28 U.S.C. § 1367

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Haslam v. Mclaughlin · filed 2022-11-08(c)(3)

The court will also decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because this court has dismissed all the claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

DECOZEN CHRYSLER JEEP CORP. v. FIAT CHRYSLER AUTOMOBILES US, LLC · filed 2022-11-21(c)

Where a “district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” it may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Rover Pipeline LLC v. Zwick · filed 2022-11-30(c)(3)

If a district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, it may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

After dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, a district court typically declines supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims.

Harper v. Arrow Electronics Corporation · filed 2022-12-01(c)(3)

A district court will typically decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also Gaston v. Ploeger, 297 F. App’x 738, 746 (10th Cir. 2008) (“we have repeatedly recognized that this is the preferred practice”). For this reason I also dismissMs. Harper’s claims based on state law.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining cross-claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction, ordinarily favoring dismissal when judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity provide no reason to retain them.

Fratelli bvba v. APM Music Services, LLC · filed 2022-12-06(c)(3)

Because district courts ordinarily decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims that remain once they have dismissed the claims over which they had original jurisdiction, and because Stone has identified no distinguishing features of this case that would justify a different result, Keizer’s motion to dismiss his and Stone’s cross-claims is granted.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Nguyen v. United States · filed 2022-12-20(c)(3)

And even if the Court did have supplemental jurisdiction, it would decline to exercise it. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (providing that a court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Corlew v. Superior Duct Fabrication, Inc. · filed 2022-12-21(c)(3)

After a court has “dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction[,]” it is inappropriate for it to retain jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, considering judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Dhillon v. Smithers · filed 2023-01-09(c)(3)

Section 1367(c)(3) provides that district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” ... The balance of these interests weighs in favor of declining supplemental jurisdiction. ... The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Lemmon v. Pierce County · filed 2023-01-13(c)(3)

Having dismissed all claims over which this Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exert supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims and dismisses these claims without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Patton v. Texas Woman's University Case remanded to the 333rd District Court of Harris County, Texas. · filed 2023-01-18(c)(3)

Having dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, the Court will follow the general rule and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Patton’s TTCA claims. Thus, Patton’s TTCA claims are remanded to state court, where this case originated.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims when no viable federal claim remains.

Sellers, Kendrick v. Madison Police Department · filed 2023-01-18(c)(3)

Although Sellers may have a state-law claim, I will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any related state-law claim without a viable federal claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Spottswood v. Washington County MN · filed 2023-01-24(c)(3)

Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Spottswood’s state claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (allowing district court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claim after dismissing all original jurisdiction claims); King v. City of Crestwood, 899 F.3d 643, 651 (8th Cir. 2018) (standard of review).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

McCarron v. HSHS St. Elizabeth's Hospital · filed 2023-01-30(c)(3)

However, § 1367(c)(3) provides that a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” ... The Court has considered the relevant factors and has decided to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, with judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity guiding the decision.

Calvary Industries, Inc. v. Winters · filed 2023-01-30(c)(3)

There is no forum manipulation and none of the Carnegie-Mellon factors weigh in favor of exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. Accordingly, the Court remands Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims to the State Court from which they were removed.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

SANSEVERO v. COUNTY OF MERCER · filed 2023-02-01(c)(3)

Because the Court will dismiss all claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to extend supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's additional state law claims at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Lampley v. U.S. Department of Transportation Case remanded to the 458th District Court of Fort Bend · filed 2023-02-13(c)(3)

Having dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction and all claims that were otherwise without merit, and having remanded the claims against TxDOT to state court, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining claims in this matter.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Ataroua v. Tamir · filed 2023-02-22(c)(3)

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction; when the case is in its early stages, the relevant factors favor declining jurisdiction.

Lobre v. Plaquemines Parish Government Operations Department · filed 2023-03-02(c)(3)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if, as here, it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” ... As this case is in its early stages, these factors favor applying this general rule here. Thus, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits dismissal of state law claims without prejudice after the other claims are dismissed.

Epley v. Lopez · filed 2023-03-13(c)(3)

Furthermore, Plaintiff's state law claims are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

When a federal claim is reinstated, a court may vacate the dismissal of related state and local claims over which supplemental jurisdiction had been declined.

Parada v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, C.A. · filed 2014-03-25(c)

In view of our decision to vacate the District Court’s dismissal of Parada’s claim of discrimination under the ADA, we also vacate the judgment of the District Court dismissing Parada’s analogous discrimination and retaliation claims against BIV under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL.

Section 1367(c) leaves the decision whether to reinstate dismissed state-law claims on remand to the district court’s discretion.

COMMITTEE CONCERNING COMMUNITY IMP. v. Modesto · filed 2009-10-08(c)

Remand will simply provide the District Court with an opportunity to exercise its discretion anew. The proper exercise of that discretion is, in the first instance, the responsibility of the District Court, not this court.

Section 1367(a) permits the district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the federal claims are reinstated.

Cherry Knoll, L.L.C. v. HDR Engineering, Incorpora · filed 2019-04-22(a)

This Court further REINSTATES Cherry Knoll’s state law claims over which the district court may now exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367 permits a district court, after reinstatement of a federal claim on appeal, to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over previously remanded state claims by enforcing the parties' consolidation stipulation.

Payne v. Norwest Corporation · filed 1999-08-10(a)

Thus, pursuant to the stipulation consolidating all claims in federal court, the district court had the authority after our remand of the federal retaliation claim to enforce the stipulation and accept supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims under 28 U.S.C. S 1367. ... With the reinstatement of the federal retaliation claim, the district court, in its discretion, had every right to review its prior remand and to once again enforce the parties' stipulation consolidating all of the claims in federal court.

Reinstatement of a federal claim requires reconsideration of whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims dismissed after disposition of all federal claims.

Mills v. City of Barbourville · filed 2004-11-12(c)(3)

Given our reinstatement of one of plaintiff’s federal claims under Section 1983, we reverse the dismissal of the state law claims for lack of jurisdiction and remand to the district court for its determination of whether the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental state law claims to be reasserted on remand when dismissal of a federal claim within the district court’s original jurisdiction is reversed.

