28 U.S.C. § 1367

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing the federal claim.

Costello v. Seminole Tribe of Florida · filed 2010-07-12(c)

Because the Tribe enjoys immunity from this FLSA action, the motion to dismiss (Doc. 9) is GRANTED, and the FLSA claim is DISMISSED. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim is DECLINED, and Count II is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing the federal claim.

Kang v. Eisenstein · filed 1997-04-21(a)

Moreover, because the court is dismissing Count I under the FDCPA, it denies to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), over plaintiffs state law claim. Count II is therefore dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Neff v. Capital Acquisitions & Management Co. · filed 2002-11-20(c)(3)

Because this court has dismissed Neffs TILA and FDCPA claims, the federal claims over which this court has original jurisdiction, this court, in its discretion, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Neffs state law claims in counts V and VI.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the claims within its original jurisdiction.

Cooper v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP · filed 2012-12-17(c)(3)

In this specific case, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law causes of action asserted against Capital One to the extent they are asserted in Plaintiffs- complaint. Here, Plaintiffs federal law claims under FDCPA and FCRA against 'Capital One have been dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. As a result, at this time there are no causes of action asserted against Capital One over which this Court has original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Okyere v. Palisades Collection, LLC · filed 2013-03-22(c)(3)

Here, the FDCPA claims provided the only basis for federal jurisdiction. Thus, we decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Okyere’s state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Lorenz v. GE Capital Retail Bank · filed 2013-05-16(c)(3)

Having dismissed the Plaintiffs federal FDCPA claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law causes of action, including (1) a claim for deceptive business practices under the General Business Law; (2) claims for negligence, negligent supervision, and negligent hiring; and (3) a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

D'ORANGE v. Feely · filed 1995-02-22(c)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction____” Because Defendants present several adequate bases for dismissing Plaintiffs RICO claims, there is no reason for the court to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a district court to dismiss supplemental state claims after the federal claim supplying original jurisdiction has been dismissed.

Barry Richards, Karen Richards, Roland Pepin v. Combined Insurance Company of America and Credit Life Insurance Company · filed 1995-05-11(c)(3)

Because federal jurisdiction was based upon that RICO claim, the district court properly exercised its discretion in dismissing the supplemental state claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(8).

Section 1367(c) permits dismissal of supplemental state law claims after the federal claims are dismissed.

Roma Const. Co., Inc. v. aRUSSO · filed 1995-10-03(c)

The state law claims in Count IV-VI, Rhode Island RICO statutes §§ 7-15-2, 7-15-4 and R.I.G.L. § 9-1-2, are dismissed for lack of supplemental jurisdiction. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims when the federal claim is dismissed early in the proceedings.

Abdallah v. United Savings Bank · filed 1996-03-01(c)(3)

Once the district court dismissed Appellants' civil RICO claim, the remaining claims were state claims. The dismissal occurred early in the proceedings. The district court did not abuse its discretion when, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claim.

Gonzalez v. K-Mart Corp. · filed 1996-09-27(c)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (1996) and United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), the Court declines to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Vazquez’ remaining claims under Puerto Rico law.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

John Paul Mitchell Systems v. Eslami · filed 1997-03-26(c)(3)

Eslami's claim that once the district court dismissed the RICO claim it was without jurisdiction to rule on the state law claims is unavailing. The district court's supplemental jurisdiction over these claims was not lost because the court ultimately concluded that the federal claim was without merit.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Ortiz v. Supermercados Amigo, Inc. · filed 1997-05-19(c)(3)

As the federal claims have been dismissed in this case, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Puerto Rico law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the claims within its original jurisdiction.

Ehrich v. BAT INDUSTRIES PLC · filed 1997-05-28(c)(3)

Finally, the parties have not alleged any basis for this Court to exercise its jurisdiction aside from the federal RICO claim. The remaining claims are grounded in state law and the parties are not diverse. This Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the claims that supplied federal jurisdiction.

Kaiser v. Stewart · filed 1997-06-10(c)(3)

Because the RICO claims were the only basis for federal jurisdiction,' we will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 to review the Liquidator’s state law claims. Therefore, we will also dismiss these claims.

Section 1367 does not supply supplemental jurisdiction over a Magnuson-Moss class claim after dismissal of the only other claim that would confer federal jurisdiction.

Williams v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1997-07-29

First, since we have already dismissed plaintiffs RICO claim against Highland—the only other issue which would confer federal jurisdiction—plaintiff can no longer ask this court to take cognizance of his Magnuson-Moss claim under the supplemental jurisdiction provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after it resolves all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Peterson v. H & R Block Tax Services, Inc. · filed 1998-09-29(c)(3)

Having determined that Block is entitled to summary judgment on Peterson’s RICO claims, thereby resolving Peterson’s only federal claims, we decline to exercise our supplemental (and discretionary) jurisdiction over the remaining claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after it dismisses the federal claims.

Rodriguez v. Banco Popular De Puerto Rico · filed 1998-12-02(c)(3)

As there is no independent basis for federal jurisdiction over Plaintiffs supplemental state-law claims, the Court declines to accept supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims under Puerto Rico law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over local-law claims when it dismisses the federal claims and the local claims predominate.

Efron v. Embassy Suites (Puerto Rico), Inc. · filed 1999-04-14(c)

The only two bases for jurisdiction alleged in the complaint are federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal RICO claims), and supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (local law claims). Because the Court is dismissing plaintiffs federal RICO claims for want of standing and for lack of an adequate substantive basis in law, the local law claims now utterly predominate in this action. ... Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over them in accordance with the rule of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claim.

