28 U.S.C. § 1367

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction when no exception favors retaining them.

Brown v. UChicago Argonne LLC · filed 2020-07-09(c)(3)

Because no exception applies, relinquishing jurisdiction over the state law claim is the appropriate course under § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Bowens v. Schrubbe · filed 2020-07-13(c)(3)

After dismissing each claim over which it has original jurisdiction, the court recognizes it may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any pendent state law claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... Taking these matters into consideration, the court will exercise its supplemental jurisdiction to dismiss Bowens’ state law medical malpractice claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to dismiss remaining state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction when no compelling basis warrants retaining supplemental jurisdiction.

MorningStar Fellowship Church v. York County South Carolina · filed 2020-07-20(c)(3)

A federal district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction ... if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... As no compelling basis has been brought forth for exercising supplemental jurisdiction over these claims, the court will dismiss them, therefore, dismissing all remaining claims against York County, Baker, and Motz.

After dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, a court may retain supplemental jurisdiction when discovery is complete and the state law claims are relatively simple to resolve.

Mateo v. University System of New Hampshire and Frances Canning · filed 2020-07-20(c)(3)

Here, where the parties have completed discovery and disposition of the state law claims is relatively simple, the circumstance weighs in favor of my retaining supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction when judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor retention.

Hazley v. State of MN · filed 2020-07-23(c)(3)

Accordingly, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity weigh in favor of the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in this case.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, considering judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Brown v. City of North Charleston · filed 2020-07-29(c)(3)

The supplemental jurisdiction statute provides the court discretion to dismiss or retain jurisdiction over a case when, as in this instance, it has ‘‘dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” ... Although the principle of comity favors remanding the case to State court, the factors of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness weigh in favor of the court exercising supplemental jurisdiction on the Tort Claims. Therefore, the court rejects the R&R’s recommendation and exercises supplemental jurisdiction on the Tort Claims based on the Cohill factors.

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims after dismissing the sole claim within its original jurisdiction.

GIBSON v. CARRIAGE FORD, INC. · filed 2020-08-27(c)(3)

The court elects to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the supplemental state law claims because they arise out of the same set of facts—those regarding his employment with and resignation from Carriage Ford—as his age discrimination claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to retain straightforward state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Wagner v. University of Washington · filed 2020-09-11(c)(3)

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims once it has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court, however, finds that resolution of the remaining claims is straightforward enough to do so here.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction; retaining them requires an affirmative justification grounded in judicial economy, convenience, or fairness.

KANAUSS v. KOWNATSKY · filed 2020-09-28(c)(3)

The Court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). In addition, the Court “‘must decline’ to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in such circumstances ‘unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so.’” Stone v. Martin, 720 F. App’x 132, 136 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000)). Here, the Court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction over the Title VII claims and supplemental jurisdiction over the other state law claims. The parties are not diverse, and the Title VII claims are the only questions of federal law presently before the Court. Thus, because there is no final pre-trail order in this case, the Court has no affirmative justification for retaining supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, and hereby remands this case to New Jersey state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction when no affirmative justification supports retaining them.

DOE v. University of Scranton · filed 2020-10-09(c)(3)

In accordance with the directives of the Third Circuit, the Court finds that there exists no affirmative justification to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the instant state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives a district court discretion to retain or decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Briley v. Barreca · filed 2020-10-26(c)(3)

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) specifically grants a district court the discretion to retain or decline supplemental jurisdiction once it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.82 Therefore, the Court will defer decision on whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims until after Plaintiff amends the Complaint.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives a federal court discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it has disposed of all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Brown v. City of North Charleston · filed 2020-10-29(c)(3)

As the court noted in the Summary Judgment Order, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) affords a federal court the discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims even where the court has disposed of all claims with original federal jurisdiction.

After dismissing every claim within its original jurisdiction, a district court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims when judicial economy, convenience, and fairness give no reason to retain them.

KNOPP v. SHELL OIL COMPANY · filed 2020-12-14(c)(3)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a federal court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” in the event that claims over which it had original jurisdiction are dismissed. ... No such justification exists here and this Court will therefore decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction when no affirmative justification supports retaining them.

Minnich v. Northeastern School District · filed 2021-01-26(c)(3)

Finding that no affirmative justification to exercise supplemental jurisdiction exists at this time, the Court therefore declines to consider Defendant’s arguments under Rule 12(b)(6) and will dismiss the Plaintiff’s state law claims under the PHRA without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to retain a state law claim after dismissing the claims within its original jurisdiction when judicial economy, convenience, the clear outcome, and possible diversity jurisdiction favor doing so.

Briggs v. Quantitech Inc · filed 2021-02-09(c)(3)

Typically, when a court dismisses the claims over which it has original jurisdiction, it should also decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(e); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); Baggett v. First Nat. Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1353 (11th Cir. 1997). In this case, however, the possibility that the court might have diversity jurisdiction, the clarity of the outcome of the state law claim, and the interests of judicial economy and convenience weigh in favor of the court exercising supplemental jurisdiction to decide Qualis’ and QuantiTech’s motions to dismiss the Florida law claim.

After all claims within original jurisdiction are dismissed, § 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims, and retaining them requires an affirmative justification based on judicial economy, convenience, or fairness.

CRASH PROOF RETIREMENT, LLC v. Price · filed 2021-04-13(c)(3)

A court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction [over state law claims] if … the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... There is no affirmative justification for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction here. The case is in its infancy. The Court has developed no partiucarl familiarity with the facts or issues presented. Thus, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits, but does not require, a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all federal claims; closely related state claims may warrant retaining it.