Laguerre v. National Grid USA · filed 2022-03-11(a)

Additionally, because we reverse the court’s dismissal of Laguerre’s federal ADA claim, with respect to which the district court has original jurisdiction, we likewise reverse the court’s dismissal of Laguerre’s supplemental state law claims, permitting Laguerre to reassert these claims on remand.

Section 1367(c)(3) no longer provides a basis for declining supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims when federal claims are reinstated.

Baltas v. Chapdelaine · filed 2025-09-03(c)(3)

But when federal claims are reinstated, “§ 1367(c)(3) no longer provides a basis for declining to exercise jurisdiction over” related state-law claims. Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 79 (2d Cir. 2003). In light of our decision to reinstate some of Baltas’s and Tarasco’s federal claims, we vacate the district court’s dismissal of their state-law claims, but offer no view as to other reasons the district court might decide on remand to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) does not override the bar on removing state workers’ compensation cases under § 1445(c).

Jones v. C.J. Mahan Construction Co. · filed 2005-05-16(a)

While the Court may have supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs nonfederal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), the Court believes the express prohibition of the removal of workmen’s compensation cases is controlling.

Section 1367 does not provide supplemental jurisdiction over a post-dismissal settlement-related lien dispute when the dismissal judgment neither incorporates the settlement nor expressly retains jurisdiction.

John A. Hill and Susan M. Hill v. Baxter Healthcare Corporation, Fujisawa Usa, Inc., American Pharmaceutical Partners, I · filed 2005-05-17

The court did not expressly retain jurisdiction, nor did it make the terms of the settlement agreements part of its judgment, which would have rendered a violation of the agreement a violation of a court order. This is in contrast to the court’s later order of July 15, which stated explicitly that “the court will retain jurisdiction for purposes of distribution.” But that element was lacking in the June 29 order and therefore the court could not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the lien dispute.

Section 1367 does not provide supplemental jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement after the underlying claims have been dismissed with prejudice; enforcement requires an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.

Morisch v. United States · filed 2010-04-06

Thus, the Court can no longer entertain disputes between the Morisches and Kreisman in its supplemental jurisdiction and can enforce the settlement agreement between them only if there is an independent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the instant controversy.

Section 1367(a) does not authorize supplemental jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement in a closed case merely because the court has authority to enforce an injunction.

Cernelle v. Graminex L L C · filed 2020-02-04(a)

It also argues that the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), using the injunction-enforcement authority as a hook. That argument is a non-starter. See Perkins v. Booker, No. 08-CV-97, 2011 WL 3664689, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2011) (noting that there is nothing in Sixth Circuit precedent interpreting and applying Kokkonen that allows the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under section 1367 to enforce a settlement agreement in a closed case). The plaintiff must meet the amount-in-controversy threshold.

Section 1367 does not supply supplemental jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement when the court lacks an independent basis for federal jurisdiction over the claims.

FLAMMIA v. NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM · filed 2020-09-16

Supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is unavailing. Generally, the “enforcement of the settlement agreement is for state courts, unless there is some independent basis for federal jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 382 (1994). As discussed above, this Court does not independently have jurisdiction over any of Plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement when the district court retained jurisdiction to enforce its terms.

Agrasanchez v. Agrasanchez · filed 2024-07-12(a)

Although on the current record we “do not have enough information to determine whether the district court had § 1332(a) diversity jurisdiction,” Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Gussi, S.A. de C.V., 92 F.4th 815, 823 (9th Cir. 2024), petition for cert. filed, No. 23-1261 (U.S. May 3, 2024), the district court properly exercised supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), see Kelly v. Wengler, 822 F.3d 1085, 1094 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining that courts have ancillary jurisdiction to enforce their orders approving settlement agreements).

Section 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claims against a nondiverse person who seeks to intervene as a defendant under Rule 24 in a diversity action.

Radchyshyn v. Allstate Indemnity Co. · filed 2015-11-05(b)

If Plaintiffs original state lawsuit against Allstate had included Tolley as a party defendant, Allstate would have been precluded from removing it to this Court for want of diversity jurisdiction under § 1332. Section 1367(b) prevents Tolley from now seeking to side-step this jurisdictional requirement through intervention.

Section 1367(b) permits a nondiverse party to intervene in a diversity case to protect an interest that arose after the case began.

Aurora Loan Serv v. Craddieth, Frank · filed 2006-03-31(b)

Section 1367(b)’s purpose of prevent- ing plaintiffs who would have destroyed federal jurisdiction had they joined a suit at its outset from using Rule 24 to circumvent the requirement of complete diversity has no application to a party forced to intervene to protect an interest that arose during the course of a federal litigation in which he had no stake at the outset.

Section 1367(a) grants supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims, but that jurisdiction does not authorize relief restricted by another federal statute.

Handberry v. Thompson · filed 2006-01-17(a)

Here, though, Congress explicitly contemplated that other statutes would limit the supplemental jurisdiction granted in section 1367, which provides that such jurisdiction may be limited “as expressly provided by Federal statute.” By its terms, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) appears to be such a “Federal statute.” ... Indeed, Congress likely did not do so here because section 3626(a) limits not jurisdiction, but rather the types of remedies available once jurisdiction has been properly invoked.

Section 1367(a) grants supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims, but that grant does not prevent another federal statute from limiting the remedies available on those claims.

Handberry v. Thompson · filed 2006-04-04(a)

Indeed, Congress likely did not do so here because section 3626(a) limits not jurisdiction, but rather the types of remedies available once jurisdiction has been properly invoked.

Section 1367(a) is impliedly repealed in part by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A), precluding supplemental jurisdiction to grant prospective relief for solely state-law violations in a federal prison-conditions action.