Lopez v. Police Department of Puerto Rico · filed 1999-12-06(c)(3)

As there is no independent basis for federal jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ supplemental state law claims, the Court declines to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims under Puerto Rico law.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissal of the claim supplying original federal jurisdiction.

Pik-Coal Co. v. Big Rivers Electric Corp. · filed 2000-01-07(c)(3)

On de novo consideration, the plaintiff's RICO cause (count one) is dismissed with prejudice under Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim; and the plaintiff's three Kentucky law charges (counts two, three, and four) are dismissed without prejudice, in the exercise of the court's discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) & (c)(3), in the absence of original federal jurisdiction over any pending claim following the dismissal of count one.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Ramos v. Roman · filed 2000-01-31(c)(3)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(e) and ... the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Commonwealth claims against the Defendants and hence, the Puerto Rico law causes of action are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Meng v. Schwartz · filed 2000-09-25(c)(3)

By statute, this Court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ... if (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (1994). Accordingly, as the plaintiffs RICO claim has been dismissed, the Court declines jurisdiction over the remaining claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Dempsey v. Sanders · filed 2001-02-22(c)(3)

Having dismissed the RICO claims, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), which provides that a federal district court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a supplemental state law claim if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims early in the suit.

Surcco v. Prasa · filed 2001-07-26(c)

Third, regarding plaintiffs’ claim for personal damages, as stated in this Court’s Opinion and Order, this Court cannot entertain plaintiffs’ claims under Puerto Rico law under supplemental jurisdiction, because plaintiffs’ federal claims are barred from prosecution in this forum.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Manhattan Telecommunications Corp. v. Dialamerica Marketing, Inc. · filed 2001-07-31(c)(3)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims where “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Because plaintiffs RICO claim — its only federal claim — cannot survive dismissal, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims of common law fraud or breach of contract.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Jordan (Bermuda) Investment Co. v. Hunter Green Investments Ltd. · filed 2001-07-19(c)(3)

Since the RICO counts have been dismissed, no federal question provides jurisdiction over this action. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) gives the Court discretion to “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ... if ... (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after resolving the claims that supplied original federal jurisdiction.

Rodriguez-Centeno v. Pueblo International, Inc. · filed 2001-11-01(c)(3)

As there is no independent basis for federal jurisdiction over Plaintiffs supplemental state law claims, the Court declines to exercise pendent jurisdiction over any of Plaintiffs claims under Puerto Rico law.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Watral v. Silvernails Farms, LLC · filed 2001-12-19(c)(3)

Having dismissed Plaintiffs RICO claims, the only claims remaining are claims brought pursuant to New York State law. The court declines to exercise its discretion to entertain such claims. The state law claims are, accordingly, dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to dismiss supplemental state-law claims after it dismisses the federal claims.

Lebron-Rios v. U.S. Marshal Service · filed 2002-04-24(c)(3)

Since this order disposes of the federal claims, plaintiffs’ supplemental claims under Puerto Rico law are dismissed as well.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims and finding no independent basis for federal jurisdiction.

Rosado v. Rotger-Sabat · filed 2002-05-07(c)(3)

However, the Court finds that Plaintiff has remaining claims under Puerto Rico law, but since these claims are not federal claims, and there is no independent basis for federal jurisdiction over Plaintiffs supplemental state law claims, the Court declines to exercise pendent jurisdiction over any of Plaintiffs claims under Puerto Rico law.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the claims that supplied federal jurisdiction.

FD Property Holding, Inc. v. US Traffic Corp. · filed 2002-06-19(c)(3)

In light of the Court’s dismissal of the RICO claims, which formed the basis of federal jurisdiction in this case, the Court declines to exercise pendent jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ common law claims for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement.

Section 1367 permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing the federal claim.

Quiñones Irizarry v. TLD De Puerto Rico · filed 2002-08-23(c)(3)

The Court, in the exercise of its discretion, has retained supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent Law 80 state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after all claims within its original jurisdiction have been dismissed.

Burstein v. First Penn-Pacific Life Insurance · filed 2002-09-18(c)(3)

As a result of the dismissal of Plaintiffs RICO claim, the only federal claim in this lawsuit, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs remaining state law claims. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court is permitted to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when all claims over which it has original jurisdiction have been dismissed. Accordingly, the Court will exercise its discretion and dismiss Plaintiffs remaining state law claims without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Torres v. Cooperativa De Seguros De Vida De Puerto Rico · filed 2003-02-26(c)(3)

Because the Court finds Torres’ federal law claims should be dismissed,- the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(c) permits, but does not require, a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after dismissing all federal claims if it had original jurisdiction over the dismissed claims.

Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan · filed 2003-08-08(c)

Since, therefore, the Court had original jurisdiction over the RICO claims that it has now dismissed, it may, but is not required to, continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367 permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims when no federal cause of action remains.

Burnett v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority · filed 2004-03-03(c)(3)

Thus, this Magistrate Judge declines to exercise pendant jurisdiction upon absence of a federal cause of action.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Marketing Products Management, LLC v. Healthandbeautydirect. Com, Inc. · filed 2004-09-07(c)(3)

For the reasons stated above, I conclude that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under RICO or the Lanham Act. In the absence of complete diversity of citizenship, I shall decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and shall dismiss without prejudice the remaining, state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Hollander v. Flash Dancers Topless Club · filed 2004-10-28(c)(3)

Because this Court has dismissed all federal causes of action under the RICO statute, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law causes of action.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Santiago-Hernandez v. Puerto Rico Danka, Inc. · filed 2005-04-04(c)

The Court having dismissed plaintiffs federal claims it may, in its discretion, decline to entertain the state-based actions under its supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367 permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction when resolving the state claims is necessary to determine whether the federal claims are reverse-preempted.

Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply · filed 2005-05-12(c)(3)

Having dismissed all claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court would normally decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, over Plaintiffs IIED claims. ... However, because the resolution of Plaintiffs IIED claims is necessary to the Court’s determination of whether the WDCÁ reverse-preempts Plaintiffs RICO claims under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, as addressed above, the Court will exercise pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiffs IIED claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a court to dismiss supplemental state law claims after dismissing the claims within its original jurisdiction.

Arce-Montalvo v. Hospital Buen Samaritano, Inc. · filed 2005-07-08(c)(3)

To the extent Arce’s amended complaint can be read as properly asserting supplemental jurisdiction for causes of action under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, such causes of action must be dismissed inasmuch as the claim under which this court had original jurisdiction will be dismissed.

Section 1367 permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the claims within its original jurisdiction when resolving the state-law claims is necessary to decide a federal claim.

Brown v. Cassens Transport Co. · filed 2005-07-15(c)(3)

However, because the resolution of Plaintiffs’ IIED claims is necessary to the Court’s determination of whether the WDCA reverse-preempts Plaintiffs’ RICO claims under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, as addressed above, the Court will exercise pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ IIED claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Strates Shows, Inc. v. Amusements of America, Inc. · filed 2005-07-25(c)(3)

Having dismissed plaintiffs only federal claims (plaintiffs first and second claims for relief under RICO), the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs remaining state law claims (plaintiffs third through eighth claims).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claim on which original jurisdiction rests.

Gagliardi v. Kratzenberg · filed 2005-09-15(c)

Because these defects in plaintiffs RICO claim cannot be cured by amendment, the court will dismiss the claims in plaintiffs complaint for lack of standing, and, in the alternative, dismiss the RICO claim with prejudice and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claim encompassed within plaintiffs complaint.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after it dismisses the federal claims.

Vazquez v. Commercial Union Insurance · filed 2006-02-17(c)

The dismissal of Plaintiffs’ federal claim leaves only Plaintiffs’ claim under Puerto Rico law. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Commonwealth claims against Defendant. Since the remaining claims are exclusively State law claims, this Court prefers that the state courts with better local law expertise decide the matter.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Torres-Martinez v. Puerto Rico Department of Corrections · filed 2006-04-03(c)(3)

However, because there is no independent basis for federal jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ supplemental state law claims, and given the dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the Court declines to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ claims under Puerto Rico law.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when the federal claims are dismissed early in the case.

Rolon v. Rafael Rosario & Associates, Inc. · filed 2006-08-31(c)

Furthermore, plaintiffs supplemental law claims under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE since early on in the case, the general rule is that the Court may discard the supplementary jurisdiction claims should federal claims be dismissed early on in the procedures.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims against defendants once all federal claims against them have been dismissed.

Hernandez-Payero v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico · filed 2007-04-27(c)(3)

Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims against individuals who are no longer subject to federal law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because all the federal claims against Defendants Toledo, Vivoni, Pereira, Rivera-Gonzalez, Miro, Aviles-Hernandez, Torres-Hernandez, Rivera-Correa and Comas were dismissed, the Court will dismiss the supplemental state law claims against them without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims supporting original federal jurisdiction.

De Pacheco v. Martinez · filed 2007-06-29(c)(3)

Because the civil RICO claim has been dismissed, there is no claim left to sustain federal jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court will exercise its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and decline to exercise jurisdiction over the state-law claims, Grounds ONE through FIVE and Ground SEVEN.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Ortiz-Rosario v. TOYS" R" US PUERTO RICO, INC. · filed 2008-10-14(c)(3)

The Court, in its discretion, declines to exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction over claims arising under state law, as there is no actionable cause under federal law.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Méndez-Aponte v. Rico · filed 2009-09-16(c)(3)

Having dismissed all federal law claims, we will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claims arising from Puerto Rico law are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives a district court discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims.

Brown v. FIRST TENNESSEE BANK NAT. ASS'N · filed 2009-11-20(c)(3)

With all federal claims dismissed, the court's jurisdiction over the remaining state matters is discretionary. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The surviving state RICO claims no longer incorporate federal mail and wire fraud elements. Accordingly, this court declines to interpret the Georgia residential mortgage fraud statute, as a predicate to Georgia RICO claims. The COURT DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Mr. Brown's remaining state law RICO claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

COSTAS-ELENA v. Municipality of San Juan · filed 2010-05-20(c)(3)

As we dismiss Plaintiffs’ federal claims, we decline supplemental jurisdiction over their claims arising under Puerto Rico law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Ramos-Borges v. PUERTO RICO HEALTH DEPT. · filed 2010-09-27(c)(3)

Having dismissed all of plaintiffs federal claims against the defendants, the court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Therefore, the court dismisses without prejudice plaintiffs supplemental claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after disposing of all federal claims.

Negrón-Santiago v. San Cristobal Hospital · filed 2011-02-16(c)(3)

Because we have disposed of all federal claims, we decline supplemental jurisdiction over their claims arising under Puerto Rico law.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

McPeters v. Edwards · filed 2011-04-14(c)(3)

Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted under the U.S. Constitution or RICO, and so no federal question remains in this case. The court still has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims because they form a part of the same “case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, the court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if ... (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction .... ” Id. at § 1367(c). The Court finds it appropriate to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims in this case.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Ambulance Ass'n of Pennsylvania v. Highmark Inc. · filed 2011-06-07(c)(3)

Further, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) provides that the district courts may refuse to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction when a district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. Consequently, because the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the above claims, including the RICO claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment and conversion claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after it dismisses the federal claims.

