28 U.S.C. § 1367

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims arising from the same facts as the original federal claims.

Graham v. Richelmon · filed 2021-06-17(a)

This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), so long as the state claims “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact” with the original federal claims. Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921, 936 (7th Cir. 2008). “A loose factual connection is generally sufficient.” Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 495 (7th Cir. 2008). Because Plaintiff’s state law claims arise from the same facts as his federal claims, the Court will assess the merits of those claims.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims that arise from the same facts as a claim within the court’s federal jurisdiction.

Kinnel v. Quieros · filed 2022-09-02(a)

This Court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if: (1) there is a claim arising under the federal constitution or federal laws; (2) the relationship between the federal and state claims permits the conclusion that the entire action comprises one constitutional case; (3) the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claim; and (4) the state and federal claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over remaining claims that derive from the same operative facts as claims within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Rodriguez v. Sukut Construction, Inc. · filed 2022-12-09(a)

Because Plaintiff's remaining claims largely are derivate from the preempted overtime and meal break claims, the Court shall exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) to avoid needless expense of judicial resources and the potential for inconsistent judgments due to parallel proceedings.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims involving the same facts as a surviving federal claim.

Blackburn v. Security Staff · filed 2023-03-28(a)

Because Plaintiff’s state law claims involve the same facts as his Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, the Court will exercise supplement jurisdiction, and Counts 2, 3, and 4 also survive screening against Royster, Brooks, and Fenton.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims against nonfederal parties when those claims arise from the same facts and circumstances as claims within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Larson v. Pedersen · filed 2023-05-09(a)

The fact that Plaintiffs also raise claims against Defendants Pedersen and the Virgin Islands Hospitals and Health Facilities Corporation—non-United States parties—does not alter this conclusion, as the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims, as they arise from the same facts and circumstances as the claims against the United States.

Section 1367(a) allows a court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims involving the same facts as a federal excessive force claim.

Blackburn v. Security Staff · filed 2023-07-11(a)

Because Plaintiff’s state law claims involve the same facts as his Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, the Court will exercise supplement jurisdiction, and Counts 7, 8, and 9 also survive screening against Royster, Brooks, and Fenton.

Section 1367(a) permits related state-law claims to proceed with federal constitutional claims when they arise from the same facts.

Richardson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2023-09-01(a)

Plaintiff’s claims in Counts 3 and 4 that Defendants were “neglectful” or negligent derive from the same facts as his federal constitutional claims and will proceed at this stage. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim arising from the same facts as a federal claim.

Rowell, Sean v. Richardson, Reed · filed 2024-01-16(a)

The court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim because it arises from the same set of facts as plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Drost, and it would make little sense for a state court to expend resources on plaintiff’s negligence claim.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law indemnification claim arising from the same set of facts as the federal claims.

Rodgers v. Village of Glen Carbon · filed 2024-04-09(a)

A federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims “that are so related to claims n the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. §1367(a). Because Plaintiff’s indemnification claim arises out of the same set of facts as his §1983 claims, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the same.

Section 1367(a) gives federal courts supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims arising from the same operative facts as a federal claim.

AGUILAR-VAZ v. LANTERN HILL INC. BY ERICSON SENIOR LIVING · filed 2024-04-30(a)

Consequently, this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state- law claims which arise out of the same operative facts underlying Plaintiff’s federal claim: Plaintiff’s employment relationship with Defendant.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim that shares a common nucleus of operative facts with a claim within the court’s original jurisdiction.

S.S. v. COLLINS · filed 2024-07-31(a)

The Court also exercises supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over Plaintiff's state law claim under N.J.S.A. 2A:58D-1. The state-law claim and the Section 6851 claim arise from a common nucleus of operative facts as both claims allege Defendant disseminated intimate images of Plaintiff to Plaintiff's family members and friends using a cell phone or computer and ... that Defendant published at least one intimate image on the Internet.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim arising from the same operative facts as a federal claim.

Lipscomb v. Wills · filed 2024-08-05(a)

Lipscomb’s assault claim under state law arises under the same operative facts; thus, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim arising from the same facts as the federal claims.

Key v. Pritzker · filed 2024-08-26(a)

The Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Illinois state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because it arises from the same facts giving rise to his federal claims.

Section 1367 gives federal courts supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims arising from the same factual predicate as federal claims.

Billups v. City Of Harvey · filed 2024-09-24(a)

As such, the fact that they are based on the same factual predicate as the Plaintiff’s civil rights claims is precisely what gives this court jurisdiction to hear the claims.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims arising from the same facts as claims within the court’s federal question jurisdiction.

BETTERSON, JR. v. STRUNCK · filed 2024-11-25(a)

But, as the Court has federal question jurisdiction over Betterson’s § 1983 claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and since the medical malpractice claims arise from the same facts, the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his claims under state law.

Section 1367(a) permits a state-law claim to proceed alongside a federal claim when both derive from the same facts.

Chancellor v. Wills · filed 2024-12-23(a)

Because Count 8 derives from the same facts as Plaintiff’s federal excessive force claims, it will also proceed against Choate, Kempfer, Taylor, McDonald, and Williamson. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921, 936 (7th Cir. 2008).

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law medical negligence claim that arises from the same facts as federal claims.

Cornille v. Myers · filed 2025-01-23(a)

Because a medical negligence claim in Illinois derives from the same facts as the federal claims, this Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count 4. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims arising from the same factual allegations as federal claims.

Aunhkhotep v. Thomas · filed 2025-01-29(a)

Because these state law claims arise from the same factual allegations as his First Amendment claims, judicial economy, convenience, and fairness support the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over these assault and battery claims. Therefore, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.

Section 1367(a) permits a state law claim to proceed alongside a federal claim when both arise from the same facts.

Coleman v. Illinois Department of Corrections · filed 2025-04-01(a)

This state law claim derives from the same facts as Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim in Count 2 and will proceed.

Section 1367(a) gives a district court supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim arising from the same core facts as a claim within its original jurisdiction.

Colella v. Starpoint Central School District · filed 2025-04-25(a)

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs’ claim is “so related to” Plaintiffs’ federal claims in this action “that they form part of the same case or controversy” under Article III. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) permits a state law claim to proceed with a federal claim when both derive from the same facts.

