28 U.S.C. § 1367

Section 1367(c)(3) does not support dismissing related state law claims when the dismissal of federal claims was premature.

Gregory v. Currituck County · filed 2022-05-20(c)(3)

However, because the court prematurely dismissed the federal claims against White in her individual capacity, we conclude that the court similarly erred in dismissing the related state law claims under § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Jenner v. The School Board of Lee County · filed 2022-05-31(c)(3)

After review, the Court employs its discretion and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Navarro v. City of Aurora, Illinois · filed 2022-06-06(c)(3)

Navarro’s federal claims are dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), and the court relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses every claim within its original jurisdiction.

Franklin v. Doheny · filed 2022-06-08(c)(3)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), this Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims if it dismisses all the claims over which it has original jurisdiction. ... Because I recommend dismissing all the federal law claims, I recommend that the Court decline supplemental jurisdiction and dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims.

Section 1367 provides no basis to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after the federal claims are dismissed under Younger abstention.

Gibson v. Lopez · filed 2022-06-15(c)(3)

Because this court finds that Plaintiff’s federal claims must be dismissed under Younger, this court no longer has any basis to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims.

When dismissal of all federal claims is the sole basis for declining supplemental jurisdiction, reinstating a federal claim requires reversal of the dismissal of the state claims.

Watts v. Northside Indep Sch Dist · filed 2022-06-27(c)(3)

And because the only basis for dismissing the state tort claims brought against Breed was the dismissal of all federal claims, we also reverse the dismissal of the state claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state and city law claims after dismissing all federal claims, considering judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Everett v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2022-06-29(c)(3)

Considering these factors, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Everett’s state and city law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) does not permit a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction merely because it dismissed all federal claims against one defendant while federal claims remain against others.

Reinhardt v. The City of Buffalo · filed 2022-07-05(c)(3)

Although the court has dismissed all federal claims against Bail Shop, it has not dismissed “all claims over which it had original jurisdiction.”

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all federal claims, but when the sole federal claim is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the state claims.

Gastelum v. Five Below, Inc. · filed 2022-07-12(c)(3)

The Court typically has discretion to refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims when all federal claims have been dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... However, where, as here, a district court “dismisses for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it has no discretion and must dismiss all claims.” Herman Fam. Revocable Tr. v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 2001). In light of this controlling authority, Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims must also be dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Hopkins v. Ramson · filed 2022-07-26(c)(3)

Having dismissed the claims under federal law for which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over any claims under state law that Plaintiff may be asserting, including any claims under state law asking this Court to determine whether the general release is a contract of adhesion.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing the only claim within its original jurisdiction.

Whitaker v. Sunhill Enterprises, LP · filed 2022-08-03(c)(3)

Because the Court has dismissed the only claim over which it has jurisdiction, it dismisses the Unruh Act claim without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367 permits a court to consider a state law claim when a federal cause of action is present, but the court should decline supplemental jurisdiction when all federal claims have been dismissed.

Thomas v. CoreCivic Facility Support Center · filed 2022-08-05(c)(3)

If the second amended complaint stated a federal cause of action, the court could consider a state law claim under the provisions for supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The court, however, should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim when all federal claims have been dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives a district court discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

NexPoint Diversified Real Estate Trust v. Acis Capital Management, L.P. · filed 2022-08-09(c)(3)

However, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over a party’s remaining state law claims is within the Court’s discretion if it has “dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims that supplied original jurisdiction.

Doering v. National Health Insurance Company · filed 2022-08-19(c)(3)

Because those claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after it dismisses all federal claims.

Brown (ID 57800) v. Schnurr · filed 2022-08-24(c)(3)

The Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if only issues of state law remain after the court has dismissed all federal claims. ... The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction, taking account of the case’s stage.

United Rentals, Inc. v. Wilper · filed 2022-09-09(c)(3)

Here, the remaining allegations in United’s operative complaint are state law claims in which this Court does not have original jurisdiction over. This case is still in its infancy and has not yet gone to trial. For these reasons, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) ordinarily permits a district court to dismiss supplemental state-law claims when it dismisses the federal claims before trial.

Harris v. Wright · filed 2022-09-20(c)(3)

Ordinarily, where a district court has exercised jurisdiction over a state-law claim solely by virtue of supplemental jurisdiction and the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the court will dismiss the remaining state-law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses all federal claims.

Portwood v. State of Texas · filed 2022-09-30(c)(3)

To the extent Portwood brings a state law claim such as negligence, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because all of his federal claims have been dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Worley v. Simon Meyrowitz & Meyrowitz, P.C. · filed 2022-10-25(c)(3)

A district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a [pendent state law claim] if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... Here, there is no basis to depart from that general rule. Accordingly, Worley’s state-law claims are dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court.

Section 1367 does not permit retention of supplemental state law claims once all federal claims are dismissed.

Webb v. Busey · filed 2022-11-07(c)(3)

Per 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it has original jurisdiction over a civil action. ... Once a lawsuit’s federal claims are dismissed, a federal court cannot retain jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims. ... Here, the Court has not identified any adequately pled federal claims that would survive dismissal and cannot retain jurisdiction over the state law claims alleged in the complaint.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, and eliminating all federal claims before trial generally suffices.

D.R. v. Wake County Board of Education · filed 2022-11-15(c)(3)

Eliminating all federal claims before trial generally suffices to decline supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims.

When a court dismisses the lone federal claim on the merits, § 1367(c)(3) presumptively calls for dismissing pendent state-law claims without prejudice.