Greenpeace, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Company · filed 2011-09-09(c)(3)

For the reasons stated above, the RICO allegations in Counts Six through Nine of the Complaint will be dismissed because they fail to state a claim. The Court declines to extend supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims otherwise pled. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Perez v. SAINT JOHN'S SCHOOL · filed 2011-09-30(c)(3)

Having dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Puerto Rico law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Reyes-Garay v. Integrand Assurance Co. · filed 2011-09-30(c)(3)

Having dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Puerto Rico law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Mendez-Martinez v. Caribbean Alliance Insurance · filed 2012-02-10(c)(3)

Having dismissed all of Plaintiffs federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs Puerto Rico law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after the federal claims are dismissed following trial.

Air China, Ltd. v. Kopf · filed 2012-04-04(c)(3)

Similarly, even if we were to accept the Defendants’ argument that the RICO claims should have been dismissed prior to trial, this does not serve as a basis for overturning the district court’s exercise of its discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims, and to dismiss the state law claims without prejudice.

Aguiar-Serrano v. Puerto Rico Highways & Transportation Authority · filed 2013-01-17(c)(3)

Because the Court dismisses plaintiff Aguiar’s section 1983 action as to all defendants, no federal claim remains upon which to ground jurisdiction over her Commonwealth law claims. Further, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. Accordingly, plaintiff Aguiar’s Commonwealth law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing every claim within its original jurisdiction, with judicial economy, convenience, and comity informing that choice.

Sunlight Electrical Contracting Co. v. Turchi · filed 2013-01-18(c)(3)

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) provides that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if it has “dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”. Our original jurisdiction here is founded solely upon Sunlight’s civil RICO claim against John J. Turchi, Jr., and so we no longer have original jurisdiction over the action. Of the six other suits pending by subcontractors against defendants, four are proceeding in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, one in the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas and one in Bankruptcy Court. PI. Br. in Opp. at 33. These cases will likely raise state law questions similar to those at issue in this action. Principles of judicial economy, convenience, and comity thus counsel in favor of dismissal without prejudice of the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over local law claims against defendants when all federal claims against those defendants have been dismissed.

Maldonado-Gonzalez v. Puerto Rico Police · filed 2013-03-05(c)(3)

The Court need not address the issue at this juncture because all federal claims against the individual defendants have been dismissed. As such, it is within the Court’s discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction over this local law claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining claims after dismissing the only claim within its original jurisdiction.

Apache Tribe v. Brown · filed 2013-08-14(c)(3)

Because the Court has decided to dismiss the Tribe’s RICO claim — the only claim for which original jurisdiction existed — the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Tribe’s remaining claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims after dismissing all federal claims.

Lee v. Life Insurance Co. of North America · filed 1993-08-05(c)(3)

In sum, I dismiss with prejudice plaintiffs’ federal antitrust, equal protection and due process claims. In the absence of any federal claims, this case lacks original jurisdiction in this Court. Within my discretion, I respectfully decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after it disposes of all federal claims.

Crosby v. Hospital Authority of Valdosta · filed 1995-01-12(c)(3)

Because the court has determined that defendants are immune from all federal claims, via the state action exemption, the only claims before the court are based on state antitrust laws. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), this court declines to continue the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over these state-based claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Terrific Promotions, Inc. v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. · filed 1996-12-10(c)(3)

The statute further provides, however, that a court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has “dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3). ... This is certainly the proper course here. Having dismissed both the federal antitrust and securities fraud claims, then, the court will now dismiss the state law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives a district court discretion to retain or decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after it dismisses the federal claims.

Big Bear Lodging Ass'n v. Snow Summit, Inc. · filed 1999-07-08(c)(3)

After the court concluded that Plaintiffs had failed to state valid federal antitrust claims, it was free to decide in its discretion whether to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state claims or to dismiss those claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after the federal claims fail.

Paladin Associates, Inc. v. Montana Power Co. · filed 2000-05-04(c)(3)

Having determined that the federal antitrust claims fail as a matter of law, the court deems it appropriate to exercise its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and refrain from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing the claims that supplied original federal jurisdiction.

North American Energy Systems, LLC v. New England Energy Management, Inc. · filed 2002-09-13(c)(3)

Even if this interference claim had merit, the court, having dismissed the antitrust claims and, thus, the basis for original federal jurisdiction, would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim.

Section 1367 does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s additional claims when that plaintiff’s federal claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, even if the court retains original jurisdiction over other plaintiffs’ claims.

SA v. Hoffman-Laroche · filed 2003-01-17(a)

When the District Court dismissed the foreign plaintiffs' underlying federal antitrust claim on jurisdictional grounds, it had no discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction at all over the foreign plaintiffs' foreign law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after all federal claims are dismissed.

GF Gaming Corp. v. City of Black Hawk · filed 2005-04-19(c)(3)

Because the district court properly dismissed all of plaintiffs’ federal claims, it was within its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state-law claims under the Colorado Antitrust Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Exum v. United States Olympic Committee, 389 F.3d 1130, 1138-39 (10th Cir. 2004).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing the only claim within its original jurisdiction.

In Re Canadian Import Antitrust Litigation · filed 2005-08-26(c)(3)

In this case, the Court has dismissed Plaintiffs’ federal antitrust claim, the only claim within the Court’s original jurisdiction. The Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state-law and common-law claims and dismisses them without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after it dismisses the claim that supplied original federal jurisdiction.