Reynolds v. Cook · filed 2020-03-09(a)

I do not have supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. Normally, I could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ state-law claims because they are so related to the federal claims in this action that “they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, the Second Circuit has held that 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) impliedly repealed 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) in part. See Handberry v. Thompson, 446 F.3d 335, 344–46. Thus, I am “not permitted to order prospective relief to remedy an asserted violation of state law only.” Id. at 346. Because I have held that the 2012 ban did not violate the Plaintiffs’ federal rights under the United States Constitution, any prospective relief that I might grant the Plaintiffs on their state-law claims would remedy only state-law violations. Thus, I dismiss the Plaintiffs’ state-law claims without prejudice.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a related state-law counterclaim even if state law purports to assign exclusive jurisdiction to a specialized state court.

Davet v. Cleveland · filed 2006-06-22(a)

If accepted, Davet’s construction of § 1901.181(A)—under which only the Housing Division of the Cleveland Municipal Court possessed jurisdiction to hear the city’s state-law counterclaim—would present a square conflict between the requirements of § 1901.181(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), which gives district courts “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.” That conflict is traditionally resolved in favor of the federal legislation under the Supremacy Clause.

Section 1367(a) allows a district court to hear a related state-law counterclaim despite a state statute giving a municipal housing division exclusive jurisdiction among divisions of that municipal court.

Davet v. City of Cleveland, Robert Vilkas and City of Cleveland Department of Building & Housing · filed 2006-06-22(a)

As one interpretation of § 1901.181(A) gives rise to serious constitutional difficulties while the other does not, the provision is best interpreted as vesting jurisdiction in the Housing Division of the Cleveland Municipal Court “exclusive” of other divisions of the municipal court, but not exclusive of a federal court otherwise properly exercising jurisdiction over the case. Section 1901.181(A) does not, in short, pose an impediment to the district court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims even when state law purports to give a specialized state court exclusive jurisdiction over those claims.

Davet v. Cleveland · filed 2006-08-01(a)

If accepted, Davet’s construction of § 1901.181(A)—under which only the Housing Division of the Cleveland Municipal Court possessed jurisdiction to hear the city’s state-law counterclaim—would present a square conflict between the requirements of § 1901.181(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), which gives district courts “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.” That conflict is traditionally resolved in favor of the federal legislation under the Supremacy Clause.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim even when state law assigns jurisdiction over that claim to a state court.

Doe v. Fournier · filed 2012-02-22(a)

It is clear that this court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs chapter 214 claim by virtue of supplemental jurisdiction. ... “[A] grant of exclusive jurisdiction by a state legislature cannot divest [a federal] court of subject matter jurisdiction. Put simply, a state legislature cannot define the scope of federal jurisdiction.”

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a related state-law claim even when a state statute designates a particular state court to hear that claim.

Bradberry v. Jefferson County, Texas · filed 2013-10-17(a)

Whatever Section 613.021 means for state court lawsuits, it is no barrier to the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in federal court.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over an insurer’s lien claim against settlement proceeds when the claim forms part of the same case or controversy as claims within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Patrick v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2021-02-24(a)

The Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Accident Fund’s lien claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. That statute provides: “[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to the claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.” Accident Fund asserts a lien on the settlement proceeds of the claims in this case. Therefore, Accident Fund’s claim is so related to claims in this action that it forms part of the same case or controversy.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an attorney’s charging-lien claim after all claims within its original jurisdiction have been dismissed with prejudice.

Pharmacy Value Management Solutions, Inc. v. Hartman · filed 2019-10-31(c)(3)

Consequently, the Court is within its discretion to “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over” Attorney Wasylik’s claim to the Disputed Funds. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The Court so declines. The parties’ rights and obligations with respect to their current fee dispute can be adequately protected and determined in a separate state court proceeding.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction only on an enumerated ground; when none applies, the court may exercise jurisdiction over an attorney’s charging-lien dispute.

ANTONMARCHI v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York · filed 2010-01-13(c)

None of the categories applies in the instant case; therefore, the Court will exercise its supplemental jurisdiction authority, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), and determine whether to fix a charging lien.

Section 1367 permits a district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over disputes involving charging liens filed against its judgments.

State Contracting & Engineering Corp. v. Condottee America v. Ross, Esq · filed 2006-07-24

A federal district court has supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 to hear disputes related to charging liens that are filed against that court’s judgments.

Section 1367(a) gives a district court supplemental jurisdiction to decide an attorney’s lien against a party’s recovery in a lawsuit over which it has original jurisdiction.

Moreno Farms, Inc. v. Tomato Thyme Corporation · filed 2012-09-17(a)

The existence of an attorney’s lien against a party’s recovery in a lawsuit is part of the same case or controversy as the underlying lawsuit.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a former attorney’s charging lien claim against proceeds of the underlying federal suit.

Freeman Ex Rel. Estate of Vann v. Clarke County · filed 2015-07-07(a)

Doyle’s argument does not cite the relevant statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which provides: in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). This supplemental jurisdiction has a long history in this circuit. ... The district court had jurisdiction over WCQP’s motion.

Section 1367(a) permits a district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a charging lien that includes fees for work performed outside the federal case.

Wright v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2020-08-18(a)

Money charged for work performed outside of a federal case may be incorporated into a charging lien as an exercise of the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a client’s attorney-fee lien dispute arising from the attorney’s work in the federal action.

Stratos v. AIG PROPERTY CASUALTY COMPANY · filed 2023-08-02(a)

Under the circumstances presented in the matters presently before the Court, the Court finds it appropriate to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction to resolve Daniels Law’s liens under equitable principles, based strictly on Florida charging lien law. This logically falls within the Court’s recognized ancillary jurisdiction to adjudicate attorneys’ fees disputes relating to fees a client owes his or her attorneys for the services provided to the client.

Section 1367 cannot supply supplemental jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment claim lacking an actual case or controversy.

Czarnik v. Illumina, Inc. · filed 2006-07-13

Plaintiff contends that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over his unenforceability claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Plaintiff cites two cases in support of his argument for supplemental jurisdiction, but both are inap-posite because they pertain to supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims upon a finding of original jurisdiction. ... Here, the Court would have original jurisdiction over Plaintiffs declaratory judgment claims if Plaintiff could point to an actual controversy. The Court will not allow Plaintiff to sidestep the constitutional subject matter jurisdiction requirement of an actual case or controversy.

Section 1367(a) requires a plaintiff to have Article III standing for a supplemental claim even when the court has original jurisdiction over related federal claims.