Turner v. Westfield Washington Township · filed 2022-11-17(c)(3)

This was sensible given the presumption that, when a court dismisses a lone federal claim on the merits, it will relinquish subject-matter jurisdiction and dismiss any pendent state- law claims without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Rivera v. Allstate Ins. Co., 913 F.3d 603, 618 (7th Cir. 2018). We therefore modify the judgment to provide that any state claims are dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state law claim after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Swartz v. Sylvester · filed 2022-11-21(c)(3)

Concluding, as we do, that the district court did not err in granting Sylvester's motion for summary judgment on the federal law claim, we see no abuse of discretion in its decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim.

Section 1367 permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the complaint pleads no valid federal claim for relief.

Egolf v. The Public Defender Agency - Principle agent · filed 2022-12-06(c)(3)

Because Plaintiff has not pled a valid federal claim for relief, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state-law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Johnson v. Peppin Properties LLC · filed 2022-12-08(c)(3)

Having dismissed Johnson’s sole federal-law claim — the only claim over which the Court has original jurisdiction — the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Johnson’s remaining state-law claim.

After dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, a district court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims.

Madison v. CVS · filed 2022-12-19(c)(3)

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of state law claims when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... Having dismissed the federal claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting.

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after the federal claims have left the case.

Holifield v. Midfield, City of · filed 2020-05-04(c)(3)

After a careful examination of the remining causes of action, the court will follow the instruction of the Eleventh Circuit and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims in this case.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives a district court discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction after the plaintiff removes all federal claims by amendment.

Shaw v. Rodriguez · filed 2022-04-26(c)(3)

As the Order explained, pro se Plaintiff amended and removed all federal claims. ... After review, the Court employs its discretion and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims after the federal claims are removed.

Shaw v. Healthpark Medical Center · filed 2022-04-26(c)(3)

After review, the Court employs its discretion and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367 authorizes pendent-party jurisdiction only in actions commenced after its December 1, 1990 effective date.

Johnson v. Reserve Life Insurance · filed 1991-02-06

As the present action was commenced prior to new 28 U.S.C. section 1367, the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining aspect of plaintiff’s negligence claim against defendant Foy, and that claim must be remanded to the state court from which this case was removed.

Section 1367 treats third-party complaints filed after its effective date as new actions, even when the underlying cases were filed earlier.

In Re Joint Eastern & Southern Districts Asbestos Litigation · filed 1991-07-02

The third-party complaints that brought these defendants into the litigation were filed in March of 1991, after the effective date of the statute. Such third-party claims should be treated as “actions” filed after the operative date of the statute to avoid unnecessary hardship to defendants.

Section 1367(a) authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over additional parties only in cases filed on or after December 1, 1990.

Hudgins v. Tammy Schwaninger-Boose and Clay County, Illinois · filed 1991-11-07(a)

New legislation authorizing supplemental jurisdiction over parties, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), is effective only for cases filed on or after December 1, 1990. Pub.L. 101-650 § 310(c). This suit was filed in 1988, so the judgment against Clay County must be vacated for want of jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) restores pendent-party jurisdiction for suits brought on or after December 1, 1990.

James E. Niehus and Denise Niehus, Cross-Appellants v. Vince Liberio and Frank Vittorio, Cross-Appellees · filed 1992-08-20(a)

Although 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) restores pendent party jurisdiction, it is applicable only to suits brought since December 1, 1990, and this suit was filed earlier, so the case law cited above governs.

Section 1367’s supplemental-jurisdiction rules do not apply to actions filed before December 1, 1990.

Anderson v. Alpine City · filed 1992-10-05

Effective December 1, 1990, Congress modified the rules of pendent jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1990). Because Plaintiffs’ claim was filed on April 3, 1990, the newly codified rules of supplemental jurisdiction which replace the former rules of pendent jurisdiction do not apply.

Section 1367 does not directly apply to cases that predate its enactment.

Ponce Federal Bank, F.S.B. v. The Vessel "Lady Abby", Cristobal Burgos Rodriguez · filed 1992-11-25

But, that statute does not directly apply to this, post-Finley, pre-stat-ute, case.

Section 1367 applies directly only to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1992, but can guide interpretation of earlier pendent-jurisdiction law.

Kovnat v. Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis · filed 1993-08-13

Section 1367 is directly applicable only to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1992. It is largely declaratory of preexisting law. It constitutes persuasive authority concerning the reasonableness of an otherwise appropriate interpretation of preexisting law.

Section 1367 applies prospectively to civil actions commenced after its December 1, 1990 effective date.

Rolo v. City Investing Co. · filed 1993-12-27

The supplemental jurisdiction statute became effective on December 1, 1990, and applies prospectively only to civil actions commenced after the effective date.

Section 1367 supersedes the requirement of explicit statutory authorization for pendent-party jurisdiction in suits arising from complaints filed after December 1, 1990.

Galt G/S v. AG · filed 1995-04-21

28 U.S.C. § 1367 supersedes this second Finley requirement for all suits arising from complaints filed after December 1, 1990. ... However, Galt filed its complaint in 1989.

Section 1367 supersedes the Finley requirement of separate statutory authorization for pendent-party jurisdiction in suits arising from complaints filed after December 1, 1990.

Galt G/S v. AG · filed 1995-07-07

28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367 supersedes this second Finley requirement for all suits arising from complaints filed after December 1, 1990.

Section 1367 does not provide supplemental jurisdiction when the original complaint was filed before December 1, 1990.

Discon, Inc. v. Nynex Corp. · filed 2000-02-02

Because the original complaint here was filed prior to December 1, 1990, supplemental jurisdiction under the amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is not available.

Section 1367 applies only to actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Bank of India v. Trendi Sportswear, Inc. · filed 2000-12-27

The current rule relating to supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, is inapplicable because it only applies to actions commenced "on or after the date of enactment of this Act” which was December 1, 1990.

Section 1367 does not apply to actions removed from state court before it took effect.