Bills v. Hughes · filed 2025-05-05(a)

Because Count 2 derives from the same facts as Plaintiff’s federal excessive force claim, it will also proceed against Goodchild. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); see also Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921, 936 (7th Cir. 2008).

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims arising from the same underlying facts as a federal claim.

Preston v. SB&C Ltd · filed 2025-05-12(a)

The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Preston’s state law CPA claims because they arise from the same underlying facts as the federal claim.

Section 1367(a) permits a federal court hearing federal claims to adjudicate state law claims arising from the same facts.

McNeal v. United Food and Commercial Workers · filed 2025-06-02(a)

“And if the complaint also asserts state-law claims arising out of the same facts, [which is the case here,] the federal court may adjudicate those claims too, in the exercise of what is called supplemental jurisdiction.”

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state claims arising from the same facts as the federal claims.

Bryant v. Wills · filed 2025-07-15(a)

The Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Illinois claims for assault and battery because the claims arise from the same facts that support the federal constitutional claims against the defendants.

Section 1367(a) gives a federal court supplemental jurisdiction over a state law counterclaim that arises from the same underlying facts as the federal claims.

Eli Lilly and Company v. Alderwood Surgical Center LLC · filed 2025-07-23(a)

The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Defendants’ state law abuse of process counterclaim4 because it arises from the same underlying facts as Eli Lilly’s federal claims.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state law assault and battery claim based on the same facts as a federal excessive force claim.

Borgen v. Edwards · filed 2025-09-17(a)

At this early stage and based on the same facts as the excessive force claim, the Court will exercise its supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) and will allow Plaintiff to proceed on a state law claim of assault and battery against Gayden.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related claims that derive from a common nucleus of operative fact with a claim within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Rahman v. Boateng · filed 2025-09-26(a)

Accordingly, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims against Vylla Title.

Section 1367 gives a federal court supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims arising from the same underlying facts as claims within its original jurisdiction.

Dorsey · filed 2025-12-04(a)

The state law claims arise out of the same set of underlying facts, so the court has supplemental jurisdiction over them under § 1367.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims arising from the same facts as pending federal claims, even when the federal claims against the state-law defendant have been dismissed.

Frye · filed 2026-02-04(a)

Here, although the Court has dismissed the federal claims against Webster (see Subsection II.B.1 above), federal claims remain pending against Edokpolo. ... The federal and state claims in this case all arise from the same set of facts—the alleged needle stick event. ... The Court, therefore, declines to exercise its discretion to dismiss the state law claims against Webster on jurisdictional grounds.

Section 1367(a) permits state-law claims to proceed with surviving federal claims when they arise from the same facts.

Brown · filed 2026-06-03(a)

Because the emotional distress claims derive from the same facts underlying the surviving federal claims in Counts 1, 6, and 7, they may be brought in this case. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921, 936 (7th Cir. 2008).

Section 1367(a) permits a federal court to hear a nonpreempted claim arising from the same common nucleus of operative facts as a claim within its federal jurisdiction.

Union de Trabajadores del Muelle de Ponce v. International Public Terminal · filed 2026-06-11(a)

The presence of a non-preempted claim does not defeat federal jurisdiction because if the second claim arises from the same common nucleus of operative facts, as is the case here, the Court may entertain it by virtue of its supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that arise from the same facts as a surviving federal claim and would ordinarily be tried with it.

Young v. Francis · filed 1993-05-04(a)

I have read each of these claims and conclude that this Court may properly exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them, because they are derived from the same facts which underlie the surviving federal claim plaintiffs have alleged on behalf of Schreffler, and “ ‘are such that [plaintiffs] would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding Sinclair, 935 F.2d at 603 (citation omitted).

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims asserted with federal claims, but does not itself authorize removal of a separate state action.

Pointer v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. · filed 1992-05-19

Therefore, this Court could have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims had Plaintiff chosen to assert them in this Court together with his federal claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. This fact alone, however, does not mean that this Court has removal jurisdiction over the State Court Action, given that Plaintiff has chosen not to assert his state claims in federal court.

Section 1367 does not supply original jurisdiction to remove a separate state-court action merely because it is related to a pending federal action.

Tafuri v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc. · filed 1998-08-27

Hence, the pendency of numerous cases in the multidis-trict litigation captioned MDL-1125, In re Air Crash Near Cali, Colombia, on December 20, 1995, over which the Court has original jurisdiction, does not cure the absence of original jurisdiction in American Airlines’ hull suit.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related claims within a federal action but does not provide a separate basis to remove an independent state law action.

Motion Control Corp. v. SICK, Inc. · filed 2003-12-30(a)

While this statute does allow factually related state law claims to be joined with the claim over which the federal district court has original jurisdiction, it plainly does not provide a separate basis for removal of independent state law actions.

Section 1367(a) allows related state law claims to be joined with a claim within original federal jurisdiction, but does not provide an independent basis to remove a separate state court action.

Motion Control Corporation v. Sick, Inc. · filed 2004-02-04(a)

While this statute does allow factually related state law claims to be joined with the claim over which the federal district court has original jurisdiction, it plainly does not provide a separate basis for removal of independent state law actions.

Section 1367 does not provide an independent basis to remove a separate state-court action solely because a related federal action is pending.

Cardillo v. Cardillo · filed 2005-03-23

Because a separate action does not create an independent basis for removal under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, the Cardillos’ removal of Case 04-60 was unreasonable.

Section 1367(a) does not permit removal of a separate state-law action merely because its claims relate to claims in a pending federal action; the removed action needs its own basis for removal.

Weinrich v. Levi Strauss & Co. · filed 2005-04-15(a)

Defendants’ argument is an invitation for the Court to bootstrap jurisdiction over Weinrich II based upon a federal claim asserted in Weinrich I. The Court declines the invitation, and concludes that it cannot exercise supplement jurisdiction over Weinrich II, as there is no basis on which it could be removed in the first instance.

Section 1367 provides supplemental jurisdiction but does not itself authorize removal of a state court action.

Jagdishbhai and Hansaben Patel v. Del Taco, Inc. · filed 2006-05-02

Section 1367, which provides for supplemental jurisdiction, is not a basis for removal.