NEW CONCEPTS FOR LIVING, INC. v. COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS LOCAL 1040 · filed 2021-05-28(c)(3)

Although the dismissal of the federal wiretap claims permitted (but did not require) the Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the interrelated nature of the federal wiretap claims, state law wiretap claims, and state law fraud claim warranted the Court’s retention of that supplemental jurisdiction here to determine that those claims were likewise not adequately pleaded.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after the federal claims are dismissed, considering economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Estate of Sean Patrick O'Brien v. City of Livingston · filed 2021-07-19(c)

Although the Court does not have authority to remand this action to state court, it may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and dismiss the case. ... Accordingly, the Court will continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367 over Plaintiffs state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives a court discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, considering fairness, convenience, and judicial economy.

Doe v. Elson S Floyd College of Medicine at Washington State University · filed 2021-08-03(c)(3)

But Plaintiff misstated the standard—which she admits in her reply—which grants the Court discretion over continued supplemental jurisdiction. ... In the interest of fairness, convenience, and judicial economy, continued jurisdiction in this matter is proper.

Section 1367 permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over related local law claims after dismissing the federal claims when judicial economy and convenience favor retaining them.

Marseille v. The Mount Sinai Hospital · filed 2021-08-05(c)(3)

Notwithstanding the dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining claims for discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation brought pursuant to the NYCHRL. ... In this case, where the parties have completed discovery and summary judgment briefing, it would be more efficient for this Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction rather than force the Plaintiff to refile the case in state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives a district court discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when all claims within its original jurisdiction have been dismissed.

Romero v. TitleMax of New Mexico, Inc. · filed 2021-08-17(c)(3)

A district court has the discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also Barlow v. C.R. England, Inc., 703 F.3d 497, 511 (10th Cir. 2012) (explaining the district court’s discretion).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims when judicial economy, convenience, and fairness favor retention.

Davis v. City of Dallas · filed 2021-09-30(c)(3)

Because all three factors weigh in favor of retaining jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims, the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction and review the claims on the merits.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives a district court discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, considering judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

THORNE v. PICKRELL · filed 2021-10-14(c)(3)

The Court finds that the balance of factors weighs in favor of exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims when judicial economy, fairness, and comity favor deciding them.

PROSSER v. CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA), N.A. · filed 2021-12-21(c)(3)

As those factors are present here and in the interest of judicial economy, fairness, and comity, the Court will retain jurisdiction over Prosser's state law claims and determine whether they are preempted by federal law.

Section 1367 allows a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims after the federal claim is dismissed when judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity support retaining them.

Fitch v. Federal Housing Finance Agency · filed 2022-03-31(c)

The Court has also reviewed record in this case and does not believe that judicial economy, convenience, or fairness is served by relinquishing the case at this stage of the litigation.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a related state law claim after dismissing all federal claims when judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor retention.

Joanne Sacco, as administrator of the Estate of Nicholas Sacco v. American Institutional Medical Group, et al. · filed 2022-06-17(c)(3)

Here, unlike in the ordinary case, the balance of factors tips in favor of continuing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s negligence claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a charging lien dispute after the underlying claims have settled.

Sabal Construction and Roofing, LLC v. Western World Insurance Company · filed 2022-10-21(c)(3)

After review, the Court employs its discretion and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Shelton Law’s fee dispute. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (empowering a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after “dismiss[ing] all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”).

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a counterclaim after resolving all claims within its original jurisdiction when fairness, convenience, and judicial economy favor retention.

Marlboro Electric Coopertive Inc v. Central Electric Power Cooperative Inc · filed 2022-12-07(c)

Even though the court has granted judgment on all the claims conferring original jurisdiction, it chooses to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Central’s counterclaim.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims when efficiency favors retaining jurisdiction.

Harris v. City of New York · filed 2023-02-16(c)

The Court, in its discretion, will continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims against the City, because factual discovery (save depositions of treating physicians) is complete, the legal issues are relatively straightforward, and efficiency favors retaining jurisdiction.

Section 1367 permits a court to retain jurisdiction over related state-law claims after all federal claims are dismissed, considering comity, judicial economy, convenience, and fairness.

Collette v. Sig Sauer, Inc. · filed 2023-02-17(c)(3)

A federal court may retain jurisdiction over state-law claims, notwithstanding that all federal claims have been dismissed. Rodriguez v. Doral Mortg. Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1177 (1st Cir. 1995). In such a situation, the court should “take into account concerns of comity, judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and the like.” Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 257 (1st Cir. 1996). Here, where fact discovery has been completed, and the federal and state claims were closely interconnected, retaining jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims would appear to promote judicial economy and fairness.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

NGONO v. MOSHANNON VALLEY CORRECTIONAL CENTER · filed 2023-03-02(c)(3)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000). ... In this matter, Plaintiff's federal and state law claims were based on the same alleged rape and use of force incidents. Therefore, the Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims against Defendant Geo.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing claims within its original jurisdiction when judicial economy and the proximity of trial favor retention.

Ragusa v. Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association · filed 2023-03-27(c)(3)

Additionally, although the Court has dismissed the claims over which it had original jurisdiction, this case has been pending in federal court for several years, extensive discovery has occurred, the Court has expended significant judicial resources on deciding multiple dispositive motions, and the case is ripe for trial in a few weeks. ... Therefore, the Court declines to remand this case to state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

MONGE v. UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA · filed 2023-03-30(c)(3)

Because the Court is granting Ms. McGreevy’s motion to dismiss and thus is “dismiss{ing] ail claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all remaining state law claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(a), 1367(c)(3).

A court may retain supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after the federal claims are eliminated before trial when judicial economy outweighs comity.