In Re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation · filed 2013-09-06

However, because § 1367 was not in effect at the time these actions were removed from state court, it does not apply to this case.

Section 1367 applies only to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler · filed 1995-07-25

This case has been in existence since 1986, and Vital-Med has been a defendant since 1989. ... Therefore, section 1367 does not apply, and the court must look to the law of supplemental jurisdiction as it existed before section 1367 was enacted.

Section 1367 applies only to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

General American Life Insurance v. Rana · filed 1991-06-27

The supplemental jurisdiction provision of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 applies to “civil actions commenced on or after the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 1, 1990].” ... Therefore, the Judicial Improvements Act is inapplicable in the present case because plaintiff filed his complaint on November 13, 1990, prior to the effective date of the Act.

Section 1367 does not govern supplemental jurisdiction in civil actions commenced before December 1, 1990.

Macklanburg-Duncan Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. · filed 1995-12-05

Section 1367 applies “to civil actions commenced on or after” December 1, 1990. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-650, § 310, 104 Stat. 5089, 5114 (1990). Because the CERCLA action was filed in 1986, Tenth Circuit ancillary jurisdiction caselaw supplanted by § 1367 governs whether the district court in the CERCLA action had jurisdiction over the garnishment proceeding.

Section 1367 does not apply to cases brought before its December 1, 1990 effective date.

Harbor Insurance v. Continental Bank Corp. · filed 1990-12-17

Because the statute is inapplicable to cases brought before its effective date (December 1, 1990), Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 310(b), it has no application to the present case and therefore the doubts that we have expressed about the continuing vitality of nonstatutory pendent and ancillary jurisdiction are not allayed.

Section 1367 does not apply to actions commenced before December 1, 1990.

Loebers v. Bay Tankers · filed 1991-03-06

Because the instant action commenced before the enactment of the Judicial Improvements Act on December 1, 1990, that act does not apply to the instant case.

Section 1367 does not apply to causes of action filed before December 1990.

Fowler v. Burns International Security Services, Inc. · filed 1991-05-24

Because this cause of action was filed before December, 1990, the new statute codifying, in part, the Gibbs decision, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 ("Supplemental jurisdiction”), is not applicable in this case.

Section 1367 does not apply to cases filed before December 1, 1990.

Kelly v. Pan-American Life Insurance Co. · filed 1991-06-12

While it appears that this Court would have jurisdiction over all parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, this statute does not apply to cases filed prior to December 1, 1990, as is the present case.

Section 1367 does not apply to actions filed before its December 1, 1990 effective date.

McGraw-Edison Co. v. Speed Queen Co. · filed 1991-07-29

It is true that Finley has since been effectively overruled by Congress, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (codifying a rule of “supplemental jurisdiction” that permits the inclusion of pendent parties in a federal action). ... That statute, as McGraw-Edison eventually acknowledges in a footnote contained in its brief, does not apply to this action, which was filed on June 28, 1990, well before the December 1, 1990, effective date of the statute.

Section 1367 does not apply to lawsuits commenced before December 1, 1990.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF LOCAL 41 v. Zacher · filed 1991-09-12

Since plaintiff commenced this lawsuit prior to December 1, 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 does not apply.

Section 1367 applies prospectively and does not govern cases filed before its effective date.

Lewis v. Windsor Door Co. · filed 1991-02-22

This enactment is to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The legislation applies prospectively only and thus is not applicable to this case.

Section 1367 applies to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990, so its authorization of pendent-party jurisdiction is unavailable in earlier actions.

Smith v. Burdette Chrysler Dodge Corp. · filed 1991-10-04

Supplemental jurisdiction, as created by the enactment, applies to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Section 1367 does not apply to lawsuits filed before December 1, 1990.

Maier-Schule GMC, Inc. v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1991-12-31

Because the plaintiff filed this lawsuit before December 1, 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 does not apply.

Section 1367 does not apply to an action brought before the provision took effect.

Beck v. Commonwealth Edison Co. · filed 1992-01-14

This court notes that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 has no application to this case because this provision was not in effect at the time this case was brought.

Section 1367(a) does not apply to complaints filed before December 10, 1990, the effective date of the supplemental jurisdiction statute.

Vild v. Visconsi · filed 1992-02-10(a)

The new supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), which was intended to codify pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, does not apply to this case because Vild filed his complaint prior to December 10, 1990, the effective date of the statute.

Section 1367 does not authorize supplemental jurisdiction in civil actions commenced before December 1, 1990.

Bruneau v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. · filed 1992-02-21

Furthermore, since this civil action was commenced prior to December 1, 1990, supplemental jurisdiction authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is unavailable.

Section 1367 does not apply to cases commenced before the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 was enacted on December 1, 1990.

Williams v. DiVittoria · filed 1991-11-05

Section 1367 does not apply here because this case commenced before the enactment of the Act on December 1, 1990.

Section 1367(a) does not apply to actions filed before its December 10, 1990 effective date.

Vild v. Visconsi · filed 1992-03-27(a)

The new supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), which was intended to codify pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, does not apply to this case because Vild filed his complaint prior to December 10, 1990, the effective date of the statute.

Section 1367’s grant of supplemental jurisdiction does not apply to cases filed before December 1, 1990.

Comeau v. Rupp · filed 1992-10-29

Although Congress recently enacted a blanket grant of “supplemental jurisdiction” to claims that arise under federal law, ... this statutory grant of pendent party jurisdiction does not apply to this case, which was filed before December 1, 1990.

Section 1367 does not apply to an action filed before its December 1, 1990 effective date.

Acme Printing Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc. · filed 1992-11-05

However, § 1367 does not apply to this action because Acme filed its Complaint on July 11, 1989, before the December 1, 1990 effective date of the statute.

Section 1367 does not govern an action filed before December 1, 1990; the common law doctrine of pendent jurisdiction applies.