Section 1367 does not authorize a federal court to remove a pending state court action.

Oriska Insurance Company v. Avalon Gardens Rehabilitation & Health Care Center, LLC · filed 2019-09-04

However, § 1367 does not provide a federal court with the authority to pluck a pending action out of a state forum.

Section 1367 grants supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims but does not authorize removal of a state-court action.

Gochin v. Markowitz · filed 2019-10-21

Section 1367 grants district courts supplemental jurisdic- tion over state-law claims; it is not a removal statute.

Section 1367 does not supply original jurisdiction to remove a separate state-court action merely because it relates to a pending federal case.

Perez v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2023-11-21

The MMR defendants also assert that removal is proper based on the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. (Dkt. No. 20 at 3). Their argument appears to be that since the Court has federal question jurisdiction over the Federal Case, and since the Federal Case and State Case relate to the same incident, the State Case can be removed to federal court and this Court can assert supplemental jurisdiction over the State Case. (Id.). This is incorrect.

Section 1367(a) does not give a district court supplemental jurisdiction over a separately removed state action merely because it overlaps factually with a related federal action; the removed action must have its own basis for original federal jurisdiction.

Link Motion Inc. v. DLA Piper LLP · filed 2024-06-10(a)

The district court had no original federal jurisdiction over LKM’s state malpractice action. DLA Piper’s reliance on Achtman v. Kirby, McInerney & Squire, LLP, 464 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 2006), is misplaced as that case did not involve the removal of an action from state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (distinguishing “civil action[s] of which the district courts have original jurisdiction” from “other claims” over which they may exercise “supplemental jurisdiction”).

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state counterclaim arising from the same transaction and facts as a federal claim, and allows the court to decide the state claim after dismissing the federal claim.

Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Lozen International, LLC · filed 2002-04-03(a), (c)

The court’s original jurisdiction over the Carmack Amendment claim gave it power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Lozen’s state-law counterclaim. ... Because the federal and state counterclaims arise from the same transaction and rely on identical facts for their resolution, they “form part of the same case or controversy under Article III” for the purposes of supplemental jurisdiction. ... Although the district court could have dismissed Lozen’s state-law claim after dismissing the Carmack Amendment claim, it did not abuse its discretion by choosing to entertain the merits of the state-law claim.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to retain jurisdiction over a supplemental counterclaim after resolving the plaintiff’s claims.

Zickafoose v. UB Services, Inc. · filed 1998-11-02(c)

The Court retains jurisdiction over Defendants’ counterclaim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367 permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law counterclaims after dismissing the federal claims when the advanced stage of the case and fairness to the parties favor retention.

United States ex rel. Trans Coastal Roofing Co. v. David Boland, Inc. · filed 1996-03-29(c)(3)

The Court’s dismissal of the underlying claims leaves the counterclaims without an independent basis of federal jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the Court will exercise its discretion and proceed to trial on the counterclaims. ... Here, the Complaint has been pending for eighteen months, and the counterclaim for seventeen months. Discovery is complete and the case is at the eve of trial. ... To require Counterplaintiff Boland to pursue its remedies in state court would, at this juncture, be unfair. It would be similarly unfair to Counterdefendants, who undoubtedly have a strong interest in finality. The counterclaims are both essentially for breach of contract, hardly a novel or complex issue of state law in which the federal court should decline to intervene. ... The Court concludes, therefore, that trial on the counterclaims is proper.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law counterclaim arising from the same common nucleus of operative fact as a claim within original jurisdiction, and jurisdiction persists after the original claim is disposed of.

Kaltman-Glasel v. Dooley · filed 2003-11-21(a)

Here, the appellees’ state law counter-claim for unpaid legal fees was plainly derived “from a common nucleus of operative fact” that was the basis of the appellant’s legal malpractice claim in diversity. ... Having been seized with subject matter jurisdiction over the counterclaims, the district court did not lose it by disposing of appellant’s claims-in-chief.

Section 1367 permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after the claims supporting original jurisdiction are eliminated when substantial time and resources have been spent on the case.

Woods v. SOUTHWEST AIRLINES, CO. · filed 2007-10-18

Even in a case where the claims upon which a federal court’s original jurisdiction was based have been eliminated, a court may continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over purely state claims if significant time and resources have been expended when the federal claims drop out. ... Given the amount of water already over the dam in this proceeding, we are of the opinion that a remand of the attorney’s lien issue would not promote efficient use of judicial resources. Therefore, we conclude that the better course of action is to continue to exercise our supplemental jurisdiction over this case.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing the claims within its original jurisdiction when judicial economy, convenience, and fairness favor retaining the claim.

MENDELSON v. REYES · filed 2020-10-22(c)

In dismissing the claims over which the Court had original jurisdiction and allowing the TCA claim against the Officers to proceed, the Court opted to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count Three pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), though it did not expressly cite to the statute. ... At this stage of the litigation, where the case has been pending before this Court for four years, and where the Court dismissed the claims over which it had original jurisdiction three and a half years ago, and where the parties have since spent that time engaged in discovery on Count Three and participating in settlement conferences before the Honorable Mark Falk, U.S.C.M.J., the Court finds that it would be inefficient, inconvenient, and unfair to the litigants to now remand this matter to state court.

Section 1367(a) requires a supplemental claim to form part of the same case or controversy as a claim within original jurisdiction, so a setoff counterclaim arising from an independent transaction needs its own jurisdictional basis.

Saenz v. Lovington Municipal School District · filed 2015-04-30(a)

If the Court lacks an independent jurisdictional basis to hear a setoff claim, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear it, because § 1367 requires supplemental claims to “form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution” as the claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction.

Section 1367 permits a court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over set-offs and to limit that exercise to specified kinds of set-offs.

Allapattah Services, Inc. v. Exxon Corp. · filed 2005-05-18

With regard to set-offs, I exercised my discretion to allow set-offs as a matter of supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. ... I did so on a very limited basis as it pertained to “unpaid motor fuel charges, unpaid rent, and the like.”

When a dismissal of federal claims is vacated, the district court should have an opportunity to reconsider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.