Shehata v. Blackwell · filed 2023-05-03(c)(3)

On balance, the judicial economy concerms outweigh any interest in comity. This Court has benefited from extensive work by the parties to develop the remaining claims. And the remaining issues are substantially similar to matters that the Court has already resolved. The Court will exercise its discretion to keep this litigation.

Section 1367 permits a court to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction when judicial economy favors doing so.

National Association for Gun Rights, Inc. v. City Of San Jose · filed 2023-07-13(a)

As an initial matter, the Court notes that, although it has dismissed all of the claims over which it has original jurisdiction, the Court nonetheless has discretion to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Because the remaining state claims contain significant overlap with the other claims, the Court finds that judicial economy favors exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction when judicial economy favors retaining them.

Clark v. Santander Bank, N.A. · filed 2023-10-27(c)(3)

Although all of the claims over which this Court has original jurisdiction have been dismissed, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. All of Plaintiffs’ claims arise from the same general nucleus of operative fact related to the foreclosure on the Clarks’ home. The Bendett Defendants urge the Court to decline supplemental jurisdiction, but do not analyze how the factors of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity apply here. Given that this case has been pending in this Court since January of 2022, economy considerations weigh in favor of the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, rather than requiring the parties to start over in state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing the claims within its original jurisdiction when judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor retention.

Desmarattes v. Equifax, Transunion, Experian · filed 2023-12-07(c)(3)

Weighing the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim in the instant case.

After dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, a district court may retain supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining claim when dismissal at a late stage would be inconvenient or unfair to the parties.

BearWaters Brewing Company v. Assurant, Inc. · filed 2024-01-16(c)(3)

Dismissal of the Plaintiff's remaining claim against Patton at this late stage in the proceedings would not be convenient or fair to the parties. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's request for the Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims against Defendant Patton is denied.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after the sole federal claim is eliminated, with fairness, judicial economy, convenience, and comity informing that choice.

Graves v. Elkins · filed 2024-04-18(c)(3)

The Carnegie-Mellon factors of fairness, judicial economy, convenience, and comity also weigh on balance against remand and warrant the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, weighing judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Farmer v. Bailey · filed 2024-06-13(c)(3)

Despite finding that Plaintiff’s federal claims should be dismissed, this Court may still maintain supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. ... Considering these factors this Court chooses to exercise the power to maintain supplemental jurisdiction at its discretion.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction after resolving the original-jurisdiction claim, considering whether the remaining state-law claims are novel or complex and how far the litigation has progressed.

Blue Hill Specialty Insurance Company, Inc. v. Grinston · filed 2024-06-23(c)

Even so, the Court exercises its discretion to retain jurisdiction over Delta’s crossclaims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The state-law claims are neither novel nor complex. ... Those claims have been pending for more than a year, discovery has closed, and the case is set for trial in just over a month.

Section 1367 permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims after the federal claims fail, taking account of the case’s duration and the claims’ shared facts.

Alarm Detection Systems, Inc. v. Village of Schaumburg · filed 2024-08-14(c)(3)

Having found that Alarm Companies’ claim under the Contracts Clause fails as a matter of law, the court may relinquish jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, as it did on the first round of dispositive motions. See, e.g., Al’s Serv. Ctr. v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir. 2010) (“When all federal claims in a suit in federal court are dismissed before trial, the presumption is that the court will relinquish federal jurisdiction over any supplemental state-law claims.”). The parties’ briefing does not address the prudence of retaining supplemental jurisdiction, but they argue the merits. Because this case has been pending for more than seven years, and because the first tortious interference claim rests on the same facts as the Contracts clause claim, the court exercises its discretion to retain jurisdiction over the state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. §1367.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims, but does not require it.

Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1, IFT-AFT v. Educators for Excellence, Inc. · filed 2024-08-21(c)(3)

And because the LMRDA claims have been dismissed, the Court could relinquish jurisdiction over the state law claims. See Dietchweiler by Dietchweiler v. Lucas, 827 F.3d 622, 631 (7th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... The Court thus declines to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after it disposes of all federal claims.

Farabaugh v. Isle, Inc. · filed 2024-09-25(c)(3)

Having granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII claims, the Court normally would decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). But in this case, the Court elects to exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c) allows a court to weigh the relevant considerations when deciding to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing the federal claims.

Heflin 483317 v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 2024-10-17(c)

Here, because Plaintiff’s federal claims against Defendants MDOC, Washington, Bush, Dodds-Dugan, MCF, Schiebner, Winger, Kludy, Jollands, and Barnes are properly dismissed, the balance of the relevant considerations weighs against the continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction as to those Defendants.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives a court discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after the federal claim is withdrawn, considering judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Yelverton v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC · filed 2024-11-22(c)(3)

Even though Yelverton withdrew this claim in response to Nationstar’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 41 at 15), under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) the Court has discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. ... This case has been pending for over a year, trial is imminent, neither party seeks remand or dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the record before the Court is complete. Thus, each factor favors the Court continuing to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction to resolve the case.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims, with judicial economy informing that decision.

TrustLabs, Inc. v. An · filed 2025-01-08(c)

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) permits the Court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims even after dismissing federal claims, and the Court has already expended time and energy on all of TrustLabs’ claims. Plus, all that remains on TrustLabs’ state-law claim is the question of damages. It is therefore appropriate—and indeed, in the interest of judicial economy—for the Court to retain supplemental jurisdiction.

After dismissing the sole federal claim, a court may retain supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims when judicial economy and fairness favor doing so.