Slunt v. Mercury Marine, a Brunswick Corporation, and Brunswick Corporation · filed 1993-01-07

On December 1, 1990, Congress codified the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction under the name "Supplemental Jurisdiction." See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Because Mr. Vande Slunt filed his complaint on January 23, 1990, the common law doctrine of pendent jurisdiction remains fully applicable.

Section 1367 does not apply to actions commenced before its December 1, 1990 effective date.

Meyers v. Trinity Medical Center · filed 1993-01-14

This case does not fall within the supplemental jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because the action commenced before December 1, 1990, the effective date of the statute.

Section 1367 does not apply to cases filed before December 1, 1990.

Schrag v. Dinges · filed 1993-04-20

However, section 1367 does not apply , to cases which, like this one, were filed before December 1, 1990.

Section 1367 does not govern actions commenced before December 1, 1990; those actions remain governed by the prior ancillary jurisdiction doctrine.

Gerald Maltman, Michael E. McGill Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellant, E.J. Leizerman, Attorney-Appellee v. Consolidated Rail · filed 1993-05-11

Ancillary jurisdiction and pendent jurisdiction have been codified and altered in the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Actions such as this one commenced prior to the effective date of the Act--December 1, 1990--are governed by the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine created by case law.

Section 1367 does not apply to a claim commenced before December 1, 1990.

Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffarhtsgesellschaft Mbh & Co., Kommanditgesellschaft v. Navimpex Centrala Navala and Uzin · filed 1993-05-25

Though § 1367 does not apply to the claim to enforce the Paris Court’s judgment, since that claim was commenced prior to December 1, 1990, ... the prior federal law recognized the appropriateness of adjudicating state law claims closely related to federal claims.

Section 1367 does not govern suits commenced before its December 1, 1990 effective date; the earlier pendent jurisdiction doctrine applies.

Pro-Choice Network of Western New York v. Project Rescue Western New York · filed 1993-07-30

The instant lawsuit was commenced prior to the December 1, 1990 effective date of the statute providing for "supplemental” jurisdiction rather than "ancillary” and "pendent” jurisdiction. Accordingly, the concept of "pendent” jurisdiction applies in this case.

Section 1367 does not apply to cases filed before its enactment on December 1, 1990.

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Davies · filed 1993-06-03

The court notes that the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, is inapplicable here, since this case was filed prior to the statute’s enactment on December 1, 1990.

Section 1367 does not apply to cases filed before December 1, 1990.

Schrag v. Dinges · filed 1993-08-13

However, that statute does not apply to cases which, like this one, were filed before December 1, 1990.

Section 1367 does not apply to a lawsuit commenced before its December 1, 1990 effective date; pendent jurisdiction doctrine governs instead.

Upper Hudson Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Doe · filed 1993-10-18

This lawsuit was commenced prior to December 1, 1990 — the effective date of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which provides for "supplemental” as opposed to pendent jurisdiction, In this case then pendent rather than supplemental jurisdiction is the applicable doctrine.

Section 1367 does not apply to cases filed before its enactment.

Edwards v. Okaloosa County · filed 1993-11-03

First, we note that this case was filed over three years prior to the enactment of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5113. Thus 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. III 1991), codifying “supplemental” jurisdiction, does not apply to this case.

Section 1367 does not apply retroactively to cases commenced before its December 1, 1990 effective date.

U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Industries, Inc. · filed 1993-11-23

But the present case was commenced before the statute's effective date on December 1, 1990, and § 1367 is not retroactive.

Section 1367 applies to civil actions commenced after December 1, 1990, and does not apply to actions filed in 1986.

Brown v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 1994-08-31

In 1990 Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1367 which codifies principles governing pendent jurisdiction for civil actions commenced after December 1, 1990. However, that statute does not apply to this case, which was filed in 1986.

Section 1367 applies to civil actions commenced after December 1, 1990, and does not govern earlier-filed actions.

In Re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation · filed 1994-10-17

In 1990 Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367 which codifies principles governing pendent jurisdiction for civil actions commenced after December 1, 1990.

Section 1367 does not apply to actions commenced before December 1, 1990.

International Paving Systems, Inc. v. Van-Tulco, Inc. · filed 1994-10-11

As this action was commenced prior to December 1, 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which codifies pre-Finley doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, does not apply.

Section 1367 does not apply to actions commenced before it took effect in 1990.

Department of Economic Development v. Arthur Andersen & Co. · filed 1996-04-02

The federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, has no application in this case because that statute became effective in 1990, five years after DED commenced this action.

Section 1367 does not apply to actions initiated before its enactment in 1990.

Allard v. Arthur Andersen & Co.(USA) · filed 1996-04-02

The supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, has no direct application here because it was enacted in 1990, almost six years after this action was initiated.

Section 1367 grants supplemental jurisdiction over pendent-party claims in federal-question cases commenced on or after December 1, 1990, but does not apply to earlier actions.

Mazyck v. Long Island Railroad · filed 1996-05-24

Further, although the Court recognizes that for actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990 this result no longer would obtain in light of the affirmative jurisdictional grant of “supplemental jurisdiction” to hear pendent-party claims in federal question cases that now is suppled by 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the supplemental jurisdiction statute does not apply to actions, such as the case at bar, which were commenced prior to December 1, 1990.

Section 1367 does not apply to actions filed before its effective date.

Lashawn A. v. Marion S. Barry, Jr. · filed 1996-07-09

Section 1367 does not apply in this particular case because the children's complaint was filed before the statute's effective date.

Section 1367 does not apply to actions filed before December 1, 1990.

National Presto Industries, Inc. v. Dazey Corporation · filed 1997-03-06

Because Presto's original action was filed before December 1, 1990, this case is not subject to the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, in which Congress codified the common law doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction (herein, collectively "ancillary jurisdiction").

