. · filed 1996-01-22(c)(2)

In the court’s best judgment, it declines to continue the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over these claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). Plaintiffs pendent state claims are dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state civil service claim that should proceed as a New York article 78 proceeding.

Eisert v. Town of Hempstead · filed 1996-03-06(c)

Rather, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over this cause of action and dismisses Eisert’s civil service law claim without prejudice to be refiled in state court as an article 78 proceeding consistent with New York Civil Service Law and New York policy favoring such proceedings in these types of suits.

Section 1367(c) permits discretionary dismissal of pendent state law claims without prejudice.

Relliford v. Holly Springs, MS · filed 1996-02-15(c)

As to Relliford's pendent state law claims, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing them pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). See Noble v. White, 996 F.2d 797, 800 (5th Cir. 1993). Dismissal of pendent state law claims pursuant to § 1367(c) is without prejudice.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state claims when they present no novel or unduly complex state-law issues and do not predominate over the federal claims.

Fried v. Sungard Recovery Services · filed 1996-05-02(c)

Finally, Intech argues that any state law claims that remain should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). It asserts that these claims raise novel and complex issues of state law and that they predominate over the federal claims. We will not dismiss these claims. Especially after the Supreme Court’s guidance in Simmons, we find that the issues are not novel nor unduly complex and that the federal Clean Air Act claims are not merely a “tail” wagging a state “dog.”

Section 1367(c) requires a court with supplemental jurisdiction to exercise it unless one of the four statutory exceptions applies.

Moubry ex rel. Moubry v. Independent School District Number 696 · filed 1996-05-13(c)

Having determined that supplemental jurisdiction exists, we are obligated to exercise that jurisdiction unless one of the four exceptions, that are listed in Section 1367(c), should apply.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims after it resolves the claims within its original jurisdiction.

Scott v. State Pilotage Commission · filed 1996-05-01(c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3)

Since, in the absence of those claims, the court shall lack an independent basis of jurisdiction over the remaining state court claims, the court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1), (2), & (3) and in its discretion, shall not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state claims present complex issues, substantially predominate, and all claims within original jurisdiction have been dismissed.

Youngblood Group v. Lufkin Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1996-06-03(c)

In addition to the above general common law guidelines, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) enumerates four specific occasions when a court may decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction, including: when the state claims raise novel or complex issues of state law; when the state law claims substantially predominate over the claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction; and when the district court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. ... All three of the listed categories have been triggéred by the current posture of the case.

Section 1367 permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims arising from a different set of facts than the federal claim.

De Long v. Mansfield · filed 1996-06-14(c)(3)

Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over De Long's state law claims which the district court found arose from a different set of facts than the Rehabilitation Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); O'Connor, 27 F.3d at 363.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state common law claims that would predominate over a federal employment discrimination claim and confuse the jury if tried together.

Betancourt v. Marine Cargo Management, Inc. · filed 1996-06-21(c)

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs common law claims would present issues of state law not appropriate for disposition in the same suit as Plaintiffs claims for sexual harassment. Trial of the issues together would engender confusion for a jury. Moreover, the common law claims would predominate over the federal employment discrimination claim over which the Court has original jurisdiction. Counts III through IX of Plaintiffs Complaint should therefore be dismissed without prejudice to file in state court, if Plaintiff be so advised.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state common law claims that would predominate over federal claims and confuse the jury if tried together.

Caraballo v. South Stevedoring, Inc. · filed 1996-07-03(c)

The Court concludes that the common law claims would present issues of state law not appropriate for disposition in the same suit as Mr. Caraballo’s employment discrimination claims. Trial of the issues together would engender confusion for a jury. Moreover, the common law claims would predominate over the federal employment discrimination claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction. Counts X through XVIII of the Complaint should therefore be dismissed without prejudice to file in state court, if Mrs. Caraballo be so advised.

Section 1367(c)(1) and (3) permit a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when they may present novel state-law questions and the federal claims have been dismissed.

Dietz v. Damas · filed 1996-07-11(c)(1), (c)(3)

Accordingly, the court, having found no triable issue of fact that there was any violation of federal law in the City and City individual defendants’ conduct toward plaintiffs, declines to retain jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ remaining causes of action that arise under state law against the City, the individual City defendants and Defendant McGurn, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) & (3).

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction when the remaining claims raise novel and complex issues of state law.

Harless Ex Rel. Harless v. Darr · filed 1996-07-30(c)

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) provides that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in a case (such as this one) in which the court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, and the remaining claims raise novel and complex issue of state law. ... The court therefore will dismiss without prejudice the remaining state-law claims so that the Plaintiffs may, if they choose to do so, pursue resolution of these claims in a state forum.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when all federal claims have been dismissed and the state-law claims present novel theories.

Lewin v. Medical College of Hampton Roads · filed 1996-08-02(c)(1), (c)(3)

In addition, because all the federal claims have been dismissed, and because the pending contract count states theories of relief never before recognized under Virginia law, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(1) and (3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims presenting novel issues of state law when it has granted summary judgment on all claims within its original jurisdiction.

May v. Town of Mountain Village · filed 1996-10-18(c)(1) and (3)

I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) and (3). These claims involve novel issues of State law, and I have granted summary judgment as to all claims over which I have original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction for compelling reasons, including a takings claimant’s failure to seek relief from the responsible agency and then in state court.