Silla v. Holdings Acquisition Co LP · filed 2021-09-16(c)(3)

Because the District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims in light of its ruling on the federal claims, we will also vacate the District Court’s ruling as to supplemental jurisdiction and remand to give the District Court an opportunity to consider exercising its jurisdiction over Silla’s state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after all federal claims are resolved on summary judgment.

Annan-Yartey v. Star Protection Agency, Inc. · filed 2005-04-04(c)(3)

Because the district court properly granted summary judgment on all of An-nan-Yartey’s federal claims, the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim once the federal claim has been dismissed.

Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, FL · filed 2005-05-06(c)(3)

Moreover pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3) the district court could decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim once the Telecommunications Act claim was dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to retain or dismiss supplemental state law claims after dismissing all claims over which it had original jurisdiction.

Shekoyan, Vladmir v. Intl · filed 2005-06-03(c)(3)

A district court may choose to retain jurisdiction over, or dismiss, pendent state law claims after federal claims are dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after resolving all federal claims and to dismiss those claims without prejudice.

Daniel v. Spectrum Stores, Inc. · filed 2005-07-21(c)(3)

Spectrum’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to all of Plaintiffs Title VII claims. Plaintiffs remaining claims, including all of his claims against Defendant Aldrich, arise under Georgia law. The Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over those claims, and those claims are dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367 permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after the federal claims have been dismissed.

Kohler v. City of Wapakoneta · filed 2005-08-12(c)(3)

Though the only remaining claims are Plaintiffs state-law claims against Defendant Harrison for intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy, the Court will retain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits dismissal without prejudice of a supplemental state law claim after the federal claims against the same defendants are resolved on summary judgment.

Reinhardt v. Dennis · filed 2005-08-31(c)(3)

The count II state law sex discrimination claim against these three defendants will be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367 permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims on the merits.

Ali v. Officer Scott Ramsdell City of Minneapolis, Minnesota · filed 2005-09-09(c)(3)

With the federal claims dismissed, the district court had discretion not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after it resolves all federal claims, taking account of policy, efficiency, and state courts’ expertise in state law.

Role Models America, Inc. v. PenMar Development Corp. · filed 2005-10-05(c)(3)

Putting that aside, however, the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction remains discretionary on the part of a federal court. This Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if the related state-law claims “substantially predominate[]” over the federal-question claim(s) or if all federal-question claims have been dismissed or otherwise resolved. ... The Court has concluded — based on considerations of policy, efficiency, and the relative expertise of state courts on matters of state law — that dismissal of the remaining claims is warranted.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after the federal claims supplying jurisdiction have been resolved.

Hess v. Roch. School Dist. · filed 2005-10-18(c)

Because Hess’s federal claims, which were the basis for jurisdiction in this case, have been resolved against him, however, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over local law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, taking account of efficiency, local courts’ expertise, and the progress of discovery.

Mitchell v. Yates · filed 2005-10-18(c)(3)

The Court has concluded, based on considerations of efficiency and the relative expertise of the local courts on matters of local law, that dismissal of the remaining claims is warranted. In deciding to exercise its discretion to decline jurisdiction over the District of Columbia law claims, the Court takes account of the fact that discovery in this case has been minimal.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after judgment is entered on all federal claims.

Roach v. SCI Graterford Medical Dept. · filed 2005-11-04(c)(3)

Because judgment is entered against plaintiff on all federal claims, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs state-law medical malpractice claims.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims.

Trinidad v. IDI HOLDINGS PR, INC. · filed 2005-11-15(c)(3)

The only two bases for jurisdiction alleged in the complaint are federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal RICO claims), and supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (local law claims). Because the Court is dismissing plaintiffs’ federal RICO claims for lack of an adequate substantive basis in law, the local law claims now utterly predominate in this action. Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over them in accordance with the rule of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a federal court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims after it resolves the federal claims, considering convenience, fairness, federal policy, comity, and judicial economy.

Coffey v. Morris · filed 2005-11-23(c)(3)

Having found in favor of the defendant on the plaintiffs federal claims, and considering the factors of convenience and fairness to ... the parties, existence of underlying issues of federal policy and comity, and judicial economy, the court declines to exercise jurisdiction over her remaining state claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims.

Taylor v. Humphries · filed 2005-11-30(c)(3)

In light of the dismissal of Taylor’s federal claims, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Guttman v. Silverberg · filed 2005-12-19(c)(3)

Although not explicitly stated, it is apparent that the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) in view of its dismissal of the § 1983 claim against Silverberg as well as the dismissal of the § 1983 claim against Judge Lang, which, we conclude below, was proper. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the entry of default for good cause based on the lack of subject matter jurisdiction and did not err in granting Silverberg’s motion to dismiss on the same ground.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after disposing of the federal claims.

Expert Business Systems, LLC v. Bi4ce, Inc. · filed 2006-01-31(c)(3)

As complete diversity of citizenship is lacking in this case, I shall decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and shall dismiss without prejudice the remaining, state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after it has disposed of all federal claims.

McKnight v. Baker · filed 2006-02-17(c)(3)

Having granted summary judgment as to all federal claims, the Court will decline to exercise jurisdiction over the state-law claim and .will dismiss it without prejudice.

When federal claims are reinstated on appeal, a dismissal of supplemental state-law claims under § 1367(c)(3) may be vacated for the district court to reconsider.

In Re: Suprema Specialties, Inc. Securities Litigation Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana, Special Situations Fund · filed 2006-02-23(c)(3)

After dismissing all claims brought under federal law, the District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) over the SSF Plaintiffs' state-law claims based on common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation. The District Court did not address the merits of the state law claims. Given our conclusion that many of the federal claims were improperly dismissed at this preliminary stage, and that the District Court therefore retains jurisdiction over the federal claims, we will vacate the dismissal of the state-law claims for reconsideration by the District Court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Gotfredson v. LARSEN LP · filed 2006-03-09(c)(3)

Since the two claims under federal law have been dismissed, and these claims provided the sole basis for this court’s original jurisdiction, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining claims and dismiss them without prejudice to refiling in state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to dismiss supplemental state-law claims without prejudice after resolving the federal claim when no other basis for federal jurisdiction remains.

Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc. · filed 2006-03-09(c)(3)

Having found that summary judgment in Defendant’s favor as to Plaintiffs ADA claim is warranted and there being no other basis for federal jurisdiction, the Court DISMISSES the state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO BEING RE-FILED IN STATE COURT.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after disposing of the sole federal claim.

Gatto v. Mortgage Specialists of Illinois, Inc. · filed 2006-03-13(c)(3)

Count I is the sole claim arising under federal law, and the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(e)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after it grants summary judgment on all federal claims.

Krieg v. Seybold · filed 2006-04-03(c)(3)

The law is clear that, since the court is granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all federal claims, it may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Krieg’s state law defamation claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367 permits a district court to remand remaining state law claims after all federal causes of action have been resolved.

Elder v. TOWN OF EMMITSBURG · filed 2006-04-21(c)(3)

Because there are no federal causes of action remaining, I am exercising my discretion to remand this case to the Circuit Court for Frederick County. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(e)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when the federal claims fail.

Beggs v. Gilkey · filed 2006-04-26(c)(3)

Without a constitutional property interest, Beggs's § 1983 claims fail, and the district court did not err in refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims when the federal claims have been dismissed.

Shortz v. United Parcel Service · filed 2006-05-05(c)(3)

Indeed, because Shortz’s federal claims had been dismissed, the dismissal of the state law claims was entirely consistent with the approach to supplemental jurisdiction that we have encouraged.

After federal claims are dismissed, declining supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims can be an abuse of discretion when refiling would waste judicial resources and the expired limitations period would prejudice the plaintiff.

Ketema v. Midwest Stamping, Inc. · filed 2006-05-12(c)(3)

We find that it would be a waste of judicial resources to require Ketema to refile a suit that has been pending for a lengthy period of time and has progressed through the discovery stage. In addition, any refiling would be fruitless, as the statute of limitations has run, and thus, Ketema would be prejudiced by dismissal. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ketema’s state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Dunlap v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. · filed 2006-05-16(c)(3)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction can be declined when a court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after granting summary judgment on all federal claims.

Nichols v. Byrd · filed 2006-06-13(c)(3)

Because we have found summary judgment to be appropriate on both federal claims, we decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on the state claims alleged in the complaint.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing the federal claims.

Glover v. Board of Education of the Rockford Public Schools, District 205 · filed 2006-06-20(c)(3)

Glover asserted no other basis for federal jurisdiction, and the district court acted within its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this state-law claim after dismissing Glover’s federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Looper Maint. Serv. Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 197 F.3d 908, 914 n.6 (7th Cir. 1999).

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after summary judgment resolves the federal claims.

Moots v. Lombardi · filed 2006-07-13(c)

Because we find that it was proper to grant summary judgment for the defendants as to Moots’s § 1983 claims, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Moots’s remaining state law claims. Gibson v. Weber, 433 F.3d 642, 647 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it grants summary judgment on all federal claims, dismissing the state law claims without prejudice.

Satterlee v. Allen Press, Inc. · filed 2006-07-31(c)(3)

Because the Court grants summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiffs federal claims, the Court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. ... IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in this case, plaintiffs state law claims are dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Grimes v. Miller · filed 2006-08-02(c)(3)

This leaves Counts III and IV, Grimes’s state-law claims, which allege “Wrongful Trespass on Personal Property and Theft” and Violation Maryland Open Meetings Act. Having concluded that Grimes’s federal claims must be dismissed, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over these claims.

When dismissal of all federal claims led a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims, reinstatement of a federal claim on appeal warrants reconsideration of jurisdiction under § 1367.

Jones v. City of Atlanta · filed 2006-08-09(c)

Because we reverse the grant of summary judgment as to the § 1983 claims against Officers Stone and Frye in their individual capacities, we also vacate dismissal of the state law claims and instruct the district court to reconsider the question of whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over the Joneses’ state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, and to dismiss the state-law claims without prejudice.

Day v. Apoliona · filed 2006-08-10(c)(3)

All of Plaintiffs’ federal claims have been dismissed. Because the only remaining claims are Counts III and IV, which are based on state law, this court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those counts. Accordingly, Counts III and IV are dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to dismiss supplemental state-law claims after summary judgment disposes of all federal claims.

Burke v. Utah Transit Authority & Local 382 · filed 2006-09-01(c)(3)

Because we find that the district court’s grant of summary judgment was proper, we agree with both appellants and Local 382 that the district court exercised its discretion in dismissing the state-based claim against Local 382 for ... lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Exum v. U.S. O lym pic C om m ., 389 F.3d 1130, 1138–39 (10th Cir. 2004) (approving dismissal of state law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after summary judgment was granted as to all federal claims).

When all federal claims are dismissed before trial, § 1367(c)(3) generally favors declining supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claim, though the district court retains discretion to hear it.

McWilliams v. Jefferson County · filed 2006-09-06(c)(3)

W e note that the pre-trial dismissal of all federal law claims, leaving only a state law claim, generally prevents a district court from reviewing the merits of the state law claim. ... W e cannot say, at this juncture, that it would be an abuse of the district court’s discretion to retain the state law claim, however we commend to the court the Supreme Court’s cautions contained in Carnegie-M ellon University v. Cohill: “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine–judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity–will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it resolves all federal claims.

Bowen v. Treiber · filed 2006-09-12

3.The court declines to exercise jurisdiction over all state law claims against all state defendants.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state-law claim after all federal claims are eliminated before trial, taking account of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Perkowski v. Stratford Board of Education · filed 2006-10-03(c)(3)

All that remains in this case is a single state law claim. Therefore, in the interests of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count Two.

Section 1367 permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law counterclaims after all federal claims are dismissed, in the interest of judicial economy.

Bozeman v. Per-Se Technologies, Inc. · filed 2006-10-16(c)(3)

While the District Court has the power to resolve these state law counterclaims, it should decline to do so in the absence of any pending federal claim and in the interest of judicial economy.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining claims after it grants summary judgment on all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Sealey v. Tropicana Perfume Shoppes, Inc. · filed 2006-11-14(c)(3)

Because summary judgment is granted for Sealey’s federal claim, it is within the sound discretion of the Court to determine whether or not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. ... The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction regarding his remaining claims for breach of contract and wrongful discharge.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after it resolves all federal claims before trial, absent considerations favoring retention.