Section 1367 does not apply retroactively to actions filed before its December 1, 1990 effective date.

Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co. · filed 1999-01-11

This court denied that portion of the plaintiffs’ proposed notification which sought to include prospective plaintiffs whose claims had not yet reached the minimum jurisdictional amount of $10,000.00 because their request to be included relied on the amended version of Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The current amended version of § 1367 was not effective until December 1, 1990, sixteen years after this lawsuit was filed, and was not retroactive. So, this court found that the amended statute did not apply to the instant case and denied that portion of the motion seeking to serve notice on prospective plaintiffs whose claims had not yet reached the applicable jurisdictional minimum.

Section 1367 applies only to actions commenced on or after its enactment.

Ortega v. C.J. Schramm · filed 1991-01-28

We do not consider this statute in our decision because it applies only to actions "commenced on or after the date of [its] enactement." Id. Sec. 310(b).

Section 1367 applies only to actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

C.D.S. Diversified, Inc. v. Franchise Finance Corp. of America · filed 1991-03-04

Section 1367, however, expressly applies to actions commenced “on or after the date of the enactment of this Act”, which is December 1, 1990 (Pub.L. 101-650, § 310[c]). Thus, by its terms, the statute is inapplicable to actions commenced before December 1, 1990.

Section 1367 applies only to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Kreuzfeld A.G. v. Carnehammar · filed 1991-06-05

Section 310(c) of Act, however, provides that “[t]he amendments made by this section shall apply to civil actions commenced on or after the date of the enactment of this Act [December 1, 1990].” Consequently, as this litigation was instituted on October 24, 1989, the court’s holding in its December 14, 1990 order (DE 177) remains the same.

Section 1367 applies to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Foster v. BD. OF TRUSTEES OF BUTLER CTY. COLLEGE · filed 1991-06-21

This statute applies to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990. Pub.L. No. 101-650, sec. 310(c), 104 Stat. 5089, 5114. Since this civil action was filed in 1989, the statute is inapplicable.

Section 1367 applies only to civil actions commenced after December 1, 1990.

Janicsko v. Pellman · filed 1991-09-25

However, the court need not analyze the MHPA claim under these standards, as the new statute is effective only as to civil actions commenced after December 1, 1990. This action was filed in September 1990. Therefore, the rule in effect when plaintiffs filed their suit will apply.

Section 1367 applies only to actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Rubinberg v. Hydronic Fabrications, Inc. · filed 1991-10-01

Congress recently codified the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, now called "supplemental” jurisdiction, which is inapplicable here, since it applies only to actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990 (see 28 U.S.C. § 1367).

Section 1367 applies only to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Miller v. Glanz · filed 1991-11-18

However, § 1367 applies only to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Section 1367 applies only to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Titus v. Geo-Engineering · filed 1992-01-23

The recently enacted statute governing what is now termed "supplemental jurisdiction," 28 U.S.C. § 1367, applies only to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990, and therefore does not affect our analysis of this case, commenced in 1986, under prior prevailing law.

Section 1367 applies only to civil actions commenced after December 1, 1990.

Bormann v. Applied Vision Systems, Inc. · filed 1992-02-28

Congress recently codified the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction in a new statutory provision entitled “supplemental jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367. However, this provision only applies to civil actions commenced after December 1, 1990.

Section 1367 applies only to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Shelton · filed 1992-03-09

However, § 1367 became effective December 1, 1990 and is applicable only "to civil actions commenced on or after the date of enactment of this Act (Dec. 1, 1990)."

Section 1367 authorizes pendent-party jurisdiction in actions filed after December 1, 1990.

Gibson v. City of Glendale Police Department · filed 1992-03-10

The enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which vests district courts with authority to exercise “pendent party” jurisdiction in actions filed after December 1, 1990, satisfies the court that the troublesome aspects of the disposition of this action are unlikely to recur.

Section 1367 applies only to actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990; third-party actions commenced before that date fall outside it.

Federal Deposit Insurance v. Howse · filed 1992-04-13

It is clear that, these actions were commenced before the effective date of § 1367; as a result § 1367 does not apply to these third-party action.

Section 1367 applies only to actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Wentz v. Park County School Dist. No. 16 · filed 1992-06-26

28 U.S.C. § 1367 governs exercise of pendent or "supplemental jurisdiction," but only applies to actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Section 1367 applies only to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., Autolite Division · filed 1992-07-22

However, this statute only applies to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990. Kauffman filed her original complaint on September 12, 1989; therefore, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 does not govern this case.

Section 1367 applies only to actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Carpenters Health and Welfare Trust Fund for Northern California v. Shirley Const., Inc. · filed 1992-07-29

Section 1367 by its own terms is applicable only to actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Section 1367 applies only to actions commenced after December 1, 1990.

Patty C. Kaiser James Kaiser v. Memorial Blood Center of Minneapolis, Incorporated American Red Cross, a Minnesota Corpo · filed 1992-10-22

However, because the supplemental jurisdiction provision is effective only for actions commenced after December 1, 1990, it is not applicable to the present case.

Section 1367 applies only to actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Carnegie v. Miller · filed 1993-01-12

Congress responded to Finley v. United States by enacting the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-650, Title III, § 310(a), 104 Stat. 5113 (1990), codifying the courts’ "supplemental jurisdiction” at 28 U.S.C. § 1367. ... This enactment has no bearing on the instant action, however, because it applies only to actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Section 1367 applies to actions commenced after December 1, 1990.

Rodriguez v. Pacificare of Texas, Inc. · filed 1993-01-12

Section 1367 is applicable to actions that were commenced after December 1, 1990.

Section 1367 applies to actions commenced after December 1, 1990.