Bensch v. Metropolitan Dade County · filed 1996-12-16(c)(4)

I have determined that there are compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction, specifically, that the Plaintiffs have failed to show that each Plaintiff has petitioned Defendant SFWMD for relief, and then has proceeded to state court for a remedy. Additionally, there are few reported decisions on the issue of whether a flowage easement has been taken and, thus, this appears to be a relatively novel issue of State law. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under all of the above circumstances.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims against individual defendants when it dismisses the only federal claim against them.

Franks Ex Rel. H.B.L. v. Kentucky School for the Deaf · filed 1996-12-27(c)

Because the Court is dismissing the only federal claim lodged against the individual defendants, this Court will no longer have jurisdiction over the defendants in their individual capacities. Therefore, the Court will decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the only remaining state law claims.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a sole remaining state law claim even if the claim is timely.

Boyle v. McCann-Erickson, Inc. · filed 1997-01-03

Even if the claim was timely filed the Court would not retain jurisdiction of that sole state law claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state law issues are complex or all claims within its original jurisdiction have been dismissed.

Pinkney v. Davis · filed 1997-01-15(c)(1), (c)(3)

Under the provisions of the applicable statute, a court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law or if the court has dismissed all of the claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1), (3). In this case, there are complex issues of state law and all of the federal claims have been dismissed. The court, therefore, declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim that substantially predominates over the claim within its original jurisdiction.

Reneau v. Oakwood Mobile Homes · filed 1997-01-28(c)(2)

It predominates over Count Two. Thus, as an alternative approach, the language of § 1367(c)(2) convinces this court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim.

A court may retain supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims when a federal claim remains and none of § 1367(c)'s grounds for declining jurisdiction applies.

Hazeldine v. Beverage Media, Ltd. · filed 1997-01-28(c)

Since the Court has original jurisdiction over the Title VII claim, I conclude that none of the discretionary grounds for declining supplemental jurisdiction exists in this case.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to dismiss supplemental state-law claims without prejudice and leave them for refiling in state court.

Ross v. Indiana State Teacher's Ass'n · filed 1997-02-07(c)

Ross’s pending state law claims against ISTA are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and he is given leave to re-file them in state court.

Section 1367(c)(1) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that raise novel or complex issues of state law.

Diversified Services, Inc. v. Simkins Industries, Inc. · filed 1997-03-26(c)(1)

The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1367, outlines a district court’s supplemental jurisdiction over pendent or ancillary claims and is similar to the common law pendent jurisdiction doctrine. It provides that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if the claims raise novel or complex issues of state law or if the claims substantially predominate over the claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction. ... In addition, the state law claims alleged in the Amended Complaint, raise novel and complex issues of state statutes and county regulations. ... Therefore, the undersigned concludes that supplemental jurisdiction should not be exercised over Counts III-VI in this ease.

Section 1367(c) gives district courts discretion to dismiss state-law claims within their supplemental jurisdiction.

Truitt v. County of Wayne · filed 1997-04-03(c)

Similarly, this court will dismiss plaintiffs state law claim for wrong-fiil discharge in Count I pursuant to the discretion conferred upon it by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an additional party when a necessary party cannot be joined and complete relief cannot be achieved.

Crisp v. United States · filed 1997-05-20(c)(4)

This is an “exceptional circumstance” that justifies the declining of supplemental jurisdiction over the purchaser. § 1367(c)(4) (fisting “exceptional circumstances” as one reason to decline jurisdiction). Judicial economy and efficiency would not be served by joining the purchaser when complete relief cannot be achieved on this claim, due to the government’s absence.

Section 1367(c)(4) allows a federal court to consider dismissing supplemental state discrimination claims before trial when differing burdens of proof would complicate a joint jury trial.

Birchem v. Knights of Columbus · filed 1997-05-30(c)(4)

Thus, in future cases, if a North Dakota employment discrimination plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial on his or her federal claim(s), the federal court should consider dismissing any pendent or supplemental claims under the NDHRA before trial. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after resolving all federal claims and when the state claims raise novel or complex state-law issues.

Reed v. Knox County Dept. of Human Services · filed 1997-06-23(c)

However, now that the court has concluded that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ federal claims, this court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims. ... The court therefore declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act claim because the Act gives state circuit courts exclusive original jurisdiction.

Spurlock v. Whitley · filed 1997-07-17(c)(4)

The Court concludes that the exclusivity provision of the TGTLA provides a compelling reason for this Court to decline supplemental jurisdiction of the TGTLA claim in this case.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives a district court discretion to retain or relinquish supplemental jurisdiction when the federal claim cannot go forward.

Serapion v. Martinez · filed 1997-07-18(c)(3)

Once it had determined that the federal claim could not go forward, the district court had substantial discretion under 28 U.S.C. S 1367(c)(3) (1994) either to retain or to relinquish jurisdiction over the supplemental claim which the appellant had brought under local law.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the federal claims are dismissed before trial and the state law questions are complex or novel.

Jones v. Saxon Mortgage, Inc. · filed 1997-08-05(c)

Generally, the state law claims, over which the Court has supplemental jurisdiction, should be dismissed if the federal claims are dismissed before trial. ... In light of the complex and novel questions of state law that, i.e. the res judicata and collateral estoppel defenses, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the fraud and usury questions.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims, particularly when the state courts should resolve developing questions of state law.

Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Systems, Inc. · filed 1997-08-28(c)

With respect to plaintiffs’ pendent state law tort claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those tort claims in this ease pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. ... The state law claims involving this particular statutory scheme are the type of claims a district court should dismiss without prejudice, leaving to the state court the continuing development and application of state law. This Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in this case over plaintiffs’ pendent state claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after disposing of the federal claims.

Roy v. Estabrook · filed 1997-08-20(c)(3)

The court declines to exercise ... jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims against the state defendants arising under state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (West 1993).

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law cross-claims that would complicate a § 6672 tax collection proceeding.

Bellovin v. United States · filed 1997-11-01(c)(4)

The Court will not permit Bellovin to make an end run around the rule prohibiting the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over contribution and indemnity claims in § 6672 proceedings under this theory.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims when no issues remain within its original jurisdiction and the state law questions may be novel.

Schrum Ex Rel. Kelly v. Land · filed 1997-11-21(c)

No issues remain in this ease over which the Court has original jurisdiction. The claims remaining against Land and Anderson raise intricate fact issues that have not been adequately addressed by the parties. Moreover, the Court discerns potentially novel questions of state law. These matters are best addressed by the state courts. The Court therefore declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims remaining against Defendants Land and Anderson.

Section 1367 permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims and dismiss them without prejudice.

Ochoa v. Texas Metal Trades Council · filed 1997-12-23

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction ... over the state law claims in this ease. Accordingly, Defendant Union Carbide’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs claims of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and those claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Section 1367 permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim when the federal claims are dismissed before trial.

Reynosa v. Wood · filed 1997-12-24(c)(3)

Accordingly, as the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, such claim is dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367 permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim that calls for detailed state and local preemption analysis better suited to a state court.

DFW Vending, Inc. v. Jefferson County, Tex. · filed 1998-01-07(c)

The questions raised by Plaintiffs require a detailed examination of state/local preemption that is better suited to the expertise of a state court, and the court refuses to exercise supplemental jurisdiction here.

Section 1367(c) allows a court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing the federal claim for lack of a case or controversy, and the judgment should reflect that disposition.

State of Illinois v. City of Chicago, Illinois, and City of Gary, Indiana · filed 1998-02-19(c)

Because the state-law claim was dismissed for want of jurisdiction (though it would have been more accurate to say that the court relinquished supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)), the judgment should have reflected this disposition. ... To set things straight, we vacate the judgment and remand with directions to enter a new judgment dismissing the federal claim for lack of a case or controversy, and relinquishing supplemental jurisdiction of the state claim.

Section 1367 permits dismissal of a supplemental breach of contract claim when exercising jurisdiction would not serve the interests underlying the FSIA and supplemental jurisdiction.

Millicom International Cellular, S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica · filed 1998-02-23

Furthermore, even if Radiográfica did not qualify as an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" under Section 1603(b), the sole breach of contract claim against it would be properly dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The court concludes that exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Radiográfica would not serve the principles and interests underlying the FSIA and the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367 permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law counterclaims, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Tommaso Buti Fashion World Company, Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants-Appellees v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., Defendant-Counte · filed 1998-02-24

Finally, we find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, over Impressa’s state law counterclaims.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.

Akpa v. State of Idaho Boise State University Robert Sims James Weatherby David Patton · filed 1998-03-17(c)

This contention lacks merit because the district court had the power to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Akpa's state law claims in keeping with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a related interpleader dispute when settlement effectively ends the federal claim and a state court forum is available.

Kazery v. City of Jackson · filed 1998-03-18(c)

First, the court’s decision that the parties have entered into a binding settlement agreement which provides for the dismissal of the plaintiffs § 1983 claim — that being the only claim within this court’s original jurisdiction — effectively ends the original litigation. That is, though the case has not yet been formally dismissed, a judgment of dismissal will be the inevitable consequence of enforcement of the parties’ settlement agreement and there simply will be no ongoing litigation within the court’s original jurisdiction. That fact, coupled with the fact that there is an alternative state court forum in which the City may pursue an interpleader action for its protection with respect to payment of the settlement funds, compels this court to decline the City’s request for interpleader.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after disposing of the federal claims when deciding the state-law claim would needlessly intrude on state law.

Huskey v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp./Container Corp. of America · filed 1998-03-27(c)

Defendant argues in the alternative that, in the interest of judicial efficiency, this court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and dismiss that claim on the merits. The Supreme Court has stated, however, that needless decisions of state law should be avoided as a matter of comity. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Accordingly, the court OVERRULES Defendant’s objections and ADOPTS that portion of the Report and Recommendation which declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction only when one of its enumerated grounds applies.

Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc. · filed 1998-04-03(c)

On the other hand, the use of “may” in subsection 1367(c) seems to confer on federal courts at least some discretion to not hear claims over which there is supplemental jurisdiction in the enumerated circumstances.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims against the defendant.

Carter v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1998-04-20(c)

This Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims asserted by Carter against Roe in his individual capacity in Counts III through IX of the Amended Complaint.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction when a state claim raises a complex issue of state law or all claims within its original jurisdiction have been dismissed.

Meier v. Kirsch · filed 1998-04-21(c)

Thus, the district court sought to correct its error of law by relinquishing supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) for reasons expressly permitted therein--a complex issue of state law and dismissal of all claims over which the district court had original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction at any time in the litigation when the state-law claim presents a complex issue or all claims within original jurisdiction have been dismissed.