Montoya ex rel. S.M. v. Española Public School District Board of Education · filed 2012-05-22(a)

In sum, I find and conclude that Plaintiffs need to have standing on their breach of contract claims in order for the Court to have jurisdiction over these claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over foreign patent claims when treaty limits and considerations of comity, judicial economy, convenience, and fairness supply compelling reasons.

Voda, M.D. v. Cordis Corporation · filed 2007-02-01(c)

We find that considerations of comity, judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and other exceptional circumstances constitute compelling reasons to decline jurisdiction under § 1367(c) in this case and therefore, hold that the district court abused its discretion by assuming jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c) allows a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a foreign patent license dispute related to a U.S. patent license dispute.

Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Third Dimension (3D) Semiconductor, Inc. · filed 2008-12-10(c)

... no § 1367 supplemental jurisdiction over the latter.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over foreign-law claims arising from the same core of operative facts as a federal-law claim.

Sisso v. Islamic Republic of Iran · filed 2006-08-23(a)

The claim against Hamas under the ATA falls within this Court's original "federal question” jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the claims against Hamas under Israeli law satisfy the requirements for this Court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, because they arise out of the same core of operative facts as the federal-law cause of action.

Section 1367(a) gives a district court supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims involving the same facts as federal claims.

Stork v. Adams · filed 2019-09-23(a)

This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over both claims because they involve the same facts as the federal claims.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over class members’ malpractice claims against class counsel arising from counsel’s representation in an underlying federal securities class action because the claims form part of the same case or controversy.

Achtman v. Kirby, McInerney & Squire, LLP · filed 2005-12-12(a)

This Court finds that malpractice litigation brought by class members against class counsel arising from counsel’s representation in a federal securities class action is part of the same case or controversy as the underlying federal securities class action for several reasons.

Section 1367(a) does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over a state malpractice claim arising from counsel’s handling of a federal case when the facts relevant to that claim and the federal merits are entirely separate.

Doherty v. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund · filed 2005-07-22(a)

28 U.S.C. § 1367 provides for supplemental jurisdiction, and this being a supplemental jurisdiction case, the existence of subject matter jurisdiction depends under the jurisprudence as to whether or not the state claim forms part of the same case or controversy as the underlying federal claim, in which case the Court must determine whether the two claims arise from a common nucleus of operative fact. ... In this case the state law claim, which is a garden variety malpractice claim, arises entirely out of counsel’s performance in pursuing the federal law claims. The facts giving rise to the two claims are entirely separate.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a legal malpractice claim when proving that claim requires proving the same facts as an underlying federal copyright claim.

Dimensional Music Publishing, LLC v. Kersey Ex Rel. Estate of Kersey · filed 2006-08-25(a)

Despite the distinct facts underlying plaintiffs two claims, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs legal malpractice claim against defendant Paul Weiss. In plaintiffs legal malpractice suit, it will be required to prove that it did not obtain the renewal rights to the Composition, and that this failure was due to Paul Weiss’s legal advice.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a legal malpractice claim when its facts substantially overlap those of the underlying federal action, creating a common nucleus of operative fact.

ACHTMAN v. KIRBY, McINERNEY & SQUIRE, LLP · filed 2006-09-25(a)

We are compelled by this unbroken line of cases to find that the facts underlying the present malpractice claims and the underlying securities claims "substantially overlap[ ]," creating a common nucleus of operative fact. ... We therefore follow their lead and find supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a spouse’s related state-law loss-of-consortium claim even without an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.

Dickerson v. Monroe County Sheriff's Department · filed 2000-09-26(a)

Although Mrs. Dickerson has not established an independent basis for federal jurisdiction, it is now clear under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) that this Court has authority to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her claim.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a spouse’s state-law loss-of-consortium claim joined with the injured spouse’s § 1983 claim.

Kinzer v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville · filed 2006-09-11(a)

A loss of consortium claim, on the other hand, is brought by an entirely different party than the one bringing the § 1983 claim, but 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) paved the way for such pendent-party claims.

Section 1367(a) authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over a spouse’s loss of consortium claim related to an underlying personal injury claim.

SER Tobby Lynn Small v. Hon. Russell M. Clawges, Jr. · filed 2013-06-05(a)

In fact, federal courts have recognized that jurisdiction over a loss of consortium claim is authorized under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a).

Section 1367 permits a federal court to consider a state-law loss of consortium claim arising alongside a § 1983 claim.

Robinson v. Johnson · filed 1996-10-25(a)

Thus, under the authority of both Rhyne and the revised law of pendent jurisdiction under § 1367, see supra note 5, the Court finds that an examination of state law here is both necessary and within its jurisdiction.

Section 1367(d) tolling is waived on appeal when it was not specifically raised in the trial court as to the defendant at issue.

Manning v. Tunnell · filed 2006-12-18(d)

The appellant, however, did not raise the tolling provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) before the trial court specifically as to the allegations against Bay County, which was named as a defendant only in count I of the verified complaint, and therefore, as to Bay County, this defense was waived.

Section 1367(d) allows a longer applicable state saving period to control instead of its 30-day tolling period.

Ney v. City of Hoisington, Kan. · filed 2007-02-22(d)

If applicable, this time frame controls over the 30-day tolling period in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).

Section 1367(d) pauses the state limitations period while a supplemental claim is pending in federal court, preserving time to refile it in state court.

West, Rufus v. Carr, Kevin · filed 2025-03-27(d)

Because plaintiff filed this lawsuit on May 5, 2017, the running of that limitations period is tolled from that date until the “final disposition” of his claim in this court.

Section 1367(b) requires a permissive counterclaim that does not arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the original claim to have an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.

SICAP INDUSTRIES, LLC v. Carpenter · filed 2007-05-24(b)

Because the allegations contained in Haines’ counterclaims do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence that support plaintiff SiCap’s complaint, the court treats Haines’ counterclaims as permissive. As stated, permissive counterclaims require an independent basis for jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 13; 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).

Section 1367 does not supply jurisdiction over a permissive counterclaim; the counterclaim needs an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.