Rodriguez v. Pacificare of Texas, Inc., Michael Heistand, M.D. · filed 1993-01-12

Section 1367 is applicable to actions that were commenced after December 1, 1990.

Section 1367 applies only to actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing & Heating Corp. · filed 1993-04-09

The Act, which codified the concepts of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction under the caption' of “supplemental jurisdiction,” applies only to actions commenced on or after the date of its enactment, which was December 1, 1990.

Section 1367 applies only to actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Rounseville v. Zahl · filed 1993-04-15

Because § 1367 expressly applies only to those actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990, the court will analyze defendants' motion using the case law on pendent jurisdiction.

Section 1367 applies only to actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Mimbs v. Commercial Life Insurance · filed 1993-04-22

The statute itself, however, applies to those actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990; this action commenced May 21, 1990.

Section 1367 applies only to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Federal Deposit Insurance v. Deloitte & Touche · filed 1993-09-03

The statute by its terms applies “to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990, the date of the enactment of this Act.” Pub.L. 101-650, Title III, § 310(a), Dec. 1, 1990, 104 Stat. 5113. As a result, since this case was filed July 25, 1990, the new supplemental jurisdiction statute does not apply to this action.

Section 1367 applies only to claims commenced after December 1, 1990.

Lambert v. Genesee Hospital · filed 1993-09-17

We note in passing that 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which codified Gibbs, only applies to claims commenced after December 1,1990, and thus was inapplicable in this ease commenced in 1986.

Section 1367 applies only to actions commenced after December 1, 1990.

Lenz v. Associated Inns & Restaurants Co. of America · filed 1993-09-24

The Act, however, expressly applies only to actions commenced after December 1, 1990.

Section 1367 applies only to actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

In Re Secretary Of The Department Of Crime Control And Public Safety · filed 1993-10-26

Congress overruled Finley in the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, which amended Title 28 to explicitly authorize the exercise of such "pendent party jurisdiction" under the new label of "supplemental" jurisdiction. Pub.L. 101-650, Title III, § 310(a) (Dec. 1, 1990) (codified at 28 USC § 1367). But the Act by its own terms applies only to actions commenced on or after Dec. 1, 1990, Pub.L. 101-650, § 310(c), and this action was filed in 1986. Accordingly, Finley is controlling here.

Section 1367 applies only to actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Barfield v. Blackwood · filed 1993-10-26

Congress overruled Finley in the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, which amended Title 28 to explicitly authorize the exercise of such "pendent party jurisdiction” under the new label of "supplemental” jurisdiction. Pub.L. 101-650, Title III, § 310(a) (Dec. 1, 1990) (codified at 28 USC § 1367). But the Act by its own terms applies only to actions commenced on or after Dec. 1, 1990, Pub.L. 101-650, § 310(c), and this action was filed in 1986. Accordingly, Finley is controlling here.

Section 1367 applies only to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Ludwig v. NYNEX Service Co. · filed 1993-11-16

The Court notes that Congress's codification of the federal common law doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. II 1990) under the rubric "supplemental jurisdiction" is not applicable to this action insofar as section 1367 only applies to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990. Plaintiff commenced this action on August 10, 1990.

Section 1367(a) applies only to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990; an amended complaint that relates back to an earlier original complaint does not make the section applicable.

Iue Afl-Cio Pension Fund v. Herrmann · filed 1993-11-19(a)

Supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(a) (Supp. II 1990), which codifies the common law doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, does not apply in this case because Section 1367(a) "shall apply to civil actions commenced on or after [Dec. 1, 1990]." Pub.L. No. 101-650 Sec. 310(c), 104 Stat. 5114 (1990). Although the Fund filed the SAC on December 27, 1990, after the effective date of section 1367, the Fund filed the original complaint on February 7, 1990, prior to the effective date. ... Therefore, the December 27, 1990 filing date of the SAC relates back to the February 7, 1990 filing date of the original complaint.

Section 1367 applies only to claims commenced after December 1, 1990.

Lambert v. Genesee Hospital · filed 1993-11-24

We note in passing that 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367, which codified Gibbs, only applies to claims commenced after December 1, 1990, and thus was inapplicable in this case commenced in 1986.

Section 1367 applies to actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Willman v. Heartland Hospital East · filed 1994-08-29

The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 codified the former common law doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction under the new rubric of supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367. See also McLaurin v. Prater, 30 F.3d 982, 984-985 (8th Cir.1994). The Act applies to actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990. This action was commenced in 1989, so we review the district court's ruling on this issue under pre-Act case law.

Section 1367 applies only to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Conopco, Inc. v. May Department Stores Co. · filed 1994-09-21

Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 applies only to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990. Pub.L. No. 101-650 § 310(c), 104 Stat. 5114 (1990). Thus, it has no applicability here.

Section 1367 applies only to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990, even when an earlier action was removed to federal court later.

Schlumberger Industries, Incorporated v. National Surety Corporation · filed 1994-10-07

Section 1367, however, was enacted on December 1, 1990, prior to ICI's removal of the Greenville County case to federal court and to ICI's dismissal. Section 310 of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, which enacted 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367, instructs: "The amendments made by this section shall apply to civil actions commenced on or after the date of the enactment of this Act." Pub.L. No. 101-650, Sec. 310(c), 104 Stat. 5089, 5114. Thus, section 1367 has no application to the Greenville County case.

Section 1367 applies only to civil actions commenced on or after its December 1, 1990 enactment.

Schlumberger Industries, Inc. v. National Surety Corp. · filed 1994-10-07

Section 310 of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, which enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1367, instructs: “The amendments made by this section shall apply to civil actions commenced on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.” ... Thus, section 1367 has no application to the Greenville County case.

Section 1367 applies only to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Conopco, Inc. v. May Department Stores Company · filed 1994-11-29

Moreover, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367 applies only to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Section 1367 applies only to actions commenced after December 1, 1990.