Innovative Home Health Care, Inc. v. P.T.-O.T. Associates of the Black Hills · filed 1998-04-21(c)

Assuming the defendants’ state law indemnification counterclaims were sufficiently related to the plaintiffs’ jurisdictionally sufficient claims such that all claims could fairly be characterized as part of the “same case or controversy” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), the district court had the discretion to decline to retain jurisdiction under section 1367(c)(3) (dismissal of all claims over which it had original jurisdiction) and 1367(c)(1) (complex issue of state law) at any ... time in the litigation.

Section 1367(c) does not require a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction merely because an issue of state law is unsettled.

Lauro v. Tomkats, Inc. · filed 1998-06-18(c)

Furthermore, this Court is competent to evaluate what standard should be applied in evaluating whether a communication is confidential, and accordingly, the fact that this is an unsettled issue in California law does not require the Court to decline jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction for compelling reasons in exceptional circumstances, including when hearing state law cross-claims would greatly expand an interpleader action, disrupt plaintiffs’ forum choice, and risk duplicative litigation and inconsistent outcomes.

Reliance National Insurance v. Great Lakes Aviation Ltd. · filed 1998-07-13(c)(4)

A court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if “in exceptional circumstances, there are ... compelling reasons” to do so. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). This Court finds “compelling reasons” for declining to exercise jurisdiction over the instant cross-claims. As already noted, allowing the claims to proceed would drastically expand the subject matter of this action, interfere with various tort plaintiffs’ choice of forum, and undermine the purpose of interpleader by producing duplicative litigation and the potential for inconsistent outcomes.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when the remaining state claim presents a novel and complex issue of state law after the federal claims have been dismissed.

Seabrook v. Jacobson · filed 1998-08-21(c)

We conclude that the District Court should not have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim in this case. We vacate the judgment below and remand with directions to dismiss without prejudice the state claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(c) supports remanding remaining state-law claims when the federal claims have been eliminated and the state claims predominate.

McClelland v. Gronwaldt · filed 1998-09-10(c)

Thus, our section 1367(c) analysis results in the conclusion that remand is appropriate.

Section 1367(c)(1) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims when their governing law differs substantially from the federal claim.

Montero v. Agco Corp. · filed 1998-09-15(c)(1)

While the remaining claims against the defendant arise from the same facts as plaintiffs Title VII claim, the applicable law differs substantially. ... Accordingly, the court dechnes to retain supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Article 78 claim because its special state-law procedure differs from an ordinary federal civil action.

Lucchese v. Carboni · filed 1998-10-09(c)

Because of the differences between an Article 78 claim and a civil claim typically brought in this Court, I find that the Article 78 proceeding should be brought in the appropriate forum—state court. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ Article 78 claim.

Section 1367(c)(1) and (2) permit a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when a state claim raises a novel or complex state law issue or substantially predominates over the claims within its original jurisdiction.

New York v. PVS Chemicals, Inc. · filed 1998-11-04(c)(1), (2)

Although this court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim which “raises a novel or complex issue of State law” or “substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction,” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1), (2), I do not find those circumstances present in this case.

Section 1367(c)(2) does not require a district court to state its reasons for declining supplemental jurisdiction when state law claims substantially predominate.

San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1998-11-06(c)(2)

This court did not discuss, nor do we require, any similar explanation for a district court’s reasons when the district court acts under any of the first three provisions.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over related claims when the federal claim is dismissed early in the case.

Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp. · filed 1998-11-13(c)(3)

When, as here, the federal claim is dismissed early in the litigation process, “the presumption to decline jurisdiction is strong.”

Section 1367(c) does not justify declining supplemental jurisdiction over related state discrimination claims solely because of possible jury confusion and asserted predominance of state issues when dismissal would duplicate proceedings.

Klein v. London Star Ltd. · filed 1998-11-19(c)

The possibility of jury confusion, and Defendants’ contention of the predominance of state issues, do not justify the duplication and waste that may result from separate proceedings. Something more would be required.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the federal claims are dismissed as a matter of law.

United States v. Domestic Industries, Inc. · filed 1999-01-06(c)

Title 28 Section'1367(c) provides that when the federal claims are dismissed from a case as a matter of law, the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(1) and (c)(3) permit a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims presenting complex or novel state law issues after the federal claims have been dismissed.

Parents, Alumni, & Friends of Taylor School v. City of Norfolk · filed 1999-02-12(c)(1), (c)(3)

Relying on the guidance from Gibbs and the subsequent Fourth Circuit case law, and its authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) and (3), this Court declines to exercise its jurisdiction to rule on the controversial state law claims where there are no remaining federal claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state tort claim when the federal defendants have defaulted and no substantive federal liability issue remains.

Boyd v. Herron · filed 1999-03-15(c)

In the present case, the only substantive issues remaining are those related to Boyd’s state law claim. ... There are no remaining substantive liability issues under § 1983, and federal jurisdiction is no longer justified under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Accordingly, Boyd’s state law claim will be dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(1) and (3) permit a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that raise novel and complex issues of state law when all claims within its original jurisdiction have been dismissed.

Williams v. City of Montgomery, Ala. · filed 1999-04-22(c)(1), (c)(3)

Accordingly, and since all federal claims over which this court has original jurisdiction are to be dismissed, the court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims against the City, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) and (3) and will dismiss those claims without prejudice.