Bland v. E.J. Willman & Sons · filed 2025-04-30(c)(3)

In this case, judicial economy and fairness favor retaining supplemental jurisdiction, especially where Plaintiff has failed to respond to the Motion despite being given two opportunities to do so. ... As such, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state-law claim after federal claims are dropped when economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor resolving it.

Monson v. State of Oregon · filed 2024-03-11(c)(3)

Here, the parties have completed discovery and fully briefed a motion for summary judgment on the sole remaining claim. It would not promote the values of economy, convenience, fairness, or comity to return the case to the Oregon state court at this stage. The Court will therefore retain supplemental jurisdiction to resolve the pending motion.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction and to reconsider that choice on remand when the claims remaining before it have changed.

Hillesheim v. Holiday Stationstores, Inc. · filed 2018-08-17(c)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), when a “district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” it may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining claims. ... The district court is entitled to determine on remand whether it still wishes to exercise its discretion in the same way.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to remand supplemental state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, considering judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Benson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2019-03-25(c)(3)

The supplemental jurisdiction statute states a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” ... These factors weigh in favor of remanding the remaining state law tort claims to the state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims and remand a removed action after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Brown v. Prince George's County Board of Education · filed 2019-08-20(c)(3)

Having disposed of the only such claim in this suit, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims and will remand this matter to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland for further proceedings.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims and remand them after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Myart v. City of San Antonio · filed 2019-10-07(c)(3)

Insofar as Plaintiff is attempting to assert a separate violation of the Texas Election Code or San Antonio City Charter, however, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims and remand them to state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction and remand state-law claims after dismissing all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Shaw v. Dolton Riverdale School District 148 · filed 2019-11-04(c)(3)

For the foregoing reasons, Count Il is dismissed. Because the court had jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims in Count | under its supplemental jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), the court will also remand Count | back to the Circuit Court of Cook County.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims and remand them after dismissing all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Paulson v. City of Mountlake Terrace · filed 2020-01-15(c)(3)

In light of its dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal civil rights claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims, which will be remanded to the Snohomish County Superior Court for further adjudication.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction and remand state law claims after dismissing all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Yawn v. Dorchester County · filed 2020-03-17(c)(3)

However, because Plaintiffs are not entitled to federal compensation, the court will remand Plaintiffs’ state law claims for further consideration. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(providing that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims and remand a removed action when all claims supporting original jurisdiction have been dismissed.

YUHASZ v. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (CMS) · filed 2020-04-01(c)(3)

Therefore, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims pursuant to § 1367(c)(3) and will remand the action to the Superior Court of New Jersey if Plaintiff does not file a second amended complaint in this Court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to remand remaining state-law claims after dismissing all claims over which it had original jurisdiction.

TallBear v. Soldi Inc. · filed 2020-05-14(c)(3)

Accordingly, the Court exercises its discretion in remanding this action under § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction and remand remaining state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Williams v. O'Conor · filed 2020-08-20(c)(3)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court can decline to exercise jurisdiction over a supplemental claim if it has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. ... Accordingly, the court remands Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction, including by remanding those claims to state court.

Dalton-Webb v. Village of Wakeman · filed 2020-08-21(c)(3)

When a district court dismisses all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, it may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff’s wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and equitable estoppel claims (Counts II and III) are REMANDED to the Huron County Court of Common Pleas.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing every claim within its original jurisdiction, and to remand those claims to state court.

Kline v. State of Maryland Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services · filed 2020-12-18(c)(3)

Having dismissed Plaintiffs sole federal claim prior to discovery, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims and will remand the dispute to the Circuit Court for Allegany County, Maryland. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) establishes a district court’s discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction and to remand those claims to state court.

Ellington v. Vance · filed 2021-03-08(c)(3)

Under these circumstances, a district court has discretion to remand the case back to the state court. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cobill, 484 U.S. 343, (1988) (explaining that district courts have discretion to remand cases whete only state claims remain because federal claims have been dismissed), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (enacted 1990) (providing that when district court has “dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” it may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining claims). The Coutt exercises its discretion and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), will remand the remaining claims against Vance, Kirby, Connections, and Backus to the Court of Common Pleas of the State of Delaware in and for Kent County.

After dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, a district court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims and remand them, taking account of the case’s stage, the nature of those claims, and its state court origin.

Drake v. The Village of Lima · filed 2021-03-30(c)(3)

Here, given the early stage of the proceedings, the fact that the remaining causes of action involve quintessential areas of state law such as negligence, nuisance, and trespass, and the fact that this action originated in state court, the Court finds it appropriate to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and to remand Plaintiffs’ remaining state law causes of action.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims and remand them after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Doe v. School District 214 · filed 2021-04-02(c)(3)

As the statute’s use of the word “may” suggests, whether to decline supplemental jurisdiction is a discretionary decision. ... The court relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) over counts I–III of plaintiff’s complaint and remands this case to the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois.

Section 1367(a) does not permit a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing the federal claim for lack of Article III standing.

Gastelum v. TJX Companies · filed 2022-01-19(a)

Having dismissed Mr. Gastelum’s ADA claim for lack of standing, this Court has no authority to retain jurisdiction over his state law claim.

A court lacks authority to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the only federal claim is dismissed for lack of standing.

Thomas v. County of San Diego · filed 2021-09-24

Having found, based on the face of the SAC, that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert the only federal claim in the SAC, the Court lacks authority to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over non-federal claims after dismissing the federal claim for lack of constitutional standing.

Webb v. United States Veterans Initiative · filed 2019-12-17(c)(3)

Therefore, it will dismiss the federal claim and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the non-federal claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state constitutional claims after dismissing the federal claim for lack of Article III standing.