Soderstrand v. OKLAHOMA, EX REL. BD. OF REGENTS · filed 2006-11-22(c)(3)

Having disposed of the federal claims prior to trial, and finding no consideration that causes the court to conclude it should retain jurisdiction over the state law claims, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after resolving all federal claims before trial.

Soderstrand v. Oklahoma ex rel. Board of Regents of Oklahoma Agricultural & Mechanical Colleges · filed 2006-11-22(c)(3)

Having disposed of the federal claims prior to trial, and finding no consideration that causes the court to conclude it should retain jurisdiction over the state law claims, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Those claims will be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims.

Levin v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago · filed 2007-01-08(a)

However, because we have dismissed all of the federal claims, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over the remaining state-law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, particularly when the remaining claim raises issues of state law.

D'Angelo-Fenton v. Town of Carmel · filed 2007-01-17(c)(3)

Thus, for prudential reasons, we should not exercise jurisdiction over this wholly-state-law claim, and we decline to address its merits.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after dismissing the federal claim.

Grimes v. Transit · filed 2007-01-17(c)(3)

Because the district court properly dismissed Grimes’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after the federal claims are dismissed.

Lemme v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc. · filed 2007-02-01(c)(3)

Having found that the allegations in the Complaint do not support federal jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after it grants summary judgment on the federal claims.

Curcio v. Bridgeport Board of Education · filed 2007-03-15(c)(3)

In light of the Court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on Cur-cio’s federal claims, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Curcio’s state law claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a district court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction after the federal claims drop out, but that decision remains reviewable for abuse of discretion.

Williams Electronics v. Garrity, James M. · filed 2007-03-19(c)(3)

Although unremarked by the parties, subsection (c)(3) expressly authorizes the district judge to dismiss a sup- plemental claim when the federal claims have dropped out of the case, without his having to consider the criteria in subsections (1), (2), or (4). ... But it is unlikely that the statute was intended to grant a district judge unreviewable discretion to relinquish jurisdiction over a supplemental claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law counterclaim after it dismisses all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Sanborn v. American Lending Network · filed 2007-03-28(c)(3)

As each of Ms. Sanborn’s federal claims pursuant RESPA, TILA and FDCPA against American Lending have been dismissed, this Court, in its discretion, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over American Lending’s counterclaim for breach of contract.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to dismiss remaining state law claims without prejudice after all federal claims are resolved, when judicial economy does not justify retaining them.

Dier v. CITY OF PRESTONSBURG, KY. · filed 2007-03-30(c)(3)

The Court is not of the opinion that “overwhelming interests of judicial economy” provide cause in this case for the Court to retain jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ pendent claims that the Court has not otherwise addressed above.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after all federal claims are dismissed.

Anita Christensen and Robert Alty v. County of Boone, Illinois, and Edward Krieger · filed 2007-04-16(c)(3)

Because the federal claims have been resolved, the district court should relinquish supplemental jurisdiction so that the state-law claims may be resolved in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Albrecht v. Hamilton · filed 2007-04-26(c)(3)

However, in light of the Court’s dismissal of Albrecht’s federal claims, the Court permissibly declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and dismissed those claims without prejudice to Albrecht’s right to bring them in state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits dismissal of state-law claims without prejudice after all federal claims are dismissed, especially when the court has expended little effort on the state-law claims.

Cox v. B. Alan Sugg, President of the University of Arkansas, in His Official and Individual Capacities, Universit · filed 2007-04-27(c)(3)

The federal and state law claims now pending against former Professor Cory in the district court are analytically distinct, and the court has expended little time and effort on the state law claims against the defendants other than Cory. Therefore, we remand the case with directions to sever the claims against Mark Cory, to dismiss all federal claims against the remaining defendants with prejudice, and to dismiss all state law claims against the remaining defendants without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a federal court to remand supplemental state-law claims after it resolves all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Bagienski v. Madison County, Indiana · filed 2007-04-30(c)(3)

Here, remand of the state court claims is clearly warranted, pursuant to 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state law claim when no federal claims remain.

Cindrich v. Fisher · filed 2007-05-31(c)(3)

There are no further federal issues pending before this Court, however. As a result, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs remaining state law Whistleblower Law claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims when it dismisses the sole federal claim before trial.

Somin v. Total Community Management Corp. · filed 2007-06-26(c)(3)

Where, as here, the court has dismissed before trial the only basis for Federal jurisdiction, the court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over the pendent state claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Total Benefits Planning Agency Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield · filed 2007-07-25(c)(3)

Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims for defamation, tortuous interference, civil conspiracy, and breach of contract.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to dismiss supplemental state-law claims without prejudice after disposing of all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Patel v. CITY OF SAUK CENTRE · filed 2007-08-03(c)(3)

2. Plaintiffs’ state-law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after the federal claims have been dismissed, but the court must decide whether to exercise that discretion.

Singh, Gajendra v. Holy Cross Hospital · filed 2007-08-16(c)(3)

Still, because it is a claim of negligence under Illinois law, the district court, in its discretion, could have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claim, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Sellars v. City of Gary, 453 F.3d 848, 852 (7th Cir. 2006), especially once the federal claims were dismissed, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Christensen v. County of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 466 (7th Cir. 2007); Bilow v. Much Shelist Freed Denberg Ament & Rubenstein, P.C., 277 F.3d 882, 896 (7th Cir. 2001). But we must remand so that the district court can make this determination.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims.

Ames v. Grammer · filed 2007-09-06(c)

Following 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the district court determined it should not exercise pendant jurisdiction following the dismissal of the only claim over which it had jurisdiction. ... The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the remaining state claims after all federal claims had been dismissed.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims, with the balance of factors ordinarily favoring that choice before trial.

Wellnx Life Sciences Inc. v. Iovate Health Sciences Research Inc. · filed 2007-09-26(c)(3)

This is a “usual case” in which the balance of factors counsels in favor of declining supplemental jurisdiction. The state law claims are therefore dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims before trial.