Section 1367 permits dismissal without prejudice of a supplemental state-law claim when the federal claims are resolved before trial, particularly when the state-law issue is novel.

Houlton Citizens' Coalition v. Town of Houlton · filed 1999-04-22(c)

Where, as here, the federal claims upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends are resolved before trial, section 1367 confers upon the judge the authority to dismiss a supplemental state-law claim without prejudice.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after disposing of all federal claims.

Fullman v. Philadelphia International Airport · filed 1999-05-10(c)

Having dismissed plaintiffs Title VII and ADA claims against Laidlaw for failure to exhaust state administrative remedies, and granted summary judgment on plaintiffs Title VII, ADA and § 1983 claims against all remaining defendants, the Court will exercise its discretion, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), and will decline supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff s state law claims.

A district court’s failure to state its reason for declining supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c) is not reversible error when the statutory ground is readily apparent.

Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc. · filed 1999-08-12(c)

In addition, we hold that, where we can readily determine that the District Court dismissed a claimant’s remaining claims based on a consideration enumerated in section 1367(c), it is not reversible error for the court to not state its reasons for doing so.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims and dismiss them without prejudice while retaining a federal claim.

Powell v. Chambers · filed 1999-08-18(c)

The Court finds that it will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over the state law claims. ... Because the Court has such discretion and firmly believes that the state court can and should resolve the remaining state claw claims, the state law claims are dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits dismissal of supplemental state-law claims without prejudice after the federal claims have been adjudicated.

United Waste Systems of Iowa, Inc. v. Wilson · filed 1999-09-07(c)(3)

Having adjudicated the companies' federal law claims, the district court properly dismissed the companies' state law claims without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(2)-(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when another jurisdiction’s law would predominate or the basis for original jurisdiction is no longer viable.

McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd. · filed 1999-09-28(c)(2)-(3)

The supplemental jurisdiction statute allows a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when another jurisdiction’s law will predominate, or when the basis for the court’s original jurisdiction is no longer viable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2)-(3). Both of those situations apply to this case.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits declining supplemental jurisdiction and remanding state claims when the potential for jury confusion from differing state and federal legal standards outweighs the economy of trying the claims together.

Padilla v. City of Saginaw · filed 1994-11-15(c)(4)

The subsection applicable to the case at bar is subsection four — “other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” ... The potential for jury confusion can be a sufficiently compelling reason for declining jurisdiction. ... The court finds that the potential for jury confusion in this ease is great. The state claims and federal claims have different legal standards, rules of vicarious liability and immunity, and recoverable damages, and it would be very difficult for a jury to keep them straight. ... Thus, remand of all state law claims is appropriate.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when the federal claims have been dismissed, complex state-law issues are present, and uncertainty about prior state-court dismissal dates creates exceptional circumstances.

Garcia v. City of Oakwood · filed 1996-10-15(c)(1), (c)(3), (c)(4)

Here, the District Court found that there were complex issues of state law present, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1), and that this case constituted an "exceptional circumstance," id. § 1367(c)(4), because of the incongruities regarding the exact dismissal dates of the state court action. Furthermore, the court had dismissed the federal claims. See id. § 1367(c)(3). We cannot say that the District Court "committed a clear error of judgment," Logan v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 865 F.2d 789, 790 (6th Cir.1989), and thus we find no abuse of discretion.

Section 1367(c) allows a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after weighing its statutory factors and judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Blacks in Technology International v. Blacks in Technology LLC · filed 2022-05-26(c)

But even if Beasley’s state law claims are permissible counterclaims over which the Court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction—which again, Beasley does not argue—the Court would decline to do so based on the discretion granted to it by congress in 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when a listed criterion applies, including dismissal of all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Snyder v. Fish · filed 2022-05-27(c)

The Court rejects defendants’ request to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's remaining state law claims. As set forth above, plaintiff has viable federal causes of action remaining pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983. Further, plaintiff's state law claims do not meet the Section 1367(c) criteria.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim when the case is at an early stage and the claim is more appropriately heard in state court.

Roberts v. Sires · filed 2022-05-31(c)

To the extent that he also raises a claim under State law related to a loss of property, this court declines to exercise jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). This case is in the early stages of pleading and defendants have not yet been served or appeared in this action. Roberts’s claim for property loss is more appropriately heard in state court and furthers judicial economies in this court.

Section 1367 permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction and dismiss remaining state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Mayfield v. Presbyterian Hospital Administration · filed 2022-05-31

The Court will again decline to reach the merits of state law claims, if any, and will dismiss those claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim accompanying an ADA claim.

Bryant v. Tom · filed 2022-06-01(c)

The Court, however, may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for the reasons delineated in § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims, with judicial economy and the avoidance of needless state law decisions informing that discretionary choice.

Jamerson 138940 v. Taskila · filed 2022-06-01(c)

Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to invoke this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction. Ordinarily, where a district court has exercised jurisdiction over a state law claim solely by virtue of supplemental jurisdiction and the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the court will dismiss the remaining state law claims. See Experimental Holdings, Inc. v. Farris, 503 F.3d 514, 521 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Generally, once a federal court has dismissed a plaintiff’s federal law claim, it should not reach state law claims.” (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966))); Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction, “[a] district court should consider the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests against needlessly deciding state law issues.” Landefeld, 994 F.2d at 1182; see also Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Residual jurisdiction should be exercised only in cases where the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation outweigh our concern over needlessly deciding state law issues.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Dismissal, however, remains “purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)); Orton v. Johnny’s Lunch Franchise, LLC, 668 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 2012). Here, the balance of the relevant considerations weighs against the continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state law claims will be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) and (4) permit a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a related state-law claim when the federal claim is moot and early-stage litigation and comity concerns favor a state forum.