Doe v. Ohio Attorney General · filed 2020-12-17(c)(3)

She therefore lacks Article III standing to litigate her First Amendment claim, and the Court lacks jurisdiction over this claim. In this situation, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her claims under the Ohio Constitution.

Section 1367(a) does not authorize supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the plaintiff lacks Article III standing on the federal claim.

Strojnik v. Ogle · filed 2021-04-05(a)

Strojnik lacks standing to proceed in this Court, and this Court consequently has no authority to retain jurisdiction over his state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, even if res judicata could bar the remaining state claim.

Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Group, Inc. · filed 2009-10-06(c)(3)

Here, once the District Court dismissed Elka-drawy’s federal claims, leaving only the state claim, the prerequisites for § 1367(c)(3) were met. Vanguard identifies no case law suggesting a strict order of decision whereby res judicata, if applicable, supercedes a district court’s exercise of the discretion expressly afforded by § 1367(c)(3). Accordingly, we will affirm the Court’s exercise of its discretion.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the claims within its original jurisdiction.

Lotto v. Hamden Board of Education · filed 2005-11-30(c)(3)

The remaining counts of the complaint are brought under state law, and after dismissing the Equal Protection count, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the other claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after it dismisses all claims over which it had original jurisdiction.

Applegate, LP v. City of Frederick · filed 2016-04-11(c)(3)

Having dismissed Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, and having denied Plaintiffs’ motion to supplement their Amended Complaint with a procedural due process claim, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits declining supplemental jurisdiction and remanding remaining state-law claims when the sole federal claim is dismissed before significant judicial resources are invested and judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor doing so.

Federman v. Town of Lorraine · filed 2019-12-20(c)(3)

Having dismissed Plaintiff’s equal protection claim, the Court declines, in its discretion, to retain supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims. ... With the dismissal of the federal claims prior to the investment of significant judicial resources, the “traditional ‘values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity’” weigh in favor of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after it has disposed of all federal claims.

Kennedy v. BMW Financial Services, N.A. · filed 2005-03-15(c)(3)

Because it has disposed of all the federal claims before it, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction to determine whether BMW’s acts independently violated CUTPA.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing all federal claims.

Krevsky v. Equifax Check Services, Inc. · filed 2000-02-14(c)(3)

Because Plaintiffs federal claims will be dismissed, we decline to exercise jurisdiction over the state consumer protection law claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after dismissing the federal claims when the state claims are insufficiently tied to federal policy and are better resolved by a state court.

Ramsay v. Sawyer Property Management of Maryland, LLC · filed 2013-05-31(c)(3)

In this case, this Court finds that Plaintiffs state law claims are not sufficiently tied to questions of federal policy such that exercising supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate. ... Accordingly, this Court dismisses Plaintiffs state claims under the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act and Maryland Consumer Protection Act pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Clements v. HOUSING AUTH. OF BOROUGH OF PRINCETON · filed 2007-12-12(c)(3)

Consequently, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims under NJLAD.

Section 1367 permits dismissal of related state-law claims after all federal claims have been dismissed.

Diehl v. Xerox Corp. · filed 1996-07-23(c)(3)

Because plaintiffs’ federal discrimination claims have been dismissed, their state law age and gender discrimination claims brought pursuant to the New York Human Rights Law, and plaintiff Tuttle’s state law disability claim, are also dismissed for lack of supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Rodriquez v. County of Nassau · filed 2013-03-27(c)

In light of the dismissal of Plaintiffs federal claims, the court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims under N.Y. State Human Rights Law, §§ 290 et seq., N.Y. Executive Law §§ 290 and 296, and N.Y. Labor Law § 741.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court that has dismissed all claims within its original jurisdiction to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state claim and dismiss it without prejudice.

Greene v. Loewenstein, Inc. · filed 2000-04-27(c)(3)

Even were this Court to find that Greene timely filed his FCRA claim and, further, that he had suffered an adverse employment action, it would nonetheless dismiss the state claim without prejudice. Title' 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) grants a court the discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if it "has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after it disposes of all federal claims.

Filion v. Bellows Falls Foods · filed 1995-06-01(c)(3)

Having granted summary judgment as to all of plaintiff's federal claims, only plaintiff's state-law claims for assault and battery (Count IV) and for false arrest and wrongful detention (Count V ) remain. Under such circumstances, the court is entitled, at its discretion, to either retain supplemental jurisdiction and continue to adjudicate the state-law claims or decline same, leaving the plaintiff to seek relief in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (1993).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing the related federal claim.

Hamilton v. S.M. Sandor Whitley S. Borrego Sheppard, Counselor, and S.K. Wentz Charles D. Marshall, Warden · filed 1997-08-28(c)(3)

The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to exercise jurisdiction over Hamilton's state assault claim because the district court had properly dismissed the related Eighth Amendment claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Berryhill v. Dorsey · filed 1998-03-06(c)(3)

Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise jurisdiction over the supplemental state law claim of assault. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (permitting district court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when it "has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction").

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after it dismisses the federal claims.

Green v. Montgomery · filed 1999-03-25(c)(3)

To the extent that there may still exist any state law claims for assault and battery, which appears not to be covered by the parties’ stipulation, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Kinsey v. City of Opp, Ala. · filed 1999-05-19(c)(3)

Because the court has dismissed Plaintiffs federal claims, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state-law assault and harassment claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a claim after dismissing the claims within its original jurisdiction.

Nuno v. County of San Bernardino · filed 1999-07-28(c)(3)

Finally, because the Court will dismiss the first and second causes of action over which it has original jurisdiction, it will decline to exerpise supplemental jurisdiction over the third cause of action for battery and false imprisonment, which is a supplemental claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction; the case’s distance from trial may support that choice.