Perry v. Rado · filed 2007-05-24(c)(3)

The antitrust claim provided this court with its original federal jurisdiction. Because of the dismissal of this claim, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims alleged by Plaintiffs in their Complaint.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction; if some federal claims are reinstated on appeal, a dismissal of related state-law claims on that basis is vacated.

In Re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation · filed 2010-08-16(c)(3)

A district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over state-law claims if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... Because we will vacate in part the judgment dismissing the federal claims, we will also vacate the ... dismissal of the state-law claims.

After all federal claims are dismissed, section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims based on judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

In re Libor-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation · filed 2013-03-29(c)(3)

Here, considerations of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity suggest that we should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ as-yet-unspecified-state-law claim.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after it dismisses the only claim supporting federal jurisdiction.

Ragland v. Rock-Tenn Co. · filed 1997-03-14(c)

By granting summary judgment on the ADEA claim, we have dismissed the only count supporting federal jurisdiction. Using our discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), we decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ragland’s remaining state law claims for breach of contract and defamation. We find that considerations of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity point toward permitting their resolution in state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives a district court broad discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims after disposing of the federal claim.

Jacques v. Sierra Pacific Power Co. · filed 1994-12-05(c)(3)

The ADEA claim having been disposed of, this court has broad discretion to refuse to exercise jurisdiction over remaining pendent state claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claim.

Tillman v. Robards · filed 1997-07-25(c)(3)

Contrary to Tillman's assertion, it was within the district court’s ... discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over Tillman’s state law claims after dismissing her ADEA claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(a), (c)(3); Murray v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 874 F.2d 555, 558 (8th Cir. 1989).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the only claim within its original jurisdiction.

Choate v. Transport Logistics Corp. · filed 2002-12-30(c)(3)

Inasmuch as Mr. Choate’s ADEA claim was the only claim over which the Court had original jurisdiction, this Court declines, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs remaining state statutory and common law claims and they are dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it resolves the federal claims against the plaintiffs.

Bacher v. City of North Ridgeville · filed 1996-05-14(c)(3)

Given our conclusion that there is no procedural or substantive due process violation, we conclude that the lower court did not err in refusing to address plaintiffs' state breach of contract and sunshine laws claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Lumpkin v. CITY OF LAFAYETTE, ALA. · filed 1998-10-27(c)(3)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), this court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. Having dismissed the procedural due process claim over which the court had original jurisdiction, this court chooses to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing every claim within its original jurisdiction.

Webster v. Moquin · filed 2001-11-20(c)(3)

The Court further declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs Connecticut Constitution due process claim on the ground that it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

When federal claims are reinstated, a dismissal of related state law claims under Section 1367(c) based on the dismissal of those federal claims must also be vacated.

Fromprovicz v. County of Schuylkill · filed 2005-05-11(c)

Appellants’ state law claim of third party interference with business relationship must be also reinstated because the federal claims described herein should not have been dismissed. ... For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s order will be vacated to the extent that it dismissed the substantive due process claim for lack of jurisdiction, the claims asserting conspiracy to deny due process rights and municipal liability for civil rights violations for failure to state a claim, and the state law claim of third party interference with business relationship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(3) leaves district courts discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after the federal claims are dismissed.

Adams v. Suozzi · filed 2008-02-22(c)(3)

We also vacate the District Court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ state law claims because that dismissal was contingent upon plaintiffs’ success on then-due process claim. On remand, we leave it to the District Court to decide whether to invoke its discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over common law or local law claims after it concludes that the plaintiff has stated no federal claim.

Mills v. District of Columbia Department of Mental Health Saint Elizabeths Hospital Managers · filed 2010-12-21

... the Court concludes that plaintiff has stated no claim under the due process clause and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any common law or local law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims when it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Reed v. Medford Fire Department, Inc. · filed 2011-08-10(c)(3)

Thus, if the Court dismisses the Plaintiffs Section 1983 claim, there will be no federal cause of action upon which the Court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court denies the Plaintiffs request to extend supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining due process claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to dismiss supplemental state-law claims after it has dismissed the federal claims.

Gazarkiewicz v. Town of Kingsford Heights · filed 2003-05-27(c)(3)

All Plaintiffs First Amendment claims having been denied, this Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs claims under Article One of the ... Indiana Constitution pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(a) does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim unrelated to the surviving federal claim.

Thomas v. Chicago Housing Authority · filed 1996-03-15(a)

Like her claim of an unsanitary apartment, this claim is not related to Ms. Thomas’ First Amendment claim. I therefore may not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after the federal claims are dismissed.

White v. Correctional Medical Services Inc. · filed 2004-03-24(c)(3)

The district court properly held that White’s complaint failed to state a claim of relief under the Eighth, Fourteenth, and First Amendments. Having found no basis for federal jurisdiction, the district court properly declined to exercise jurisdiction over White’s state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

McMillion v. Metropolitan Government · filed 2011-06-29(c)(3)

However, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) allows a district court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. ... Having dismissed Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim, and as there are no remaining claims over which this Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claim under the THRA.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining claims after entering judgment on all federal claims.