Love Terminal Partners v. City of Dallas, Tex. · filed 2007-10-31(c)(3)

Having dismissed plaintiffs’ federal-law claims, the court in its discretion declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their state-law claims.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after resolving all federal claims.

Pratt v. NH DOC, et al. · filed 2007-11-07(c)(3)

Having resolved all of Pratt’s federal claims in favor of defendants, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1367(3).

State-law claims dismissed under § 1367(c)(3) are reinstated when the appellate court revives the federal claims.

Engel v. Rapid City School District · filed 2007-11-09(c)(3)

Because the district court dismissed without prejudice certain state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), we reinstate those claims as well.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the federal claims supporting original jurisdiction are resolved well before trial.

MacDonald v. Town of Windham · filed 2007-11-15(c)(3)

When, as here, the claims which were the basis for original jurisdiction have been resolved well before trial, the court has discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Marrero-Gutierrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007). That is the appropriate outcome in this case. Therefore, the court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' state law claims, which are dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Foster v. New Jersey Department of Transportation · filed 2007-11-15(c)(3)

Having done so, the District Court acted within its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims (and Foster does not argue otherwise on appeal).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after disposing of federal claims when judicial economy favors deciding them.

STEFANIK v. Town of Huntington · filed 2008-03-13(c)

Because these pendent claims clearly raise no genuine issues of material fact, however, this court, as in Bern (see Sep. 13, 2007 report and recommendation), believes that supplemental jurisdiction should be exercised, if for no other reason than judicial economy.

When the sole federal claim is revived on appeal, a district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims under § 1367(c)(3) must be reconsidered.

Van Asdale v. International Game Technology · filed 2009-08-13(c)(3)

After granting summary judgment to IGT on the Van Asdales’ sole federal claim, the district court exercised its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) and declined to retain jurisdiction over their pendant state-law claims. Because we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the Sarbanes-Oxley claim, we vacate its dismissal of the Van Asdales’ state-law claims and remand for reconsideration.

When dismissal of the sole federal claim is reversed, a district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims under § 1367(c)(3) may be vacated and remanded for reconsideration.

Van Asdale v. Intl Game Technology · filed 2009-08-13(c)(3)

Because we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the Sarbanes-Oxley claim, we vacate its dismissal of the Van Asdales’ state-law claims and remand for reconsideration.

Section 1367(c)(3) creates a presumption that a federal court will relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when all federal claims are dismissed before trial.

Al's Service Center v. Bp Products North America, Inc. · filed 2010-03-26(c)(3)

When all federal claims in a suit in federal court are dismissed before trial, the presumption is that the court will relinquish federal jurisdiction over any supplemental state-law claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Beck v. Dobrowski, 559 F.3d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 2009), which the plaintiff can then prosecute in state court.

Section 1367 gives a district court discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it grants summary judgment on the federal claims.

Burns v. Salem Tube, Inc. · filed 2010-05-24(c)(3)

We disagree; the Court had discretion whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Burns’ state law claims, see Peter Bay Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Stillman, 294 F.3d 524, 534 (3d Cir. 2002), and Burns does not argue that it abused that discretion.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction and remand removed state-law claims when no federal-question claims remain pending.

Rico v. School Board of Miami-Dade County Public Schools · filed 2010-06-29(c)

Absent diversity or some other independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction, a district court may, in its discretion, remand previously removed state-law claims if no federal-question claims remain pending.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after federal claims are gone when the state-law issues are straightforward and judicial economy and convenience favor retention.

IMG FRAGRANCE BRANDS, LLC v. Houbigant, Inc. · filed 2010-12-21(c)

This Court has jurisdiction over the present claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Although no federal claims remain, in its discretion, the Court retains jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. The claims do not raise any complex or novel issues of state law and can be easily resolved by this Court.

Section 1367 permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims after resolving all federal claims before trial when judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor retention.

Thomas v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF BRANDYWINE SCHOOL · filed 2010-12-30(c)(3)

This case presents one of the rare instances in which the balance of the relevant factors favors exercising supplemental jurisdiction, despite the absence of any federal claim that will be proceeding to trial.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives a district court discretion to remand state-law claims after the federal claim drops out, and permits it to retain jurisdiction when there is good reason to do so.

Whitely v. Moravec · filed 2011-02-16(c)(3)

That is not, however, what 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3), which governs the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, provides. The statute says that a district judge has discretion to re- linquish supplemental jurisdiction and remand once the federal claim has dropped out. Discretion to remand implies a power to retain jurisdiction for good reasons.

Section 1367 allows a district court to reconsider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when federal claims are reinstated on appeal.

Turner v. Jones · filed 2011-02-23

Because we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Lieutenant Jones on Turner’s § 1983 claims for excessive force and wrongful arrest, we also vacate dismissal of the state law claims and instruct the district court to reconsider the question of whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over Turner’s state law claims.

Section 1367(c) permits remand of state-law claims when the federal claims have been eliminated, with the absence of federal claims and novel state-law issues favoring remand.

Oliver v. Lewis · filed 2012-08-31(c)

The second and third § 1367(c) factors strongly favor remand: all that remains in this case are state-law claims.

Section 1367 permits reconsideration of supplemental jurisdiction over state claims when a federal claim is reinstated on appeal.

Cancel v. New York City Human Resources Administration/Department of Social Services · filed 2013-05-23

In light of our reversal of the dismissal of Cancel’s procedural due process claim, we vacate the district court’s dismissal of Cancel’s state law claims and remand for reconsideration of the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over any state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(c) gives a district court discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing every claim within its original jurisdiction.

Gordon v. Kaleida Health Hinterberger v. Catholic Health · filed 2013-08-21(c)

The Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear–-in a case that also involved a dismissed RICO claim–-that “[a] district court’s decision whether to exercise [supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims] after dismissing every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., 556 U.S. at 639 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)). The district court’s decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction here was a wise exercise of judicial economy, not an abuse of discretion.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives a district court discretion to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim when no federal claim remains, and relinquishment is generally presumed appropriate.