HBE Leasing, Corp. v. Frank · filed 1995-03-22

However the statute applies only to actions commenced after December 1, 1990. Consequently it has no applicability to the judgment in this case which was commenced in 1988.

Section 1367 applies only to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Valanzuela v. Snider · filed 1995-06-20

In 1990, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which governs the area of pendent claim jurisdiction and refers to such jurisdiction as “supplemental jurisdiction." That section, however, applies only to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Section 1367 applies only to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing & Heating Corp. · filed 1995-10-13

That statute, however, only applies to civil actions commenced on or after the date of its enactment, December 1, 1990, ... and this action was commenced on November 21, 1989.

Section 1367 applies to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990; earlier actions are governed by preexisting ancillary jurisdiction law.

Macklanburg-Duncan Co. v. Aetna Casualty · filed 1995-12-05

Section 1367 applies "to civil actions commenced on or after" December 1, 1990. ... Because the CERCLA action was filed in 1986, Tenth Circuit ancillary jurisdiction caselaw supplanted by Sec. 1367 governs whether the district court in the CERCLA action had jurisdiction over the garnishment proceeding.

Section 1367 applies only to cases commenced after December 1, 1990.

Shumaker v. Iowa Department of Transportation · filed 1995-12-20

The federal court doctrine of pendent jurisdiction applies in this case despite being supplanted by 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The new federal supplemental jurisdiction statute only applies to cases commenced after December 1, 1990.

Section 1367 applies only to actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990; earlier actions remain governed by prior pendent and ancillary jurisdiction law.

Pahmer v. Greenberg · filed 1996-05-09

section 1367 applies only to actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990. Because plaintiffs filed this action on December 21, 1989, it is governed, not by section 1367, but by the prior common law of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.

Section 1367 applies only to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.

Abbent v. Eastman Kodak Co. · filed 1996-08-29

However, Section 1367 applies only “to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990,” the date of its enactment.

Section 1367 applies only to suits that began after November 30, 1990.

Wilson v. City of Chicago, Cross-Claim and Jon Burge, Cross-Claim · filed 1997-07-21

But that statute is applicable only to suits that began after November 30, 1990, ... and this suit began before.

Section 1367 applies only to civil actions commenced after December 1, 1990.

Beck v. Prupis · filed 1998-12-15

The district court's ruling improperly relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Section 1367 applies only to civil actions commenced after December 1, 1990.

Section 1367 does not supply jurisdiction over a federal TCPA claim through an allegation of pendent state law jurisdiction.

Bridge v. OCWEN FEDERAL BANK · filed 2009-08-28

The Court has given consideration to the fact that they have alleged jurisdiction “pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 for pendent state law claims.” ECF 80 at ¶ 2. But TCPA is not a pendent state law claim; it is a federal claim despite the fact there is no federal question jurisdiction to hear it.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a related state-law claim against an additional party when the claim is part of the same case or controversy as a claim within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Rosen Ex Rel. Estate of Souza v. Chang · filed 1991-02-15(a)

Since the passage of this statute, this Court now has the power to assert jurisdiction over this state law claim against the State.

Section 1367(a) gives district courts supplemental jurisdiction over claims against additional defendants when those claims are sufficiently related to claims within original jurisdiction.

Doe v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp. · filed 1991-05-20(a)

Plaintiffs' claims against the other defendants are so related to the claims against the Red Cross that they are pendent (supplemental) to them.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a pendent plaintiff named in the original complaint when that plaintiff’s claim shares a common nucleus of operative fact with a claim within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Arnold v. Kimberly Quality Care Nursing Service · filed 1991-05-06(a)

The section specifically includes within the supplemental jurisdiction of the district courts “claims that include joinder or intervention of additional parties.” This language is broad enough to include a pendent plaintiff who is named in the original complaint, not just one, as the defendants argue, who may subsequently be joined, or seek to join, or who intervenes.

Section 1367(a) extends supplemental jurisdiction to claims against additional parties when those claims arise from the same common nucleus of operative fact as claims within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Sinclair v. Soniform · filed 1991-06-06(a)

Sinclair's claims against the crew and his claims against the manufacturers did arise from a common nucleus of operative fact. Both sets of claims are based on the same purported injuries stemming from the same scuba diving incident. Those injuries were allegedly caused by the negligence of both the crew and the manufacturer. Accordingly, we find that Sinclair's claims against the manufacturers fall within the district court's supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) grants supplemental jurisdiction over a claim sufficiently related to an action within original jurisdiction to form part of the same case or controversy.

Bio-Vita, Ltd. v. Biopure Corp. · filed 1991-07-17(a)

Here, petitioners’ request to enter upon Upjohn’s property is sufficiently related to the Principal Action that it forms “part of the same case or controversy” under § 1367.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims against additional parties when they arise from a common nucleus of operative facts with a claim within original jurisdiction and Article III permits it.

Corporate Resources, Inc. v. Southeast Suburban Ambulatory Surgical Center, Inc. · filed 1991-09-26(a)

With that last sentence, Congress has enabled federal district courts to exercise pendent party jurisdiction (provided that the exercise of the jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution).

Section 1367(a) provides supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims closely related to claims within a federal court’s original jurisdiction because they form part of the same case or controversy.

Henry Horner Mothers Guild v. Chicago Housing Authority · filed 1991-11-20(a)

The claims in Count V, alleging breach of the leases between CHA and plaintiffs, are closely related to the claims in this case that are within the original jurisdiction of this Court. Hence the state law claims and the federal question claims “form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1991). Since defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion fails, it is unnecessary to dismiss or sever the state law claims because they are within the supplemental jurisdiction of the Court.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction only when the additional claims form part of the same case or controversy as a claim within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Lehighton Area School District v. Gilbert · filed 1992-01-06(a)

In the instant case, Lehighton attempts to join its RICO claims against Gilbert with its claims against American and Commercial for breach of their respective contracts to act as surety under a public official’s bond for the faithful performance of Gilbert in her official capacity as tax collector. These claims, however, are not part of the same case or controversy.