Whitaker v. Chan · filed 2022-06-02(c)(3), (c)(4)

In this case, it is appropriate to decline to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to §§ 1367(c)(3) and (4).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over crossclaims and dismiss them without prejudice.

Jamison v. Life Insurance Company of North America · filed 2022-06-02(c)

I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(a) and (c) and therefore dismiss Jaguar and LINA’s crossclaims without prejudice.

Section 1367(c) gives district courts discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction when one of its listed grounds exists, including exceptional circumstances with other compelling reasons to decline.

Whitaker v. Elpipila LLC · filed 2022-05-27(c)

District courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if: “(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.”

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims after an untimely or inadequate response to an order to show cause.

Elliott v. Good Life Enterprises, L.L.C. · filed 2022-06-03(c)

Failure to timely or adequately respond to this Order to Show Cause may result in the court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and any related state law claims and dismissing such claim or claims without further notice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the complaint fails to state a federal claim.

Wilson v. Custer County, Idaho · filed 2022-06-03(c)(3)

Moreover, because the Complaint fails to state a federal claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims in any event.

When federal claims are dismissed, § 1367(c) allows a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims after considering its criteria and judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

McIntosh v. Goings · filed 2022-06-03(c)

In contrast, McIntosh’s state law claims of negligence and respondeat superior were dismissed without prejudice “to their being timely asserted in state court,”30 and McIntosh may take that path. This Court noted that “the general rule in the Fifth Circuit is to dismiss state law claims when the federal claims to which they are pendent are dismissed.’”31 The Court also noted the criteria set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and the common law factors of “‘judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’”32 These are the exact same principles that the Fifth Circuit discussed in Enochs, and McIntosh identifies no portion of that opinion indicating any error here.

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims to avoid jury confusion.

Vanderlinden v. City of Warren · filed 2022-06-03(c)(4)

Because the parties to this matter are non-diverse, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims so as to avoid jury confusion. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4); Moor v. Cty. of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 716 (1973); Padilla v. City of Saginaw, 867 F. Supp. 1309, 1315 (E.D. Mich. 1994).

Section 1367(c) does not warrant declining supplemental jurisdiction when the state law claims raise no novel questions, do not predominate over the federal claims, and present no exceptional circumstances.

Webb v. Lott · filed 2022-06-03(c)

The court finds that Plaintiffs state law claims do not present novel questions of state law or predominate over the § 1983 claims, nor do there appear to be any exceptional circumstances supporting Sheriff Lott’s request for the court to decline jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court finds the § 1367(c) factors also weigh against severance in this case.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims if the plaintiff fails to justify its exercise after an order to show cause.

Davidson v. Infinitely Group, Inc. · filed 2022-06-06(c)

Failure to timely or adequately respond to this Order to Show Cause may result in the court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and any related state law claims and dismissing such claim or claims without further notice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to consider fairness and comity and require a plaintiff to show cause before deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim.

Ho v. The Arroyo Parkway, LLC · filed 2022-06-06(c)

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to consider declining supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims after weighing fairness and comity.

Neal v. 3198 W LLC · filed 2022-06-06(c)

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act, Disabled Persons Act, Unfair Competition Act, and negligence claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state claims raise a novel issue of state law and all original-jurisdiction claims have been dismissed, with judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity guiding that choice.

Weekley Homes, LLC v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2022-06-08(c)

Because Weekley Homes’ case raises a novel issue of state law and the Court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, the Court must consider whether judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity counsel dismissal of the remaining state claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims for the reasons it lists.

Davidson v. Yniguez · filed 2022-06-09(c)

The Court, however, may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for the reasons delineated in § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state claims substantially predominate over federal claims or compelling reasons, including comity, warrant doing so.

Dalfio v. J.G. MGMT Properties IV, LLC · filed 2022-06-09(c)

The Court declines to extend jurisdiction over Dalfio’s state law claim because they substantially predominate over his ADA claim and because there are compelling reasons to decline supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c) permits district courts to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after considering the circumstances, the nature and governing law of the claims, and their relationship to the federal claims.

Edmonds v. Bhullar Properties, LLC · filed 2022-06-10(c)

Depending on a host of factors, then -- including the circumstances of the particular case, the nature of the state law claims, the character of the governing state law, and the relationship between the state and federal claims - - district courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental state law claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction for the reasons it specifies.

Cauley v. Tsiboukas · filed 2022-06-13(c)

The Court, however, may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for the reasons delineated in § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to require a plaintiff to show cause why it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.

Bryant v. Project One-Fifty · filed 2022-06-13(c)

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim, California’s Disabled Persons Act, California’s Health & Safety Code, and negligence claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

GOLDSTEIN v. FOX NEWS · filed 2022-06-13(c)

Because the Court has dismissed Goldstein’s federal claims, the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) over any state law claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim accompanying an ADA claim.

Neal v. Liu · filed 2022-06-15(c)

The sole basis for jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim is supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The Court, however, may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for the reasons delineated in § 1367(c).