Brooks v. Pactiv Corporation · filed 2013-09-06(c)(3)

However, because no federal claim remains in the case, the district court may wish to consider exercising its discretion to relinquish jurisdiction over the claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Fields v. Wharrie, 672 F.3d 505, 518 (7th Cir. 2012). That’s the general presumption in this situation.

Section 1367 permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after dismissing the federal claims when judicial economy, convenience, and fairness justify doing so.

Velasquez v. Hayman · filed 2013-11-20(c)(3)

The District Court was permitted to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 286 (3d Cir. 2006) (District Courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing federal claims if “considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so”).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims before trial when judicial economy, convenience, and fairness favor retention.

Garden Catering-Hamilton Avenue, LLC v. Wally's Chicken Coop, LLC · filed 2014-04-04(c)

Given that the parties have already completed discovery and are ready to proceed to trial, the Court concludes that it would be more efficient, convenient and fair to the parties to retain supplemental jurisdiction rather than requiring them to start anew in state court.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims when judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor retaining them.

Morales v. City of New York · filed 2014-10-06(c)

Instead, a district court may maintain jurisdiction where “the ‘values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity’ support the exercise.” ... Accordingly, deciding these claims now— as the Court elects to do — “will save future, needless litigation in state court.”

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all federal claims when the advanced stage of litigation and hardship from refiling favor retention.

Kroshnyi v. U.S. Pack Courier Services, Inc. · filed 2014-11-04(c)

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it decided that the “advanced stage of the litigation and the Court’s long familiarity with the issues in the case, combined with the likely hardship to both parties should plaintiff be forced to re-file in state court” weighed in favor of exercising supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing federal claims when resolving plainly defective local-law claims serves judicial economy.

Henok v. Kessler · filed 2015-01-29(c)(3)

The Court will use its discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims because, as explained further in this Opinion, Araya’s claims under the DCHRA and his claim for breach of fiduciary duty both clearly fail for two threshold reasons: untimeliness, and Araya’s failure to provide notice of his alleged injuries to the Mayor.

Section 1367(c) permits, but does not require, a district court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when all federal claims are dismissed before trial.

Doe v. Village of Arlington Heights · filed 2015-04-13(c)

Bond v. Atkinson, 728 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2013), relied on by Doe, does not state the contrary; it does not say that a district court “must” relin- quish jurisdiction when all federal claims are dismissed be- fore trial. Section 1367(c) does not say that either.

When dismissal of a federal claim is reversed, the district court must reconsider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Lynda Butler v. Winco Foods, LLC · filed 2015-05-26

Because the district court erred in dismissing Butler’s ADA claim as moot, we remand to the district court to reconsider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Butler’s state law claims. See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 940 (9th Cir. 2012); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), (c).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction when economy and convenience favor doing so.

Harte v. Board of Commissioners · filed 2015-12-18(c)(3)

While supplemental jurisdiction clearly exists in this case, the court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, where, as here, it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. ... Because none of the parties have asked the court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and because the parties have completed discovery and the trial of this matter is set for just over, two months away, the court concludes that exercising supplemental jurisdiction in this case will further the interests of economy, and convenience.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives district courts broad discretion to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims, with a presumption favoring relinquishment when federal claims are dismissed before trial.

Dietchweiler Ex Rel. Dietchweiler v. Lucas · filed 2016-06-28(c)(3)

Indeed, when the federal claims are dismissed before trial, there is a presumption that the court will relinquish jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); RWJ Mgmt, Co., 672 F.3d at 479; Al’s Serv. Ctr. v. BP Prod. N. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir. 2010).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to remand remaining state-law claims after the federal claims have been resolved.

Williams v. Folino · filed 2016-11-17(c)(3)

In light of the above, the remaining negligence claims under Pennsylvania state law were properly remanded to state court.

When federal claims are reinstated on appeal, the district court must revisit its decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims.

Brunson v. Murray · filed 2016-12-13(c)(3)

Finally, the district court declined to exercise supple- mental jurisdiction over Brunson’s state-law claims because it had dismissed all of the federal claims over which it had orig- inal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because we rein- state some of Brunson’s federal claims under § 1983, the dis- trict court will need to revisit the question of supplemental jurisdiction on remand. See McCullah v. Gadert, 344 F.3d 655, 662 (7th Cir. 2003).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after resolving all federal claims when judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor doing so.

Klein v. Commerce Energy, Inc. · filed 2017-06-21(c)(3)

The court must consider whether it will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims against Collectcents and Commerce Energy pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) because it has concluded that Collectcents and Commerce Energy are entitled to summary judgment on the TCPA claims, the only federal claims remaining in this action. ... In this posture, the considerations of judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity, weigh in favor of exercising supplemental jurisdiction with respect to the state law claims against Collectcents and Commerce Energy. ... Accordingly, supplemental jurisdiction over these claims will be exercised.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all federal claims when the relevant factors, including judicial economy and convenience, favor retention.

LeBaron v. Massachusetts Partnership for Correctional Healthcare · filed 2018-01-02(c)(3)

It serves the interests of judicial economy and the convenience of the parties for the court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. In short, consideration of the relevant factors warrants the exercise of the court’s discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367 permits a court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims after dismissing federal claims when fairness, judicial economy, and convenience favor doing so.

Vardakas v. American DG Energy, Inc. · filed 2018-03-02

This is the rare case where “the interests of fairness, judicial economy, and convenience” counsel in favor of exercising supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to remand remaining state law claims after federal claims are eliminated, considering judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

Vill. Builders on the Bay, Inc. v. Cowling · filed 2018-06-22(c)

In determining whether to remand a case to state court, courts should look at what "best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." ... After reviewing the factors put forth in Cohill, the court finds remand appropriate.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after disposing of all federal claims when the usual exceptions to relinquishment do not apply.

Vega v. The Chicago Board of Education · filed 2018-08-10(c)(3)

Given all this, relinquishing jurisdiction over the state law claims is the appropriate course under § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367 gives a district court discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining local claim or remand it to state court after the federal claims are withdrawn on appeal.

Paramount Contractors and Developers v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2018-10-17(c)(3)

Because Paramount withdrew its constitutional claims on appeal, the only remaining claim is a purely local one. Thus, the district court has discretion to either exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim or remand the action to state court.