Marcial v. Rush University Medical Center · filed 2018-05-09

As a permissive counterclaim, the Court would need an independent basis for federal jurisdiction, and supplemental jurisdiction will not suffice.

Section 1367(a) does not provide supplemental jurisdiction over a permissive counterclaim without an independent jurisdictional basis under binding Fourth Circuit precedent.

Suarez v. Camden Property Trust · filed 2020-09-08(a)

Thus, defendants’ breach of contract counterclaim must have an independent jurisdictional base for this court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.* Because defendants’ counterclaim lacks such a base, the court grants Suarez’s motion to dismiss.

Section 1367(a) requires a permissive counterclaim to have an independent jurisdictional basis in the Fourth Circuit.

Colborn v. Forest Good Eats, LLC · filed 2020-09-21(a)

Thus, defendants’ counterclaims must have an independent jurisdictional base for this court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367 does not govern permissive counterclaims over which a court has an independent basis for original federal jurisdiction.

Uniters North America, LLC v. ServeCo International, Inc. · filed 2022-09-26(a)

Because the Court has original jurisdiction over the permissive counterclaims, the statute providing for discretionary supplemental jurisdiction does not apply.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a permissive counterclaim that is part of the same case or controversy as the original claim, even without an independent basis for federal jurisdiction, subject to subsections (b) and (c).

Frisby v. Keith D. Weiner & Associates Co., LPA · filed 2009-11-17(a)

Because the Sixth Circuit, like the Seventh and Second, reads § 1367 as a “sweeping grant of supplemental jurisdiction,” this Court holds that a permissive counterclaim need not independently satisfy federal jurisdictional requirements. Instead, this Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the counterclaim as long as the counterclaim is part of the same “case or controversy” as the underlying claim, § 1367(a), not specifically excluded by § 1367(b), and not coupled with any persuasive reason to nevertheless decline jurisdiction under § 1367(c).

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a permissive counterclaim when it has a loose factual connection to the original claims.

Clear Connection Corp. v. Comcast Cable Communications Management, LLC · filed 2015-12-08(a)

Therefore, because Comcast has established a loose factual connection between the indemnity clauses of the PVAs and the other legal issues related to the PVAs .alleged by Qlear Connection, the Court finds that it may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Comcast’s counterclaims and therefore denies Clear Connection’s motion for judgment as to these claims on jurisdictional grounds.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a permissive counterclaim that shares a common nucleus of operative fact with a claim within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Nalan v. Access Finance, Inc. · filed 2020-10-23(a)

Here, Access’ counterclaim, although not arising out of the same “transaction or occurrence” as Plaintiff’s TCPA claim, still derives from a “common nucleus of operative fact,” in that both parties’ claims are related to the same underlying debt owed by Plaintiff to Access. Access would not have called Plaintiff in the manner it allegedly did, which serves as the basis for Plaintiff’s RFDCPA and TCPA claims, if Plaintiff did not owe Access a debt. Access’ permissive counterclaim thus satisfies the Gibbs test, and the Court may therefore exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the counterclaim.

Section 1367(a) does not permit claims against the United States without its consent, even when the claims arise from the same case or controversy as a claim within the district court’s original jurisdiction.

Wright v. Foreign Service Grievance Board · filed 2007-08-03(a)

In other words, since the United States cannot be sued without its consent, litigants may not utilize § 1367(a) to bring claims against the United States which would otherwise not be permitted in federal district court.

Section 1367(a) does not grant supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims against state defendants that have not waived sovereign immunity.

Heike v. Guevara · filed 2009-09-02(a)

This means that supplemental jurisdiction can only be exercised if the state has waived its sovereign immunity. In this ease, the state Defendants have not waived sovereign immunity, thus, supplemental jurisdiction cannot be exercised over Plaintiffs state law claims against the state Defendants.

Section 1367(a) does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over a nonparty when no claim has been asserted against it.

Reserve International Liquidity Fund, Ltd. v. Caxton International Ltd. · filed 2010-06-23(a)

The Fund’s application for an injunction does not fall within the boundaries of supplemental jurisdiction articulated in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) because SG is not a party to this case and thus no claims have been asserted against it.

Section 1367 does not authorize supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims against a state or state agency that has not consented to suit in federal court.

DAY v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2022-01-19

This argument is unavailing. District courts have “no jurisdiction to hear supplemental state-law claims against sovereign entities absent consent by the entity to suit in federal court.”

Section 1367 does not authorize supplemental jurisdiction over claims against non-consenting states.

J.A. v. MONROE TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION · filed 2022-03-31

Plaintiffs miss the mark in making that argument. “[T]he supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, does not authorize district courts to exercise jurisdiction over claims against non-consenting States.”

Section 1367(a) does not authorize supplemental jurisdiction over claims against a state that has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Carter v. Ely · filed 2023-05-08(a)

Because the Commonwealth is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and that immunity has not been waived, there is no basis for exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the claims against the Commonwealth.

Section 1367 does not authorize supplemental jurisdiction over claims against a state that has not waived sovereign immunity.

JACKSON v. SEIFRIED · filed 2023-07-19

“['Tyhe supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, does not authorize district courts to exercise jurisdiction over claims against non-consenting States.” Balsam, 607 F. App’x at 183 (citing Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minnesota, 534 U.S. 533, 541-42 (2002)). Here, Defendant did not waive sovereign immunity. (ECF No. 324-1 at 14-15.) Consequently, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's NJCRA claim, which is hereby dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(a) does not authorize supplemental jurisdiction over claims against a nonconsenting state.

Figueroa v. City of Camden · filed 2008-10-02(a)

However, the Supreme Court has stated unequivocally that § 1367(a) does not “authorize district courts to exercise jurisdiction over claims against nonconsenting States, even though nothing in the statute expressly excludes such claims.”

Section 1367(a) does not extend supplemental jurisdiction to claims against nonconsenting state defendants.