Mawhirt v. Ahmed · filed 2000-02-14(c)(3)

The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction by a federal court over a state law claim is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1367 which provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ... [if] the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction” (28 U.S.C. § 1367[c][3]). ... As the Court has dismissed all the federal Section 1983 causes of action and as the case is not near the trial stage, the Court declines to retain jurisdiction over the one cause of action asserted against Barbara Mawhirt alleging that she committed assault and battery by forcing the plaintiff to take an anti-psychotic drug.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Bradford v. Giessel Barker Lyman · filed 2003-01-24(c)(3)

However, as the district court had “dismissed all claims over which it ha[d] original jurisdiction,” we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s dismissal of Bradford’s assault and battery claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to dismiss a supplemental state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Beaubrun v. Thomas Jefferson University · filed 2008-09-23(c)(3)

All the claims over which there was federal question jurisdiction were dismissed. I exercise my right to dismiss the claim over which I had supplemental jurisdiction, therefore plaintiffs assault claim is dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Anderson v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF FAYETTE COUNTY · filed 2009-05-01(c)(3)

The Court will dismiss all claims arising under federal law and over which it had original jurisdiction, leaving Plaintiffs’ state law claims of battery, outrage, intentional infliction, failure to supervise, and Plaintiffs’ claims under KRS 344.145 and KRS 620.030. These state law claims are best decided by the state court, and this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under over the remaining state claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) does not justify dismissing state-law claims on the ground that all federal claims were dismissed when federal claims are reinstated on appeal.

Hart v. Hodges · filed 2009-11-17(c)(3)

Finally, the district court dismissed Plaintiff Hart’s state law claims of battery and conspiracy to commit battery for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because all the federal claims were dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Having reinstated portions of Hart’s federal claims, dismissal of his state law claims for lack of jurisdiction is no longer appropriate. The district court’s order dismissing Hart’s state law claims is vacated, and the state law claims are reinstated on remand.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Flippo v. American Power Source, Inc. · filed 2014-05-12(c)(3)

The courts also accepts the recommendations of the magistrate judge that the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Counts Three (negligent hiring, training, supervision and retention), Five (invasion of privacy), Six (assault and battery) and Seven (outrage), and that these claims be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Miller v. DuPage County Sheriff · filed 2018-08-08(c)(3)

And without any remaining federal claims, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Miller’s state law aggravated battery claim against Gaines in Count III.

Section 1367 permits a court to dismiss supplemental state law claims when no federal claims remain.

Waste Conversion, Inc. v. Sims · filed 1994-11-15(c)(3)

Because plaintiffs do not bring any other federal claims, their pendent state law claims are dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Rawls v. Sundquist · filed 1996-05-23(c)(3)

Plaintiffs’ remaining claims (conversion, fraudulent misappropriation, misuse) are state law claims, and this Court, in its discretion, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The state law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Garrett v. Talladega County Drug & Violent Crime Task Force · filed 2013-11-19(c)(3)

That title also provides that “[t]he district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... Further, as the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs remaining claims (conversion and replevin) against the sole remaining defendant, Jim Pritchett, the court will dismiss those claims, without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims.

Massey v. Biola University, Inc. · filed 2022-03-07(c)(3)

The district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Massey’s state law claims after dismissing all of her federal claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, guided by judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Wooley v. Wellpath · filed 2022-03-07(c)(3)

A federal court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction [over state law claims] if the . . . district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). In deciding whether to decline supplemental jurisdiction, a district court must factor in “the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). These factors tip towards declining supplemental jurisdiction when “the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain.” Id. Considering this, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s professional negligence claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after all claims within its original jurisdiction have been dismissed.

Khan v. Board Of Education Of The City Of Chicago · filed 2022-03-08(c)(3)

A court may—but is not required to—decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims upon dismissal of “all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” ... There is no federal interest in this remaining state-law employment dispute, so I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Khan’s state-law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing the federal claim.

Rovanco Piping Systems, Inc · filed 2022-03-08(c)(3)

Because we grant Perma-Pipe’s Motion to Dismiss the Lanham Act claim, the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, and thus declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Rovanco’s state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

COUSAR v. MORGAN · filed 2022-03-08(c)(3)

Because the Court dismissed all federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if the court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, based on factors including judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Weston J. Stow v. Davis · filed 2022-03-09(c)(3)

The court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... Under these circumstances, the court exercises its discretion and finds that the balance of factors weighs in favor of declining jurisdiction over Stow’s state law claims. Those claims are therefore dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when it dismisses the federal claims.

Daniels v. Rosenquist · filed 2022-03-09(c)(3)

To the extent he intends to state a claim for relief under state law, the Court declines supplemental jurisdiction as Daniels’ federal claims are dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing the claims within its original jurisdiction.

Deursen v. United States Tobacco Sales & Marketing Co. · filed 1993-12-16(c)(3)

Since I dismiss Van Deursen’s claims over which I have original jurisdiction, I may decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction over her remaining state law defamation claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. There is no compelling reason to retain jurisdiction over this state law claim and I decline to exercise jurisdiction in this regard.

Section 1367(c)(3) does not require a district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after the federal claim fails to state a claim.

Wilson v. "Hardcopy," · filed 1995-10-23(c)(3)

However, because Wilson failed to state a claim under Sec. 1983, the district court had no duty to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law defamation claims that he may have raised.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claim that supported original jurisdiction.

Scallet v. Rosenblum · filed 1996-01-18(c)(3)

Consequently, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law defamation claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(e)(3), and, therefore, will not address the merits of those claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing the federal claim.