Section 1367 allows a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when an unresolved state law issue warrants Pullman abstention.

Goodman v. Harness · filed 2022-06-16

Accordingly, the Court declines to exert supplemental jurisdiction over all state law claims in Counts 4–8, and they are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to require the plaintiff to show why it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims, weighing judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Brooke v. Mian Extended Stay Inc. · filed 2022-06-17(c)

The supplemental jurisdiction statute “reflects the understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, faimess, and comity.’” City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (emphasis added) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). The Court therefore further ORDERS Plaintiff to show cause in writing why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim and any other state law claim asserted in the Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(1)–(2) permits a court to retain a related state-law claim when it raises no novel or complex state-law issue and does not substantially predominate over the federal claim.

Doe v. District of Columbia · filed 2022-06-23(c)(1)–(2)

Doe’s negligence claim against Hollis shares a “common nucleus of operative fact” with her Title IX claim against Duke Ellington. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Moreover, the Court concludes that the negligence claim neither raises a “novel or complex issue of State law” nor “substantially predominates” over the Title IX claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)–(2). Finally, because the two claims turn on overlapping questions of fact, the Court notes that considering them together would further “judicial economy.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over shareholder claims that raise novel state-law issues and could overwhelm the related federal employment claims.

Bare, Jonathan v. Al. Ringling Brewing Company, Inc. · filed 2022-06-28(c)

But even if there is sufficient commonality to satisfy § 1367(a), multiple provisions in § 1367(c) suggest that the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the shareholder claims. ... Allowing plaintiffs to combine such a far-reaching claim with their employment-related claims would have the potential to overwhelm the proceedings. ... The court will dismiss Bare and Grassman’s claim for shareholder oppression and Bare’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims for the reasons specified in that subsection.

Gastelum v. Calimesa Motel Management, Inc. · filed 2022-06-28(c)

The Court, however, may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for the reasons delineated in § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a court facing an unresolved state-law issue to decline supplemental jurisdiction, but the court may decide the claim when declining jurisdiction would leave it time-barred in state court.

Lewis-Bledsoe v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2022-06-28(c)

The Court has two choices when faced an issue of unresolved state law. The Court could dismiss the state law claim outright or simply decline to exercise jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Although the Court acknowledges that there is some uncertainty in the state law, the timing of the amendment to the federal claim bars Lewis-Bledsoe’s IGVA claim from being pled separately. If the Court simply declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claim, Lewis-Bledsoe’s IGVA claim would not relate back to any lawsuit, and the claim would be barred in state court. Because the Court finds that the Illinois Supreme Court would define “person” as set forth in the IGVA to exclude corporations, and because declining to exercise jurisdiction would be futile for Lewis- Bledsoe’s claim, the Court grants Ford’s Motion to Dismiss Count VI.

Section 1367(c) lists disjunctive grounds, so any one of them gives a district court discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction.

Jackson v. Shaw · filed 2022-06-28(c)

The four § 1367(c) factors are thus listed in the disjunctive, which means that only one of them needs to be met in order to grant a district court discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c) allows a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims and to require the plaintiff to show cause why it should exercise that jurisdiction.

Cauley v. Sandoval Real Properties L.P. · filed 2022-06-29(c)

The Court, however, may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for the reasons delineated in § 1367(c). ... Therefore, to assist this Court in its duty, Plaintiff is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE in writing as to why this Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction ... over the Unruh Act claim and the other state law claims alleged by Plaintiff.

Section 1367(c) allows a court to retain related state wage claims when they raise no novel or complex state-law issue, do not predominate over the federal claims, and present no exceptional circumstance justifying declination.

Esquivel v. Downhole Technology LLC · filed 2022-06-30(c)

Considering the statutory factors set forth in section 1367(c), as well as the common-law factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, I conclude that it is appropriate for this Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. As I have explained above, Plaintiffs’ state-law claims raise neither novel nor complex issues of state law, they do not predominate over the FLSA claims, and there are no exceptional circumstances that would justify refusing to hear the pendent state-law claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction for the reasons it lists.

Elliott v. Siegel · filed 2022-07-01(c)

The Court, however, may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for the reasons delineated in § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing the claims within its original jurisdiction, subject to abuse-of-discretion review.

Fonseca v. University Medical Center · filed 2022-07-05(c)(3)

To the extent that Fonseca challenges the district court’s decision declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims against the University Medical Center defendants, we can discern no abuse of discretion from his arguments.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives no basis to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim when a claim within the court’s original jurisdiction remains.

Cole v. Uni-Marts, Inc. · filed 2000-02-16(c)(3)

In this case, because defendants are not entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s FMLA claim (see discussion in the text infra), there remains a claim "over which [the court] has original jurisdiction," and there is no basis for declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the NYHRL claim.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when the federal claim fails at the outset, particularly if the case was removed and the state claims may not have been preserved for state-court review.

Freeman v. Burlington Broadcasters, Inc. · filed 2000-02-23(a)

Since the federal claim (that the ZBA’s preemption ruling is erroneous) failed at the outset in the District Court, it would be inappropriate to exercise supplemental jurisdiction with respect to the state law claims, especially in a removed case like this one, where a federal court would be obliged to consider the extent to which such claims had been sufficiently tendered to the ZBA to make them available for review in the Vermont Environmental Court.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims, particularly when the remaining claims raise unsettled issues of state law and implicate state interests.