Stanfield v. Osborne Industries, Inc. · filed 1993-12-23(c)(3)

In conclusion, the court finds that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs claims brought under the Lanham Act. With judgment entered on these claims, the court shall not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims contained in Count III of the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Tax Cap Committee v. Save Our Everglades, Inc. · filed 1996-07-09(c)(3)

Moreover, having found that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Tax Cap’s Lanham Act claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the unfair competition claim that is predicated on state law.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Sun Trading Distributing Co. v. Evidence Music, Inc. · filed 1997-10-14(c)(3)

In dismissing the Lanham Act claims, the Court has the discretion whether to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Professional Sound Services, Inc. v. Guzzi · filed 2004-12-27(c)(3)

In dismissing the Lanham Act claims, the Court has the discretion whether to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. ... The Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over such claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Baker v. The Board of Regents of the State of Kansas and University of Kansas Medical School--School of Medici · filed 1993-04-12(c)(3)

The district court, in its discretion, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the appellant’s state law contract claim. We see no reason to disturb the district court’s decision.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Dow v. Terramara, Inc. · filed 1993-10-06(c)(3)

In fact it is expressly authorized to decline supplemental jurisdiction if the court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... The court finds there is no compelling reason to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Dow’s wrongful discharge and breach of employment contract claims. Therefore, these claims shall be dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after disposing of the federal claims.

Reigel v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of North Carolina · filed 1994-06-30(c)(3)

Although plaintiff’s pendent state law breach of contract claim arguably involves several of the issues presented and touched upon above, the court, in its discretion, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs state claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to dismiss a state law claim after dismissing the federal claims.

Roberts v. Potomac Electric Power Company · filed 1995-03-22(c)(3)

Finally, although the district court did not specifically address Roberts' state law breach of contract claim, it is clear that the district court, having dismissed the federal law claims, could properly dismiss the state law claim. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(c)(3); see Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7 (1988); cf. Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1042 (D.C.Cir.1991); see also Reeve v. Oliver, 41 F.3d 381, 383 (8th Cir.1994).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after resolving the claims within its original jurisdiction.

General Textile Printing & Processing Corp. v. City of Rocky Mount · filed 1995-04-03(c)(3)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs remaining state-law claims for misrepresentation, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the claim that supplied original jurisdiction.

USAR Systems, Inc. v. Brain Works, Inc. · filed 1995-05-31(c)(3)

And, having dismissed USAR’s copyright infringement claim, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over USAR’s breach of contract and fraud claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after it disposes of all federal claims.

Day v. Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska · filed 1995-10-24(c)(3)

Additionally, I have concluded that summary judgment is appropriate with respect to each claim raised by Dr. Day which arises under the United States Constitution or federal statute. I shall therefore decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Day’s state law contract claim, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and I shall dismiss it without prejudice so that he may refile in an appropriate forum.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over common law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Tri-County Industries, Inc. v. District of Columbia · filed 1996-01-17(c)

Having decided to dismiss all the claims over which I have original jurisdiction, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs common law claims of tortious interference with contract and interference with prospective business advantage. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367 makes supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim discretionary after all federal claims are dismissed.

Davis v. City of Palo Alto · filed 1996-06-14(c)(3)

Because the Court has dismissed all of the federal claims, the jurisdiction over the pendent state contract claim is discretionary. That claim is DISMISSED. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(8).

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after it has disposed of the federal claims.

Phillips v. Holladay Property Services, Inc. · filed 1996-08-20(c)(3)

FURTHER ORDERED that there no longer being any basis for the Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs other claim for breach of contract under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, that claim shall be dismissed, without prejudice, with leave to proceed thereunder in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia to which her remaining claim is hereby remanded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); and, it is FURTHER ORDERED in view of the Judgment entered in favor of the defendant on the plaintiffs claims for race and national origin discrimination and the remand referred to above, this ease stands dismissed from the docket of this Court, without reaching the merits of the common law breach of contract claim.

Section 1367 permits a court that has disposed of all federal claims to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim requiring further proceedings while retaining state claims it can easily resolve.

Schartz v. Unified School District No. 512 · filed 1997-01-16(c)(3)

Given that no federal question remains in this case and diversity jurisdiction does not exist, the court in its discretion declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs breach of contract claim. ... In contrast, the court will retain supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs other state law claims. Plaintiffs other state law claims can be easily resolved without further proceedings and thus the court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over these claims is appropriate.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after all federal claims have been dismissed.

Faust v. Al C. Parke · filed 1997-05-22(c)(3)

Assuming, however, that these claims are made pursuant to our supplemental jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367, we dismiss the implied contract claim as no facts have been alleged showing that an implied contract existed. All other federal claims having been dismissed, we do not retain jurisdiction of the constructive fraud claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after the claims supporting original federal jurisdiction are dismissed.

Palmatier v. Michigan Department of State Police · filed 1997-08-15(c)(3)

The Court having thus concluded that plaintiffs count II USERRA claim may proceed no further against any of the remaining defendants, the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction is extinguished. Under these circumstances, the Court will, in its discretion, refrain from exercising continuing supplemental jurisdiction over the count I breach of contract claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, including when the federal claims are dismissed early in the case.

Harless v. Research Institute of America · filed 1998-03-26(c)(3)

However, as the Court now grants defendants’ motion to dismiss and or/for summary judgment on plaintiffs federal claims, it must re-examine its subject-matter jurisdiction over the third claim. As provided in § 1367(c), “The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if ... (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, ...” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). As defendants brought this motion early in the proceedings (within three months of the filing of the Complaint), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs contract claim for recovery of STD benefits.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Lowry v. Cabletron Systems · filed 1998-04-27(c)(3)

The court exercises its discretion to dismiss the breach of contract claim, having dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after all federal claims have been resolved.