Shannon v. MTA Metro-North Railroad · filed 1996-01-31(c)(3)

I decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state-law claim after all federal claims have been dismissed.

Thorpe v. Alber's, Inc. · filed 1996-02-09(c)(3)

With respect to the plaintiffs claim under Tennessee law for alleged libel and/or slander, the court finds it appropriate to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of this claim, and so to remand it to the State court from which this civil action was removed. No claim arising under federal law remains in this civil action.

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after it dismisses all federal claims.

Beltran v. The Price Company/costco Dba Price Club Anthony Stout Shawn Parks Roxanne Nozolino · filed 1996-07-12(c)(3)

However, having dismissed all of Beltran's federal claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state defamation claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). It did not abuse its discretion by doing so.

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses all federal claims.

Elmore v. Clarion University of Pennsylvania · filed 1996-08-06(c)(3)

Because we have granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on all of the federal claims, we will exercise our discretion not to address Plaintiffs state law claims for libel, slander, and invasion of privacy. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We will, therefore, dismiss Count VI of the complaint.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

John v. Heath, Doing Business as Heath & Association v. Howard W. Steinholz, President Ernest Bantos, Director of Proper · filed 1996-08-16(c)(3)

Finally, Heath's claims of libel and slander are torts properly raised in state court. A federal district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Pehnke v. City of Galveston · filed 1997-09-24(c)(3)

Finally, Plaintiff has also alleged libel and slander. In accordance with § 1367(c)(3), the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Diaz v. Farley · filed 1998-07-17(c)(3)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) this court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when it has “dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” The court has dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims over which it has original jurisdiction by dismissing plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claims. The only remaining claims are plaintiffs’ pendant state law defamation and tortious interference with economic relations claims. Because these claims deal solely with state law, they are better left to the jurisdiction of the state courts. Therefore, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Jackson v. City of Columbus · filed 1998-07-28(c)(3)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), this court has the discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of a state claim if the court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. ... Accordingly, this court declines to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law defamation claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Cooper v. Garcia · filed 1999-05-27(c)(3)

With respect to plaintiff's pendant state law claim for slander, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim because: (1) plaintiff’s federal claims are dismissed, and (2) plaintiff has not alleged that he complied with the claim-filing prerequisites set forth in the California Tort Claims Act, Cal. Gov't Code §§ 900 et seq.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Wheeler v. City of Macon · filed 1999-06-16(c)(3)

Plaintiffs’ remaining claims of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress are state law claims before this Court based on supplemental jurisdiction. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims because all claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction have now been dismissed.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims against defendants for whom no federal claims remain.

Barbara M. Ryan and William O. Gillespie v. Illinois Department of Children and Family Services · filed 1999-07-16(c)

Because there are no surviving federal claims against the remaining defendants, the district court acted within its discretion when it dismissed without prejudice the defamation claim against Flynn, Sakolsky, Moody, Seggelke, and Bucari.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing the claims within its original jurisdiction.

Xiangyuan (Sue) Zhu v. Fisher, Cavanaugh, Smith & Lemon, P.A. · filed 2001-02-07(c)(3)

According to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction once it has dismissed the claims over which it had original jurisdiction. ... Because the Court has dismissed plaintiffs federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law defamation claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after resolving all federal claims.

Presnick v. Town of Orange · filed 2001-03-14(c)(3)

As defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all of plaintiffs federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs remaining state law claims for false arrest, denial of equal protection, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and implied libel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it has dismissed all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Bourguignon v. Guinta · filed 2003-02-24(c)(3)

Because the court has granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to all federal claims contained in the complaint, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, or any other possible state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Olivera v. Town of Woodbury, New York · filed 2003-09-02(c)(3)

I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs New York State common law claims of defamation, negligence and intentional infliction of mental distress. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). They are dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after disposing of the federal claims.

Cawood v. Haggard · filed 2004-02-11(c)(3)

In light of the Court’s ruling on plaintiffs federal claims as set forth above, the Court will decline to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law causes of action. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Accordingly, plaintiffs claims for defamation, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, public disclosure of private facts, intrusion into seclusion, and outrageous conduct will be DISMISSED without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Collins v. West Hartford Police Dept. · filed 2005-07-27(c)(3)

Having dismissed the federal claims which confer subject matter jurisdiction, this Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law defamation claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Saltarella v. Town of Enfield · filed 2006-03-28(c)(3)

Because the Court has dismissed plaintiffs constitutional claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim after dismissing all federal claims.

Williams v. Detroit Board of Education · filed 2007-03-05(c)(3)

For these reasons, we reverse summary judgment on Williams’s defamation claim and affirm the judgment on all other claims, noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim after dismissing all of the federal claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state law claim after dismissing the claim within its original jurisdiction.

Vaughan v. Bernice Ray Elem. School · filed 2007-09-12(c)

When, as here, a district court has dismissed the claim over which it had original jurisdiction, the court may exercise its discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction as to a remaining state law claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Marrero- Gutierrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007). As that is appropriate in this case, the defamation claim is dismissed, without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after it dismisses the claim over which it had original jurisdiction.

Callahan v. Buerkle · filed 2008-07-25(c)(3)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Callahan’s defamation claim, which is DISMISSED without prejudice to refiling in state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives a district court discretion to dismiss a remaining state law claim after dismissing the federal claims.