Section 1367(a) gives a bankruptcy court supplemental jurisdiction over a claim that forms part of the same case or controversy as a claim within its original jurisdiction.

Jones v. Woody (In Re W.J. Services, Inc.) · filed 1992-01-10(a)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), the bankruptcy court has supplemental jurisdiction over claims that form the same case or controversy. ... Accordingly, this Court has the supplemental jurisdiction to hear the removed state court claim.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over common-law claims that form part of the same case or controversy as False Claims Act claims within the district court’s original jurisdiction.

United States v. Rockwell International Corp. · filed 1992-02-27(a)

However, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that that initial original jurisdiction issue having been decided, this Court may, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), exercise “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims ... [which] form part of the same case or controversy” as Plaintiff’s FCA claims.

Section 1367 requires a claim within original federal jurisdiction to support supplemental jurisdiction over a related state-law claim.

Georgia Carpet Sales, Inc. v. SLS CORP. · filed 1992-02-27

And if no jurisdictional predicate exists for such a claim, then by definition there is no “supplemental jurisdiction” under Section 1367’s recent replacement of the pendent jurisdiction concept (for by definition there must be an original-jurisdiction anchor to which the supplemental jurisdiction can attach).

Section 1367(a) requires the district court to have original jurisdiction over a case before it may hear related state law claims under supplemental jurisdiction.

Hammond v. Creative Financial Planning Organization, Inc. · filed 1992-02-28(a)

The doctrine of pendant and ancillary jurisdiction is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 under the name “supplemental jurisdiction.” The statute parallels Gibbs in requiring that the district court have original jurisdiction over the case in which pendant state claims are alleged.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction only when the court already has original jurisdiction.

State of Idaho, Dept. of Finance v. Clarke · filed 1992-03-13(a)

Finally, Section 1367 of Title 28, which grants this court pendent and ancillary jurisdiction in certain situations, only applies in those situations where the court already has original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) gives a district court supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims based on the same facts as federal claims within its original jurisdiction.

Storment v. Gossage · filed 1992-04-29(a)

Therefore, this Court also has supplemental jurisdiction over Counts I and II because they are so related to the counts within this Court’s original jurisdiction that they form part of the same controversy.

Section 1367(a) gives a court with original jurisdiction over a remaining federal claim supplemental jurisdiction over related state tort claims.

Kennedy v. Widdowson · filed 1992-09-03(a)

Because the Court has original jurisdiction over the remaining federal claims in count II, this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over these state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) requires an independently viable action within the court’s original jurisdiction before supplemental jurisdiction can support joinder of an indispensable nondiverse party.

ZB Holdings, Inc. v. White · filed 1992-09-25(a)

We hold today that where a derivative suit brought in diversity is subject to dismissal for failure to join an indispensable, non-diverse party, supplemental jurisdiction is not available to join that non-diverse party because, under § 1367(a), the Court never had “original jurisdiction” over the derivative action.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim arising from the same nucleus of operative facts as a claim within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Rekhi v. Wildwood Industries, Inc. · filed 1992-10-09(a)

The court agrees with Judge Kauffman and finds that Count III is based upon the same nucleus of operative facts as Count I. Rekhi’s wage demand was prompted by Wildwood’s failure to pay certain compensation which Rekhi felt he deserved under his contract for employment. His breach of contract claim under Count I also arises from the same alleged nonpayment of wages and benefits owed.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims against additional parties when those claims share a common nucleus of operative facts with claims within original federal jurisdiction.

Grynberg Production Corp. v. British Gas, P.L.C. · filed 1993-03-19(a)

All of Grynberg’s contract and tort claims against Gregory and British Gas, and Grynberg’s declaratory judgment action against ARCO, BP, and TransWorld, derive from the same sequence of events. Supplemental jurisdiction exists over all remaining parties and claims for which there is no primary federal jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) mandates supplemental jurisdiction over state claims that form the same case or controversy as a claim within original jurisdiction, unless a section 1367(c) exception applies.

LaSorella v. Penrose St. Francis Healthcare System · filed 1993-04-26(a)

This finding satisfies section 1367(a) and mandates that I exercise supplemental jurisdiction unless one of the exceptions in section 1367(c) applies.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law third-party claim only if it forms part of the same case or controversy as a claim within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Molina v. Mallah Organization, Inc. · filed 1993-04-02(a)

To permit us to assert supplemental jurisdiction over Mallah’s purely state law defamation claims, the third-party complaint must allege facts “so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim arising from the same series of events as a claim within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Doe v. Town of Plymouth · filed 1993-07-02(a)

Section 1367(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides this court with “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original ’jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.” ... This court finds the two claims related inasmuch as they arise out of the same series of events. Accordingly, this court rejects defendants’ argument.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over state law and ADEA claims arising from the same employment termination as a Title VII claim within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Baughey v. Tecumseh Country Club, Incorporated · filed 1993-08-03(a)

Given that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the Title VII claim, the court was entitled to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and the ADEA claim, all of which arise from the termination of the Plaintiffs' employment contract with the Defendants.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims sufficiently related to a claim within original jurisdiction to form part of the same case or controversy.

Dochterman v. First Mississippi Corp. · filed 1993-09-20(a)

However, it is apparent that Plaintiffs remaining claims “are so related to [the § 510 claim] that they form part of the same ease or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c); see also Richmond v. American Sys. Corp., 792 F.Supp. 449, 454 (E.D.Va.1992). The Court will, therefore, exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs remaining claims.