McMahon v. CITY OF EDGEWATER, FLA. · filed 1999-01-20(c)(3)

Counts Three and Four of the Complaint allege state contract claims, and Plaintiff has no remaining federal claims. Moreover, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such claims. Thus, such claims must be dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after the claims supporting original jurisdiction have been dismissed.

French v. United States ex rel. Department of Human Health & Human Service · filed 1999-02-25(c)(3)

The Plaintiffs claim under FTCA has not survived and thus, this Court’s original jurisdiction no longer exists. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Plaintiffs state law claims for intrusion into private affairs, for intentional infliction of emotional distress and the claim against Dugan alone for tortious interference with contract will be dismissed without prejudice to bringing these claims in state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims when those claims may have merit but are better adjudicated in state court.

Pleva v. Norquist · filed 1999-10-26(c)(3)

After dismissing all of Pleva's federal claims, the district court used its discretion under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1367(c)(3) to exercise jurisdiction over the contract claims, dismissing them with prejudice, and to decline to exercise jurisdiction over the defamation and conspiracy claims, dismissing them without prejudice. ... That court's conclusion that these claims may have merit, but that the state court is a better forum for their adjudication, is not unreasonable. Thus, the district court's decision to dismiss the remaining claims without prejudice is not an abuse of discretion and is affirmed.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives a court discretion to retain or decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after all federal claims are dismissed.

Staggers v. Real Authentic Sound · filed 1999-10-28(c)(3)

Plaintiffs copyright claims were substantial and non-frivolous; thus, even if all of the copyright claims were dismissed, the Court has the discretion to retain or decline jurisdiction over plaintiffs supplemental contract law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims after disposing of all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Urdinaran v. Aarons · filed 2000-09-26(c)(3)

Because the Court is disposing of all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state contract and tort claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Ackoff-Ortega v. Windswept Pacific Entertainment Co. · filed 2000-10-11(c)(3)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims where “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Because plaintiffs’ only federal claim cannot survive dismissal, I now decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ remaining state law contract, claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Tigrett v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia · filed 2001-03-01(c)(3)

28 U.S.C. § 1367 provides that courts “may decline” to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in certain circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). In particular, a court has discretion to dismiss or keep a case when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” ... Having dismissed all of Plaintiffs’s federal claims, and in heeding the warning of Gibbs, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff Ti-grett’s state law contract claim, and that claim is therefore dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Ferreri v. Mac Motors, Inc. · filed 2001-04-11(c)(3)

Because we will dismiss all of the federal claims against Defendant, we must decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs PHRA, WPCL, and breach of contract claims. A court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction [over state law claims] if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). We decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs remaining state law claims.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Coles v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2001-06-18(c)(3)

Finally, as to the plaintiffs’ state law claims for breach of contract, conspiracy and specific performance, we decline to exercise our supplemental jurisdiction over them. See: 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(8).

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after the federal claims are dismissed and diversity jurisdiction is absent.

Seaweed, Inc. v. DMA Product & Design & Marketing LLC · filed 2002-09-04(c)(3)

Finally, in the absence of any federal question, and because there was a lack of diversity between the parties at the time the complaint was filed, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the claim and counterclaim for breach of contract and the counterclaim for unjust enrichment.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing the federal claim that supplied original jurisdiction.

Morgan, Inc. v. White Rock Distilleries, Inc. · filed 2002-10-30(c)(3)

Because the Court is without jurisdiction to hear the federal copyright claim, the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law contract claims when the federal claims have been dismissed.

Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc. · filed 2003-05-13(c)(3)

However, the district court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these contract claims. 171 F.Supp.2d at 1074-75. Because we now uphold the district court's determination that the compositions are works for hire and Warren lacks standing to pursue his copyright claims, the only remaining claims are contractual in nature, and the district court's dismissal of these claims in favor of state court adjudication was not an abuse of discretion See Skysign Int'l, Inc. v. City and County of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over local law claims and counterclaims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Shekoyan v. Sibley International Corp. · filed 2004-03-19(c)(3)

In addition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court will dismiss the defendant’s counterclaim for conversion and trespass to chattels and the plaintiffs DCHRA, breach of contract, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.

Section 1367(c) generally calls for a court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the federal claims that supplied original jurisdiction are gone.

Howell v. North Central College · filed 2004-08-17(c)(3)

Because plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed her original Title IX claim and she cannot allege a retaliation claim that would withstand a motion to dismiss, the basis for invoking federal jurisdiction is gone. The general rule in such instances, which Judge Bobrick followed, is that the court should relinquish jurisdiction over pendent state law claims rather than resolve them on the merits. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Williams v. Aztar Indiana Gaming Corp., 351 F.3d 294, 300 (7th Cir.2003). Accordingly, the court properly denied plaintiff leave to add a state law breach of contract claim to her complaint, and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim when the federal claims are dismissed early in the proceedings.

Hydril Co., LP v. Grant Prideco, LP · filed 2005-08-25(c)(3)

Because the federal claims have been dismissed at such an early stage of the proceedings, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ pendent state law claim for breach of contract.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Hanig v. Yorktown Central School District · filed 2005-09-02(c)(3)

Accordingly, as all federal claims have been dismissed, we exercise our discretion and decline to retain supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs remaining state law breach of contract claim.

Section 1367(a) gives a district court supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims when it has original jurisdiction over a federal claim; after disposing of the federal claim, the court must consider whether to decline supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(3) rather than dismiss the state-law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Anderson v. Cader Publishing, Ltd. · filed 2005-10-05(a), (c)(3)

Here, the district court had original jurisdiction over Anderson’s copyright claim, and accordingly had supplemental jurisdiction over Anderson’s remaining claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Rather than dismissing the breach of contract claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the district court should instead have considered whether to exercise its discretion, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

McGuire v. Warren · filed 2005-12-09(c)(3)

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... Accordingly, as all federal claims have been dismissed, we exercise our discretion and decline to retain supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs remaining state law breach of contract claim.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claim.