Salvana v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision · filed 2022-08-10(a)

While federal courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims “that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution,” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), that grant of supplemental jurisdiction “does not extend to claims against nonconsenting state defendants.” Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 541–42 (2002); see also Doe v. State Univ. of New York Purchase Coll., No. 21-cv-8417, 2022 WL 2972200, at *10, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133690, at *32 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2022) (“The Supreme Court has also instructed that th[e] principle of Eleventh Amendment immunity ‘applies as well to state-law claims brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction.’” (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984))).

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after the federal issue that brought the case to court has been resolved.

Coefield v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co. · filed 2007-12-11(c)

Here, because the sole issue that brought the parties to this Court has been resolved, and the Court has determined that the LMRA does not have a preemptive effect on Plaintiffs State Law Claims, the Court is declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs purely state law based claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing all federal claims, with limited discovery and judicial investment favoring dismissal.

Robinson-Reeder v. Am. Council on Educ. · filed 2008-01-29(c)(3)

Because there has been no discovery in this case and the investment of judicial resources has been minimal, the Court concludes that the dismissal of plaintiffs defamation claim, for which jurisdiction in this Court is premised solely on the discretionary exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, is warranted.

Section 1367 ordinarily calls for relinquishing supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when all federal claims are resolved before trial, unless the state law claims have a crystal-clear resolution.

Martin v. Indiana State Police · filed 2008-01-29(c)(3)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the federal court should ordinarily relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when all federal claims have been resolved prior to trial. There is a so-called “no brainer” exception to that rule, so that when the proper resolution of the state law claims is crystal clear, the federal court should conclude matters and avoid imposing additional work on busy state courts.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after disposing of the federal claims.

Adamson v. Multi Community Diversified Services, Inc. · filed 2008-02-01(c)(3)

Finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law wage and defamation claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), we also AFFIRM the district court in that regard.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Hayden v. Coppage · filed 2008-02-04(c)(3)

Having dismissed the federal claims, the court in its discretion declines supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims in Counts Four, Five and Six.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it has dismissed all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Hill v. Sharber · filed 2008-02-28(c)

As Hill’s federal claims are all dismissed, this court will decline to exercise jurisdiction over Hill’s state law claims.

Section 1367 permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after the federal claims are eliminated, considering judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

LeVarge Ex Rel. T.L. v. Preston Board of Education · filed 2008-03-11(c)(3)

All that remains in this case are two state law claims. Therefore, in the interests of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Counts Three and Four.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims.

Assoko v. City of New York · filed 2008-03-26(c)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court may decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction over these claims. ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims against all defendants are hereby dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after resolving all federal claims.

Gibbs v. City of New Haven · filed 2008-04-03(c)(3)

Plaintiffs only remaining claims arise under state law. Accordingly, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all federal claims; dismissal of the state claims is ordinarily appropriate before trial when little time has been spent on them.

Villalpando v. Denver Health & Hospital Authority · filed 2008-04-14(c)(3)

In this case, there was no compelling reason for the district court to retain jurisdiction over the state law claims after dismissing the § 1983 claims. At the time the district court dismissed the state law claims, neither the parties nor the district court had expended a great deal of time or energy. ... Accordingly, we conclude the district court abused its discretion in retaining supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a local law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Abiff v. Yusuf · filed 2008-05-16(c)(3)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), “the district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction ... if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” ... The Court finds that the local claim asserted in this matter is better left to the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands. Accordingly, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after disposing of the federal claims.

Michigan Electrical Employees Pension Fund v. Encompass Electric & Data, Inc. · filed 2008-05-19(c)(3)

Having disposed of the federal claims, the court exercises its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) and declines supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after granting summary judgment on the federal claims.

Waris v. Harris County Public Health & Environmental Services · filed 2008-06-04(c)(3)

Finding that there was no jurisdiction once the Defendants were granted summary judgment, the district court properly refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after resolving the sole federal claim.

Omokehinde v. Detroit Board of Education · filed 2008-06-12(c)(3)

Having resolved Plaintiffs sole claim arising under federal law, the Court declines to address the Defendant School District's various challenges to Plaintiff’s state-law claims, and instead elects not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these remaining claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after the federal claims are resolved.

Martel v. TOWN OF SOUTH WINDSOR · filed 2008-06-12(c)(3)

Plaintiffs only remaining claims arise under state law. Accordingly, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after granting summary judgment on the federal claims.

Stucky v. Department of Education · filed 2008-06-20(c)(3)

District courts may exercise their discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) and decline to address pendant state-law claims after they have granted summary judgment to the defendant on the federal claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when all federal claims have dropped out of the case.

Edwards v. School Dist. of Baraboo · filed 2008-08-11(c)(3)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when all of the federal claims have dropped out of the case. ... In this case, I see no reason to retain jurisdiction over the state law claim and the parties do not provide one.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after it resolves all federal claims by summary judgment.

Zilinski v. Earth Tech · filed 2008-08-13(c)(3)

Plaintiffs remaining claims of CFEPA violations, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress arise under state law. Accordingly, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after all federal claims have been dismissed.

Hopkins v. White · filed 2008-08-27(c)(3)

District courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims if all federal claims have been dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives district courts discretion to dismiss remaining state law claims after the federal claims have been resolved.

Tripp v. Charlie Falk's Auto Wholesale Inc. · filed 2008-08-29(c)(3)

As stated earlier, exercising supplemental jurisdiction is within the discretion of the district court and since the district court here properly granted summary judgment to CFAW on the federal law claims, we find that there was no abuse of discretion in dismissing the state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after resolving the federal claim in the defendant’s favor.

Amador v. GUARDIAN INSTALLED SERVICES, INC. · filed 2008-09-08(c)(3)

Because I find in favor of Guardian on the FLSA claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it disposes of all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Walker v. City of Wilmington · filed 2008-09-29(c)(3)

Because the court, as explained hereafter, grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the § 1983 claims, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after all federal claims are dismissed when retaining them would not promote economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Lavoie-Francisco v. Town of Coventry · filed 2008-10-10(c)

The court notes, that, when all of a plaintiffs federal claims have been dismissed, it can decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) if it determines that exercising supplemental jurisdiction would not promote economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. ... In this case, however, the court believes that the Plaintiffs remaining claims should be heard in state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state law claim after resolving every claim within its original jurisdiction.