Sportsmans Warehouse, Inc. v. Fair · filed 2008-08-05(c)(3)

Given the dismissal of the federal copyright question, I conclude that I have discretion to dismiss the defamation claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state-law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Torres-Hicks v. Connecticut Housing Finance Authority · filed 2008-09-05(c)(3)

Because the court is granting summary judgment as to, inter alia, all the plaintiffs claims over which the court has original jurisdiction, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim for slander.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

United States Ex Rel. Deering v. Physiotherapy Associates, Inc. · filed 2009-03-10(c)(3)

Even if either statement could meet the pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), I decline to exercise supplementary jurisdiction over a lone state law defamation claim. This Court had subject matter jurisdiction over Deering’s Arizona defamation claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. That same statute allows a federal court to decline to exercise supplementary jurisdiction where all the federal claims in a suit have been dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims, subject to abuse-of-discretion review.

Elzie Woods v. AR Department of Correction · filed 2009-05-21(c)(3)

We review a district court’s decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) for an abuse of discretion. ... Similarly, we do not find that the district court abused its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law defamation claim after all the federal claims had been dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when no viable federal claim remains.

Roy v. TN · filed 2012-10-26(c)(3)

Finally, the district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Roy’s state-law claims of negligence and defamation in the absence of a viable federal claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a related state-law claim after recommending disposition of all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Harp v. Department of Human Services, Colorado Mental Health Institute · filed 2013-03-18(c)(3)

Because the court recommends summary judgment be entered in favor of Defendant on the claims over which the court has original jurisdiction, the court further recommends that supplemental jurisdiction be declined over any claim for defamation that Ms. Harp alleges.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing all claims over which it had original jurisdiction.

Dittmann v. ACS Human Services LLC · filed 2016-09-26(c)(3)

Having dismissed all of Dittmann’s federal claims against Quest, I decline to exercise my supplemental jurisdiction over his defamation claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses the federal claims.

Marchman v. Crawford · filed 2017-02-17(c)(3)

To the extent that the Amended Complaint intended to allege any state law causes of action such as battery or defamation, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such state claims in light of the Court’s decision that Marchman’s factual allegations do not state any federal civil rights claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Proctor v. Title 4-D · filed 2018-07-17(c)(3)

To the extent any state law defamation claim remains against any defendant, the Court chooses, in its discretion, not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it now that all federal claims over which it had original jurisdiction have been dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state-law claim after dismissing all federal claims.

Yerdon v. Teamsters Local 1149 · filed 1995-05-12(c)(3)

Because the court dismisses all of the federal claims, the only claim remaining is for common law intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court declines supplemental jurisdiction over such a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Patrick v. Francis · filed 1995-05-17(c)(3)

Since no federal issues survive, plaintiff’s state law cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. “District courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ... if ... (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits dismissal of state-law claims when the federal claims supporting supplemental jurisdiction have been dismissed, even if an unrelated federal claim remains.

Kozy v. Wings West Airlines, Inc. Jim Bishop Chester Gault Gene Erreca Regional Airline Pilot Association · filed 1996-07-15(c)(3)

We affirm the dismissal of the two state law claims on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The federal claims giving the District Court jurisdiction over these state law claims have been dismissed. While it is true that a single federal claim remains for enforcement of the CBA requirement that a written decision be issued, there is no allegation in the complaint that the failure to issue a written decision was defamatory or caused emotional distress.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after all federal claims have been dismissed.

Kariotis v. Navistar International Transportation Corp. · filed 1997-01-28(c)(3)

Since, as a result of the Court’s analysis, there are no longer any federal causes of action remaining in this matter, however, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over the remaining state law negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing all federal claims.

Coleman v. Prudential Relocation · filed 1997-08-25(c)(3)

All of Bowen’s federal claims having been dismissed, I decline to exercise jurisdiction over his claim under state law for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when no federal claims remain.

Jessica L. Hayden, Nicole C. Merrill and Colleen M. Rhoads v. Richard Grayson, Chief of Police of the Town of Lisbon · filed 1998-01-22(c)(3)

As no "federal question” claims remain, we also affirm the district court’s discretionary decision not to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state-law claims for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the Town and Grayson.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims after it dismisses all federal claims.

Papadopoulos v. Modesto Police Department · filed 1998-07-09(c)(3)

The court has dismissed all federal claims in this action, as well as the parallel state claims arising under the FEHA. The only remaining claims are the state tort claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress pleaded by all plaintiffs except Balentine. “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors ... will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988). The court finds that this is the usual case in which the court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining pendent state claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after disposing of all federal claims.

Atkinson v. City of Dayton · filed 1998-11-10(c)(3)

In any event, having found summary judgment proper on the Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ state law emotional distress claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims after dismissing the federal claims that supplied original jurisdiction.

Snow v. Village of Chatham · filed 2000-01-21(c)(3)

In light of the dismissal of the claims forming the basis for the section 1983 and 1988 actions, which provided federal subject matter jurisdiction over this action, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and various violations of the New York State constitution.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing the federal claims.

Kramer v. Hickey-Freeman, Inc. · filed 2001-05-30(c)

Lastly, having denied plaintiffs federal causes of action, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to consider plaintiffs state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Estate of Smith v. Marasco · filed 2002-01-11(c)(3)

A district court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a state law claim if the court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. ... Since we have granted summary judgment on all of the federal claims, we decline to exercise jurisdiction over the supplemental state law claims, including plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim, survival action and intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Riccio v. City of West Haven · filed 2002-03-22(c)(3)

The Court also declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Riccio’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress on the ground that it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state-law claim after it has dismissed the claims within its original jurisdiction.

Arnold v. Yale New Haven Hospital · filed 2002-07-12(c)

In light of the Court’s ruling on the plaintiffs other claims, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over his claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (“district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ... if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Harrell v. Purcell · filed 2002-12-19(c)(3)

This court dismisses Plaintiffs state law claims of negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery because the court declines to extend pendent jurisdiction over such claims.