Azubuko v. Eastern Bank · filed 2005-12-16(c)

The District Court also properly declined to consider Azubuko’s state law contract or tort claims,3 by deciding against exercising its supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims that remained after his federal claim had been dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims after dismissing the claims within its original jurisdiction.

Traicoff v. Digital Media, Inc. · filed 2006-07-07(c)(3)

Given that summary judgment is appropriate on the federal claim (and the breach of contract claim), the court, in its discretion, DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claim and cross-claims, which will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling in state court within thirty (30) days of this date.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Carter v. ALK Holdings, Inc. · filed 2007-06-05(c)

Because the Court has dismissed all federal claims over which it has jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Carter’s remaining state law claims for fraud (Count IV), breach of fiduciary duty (Count VII), ... tortious interference with a prospective business relationship (Count XII), defamation (Count XIII), deceptive trade practices (Count XIV), and breach of contract (Count XV).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over local-law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

McManus v. District of Columbia · filed 2007-12-31(c)(3)

Even if the Court could assert subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract, breach of collective bargaining agreement, and breach of fair duty of representation, in light of the Court's dismissal of Plaintiffs’ federal law claim, it would be entirely appropriate for the Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ local law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the claim within its original jurisdiction.

Jackson v. Ponds · filed 2008-01-25(c)(3)

With the dismissal of plaintiffs civil rights claim, the only claim over which this Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs breach of contract and tort claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives a district court discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims once all federal claims have been dismissed.

King v. St of LA Dept of Pub · filed 2008-09-23(c)(3)

With all federal claims properly dismissed, we conclude that the district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction for King’s claims under ... unspecified “employment, contract and tort laws” of Louisiana was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state-law claim after dismissing the federal claims.

Malcolm v. Honeoye Falls Lima Central School District · filed 2009-11-10(c)(3)

Having dismissed plaintiffs federal law claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs contract claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state-law claim after dismissing the claims within its original jurisdiction.

Russo v. School Board · filed 2011-12-15(c)(3)

Thus, having dismissed Dr. Russo’s Section 1983 claims, this Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over his state law breach of contract claim arising from the same case and controversy.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing the federal claims.

Thomas v. Advance Housing, Inc. · filed 2012-04-03(c)(3)

Given our conclusion that the District Court properly dismissed Thomas’ federal claims, any exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the contract claim would not have been warranted.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc. · filed 2012-10-30(c)(3)

Having dismissed the only federal claim in this case, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs sole remaining state law claim of breach of implied contract. The United States Code provides, “The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ... if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim when it dismisses the federal claim that supplied original jurisdiction.

Arco Capital Corporations Ltd. v. Deutsche Bank AG · filed 2013-06-06(c)(3)

Because Arco’s federal claim is dismissed, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over its breach of contract claim.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing the federal claim before trial.

Williams v. Citibank, N.A. · filed 2008-07-17(c)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court may decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction over these claims. ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs remaining state law claims are hereby dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) calls for declining supplemental jurisdiction over state claims when all claims within original jurisdiction are dismissed before trial, unless judicial economy, convenience, and fairness affirmatively justify retaining them.

V-Tech Services, Inc. v. Street · filed 2007-02-06(c)(3)

The District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing V-Tech’s state law claims. When a District Court dismisses before trial the claims over which it had original jurisdiction, it “must decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so.” Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (giving district courts discretion to decline to hear state claims that they would have supplemental jurisdiction to entertain under § 1367(a)). V-Tech has not argued those considerations here.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claim that supplied original jurisdiction, particularly when dismissal occurs well before trial.

Ronald Alexander Leblanc Trust v. Ransom · filed 2003-08-13(c)(3)

In the instant case, this Court’s dismissal of the only federal claim in the suit so far in advance of trial coupled with Plaintiffs’ acquiescence, upon motion by Defendants, to dismiss the RICO claim weighs heavily in favor of a determination to decline supplemental jurisdiction of the state law claims.

Section 1367 permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when all federal claims are dismissed before trial.

Diaz-Diaz v. CROWLEY LINER SERVICES, INC. · filed 2003-09-09(c)(3)

Nevertheless, where, as here, all federal claims warrant dismissal prior to trial, the district court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after the federal claims are disposed of before trial.

Perez v. Norwegian-American Hospital · filed 2003-02-04(c)(3)

Having concluded that Perez’ federal claims cannot survive a motion for summary judgment, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law intentional battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.

When all federal claims are eliminated before trial, a district court ordinarily may decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims; that decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Gee v. Liebert Corp. · filed 2003-02-12(c)(3)

“[I]n the usual case in which all federal law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered ... will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” ... As such, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a related state-law claim after disposing of the federal claims before trial, dismissing the state-law claim without prejudice.

Verizon Maryland Inc. v. RCN Telecom Services, Inc. · filed 2003-03-05(c)(3)

Typically, courts decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when all the federal claims have been disposed of prior to a full trial on the merits. ... Accordingly, to whatever extent supplemental jurisdiction exists, this Court declines to exercise it. Verizon’s claim that the PSC misconstrued its agreement with WorldCom will be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state claim when the federal claims are resolved before trial.

Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc. · filed 2003-01-30(c)(3)

Finally, as the federal claims in this case have been resolved before trial, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claim.