Derry v. MARION COMMUNITY SCHOOLS · filed 2008-10-12(c)(3)

Now that the Court has found for the Defendants on all of the federal claims asserted by the Plaintiffs and thus on all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, the Court must decided whether to retain jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim or remand the case to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... The Court, therefore, declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after it resolves all federal claims before trial.

Brown v. Town of Seabrook et al. · filed 2008-11-06(c)(3)

Finally, in light of the entry of judgment for the defendants on all of Brown’s federal constitutional claims, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims, including violations of the state constitution, assault and battery, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims against defendants after dismissing all federal claims against them.

Robinson v. Allstate · filed 2008-11-06(c)(3)

With respect to plaintiffs state law claims against the moving defendants, I observe that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim where all claims over which it had original jurisdiction have been dismissed. ... Having dismissed all of the pending federal claims against the Department, its Fraud Bureau, and Director Bardong, the Court therefore declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims against those defendants.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

King v. County of Gloucester · filed 2008-12-10(c)(3)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a district court has the discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” That discretion was not abused here.

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after the claims within its original jurisdiction are dismissed, guided by judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Wright v. TENERGY CHRIST WATER, LLC · filed 2009-01-09(c)(3)

A court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction,” however, if “all claims over which it has original jurisdiction” have been dismissed from the ease. § 1367(c)(3). ... Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs remaining claims, grants the Plaintiffs motion to remand [Doc. # 88], and orders this case remanded to' the Connecticut Superior Court for the Judicial District of Hartford.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the claims over which it had original jurisdiction.

Flanagan v. Anne Arundel County · filed 2009-01-22(c)(3)

Courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendant state law claims if the court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ... The Court will not exercise pendant jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims against the County defendants.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after granting summary judgment on all federal claims.

Hansen v. Clark County · filed 2009-01-23(c)(3)

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the pendent state law claim once it had granted summary judgment on all federal claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim after judgment on the federal claim.

McAnally v. Clark County · filed 2009-03-20(c)(3)

In remanding this case, we also do not preclude that district court from issuing an order denying supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim, if it so chooses, now that we have affirmed judgment on the federal claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after it grants summary judgment on all federal claims.

Dees v. Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama, LLC · filed 2009-03-25(c)(3)

Because summary judgment is being granted on Dees’s federal claims, this court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over his state-law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The language of the statute is discretionary, but case law leans toward dismissing state-law claims in the absence of a federal claim to tether them to federal court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses every claim within its original jurisdiction.

Harris v. CITY OF VALDOSTA, GA. · filed 2009-04-15(c)(3)

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (indicating that a court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims under which it has original jurisdiction). ... The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims. Consequently, those claims are dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims before trial.

Rivera v. Hospital Episcopal Cristo Redentor · filed 2009-03-26(c)(3)

Therefore, the Court will exercise its discretion and decline Supplemental Jurisdiction over the state-law claim asserted under Article 1802 and 1803 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to dismiss a remaining state-law claim without prejudice after disposing of the federal claims.

Townsend v. Shook · filed 2009-04-24(c)(3)

We note that the magistrate judge remains free on remand to dismiss, without prejudice, Plaintiff’s North Carolina public policy claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it disposes of all federal claims.

Proa v. NRT Mid Atlantic, Inc. · filed 2009-05-27(c)(3)

Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, defendants’ motion for summary judgment shall be granted as to all defendants on all federal law claims. In the absence of complete diversity of citizenship, the court elects not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Accordingly, all remaining state law claims shall be dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to dismiss supplemental claims without prejudice when no federal claim remains to support jurisdiction.

Colon-Perez v. Department of Health of Puerto Rico · filed 2009-06-11(c)(3)

Because no federal claim remains to ground jurisdiction in this case, Colon’s ... commonwealth law claims against defendants are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing the federal claims.

Do Denim, LLC v. Fried Denim, Inc. · filed 2009-06-17(c)(3)

Because Plaintiffs federal claims are dismissed, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction ... Section 360-1.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state-law claim after all federal claims have been dismissed and to dismiss the state-law claim without prejudice.

MALLES v. Lehigh County · filed 2009-07-27(c)(3)

As there are no federal law claims remaining in the case, we decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and we will dismiss that claim without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after it dismisses the federal claims.

Gardner v. City of Cleveland · filed 2009-08-20(c)(3)

Further, the Court exercises its discretion, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), to decline to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims against the Defendants in this case.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims, especially when the case is at an early stage and judicial economy and convenience do not favor retaining them.

Luminent Mortgage Capital, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch & Co. · filed 2009-08-20(c)(3)

This case does not present extraordinary circumstances. No scheduling order has been issued by the Court. There is no trial date, and no lengthy motion practice has occurred. Judicial economy and convenience to the parties therefore do not weigh in favor of retaining supplemental jurisdiction, and comity favors allowing the appropriate state court to hear the state law claims in this matter. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ state law claims will be dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to retain a state law claim after resolving the federal claim when the state law issue is neither complex nor novel and declining jurisdiction could lead to additional litigation.

Pertzsch Design, Inc. v. Gundersen Lutheran Health System, Inc. · filed 2009-08-21(c)(3)

Although I could decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the issue is not a complex one and it does not involve any novel issues of state law. Leaving it undecided would mean that the parties would face the possibility of additional litigation.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Crump v. Correctional Medical Services · filed 2009-08-25(c)(3)

The court does not have original jurisdiction over these remaining claims and, pursuant to subsection 3 of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after the federal claims drop out before trial, despite a remote possibility that a federal defense may raise an unsettled issue.

Stayart v. YAHOO! INC. · filed 2009-08-28(c)(3)

This concern is too remote to compel the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction at this early stage in the proceedings.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after it dismisses the federal claims that supplied original jurisdiction.