Bletter v. Incorporated Village of Westhampton Beach · filed 2000-03-08(c)(1), (c)(3)

Subsection (c) of Section 1367 lists several circumstances in which the federal court may choose not to exercise that jurisdiction, including where the state claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law; and where the district court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) and (3). ... In light of these policies, this Court concludes that it should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remainder of Bletter’s state law claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims when none of its grounds for declining jurisdiction is met.

Doll v. U.S. West Communications, Inc. · filed 2000-03-09(c)

I find that none of these factors is met in this case, and that I should thus exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. ... Thus, I will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims of Bridges, Green and Doll pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims.

Potter v. Xerox Corp. · filed 2000-03-31(c)

To the extent that plaintiff seeks to assert state law claims for fraud or for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them.

Section 1367(c) does not permit remand of state claims when the court also has independent diversity jurisdiction over them.

Shackelford v. Continental Casualty Co. · filed 2000-05-12(c)

In the alternative, defendants urge the court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and remand those claims to state court. In urging the court to do this, however, the defendants ignore the fact that the court has jurisdiction over the remaining state claims not only through supplemental jurisdiction based on the presence of the ERISA claim, but also through diversity jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c) permits, but does not require, a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when a claim presents novel or complex state-law issues or predominates over the claim within original jurisdiction.

MILAN EXPRESS, INC. v. Averitt Express, Inc. · filed 2000-05-31(c)

In any event, this court finds neither that the excess damages claim involves complex issues of Alabama law, nor that it predominates over the bond claim. Furthermore, even if both of these factors were present, they would only provide reasons for declining supplemental jurisdiction and would not mandate such a declination. The operative word in § 1367(c) is “may.”

Section 1367(c) permits a court to dismiss supplemental state-law claims after it finds the claims within its original jurisdiction meritless.

Johnson v. Zumbro · filed 2000-06-19(c)

The district court’s failure to consider explicitly Johnson’s supplemental state-law claims was not an abuse of discretion. See Cabrol v. Town of Youngsville, 106 F.3d 101, 110 (5th Cir. 1997). The court was entitled to dismiss any state-law claims after it properly deemed meritless the claims over which it had original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the federal claims against those defendants are dismissed early and the state claims raise potentially complex issues.

Rogers v. USA, et al. · filed 2000-06-21(c)

In this case, several factors counsel against the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims against these defendants. First and perhaps most notably, plaintiff's foundational federal claims against these defendants have been dismissed at an early stage of this litigation. ... In light of the foregoing, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims against the Cornell Defendants, CFDFC, and Liburdi.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction only when one of its four listed circumstances is present.

Mincy v. Staff Leasing, L.P. · filed 2000-06-22(c)

Plaintiffs also appear to attribute a broad meaning to the discretionary aspects of federal courts’ exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The discretion applies, however, only when one of the four situations listed in § 1367(c) is present.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when it has dismissed all claims within its original jurisdiction or when state law claims predominate.

Boyce v. Augusta-Richmond County · filed 2000-08-22(c)

Here, the Court determines that it is not appropriate to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction for several reasons. First, the Court has dismissed all the claims over which it has original jurisdiction. Second, even if the Court had not dismissed any federal claim, the state law claims predominate in this lawsuit. They are numerous and they involve complicated issues of Georgia law. Additionally, the fact that the Plaintiffs must first exhaust state remedies to attempt to recover for a taking provides further support for the Court’s refusal to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction. Because the Court refuses to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction under the authority of § 1367(c), the Court need not consider ARC’s arguments in its summary judgment brief concerning the state law claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing their foundational federal claims, with the relationship between those claims and remaining claims also informing the decision.

Nabatanzi v. NH Dept. of Corrections · filed 2000-08-25(c)

In this case, several factors counsel against the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims against the Goffstown defendants. First and perhaps most notably, her foundational federal claims against those defendants have been dismissed. Additionally, plaintiff’s state claims against the Goffstown Defendants do not arise out of the same common nucleus of operative facts as her claims against the remaining defendants. Rather, her state law claims against the Goffstown Defendants relate exclusively to her treatment while housed at Goffstown, while her claims against the remaining defendants relate to her subsequent detention at the Valley Street facility.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a purely state-law claim between nondiverse parties after considering the relevant factors.

Krider v. Marshall · filed 2000-10-06(c)

Assuming Krider could show good cause after notice of failure to make service on Young, the Court, after considering the factors outlined in Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106 (4th Cir.1995), declines jurisdiction over that purely state law claim involving non-diverse parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over additional claims even if it otherwise has that jurisdiction.

In Re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litigation · filed 2001-01-12(c)

In any event, even if I had supplemental jurisdiction, I would decline to exercise it under the standards set forth in section 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim when all federal claims have been resolved and the remaining claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law.

Simpson v. MacOn County, NC · filed 2001-01-19(c)

Because the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on each of the Plaintiffs federal claims, and all that remains is a novel or complex issue of state law, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over this claim.

Section 1367(c) gives a district court that declines supplemental jurisdiction inherent authority to remand a removed case to state court when the statutory conditions are met.

Hinson v. Norwest Financial South Carolina, Inc. · filed 2001-02-06(c)

In reaching this interpretation of § 1367(c), we join the other courts of appeals which unanimously have treated the remand power as inherent in the statutory authorization to decline supplemental juris- diction under § 1367(c).