American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations v. City of Miami · filed 2009-09-02(c)(3)

Having dismissed Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ six remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Williams v. CITY OF MILAN, TENN. · filed 2009-09-15(c)(3)

Having disposed of the Plaintiffs allegations under federal law, the Court now turns to her claims under state law. The exercise by a district court of supplemental, or pendent, jurisdiction over state law claims is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which expressly permits the Court to decline the exercise of jurisdiction when it has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Absent any remaining federal claims against the Defendants, the Court, in its sound discretion, hereby DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Plaintiffs state law claims, including her THRA allegations.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state-law claim after dismissing the federal claims.

Spiegel v. Adirondack Park Agency · filed 2009-09-18(c)(3)

The Spiegels’ federal and state due process claims were previously dismissed. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claim of estoppel, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Bateman v. TOWN OF COLUMBIA, NC · filed 2009-09-23(c)(3)

Plaintiffs remaining claims arise exclusively under North Carolina law and are before this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Having dismissed plaintiffs federal claim, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction; state law claims ordinarily are dismissed without prejudice when federal claims are dismissed before trial unless an exception warrants retaining them.

Patrick v. City of Chicago · filed 2009-09-30(c)(3)

Because that disposition results in the dismissal of all claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction (see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)), the Court must address whether to retain jurisdiction over the state law claims in Counts I and II of the amended complaint. ... In sum, the Court concludes that none of the exceptions to the “usual practice” applies in this case. Accordingly, the Court dismisses without prejudice the state law claims asserted in Counts I and II of Plaintiffs amended complaint.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after all federal claims are dismissed on summary judgment, and those state-law claims may be dismissed without prejudice.

DeFABIO v. East Hampton Union Free School Dist. · filed 2009-10-01(c)(3)

Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court, in its discretion, declines to retain jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims given the absence of any federal claims that survive summary judgment, and dismisses such state claims without prejudice.

Section 1367 gives courts discretion to dismiss related state-law claims, ordinarily without prejudice, when the federal claim is dismissed before trial.

Sharp v. Worthington City School Board of Education · filed 2009-10-13(c)(3)

Although the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is a matter of discretion, when a court properly dismisses a federal claim before trial, it customarily will dismiss the state-law claims as well—though without prejudice to their refiling in state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when the only federal claim is dismissed early, after considering the statutory and common-law factors.

Meroney v. PHARIA, LLC · filed 2009-10-19(c)(3)

The court sees no reason to deviate from the general rule here. ... The statutory factors do not provide a compelling reason to retain jurisdiction, either. Thus, Meroney’s pendent state-law causes of action against Pharia should be dismissed without prejudice to their refiling in state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state-law claim after all federal claims have been resolved, and to remand a removed case to state court.

Lowe v. District of Columbia · filed 2009-11-15(c)(3)

Because no federal claims remain after the grant of summary judgment to Defendants on the Title VII claim, the Court has discretion to either dismiss the case, remand it to Superior Court, or exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claim.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it dismisses the federal claims.

Torres-Santiago v. Díaz-Casiano · filed 2009-11-16(c)

The court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims against Toledo.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after disposing of the federal constitutional claims.

Croom v. Balkwill · filed 2009-11-18(c)(3)

For the same reason, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after it has resolved all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Sanders v. City of Dothan · filed 2009-11-30(c)(3)

All of the federal claims over which this Court had original jurisdiction have now been resolved against Sanders Sr. Therefore, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Sanders Sr.’s remaining state-law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after disposing of all federal claims, dismissing the state-law claims without prejudice.

Brown v. City of Nashua, et al. · filed 2009-12-04(c)(3)

Summary judgment is appropriate on all of Brown’s civil rights claims, which are the predicate for federal question jurisdiction. Therefore, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, which are dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims, especially when state law designates another forum for their enforcement.

Executive Transportation System LLC v. Louisville Regional Airport Authority · filed 2010-01-04(c)

Having dispensed with the federal issues, we are inclined to respect Kentucky’s scheme for the enforcement of local law, especially in light of the fact that KRS 183.133(6) specifies a particular forum for adjudicating the Authority’s claims. ... These factors combine to provide ample reason to decline to exercise jurisdiction here.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after it has disposed of the federal claims.

Wheeler v. City of Lansing · filed 2010-01-06(c)(3)

Having disposed of Wheeler’s federal claims, the court exercises its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) and declines supplemental jurisdiction over the claims which arise under state law.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a federal court that has resolved the federal claims to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and remand them to state court.

Chism v. Washington Ex Rel. Washington State Patrol · filed 2010-01-08(c)(3)

The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims, 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(c) (3), and those claims are hereby REMANDED to the Spokane County Superior Court from which this action originated.

Section 1367(c)(3) leaves a district court discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

HOOTSTEIN v. Collins · filed 2010-01-14(c)(3)

Rather, dismissal of the federal questions merely sets the stage for the court to use its informed discretion regarding whether it should retain the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction, especially early in litigation before discovery.

Anegada Master Fund, Ltd. v. PXRE Group Ltd. · filed 2010-01-26(c)(3)

The federal claims brought pursuant to the Securities Act have been dismissed at an early stage of the litigation, and the parties have conducted no discovery. The Court thus finds it appropriate to decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after all federal claims have been dismissed.

Green v. Tudor · filed 2010-01-29(c)(3)

Generally, where all federal claims have been dismissed, federal courts decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiffs state-law claims. ... There is no reason in this case to depart from the general rule.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after resolving the federal claims against the plaintiff.

Strujan v. Lehman College · filed 2010-01-29(c)(3)

It was proper for the district court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Appellant’s state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after disposing of all federal claims.

Mercatus Group LLC v. Lake Forest Hospital · filed 2010-02-16(c)(3)

Nevertheless, given the disposition of the federal claims and the nature of the remaining state claims, the court, in an exercise of its discretion, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

After summary judgment resolves the sole claim supporting original federal jurisdiction, § 1367(c)(3) permits the court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims.

CLARITY SERVICES, INC. v. Barney · filed 2010-02-26(c)(3)

Pre-trial disposition of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claim, the sole basis for federal jurisdiction over this lawsuit, presents an occasion for discretion in exercising subject matter jurisdiction over Clarity’s remaining claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Supplemental jurisdiction over Clarity’s state law claims in Counts II, III, and IV is DECLINED, and Clarity’s state law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.